# Palm R1

## NC

### OFF – TBODY

#### Interpretation – 1AC must use personal knowledge, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals, to garner offense.

Reid-Brinkley, Shanara (2008),” The Harsh Realities Of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance and Style” Retrieved from <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf> Taja1h

The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence. As Green argues, their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.”57 In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledgemaking practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.”58 Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claims in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.59

#### Violation – [Extempt]

#### Prefer

#### 1] Pornotroping: The 1AC narrates forms of violence for ballots commodifying experience and degrading them to high school debate rounds and detaching ourselves from the violence. This turns the aff because none of your impacts are achieved only recreating cruel optimism.

#### 2] Embodiment – Without embodiment the aff does nothing. Their method illusory so voting aff doesn’t do the benefits it discusses. It only matters if you have a connection with the advocacy, means vote neg on presumption. Also turns their method since it filters out whiteness.

**Campbell 97** [Fiona, [members.tripod.com/FionaCampbell/speech\_acts\_on\_problematising\_empowerment.htm](http://members.tripod.com/FionaCampbell/speech_acts_on_problematising_empowerment.htm), 12-04-07] Brackets in original

So who am I to speak, to be listened to? And why is it important to identify my speaking position? The word‘ in spoken or written form (sometimes referred to as Discourse), is the site that both power and knowledge meet. Which is why speech acts can be inherently dangerous**. Furthermore a personin a Privileged speaking position, such as myself, has a political/ethical responsibility to interrogate his/her relationship” to subordinated and disadvantaged peoples** and declare their „interest‟. On this point, La Trobe University, Professor Margaret Thornton states ―assumed objectivity of **knowledge itself camouflage not only the fact that it always has a standpoint, but that it also serves an ideological purpose**‖ (Thornton 1989: 125**). Refusing to declare one‟s speaking position, I argue constitutes not only a flagrant denial of the privileging effect of speech, but must be considered as an act of complicity to systematically mislead**. I speak tonight from what I would term, a privileged speaking position. As someone who has been exposed to tertiary education, had an opportunity to read and reflect on many books and ideas, with a job and more particularly, as a teacher. Indeed, for some I act as a mentor - the one who ‗knows something about knowledge‘. On the other hand, I am deeply ambivalent about my ‗expertise‘ to engage in the act of public speech talk. For am from the margins, the client, patient, the ‗riff raff‘, flotsam and jetsam of society and might say - somewhat ‗deviant‘. It is important to come clean about my speaking position, my knowledge standpoint and declare my interests: I speak for myself as a woman who has experienced youth homelessness, childhood violence and later ‗disability‘. **Before I speak I am required to undertake a process of self-examination, to scrutinise my representational politics, to immerse myself in a self-reflexive interrogation and discern “what [my] representational politics authorises and who it erases** … ―(Howe 1994: 217). Do I speak for myself or others? Am I making gross generalisations about groups in the community? Does my speech contain unacknowledged assumptions and values? More specifically, within this process of reflection, **I am required to examine the context and location from which I speak, in order to ascertain whether it is ―allied with structures of oppression … [or] … allied with resistance to oppression.**

#### 3] Accessibility – models of debate that don’t meet the three tiered process are uniquely inaccessible for oppressed bodies because they’re forced to invest in a system that is terminally juxtaposed in opposition to their very identity.

#### TVA – [extempt]

#### Drop the debater – we indict their model of debate. Evaluate the T-shell through competing interpretations – you cannot be reasonably oppressive, and reasonability brightlines are arbitrary which requires judge intervention. No RVIs or impact turns – you should not win for proving you’re accessible, and their model deters debaters from indicting oppressive practices.

NC therory first – our absue is off your abuse, turns time skew since u skewed 7 minutes of the nc

### OFF – Legal OR

#### The 1AC notion that the absence of law is bad and the foreign countries need regulations of space is a site of legal orientalism that is fueled by Sinocentric ideology.

**Ruskola 1** Teemu Ruskola, *Legal Orientalism*, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 179 (2002).  
Available at: <https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol101/iss1/4> //Nato

Below, I analyze the processes by which claims of the putative absence of law in China have become part of the observers' cultural identity and, in tum, contribute to the contents of the observations themselves. In the final analysis, the object of my inquiry is certain Western representations of Chinese law and the notions of legality and legal subjectivity that they imply. The project is ultimately hermeneutical in Gadamer's sense: its goal is "not to develop a procedure" for understanding Chinese law "but to clarify the conditions in which [such] understanding takes place."28 Whether we like it or not, legal Orientalism is one condition of Western knowledge of Chinese law. However, while we in the West are perhaps bemused to learn of the traditional Sinocentric worldview - the Chinese word for "China" means "Middle Kingdom" - we nevertheless accept with utmost unselfconsciousness the notion that we are the First World, twiceremoved from the soi-disant Third World. To be sure, the distance is shrinking, as the Second World has essentially disappeared. Yet our occidental solipsism aside, cultures do not come labeled with ordinal numbers. Given the traditional Eurocentrism of legal scholarship,29 perhaps the category of "law" obscures more than it illuminates; might we not be better off with the study of, say, "comparative social control," rather than comparative law?30

Their rhetoric is complicit in this violence.

1AC Aganaba-Jeanty 16 recut Strake(, T., 2016. Space Sustainability and the Freedom of Outer Space. [online] Taylor & Francis. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2016.1148463> [Accessed 15 December 2021] Timiebi is an assistant professor of Space and Society, in the School for the Future of Innovation in Society, an affiliate faculty with the Interplanetary Initiative, a senior global futures scientist with the Global Futures Lab, and holds a courtesy appointment at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, all at Arizona State University. Timiebi was a post-doctoral fellow and is a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) based in Waterloo, Ontario Canada where she focused on environmental and space governance. Timiebi was Executive Director of the World Space Week Association coordinating the global response to the UN 1999 declaration that World Space Week should be celebrated Oct 4-10 annually. She is currently on the Advisory Board for the Space Generation Advisory Council supporting the UN Programme on Space Applications. She is also on the Science Advisory Board of World View Enterprises and the SETI Institute. - pp. 10-13.)-rahulpenu

#### This logic emphasizes that “the more different countries, companies, and individuals depend on space for a growing array of purposes, the more they need **equitable rules**, **shared decision-making procedures**, and **effective compliance mechanisms** to maximize the benefits that they all can gain from space, while minimizing risks from irresponsible space behaviors or deliberate interference with legitimate space activities.”52 While it is acknowledged that such a need exists, the difficulty in reaching agreement on how to bring it about is one reason why some states are more focused on producing a dialogue on long-term sustainability. This is seen in the proliferation of reports outlining best practices and options that enhance sustainability through increased information sharing, as well as a focus on technical issues rather than on the creation of any new legal regimes.

#### The Impact is Oriental Despotism – eastern subjectivity becomes no longer individualized by concentrated by the state and becomes an anti-model through negative semantics. That leads to legal erasure and anti asian violence.

**Ruskola 2** Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 179 (2002).  
Available at: <https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol101/iss1/4> //Nato

I begin the account of Chinese legal subjectivity, or its absence, by outlining Hegel's vision of China in his Philosophy of History. I do so without any implication that Hegel "invented" Orientalism or is somehow singularly responsible for it. Uninterested in either accusing or excusing its author,139 I use the Philosophy of History simply as a textual case study, for it happens to provide a truly classic statement of many Orientalist ideas that continue to structure the perception of Chinese law even today. According to Hegel, "The history of the world travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning."140 In Hegel's dual ontology, Oriental states "belong to mere space," or "un-Historical History," while the West exists in the "Form of time."141 According to Hegel, With the Empire of China History has to begin, for it is the oldest, as far as history gives us any information, and its principle has such substantiality, that for the empire in question it is at once the oldest and the newest. Early do we see China advancing to the condition in which it is found at this day, for as the contrast between objective existence and subjective freedom of movement within it, is still wanting, every change is excluded, and the fixedness of character which recurs perpetually takes the place of what we should call the truly historical.142 Hegel's statement of China's extraordinary stability is no doubt extreme, yet it has many historical variations.143 In Marx's scathing metaphor, China "vegetates in the teeth of time,"144 while Weber saw in Confucianism a religion that worshipped the status quo and thus radically impeded China's passage into modernity.145 In Hegel's particular teleological view, History's end goal is the accomplishment of freedom, which coincidentally culminates in the political system of Prussia. In contrast, China, standing at the threshold of History, is the paradigmatic example of "Oriental Despotism." Despotism is in fact the natural form of government for the Chinese, for the simple reason that they do not exist as individual subjects. In Hegel's words, in China "all that we call subjectivity is concentrated in the supreme Head of the State,"146 while "individuals remain mere accidents."147 This despotism results in part from a confusion between family and state: "The Chinese regard themselves as belonging to the family, and at the same as children of the state."148 By implication, the Chinese also lack a proper distinction between law and morality: moral dicta are expressed in the form of laws, but lacking subjectivity, the Chinese obey these laws merely as external forces, like children who fear parental punishment.149 Analyzed as an Orientalist discourse, Hegel's account accomplishes several things. First, the purported fact that China is timeless and static implies that the West is not.150 Second, imputing to the Chinese a lack of subjectivity and moral character suggests that Westerners do not lack those progressive qualities. Third, observing that the Chinese are confused about the real nature of "law" establishes the European legal ordering as proper. The Orientalist implications are not difficult to grasp: China is an anti-model and stands for everything that we would not wish to be - or admit to being. This is an entirely negative definition: China is basically just a "glimpse of what it itself is not," viz., we, the Occident.151 Hegel, Marx, and Weber are classical European Orientalists whose work ultimately affirms the superiority of Western civilization and law.152 However, they do not exhaust the universe of legal Orientalisms, which vary by historical and cultural context. The anti immigrant Orientalism of nineteenth-century United States provides an example of a peculiarly American form of Orientalism.153 As one historian of Chinese immigration observes, nineteenth-century Americans viewed almost every aspect of Chinese life as an illustration of their backwardness: "wearing white for mourning, purchasing a coffin while still alive, dressing women in pants and men in skirts, shaking hands with oneself in greeting a friend, writing up and down the page, eating sweets first and soup last, etc."154 The usefulness of this particular Orientalist discourse lay in its role in justifying the legal exclusion of Chinese immigrants at that historical moment. Indeed, the text of a 1878 report by the California State Senate Committee on Chinese Immigration sounds as though it had been excerpted directly from Hegel's Philosophy of History: The Chinese are ... able to underbid the whites in every kind of labor. They can be hired in masses; they can be managed and controlled like unthinking slaves. But our laborer has an individual life, cannot be controlled as a slave by brutal masters, and this individuality has been required by the genius of our institutions, and upon these elements of character the State depends for defense and growth.155 Such sentiments may have very much a nineteenth-century flavor, but consider also the following analysis of the Chinese immigration exclusion, made by a federal judge in the 1920s: The yellow or brown racial color is the hall-mark of Oriental despotisms, or was at the time the original naturalization law was enacted. It was deemed that the subjects of these despotisms, with their fixed and ingrained pride in the type of their civilization, which works for its welfare by subordinating the individual to the personal authority of the sovereign, as the embodiment of the state, were not fitted and suited to make for the success of a republican form of Government. Hence they were denied citizenship.156 To the judge, it was thus self-evident that the Congress's exclusion of the Chinese from immigration was not based on "color" but cultural disqualification for citizenship.157 That is, the Chinese were so radically "un-legal" that they were simply not capable of the kind of selfgovernance that was required by America's "republican form of Government."