# AC Trips

## 1AC – Shell

### 1AC – Overview

#### The aff is two independent warrants for offense under the ROB – each piece of offense acts on its own.

### 1AC – Framing

#### The ROB is to reject every instance of anti-asianness in the classroom – anything else normalizes violence

Eng & Han 1 [Asian], DAVID L. ENG & SHINHEE HAN [David L. Eng is Richard L. Fisher Professor of English as well as Graduate Chair of the English Department at UPenn. He is also Professor in the Program in Asian American Studies, the Program in Comparative Litera Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America (Duke University Press) as well as the Coeditor (with Alice Y. Hom) of Q&A: Queer in Asian America (Temple University Press, 1998). His current project is a co-edited collection (with David Kazanjian) entitled Loss: Mourning and Melancholia in the Twentieth Century. Shinhee Han, C.S.W., is a psychotherapist at the Counseling & Psychological Services of Columbia University. She is a doctoral candidate in the Shirley M. Ehrenkranz School of Social Work at New York University and maintains a private practice in New York City.], RACIAL MELANCHOLIA, RACIAL DISSOCIATION: On the Social and Psychic Lives of Asian Americans, DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS, Durham and London, 2019, ghs//BZ Recut/Tagged Nato

NATIONAL MELANCHOLIA For Asian Americans and other people of color, suspended assimilation into mainstream culture may involve not only debilitating personal consequences; ultimately, it also constitutes the foundation for a type of national melancholia, a collective national haunting, with destructive effects. In Caucasia, the ambivalence characterizing the narrator’s passing into whiteness leaves her with the constant and eerie feeling of “contamination.”13 Writing about the nature of collective identifications, Freud notes in “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921), “In a group every sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest. This is an aptitude very contrary to his nature, and of which a man is scarcely capable, except when he makes part of a group.”14 Our analysis insists on a consideration of what happens when the demand to sacrifice the personal to collective interest is accompanied not by inclusion in—but rather exclusion from—the larger group. It reorients psychic problems of racial melancholia toward social problems concerning legal histories of whiteness as property and, in particular, exclusion laws and bars to naturalization and citizenship for Asian Americans as a type of property right. As we know, the formation of the US nation-state entailed—and continues to entail—a history of institutionalized exclusions, legal and otherwise. Part of our introduction focused on the transatlantic slave trade and indigenous dispossession. Here, it is vital to consider the long history of legalized exclusion of Asian American immigrants and citizens alike—from Japanese internment and indefinite detention during World War II to earlier exclusion acts legislated by Congress, brokered by the executive, and upheld by the judiciary against every Asian immigrant group.15 For example, from 1882 to 1943, Chinese immigrants experienced the longest legalized history of exclusion and bars to naturalization and citizenship—the first raced-based exclusions in US history. To cite but one specific instance, in 1888 the US Congress retroactively terminated the legal right of some twenty thousand Chinese residents to reenter the United States after visiting China. Those excluded from reentry were also barred from recovering their personal property remaining in the country, underscoring the ways in which race, citizenship, and property were simultaneously managed by the state to control and restrict flows of both Asian labor and capital. This law was followed by a series of further exclusion laws, as well as accompanied by legislative acts against miscegenation and the ownership of private property, culminating in the National Origins Act (1924) and the Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934), which effectively halted all immigration from Asia for an indefinite period. As Teemu Ruskola notes, at the very historical moment when “the United States was pleased to refer to its China policy as Open Door … it hardly escaped the Chinese that the door swung one way only.”16 Yet, in our multicultural and colorblind age, few people remember this history of racially motivated discrimination against Asian Americans that laid the legal foundation for the emergence of the figure of the “illegal immigrant” and of “alien citizenship” preoccupying so much of political debate concerning immigration today. This history of exclusion is barely taught in US universities or high schools—indeed, colorblindness and the model minority myth demand a forgetting of these events of group discrimination in the name of abstract equality and individual meritocracy. A return to this history thus expands our prior analyses of race as relation and whiteness as property to consider how the legal mechanisms of citizenship have broadly functioned as a kind of restricted property right. For Asian immigrants, these mechanisms have mediated a long history of social exclusion and inclusion in US law and society. Racial melancholia can be seen as one profound psychic effect marking these histories of legal exclusion from the nation-state and prohibitions from national belonging. Today, discourses of American exceptionalism and democratic myths of abstract equality and individualism demand a forgetting of these formative losses and exclusions, an enforced psychic amnesia that can return only as a type of repetitive national haunting—a type of negative or absent presence.17 The contemporary model minority stereotype that defines Asian Americans is both a product of—and productive of—this negative or absent presence.18 Asian American model minority discourse emerged in the postwar period after the lifting of legalized exclusion—in the wake of Cold War conflict, the US civil rights movements, and the reformation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Hart-Celler Act) of 1965. The Hart-Celler Act abolished the earlier immigration quotas based on national origins at the heart of US immigration policy for nearly half a century, replacing it with a system of preferences focused on the technical skills of immigrants and on family reunification. It dramatically shifted immigration patterns to the United States and spurred a “brain drain” of settlers from Asia (and Latin America). At the same time, Hart-Celler also created a vast and largely unacknowledged force of low-income and undocumented migrants from South Asia, new areas of China, particularly Fujian province, and Southeast Asia. This “yellowing” of the US nation-state reversed a long history of anti-Asian exclusion precisely under the banner of model minority citizenship and the collective forgetting of this history of exclusion and its unauthorized subjects. The model minority myth identifies the academic success of second-generation Asian American immigrant children as dispositive of the United States as a land of equal opportunity free of racial discrimination or distress. Thereby, it functions as a national tool that manages and erases a long history of institutionalized exclusion by characterizing Asian American success precisely as the result—rather than something that occurred despite the lack—of equal opportunity in the United States. In turn, the deployment of the model minority myth configures the unequal status of African Americans in US culture and society as a self-inflicted injury. Resisting the invidious political juxtaposition of Asian American “success” with African American “failure,” comparative race scholars have sought to reformulate this regulatory dialectic. Over a hundred years ago, W. E. B. Du Bois asked African Americans in The Souls of Black Folk (1903), “How does it feel to be a problem?”19 Today, comparative race scholars have revised Du Bois’s earlier inquiry, asking Asian Americans, “How does it feel to be a solution?”20 (We return to this dynamic in detail is chapter 3 on parachute children and psychic nowhere.) Put in terms of comparative race relations, Ellen Wu observes that during the prewar era of exclusion and yellow peril, Asians were defined as definitely not white. However, following the postwar era of inclusion, citizenship, and the emergence of model minority stereotype, Asians were defined as definitely not black.21 Understanding this triangulation is key to apprehending the ways in which racial binaries of black and white mask complex social relations of race while preventing political coalitions and alliances. Effacing unequal histories of racial discrimination, this divide and conquer strategy emerges most forcefully today in contemporary debates about affirmative action that seek to pit the interests of African Americans and Asian Americans against one another. The model minority stereotype is a myth because it homogenizes widely disparate Asian American and Asian immigrant groups by generalizing them all as academically and economically successful, with no social problems to speak of. In this manner, the stereotype works to deny, in Lisa Lowe’s words, the “heterogeneity, hybridity, and multiplicity” of various Asian American individuals and groups who do not fit its ideals of model citizenry.22 The pervasiveness of the model minority stereotype in our contemporary national imagination thus works as one important melancholic mechanism facilitating the erasure and loss of repressed Asian American identities as well as histories of discrimination and exclusion. These identities and histories can return only as a type of ghostly presence. In this sense, the Asian American model minority subject also endures in the US historical imaginary as a melancholic national object—as a haunting specter to democratic ideals of inclusion that cannot quite get over these legislated histories of loss. The psychic consequences that this model of national melancholia has exacted on the Asian American psyche are extensively explored and interrogated in Asian American cultural productions. One compelling example comes from Maxine Hong Kingston’s China Men (1980). In Kingston’s historical novel, an imaginary chronicle of several successive generations of male ancestors in the United States, the narrator speculates about the disappearance of the “Grandfather of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.” After he helps to complete the transcontinental railroad, the greatest technological feat of ﻿the nineteenth century, Ah Goong vanishes. Kingston writes, “Maybe he hadn’t died in San Francisco, it was just his papers that burned; it was just that his existence was outlawed by Chinese Exclusion Acts. The family called him Fleaman. They did not understand his accomplishments as an American ancestor, a holding, homing ancestor of this place.”23 Kingston understands that the law’s refusal to recognize Chinese immigrants as citizens “outlaws” their existence, subjecting them to legal erasure as well as institutional violence: “It was dangerous to stay,” she observes in the context of the “Golden Spike” ceremony commemorating the railroad’s completion. “The Driving Out had begun. Ah Goong does not appear in railroad photographs.”24 At the same time, Kingston also underscores how this historical repudiation of the Asian laborer gains its psychic efficacy through a simultaneous internalization of its interdictions on the part of those excluded themselves. That is, the grandfather’s own family members refuse to recognize him as “an American ancestor, a holding, homing ancestor of this place.” They cannot perceive the “Fleaman’s” accomplishments building the transcontinental railroad as legitimizing his membership in the American nation. How, in turn, can it be possible to see themselves as legitimate members of this society? In this regard, racial melancholia can be described as splitting the Asian American psyche. This cleaving of the psyche can be productively thought about in terms of an altered, racialized model of classic Freudian fetishism.25 That is, assimilation into the national fabric demands a psychic splitting on the part of the Asian American subject who knows and does not know, at once, that she or he is part of the larger social body. In the same breath, fetishism also describes mainstream society’s disavowal and projection of otherness onto a disparaged group that is then homogenized and reduced to a stereotype. In this manner, racial fetishism delineates a psychic process by which difference is assumed and projected and then negated and denied, returning us to social dynamics of Myrdal’s “American dilemma.”

### 1AC – Linguistics

#### This is just a translation of the resolution in Taiwanese Chinese

#### TOC Topic

#### 已解決：私人實體佔用外層空間是不公正的。

#### Linguistic features signify personhood and creates stereotypes. Vote Aff to interrogate racial ideologies of language.

Rosa et al 17 Rosa, Jonathan, and Nelson Flores. "Unsettling race and language: Toward a raciolinguistic perspective." Language in society 46.5 (2017): 621-647. (Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Linguistics and Associate Professor in the Educational Linguistics Division)//Elmer recut Nato

Similar to Bucholtz & Hall's (2005) approach to identity and interaction, we are interested in **how processes of raciolinguistic enregisterment emblematize particular linguistic features as authentic** **signs of racialized models of personhood**. This is found not only in sociolinguistic accounts of the features that **compose** categories such as ‘**African American English’ (Green 2002) or ‘Chicano English’ (Fought 2003), but also popular stereotypes and modes of linguistic appropriation such as ‘Mock Spanish’ (Hill 2008), ‘Mock Asian’ (Chun 2004), ‘Hollywood Injun English’ (Meek 2006), and ‘linguistic minstrelsy’ (Bucholtz & Lopez 2011).** In each of these cases, minute **features of language**, including grammatical forms, prosodic patterns, and morphological particles, are emblematized as **sets of signs that correspond to racial categories**. Crucially, as Meek (2006) demonstrates, these forms need not correspond to empirically verifiable linguistic practices in order to undergo racial emblematization. Moreover, as Lo & Reyes (2009) point out, **the imagination of groups such as Asian Americans as lacking a distinctive racialized variety of English analogous to African American English or Chicano English, must be interrogated based on the racial logics that organize stereotypes about and societal positions of different racial groups on the one hand, and perceptions of their language practices on the other. Specifically, Lo & Reyes argue that racial ideologies constructing Asian Americans as model minorities who approximate whiteness are linked to language ideologies constructing Asian Americans as lacking a racially distinctive variety of English**. In related work, Chun (2016:81) shows how emblematized Mock Asian forms such as ‘ching-chong’ are located across ‘the important boundary between ‘Oriental talk’ and English’, which **sustains Asian Americans** alternately **as model minorities and forever foreigners. Thus, we must carefully reconsider seemingly ‘distinctive’ and ‘nondistinctive’ language varieties alike, by analyzing the logics that position particular racial groups and linguistic forms in relation to one another. That is, no language variety is objectively distinctive or nondistinctive, but rather comes to be enregistered as such in particular historical, political, and economic circumstances.**

#### The 1AC’s translation is linguistic activism that reclaims cultural agency and critiques stereotypes.

Duan 15 [Asian] Duan, Carlina. " The Space Between: An analysis of code-switching within Asian American poetry as strategic poetic device"(English Honors) AND" Here I Go, Torching"(Creative Writing Honors). Diss. 2015. (BA in Honors English from the University of Michigan)//Elmer recut Nato

In an interview with Women’s Review of Books literary magazine, Hong further discussed **the strategic role of translation as a form of linguistic activism** within her poetic work. When asked why she does not include translations from Korean to English within her own poetry, **Hong said: “I wanted to open up these schisms, to emphasize that memory, the filtering of human experience into poetry, is often fractured and not transparent, especially experiences which have always been bisected and undercut by two languages.**” She added, “I think I want to debunk the idea of **easy translation—whether it be the idea of literal translation or, as I said before, the translating of one’s experience into poetry**” (Hong 2002a, 15). Hong’s intentional decision to leave out English translations in her poetry creates a power dynamic between speaker and reader of the poem. Not only are “easy” translations dismantled and withheld from the reader, but, according to Hong, **codeswitching — without translation — also more accurately reflects her personal experiences of cultural and linguistic movement. Hong points out that human experiences and the world of memory, especially for bilingual speakers, are “not transparent” — not captured neatly by one language, but rather, “bisected” by the complexities of belonging to two (or more) languages, implying a movement between multiple spaces. Scholars describe poetic code-switching in this way as a navigation of power**. Literary scholar Benzi Zhang argues that code-switching makes apparent different levels of cultural knowledge for speaker and reader: **“[T]he insertion of […] foreign words effectively renders Asian sensibilities into English and signifies different positions of cultural agency” (Zhang 131). Building upon this idea of cultural agency, I argue that Hong uses Korean to consciously expose themes of exoticism and racial stereotyping that readers themselves may be (consciously or unconsciously) participating in. As a result, Hong creates agency for her speaker through critiquing culturally appropriative behavior, in addition to an agency in knowledge**; Hong’s speaker can access cultural understanding that her readers do not have. Yet, Hong does more than negotiate questions of audience access; **she uses code-switching to reflect her speaker’s lived experiences of Korean-American identity, grappling with multiple languages and cultural codes**. In “An Introduction to Chinese-American and Japanese American Literatures,” Jeffrey Chan et al. writes, “**The minority experience does not yield itself to accurate or complete expression on the white man’s language” (qtd. Zhang 137**). As Chang et al. suggest, code-switching embeds itself as a natural part of the “minority experience,” and is documented as such in Hong’s poems. **Thus, the poems not only act as social critique of exoticization, but further inhabit the embodied experiences of Korean-American female identities living in the U.S. — which, as Hong reveals, are complicated experiences of rage, agency, celebration, and shifting power dynamics.** Critics who have reviewed Hong’s work, such as Jan Clausen, have raised questions about the effect of Hong’s play with translation. Clausen, in a review titled “The poetics of estrangement,” published through the Women’s Review of Books, writes of Hong’s collection Translating Mo’um: “Hong deftly dismantles the romance of language as homeland, with results especially unnerving for the non-Korean-speaking reader” (Clausen 15). **According to Clausen, Hong’s work with code-switching** subverts traditional notions of the ‘native tongue’ as representative of “homeland**,” dismantling what a reader may expect of a Korean American author: that she use Korean language to specifically discuss her ethnic culture as a hyphenated American**. In other words, Hong’s code-switches function as intentional poetic protest against the reader’s expectations of the relationship between multilingual text and ethnic identity. As Clausen points out, such readings may anticipate that mother tongue is only introduced to speak about cultural difference or history, rather than used additionally as formal poetic device. **In this chapter, I reveal Hong’s awareness of Korean language and code-switching as tools in identity-construction. Rather than allow others to shape her identity for her, she remains dominant in shaping her identity — and her agency — for herself.**

#### The 1AC embodies the oppressor and weaponizes language to rupture debate through radical mimicry – doing what debaters do, except in Taiwanese Chinese – that’s our form of implementation and proves code switching is a valuable exercise

**Conquergood 2**, Performance Studies: Interventions and Radical Research, Dwight Conquergood, TDR (1988-) Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 145-156 (12 pages) Published by: [The MIT Press](https://www.jstor.org/publisher/mitpress) SJDH

Geertz's now classic depiction of the turn toward texts in ethnography and cultural studies needs to be juxtaposed with Zora Neal Hurston's much earlier and more complex rendering of a researcher reading the texts of subordinate others: The theory behind our tactics: "The white man is always trying to know into somebody else's business. All right, I'll set something outside the door of my mind for him to play with and handle. He can read my writ- ing but he sho' can't read my mind. I'll put this play toy in his hand, and he will seize it and go away. Then I'll say my say and sing my song." ([I935] I990:3) Hurston foregrounds the terrain of struggle, the field of power relations on which texts are written, exchanged, and read. Whereas Geertz does not problematize the ethnographer's will-to-know or access to the texts of others, Hurston is sensitive to the reluctance of the subordinate classes "to reveal that which the soul lives by" (2) because they understand from experience the ocular politics that links the powers to see, to search, and to seize. **Aware of the white man's drive to objectify, control, and grasp as a way of knowing, subordinate people cunningly set a text, a decoy, outside the door to lure him away from "homeplace" where subjugated but empowering truths and survival secrets are sheltered** (hooks 1990). In Hurston's brilliant example, vulnerable people actually redeploy the written text as a tactic of evasion and camouflage, performatively turning and tripping the textual fetish against the white person's will-to-know. "So driven in on his reading," as Williams would say, he is blinded by the texts he compulsively seizes: "knowing so little about us, he doesn't know what he is missing" (Hurston [1935] 1990:2). Once provided with something that he can "handle," "seize," in a word, apprehend, he will go away and then space can be cleared for performed truths that remain beyond his reach**: "then I'll say my say and sing my song." By mimicking the reifying textualism of dominant knowledge regimes, subordinate people can deflect its invasive power. This mimicry of textualism is a complex example of "mimetic excess" in which the susceptibility of dominant images, forms, and technologies of power to subversive doublings holds the potential for undermining the power of that which is mimed** (Taussig I993:254-55). Note that in Hurston's account, subordinate people read and write, as well as perform. **With her beautiful example of how a text can perform subversive work, she disrupts any simplistic dichotomy that would align texts with domination and performance with liberation**. In Hurston's example, **the white man researcher is a fool not because he values literacy, but because he valorized it to the exclusion of other media, other modes of knowing.** I want to be very clear about this point: textocentrism-not texts-is the problem. The constitutive liminality of performance studies lies in its capacity to bridge segregated and differently valued knowledges, drawing together legitimated as well as subjugated modes of in- quiry. From her ethnographic fieldwork in the coal camps and "hollers" of West Virginia, Kathleen Stewart documents an especially vivid example of text- performance entanglements: how official signs and local performances play off and with each other in surprising and delightful ways. After a dog bit a neighbor's child, there was much talk and worry throughout the camp about liability and lawsuits: Finally Lacy Forest announced that he had heard that "by law" if you had a NO TRESPASSING sign on your porch you couldn't be sued. So ev- eryone went to the store in Beckley to get the official kind of sign. Neighbors brought back multiple copies and put them up for those too old or sick or poor to get out and get their own. Then everyone called everyone else to explain that the sign did not mean them. In the end, every porch and fence (except for those of the isolated shameless who don't care) had a bright NO TRESPASSING, KEEP OFF sign, and people visited together, sitting underneath the NO TRESPASSING signs, looking out. (1996:141; see also Conquergood I997)4 Through the power of reframing, social performances reclaim, short-circuit, and resignify the citational force of the signed imperatives. Moreover, Ngugi wa Thiong'o's concept of "orature" complicates any easy **separation between speech and writing, performance and print, and reminds us how these channels of communication constantly overlap, penetrate, and mutually produce one another** (1998). The **performance studies project makes its most radical intervention, I believe, by embracing both written scholarship and creative work, papers and performances. We challenge the hegemony of the text best by reconfiguring texts and performances in horizontal, metonymic tension, not by replacing one hierarchy with another, the romance of performance for the authority of the text. The "liminal-norm" that Jon McKenzie identifies as the calling card of performance studies (2001:41) manifests itself most powerfully in the struggle to live betwixt and between theory and theatricality, paradigms and practices, critical reflection and creative accomplishment. Performance studies brings this rare hybridity into the academy, a commingling of analytical and artistic ways of knowing that unsettles the institutional organization of knowledge and disciplines.** The constitutive liminality of performance studies lies in its capacity to bridge segregated and differently valued knowledges, drawing together legitimated as well as sub- jugated modes of inquiry. There is an emergent genre of performance studies scholarship that epitomizes this text-performance hybridity. A number of performance studies-allied scholars create performances as a supplement to, not substitute for, their written research. These performance pieces stand alongside and in metonymic tension with published research. The creative works are developed for multiple professional rea- sons: they deepen experiential and participatory engagement with materials both for the researcher and her audience; they provide a dynamic and rhetorically compelling alternative to conference papers; they offer a more accessible and engaging format for sharing research and reaching communities outside academia; they are a strategy for staging interventions. To borrow Amanda Kemp's apt phrase, they use "performance both as a way of knowing and as a way of showing" (I998: I6). To add another layer to the enfolding convolutions of text and performance, several of these performance pieces have now been written up and published in scholarly journals and books (see Conquergood 1988; Becker, McCall, and Morris 1989; McCall and Becker I990; Paget I990; Pollock 1990; Jackson 1993, 1998; Allen and Garner 1995; Laughlin 1995; Wellin 1996; Jones 1997; Kemp I998). Performance studies is uniquely suited for the challenge of braiding together disparate and stratified ways of knowing. We can think through performance along three crisscrossing lines of activity and analysis. We can think of performance (I) as a work of imagination, as an object of study; (2) as a pragmatics of inquiry (both as model and method), as an optic and operator of research; (3) as a tactics of intervention, an alternative space of struggle. Speaking from my home department at Northwestern, we often refer to the three a's of performance studies: artistry, analysis, activism. Or to change the alliteration, a commitment to the three c's of performance studies: creativity, critique, citizenship (civic strug- gles for social justice). We struggle to forge a unique and unifying mission around the triangulations of these three pivot points: I. Accomplishment-the making of art and remaking of culture; creativity; embodiment; artistic process and form; knowledge that comes from doing, par- ticipatory understanding, practical consciousness, performing as a way of knowing. 2. Analysis-the interpretation of art and culture; critical reflection; thinking about, through, and with performance; performance as a lens that illuminates the constructed creative, contingent, collaborative dimensions of human com- munication; knowledge that comes from contemplation and comparison; concentrated attention and contextualization as a way of knowing. 3. Articulation-activism, outreach, connection to community; applications and interventions; action research; projects that reach outside the academy and are rooted in an ethic of reciprocity and exchange; knowledge that is tested by practice within a community; social commitment, collaboration, and contri- bution/intervention as a way of knowing: praxis. Notwithstanding the many calls for embracing theory and practice, universities typically institutionalize a hierarchical division of labor between scholars/re- searchers and artists/practitioners. For example, the creative artists in the Department of Fine Arts are separated from the "serious" scholars in the Department of Art History. Even when scholars and practitioners are housed within the same department, there often is internal differentiation and tracking, e.g., the literarytheorists and critics are marked off from those who teach creative and expository writing. This configuration mirrors an entrenched social hierarchy of value based on the fundamental division between intellectual labor and manual labor. In the academy, the position of the artist/practitioner is comparable to people in the larger society who work with their hands, who make things, and who are valued less than the scholars/theorists who work with their minds and are comparable to the more privileged professional-managerial class. Indeed, sometimes one of the reasons for forming schools of fine and performing arts is to protect artists/ practitioners from tenure and promotion committees dominated by the more institutionally powerful scholar/researchers who do not know how to appraise a record of artistic accomplishment as commensurate with traditional criteria of scholarly research and publication. The segregation of faculty and students who make art and perform from those who think about and study art and performance is based on a false dichotomy that represses the critical-intellectual component of any artistic work, and the imaginative-creative dimension of scholarship that makes a difference. A spurious, counterproductive, and mutually denigrating opposition is put into play that pits so-called "mere technique, studio skills, know- how" against so-called "arid knowledge, abstract theory, sterile scholarship." This unfortunate schism is based on gross reductionism and ignorance of "how the other half lives." Students are cheated and disciplines diminished by this academic apartheid. **The ongoing challenge of performance studies is to refuse and supercede this deeply entrenched division of labor, apartheid of knowledges, that plays out inside the academy as the difference between thinking and doing, interpreting and making, concep- tualizing and creating. A performance studies agenda should collapse this divide and revitalize the connections between artistic accomplishment, analysis, and articulations with communities; between practical knowledge (knowing how), propositional knowledge (knowing that), and political savvy (knowing who, when, and where).** This epistemological connection between creativity, critique, and civic engage- ment is mutually replenishing, and pedagogically powerful. Very bright, talented students are attracted to programs that combine intellectual rigor with artistic excellence that is critically engaged, where they do not have to banish their artistic spirit in order to become a critical thinker, or repress their intellectual self or political passion to explore their artistic side. Particularly at the PhD level, original scholarship in culture and the arts is enhanced, complemented, and complicated in deeply meaningful ways by the participatory understanding and community involvement of the researcher. This experiential and engaged model of inquiry is coextensive with the participant-observation methods of ethnographic research. The ongoing challenge of performance studies is to refuse and supercede this deeply entrenched division of labor, apartheid of knowledges, that plays out inside the academy as the difference between thinking and doing, interpreting and mak- ing, conceptualizing and creating. The division of labor between theory and practice, abstraction and embodiment, is an arbitrary and rigged choice, and, like all binarisms, it is booby-trapped. It's a Faustian bargain. If we go the one-way street of abstraction, then we cut ourselves off from the nourishing ground ofparticipatory experience. If we go the one-way street of practice, then we drive ourselves into an isolated cul-de-sac, a practitioner's workshop or artist's colony. Our radical move is to turn, and return, insistently, to the crossroads.

### 1AC – Kritik

#### Asian Americans subject formation is never complete – there is an ontological gap between the real and symbolic which is characterized by incomplete assimilation. Asian bodies are not our own but rather tools of society.

Kim 1 [Asian] (Chang-Hee Kim, The Fantasy of Asian America: Identity, Ideology, and Desire) 2009 klmd recut/tagged Nato

Fantasy of Asian American Identity The question of how Asian Americans are perceived as ‘permanent aliens’ in the U.S. is a common topic in Asian American studies. Frank H. Wu states that “where are you from” is a question anyone with an Asian face is continuously asked in the U.S. In his essay “Where Are You Really From,” he mentions that Asian Americans’ being mistaken for a foreigner has become their routine experience to the extent that they cannot be a real American. In everyday life in the United States, such awkward situations happen casually and regularly, and affect Asians and Asian Americans deeply, placing them in the status of permanent, yet never complete assimilation. Due to the popular circulation of knowledge informed by postcolonial studies in academia, the misrecognition of the Other has become a constant point of reference to support oppositional positions of “minoritized” in opposition to so-called epistemic violence9; our identities are constituted, exchanged, and recognized by the hegemonic social order justifying the legitimacy of existing arbitrary social structures. Given how the cognitive knowledge of ‘who we are’ is predetermined, we are subject to the pre-existing system 8 Who Killed Vincent Chin? is a 1987 documentary film directed by Christine Choy and produced by Renee Tajima-Pena about the death of Vincent Chin. It was nominated for an Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. 9 Gayatri C. Spivak theorizes the notion of “epistemic violence” in her renowned article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 31 of signs that creates a kind of epistemological gap between our knowledge of ourselves and how we are referred to. The recognition of ones’ identity as Asian, for instance, takes place when the public eye sees something in them that does not fully belong to them. It ascribes to their being a kind of fantasy that makes them “typical” Asians in terms of racial identification. Parts of their bodily appearances become determinants of their racial identity, functioning as an abstract sign that automatically refers to some concept of “Asian,” and their ontological being has its meaning only in relation to the conceptualized. Their subjectivity thus becomes regulated by, and subject to, the pre established system of racial identification insofar as it certifies “who they are.” It refers to the way in which any Asian American happens to be recognized as Charlie Chan. “Who they are,” in this sense, indicates, as Louis Althusser might put it, an ideological subject that the contingent and arbitrary rule of social agreements, however biased, constitutes. It is no wonder that Michael Omi and Howard Winant define racial formation as a “sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed” (RFUS 55). It is interesting to see the way in which particular parts of “what they are made of”—hair color, the shape of eyes, facial features—become the universal referent of “who they are.” They not only represent but also substitute for the imagined totality of their ontological being. In other words, their identitarian self has its ontological meaning reduced to the conceptual formality of what it means to be Asian American. The process of racial identification, as a result, occurs beyond their control and will in figuring out their self-identity. It keeps escaping and defying their basic desire to 32 differentiate their individual self from that of others. Essential to an understanding of how racial identification takes place is obviously such an uncontrollability of representations. Asian American identity exists as an abstract sign that makes sense in the context of the conceptual Asian like Charlie Chan—for example, the imagined as well as hegemonic system of Asian stereotypes. Within the discursive formality of the identity are imaginary elements that seem both extraneous and intrinsic to Asian American ontology. This epistemological difference in their self-identity stands for the gap. Fundamentally, the gap emerges when the hegemonic authority of public gaze defines “who they are” as typical of Asian Americans. That is, it comes out of the ontological inconsistency and contradiction of the representational system of Asian American identity vis-à-vis the totalitarian authority to recognize them “as such” in accordance with the pre-ontological formality of the conceptual Asian American. Nonetheless, Asian Americans’ bodies superfluously signify something excessive, more than “who they are,” an elusive meaning that is not always clear and definable vis-à-vis their racial identity. The discrepancy between the formalistic meaning of Asian American identity and the self-reflective or self-referential meaning of their subjective self consists in an indefinable dimension, or an ontological gap, within the identity. Metaphorically, it works as Charlie Chan’s apparitional power encompassing Asian Americans’ distinctive individualities within themselves. This apparition keeps haunting them, evoking others’ temptation to recognize the former as symbolic of the conceptual Asian. Given this, that Asian Americans’ distinctive subjectivity negates any given identity in terms of, say, race, can be seen as an antagonistic gesture of political resistance to U.S. culture, i.e., the public eye that 33 produces the stereotype of Asians as a fixed form of truth. Constituted as a cognitive system of knowledge that falls within the realm of common sense, stereotype rather turns Asian Americans into an appendix to the symbolic apparition or uncanny double that reifies their identity in the typical formality of “Asian”—that is, racial fantasy. Asian Americans become a puppet-like agent of Charlie Chan’s apparitional power evoking something in themselves more than themselves, which is projected upon their identity. It creates a division within the system of “commonsensical” representation—the conceptual (fantasy) vs. the original (imagination). The apparitional power of fantasy—invisible but effective to the public eye—is what combines the two for the sake of the communicative exchange of their identity as a cognitive sign. At the same time, the apparitional fantasy remains elusive and unidentifiable, making the gap between “who they are” and “who they are seen as.” Simply put, the former is the real of them whose subjectivity remains neither fully symbolized nor properly interpellated, an unfathomable dimension of Asian American identity that resists their being completely identified as a typical Asian as a whole. On the contrary, the latter refers to the symbolic figure of the Asian American that the public eye recognizes as one of Charlie Chan Asians. Although it is our fate to be social subjects dictated by the representational system that constitutes our identitarian position, the gap of the subject between real and symbolic never comes to a closure. The identitarian system of representation can maintain itself through social agreements for the communication between self and other. At stake in the system is the uncontrollability of representations intrinsic to the nature of the agreements making for the idealistic achievement of universal communication in 34 totality, yet it always remains incomplete. W. J. T. Mitchell observes, “Representation is that by which we make our will known and, simultaneously, that which alienates our will from ourselves in both the aesthetic and political spheres” (21). The system of representation, such as languages and bodily appearances, is a social construct making possible the communicative process of identification and, simultaneously, creating an epistemological void that prevents the communication from being fully accomplished. This gap is where fantasy with a spectral power operates in the process of identification and fills up the gap, and thus secures the discursive certainty of a community in which the ideological transparency of a hegemonic discourse comes true.

#### Debate is a communicative activity which forces coercive mimetism which gauges successful assimilation that excludes Asian bodies. Language marks impossible social compliance for the Asian and separates them from the rest of the students.

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﻿MIMICRY; OR, THE MELANCHOLIC MACHINE Racial melancholia as psychic splitting and national dis-ease opens on the interconnected terrains of mimicry, ambivalence, and the stereotype. In his seminal essay “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse,” Homi Bhabha describes the ways in which a colonial regime compels the colonized subject to mimic Western ideals of whiteness. At the same time, this mimicry is also condemned to failure. Bhabha writes, “Colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually reproduce its slippage, its excess, its difference.… Almost the same but not white.”28 Bhabha locates and labels the social imperative to assimilate as the colonial structure of mimicry. He highlights not only the social performance but also its inevitable, built-in failure. This doubling of difference that is almost the same but not quite, almost the same but not white, results in ambivalence, which comes to define the failure of mimicry. Here we elaborate on Bhabha’s observations of mimicry with its intrasubjective internalization into the psychic domain through the logic of racial melancholia. It is important to remember that, as with Bhabha’s analysis of mimicry in the colony, Freud marks ambivalence as one of melancholia’s defining characteristics. In describing the genealogy of ambivalence in melancholia, Freud himself moves from the domain of the social to the realm of the psychic. He notes that the “conflict due to ambivalence, which sometimes arises from real experiences, sometimes more from constitutional factors, must not be overlooked among the preconditions of melancholia.”29 According to Freud, melancholia not only traces an internalized pathological identification with what was once an external but now lost ideal. In this moving from outside to inside, we also get a strong sense of how social injunctions of mimicry configure individual psychic structures as split and dis-eased. The ambivalence that comes to define Freud’s concept of melancholia is one that finds its origins and routes in social history—in colonial and racial structures impelling performative displays of mimicry and man. It is crucial to extend Bhabha’s theories on colonial mimicry to the domestic landscape of race relations in the United States—a postcolonial nation itself—in order to consider how we might usefully explore this concept for Asian Americans. One potential site of investigation is the racial stereotype discussed above—the model minority myth. In an earlier essay titled “The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism,” Bhabha aligns ambivalence and splitting with the stereotype, suggesting that the performance of mimicry and the phenomenon of the stereotype be considered together. The stereotype, Bhabha writes, “is a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is always ‘in place,’ already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated … for it is the force of ambivalence that gives the colonial stereotype its currency.”30 If we conceptualize the model minority myth as a privileged stereotype through which Asian Americans appear as subjects in the contemporary social domain, then we gain a better understanding of how mimicry specifically functions as a material practice in racial melancholia. That is, Asian Americans are forced to mimic the model minority stereotype in order to be recognized by mainstream society—in order to be, in order to be seen at all. However, to the extent that this mimicry of the model minority stereotype functions only to estrange Asian Americans from mainstream norms and ideals (as well as from their own histories), mimicry can operate only as a melancholic process. As both a social and a psychic malady, mimicry and the model minority myth distance Asian Americans from the mimetic ideals of the nation. For Asian Americans, mimicry is always a partial success as well as a partial failure to assimilate into regimes of whiteness. Let us analyze this dynamic from yet another angle. Although Asian Americans are now largely thought of as model minorities exemplifying the “American dream,” this stereotype of material success is partial because it is configured primarily as economic achievement (in spite of extreme poverty in various Asian American communities) rather than social or cultural belonging. The putative success of the model minority subject comes to mask the limits of his political representation and agency. It covers over her inability to gain “full” and “well-rounded” subjectivities—to be politicians, athletes, artists, and activists, for example—to be recognized as a “typical American,” to invoke the exact title of Gish Jen’s novel from 1991. To occupy the model minority position, Asian American subjects must therefore submit to a model of economic rather than political and cultural legitimation. To this day, widespread social and parental pressures often dictate that Asian American students must opt for “safe”professional and upwardly mobile careers— doctor, engineer, lawyer— often at the expense of individual desires and psychic well-being—“doing well versus feeling well.”31They must not contest the dominant order of things; they must not “rock the boat”or draw attention to themselves. It is often difficult for our Asian American patients and students to articulate or to acknowledge their desires, as the model minority stereotype demands not only an enclosed but also a passive self-sufficiency and compliance. Drawing from Jacques Lacan’s idea of the subject as a desiring subject, Antonio Viego has described a similar prioritizing of needs over desires in the context of Latino immigration. He describes this process as the psychic production of a “dead subject,”the creation of a subject dead to his or her desires.32 Insofar as both social and parental pressures emphasize needs over desires— necessity over extravagance in Sau-ling W ong’s elegant formulation— melancholia and the death drive cannot be far behind.33 The model minority stereotype also delineates Asian Americans as academically successful but rarely well-rounded—well-rounded in tacit comparison to a normative white student body. Here is another example of Bhabha’s concept of mimicry as nearly successful imitation. This not quite successful performance attempts to cover over that gap—the failure of well­ roundedness— as well as that unavoidable ambivalence resulting from this tacit comparison in which the Asian American student is seen as lacking and not fully assimilated. This social failure incites a psychic ambivalence that characterizes the racialized subject’s identifications with dominant ideals of whiteness as pathological. This is an ambivalence that opens upon the landscape of melancholia and depression for many Asian American students. Those Asian Americans who do not fit into the model minority stereotype are altogether erased from—are not recognized by—mainstream society. Like Kingston’s grandfather in China Men, they are often rejected by their own families as well. The difficulty of negotiating this unwieldy stereotype is that, unlike most negative stereotypes of African Americans, the model minority myth is considered to be a “positive”representation— a model of social achievement and exceptionalism. In this regard, not only mainstream society but also Asian Americans themselves become attached to, and divided by, its seemingly admirable qualities without sufficiendy recognizing its liabilities—what the political theorist Wendy Brown describes as a “wounded attachment.”34 According to Bhabha, in its doubleness the stereotype, like mimicry, creates a gap embedded in an unrecognized structure of ambivalence. In Jen’s Typical American, for instance, we encounter Ralph Chang, who chases the American dream through his attempts to build a fried-chicken empire, the “Chicken Palace.”Eventually, the franchise fails, and the first “a”falls off the “Chicken Palace”sign which becomes “Chicken P\_lace.”This falling off is the linguistic corollary to the gap in the American dream that Ralph unsuccessfully mimes. Perhaps it is in this gap—in this emptiness—that melancholia emerges and comes to inhabit. It is also where the negotiation between mourning and melancholia is staged. MOURNING/MELANCHOLIA/IMMIGRATION The structure of mimicry gestures to the partial success and partial failure to mourn our identifications with whiteness. Moreover, it also gestures to our partial success and partial failure to mourn our identifications and affiliations with Asian cultures. Thus far, we have been focusing on the loss of whiteness as an ideal structuring the assimilation and racialization processes of second- generation Asian Americans. However, the lost object can be multifaceted. Since the reformation of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, demographically there are more first-generation Asian American immigrants living in the United States today than any other generations of Asian Americans (these patterns are shifting noticeably under globalization today, a topic of further discussion in part II). Examining Asian American experiences of exclusion from the mid-1990s, this chapter focuses on the second-generation offspring of these first-generation immigrants who at that time filled our classrooms and clinics. Hence, it focuses on the psychic dynamics of mourning and melancholia in relation to problems of immigration and intergenerational losses between first- and second-generation Asian Americans. Generationally, racial melancholia delineates a psychic process by which an intersubjective subject-subject relationship between mainstream and minority groups as well as between the first- and the second-generation Asian American parents and children becomes configured as an intrasubjective psychic predicament of loss and exclusion. The experience of immigration itself is based on a structure of mourning. When one leaves one’s country of origin—voluntarily or involuntarily—one must mourn a host of losses both concrete and abstract. These include homeland, family, language, identity, property, status in community—the list goes on. In Freud’s theory of mourning, one works through and finds closure to these losses by investing in new objects— in the American dream, for example. Our attention to the problematics of mimicry, performance, ambivalence, and the stereotype, as well as our earlier analysis of the legal history of exclusion and bars to naturalization and citizenship for Asian Americans, reveals a social structure that prevents the immigrant from fully assimilating into the American melting pot. From another perspective, it denies him or her the capacity to invest in new objects. The inability to invest in new objects, we must remember, is part of Freud’s definition of melancholia. Given the ways in which Asian American immigrants are foreclosed from fully assimilating into mainstream culture, are they consigned to a perpetually melancholic status? If so, how do we begin to address Freud’s notion of melancholia as pathological? Clearly not all Asian Americans are consigned to melancholy or depression. If this is the case, how do first-generation immigrants negotiate and mitigate their losses? How do their second-generation offspring inherit and inhabit these losses? If the losses suffered by first-generation immigrants are not resolved and mourned in the process of assimilation—if libido is not replenished by the investment in new objects, new communities, and new ideals—then the melancholia that ensues can be traumatically passed down to the second generation. At the same time, can the hope of assimilation and pursuit of the American dream also be transferred? If so, we might say that mourning and melancholia are reenacted and lived out by second-generation children in their own attempts to assimilate and to negotiate the American dream. Here, immigration and assimilation characterize a process involving not just mourning or melancholia but the intergenerational negotiation between mourning and melancholia. Configured as such, this notion begins to depathologize melancholia by situating it as the intersubjective unfolding and outcome of the mourning process that underwrites the various psychic investments and losses connected to the immigration experience. CASE HISTORY: ELAINE Let us turn to a clinical example. Elaine, a US-born Korean American female college student, grew up in Texas. Her father is a professor, and her mother is a homemaker. An academic dean referred Elaine to me (Dr. Han) in 1997 because she was at risk of failing her first year in college. In a tearful presentation, Elaine reported, “My parents have sacrificed everything to raise me here. If my parents had stayed in Korea, my mom would be so much happier and not depressed. She would have friends to speak Korean with, my father would be a famous professor, and we would be better off socially and economically. I wouldn’t be so pressured to succeed. They sacrificed everything for me, and now it’s up to me to please them, and to do well in school.”When asked the reasons for her academic probation, she responded, “I didn’t do well because at a certain point, I didn’t care anymore, about myself or anything else.” Elaine’s case is an illustration of an intergenerational transference between immigrant parents and a child that might be usefully described through the logic of racial melancholia. The loss experienced by the parents’failure to achieve the American dream—to achieve a standard of living and a level of social acceptance greater than what they could have putatively achieved in Korea— is a loss transferred onto and incorporated by Elaine for her to work out and to repair. In particular, Elaine reenacts these losses through her relationship with her mother. Elaine’s depression is a result of internalized guilt and residual anger that she not only feels toward but also identifies with in her mother. Through this incorporation, she also functions as the placeholder of her mother’s depression. This mother-daughter predicament has been widely debated in feminist circles.35 Here, the question is how race intersects and reconfigures what is considered a strongly gendered dynamic. This intersection of sexual and racial difference in first- and second- generation intersubjective conflict is a common narrative in Asian American literature as well. Numerous stories portray the first generation (and often the second generation) as being a lost generation—bereft, traumatized, with few material or psychic resources.36Is it, however, only at the moment in which the first generation acknowledges its disappointments and failure to achieve the American dream that this theme of first-generation sacrifice then emerges to be retroactively projected onto the second generation? In other words, are Asian American parents as completely selfless as the theme of sacrifice and ideals of Confucian filial tradition suggest, or is this idea a compensatory gesture that attaches itself to the losses, disappointments, and failures associated with immigration? Could the ambitions of Elaine’s father to become a professor in an American university have motivated the family’s immigration, or was it perhaps his inability to succeed in Korea—especially because of constraints on opportunities connected to various military conflicts during World War II and the ensuing Cold War? Sacrifice, it is important to remember, is built on the assumption of nonequivalence and the melancholic notion that what is forfeited and lost can never be recuperated. In turn, do children of immigrants “repay” this sacrifice only by repeating and perpetuating its melancholic logic—by berating and sacrificing themselves? But could sacrifice also be considered the displaced residue of hope— a hope for the repairing of melancholia, of achieving the American dream? Can hope, too, be transferred from parent to child, or from child to parent? Elaine’s case evokes Rea Tajiri’s moving documentary film History and Memory (1991).37 History and Memory is about a young Japanese American girl whose parents endure internment during World War II. Whereas the girl’s mother has repressed all memories of the internment experience, the daughter has nightmares that she cannot explain—recurring images of a young woman at a watering well. The daughter is depressed, and the parents argue over the etiology of her depression. Eventually, the daughter discovers that these nightmares are reenactments of the mother’s histories in camp. Ironically, the mother has history but no memory, while the daughter has memory but no history. For both mother and daughter, history and memory do not come together until the daughter visits the former site of the internment camp, Poston. There she realizes that it is her mother’s history that she remembers. Tajiri’s film is an eloquent disquisition on racial melancholia. It is a compelling example of the ways in which historical traumas of loss, grief, and forgetting are passed down from one generation to another unconsciously— how, as Freud remarks in his essay “The Unconscious”(1915), “the unconscious of one human being can react upon that of another, without passing through the conscious.”38The daughter’s psychic predicament illustrates Freud’s observation that the most difficult losses suffered in melancholia are unconscious ones, psychic forfeitures that cannot be properly grieved and for which Freud could offer no simple solution or remedy. Yet, at the same time, it also diverges from Freud’s conception of the disease insofar as it posits a theory of melancholia that is not individual but that is intergenerationally shared among members of a social group, Japanese American internees. It also departs from Freud’s definition of melancholia as pathology and permanence. Here, the hope for psychic health is stitched into the fabric of melancholia but only as an optative gesture that must be redeemed by subsequent generations. In contrast to Freud’s contention that melancholia is a classic intrasubjective psychic condition, Tajiri’s version of melancholia approaches this condition from a different perspective. It refines our theory of racial melancholia as a psychic state focused on bonds of displaced love and hate among a collective—an intersubjective collective— that might be addressed and resolved across generations. Indeed, in History and Memory the daughter’s return to Poston initiates an incipient healing process in her mother. In melancholia, the subject’s turning from outside (intersubjective) to inside (intrapsychic) threatens to render social history invisible. What is striking in both these examples, of Elaine and of History and Memory, is the manner in which the daughters’bodies and voices become substitutes for those of the mothers— not just the mothers’bodies and voices but also something that is unconsciously lost in them. To return to Freud, the melancholic “knows whom [s]he has lost but not what [s]he has lost in [her].”39Elaine’s narrative and the Japanese American daughter’s nightmares are not their own histories. These daughters have absorbed and been saturated by their mothers’losses. The mothers’voices haunt the daughters. These losses and voices are melancholically displaced from the external world of the social into the internal world of the psyche. The anger that these daughters feel toward the loved object is internalized as depression and anger toward the self. Freud’s essay reminds us that the reproaches against the self are, in fact, displaced reproaches against the loved object that have been shifted onto the individual’s own ego.40 In this respect, racial melancholia highlights a particular subject-object confusion, as it traces a trajectory from love to hate of the lost object, indeed orienting the production of racial hatred over love. In the course of moving from the outside world into the domain of the psyche, this hate is brought into the shelter of the ego, identified with the self, and subsequently transformed into self-hate. As such, the internal monologue that the daughters direct toward themselves should rightly be an external dialogue between daughter and mother —indeed, toward the larger social world around them. If racial melancholia traces the social exclusions of immigration, assimilation, and racialization as form of self-hate, how might we address the problem as a subject-subject relation, a subject-subject (com)plaint? In the Psychic Life of Power, Judith Butler writes, “The melancholic would have saidsomething, if he or she could, but did not, and now believes in the sustaining power of the voice. Vainly, the melancholic now says what he or she would have said, addressed only to himself, as one who is already split off from himself, but whose power of self-address depends upon this self-forfeiture. The melancholic thus burrows in a direction opposite to that in which he might find a fresher trace of the lost other, attempting to resolve the loss through psychic substitutions and compounding the loss as he goes.”41This turning from outside to inside threatens to erase the political bases of melancholia, and to obscure the history of the melancholic (racial) subject in relation to the subject of (racial) history, precisely as it configures hate as a displaced residue of love. To approach this dynamic from another angle, when Asian American students seek therapy, their mental health issues are overwhelmingly perceived as intergenerational familial conflicts. That is, they are often diagnosed as being exclusively symptomatic of cultural rather than social or political conflicts. By configuring Asian values and Confucian filial tradition as the exclusive source of all intergenerational dis-ease, a pathologized Asian culture comes to serve as an alibi for a panoply of mental health issues and symptoms.42 These predicaments may in fact trace their etiology not to questions of Asian cultural difference but rather to historical forms of institutionalized racism and economic exploitation—to the subject of (racial) history. The segregation of Asian American mental health issues into the domain of cultural difference covers over structural questions of institutional violence and inequality, as well as histories of whiteness as property, as they circulate both inside and outside the therapeutic space of the clinic. For instance, not to account for a history of Japanese internment and indefinite detention when analyzing Tajiri’s mother- daughter family conflict serves not only to repress and to deny this history but also to redouble and to intensify the source of the daughter’s melancholia and depression. Lowe writes in Immigrant Acts, “Interpreting Asian American culture exclusively in terms of the master narratives of generational conflict and filial relation essentializes Asian American culture, obscuring the particularities and incommensurabilities of class, gender, and national diversities among Asians. The reduction of the cultural politics of racialized ethnic groups, like Asian Americans, to first-generation/second-generation struggles displaces social differences into a privatized familial opposition. Such reductions contribute to the aestheticizing commodification of Asian American cultural differences, while denying the immigrant histories of material exclusion and differentiation.”43 A therapeutic process that solely attributes Asian cultural differences to intergenerational conflict may result in the failure to cure; even more, it may also serve to endanger further the mental health of the patient. CASE HISTORY: NELSON This discussion on intergenerational dilemmas of immigration and assimilation brings us to the related issue of mourning, melancholia, and language. Nelson, a first-generation Japanese American student who emigrated from Osaka to New Jersey when he was five, sought therapy with me (Dr. Han) in 1996, presenting chronic struggles with depression associated with racial conflict. Nelson is the eldest child and has two siblings, a brother and a sister, both of whom were born in the United States. Before Nelson entered school, his mother spoke only Japanese to the children. When Nelson started kindergarten, his teacher admonished his mother to replace Japanese with English at home if she wanted her children to assimilate and to become successful students. Despite the mother’s broken English, she followed the teacher’s instructions assiduously, speaking only English to her children. Nelson recounts a story that took place later in grade school. During a reading lesson, he mispronounced “crooked” as “crookd”(one syllable). His teacher shamed him publicly for his failed speech act—his failed act of mimicry —and demanded to know where he learned to mispronounce such a simple word. Nelson reluctantly replied that he learned this pronunciation from his mother. Nelson remembers, in particular, feelings of social embarrassment and shame from the ridicule of his teacher and classmates. What we learn about Nelson’s case history is that, although his original connection to the primary object (the mother) was through the Japanese language, this connection was interrupted by a foreign property, English. The mother’s poor mimicry of English severed and revised the earliest mother-child attachment, one brokered in Japanese. As such, Nelson could no longer mirror himself from his mother, in Japanese or in English. This estrangement from language, both native and foreign, is a double loss. Although acquiring a new language (English) should be perceived as a positive cognitive development, what is often not acknowledged sufficiently is the concomitant psychic trauma triggered by the loss of what had once been a safe, nurturing, and familiar language to the young child (Japanese). The loss of Japanese as a safe and nurturing object reveals another way to think about racial melancholia in relation to processes of immigration and assimilation. In Nelson’s case history, melancholia results not only from a thwarted identification with a dominant ideal of unattainable whiteness but also a vexed relationship to a compromised Japaneseness. Nelson’s situation reveals how on two fronts ideals of whiteness and ideals of Japaneseness are lost and unresolved. Here the problem of accent marks an impossible social compliance. In both instances, language is the privileged vehicle— the privileged property— by which standards of successful assimilation and failed integration are measured. In this sense, language itself might be thought of as a kind of property right and stereotype, demanding a flawless mimicry on the part of the young Nelson, whose failed performance leads him to shame and self-abasement at a crucial moment of social and psychic development. Nelson’s transition from Japanese to English is another example of the negotiation between mourning and melancholia in the immigration and assimilation process. That is, although he suffers a loss and revaluation of his mother tongue, his transition into the adopted ideal of the English language is anything but smooth. We need to emphasize that the shaming ritual to which the grade-school teacher subjected Nelson—one all too common in the Darwinian space of the classroom— is one that not merely makes his transition into English difficult but also demonizes and repudiates the mother (and the mother tongue and accent) at the same time. What was once a loved and safe object is retroactively transformed into an object of shame and insecurity. To the extent that the figure of the mother originally represents safe notions of “home,” Nelson’s estrangement from his mother, and from his mother tongue, renders her unheimlich— unhomely, unfamiliar, uncanny— a topic that critical race scholar Mari Matsuda has explored in her legal analyses of accent discrimination.44 The relationship between language, pedagogy, and assimilation into a mainstream national citizenry is examined also in a short story by Monique T. D. Truong. “Kelly”(1991) is about a young Vietnamese refugee, Thuy-Mai, who finds herself in the improbable space of a North Carolina classroom of 1975. Truong’s narrator composes a distressing epistolary monologue to her one and only (and now absent) friend from that dark period of her life, Kelly. In doing so, she reenacts the melancholic logic discussed above. That is, an intersubjective external dialogue meant for two parties is melancholically internalized and transformed into an intrasubjective monologue of one remarkable for its anger and solipsism. What is an epistolary, after all, other than an impassioned (but not necessarily answered) plea to the other? Truong’s narrator recalls their grade-school teacher: Kelly, remember how Mrs. Hammerick talked about Veteran’s Day? How about the Day of Infamy when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor? Mrs. Hammerick, you know, the mayor’s wife always had a sweet something surrounding her like she had spent too much time pulling taffy.... Kelly, you only knew that she liked the Beths and the Susans cause they wore pink and never bulged and buckled out of their shirt plackets. I was scared of her like no dark corners could ever scare me. You have to know that all the while she was teaching us history she was telling, with her language for the deaf, blind, and dumb; she was telling all the boys in our class that I was Pearl and my last name was Harbor. They understood her like she was speaking French and their names were all Claude and Pierre.45 Truong’s story expands our discussion of language and its performative effects on the constitution of good and bad national subjects. Here, Mrs. Hammerick’s common language for the “deaf, blind, and dumb”—a language from which Thuy-Mai is emphatically excluded—is used to create and then separate good students from bad students within the institutionalized space of the classroom. The Susans and the Beths, the Claudes and the Pierres, are all, as Louis Althusser would put it, “interpellated”by the mayor’s wife as good citizen- subjects of the classroom and nation-state.46 Truong emphasizes how education is a primary site through which narratives of national identity and belonging are established and reinforced through pedagogical compliance. At the same time, the Vietnamese refugee, Thuy-Mai, is pathologized as Asian enemy, dismissively labeled “Pearl Harbor,”erroneously conflated with the Japanese, and implicitly rendered a menace to the coherence and integrity of the US nation-state. Mrs. Hammerick is, of course, not literally speaking French (though Vietnam was of course colonized earlier by France), but Truong’s attention to language underscores the ways in which an unconscious discourse of colonialism and race, of national inclusion and exclusion, is circulated in the classroom. Furthermore, as Lowe points out, Mrs. Hammerick’s nationalizing tract is simultaneously a gendered discourse: “The narrator’s observations that the teacher’s history lesson addresses ‘all the boys’further instantiates how the American nationalist narrative recognizes, recruits, and incorporates male subjects, while ‘feminizing’and silencing the students who do not conform to that notion of patriotic subjectivity.”47 Racialized subjects, such as Nelson and Thuy-Mai, become “good”citizens when they identify with the paternal state and accept, as Lowe summarizes, “the terms of this identification by subordinating [their] racial difference and denying [their] ties with the feminized and racialized ‘motherland.’”48 In the following section, we turn to Melanie Klein’s theories of good and bad objects, of good and bad mothers and motherlands, to explore the politics of aggression and destructiveness, of guilt and reparation, as they configure the psychic limits of racial melancholia and expand on Freud’s account of loss and interminable mourning.

#### Thus, the advocacy refuse Asian subject formation. Signifiers will always fail to bridge the gap between the real and symbolic, but self-negation makes the subject unfathomable in ideological edifice.

Kim 2 [Asian] (Chang-Hee Kim, The Fantasy of Asian America: Identity, Ideology, and Desire) 2009 //Nato

In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Georg Hegel concentrates on the concept of struggle in the dialectical formation of subjectivity. His well-known dialectical division, the master vs. slave, is clearly indicative of their uneven relation. In Hegel, the freedom to gain the true sense of self is not the subject’s recognizing the objectified other in self-reflectivity; rather, that is its eliminating the other from itself to consolidate its hegemonic—whether master or slave—position and thus to become independent of the other permanently. Nonetheless, the Hegelian subject is aware that its dialectical positionality as either master or slave relies on the other, without which it cannot survive, realizing its ontological limitation as such. This is a critical moment when the ontological gap of the subject erupts, separating its becoming from its being. That is, the 44 subject as either master or slave can never be the other, for their relationship always remains ontologically distanced in the perpetual process of becoming. Yet the relationship between master and slave is different from that of the Adornian model in which both subject and other are objectively distinct in self-reflectivity. In Hegel, their distanced relationship is rather what evokes the desire and struggle for mutual identification not only to remove one from the other but also to become a free independent subject. Moreover, Hegel insists that the relationship take on one’s desire to dominate the other for the sake of its self-reliance, which nevertheless ends up impossible and incomplete in that it is suicidal. In the Hegelian dialectic, the master’s position is indebted to that of the slave insofar as the latter, i.e., the enemy, is what makes the former ontologically consistent in itself. In other words, the true sense of freedom for the subject in Hegel is to either become the enemy or eliminate it, either of which means the death of the subject. The Hegelian subject essentially attempts to carry out the “absolute negation” of the selves in a fashion to negate their own otherness in themselves and to “raise their self-certainty (about existing for-self) to truth in the ‘other’ as well as in themselves” (Hegel 55). Rather than pretend to remain objective and distanced in treating the other, the Hegelian subject strives to secure its identitarian position in light of the life-death struggle between master and slave. The eventual way to obtain freedom from its own ontological limitation that the subject cannot be in-andfor itself as a whole is paradoxically negating its positive being dependent on that of the other. This illustrates the subject’s death instinct towards “nothingness,” which makes our knowledge on the subject inexorably entangled in inconsistencies and contradictions. 45 In Hegel, the subject’s death instinct, an ontological abyss that remains unfathomable in its ideological edifice, is the only way to realize its “pure existence-for-self” (Hegel 55) Identity is apparitional in nature, for as discussed earlier, we all can become a/the “real Asian American” but never will be, and the resulting gap between our being and becoming is where the subject endlessly strives to secure its identitarian position in light of the life-death struggle against the other in-and-for itself. The realization of identity is its purist objectification in that, in neoliberal capitalism, identity is equivalent to a commodity imbued with a cultural capital of dual meanings: an owned property of the subject feeling happy (with no more work) and an alienated property of the subject feeling miserable (with endless work) as Karl Marx teaches us.16 In Race and Resistance, Viet T. Nguyen describes Asian American identity as the cultural capital of both accommodation and resistance in U.S. society, and it well explains the point I am making here (143-44): on the one hand, Asian Americans make a good relationship with the society that praises them as a model minority, as a civil subject fully assimilable to the mainstream; on the other hand, they make a bad relationship with the society that stereotypes their identity as a yellow peril, viciously alienating them from the mainstream. Asian American identity has its multiple meanings with an apparitional effect that changes the ontological meaning of its referent and at the same time, reduces them back to their archetype: Charlie Chan or the gook. While the identity acts as a conduit that connects Asian Americans with the society for their mutual understanding, this communicative sign always signifies itself as inconsistent, contradictory, and, as Nguyen puts it, “hypocritical” in representing Asian Americans as a whole. It is no wonder Nguyen observes that Asian Americans are facing the “crisis of representation over ideological diversity” in identity politics (9). Identity works as a vanishing mediator that connects the hegemonic system of ideological reality with the identitarian subject as the constituent of the former. Such a vanishing mediator as identity, through its apparitional as well as self-effacing effect, plays a role in maintaining the systematic order of the reality by transforming the preontological chaotic multitude, namely, individuals with identities, into, as Slavoj Žižek puts it, “the semblance of a positive objective order of reality” (Ticklish 158). The Hegelian dialectic shows that the subject comes to have its identity rendered apparitional and thus precarious. Simultaneously, the identity never completely sits itself apart from its proprietor because of its dialectical relationship with it, the subject, in terms of the life/death struggle, which makes the mutual gap never closed. This gap can be translated as a minimal void that prevents the subject from being, that is, fully getting identified with, its identitarian self, which potentially gives rise to the totalitarian racist subject: being fully identified as white, “the kind of men” who can kill Vincent Chin, or anyone with a darker skin, with impunity.

### 1AC – Add On – Permutation

#### Permutation is key – movements are stronger when coalitions are formed and there’s the net benefit of using solidarity to defy the divisiveness of the model minority.

Ty 17 [Asian] [Eleanor Ty, Professor in the Department of English and Film Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University. She holds a PhD and MA in English from McMaster University, and a BA Hons from the University of Toronto., University Of Illinois Press, "Asian Fail Narratives Of Disenchantment And the Model Minority ", 2017]//lydiaw

In their own ways, the works I have studied in this book contribute to the growing awareness of the need to re-examine the “good life”—its high cost not only to youths but also to older members of the community, and its viability in the twenty-first century. Through inventive narrative and representational strategies that reveal precarious conditions, these works illuminate the critical social, cultural, historical, and political issues that most concern Asian North Americans in the twenty-first century. These issues, ranging from environmental degradation, the loss of stability from the financial crisis of 2007–8 and following, the suspicion and paranoia after 9/11, postwar trauma and memory, racialization and typecasting, and real and imagined cultural and familial expectations, mark the experiences of these artists I have studied. Between 2000 and 2015 the economic conditions in the United States and Canada have worsened due to the increasing neoliberal policies under the governments of Presidents Bill Clinton (1993–2001) and George W. Bush (2001–8) and of Prime Ministers Paul Martin (2003–6) and Stephen Harper (2006–15). **American-model neoliberalism has been criticized because it results in “substantial levels of social exclusion, including high levels of income inequality, high relative and absolute poverty rates, poor and unequal educational outcomes, poor health outcomes, and high rates of crime incarceration” (Schmitt and Zipperer 15). For example, popular stances of both the U.S. and Canadian governments have been that we should be “tough on crime” and wage a “war on drugs.” These notions resulted in an unprecedented rise of blacks and other minorities in U.S. prisons and of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian prisons**. As Bruce Western notes, “Incarceration would be used less for rehabilitation than for incapacitation, deterrence, and punishment. … Tough new sentences were attached to narcotics offenses as the federal government waged first a war on crime, then a war on drugs. Locked facilities proliferated around the country to cope with the burgeoning penal population. Prison construction became an instrument for regional development as small towns lobbied for correctional facilities and resisted prison closure” (2–3). Although these details do not directly relate to Asian North Americans, I argue that the movement from an ethic of care to the politics of the punitive, from rehabilitation to penal discipline, creates an atmosphere of fear, anxiety, and distrust in contemporary society. Only one of the texts in this study features incarceration of an Asian immigrant, but what is important is the institutional change, “shifts in the structure of society and politics” that have “large consequences for the quality of American democracy” (Western 2). If in the 1960s **and early 1970s** Asian **American** movements were formed in solidarity with **and as a response to** the Black Panther and Women’s Liberation **movements**, then in the twenty-first century the criminalization of **large numbers of young** African Americans **and First Nations Canadians** has considerable effects on **American and Canadian racial and** social inequality, on the collective **affective** experiences of p**eople** o**f** c**olor** and minorities. In the works I examined, we see the affect of fear in Vietnamese refugees who do not understand enough English to follow rules in The Gangster We Are All Looking For, or the dire consequences of the misrecognition of a Filipino immigrant in Gilvarry’s From the Memoirs of a Non-Enemy Combatant. The fear of the racial Other in the last decade has been exacerbated by the decline of manufacturing and industry and the dismantling of welfare state. It is not surprising that one of the most popular TV series in the last five or six years has been the American horror show The Walking Dead (2010– ), where the fearful flesh-eating zombie Others turn out to be our own family members and neighbors rather than invaders from an external nation. People now fear contagion from those who are within rather than from strangers from a distant shore. **For this reason,** it is heartening to see Asian **American**s **and Asian Canadians** expressing solidarity with other disenfranchised groups **and working for global environmental causes. The affiliations work** to defy **and counter** the **racially** divisive idealization of **Asian North Americans perpetuated by** the model minority **myth**. For example, #Asians4Blacklives **is a “diverse group of Asian voices coming from the Philippines, Vietnam, India, China, Pakistan, Korea, Burma, Japan, and other nations, based in the Bay Area,” who “**have come together **in response to a call from Black Lives Matter Bay Area”** to show solidarity **with black people. The group recognizes that Asians, like blacks, are subjected to racism, misrecognition, and negative stereotyping**. In her most recent book, Undercurrent, Asian Canadian poet Rita Wong vows to “honour what the flow of water teaches us” (“Declaration of Intent”), to be led by the “healing walkers” of the “Cree and Dene elders and everyday people” and to “reassert human responsibilities to land, water, life” (“Fresh Ancient Ground”). **Wong stresses** the need to form alliances with feminists and First Nations communities, **recognizing that they will protect water and resist corporations that want to use the earth’s resources as commodities. Similarly, the Chinese Canadian Historical Society of BC is making a concerted effort to discover links between Chinese Canadians and First Nations people, producing videos called “Cedar and Bamboo” that highlight stories of marginalization by mixed-race Chinese/First Nations Canadians**. The project goes beyond the history of Chinese immigrants in relationship to the gold rush, the building of the railroad, and Chinatowns to the historical and continuing relationships between the Chinese population and First Nations in British Columbia. Started by Chinese Canadian history professor Henry Yu, the online “Chinese Canadian Stories” feature information about key historical events in Chinese Canadian history as well as short videos made by university students about their background and issues that concern them. The project highlights the multiplicity of identities and ways of expressing these identities in the twenty-first century. One funny video that is a fine example of Asianfail is Jennifer Yip’s “Hybrid Husband.” The short video humorously depicts the pressure Yip feels at twenty-two to find a fiancé. Embarking on her twenty-seventh blind date to find the perfect Chinese/Canadian boyfriend, she meets a young man who seems to pass all the requirements set out by her family and herself. He speaks Cantonese and English, snowboards, skis, is learning to fly a plane, and understands her complicated hybrid culture. But by the end of the video, Yip is shocked and confounded by the discovery from his Facebook page that he already has a girlfriend. The video uses irony, humor, and exaggeration to cut through the tensions between a third-generation Asian Canadian and Old World cultural beliefs. **These instances I have been discussing here** illustrate the increasing diversity of Asian **North American** subjects, and their responses to failure **of various sorts**. The works I have discussed show how Asian Americans and Asian Canadians are negotiating and reconfiguring their desires and aspirations. Although the works document different types of failure and depression, they also present alternatives to the current definitions of success, which center on professional and economic achievement. These novels, films, graphic narratives, and memoirs explore the consequences and rewards of not following or not being able to follow society’s prescribed roads to success. As we have seen, the depicted reasons for failure include mental breakdown, shame, lingering memories of trauma and pain, the refusal to subscribe to capitalism’s notion of success, and the rejection of the heteronormative romance script. Further failures are caused by bullying, misidentification and misrecognition, or the internalization of others’ false assumptions and expectations. It is only through the telling of their stories that we understand the dystopic space in which many of these Asian North American people exist. They illuminate the precarity in the lives of some members of a group that has been perceived to be in a privileged space. An inadvertent positive result of some members’ failure to conform has been the production of an incredible assortment of works that question, in sometimes humorous, witty, ironic, and entertaining ways, our apprehension of our modern world, including our perception of the passing of time, of beauty, happiness, aging, gender, family life, and love. Sometimes, the failure to follow traditional routes leads to a new and unexpected way of finding peace and contentment, or an unexplored career path. In keeping with the motif of finding pleasures in the unpredictable, I deliberately sought to examine works that play with the conventions and forms of genre: the use of poetic prose, postmodern reiterations of Buddhist beliefs, stage performance with an inanimate character, a fake memoir, and a graphic narrative not contained by frames and sequences. This book is one of many efforts to participate in the ongoing and much-needed dialogue about priorities and values for our society, global environment, and political identities in the twenty-first century.

### 1AC – Add On – Perf Con

#### Neoliberalism is inevitable – but perfcons are good to create a buffer zone between the ruling ideology and the subject of exclusion.

Kim 09 (Chang-Hee Kim, The Fantasy of Asian America: Identity, Ideology, and Desire) 2009 //Nato + lydia

On a theoretical level, Mei-Li’s double identity, which cheats the American spectator, is concerned with the politically salient use of a so-called “performative contradiction.” Žižek explains that the ruling ideology can possibly claim its universality only when grounded upon the continuing exclusion of its own particulars that contradict its dominant discourse and challenge its power. The hegemonic system of the ruling ideology makes this process of exclusion a consistent routine in a persistent manner of questioning, renegotiating, and displacing the oppositional particulars—i.e., of “assuming the gap between its own form and content, by conceiving itself as unaccomplished in its very notion.” Žižek likens to cheating the paradoxical formation of the universal hegemony of a ruing ideology, which in fact has recourse to its insubordinate particulars. He continues: [I]f the ruling ideology performatively ‘cheats’ by undermining…its own officially asserted universality, progressive politics should precisely openly practice performative contradiction, asserting on behalf of the given universality the very content this universality (in its hegemonic form) excludes. (“Class Struggle” 102) The self-imposed cheating of a particular subject refers to the ideological practice of performative contradiction that the ruling ideology carries out to maintain its own universal 100 hegemony via the paradoxical denial of its own totality; moreover, the universal edifice of the ruling ideology fundamentally depends on the exclusion of its particular subjects inassimilable to it. On the other hand, such a paradoxical, which Žižek translates as cheating, identity of the inassimilable subjects also creates a performative locus of inconsistency, exclusion, and exception in the hegemonic space of the ruling ideology as a kind of buffer zone between the universal (the ruling ideology) and the particular (the subject of exclusion). This buffer zone, or ideological gap, works as a sort of structural short circuit between them, for the act of cheating is what they both want from each other for their own sake. In light of progressive politics, the particular subject, the inconsistent site of exclusion, can appropriate the self-contradictory performance of cheating for its own exclusive inclusion as the perverse site of exception. The performative contradiction of the U.S. neoliberal expansionism enables Mei-Li to become the inconsistent subject of exception—a female Oriental illegal-immigrant who marries for love and can be naturalized as a lawful citizen subject. Nonetheless, it is not so much obvious as problematic to assume that her desire to be American citizen is spontaneously transparent and self-oriented. On the one hand, the hegemonic ideology of Cold War neoliberalism wants the particular Oriental to be exceptionally included in its ideological edifice and thus to function as its ideological utility. Ethnic minorities, on the other hand, look for American citizenship in pursuit of their full inclusion as legitimate members of U.S. society and want to be blessed with what the liberal tropes of freedom and consumer culture promise to them. But the promise of making free choices in the liberal society of U.S. consumer culture is not made as purely sincere but pretended. In Transnational America, Inderpal Grewal premises that the dissemination of American neoliberalism played a crucial role in upholding the hegemonic authority of the U.S. as neoliberal Empire. She posits that this role “could not be limited to the institutions of the state but circulated within what came to be called a ‘global civil society’” (1-2). The universalizing force of global civil society leaves no choice for people in its consumer culture 101 but to be participants in “the civilizing work of post industrial society, in which serious labor is put into producing the conditions of consciousness in which buying can occur” (30). Asians’ desire for American citizenship should be considered not so much a transparently self-serving choice as a constituted one, for no other choices can possibly be made to remain un-civilized in U.S. neoliberal capitalism. In this framework, Mei-Li’s double identity bears upon her politically-salient use of “performative contradiction,” by which she becomes a member of American civil society with a free but pretended choice—namely, a choice only to become American and thus civilized.

### 1AC – Theory

#### Aff gets 1AR theory, DTD, no RVI, CI – a] key to check abuse against white practices b] indicts your orientation towards anti Asian structures c] RVIs is a form of white reparations of harshly punishing minorities for small mistakes d] Only terminal impact on theory is anti asianness, fairness and education that require the oppression of Asian bodies is violent.

**Presumption and permissibility affirm –**

**1] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me.**

**2] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.**

**3] Illogical – presuming statements false is illogical since you can’t say things like P and ~P are both wrong.**

**4] To negate means to deny the truth of, which means if there isn’t offense to deny the truth of you should affirm.**

#### ROB Before T

#### A] Jurisdiction – the ROB how the ballot should be signed, while norm-setting which is out of the judge's jurisdiction bc that is out of round

#### B] Offense – the ROB constrains what is and isn't offensive so theory must be contextualized to the framing

#### C] Lexicality – Theory speaks to a fair space but my ROB evidence says that those spaces can't exist prior to the aff because they're anti asian

#### D] Side Constraint- the kritik sets out a problem in society and the ROB attempts to resolve it otherwise that societal bias can never be solved and influences theory

#### Form over content –

#### a] their speech-act controls the way that we understand and interpret their content,

#### b] it shouldn’t matter how correct you are if you engaged in unethical practices along the way, both of these mean that you should evaluate the K as a side-constraint on how we view things like the aff.