### 1

#### Interpretation – 1AC must use personal knowledge, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals, to garner offense.

Reid-Brinkley, Shanara (2008),” The Harsh Realities Of “Acting Black”: How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance and Style” Retrieved from <https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/reid-brinkley_shanara_r_200805_phd.pdf> Taja1h

The process of signifyin’ engaged in by the Louisville debaters is not simply designed to critique the use of traditional evidence. As Green argues, their goal is to “challenge the relationship between social power and knowledge.”57 In other words, those with social power within the debate community are able to produce and determine “legitimate” knowledge. These legitimating practices usually function to maintain the dominance of normative knowledgemaking practices, while crowding out or directly excluding alternative knowledge-making practices. The Louisville “framework looks to the people who are oppressed by current constructions of power.”58 Jones and Green offer an alternative framework for drawing claims in debate speeches, they refer to it as a three-tier process: A way in which you can validate our claims, is through the three-tier process. And we talk about personal experience, organic intellectuals, and academic intellectuals. Let me give you an analogy. If you place an elephant in the room and send in three blind folded people into the room, and each of them are touching a different part of the elephant. And they come back outside and you ask each different person they gone have a different idea about what they was talking about. But, if you let those people converse and bring those three different people together then you can achieve a greater truth.59

#### Violation – [Extempt]

#### Prefer

#### 1] Pornotroping: The 1AC narrates forms of violence for ballots commodifying experience and degrading them to high school debate rounds and detaching ourselves from the violence. This turns the aff because none of your impacts are achieved only recreating cruel optimism.

#### 2] Embodiment – Without embodiment the aff does nothing. Their method illusory so voting aff doesn’t do the benefits it discusses. It only matters if you have a connection with the advocacy, means vote neg on presumption. Also turns their method since it filters out whiteness.

**Campbell 97** [Fiona, [members.tripod.com/FionaCampbell/speech\_acts\_on\_problematising\_empowerment.htm](http://members.tripod.com/FionaCampbell/speech_acts_on_problematising_empowerment.htm), 12-04-07] Brackets in original

So who am I to speak, to be listened to? And why is it important to identify my speaking position? The word‘ in spoken or written form (sometimes referred to as Discourse), is the site that both power and knowledge meet. Which is why speech acts can be inherently dangerous**. Furthermore a personin a Privileged speaking position, such as myself, has a political/ethical responsibility to interrogate his/her relationship” to subordinated and disadvantaged peoples** and declare their „interest‟. On this point, La Trobe University, Professor Margaret Thornton states ―assumed objectivity of **knowledge itself camouflage not only the fact that it always has a standpoint, but that it also serves an ideological purpose**‖ (Thornton 1989: 125**). Refusing to declare one‟s speaking position, I argue constitutes not only a flagrant denial of the privileging effect of speech, but must be considered as an act of complicity to systematically mislead**. I speak tonight from what I would term, a privileged speaking position. As someone who has been exposed to tertiary education, had an opportunity to read and reflect on many books and ideas, with a job and more particularly, as a teacher. Indeed, for some I act as a mentor - the one who ‗knows something about knowledge‘. On the other hand, I am deeply ambivalent about my ‗expertise‘ to engage in the act of public speech talk. For am from the margins, the client, patient, the ‗riff raff‘, flotsam and jetsam of society and might say - somewhat ‗deviant‘. It is important to come clean about my speaking position, my knowledge standpoint and declare my interests: I speak for myself as a woman who has experienced youth homelessness, childhood violence and later ‗disability‘. **Before I speak I am required to undertake a process of self-examination, to scrutinise my representational politics, to immerse myself in a self-reflexive interrogation and discern “what [my] representational politics authorises and who it erases** … ―(Howe 1994: 217). Do I speak for myself or others? Am I making gross generalisations about groups in the community? Does my speech contain unacknowledged assumptions and values? More specifically, within this process of reflection, **I am required to examine the context and location from which I speak, in order to ascertain whether it is ―allied with structures of oppression … [or] … allied with resistance to oppression.**

#### 3] Accessibility – models of debate that don’t meet the three tiered process are uniquely inaccessible for oppressed bodies because they’re forced to invest in a system that is terminally juxtaposed in opposition to their very identity.

#### TVA – [extempt]

#### Drop the debater – we indict their model of debate. Evaluate the T-shell through competing interpretations – you cannot be reasonably oppressive, and reasonability brightlines are arbitrary which requires judge intervention. No RVIs or impact turns – you should not win for proving you’re accessible, and their model deters debaters from indicting oppressive practices.

### Case

#### Stikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

Gourevitch 18 [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ froze major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.

#### 3] Free-riding: strikes are a form of free-riding since those who don’t participate still reap the benefits.

Dolsak and Prakash 19 [Nives and Aseem; We write on environmental issues, climate politics and NGOs; “Climate Strikes: What They Accomplish And How They Could Have More Impact,” 9/14/19; Forbes; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/prakashdolsak/2019/09/14/climate-strikes-what-they-accomplish-and-how-they-could-have-more-impact/?sh=2244a9bd5eed>] Justin

While strikes and protests build solidarity among their supporters, they are susceptible to collective action problems. This is because **the goals that strikers pursue tend to create non-excludable benefits**. That is, benefits such as climate protection can be enjoyed by both strikers and non-strikers. Thus, large participation in climate strikes will reveal that in spite of free-riding problems, a large number of people have a strong preference for climate action.

#### 4] The aff homogenizes all strikes as an unconditional right which is unethical.

Loewy 2K, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

It would seem then that the ethical considerations for workers striking in an industry such as a shoe factory or a chain grocery store are quite different from the ethical considerations for workers in sanitation, police, or fire departments, or for professionals such as teachers or those involved directly in healthcare. Even in the latter “professional” category, there are subtle but distinct differences of “rights” and obligations. However, one cannot conclude that for workers in essential industries strikes are simply ethically not permissible, whereas they are permissible for workers in less essential industries. Strikes, by necessity, injure another, and injuring another cannot be ethically neutral. Injuring others is prima facie ethically problematic—that is, unless a good and weighty argument for doing so can be made, injuring another is not ethically proper. Striking by a worker, in as much as doing so injures another or others, is only a conditional right. A compelling ethical argument in favor of striking is needed as well as an ethical argument in favor of striking at the time and in the way planned. It remains to delineate the conditions under which strikes, especially strikes by workers in essential industries and even more so by persons who consider themselves to be “professionals,” may legitimately proceed and yet fulfill their basic purpose.