# 1AC R6 NDCA

#### MY DOG.

A dog lying in the grass

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

#### = doge.

A dog looking at the camera

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

### 1AC – Plan

#### Plan – The appropriation of outer space through the production of orbital debris by private entities is unjust.

#### Orbital debris is

NASA.gov 21 [NASA – 5/26/21. “Space Debris and Human Spacecraft.” <https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html>] Justin

Orbital Debris

Space debris encompasses both natural meteoroid and artificial (human-made) orbital debris. Meteoroids are in orbit about the sun, while most artificial debris is in orbit about the Earth (hence the term “orbital” debris).

Orbital debris is any human-made object in orbit about the Earth that no longer serves a useful function. Such debris includes nonfunctional spacecraft, abandoned launch vehicle stages, mission-related debris, and fragmentation debris.

#### The aff interprets enforcement as an OUF (Orbital Use Fee). Proportionality in relation to the space industry solves best without harming it and any other solution only worsens the threat – models.

Rao et al 20. Akhil, Matthew Burgess, and Daniel Kaffine \*Department of Economics, Middlebury College, Middlebury \*\*Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences, University of Colorado, Environmental Studies Program, and Department of Economics \*\*\*Department of Economics. 2020 [PNAS, “Orbital-use fees could more than quadruple the value of the space industry,” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7293599/>] Justin

The space industry’s rapid recent growth represents the latest tragedy of the commons. Satellites launched into orbit contribute to—and risk damage from—a growing buildup of space debris and other satellites. Collision risk from this orbital congestion is costly to satellite operators. Technological and managerial solutions—such as active debris removal or end-of-life satellite deorbit guidelines—are currently being explored by regulatory authorities. However, none of these approaches address the underlying incentive problem: satellite operators do not account for costs they impose on each other via collision risk. Here, we show that an internationally harmonized orbital-use fee can correct these incentives and substantially increase the value of the space industry. We construct and analyze a coupled physical–economic model of commercial launches and debris accumulation in low-Earth orbit. Similar to carbon taxes, our model projects an optimal fee that rises at a rate of 14% per year, equal to roughly $235,000 per satellite-year in 2040. The long-run value of the satellite industry would more than quadruple by 2040—increasing from around $600 billion under business as usual to around $3 trillion. In contrast, we project that purely technological solutions are unlikely to fully address the problem of orbital congestion. Indeed, we find debris removal sometimes worsens economic damages from congestion by increasing launch incentives. In other sectors, addressing the tragedy of the commons has often been a game of catch-up with substantial social costs. The infant space industry can avert these costs before they escalate.

In 2017, 466 new satellites were launched—more than double the previous year’s launches and more than 20% of all active satellites in orbit in 2017 (1, 2). Rapid space industry growth is projected to continue, driven largely by commercial satellites (Fig. 1). This growth is driving buildup of debris in low-Earth orbit, currently including over 15,000 objects (3). Collision risk from debris is costly; collisions damage or destroy expensive capital assets that are difficult or impossible to repair. Debris buildup could eventually make some low-Earth orbits economically unviable and other orbits difficult or impossible to access (4). In the worst case—although uncertain and occurring over long time sshorizons—debris growth could become self-sustaining due to collisions between debris objects, a tipping point called Kessler Syndrome (4, 5).

Proposed solutions have so far largely been technological and managerial, aimed at mapping, avoiding, and removing debris (6, 7). These include end-of-life deorbit guidelines and “keep out” zones for active satellites and nets, harpoons, and lasers to deorbit debris (6). However, with open access to orbits, reducing debris and collision risk incentivizes additional satellite launches, which eventually restore the debris and risk. For instance, if firms were willing to tolerate a 0.1% annual risk of satellite loss before a technological improvement in debris removal, they will be willing to launch more satellites until the 0.1% annual risk of satellite loss was restored.

Thus, the core of the space debris problem is incentives, not technology. Since satellite operators are unable to secure exclusive property rights to their orbital paths or recover collision-related costs imposed by others, prospective operators face a choice between launching profitable satellites, thereby imposing current and future collision risk on others, or not launching and leaving those profits to competitors. This is a classic tragedy of the commons problem (1, 3, 8, 9). It can be economically efficiently addressed via incentive-based solutions, such as fees or tradable permits per year in orbit, analogous to carbon taxes or cap and trade (8, 10–12). Incentives should target objects in orbit—rather than launches—because orbiting objects are what directly imposes collision risk on other satellites (13). We quantify the economic benefits of implementing such incentives to correct the underlying open-access problem.

We use a coupled physical–economic model combining rich physical dynamics with satellite economics to quantify the benefits of an internationally harmonized “orbital-use fee” (OUF) relative to a business as usual (BAU) open-access scenario and relative to a scenario with active debris removal. An OUF is a type of Pigouvian tax—a well-known economic instrument for addressing externality problems (14). Our model accounts for the effects of each scenario on satellite launch decisions (Materials and Methods and SI Appendix). While we focus on an OUF for analytical convenience, it is conceptually equivalent to other mechanisms for pricing orbits, such as tradable permits.

Our physical model of satellite and debris evolution in orbit obeys relevant accounting identities and utilizes reduced form approximations of physical processes validated in other works (15, 16). We fit and calibrate the model using data on collision risk and orbital debris from the European Space Agency (ESA) (17) and data on active satellites from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) (2) (Materials and Methods and SI Appendix). The ESA dataset covers 1958 to 2017, and the UCS dataset covers 1957 to 2017. Our physical model assumes runaway debris growth (Kessler Syndrome) cannot occur, which likely leads our model to understate the benefits of OUFs (Materials and Methods). Our economic model assumes that satellites are launched and operated to maximize per satellite private profits, net of any fees, subject to collision risk. We calibrate the model by fitting the BAU scenario (no fees or debris removal) to historical industry data and launch trends (1, 2) (Materials and Methods and SI Appendix).

We project future launch rates to 2040 under the BAU scenario using our fitted model and published projections of future growth of the space economy (18). The projections in ref. 18 were developed by projecting how the industries constituting the space sector—telecommunications, imaging, etc.—would grow from 2017 to 2040 under different assumptions on their individual profitability over time, then aggregating up to obtain projections for the space sector. We then calculate launch rates that would maximize the long-run value of the industry, and we calculate the time series of OUFs that would incentivize these optimal launch rates. The industry value is measured as net present value (NPV)—the long-run value of the entire fleet of satellites in orbit, accounting for both the financial costs of replacing satellites due to natural retirement and collisions as well as the opportunity cost of investing funds in satellites rather than capital markets. For instance, an NPV of $1 trillion in 2020 means the sum total of the stream of net benefits, looking from 2020 into the future and accounting for the timing of the net benefits, is $1 trillion.

Although our models are deliberately simplified for tractability, they are based on previously validated approaches to orbital object modeling (15, 16), and our calibrations allow us to reproduce observed trends and magnitudes in the growth of orbital debris and satellite stocks as well as the calculated collision risk (Fig. 3). Nonetheless, our projections should be interpreted as order of magnitude approximations that can be refined as needed by more detailed models. In these respects, our approach mirrors integrated assessment modeling approaches that have been useful in developing solutions to other natural resource management problems (e.g., ref. 19).

RESULTS

We project that shifting from open access to the optimal series of OUFs in 2020 would increase the NPV of the satellite industry from around $600 billion under BAU to around $3 trillion—a more than 4-fold increase (4.18- to 6.49-fold increases in 95% of parameter sets randomly drawn from their calibrated distributions) (Fig. 2D). Assuming a 5% market rate of return, an increase of $2.5 trillion in NPV would be equivalent to annual benefits of approximately $120 billion in perpetuity. The large immediate increase in NPV that we project in each OUF scenario, relative to BAU (Fig. 2A), comes primarily from the immediate effect of reducing launch activity while the satellite and debris stocks are suboptimally high (SI Appendix).

Based on our calculations (Materials and Methods), the optimal OUF starts at roughly $14,900 per satellite-year in 2020 and escalates at roughly 14% per year (aside from some initial transition dynamics) to around $235,000 per satellite-year in 2040. Rising optimal price paths are common in environmental pricing such as carbon taxes (20), although declining optimal price paths are also possible (21). The rising price path in this case partly reflects the rising value of safer orbits (resulting in rising industry NPV) (Fig. 2A) from the OUF. For comparison, the average annual profits of operating a satellite in 2015 were roughly $2.1 million. The 2020 and 2040 OUF values we describe amount to roughly 0.7 and 11% of average annual profits generated by a satellite in 2015.

Forgone NPV from the satellite industry in 2040—which is the cost of inaction under BAU—escalates from around $300 billion if optimal management begins in 2025 to around $700 billion if optimal management begins in 2035. Without OUFs, losses remain substantial even when active debris removal (implemented in the model as removal of 50% of debris objects in orbit each year) is available. In a best-case analysis where we assume debris removal is costless (i.e., it requires no payments nor additional satellites to implement), debris removal can only recover up to 9.5% of the value lost under open access. (The satellite industry’s willingness to pay for debris removal is not easily calculable in our model [SI Appendix, section 1.9.2].) At worst, debris removal can exacerbate orbital congestion via a rebound-type effect, causing additional losses on the order of 3% of the value already lost from open access (Fig. 4 and SI Appendix). The inability of debris removal to induce efficient orbit use is driven by open-access launching behavior and underscores the importance of policies to correct economic incentives to launch satellites.

DISCUSSION

The costly buildup of debris and satellites in low-Earth orbit is fundamentally a problem of incentives—satellite operators currently lack the incentives to factor into their launch decisions the collision risks their satellites impose on other operators. Our analysis suggests that correcting these incentives, via an OUF, could have substantial economic benefits to the satellite industry, and failing to do so could have substantial and escalating economic costs.

Escalating costs of inaction are a common feature of the tragedy of the commons, evident in several other sectors in which it went unaddressed for lengthy periods (22). For example, tens of billions of dollars in net benefits are lost annually from open-access or poorly managed fisheries globally (23). Similarly, open access to oil fields in the United States at the turn of the century drove recovery rates down to 20 to 25% at competitively drilled sites, compared with 85 to 90% potential recovery under optimal management (24). Open access to roadways—somewhat analogous to orbits—is estimated to create traffic congestion costs in excess of $120 billion/y in the United States alone (25). In contrast, there is still time to get out ahead of the tragedy of the commons in the young space industry.

The international and geopolitically complex nature of the space sector poses challenges to implementing orbital-use pricing systems, but these challenges need not be insurmountable. Theory suggests countries could each collect and spend OUF revenues domestically, without losing economic efficiency, as long as the fee’s magnitude was internationally harmonized (20). Engaging in such negotiations would be in the economic interests of all parties involved (26). An example of such a system is the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) used by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) to manage tuna fisheries. Under the VDS, PNA countries each lease fishing rights within their waters, using a common price floor (27). The European Union’s Emissions Trading System provides an example of an internationally coordinated tradable permit system (28). Notably, each of these pricing programs is built on a preexisting international governance institution (the Nauru Agreement and the European Union).

An OUF could also be built within existing space governance institutions, such as the Outer Space Treaty (29). For example, Article VI states that countries supervise their space industries, which provides a framework for OUFs to be administered nationally. Article II prohibits national appropriation of outer space but does not prohibit private property rights, potentially allowing for tradable orbital permitting.

### 1AC – Advantage

#### The space sector is trending towards privatization – that drives feedback loops of technology creating cascading collisions.

BERNAT 20. Pawel @ Military University of Aviation. 11/4/20. [SAFETY ENGINEERING OF ANTHROPOGENIC OBJECTS, “ORBITAL SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS AND THE GROWING THREAT OF KESSLER SYNDROME IN THE LOWER EARTH ORBIT,” Volume 4, PDF] Justin

The second decade of the 21st century has brought a dynamic and somewhat surprising development of the space industry. Since 1972 – the Apollo 17 crew mission to the Moon, the humankind has not left the safe environment of Earth’s orbit, and for years the global space sector has been progressing in slow but steady pace run by a few largest space agencies like American NASA, European ESA, Japanese JAXA, and Chinese CNSA. The most significant achievement of the “old ways” of managing outer space exploration is the International Space Stations (ISS) that has facilitated more than 20 years of continuous crewed operations.

The situation started to change at the turn of the century when new generations of private entrepreneurs began to invest in and develop space technologies like rocket boosters, spaceships, and what most important for the subject of the paper – satellites and their constellations. This new shift is known among the space industry as “Space 2.0”, and its emergence is dated around 2000-2002 when the companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic were established. (Pyle, 2019). The real change, however, came in 2012 when the first SpaceX commercial mission was successfully launched to the ISS (NASA, 2012).

Since then, the participation of the private sector in the space industry has skyrocketed, especially in the United States. Today, SpaceX is the only entity that provides reusable rockets (first stage and fairings) that is capable of vertical launch and landing. Their current flagship rocket – Falcon 9 has carried out 23 successful missions in 2020 (SpaceX, 2020) and another four are planned for December of that year (Weitering, 2020). Moreover, thanks to Crew Dragon spaceship developed by the company, Americans have regained this year the capacity of sending astronauts from their own soil after nine years of buying the seats on Russian Soyuz capsule. SpaceX is now in the process of building a communication satellites constellation that will be addressed and analyzed in the paper.

Nowadays, in the space industry, we witness a very productive cybernetic feedback look between the development of space technologies, the democratization of those technologies, and a substantial reduction of prices. The latter is even more significant if we compare the cost of launching cargo into orbit now and 20 years ago – Falcon 9 is over ten times cheaper than Space Shuttle (Jones, 2018). This, of course, directly translates into the mass and number of objects that we are able to put in the orbit viably. Once the constellations consisting of thousands of satellites were unthinkable, but in the current environment, they become a reality.

Space 2.0 also has brought new threats and challenges in the sphere of national and international security. The increase in launch capacity, among other factors, has led to progressive militarization and weaponization of space and new arms race (Bernat, 2019), which has also contributed to the growing numbers of orbiting objects.

The goal of the paper is to present the argumentation that the threat posed by the cascading collisions in the Earth’s orbit (Kessler syndrome) is becoming more severe due to the construction of orbital satellite constellations; the threat that presents a real danger for people during their EVAs and orbital infrastructure, which may bare immediate consequences for safety and security systems on Earth. In order to provide the theoretical context for the above claim, the following issues will be presented and discussed: (1) space debris, (2) the Kessler syndrome, (3) orbital debris models, (4) the legal issues related to space debris and mitigation actions against their proliferation, and (5) the planned and being currently developed orbital satellite constellations and how they contribute to the growing threat of the Kessler syndrome.

#### Privatization exponentially increases debris – lack of regulations spikes it – models.

BERNAT 20. Pawel @ Military University of Aviation. 11/4/20. [SAFETY ENGINEERING OF ANTHROPOGENIC OBJECTS, “ORBITAL SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS AND THE GROWING THREAT OF KESSLER SYNDROME IN THE LOWER EARTH ORBIT,” Volume 4, PDF] Justin

5. Orbital satellite constellations and the growing threat of the Kessler syndrome

Space 2.0 – the new era of space exploration that we witness now in the 21st century means, in words of Buzz Aldrin, “moving human enterprise into space” (Pyle, 2019, p. xiv). The process of commercialization of outer space has already begun and is not limited to private companies providing technologies and services for national or international space agencies, as it was in the past. On the contrary, private companies from the space sector have now matured to carry out their own independent projects.

As for 2020, SpaceX is a company that serves as the best example – it launches satellites to the orbit, both for state and private contractors, it successfully realized two crew missions to the International Space Station, and is in the process of constructing Starlink satellite constellation that will provide high-speed internet access across the planet.

Each satellite weighs around 260 kg, is equipped with an ion propulsion system, autonomous collision avoidance system, and orbits Earth at approximately 540-560 km altitude (Starlink, 2020). At the beginning of November 2020, more than 860 Starlink satellites were orbiting the Earth (Jewett, 2020). Immediate plans include launching 12,000 satellites, but they assume a potential later extension to 42,000 (Henry, 2019a). Of course, SpaceX has employed, at least declaratively, all necessary measures to keep the space clean – the satellites are equipped with the deorbiting system, and in the event of inoperability of the propulsion system (Starlink, 2020). The orbital collisions are, however, inevitable. As it was shown before, the possibility of collisions grows with the number of orbital objects. Bastida Virgili with the team compared (2016, p. 154-155) orbital debris environment development without and with a large hypothetical constellation consisting of merely 1080 satellites, distributed across 20 orbital planes at 1,100 km altitude (Fig. 5).

Chart, line chart

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Figure 5. Comparison of long term evolution of the number of objects in LEO with and without the constellation (Virgili et al., 2016, p. 155)

It has to be noted that although SpaceX’s Starlink is the only constellation that is being built in orbit, it is not the only one planned. There are at least a few initiatives aiming at the same goal – to construct internet infrastructure at the Earth’s orbit. The planned Kuiper Systems LLC, which is a subsidiary of Amazon and intends to place 3,236 broadband satellites in the LEO, is one of Starlink’s biggest competitors (Henry, 2019b). Now, there is even a rivalry between the two companies because Kuiper’s lowest orbital shell is planned to be 590 km, with a tolerance of 9 km either above or below (Cao, 2020), which is the altitude of Starlink satellites. Moreover, the race for space in orbit is now at the beginning.

The outer space is vast. It increasingly becomes more cluttered with both operational satellites and space debris. The threat of collisions increases and no institution or body has enough power to license, coordinate and regulate what is sent to the orbit. The UNOOSA has not such power. National states decide what the companies from the space industry can launch to space. In the United States, which is most advanced in the area of private constellations, it is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that issues the appropriate approvals. The race to put broadband internet satellites bears similarities to the gold rush – there are no rules, at the global level, apart from first-come, first-served.

#### Models are rigorous – inserted below.

Virgili et al. 16 – Bastida, J.C. Dolado, H.G. Lewis, J. Radtke, H. Krag, B. Revelin, C. Cazaux b , C. Colombo, R. Crowther, M. Metz. 4/26/16. [Act Astranautica “Risk to space sustainability from large constellations of satellites,” <https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.actaastro.2016.03.034>.] Justin

1.3. Simulation approach and result analysis A Monte Carlo (MC) approach was used to simulate the evolution of the object population over a period of 200 years under different post-mission disposal requirements, with four different tools (MEDEE – Modelling the Evolution of Debris on Earth's Environment [9], LUCA – Long Term Utility for Collision Analysis [10], DAMAGE – Debris Analysis and Monitoring Architecture to the Geosynchronous Environment [11] and DELTA – Debris Environment Long Term Analysis [12]). For analysis purposes, the effective number of objects was used where the contribution to the population by each object was weighted by the proportion of the orbital period spent in LEO. In a first step, four different evolutionary models performed an analysis of two reference scenarios. One scenario considered only the evolution of the background population and non-constellation traffic. The second scenario augmented the first with the addition of the representative constellation, with the requirement that 90% of the constellation satellites achieved post-mission disposal to orbits with remaining lifetimes of 25 years. The manoeuvres performed at the mission end to meet the disposal requirement are assumed to be impulsive (i.e. instantaneous) and result in an eccentric orbit with the apogee near the original (constellation) altitude and the perigee at an altitude such that the effects of atmospheric drag would cause the orbit to decay within 25 years. Two of the models considered an apogee remaining at the operational constellation altitude, while the other two reduced the apogee by 50 km. The purpose of these scenarios is to provide a cross-comparison of the models in terms of their predictions of the total object population, which take into account the effects of the constellation. As the distribution of the MC results for the models is of the same nature and the results are independent, a bootstrapping [20] approach is used to derive the mean, the standard deviation and the confidence levels at 95% of the combined results of all the MC runs from the four models (cf. Fig. 1), although not all the models performed the same number of MC runs (see Table 1). The main source of variation inside a particular model's MC runs included the randomness in collision activity, while the different models used their own solar activity forecast.

#### Debris is exponentially increasing and current models underestimate the risk. The aff is our best shot making it try-or-die.

Shen & Blake 2/24/22 [Zili Shen, Internally citing James Blake \* I am a Ph.D. student in Astronomy at Yale University. My research focuses on ultra-diffuse galaxies and their globular cluster populations. Since I came to Yale, I have worked on two "dark-matter-free" galaxies NGC1052-DF2 and DF4 \*\* Department of Physics and Centre for Space Domain Awareness, University of Warwick, Coventry. “How not to bury ourselves under space trash.” astrobites. <https://astrobites.org/2022/02/24/space-sustainability/>] Justin

What’s wrong with having some stuff orbiting the Earth, you might ask? Like my trash analogy, the problem is that they block our way to space. Fragments as small as 10 cm can kill a satellite mission. Unlike my trash analogy, if enough space junk accumulates, they can produce more fragments on their own. Several bands of LEO are already at risk of what’s called a runaway collisional cascade. This happens when space junk collide with each other and fall apart, their fragments going on to seeding more collisions, generating more debris, and restarting the cycle. On the other hand, space debris in high altitude orbits (like GSO) don’t experience much atmospheric drag, and will stay up there for centuries. From this you probably gathered that most of these debris are either abandoned satellites or their fragments. Even though these objects were originally launched by humans, cataloging and tracking them are a huge challenge.

What’s up there?

Since the first manmade satellite was launched in 1957, space agencies have been keeping track of bodies orbiting the Earth. By mass, 98% of those are satellites and rocket bodies, but we know very little about the remaining 2%, millions of small debris. These small debris elude radars and optical telescopes used in ground-based surveys, but they can still cause mission-fatal damage to a satellite. With limited data, NASA and ESA cannot accurately estimate the risk from orbital debris. Their models don’t even agree on the number of expected debris because there is no good observational constraint for very small fragments.

Fig. 2: Number of tracked objects in Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geo-synchronous orbit (GSO). Modified from Fig.2 of the paper.

Fig. 2 shows a breakdown of what we do know about objects in LEO and GSO. In LEO (left panel) , the most numerous objects are debris. These come from fragmentation events, or “break-ups,” most commonly due to propulsion-related subsystems exploding. In other words, when leftover fuel gets heated up in space, it can blow the satellite to pieces. Other sources of debris include intentional anti-satellite tests (in which countries develop technology to destroy each other’s satellites) and a small number of accidental satellite collisions. In GSO (right panel), a large number of objects are “unknown” because GSO is significantly farther away from Earth and has historically received less attention. To quote Dr. Blake, the author of today’s paper, “monitoring the mess of near-Earth space cannot solve the problem entirely, especially while the bulk of the dangerous debris population remains invisible and uncatalogued.” Now that I’ve alerted you to the grave danger we face, how do we make sure that future humanity can still go to space?

What can be done?

Like any environmental problem, the best solution is prevention. To prevent leftover fuel from exploding, satellite operators are now advised to “passivate” the spacecraft at the end of the mission. That means dumping out residual fuel and discharging batteries while they still control the spacecraft. The other safe disposal measures after the mission ends are to have the satellite re-enter the atmosphere or move into unused high-altitude orbits. Even though these prevention measures are the best way forward, they are (un)surprisingly hard to enforce. The authors says, “despite an apparent consensus that [anti-satellite weapon] tests represent irresponsible and reckless behaviour, legally binding and internationally recognised regulations are still lacking.” The level of adherence to the above safety guidelines remain concerningly low. Given that prevention is a “legal quagmire,” we can also try to remove debris that is already up there. Everything from harpoons to nets and tentacles have been used to collect orbital debris, but there’s no one-size-fits-all solution. Imagine how hard it is to capture metal shards tumbling at high speed without creating more debris.

Looking towards the future

Small satellites have flourished in recent years as LEO satellite constellations proved commercially lucrative. These satellites are not only a problem for astronomers but also a huge issue for the existing surveillance infrastructure. Dr. Blake says, “the problem is one that affects all operators in space, truly global in nature… [and] warrants a cross-sector, cross-disciplinary approach.” As astronomers, we can help society keep a watchful eye and ensure that the future of space flight is sustainable. If you want to learn more about space sustainability, Dr. Blake recommends the GNOSIS project.

#### Current regulatory guidelines fail – answers neg turns.

Boley and Byers 21. Aaron Boley is at the Department of Physics and Astronomy, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada and Michael Byers is at the Department of Physics and Astronomy, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. 5/20/21. [Nature, “Satellite mega-constellations create risks in Low Earth Orbit, the atmosphere and on Earth,” <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-89909-7>] Justin

Companies are placing satellites into orbit at an unprecedented frequency to build ‘mega-constellations’ of communications satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). In two years, the number of active and defunct satellites in LEO has increased by over 50%, to about 5000 (as of 30 March 2021). SpaceX alone is on track to add 11,000 more as it builds its Starlink mega-constellation and has already fled for permission for another 30,000 satellites with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)1 . Others have similar plans, including OneWeb, Amazon, Telesat, and GW, which is a Chinese state-owned company2 . Te current governance system for LEO, while slowly changing, is ill-equipped to handle large satellite systems. Here, we outline how applying the consumer electronic model to satellites could lead to multiple tragedies of the commons. Some of these are well known, such as impediments to astronomy and an increased risk of space debris, while others have received insufcient attention, including changes to the chemistry of Earth’s upper atmosphere and increased dangers on Earth’s surface from re-entered debris. Te heavy use of certain orbital regions might also result in a de facto exclusion of other actors from them, violating the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. All of these challenges could be addressed in a coordinated manner through multilateral law-making, whether in the United Nations, the Inter-Agency Debris Committee (IADC), or an ad hoc process, rather than in an uncoordinated manner through diferent national laws. Regardless of the law-making forum, mega-constellations require a shif in perspectives and policies: from looking at single satellites, to evaluating systems of thousands of satellites, and doing so within an understanding of the limitations of Earth’s environment, including its orbits.

Tousands of satellites and 1500 rocket bodies provide considerable mass in LEO, which can break into debris upon collisions, explosions, or degradation in the harsh space environment. Fragmentations increase the cross-section of orbiting material, and with it, the collision probability per time. Eventually, collisions could dominate on-orbit evolution, a situation called the Kessler Syndrome3 . Tere are already over 12,000 trackable debris pieces in LEO, with these being typically 10 cm in diameter or larger. Including sizes down to 1 cm, there are about a million inferred debris pieces, all of which threaten satellites, spacecraf and astronauts due to their orbits crisscrossing at high relative speeds. Simulations of the long-term evolution of debris suggest that LEO is already in the protracted initial stages of the Kessler Syndrome, but that this could be managed through active debris removal4 . Te addition of satellite mega-constellations and the general proliferation of low-cost satellites in LEO stresses the environment further5–8 .

[Omitted Figures 1 and 2]

Results

The overall setting. Te rapid development of the space environment through mega-constellations, predominately by the ongoing construction of Starlink, is shown by the cumulative payload distribution function (Fig. 1). From an environmental perspective, the slope change in the distribution function defnes NewSpace, an era of dominance by commercial actors. Before 2015, changes in the total on-orbit objects came principally from fragmentations, with efects of the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test and the 2009 Kosmos-2251/Iridium-33 collisions being evident on the graph.

Although the volume of space is large, individual satellites and satellite systems have specifc functions, with associated altitudes and inclinations (Fig. 2). Tis increases congestion and requires active management for station keeping and collision avoidance9 , with automatic collision-avoidance technology still under development. Improved space situational awareness is required, with data from operators as well as ground- and space-based sensors being widely and freely shared10. Improved communications between satellite operators are also necessary: in 2019, the European Space Agency moved an Earth observation satellite to avoid colliding with a Starlink satellite, afer failing to reach SpaceX by e-mail. Internationally adopted ‘right of way’ rules are needed10 to prevent games of ‘chicken’, as companies seek to preserve thruster fuel and avoid service interruptions. SpaceX and NASA recently announced11 a cooperative agreement to help reduce the risk of collisions, but this is only one operator and one agency

When completed, Starlink will include about as many satellites as there are trackable debris pieces today, while its total mass will equal all the mass currently in LEO—over 3000 tonnes. Te satellites will be placed in narrow orbital shells, creating unprecedented congestion, with 1258 already in orbit (as of 30 March 2021). OneWeb has already placed an initial 146 satellites, and Amazon, Telesat, GW and other companies, operating under diferent national regulatory regimes, are soon likely to follow.

Enhanced collision risk. Mega-constellations are composed of mass-produced satellites with few backup systems. Tis consumer electronic model allows for short upgrade cycles and rapid expansions of capabilities, but also considerable discarded equipment. SpaceX will actively de-orbit its satellites at the end of their 5–6-year operational lives. However, this process takes 6 months, so roughly 10% will be de-orbiting at any time. If other companies do likewise, thousands of de-orbiting satellites will be slowly passing through the same congested space, posing collision risks. Failures will increase these numbers, although the long-term failure rate is difcult to project. Figure 3 is similar to the righthand portion of Fig. 2 but includes the Starlink and OneWeb megaconstellations as fled (and amended) with the FCC (see “Methods”). Te large density spikes show that some shells will have satellite number densities in excess of n = 10−6 km−3 .

Deorbiting satellites will be tracked and operational satellites can manoeuvre to avoid close conjunctions. However, this depends on ongoing communication and cooperation between operators, which at present is ad hoc and voluntary. A recent letter12 to the FCC from SpaceX suggests that some companies might be less-thanfully transparent about events13 in LEO.

Despite the congestion and trafc management challenges, FCC flings by SpaceX suggest that collision avoidance manoeuvres can in fact maintain collision-free operations in orbital shells and that the probability of a collision between a non-responsive satellite and tracked debris is negligible. However, the flings do not account for untracked debris6 , including untracked debris decaying through the shells used by Starlink. Using simple estimates (see “Methods”), the probability that a single piece of untracked debris will hit any satellite in the Starlink 550 km shell is about 0.003 afer one year. Tus, if at any time there are 230 pieces of untracked debris decaying through the 550 km orbital shell, there is a 50% chance that there will be one or more collisions between satellites in the shell and the debris. As discussed further in “Methods”, such a situation is plausible. Depending on the balance between the de-orbit and the collision rates, if subsequent fragmentation events lead to similar amounts of debris within that orbital shell, a runaway cascade of collisions could occur.

Fragmentation events are not confned to their local orbits, either. Te India 2019 ASAT test was conducted at an altitude below 300 km in an efort to minimize long-lived debris. Nevertheless, debris was placed on orbits with apogees in excess of 1000 km. As of 30 March 2021, three tracked debris pieces remain in orbit14. Such long-lived debris has high eccentricities, and thus can cross multiple orbital shells twice per orbit. A major fragmentation event from a single satellite could afect all operators in LEO.

#### Fragmentation leads to speedy debris – that’s laws of physics.

Aerospace.org n.d. [As an independent, nonprofit corporation operating the only FFRDC for the space enterprise, The Aerospace Corporation performs objective technical analyses and assessments for a variety of government, civil, and commercial customers. “SPACE DEBRIS 101.” AEROSPACE. <https://aerospace.org/article/space-debris-101>] Justin

Can you see space debris coming at you?

It is very unlikely that you would see space debris. Relative to a person in orbit, space debris is moving about ten times faster than a bullet, and the vast majority of debris is as small as or smaller than a bullet. No one can see a bullet coming, let alone an object moving ten times faster.

What is an on-orbit collision like?

It looks more like an explosion of each object, as if they passed through each other and exploded on the other side. A hyper-velocity collision like those at orbital speed doesn’t behave like collisions that we are used to seeing. The objects are moving so fast that they travel through each other faster than the shock waves can travel. The shock waves in the structures of each object then shatter them into fragments of varying sizes and, in the process, give each fragment a boost in a different direction. Each one of these fragments is then in a different orbit than the original object and will move away according to the laws of orbital motion. With thousands of fragments, each moving in slightly different directions, it looks a lot like an explosion.

Do breakups look like the movies?

For dramatic purposes, movies, TV, and commercials tend to show space breakups at a much slower speed than they would happen at in real life. A breakup in space, especially a collision, can involve a lot of energy, and the pieces are flung away at extremely high speeds. Since there is no air to slow the pieces down the fragments would all fly away from one another and rapidly disappear from view. For many breakups, a softball-sized fragment would fly the length of the space station (a little less than a football field) in less than half a second. If you were watching it from nearby, you would see a flash, and the object that broke up would just disappear and be gone. It would be very unlikely for you to see pieces drifting away. Similarly, a low orbit space collision is unlikely to look much like a car crash — the speeds are much too high. The collisions would look like explosions to a nearby observer.

#### Rivalrous orbits create space conflict and turn good satellites.

Samson 22 – Victoria Samson is the Washington office director for the Secure World Foundation, an organization that focuses on space sustainability, and she has over 20 years of experience in military space and security issues. Previously, Ms. Samson was a senior analyst for the Center for Defense Information. She also was a senior policy associate at the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, a consortium of arms control groups. Earlier, she was a researcher at Riverside Research Institute, where she worked on war-gaming scenarios for the Missile Defense Agency. 1/17/22. [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “The complicating role of the private sector in space,” DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2021.2014229] Justin

At this exact moment, we are seeing the increasing dominance of commercial actors in space – specifically the rise of mega-constellations, or large numbers of small satellites flying in formation to provide global coverage for a variety of governmental and commercial uses, including both communications and Earth observation. Consequently, the fundamental nature of space is changing, to one of a domain dominated by commercial actors. This change will have major consequences for international stability, both in terms of how it demonstrates that the old governance structure for space is being left behind – and how it highlights Russia’s declining rank in global space powers. Certain orbits may be effectively taken over by a handful of entities, and there will be competition for useful portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. With eyes on the sky everywhere, there will be little or no room for state secrets – for better or worse. This is happening at the same time that Russia’s space identity is floundering, which may further upset the stability of the domain of space.

As of November 2021, there are roughly 4,800 active satellites in orbit around Earth, around 1,850 of which belong to just one entity: SpaceX’s Starlink mega-constellation (Thompson 2021). This change has happened very quickly, as Starlink satellites just began to be launched in May 2019 (O’Callaghan 2019). This is only the first wave of the megaconstellations as well. While it is hard to say exactly how many satellites will be launched as part of this new use of space, there are requests or plans for mega-constellations that could mean well over 100,000 new satellites could potentially be in low Earth orbit. While not all of these satellites will be launched, even a small fraction of that proposed number will fundamentally shift the situation so that the major actors in space will no longer be nation-states (as has been the case to date) but the private sector, changing the timbre of the space domain.

This leads to challenges in discussing space security issues: Space is a shared, international domain; if we cannot include all the stakeholders in the discussions, we will not come to complete solutions to the problems. But first, some background.

A little history

The commercial sector is not new to space. Commercial entities have been active in space for decades now; in fact, it was a dispute over what should be the extent of their role in space that shaped part of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Article VI of that treaty notes:

States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities . . .. The activities of nongovernmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. (Outer Space Treaty 1967)

This was a compromise between the United States and the USSR, in which the latter argued that there was no such thing as commercial space. Having language requiring state actors to carry out “authorization and continuing supervision” gave the United States the flexibility it wanted to develop a commercial space sector while ensuring that there would still be national oversight.

A lack of coordination

One way in which the rise of these mega-constellations may complicate international security in space is through concerns about these satellites hampering access to certain orbits. While slots in geosynchronous Earth orbit are set by the International Telecommunication Union, there is no international entity coordinating orbital slots at low Earth orbit. This means that, given the potentially tens of thousands of satellites that could be launched given company plans, certain orbits could be de facto ceded to a handful of entities – in defiance of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which says that space “is not subject to national appropriation.” Consequently, this could lead to strife or competition over certain orbits.

It is possible that, given the number of satellites that companies are asking the United States’ Federal Communications Commission for broadcasting rights to, certain orbits may reach their carrying capacities – meaning that they are at the maximum number of satellites that can be operated, as defined by physical and radiofrequency interference aspects. This could lead to disputes over which country has the right to use certain orbits, or, alternatively, resentment when one country’s commercial sector essentially takes over a particular orbit

Competition over parts of the electromagnetic spectrum is another possible path for international security issues to arise from mega-constellations. Satellites are only as good as their ability to receive and communicate information, which requires spectrum; if one or a few entities from one country use up all the readily accessible spectrum for specific capabilities at certain orbits, that could possibly lead to confrontation as well. For the most part, the companies launching mega-constellations are largely based in the West, which can shape the global perception of their effects and intent – although there have been some plans for at least one Chinese company to launch a mega-constellation of potentially 13,000 satellites, and the South Koreans have expressed interest in their own mega-constellation.

#### Triggers space escalation and nuclear war.

Perez 21 – Veronica Delgado-Perez is a Staff Writer at The International Scholar. 12/14/21 – Note, doesn’t say date but most recent cited event is 2021, correct if I’m wrong. [The International Scholar, “Argument | The Commercialization of Space Risks Launching a Militarized Space Race,” <https://www.theintlscholar.com/periodical/12/14/2020/analysis-commercialization-space-risk-international-law-military-space-race>] Justin

With new actors on the game stage, conflicts of interest may arise. There is a risk that each actor adopts a kind of short-term Realist approach to space policy — one which is driven by self-interest in reaping the greatest benefits of extraterrestrial exploration and commercialization while controlling access to others. If unmitigated, states may choose to militarize outer space to gain a strategic edge over competitors and adversaries.

This process has already begun. Under the Trump administration, the Pentagon established the U.S. Space Force as a new branch of the Armed Forces to protect the country and allied interests in space. Already, Delta 4 — one of the U.S. Space Force’s missions — conducts strategic and theater missile warnings, manages weapon systems, and provides information to missile defense forces. The measure shows that for the U.S., outer space is not only a domain of scientific exploration but has the potential to become increasingly securitized.

With the impending expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the U.S. and Russia on February 5, 2021, a number of security dilemmas could arise. If the world’s two largest nuclear powers do not edge toward extending the treaty, Washington and Moscow risk returning to the era of unrestricted expansion of launch platforms and strategically-deployed nuclear warheads — potentially with the aid of military infrastructure in space.

Although President-elect Biden has expressed his interest in negotiating an extension of New START, how Moscow and Washington might proceed remains an open question. Bilateral progress towards a new arms-control regime would require establishing limits on the number and range of long- and mid-range missiles, establishing measures to limit the expansion of traditional missile deployment to space, and banning the deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

#### Look at this telescope view

A picture containing cat, mammal

Description automatically generated

#### Satellites are an impact multiplier – specifically solves the grid.

Pellegrino & Stang 16. Massimo Pellegrino, Master’s Degree in Space Studies from ISU, with Gerald Stang, Senior Associate Analyst at the EUISS, holds BSc and MSc degrees in chemical engineering from the University of Saskatchewan and an MA in international affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University (“Space Security for Europe”, *EU Institute for Security Studies*, published July 2016, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/space-security-europe>, accessed 7-10-2019) bm

Modern societies are highly dependent on the continuous operation of critical infrastructure to ensure the provision of basic goods and services. They consist of assets, systems or parts thereof which are so vital, that their disruption would significantly impact the economy, national security, public health, safety, or social well-being. Examples of critical infrastructure include energy, water, food supply, communication, transportation, and waste processing systems. Space assets are so deeply embedded in developed economies that a day without fully functioning space capabilities would severely restrict or even endanger our lives.

Space systems are critical for running energy grids and telecommunication networks, border and maritime surveillance, crisis management and humanitarian operations, environmental and climate monitoring, verification of international treaties and arms control agreements, and the fight against organised crime and terrorism. Space assets also provide the technological backbone for other critical infrastructures. The synchronisation of power grids and telecommunication networks, for example, is heavily dependent on GNSS timing signals and any disruption would create a domino effect on other critical infrastructures (see Figure 5).

Satellites also play a central role in supporting defence systems and military operations. They are force multipliers that provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, as well as communication, navigation, positioning and timing signals. Armed forces do not only use their own space systems, but are also significant consumers of space services provided by private operators. In fact, about 90% of US military communications traffic passes through civilian satellites, many of which privately owned, rather than through dedicated systems designed to withstand attempted interruptions.1 The reliance of both civilian and military users on space systems therefore places them firmly in the area of critical infrastructure. Some critical space systems, such as the American GPS, are under foreign control, and the governments controlling those systems retain the authority to disrupt services, even for allies, in case of a national emergency. While the United States announced that it has no intention of ever intentionally degrading public GPS signals (also known as ‘Selective Availability’) and that the next generation of GPS satellites will not include this feature, other governments might still do so.2

These dependences engender new and growing vulnerabilities. Reliance on space is likely to increase further as space capabilities and services improve in diversity, quality and affordability. Close to 1,500 satellites with a launch mass of over 50 kg are expected to be launched over the next decade; an increase of 50% compared to 2005-2014. This estimate excludes both the expected proliferation of smaller satellites (such as CubeSats), but also the planned OneWeb and Steam mega-constellations for global internet broadband service. Advances in small satellite capabilities and in launch technology (e.g. SpaceX’s Falcon rocket family) have already lowered the cost of access to space. About 45% more CubeSats were launched in 2014 than in 2013 (130 vs. 91), accounting for 63% of all satellites launched3 . However, just as the reliance on space increases, so too do threats and vulnerabilities. Therefore, in order to realise the full potential of investments in space, critical space systems need to be adequately protected and the space environment properly managed.

#### Grid security is an impact filter.

Denkenberger 21 [David Denkenberger, Anders Sandberg, Ross John Tieman, and Joshua M. Pearce, \* assistant professor of mechanical engineering at University of Alaska Fairbanks, “Long-term cost-effectiveness of interventions for loss of electricity/industry compared to artificial general intelligence safety,” 2021, *European Journal of Futures Research*, Vol. 9, Issue 1, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40309-021-00178-z, EA]

Civilization relies on a network of highly interdependent critical infrastructure (CI) to provide basic necessities (water, food, shelter, basic goods), as well as complex items (computers, cars, space shuttles) and services (the internet, cloud computing, global supply chains), henceforth referred to as industry. Electricity and the electrical infrastructure that distributes it plays an important role within industry, providing a convenient means to distribute energy able to be converted into various forms of useful work. Electricity is one component of industry albeit a critical one. Industry provides the means to sustain advanced civilization structures and the citizens that inhabit them. These structures play a critical role in realizing various futures by allowing humanity to discover and utilize new resources, adapt to various environments, and resist natural stressors.

Though industry is capable of resisting small stressors, a sufficiently large event can precipitate cascading failure of CI systems, resulting in a collapse of industry. If one does not temporally discount the value of future people, the long-term future (thousands, millions, or even billions of years) could contain an astronomically large amount of value [18]. Events capable of curtailing the potential of civilization (existential risks, such as human extinction or an unrecoverable collapse) would prevent such futures from being achieved, implying reducing the likelihood of such events is of the utmost importance [100]. Reducing the prevalence of existential risks factors; events, systemic structures, or biases which increase the likelihood of extinction but do not cause extinction by themselves is also highly valuable. Complete collapse or degraded function of industry would drastically reduce humanity’s capacity to coordinate and deploy technology to prevent existential risks, representing an existential risk factor. Consequently, interventions preventing loss of industry, reducing the magnitude of impacts, or increasing speed of recovery could be extremely valuable.

Existential risk research is, by nature, future focused, requiring the investigation of events that have not yet occurred. Futures studies methodologies are often applied to uncover salient trends or events, and explore potential causal structures [54, 123]. Probabilistic modeling techniques can then be used to determine the likelihood of such events occurring, including adequate treatment of uncertainty [101]. The cost-effectiveness modeling approach outlined in this paper is an example of this, attempting to assess the marginal utility of losing industry interventions on improving the long-term future. This approach could guide future efforts to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of interventions for different risks, existential or otherwise. More practically, this research can inform prioritization efforts of industrialized countries by providing estimates of the cost of global industrial collapse, and the utility of resilience interventions. This is relevant to the European Union which has a highly industrialized economy, providing $2.3 Trillion USD of the $13.7 Trillion USD global total of value add manufacturing [122]. The EU has shifted toward a more proactive foresight approach about natural and man-made disasters, noting the importance of rare high-impact events, systemic risks, and converging trends requiring better data and forecasting to drive a more ambitious crisis management system [47]. Still, it is clear that most academic and institutional emphasis has been on “ordinary” rather than extreme disasters, and risks from industry to the public and environment rather than widespread failures of industrial services causing harm.

The integrated nature of the electric grid, which is based on centralized generation makes the entire system vulnerable to disruption.1 There are a number of anthropogenic and natural catastrophes that could result in regional-scale electrical grid failure, which would be expected to halt the majority of industries and machines in that area. A high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) caused by a nuclear weapon could disable electricity over part of a continent [16, 48, 66, 93]. This could destroy the majority of electrical grid infrastructure, and as fossil fuel extraction and industry is reliant on electricity [49], industry would be disabled. Similarly, solar storms have destroyed electrical transformers connected to long transmission lines in the past [117]. The Carrington event in 1859 damaged telegraph lines, which was the only electrical infrastructure in existence at the time. It also caused Aurora Borealis that was visible in Cuba and Jamaica [70]. This could potentially disable electrical systems at high latitudes, which could represent 10% of electricity/industry globally. Though solar storms may last less than the 12 h that would be required to expose the entire earth with direct line of sight, the earth’s magnetic field lines redirect the storm to affect the opposite side of the earth [117].

Lastly, both physical [6, 8, 69, 89, 111] and cyber attacks [3, 63, 90, 96, 118, 128, 130] could also compromise electric grids. Physical attacks include traditional acts of terrorism such as bombing or sabotage [130] in addition to EMP attacks. Significant actors could scale up physical attacks, for example by using drones. A scenario could include terrorist groups hindering individual power plants [126], while a large adversary could undertake a similar operation physically to all plants and electrical grids in a region.

Unfortunately, the traditional power grid infrastructure is simply incapable of withstanding intentional physical attacks [91]. Damage to the electric grid resulting in physical attack could be long lasting, as most traditional power plants operate with large transformers that are difficult to move and source. Custom rebuilt transformers require time for replacement ranging from months and even up to years [91]. For example, a relatively mild 2013 sniper attack on California’s Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) substation, which injured no one directly, was able to disable 17 transformers supplying power to Silicon Valley. Repairs and improvements cost PG&E roughly $100 million and lasted about a month [10, 102]. A coordinated attack with relatively simple technology (e.g., guns) could cause a regional electricity disruption.

However, a high-tech attack could be even further widespread. The Pentagon reports spending roughly $100 million to repair cyber-related damages to the electric grid in 2009 [57]. There is also evidence that a computer virus caused an electrical outage in the Ukraine [56]. Unlike simplistic physical attacks, cyber attackers are capable of penetrating critical electric infrastructure from remote regions of the world, needing only communication pathways (e.g., the Internet or infected memory sticks) to install malware into the control systems of the electric power grid. For example, Stuxnet was a computer worm that destroyed Iranian centrifuges [73] to disable their nuclear industry. Many efforts are underway to harden the grid from such attacks [51, 63]. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security responded to ~ 200 cyber incidents in 2012 and 41% involved the electrical grid [103]. Nations routinely have made attempts to map current critical infrastructure for future navigation and control of the U.S. electrical system [57].

The electric grid in general is growing increasingly dependent upon the Internet and other network connections for data communication and monitoring systems [17, 112, 118, 127, 135]. Although this conveniently allows electrical suppliers management of systems, it increases the susceptibility of the grid to cyber-attack, through denial of webpage services to consumers, disruption to supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) operating systems, or sustained widespread power outages [3, 72, 118, 120]. Thus global or regional loss of the Internet could have similar implications.

A less obvious potential cause is a pandemic that disrupts global trade. Countries may ban trade for fear of the disease entering their country, but many countries are dependent on imports for the functioning of their industry. If the region over which electricity is disrupted had significant agricultural production, the catastrophe could be accompanied by a ~ 10% food production shortfall as well. It is uncertain whether countries outside the affected region would help the affected countries, do nothing, or conquer the affected countries. Larger versions of these catastrophes could disrupt electricity/industry globally. For instance, it is possible that multiple HEMPs could be detonated around the world, due to a world nuclear war [105] or due to terrorists gaining control of nuclear weapons. There is evidence that, in the last 2000 years, two solar storms occurred that were much stronger than the Carrington event [85]. Therefore, it is possible that an extreme solar storm could disable electricity and therefore industry globally. It is conceivable that a coordinated cyber or physical attack (or a combination) on many electric grids could also disrupt industry globally. Many of the techniques to harden the electric grid could help with this vulnerability as well as moving to more distributed generation and microgrids [23, 29, 75, 76, 103, 114]. An extreme pandemic could cause enough people to not show up to work such that industrial functioning could not be maintained. Though this could be mitigated by directing military personnel to fill vacant positions, if the pandemic were severe enough, it could be rational to retreat from high human contact industrial civilization in order to limit disease mortality. The global loss of electricity could even be self-inflicted as a way of stopping rogue artificial general intelligence (AGI) [124]. As the current high agricultural productivity depends on industry (e.g., for fertilizers), it has been assumed that there would be mass starvation in these scenarios [107].

Repairing these systems and re-establishing electrical infrastructure would be a goal of the long term and work should ideally start on it immediately after a catastrophe. However, human needs would need to be met immediately (and continually) and since there is only a few months of stored food, it would likely run out before industry is restored with the current state of preparedness. In some of the less challenging scenarios, it may be possible to continue running some machines on the fossil fuels that had previously been brought to the surface or from the use microgrids or shielded electrical systems. In addition, it may be feasible to run some machines on gasified wood [31]. However, in the worst-case scenario, all unshielded electronics would be destroyed.

#### Debris triggers miscalculated war.

Robert Farley 22, Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Robert Farley is a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). 1/9/22. [19 Fourty Five, “Does A Space War Mean A Nuclear War?,” <https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/does-a-space-war-mean-a-nuclear-war/>] Justin

The recent Russian anti-satellite test didn’t tell the world anything new, but it did reaffirm the peril posed by warfare in space. Debris from explosions could make some earth orbits remarkably risky to use for both civilian and military purposes. But the test also highlighted a less visible danger; attacks on nuclear command and control satellites could rapidly produce an extremely dangerous escalatory situation in a war between nuclear powers. James Acton and Thomas Macdonald drew attention to this problem in a recent article at Inside Defense. As Acton and MacDonald point out, nuclear command and control satellites are the connective tissue of nuclear deterrence, assuring countries that they’re not being attacked and that they’ll be able to respond quickly if they are.

For a long time, these strategic early-warning satellites were akin to a center of gravity in ICBM warfare. Nuclear deterrence requires awareness that an attack is underway. Attacks on the monitoring system could easily be read as an attempt to ~~blind~~ an opponent in preparation for general war, and could themselves incur nuclear retaliation. Thus, the nuclear command and control satellites are critical to the maintenance of nuclear deterrence. They make it possible to distribute an order from the chief of government to the nuclear delivery systems themselves. Consequently, their destruction might lead to hesitation or delay in performing a nuclear launch order.

It was only later that the relevance of satellites for conventional warfare became clear. Satellites could reconnoiter enemy positions and, more importantly, provide communications for friendly forces. Indeed, the expansion of the role of satellites in conventional warfare has complicated the prospect of space warfare. States have a clear reason for targeting enemy satellites which support conventional warfare, as those satellites enable the most lethal part of the kill chain, the communications and recon networks that link targets with shooters. Thus, we now have a situation in which space military assets have both nuclear and conventional roles. In a conflict confusion and misperception could rapidly become lethal. If one combatant views an attack against nuclear command and control as a prelude to a general nuclear attack, it might choose to pre-empt.

Nuclear powers have dealt with problems in this general category for a good long while; would a conventional attack against tactical nuclear staging areas represent an escalation, for example? Would the use of ballistic missiles that can carry either conventional or nuclear weapons trigger a nuclear response? Do attacks against air defense networks that have both strategic and tactical responsibilities run the risk of triggering a nuclear response? There’s also the danger that damage to communications networks designated for conventional combat could force traffic onto the nuclear control systems, further confusing the issue.

#### **No checks on escalation.**

MacDonald 18. Bruce W. MacDonald, professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), ("Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation," August 2018, *NSI* white paper, <https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/SMA-White-Paper_Chinese-Persepectives-on-Space_-Aug-2018.pdf>, accessed 7-14-2019) bm

Challenges across all five phases: Another escalation threat is the inexperience that nations share in the space and cyber domains, unlike in conventional domains of conflict and in the nuclear domain to a lesser extent. This inexperience gives rise to a “sorcerer’s apprentice” problem, placing leaders at risk of making potentially unwise judgment calls without a full grasp of their implications. The space and cyber domains are sufficiently new and dynamic that such decisions are highly likely. Adding to this uncertainty is the ever-growing interdependence of infrastructures within and among advanced countries, making the impact of major attacks against a country’s space and/or cyber infrastructures inherently unknowable. In considering all these factors, it is important to keep in mind that events in space do not happen in isolation. Any space conflict would likely be part of a multidimensional field of play, with space being important because of the effects it has on the earth. Significant instability in space is unlikely to lead to war if there is stability in other domains and in the larger geopolitical relationship between participants, while conflict could easily spread to a stable space domain if war in other domains appeared preferable to the alternative. While any use of nuclear weapons would pose a serious threat of escalation to full-scale nuclear war, any use of space or cyber offense would not pose a comparable escalation threat. That said, a series of reciprocal escalations could easily become unstable. No clear-cut escalation barrier exists in the space and cyber domains, and given the short-term tactical benefits of escalating ahead of an adversary, each additional escalation could create incentives for further escalation that an adversary would not always anticipate. Escalation in space, then, is a slippery slope with few off-ramps.

#### No limited nuclear wars – extinction.

Webber 19 – Dr Philip Webber has written widely on nuclear issues and is Chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) – a membership organisation promoting responsible science and technology. We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it. 5/18/19. [METRO.UK “We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it,” <https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/18/we-will-all-end-up-killing-each-other-and-one-nuclear-blast-could-do-it-9370115/>] Recut Justin

The nuclear armed nations have inadvertently created a global Doomsday machine, built with 15,000 nuclear weapons.

Most (93%) have been built by Russia and in the US, 3,100 of them are ready to fire within hours.

Pre-programmed targets include main cities as well as a range of military and civilian targets across the world primarily in the UK, Europe, US, Russia and China but also in Japan, Australia and South America.

One nuclear blast, one mistake, one cyber attack could trigger it.

But first a reminder about the incredible destructive power of a nuclear weapon. Modern nuclear warheads are typically 20 times larger than either of the two bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. What just one nuclear warhead can do is unimaginable. We’ve drawn some of the key features to scale against cityscapes in the UK for a Russian SS-18 RS 20V (NATO designation ‘Satan’) 500kT warhead. US submarines deploy a similar weapon – the Trident II Mk5, 475kT warhead. A deafening, terrifying noise will be created, like an intense thunder that lasts for 10 seconds or longer.

After a blinding flash of light bright destroying the retina of anyone looking, and a violent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) knocking out electrical equipment several miles away, a bomb of this size quickly forms an incandescent fireball 850 metres across.

This is about the same height as the world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa. Drawn against the London Canary Wharf financial district or the Manchester skyline, the huge fireball dwarfs one Canary Sq. (240m), the South Tower Deansgate (201m) and the Beetham Tower Hilton, (170m). The fireball engulfs both city centres completely, melting glass and steel and forms an intensely radioactive 60m deep crater zone of molten earth and debris. A devastating supersonic blast wave flattens everything within a radius of two to three km, the entire Manchester centre, an area larger than the City of London, with lighter damage out to eight km. Most people in these areas would be killed or very seriously injured.

The fireball quickly rises forming an enormous characteristic mushroom shaped cloud raining highly radioactive particles (fallout). It rises to 60,000 ft (18,000m) – twice the altitude of Everest – and is 15 miles, 24km across.

This is one warhead. There are 10 such warheads on each of Russia’s 46 missiles (460 in total) and 48 on each of eight US Trident submarines (384 in total). In reality, in a nuclear conflict all of these warheads and a further 956 ready-to-fire are likely to be launched.

Whilst this scale of destruction is horrific and hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a few hours from a combination of blast, radiation and huge fires, there are also terrible longer-term effects.

Scientists predict that huge city-wide firestorms combined with very the high-altitude debris clouds would severely reduce sunlight levels and disrupt the world’s climate for a decade causing drought, a prolonged winter, global famine and catastrophic impacts for all life on earth and in the seas due to intense levels of UV with the destruction of the ozone layer.

But even at the level of a few hundred nuclear warheads, the consequences of a nuclear war would be extremely severe across the world far beyond the areas hit directly. A nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan with ‘only’ 100 small warheads would kill hundreds of millions and cause climate damage leading to a global famine. The sheer destructive nature of nuclear explosions combined with long lasting radiation, means that nuclear weapons are of no military use. ‘Enemy’ territory would be unusable for years because of intense radiation – especially when nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants are hit.

Even if your own country is not hit, radiation and climate damage will spread across the globe. No one escapes the consequences.

But the nuclear nations argue that they build and keep nuclear weapons to make sure that they are never used. After all no one would be stupid enough to actually launch a nuclear weapon facing such terrible retaliation? It sounds obvious. If you threaten any attacker with terrible nuclear devastation of course they won’t attack you. That might be true most of the time. It is very unlikely that any country would launch a nuclear attack deliberately. But there are two very major problems. First, a terrorist organisation with a nuclear weapon cannot be deterred in this way. Secondly, there are several ways in which a nuclear war can start by mistake. A report by the prestigious Chatham House in 2014 documents 30 instances between 1962 and 2002 when nuclear weapons came within minutes of being launched due to miscalculation, miscommunication, or technical errors. What prevented their use on many of these occasions was the intervention of individuals who, against military orders, either refused to authorise a nuclear strike or relay information that would have led to launch. Examples include a weather rocket launch mistaken for an attack on Russia, a US satellite misinterpreting sunlight reflecting off clouds as multiple missiles firings, a 42c chip fault creating a false warning of 220 missiles launched at the United States. Such risks are heightened during political crises.

The risk of mistake is very high because, in a hangover from the Cold War, the USA and Russia each keep 900 warheads ready to fire in a few minutes, in a ‘launch on warning’ status, should a warning of nuclear attack come in.

These nuclear weapons form a dangerous nuclear stand-off – rather like two people holding guns to each other’s heads.

With only a few minutes to evaluate a warning of nuclear attack before warheads would strike, one mistake can trigger disaster. A similar nuclear stand-off exists between India and Pakistan.

### 1AC – Framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being – to clarify, saving lives. Calc indicts don’t link—my framework evaluates offense—pandemics is bad because as far as we know, it would cause suffering.

#### Death is bad and o/w—ontologically destroys the subject.

Paterson 1 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81  In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Comes before value-to-life.

Tännsjö 11 (Torbjörn, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” <http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf>) //BS 1-27-2018

\*\*Bracketed to avoid triggers

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all [die] commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not [die] commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I [die] kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

#### C] Mathematically outweighs.

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### Interpretation: The negative must concede the affirmative framework provided it is topical and disclosed.

#### Violation: It’s preemptive

#### Prefer-

#### 1] Time skew- Winning the negative framework moots 6 minutes of 1AC offense and forces a 1AR restart against a 7 min 1NC – outweighs on quantifiability and reversibility – I can’t get back time lost and it’s the only way to measure abuse.

#### 2] Topic Ed- Every debate would be a framework debate which crowds out our ability to have core debates about the topic- outweighs- A] Time Frame- We only have 2 months to debate the topic B] Inclusion- Phil and K literature is incredibly dense and requires a vast amount of prior knowledge and experience which excludes novices while topic literature is less esoteric C] Constitutivism- The only thing intrinsic to debate is the topic so it should be prioritized

Dtd and competing interps

No rvi

### 1AC – Underview

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer – 1AR are too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time.

#### 2] Procedural fairness is a voter and outweighs a] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is a game and equity is necessary to sustain the activity, b] probability – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews, c] internal link turns every impact – a limited debate promotes research and engagement d] All your arguments concede fairness since you assume they will be evaluated fairly.

#### 3] Non-governmental action is a voting issue for reciprocity and prep skew- I defend the government taking an action so the negative should do. That’s key to reciprocal ground otherwise they get access to a ton of state bad and legalism bad turns that are functional nibs in the 1ar. We additionally can’t predict near infinite non-governmental actors while they just have to prep one; outweighs on sequencing since we need prep to debate. Turns and outweighs the K since it indicts our ability to test the truth value of their theory of power.