### 1

#### Interpretation – 1AC must use personal knowledge, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals, to garner offense.

Reid-Brinkley, Shanara (2008),” The Harsh Realities Of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance and Style” Retrieved from <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf> Taja1h

The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence. As Green argues, their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.”57 In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledgemaking practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.”58 Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claims in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.59

#### Violation – [Extempt]

#### Prefer

#### 1] Pornotroping: The 1AC narrates forms of violence for ballots commodifying experience and degrading them to high school debate rounds and detaching ourselves from the violence. This turns the aff because none of your impacts are achieved only recreating cruel optimism.

#### 2] Embodiment – Without embodiment the aff does nothing. Their method illusory so voting aff doesn’t do the benefits it discusses. It only matters if you have a connection with the advocacy, means vote neg on presumption. Also turns their method since it filters out whiteness.

**Campbell 97** [Fiona, [members.tripod.com/FionaCampbell/speech\_acts\_on\_problematising\_empowerment.htm](http://members.tripod.com/FionaCampbell/speech_acts_on_problematising_empowerment.htm), 12-04-07] Brackets in original

So who am I to speak, to be listened to? And why is it important to identify my speaking position? The word‘ in spoken or written form (sometimes referred to as Discourse), is the site that both power and knowledge meet. Which is why speech acts can be inherently dangerous**. Furthermore a personin a Privileged speaking position, such as myself, has a political/ethical responsibility to interrogate his/her relationship” to subordinated and disadvantaged peoples** and declare their „interest‟. On this point, La Trobe University, Professor Margaret Thornton states ―assumed objectivity of **knowledge itself camouflage not only the fact that it always has a standpoint, but that it also serves an ideological purpose**‖ (Thornton 1989: 125**). Refusing to declare one‟s speaking position, I argue constitutes not only a flagrant denial of the privileging effect of speech, but must be considered as an act of complicity to systematically mislead**. I speak tonight from what I would term, a privileged speaking position. As someone who has been exposed to tertiary education, had an opportunity to read and reflect on many books and ideas, with a job and more particularly, as a teacher. Indeed, for some I act as a mentor - the one who ‗knows something about knowledge‘. On the other hand, I am deeply ambivalent about my ‗expertise‘ to engage in the act of public speech talk. For am from the margins, the client, patient, the ‗riff raff‘, flotsam and jetsam of society and might say - somewhat ‗deviant‘. It is important to come clean about my speaking position, my knowledge standpoint and declare my interests: I speak for myself as a woman who has experienced youth homelessness, childhood violence and later ‗disability‘. **Before I speak I am required to undertake a process of self-examination, to scrutinise my representational politics, to immerse myself in a self-reflexive interrogation and discern “what [my] representational politics authorises and who it erases** … ―(Howe 1994: 217). Do I speak for myself or others? Am I making gross generalisations about groups in the community? Does my speech contain unacknowledged assumptions and values? More specifically, within this process of reflection, **I am required to examine the context and location from which I speak, in order to ascertain whether it is ―allied with structures of oppression … [or] … allied with resistance to oppression.**

#### 3] Accessibility – models of debate that don’t meet the three tiered process are uniquely inaccessible for oppressed bodies because they’re forced to invest in a system that is terminally juxtaposed in opposition to their very identity.

#### TVA – [extempt]

#### Drop the debater – we indict their model of debate. Evaluate the T-shell through competing interpretations – you cannot be reasonably oppressive, and reasonability brightlines are arbitrary which requires judge intervention. No RVIs or impact turns – you should not win for proving you’re accessible, and their model deters debaters from indicting oppressive practices.

### 2

#### Anti Asian racism is ingrained in history as the Model Minority that stays silent in the face of violence. Objectivity gives voice to whiteness and crowds out the already quiet Model Minority, but advocacy sheds light that and #StopAsianHate.

**Coppens 21** Julie Coppens “Anti-Asian Violence: Facing the Ugly History of Our Beautiful Kingdom.” *Democracy and Me*, 20 Mar. 2021, [www.democracyandme.org/anti-asian-violence-facing-the-ugly-history-of-our-beautiful-kingdom/](http://www.democracyandme.org/anti-asian-violence-facing-the-ugly-history-of-our-beautiful-kingdom/). //Nato

America, 美国, means “beautiful kingdom” in Chinese, but it’s been increasingly difficult to see much beauty in the country that I was born in and love. Since the start of the pandemic, [hate](https://www.npr.org/2021/03/17/978055571/anti-asian-attacks-rise-during-pandemic-read-nprs-stories-on-the-surge-in-violen) [crimes against Asians have spiked](https://www.npr.org/2021/03/17/978055571/anti-asian-attacks-rise-during-pandemic-read-nprs-stories-on-the-surge-in-violen), with more than 3,000 reports in the past year alone. The racism has been exacerbated by xenophobic and harmful rhetoric from the highest levels of government. Donald Trump derisively labeled COVID-19 the [“China virus” and the “kung flu,”](https://www.npr.org/2020/06/22/881810671/white-house-defends-trumps-use-of-racist-term-to-describe-coronavirus) gleefully telling a campaign rally crowd, “I can name 19 different versions of names.” During the height of the crisis, the most powerful person in the country not only made it acceptable to blame and hate us; he encouraged it. However, racism against people of Asian descent is nothing new; it’s nearly as old as America itself. When Chinese workers first came to America in the mid-19th century, they were exploited for their labor and [used to construct railroads](https://cet.pbslearningmedia.org/resource/chinese-transcontinental-railroad-workers-video/asian-americans/) across the west, but were shunned by white settlers and barred from becoming citizens. As “yellow peril” swept through the nation, Congress passed the [Chinese Exclusionary Act](https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=47), banning Chinese immigration to America. In 1871, a white mob entered Chinatown and brutally murdered 18 Chinese men and boys in [one of the worst lynchings in American history](https://www.pbs.org/video/the-chinese-massacre-one-of-los-angeles-worst-atrocities/). In this same period, and well into the 20th century, [Asian workers in the fish-canning industry](https://www.nps.gov/safr/learn/historyculture/asiancanneryworkers.htm) faced similar exploitation, discrimination and violence. During World War II, [President Roosevelt designated the forced incarceration of over 100,000 Japanese and Japanese-Americans](https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=74), labeling them all as threats to the nation. In 1989, five elementary school students in California were killed by a gunman in [the Stockton shooting](https://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/18/us/five-children-killed-as-gunman-attacks-a-california-school.html), targeted because they were refugees from Vietnam and Cambodia. As a first-generation American, I carry these stories with me. My parents emigrated from China in the hope that their children would find greater opportunity in the United States. As part of an ethnic minority, however, I also have greater understanding of America’s painful past. In the last year, I’ve been lucky enough to avoid racial slurs or other harms. Still, I live in fear that a trip to the grocery store might turn into a confrontation with an ignorant stranger. I worry constantly that my ten-year-old sister might be bullied at school, called “coronavirus” or accused of bringing the pandemic to America. Asians tend to be perceived as a docile, quiet minority group. I get that; it’s in our community culture to minimize the harassment we face. We’re unused to speaking up about the pain of racism, and in many instances, we have felt the bitterness of our experiences being ignored or diminished. Even among the Asian people I know, there’s oftentimes a feeling of inevitability surrounding racism. Sure, a certain experience was horrible and unfortunate, but it was a misunderstanding that we should brush off and move on from. This attitude has to change. Increasing Asian visibility and amplifying Asian voices should be a top priority in combatting hate. To begin with, the word “Asian” describes a huge community of people from (or generations removed from) a plethora of countries sprawling across half the globe, and covers a vast socio-economic range in America. Far from being the shining “model minority” of pop-culture stereotypes, Asian-Americans actually [have a higher poverty rate](https://www.nhpr.org/post/asian-americans-smart-high-incomes-and-poor#stream/0) than white households, and many new and first-generation immigrants face dismal standards of living. The shootings in Atlanta draw our attention to low-income Asian immigrants who work at massage parlors, spas, and other jobs that put Asian workers at extra risk of sexual and racial discrimination. The Atlanta shooter claimed a “sex addiction” in defense of the massacre, denying he had any racial motive. Common sense tells us that he knew exactly whose lives he would be ending when he walked through the doors of Young’s Asian Massage. Moreover, his outlet for sex points to the lens of Orientalism, through which Westerners reduce Asian women to exotic sexual objects. The shooting shows every characteristic of an anti-Asian hate crime. After every shooting or attack on minorities, America expresses shock and dismay and jumps to take action in ways that seek to alleviate symptoms without addressing the underlying diseases of racism, misogyny, and hatred. As a member of the Asian-American community, I’ve been tensely following reports of Asian hate crimes for the past year—a father and his children stabbed at the store, an elderly Asian man shoved down on the street, a Filipino man slashed across the face with a box cutter. Along this vein, the Atlanta shooting was almost predictable. In its aftermath, I fervently hope that this marks a turning point. There isn’t a quick solution to resolving anti-Asian hatred. It means dismantling centuries of discrimination and violent oppression, but it can start with paying attention to the lasting effects of this history in today’s society. We must recognize and call out casual scapegoating of the Asian community. We must educate ourselves and others about America’s history of discrimination against people of Asian descent, have difficult conversations, and support the Asian community, because as long as one minority faces discrimination, no one can truly be free. We also need the advocacy and support of our elected officials, who have the power to bring the Asian community out of the shadows. This week’s [House hearing on anti-Asian discrimination](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/18/us/congress-hearing-asian-american-discrimination.html) was the first in three decades; it was both a necessary start and yet not enough. History will continue to repeat itself until the Asian community and its allies mobilize. By targeting the common enemy of systemic white supremacy, we can transform our grief and horror into meaningful action. This will hopefully not only prevent another Atlanta, but also truly make America a beautiful kingdom.

#### The alt is Political Queerness as a narrative structure – that forms bonds that allows politicization against imperialist structures and makes identities intelligible. Its uncondo

**Liu 19** Liu, Wen. “Narrating Against Assimilation and the Empire: Diasporic Mourning and Queer Asian Melancholia.” *Women’s Studies Quarterly*, vol. 47, no. 1 & 2, The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2019, pp. 176–92, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26734052>. //Nato

If the intersection of queer and Asian subjectivity creates the conditions of melancholia and ambivalent attachments to both the host society and homeland, how does one begin to mourn? As Cheng asks, “How does an individual go from being a subject of grief to being a subject of grievance?” (2001, 3). These questions of queer melancholia arose from my larger ethnographic research on Asian American political participation in anti-imperialist solidarity activism in New York City. Although queerness was not the political focus of the Asian American activists involved in the movement, it was the social and material bond that brought us together as the API People’s Solidarity, a coalition of approximately fifteen anti-imperialist activists working to connect issues of militarism and neoliberal trades abroad to racialized violence in the U.S.1 The emergence of a more solidified queer Asian American subjectivity can be contributed to the increasing politicization of this intersection through the efforts of local and national queer Asian American organizations such as the National Queer Asian Pacific Islander Alliance in the past decade. The Asian American activists in the coalition all have personal and political ties to their countries of origin, including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, China, and the Philippines. Since becoming involved in the coalition in 2013, I have been curious about its members’ capacity to forge transpacific political alliances and psychological bonds flexibly across the U.S. border and carry a sense of obligation to defy the U.S. nation-state and imperialist apparatus as individuals who have the privilege to reside within the U.S. borders. Nevertheless, the activists’ relationships with their countries of origin, for both first-generation and second-generation immigrants, were infused with different forms of negative affects. Particularly, as queer Asians in the United States, they must negotiate with processes of both racialization and sexualization while intersectional and inclusive spaces are not always readily accessible. I became curious about how they could afford to be continually attached to Asia, the object infused with trauma and pain, yet at the same time generate the capacity to actively resist dominant narratives of assimilation and orientalization. To understand how queer Asian subjects negotiate these multiple spaces of loss and grief, I interviewed six Asian American activists who identified as queer (out of the total fifteen coalition members in which the majority consisted of women and queer leadership) on their migration history, political development, and social identity and how these dimensions of their lives intersect with their queerness.2 The six participants were queer women of Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and Taiwanese ethnicities whose ages ranged from early twenties to late forties. Starting with their motives behind migration, the interviews gradually built on the critical events in participants’ lives that highlighted a central struggle or dilemma around their identities that did not easily fit into normative categories of race, gender, sexuality, or nationality. Although I did not probe regarding trauma and loss initially, these subjects related to imperialist and racialized violence emerged as primary narrative themes that cut across participants’ articulations of identities. Traumatic events of imperialist violence, racism, sexism, and heterosexism, whether experienced directly or indirectly, could be particularly memorable and elicit powerful affects that moved subjects’ stories across time and space, rescuing the objects of loss—the nation of origin, family, or ideal self. Through critical narrative analysis (Langdrige 2007), I examined how their narratives organized their multiple identities across different events of trauma and loss, but also sites of transformation and healing as the participants connect the events to structural forces outside and beyond their body. I am especially interested in the narrative functions of queerness across the participants—how the introduction of their queer narrative deepens and widens their conversations on migration to complicated webs of violence and power across personal and political spaces of nationhood, family, and intimate partnership. For some, queerness helped them reach out to political projects and affiliations beyond one’s identity groups; and for others, queerness served as an armor that helped them resist the white male gaze on their bodies. In my analysis, I depart from the conceptualization of queerness as a sexual identity and instead examine queerness as a narrative structure that makes the multiplicity of participants’ identities intelligible, and in a sense, grievable for others (Butler 2004, 30). That is, deviating from the hegemonic narrative of assimilation in which the subject must lose the nation of origin in becoming Asian American, queerness has a capacity to divert and transform this sense of loss.

#### The ROB is to reject every instance of anti-asianness in the classroom – anything else normalizes violence

**Eng & Han 19** DAVID L. ENG & SHINHEE HAN [David L. Eng is Richard L. Fisher Professor of English as well as Graduate Chair of the English Department at UPenn. He is also Professor in the Program in Asian American Studies, the Program in Comparative Litera Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America (Duke University Press) as well as the Coeditor (with Alice Y. Hom) of Q&A: Queer in Asian America (Temple University Press, 1998). His current project is a co-edited collection (with David Kazanjian) entitled Loss: Mourning and Melancholia in the Twentieth Century. Shinhee Han, C.S.W., is a psychotherapist at the Counseling & Psychological Services of Columbia University. She is a doctoral candidate in the Shirley M. Ehrenkranz School of Social Work at New York University and maintains a private practice in New York City.], RACIAL MELANCHOLIA, RACIAL DISSOCIATION: On the Social and Psychic Lives of Asian Americans, DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS, Durham and London, 2019, ghs//BZ Recut/Tagged Nato

NATIONAL MELANCHOLIA For Asian Americans and other people of color, suspended assimilation into mainstream culture may involve not only debilitating personal consequences; ultimately, it also constitutes the foundation for a type of national melancholia, a collective national haunting, with destructive effects. In Caucasia, the ambivalence characterizing the narrator’s passing into whiteness leaves her with the constant and eerie feeling of “contamination.”13 Writing about the nature of collective identifications, Freud notes in “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921), “In a group every sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest. This is an aptitude very contrary to his nature, and of which a man is scarcely capable, except when he makes part of a group.”14 Our analysis insists on a consideration of what happens when the demand to sacrifice the personal to collective interest is accompanied not by inclusion in—but rather exclusion from—the larger group. It reorients psychic problems of racial melancholia toward social problems concerning legal histories of whiteness as property and, in particular, exclusion laws and bars to naturalization and citizenship for Asian Americans as a type of property right. As we know, the formation of the US nation-state entailed—and continues to entail—a history of institutionalized exclusions, legal and otherwise. Part of our introduction focused on the transatlantic slave trade and indigenous dispossession. Here, it is vital to consider the long history of legalized exclusion of Asian American immigrants and citizens alike—from Japanese internment and indefinite detention during World War II to earlier exclusion acts legislated by Congress, brokered by the executive, and upheld by the judiciary against every Asian immigrant group.15 For example, from 1882 to 1943, Chinese immigrants experienced the longest legalized history of exclusion and bars to naturalization and citizenship—the first raced-based exclusions in US history. To cite but one specific instance, in 1888 the US Congress retroactively terminated the legal right of some twenty thousand Chinese residents to reenter the United States after visiting China. Those excluded from reentry were also barred from recovering their personal property remaining in the country, underscoring the ways in which race, citizenship, and property were simultaneously managed by the state to control and restrict flows of both Asian labor and capital. This law was followed by a series of further exclusion laws, as well as accompanied by legislative acts against miscegenation and the ownership of private property, culminating in the National Origins Act (1924) and the Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934), which effectively halted all immigration from Asia for an indefinite period. As Teemu Ruskola notes, at the very historical moment when “the United States was pleased to refer to its China policy as Open Door … it hardly escaped the Chinese that the door swung one way only.”16 Yet, in our multicultural and colorblind age, few people remember this history of racially motivated discrimination against Asian Americans that laid the legal foundation for the emergence of the figure of the “illegal immigrant” and of “alien citizenship” preoccupying so much of political debate concerning immigration today. This history of exclusion is barely taught in US universities or high schools—indeed, colorblindness and the model minority myth demand a forgetting of these events of group discrimination in the name of abstract equality and individual meritocracy. A return to this history thus expands our prior analyses of race as relation and whiteness as property to consider how the legal mechanisms of citizenship have broadly functioned as a kind of restricted property right. For Asian immigrants, these mechanisms have mediated a long history of social exclusion and inclusion in US law and society. Racial melancholia can be seen as one profound psychic effect marking these histories of legal exclusion from the nation-state and prohibitions from national belonging. Today, discourses of American exceptionalism and democratic myths of abstract equality and individualism demand a forgetting of these formative losses and exclusions, an enforced psychic amnesia that can return only as a type of repetitive national haunting—a type of negative or absent presence.17 The contemporary model minority stereotype that defines Asian Americans is both a product of—and productive of—this negative or absent presence.18 Asian American model minority discourse emerged in the postwar period after the lifting of legalized exclusion—in the wake of Cold War conflict, the US civil rights movements, and the reformation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Hart-Celler Act) of 1965. The Hart-Celler Act abolished the earlier immigration quotas based on national origins at the heart of US immigration policy for nearly half a century, replacing it with a system of preferences focused on the technical skills of immigrants and on family reunification. It dramatically shifted immigration patterns to the United States and spurred a “brain drain” of settlers from Asia (and Latin America). At the same time, Hart-Celler also created a vast and largely unacknowledged force of low-income and undocumented migrants from South Asia, new areas of China, particularly Fujian province, and Southeast Asia. This “yellowing” of the US nation-state reversed a long history of anti-Asian exclusion precisely under the banner of model minority citizenship and the collective forgetting of this history of exclusion and its unauthorized subjects. The model minority myth identifies the academic success of second-generation Asian American immigrant children as dispositive of the United States as a land of equal opportunity free of racial discrimination or distress. Thereby, it functions as a national tool that manages and erases a long history of institutionalized exclusion by characterizing Asian American success precisely as the result—rather than something that occurred despite the lack—of equal opportunity in the United States. In turn, the deployment of the model minority myth configures the unequal status of African Americans in US culture and society as a self-inflicted injury. Resisting the invidious political juxtaposition of Asian American “success” with African American “failure,” comparative race scholars have sought to reformulate this regulatory dialectic. Over a hundred years ago, W. E. B. Du Bois asked African Americans in The Souls of Black Folk (1903), “How does it feel to be a problem?”19 Today, comparative race scholars have revised Du Bois’s earlier inquiry, asking Asian Americans, “How does it feel to be a solution?”20 (We return to this dynamic in detail is chapter 3 on parachute children and psychic nowhere.) Put in terms of comparative race relations, Ellen Wu observes that during the prewar era of exclusion and yellow peril, Asians were defined as definitely not white. However, following the postwar era of inclusion, citizenship, and the emergence of model minority stereotype, Asians were defined as definitely not black.21 Understanding this triangulation is key to apprehending the ways in which racial binaries of black and white mask complex social relations of race while preventing political coalitions and alliances. Effacing unequal histories of racial discrimination, this divide and conquer strategy emerges most forcefully today in contemporary debates about affirmative action that seek to pit the interests of African Americans and Asian Americans against one another. The model minority stereotype is a myth because it homogenizes widely disparate Asian American and Asian immigrant groups by generalizing them all as academically and economically successful, with no social problems to speak of. In this manner, the stereotype works to deny, in Lisa Lowe’s words, the “heterogeneity, hybridity, and multiplicity” of various Asian American individuals and groups who do not fit its ideals of model citizenry.22 The pervasiveness of the model minority stereotype in our contemporary national imagination thus works as one important melancholic mechanism facilitating the erasure and loss of repressed Asian American identities as well as histories of discrimination and exclusion. These identities and histories can return only as a type of ghostly presence. In this sense, the Asian American model minority subject also endures in the US historical imaginary as a melancholic national object—as a haunting specter to democratic ideals of inclusion that cannot quite get over these legislated histories of loss. The psychic consequences that this model of national melancholia has exacted on the Asian American psyche are extensively explored and interrogated in Asian American cultural productions. One compelling example comes from Maxine Hong Kingston’s China Men (1980). In Kingston’s historical novel, an imaginary chronicle of several successive generations of male ancestors in the United States, the narrator speculates about the disappearance of the “Grandfather of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.” After he helps to complete the transcontinental railroad, the greatest technological feat of ﻿the nineteenth century, Ah Goong vanishes. Kingston writes, “Maybe he hadn’t died in San Francisco, it was just his papers that burned; it was just that his existence was outlawed by Chinese Exclusion Acts. The family called him Fleaman. They did not understand his accomplishments as an American ancestor, a holding, homing ancestor of this place.”23 Kingston understands that the law’s refusal to recognize Chinese immigrants as citizens “outlaws” their existence, subjecting them to legal erasure as well as institutional violence: “It was dangerous to stay,” she observes in the context of the “Golden Spike” ceremony commemorating the railroad’s completion. “The Driving Out had begun. Ah Goong does not appear in railroad photographs.”24 At the same time, Kingston also underscores how this historical repudiation of the Asian laborer gains its psychic efficacy through a simultaneous internalization of its interdictions on the part of those excluded themselves. That is, the grandfather’s own family members refuse to recognize him as “an American ancestor, a holding, homing ancestor of this place.” They cannot perceive the “Fleaman’s” accomplishments building the transcontinental railroad as legitimizing his membership in the American nation. How, in turn, can it be possible to see themselves as legitimate members of this society? In this regard, racial melancholia can be described as splitting the Asian American psyche. This cleaving of the psyche can be productively thought about in terms of an altered, racialized model of classic Freudian fetishism.25 That is, assimilation into the national fabric demands a psychic splitting on the part of the Asian American subject who knows and does not know, at once, that she or he is part of the larger social body. In the same breath, fetishism also describes mainstream society’s disavowal and projection of otherness onto a disparaged group that is then homogenized and reduced to a stereotype. In this manner, racial fetishism delineates a psychic process by which difference is assumed and projected and then negated and denied, returning us to social dynamics of Myrdal’s “American dilemma.”