## 1AC

### 1AC – Framing

#### The meta ethic is bindingness – I can keep asking "why should I follow this" which results in skep since obligations are predicated on ignorantly accepting rules.

#### Ethics begin a priori. Prefer:

#### 1] Is/Ought gap – experience can only tell us what is happening but can’t tell us what ought to happen as any is statement begs the question of a more concrete moral answer.

#### 2] Transcendental idealism – imagine a world with no humans in it – this would mean that if ethics didn’t begin a priori that nothing would have meaning as we can’t determine it which means that ethics must exist absent humans.

#### 3] Authority – practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason.

#### 4] Descartes Paradox – evil demon could deceive us, dreaming, simulation, and inability to know others’ experience make empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### 5] Action theory – individual actions are infinitely divisible we don’t know at which point the step had the intent of going to X space which means individual actions are infinitely divisible and we can’t look at individual actions but instead intents of the overarching idea.

#### 6] Externalism fails – no reason why we ought to care about higher order which takes out consequences because we don’t care about them.

#### 7] There’s an act/omission distinction – otherwise we’d be held infinitely culpable for every omission which kills any conception of morality

#### 8] Consequences Fail – a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. c] Aggregation fails – suffering is not additive can’t compare between one migraine and 10 head aches

#### That justifies universality – a] a priori principles like reason apply to everyone since they are independent of human experience and b] any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative – all other theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

### 1AC – Offense (State)

#### Affirm –

#### 1] Agents have a perfect duty to tell the truth and be objective which o/w imperfect duties to advocate.

#### 2] A condition of reason is to think consistently – that requires objective standard method of reporting and rejects personal reasons.

#### Donald 03 [James Donald, February 3, 2003; KANT, THE PRESS, AND THE PUBLIC USE OF REASON JAMES DONALD James Donald is Professor of Film Studies at the University of New South Wales, email: [J.Donald@curtin.edu.au](mailto:J.Donald@curtin.edu.au). https://javnost-thepublic.org/article/pdf/2003/2/3/]

This, according to Pinkard at least, was the receptive cultural milieu which Kant addressed with this dramatic opening answer to Biester’s question: E**nlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity**. The motto of enlightenment must be, Sapere Aude! Dare to know. Have the courage to use your own reason (Kant 1991, 54, translation modified). What, though, did using your own reason mean in this context and at that time? And, more broadly, in what circumstances is the use of reason possible? Here it is necessary to read what Kant has to say both historically and philosophically. The Berlinische Monatsschrift was not just in the business of publishing news and views. It had a political and social agenda. The journal represented the public face of a secret society of senior officials in the administration of Frederick II who were committed to embedding Enlightenment principles in the institutions of the Prussian state. The inference must therefore be that Kant knew exactly whom he was talking to, and that his emphasis on daring and courage in the somewhat hesitant and cryptic opening of the essay is a nod towards the risks these men would have seen themselves as taking in the attempt to create social conditions in which their fellow-citizens might be (more) free to think (Caygill 2001, 31). At the time Kant’s essay was published in 1784, they were especially concerned that their achievements should not be reversed when Frederick II, then in the 44th year of his reign, died  as he did two years later  and was replaced by his more reactionary heir. It helps to know this, as it explains the strategic nature of the essay. It is designed to make use of the press and its public access in order to help a political cause as well as to establish philosophical principles. The philosophical basis for the argument **about the public use of reason is Kant’s axiomatic belief that thinking well must be based on three maxims: Think for your- self; think from the standpoint of everyone else; and think consistently. Respecting all or any of these maxims is possible only in community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts, and who communicate their thoughts to us.** Thinking is of its nature a social activity, then, and reason is a product of society (Wood 1999, 301). For thinking to demonstrate reason, it must be critical, testing what is thought from different possible perspectives in order to achieve understanding and coherence. To a degree, and perhaps quite a considerable degree, such critical self-reflection is possible through the inner exercise of imagination. To be most effective, however, imagination needs at least some external stimulus from actual dialogue with people in relation to whose viewpoints one is trying to think. This is why, in What Is Enlightenment?, Kant insists that citizens have a philosophical responsibility to do their thinking in front of the entire reading public  even if his historical under- standing of who should make up the public was much more discriminating (Kant 1991, 55). **Kant’s is thus an inherently pluralistic conception of reason: that is, it requires the disposition of not being occupied with oneself as the entire world, but regarding and conducting oneself as a cosmopolitan** [or citizen of the world] (Wood 1999, 302). This is how he puts it in his discussion of census communis in The Critique of Judgment: **The idea of a public sense, i.e., a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgment with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence upon its judgment. This is accomplished by weighing the judgment, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else, as the result of mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently affect our own estimate** (cited in Splichal 2002, 101). Without that worldly regard for the thoughts, feelings, and wishes of others, thought and judgment fall prey to the opposite of pluralism, which is egoism. And egoism, whether in terms of one’s understanding, one’s tastes or one’s interests, in turn produces traits that are obstacles to moral self-development: passion, self- conceit, fear, and intellectual indolence (Wood 1999, 283).1 It is the very nature of thinking that requires its public use and an initiating act of resolution and courage if reason is to be developed in individuals and in humanity as a whole. The immaturity (Unmündigkeit), or intellectual and moral de- pendency, that is the opposite of enlightenment is not a developmental stage be- fore maturity, but is self-incurred (selbstverschuldet) (Kant 1991, 54). **Thinking adults have a choice. They have to decide between the challenging demands of reason and the comfort zone of conformity and deference to authority: people who do not need to submit to tutelage often do so because they find it convenient to have others guide them.** Being unaccustomed to think for themselves, they are often frightened by the prospect of having to do so (Wood 1999, 305). This is why some of the most intransigent barriers to the development of rea- son are to be found in ourselves. Mündigkeit adulthood ,majority, or maturity brings with it not just the freedom and assurance of autonomy, but also its attendant anxieties, risks and responsibilities. As Kant strategically acknowledges, however, the roadblocks to enlightenment are external as well as internal. **It is in the interests of tyrants, priests, and other often more benevolent powers to tell people what to think, to tell them what will make them safe and happy, and so to perpetuate their deference and dependency. Their most effective weapon is, of course, the ability to play on spiritual, social and economic fears.** Having carefully prevented the docile creatures from daring to take single step without the leading- strings to which they are tied, such authorities will attempt to show them the danger which threatens them if they try to walk unaided (Wood 1999, 305-306). **Kant does not deny the existence of such dangers and discontents, but sees them simply as part and parcel of the human condition, as obstacles that need to be overcome**: they would certainly learn to walk eventually after a few falls (Kant 1991, 54). And learning to walk means taking on those social impediments as well as well as one’s own fears. Kant sees it as our duty to opt for maturity: a duty to ourselves, because to opt for tutelage and dependency is personally degrading, but also a kind of species- duty, in the sense that reason can exist and fulfil its vocation in human history only through free rational communication between independent thinkers (Wood 1999, 306). Kant’s philosophy was radical in its emphasis on the spontaneity and autonomy of human beings, and it was this that found an affinity with an emerging cultural sense of people’s potential  and desire  for subjective development and collective progress. As Pinkard (2002, 19) puts it, he captured a deep, almost sub- terranean shift in what his audience was coming to experience as necessary for themselves: from now on, we were called to lead our own lives, to think for ourselves. Historically, the question is whether, how and to what extent the dissemination of Kant’s philosophical ideas helped to articulate that ethos as a social force. From that point of view, what is electric in Kant’s account of that now are his comments about the social circumstances that are necessary if such courage is to lead to autonomy. When Kant observes that for enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom, he is not just talking about overcoming the psychological comforts of immaturity and the inner tyranny of superstition and timidity, but also about all too real and familiar ideological pressures and political-legal obstacles to free communication, to the operation of reason, and so to human progress (Kant 1991, 55; Wood 1999, 283).2 Hence the need for courage, but also the need for the existence of social circumstances that made daring to use one’s reason a possibility**. Because we can develop our reason only by communicating with others, and as the development of reason in human society depends on its public use, therefore Kant de- fends freedom of public communication as an absolute precondition for the collective development of people’s rational powers and so for human progress** (Wood 1999, 306). The freedom to communicate, asserts Kant, is the one treasure which remains to us amidst all the burdens of civil life, and which alone offers us a means of overcoming all the evils of this condition (in Reiss 1991, 247). To prohibit the use of public reason, however, is not only to injure and trample on the rights of mankind. In a subtle argument  or a piece of opportunist flattery, depending on how you look at it  Kant makes the case that such restriction is also against the interests of an enlightened ruler who is not afraid of shadows [or phantoms]. It is, after all, the public use of critical reason alone that can foster enlightenment, and so create a population that is likely to be peaceful and virtuous. A prince who does not regard it as beneath him to say that he considers it his duty, in religious matters, not to prescribe anything to his people, but to allow them complete freedom, a prince who thus even declines to accept the presumptuous title of tolerant, is himself enlightened. This spirit of freedom is also spreading abroad, even where it has to struggle with outward obstacles imposed by governments which misunderstand their own function. For such governments can now witness a shining example of how freedom may exist without in the least jeopardizing public concord and the unity of the commonwealth. Men will of their own accord gradually work their way out of barbarism so long as artificial measures are not deliberately adopted to keep them in it (Kant 1991, 58-59). Just as individuals need to think their way out of tutelage and towards maturity, so the general development from an age of enlightenment to an enlightened age requires a polity that not only allows, but encourages criticism of existing political institutions as part of the development and expansion of reason.

#### Interp – Aff gets offense choice – to clarify you cannot read theoretical, turns, or answers to our offense section.

#### 1] Time skew – it skews my time since the neg can just dump for 7 min on 3 minutes of AC offense and I’ll never be able to answer back in the 4 minute 1AR

#### 2] Reciprocity – I must win fw and offense, while you only have to answer one layer and collapse on it.

#### DTD – makes abuse worse since they knew it was bad but still choose to do so. Punishing them deters abuse.

#### CI – reasonability is arbitrary and justifies judge intervention

#### No RVI – incentivies spending 7 minutes on theory and win every time

### 1AC – Method (Taiwanese)

#### This is just a translation of the resolution in Taiwanese Chinese

#### Linguistic features signify personhood and creates stereotypes. Vote Aff to interrogate racial ideologies of language.

Rosa et al 17 Rosa, Jonathan, and Nelson Flores. "Unsettling race and language: Toward a raciolinguistic perspective." Language in society 46.5 (2017): 621-647. (Assistant Professor of Anthropology and Linguistics and Associate Professor in the Educational Linguistics Division)//Elmer recut Nato

Similar to Bucholtz & Hall's (2005) approach to identity and interaction, we are interested in **how processes of raciolinguistic enregisterment emblematize particular linguistic features as authentic** **signs of racialized models of personhood**. This is found not only in sociolinguistic accounts of the features that **compose** categories such as ‘**African American English’ (Green 2002) or ‘Chicano English’ (Fought 2003), but also popular stereotypes and modes of linguistic appropriation such as ‘Mock Spanish’ (Hill 2008), ‘Mock Asian’ (Chun 2004), ‘Hollywood Injun English’ (Meek 2006), and ‘linguistic minstrelsy’ (Bucholtz & Lopez 2011).** In each of these cases, minute **features of language**, including grammatical forms, prosodic patterns, and morphological particles, are emblematized as **sets of signs that correspond to racial categories**. Crucially, as Meek (2006) demonstrates, these forms need not correspond to empirically verifiable linguistic practices in order to undergo racial emblematization. Moreover, as Lo & Reyes (2009) point out, **the imagination of groups such as Asian Americans as lacking a distinctive racialized variety of English analogous to African American English or Chicano English, must be interrogated based on the racial logics that organize stereotypes about and societal positions of different racial groups on the one hand, and perceptions of their language practices on the other. Specifically, Lo & Reyes argue that racial ideologies constructing Asian Americans as model minorities who approximate whiteness are linked to language ideologies constructing Asian Americans as lacking a racially distinctive variety of English**. In related work, Chun (2016:81) shows how emblematized Mock Asian forms such as ‘ching-chong’ are located across ‘the important boundary between ‘Oriental talk’ and English’, which **sustains Asian Americans** alternately **as model minorities and forever foreigners. Thus, we must carefully reconsider seemingly ‘distinctive’ and ‘nondistinctive’ language varieties alike, by analyzing the logics that position particular racial groups and linguistic forms in relation to one another. That is, no language variety is objectively distinctive or nondistinctive, but rather comes to be enregistered as such in particular historical, political, and economic circumstances.**

#### The 1AC’s translation is linguistic activism that reclaims cultural agency and critiques stereotypes.

Duan 15 [Asian] Duan, Carlina. " The Space Between: An analysis of code-switching within Asian American poetry as strategic poetic device"(English Honors) AND" Here I Go, Torching"(Creative Writing Honors). Diss. 2015. (BA in Honors English from the University of Michigan)//Elmer recut Nato

In an interview with Women’s Review of Books literary magazine, Hong further discussed **the strategic role of translation as a form of linguistic activism** within her poetic work. When asked why she does not include translations from Korean to English within her own poetry, **Hong said: “I wanted to open up these schisms, to emphasize that memory, the filtering of human experience into poetry, is often fractured and not transparent, especially experiences which have always been bisected and undercut by two languages.**” She added, “I think I want to debunk the idea of **easy translation—whether it be the idea of literal translation or, as I said before, the translating of one’s experience into poetry**” (Hong 2002a, 15). Hong’s intentional decision to leave out English translations in her poetry creates a power dynamic between speaker and reader of the poem. Not only are “easy” translations dismantled and withheld from the reader, but, according to Hong, **codeswitching — without translation — also more accurately reflects her personal experiences of cultural and linguistic movement. Hong points out that human experiences and the world of memory, especially for bilingual speakers, are “not transparent” — not captured neatly by one language, but rather, “bisected” by the complexities of belonging to two (or more) languages, implying a movement between multiple spaces. Scholars describe poetic code-switching in this way as a navigation of power**. Literary scholar Benzi Zhang argues that code-switching makes apparent different levels of cultural knowledge for speaker and reader: **“[T]he insertion of […] foreign words effectively renders Asian sensibilities into English and signifies different positions of cultural agency” (Zhang 131). Building upon this idea of cultural agency, I argue that Hong uses Korean to consciously expose themes of exoticism and racial stereotyping that readers themselves may be (consciously or unconsciously) participating in. As a result, Hong creates agency for her speaker through critiquing culturally appropriative behavior, in addition to an agency in knowledge**; Hong’s speaker can access cultural understanding that her readers do not have. Yet, Hong does more than negotiate questions of audience access; **she uses code-switching to reflect her speaker’s lived experiences of Korean-American identity, grappling with multiple languages and cultural codes**. In “An Introduction to Chinese-American and Japanese American Literatures,” Jeffrey Chan et al. writes, “**The minority experience does not yield itself to accurate or complete expression on the white man’s language” (qtd. Zhang 137**). As Chang et al. suggest, code-switching embeds itself as a natural part of the “minority experience,” and is documented as such in Hong’s poems. **Thus, the poems not only act as social critique of exoticization, but further inhabit the embodied experiences of Korean-American female identities living in the U.S. — which, as Hong reveals, are complicated experiences of rage, agency, celebration, and shifting power dynamics.** Critics who have reviewed Hong’s work, such as Jan Clausen, have raised questions about the effect of Hong’s play with translation. Clausen, in a review titled “The poetics of estrangement,” published through the Women’s Review of Books, writes of Hong’s collection Translating Mo’um: “Hong deftly dismantles the romance of language as homeland, with results especially unnerving for the non-Korean-speaking reader” (Clausen 15). **According to Clausen, Hong’s work with code-switching** subverts traditional notions of the ‘native tongue’ as representative of “homeland**,” dismantling what a reader may expect of a Korean American author: that she use Korean language to specifically discuss her ethnic culture as a hyphenated American**. In other words, Hong’s code-switches function as intentional poetic protest against the reader’s expectations of the relationship between multilingual text and ethnic identity. As Clausen points out, such readings may anticipate that mother tongue is only introduced to speak about cultural difference or history, rather than used additionally as formal poetic device. **In this chapter, I reveal Hong’s awareness of Korean language and code-switching as tools in identity-construction. Rather than allow others to shape her identity for her, she remains dominant in shaping her identity — and her agency — for herself.**

#### The 1AC embodies the oppressor and weaponizes language to rupture debate through radical mimicry – doing what debaters do, except in Taiwanese Chinese – that’s our form of implementation and proves code switching is a valuable exercise

**Conquergood 2**, Performance Studies: Interventions and Radical Research, Dwight Conquergood, TDR (1988-) Vol. 46, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), pp. 145-156 (12 pages) Published by: [The MIT Press](https://www.jstor.org/publisher/mitpress) SJDH

Geertz's now classic depiction of the turn toward texts in ethnography and cultural studies needs to be juxtaposed with Zora Neal Hurston's much earlier and more complex rendering of a researcher reading the texts of subordinate others: The theory behind our tactics: "The white man is always trying to know into somebody else's business. All right, I'll set something outside the door of my mind for him to play with and handle. He can read my writ- ing but he sho' can't read my mind. I'll put this play toy in his hand, and he will seize it and go away. Then I'll say my say and sing my song." ([I935] I990:3) Hurston foregrounds the terrain of struggle, the field of power relations on which texts are written, exchanged, and read. Whereas Geertz does not problematize the ethnographer's will-to-know or access to the texts of others, Hurston is sensitive to the reluctance of the subordinate classes "to reveal that which the soul lives by" (2) because they understand from experience the ocular politics that links the powers to see, to search, and to seize. **Aware of the white man's drive to objectify, control, and grasp as a way of knowing, subordinate people cunningly set a text, a decoy, outside the door to lure him away from "homeplace" where subjugated but empowering truths and survival secrets are sheltered** (hooks 1990). In Hurston's brilliant example, vulnerable people actually redeploy the written text as a tactic of evasion and camouflage, performatively turning and tripping the textual fetish against the white person's will-to-know. "So driven in on his reading," as Williams would say, he is blinded by the texts he compulsively seizes: "knowing so little about us, he doesn't know what he is missing" (Hurston [1935] 1990:2). Once provided with something that he can "handle," "seize," in a word, apprehend, he will go away and then space can be cleared for performed truths that remain beyond his reach**: "then I'll say my say and sing my song." By mimicking the reifying textualism of dominant knowledge regimes, subordinate people can deflect its invasive power. This mimicry of textualism is a complex example of "mimetic excess" in which the susceptibility of dominant images, forms, and technologies of power to subversive doublings holds the potential for undermining the power of that which is mimed** (Taussig I993:254-55). Note that in Hurston's account, subordinate people read and write, as well as perform. **With her beautiful example of how a text can perform subversive work, she disrupts any simplistic dichotomy that would align texts with domination and performance with liberation**. In Hurston's example, **the white man researcher is a fool not because he values literacy, but because he valorized it to the exclusion of other media, other modes of knowing.** I want to be very clear about this point: textocentrism-not texts-is the problem. The constitutive liminality of performance studies lies in its capacity to bridge segregated and differently valued knowledges, drawing together legitimated as well as subjugated modes of in- quiry. From her ethnographic fieldwork in the coal camps and "hollers" of West Virginia, Kathleen Stewart documents an especially vivid example of text- performance entanglements: how official signs and local performances play off and with each other in surprising and delightful ways. After a dog bit a neighbor's child, there was much talk and worry throughout the camp about liability and lawsuits: Finally Lacy Forest announced that he had heard that "by law" if you had a NO TRESPASSING sign on your porch you couldn't be sued. So ev- eryone went to the store in Beckley to get the official kind of sign. Neighbors brought back multiple copies and put them up for those too old or sick or poor to get out and get their own. Then everyone called everyone else to explain that the sign did not mean them. In the end, every porch and fence (except for those of the isolated shameless who don't care) had a bright NO TRESPASSING, KEEP OFF sign, and people visited together, sitting underneath the NO TRESPASSING signs, looking out. (1996:141; see also Conquergood I997)4 Through the power of reframing, social performances reclaim, short-circuit, and resignify the citational force of the signed imperatives. Moreover, Ngugi wa Thiong'o's concept of "orature" complicates any easy **separation between speech and writing, performance and print, and reminds us how these channels of communication constantly overlap, penetrate, and mutually produce one another** (1998). The **performance studies project makes its most radical intervention, I believe, by embracing both written scholarship and creative work, papers and performances. We challenge the hegemony of the text best by reconfiguring texts and performances in horizontal, metonymic tension, not by replacing one hierarchy with another, the romance of performance for the authority of the text. The "liminal-norm" that Jon McKenzie identifies as the calling card of performance studies (2001:41) manifests itself most powerfully in the struggle to live betwixt and between theory and theatricality, paradigms and practices, critical reflection and creative accomplishment. Performance studies brings this rare hybridity into the academy, a commingling of analytical and artistic ways of knowing that unsettles the institutional organization of knowledge and disciplines.** The constitutive liminality of performance studies lies in its capacity to bridge segregated and differently valued knowledges, drawing together legitimated as well as sub- jugated modes of inquiry. There is an emergent genre of performance studies scholarship that epitomizes this text-performance hybridity. A number of performance studies-allied scholars create performances as a supplement to, not substitute for, their written research. These performance pieces stand alongside and in metonymic tension with published research. The creative works are developed for multiple professional rea- sons: they deepen experiential and participatory engagement with materials both for the researcher and her audience; they provide a dynamic and rhetorically compelling alternative to conference papers; they offer a more accessible and engaging format for sharing research and reaching communities outside academia; they are a strategy for staging interventions. To borrow Amanda Kemp's apt phrase, they use "performance both as a way of knowing and as a way of showing" (I998: I6). To add another layer to the enfolding convolutions of text and performance, several of these performance pieces have now been written up and published in scholarly journals and books (see Conquergood 1988; Becker, McCall, and Morris 1989; McCall and Becker I990; Paget I990; Pollock 1990; Jackson 1993, 1998; Allen and Garner 1995; Laughlin 1995; Wellin 1996; Jones 1997; Kemp I998). Performance studies is uniquely suited for the challenge of braiding together disparate and stratified ways of knowing. We can think through performance along three crisscrossing lines of activity and analysis. We can think of performance (I) as a work of imagination, as an object of study; (2) as a pragmatics of inquiry (both as model and method), as an optic and operator of research; (3) as a tactics of intervention, an alternative space of struggle. Speaking from my home department at Northwestern, we often refer to the three a's of performance studies: artistry, analysis, activism. Or to change the alliteration, a commitment to the three c's of performance studies: creativity, critique, citizenship (civic strug- gles for social justice). We struggle to forge a unique and unifying mission around the triangulations of these three pivot points: I. Accomplishment-the making of art and remaking of culture; creativity; embodiment; artistic process and form; knowledge that comes from doing, par- ticipatory understanding, practical consciousness, performing as a way of knowing. 2. Analysis-the interpretation of art and culture; critical reflection; thinking about, through, and with performance; performance as a lens that illuminates the constructed creative, contingent, collaborative dimensions of human com- munication; knowledge that comes from contemplation and comparison; concentrated attention and contextualization as a way of knowing. 3. Articulation-activism, outreach, connection to community; applications and interventions; action research; projects that reach outside the academy and are rooted in an ethic of reciprocity and exchange; knowledge that is tested by practice within a community; social commitment, collaboration, and contri- bution/intervention as a way of knowing: praxis. Notwithstanding the many calls for embracing theory and practice, universities typically institutionalize a hierarchical division of labor between scholars/re- searchers and artists/practitioners. For example, the creative artists in the Department of Fine Arts are separated from the "serious" scholars in the Department of Art History. Even when scholars and practitioners are housed within the same department, there often is internal differentiation and tracking, e.g., the literarytheorists and critics are marked off from those who teach creative and expository writing. This configuration mirrors an entrenched social hierarchy of value based on the fundamental division between intellectual labor and manual labor. In the academy, the position of the artist/practitioner is comparable to people in the larger society who work with their hands, who make things, and who are valued less than the scholars/theorists who work with their minds and are comparable to the more privileged professional-managerial class. Indeed, sometimes one of the reasons for forming schools of fine and performing arts is to protect artists/ practitioners from tenure and promotion committees dominated by the more institutionally powerful scholar/researchers who do not know how to appraise a record of artistic accomplishment as commensurate with traditional criteria of scholarly research and publication. The segregation of faculty and students who make art and perform from those who think about and study art and performance is based on a false dichotomy that represses the critical-intellectual component of any artistic work, and the imaginative-creative dimension of scholarship that makes a difference. A spurious, counterproductive, and mutually denigrating opposition is put into play that pits so-called "mere technique, studio skills, know- how" against so-called "arid knowledge, abstract theory, sterile scholarship." This unfortunate schism is based on gross reductionism and ignorance of "how the other half lives." Students are cheated and disciplines diminished by this academic apartheid. **The ongoing challenge of performance studies is to refuse and supercede this deeply entrenched division of labor, apartheid of knowledges, that plays out inside the academy as the difference between thinking and doing, interpreting and making, concep- tualizing and creating. A performance studies agenda should collapse this divide and revitalize the connections between artistic accomplishment, analysis, and articulations with communities; between practical knowledge (knowing how), propositional knowledge (knowing that), and political savvy (knowing who, when, and where).** This epistemological connection between creativity, critique, and civic engage- ment is mutually replenishing, and pedagogically powerful. Very bright, talented students are attracted to programs that combine intellectual rigor with artistic excellence that is critically engaged, where they do not have to banish their artistic spirit in order to become a critical thinker, or repress their intellectual self or political passion to explore their artistic side. Particularly at the PhD level, original scholarship in culture and the arts is enhanced, complemented, and complicated in deeply meaningful ways by the participatory understanding and community involvement of the researcher. This experiential and engaged model of inquiry is coextensive with the participant-observation methods of ethnographic research. The ongoing challenge of performance studies is to refuse and supercede this deeply entrenched division of labor, apartheid of knowledges, that plays out inside the academy as the difference between thinking and doing, interpreting and mak- ing, conceptualizing and creating. The division of labor between theory and practice, abstraction and embodiment, is an arbitrary and rigged choice, and, like all binarisms, it is booby-trapped. It's a Faustian bargain. If we go the one-way street of abstraction, then we cut ourselves off from the nourishing ground ofparticipatory experience. If we go the one-way street of practice, then we drive ourselves into an isolated cul-de-sac, a practitioner's workshop or artist's colony. Our radical move is to turn, and return, insistently, to the crossroads.

#### We defend this through perfcons – hiding intention and creating inconsistencies is good since it create a buffer zone between the ruling ideology and the subject of exclusion.

Kim 09 (Chang-Hee Kim, The Fantasy of Asian America: Identity, Ideology, and Desire) 2009 //Nato + lydia

On a theoretical level, Mei-Li’s double identity, which cheats the American spectator, is concerned with the politically salient use of a so-called “performative contradiction.” Žižek explains that the ruling ideology can possibly claim its universality only when grounded upon the continuing exclusion of its own particulars that contradict its dominant discourse and challenge its power. The hegemonic system of the ruling ideology makes this process of exclusion a consistent routine in a persistent manner of questioning, renegotiating, and displacing the oppositional particulars—i.e., of “assuming the gap between its own form and content, by conceiving itself as unaccomplished in its very notion.” Žižek likens to cheating the paradoxical formation of the universal hegemony of a ruing ideology, which in fact has recourse to its insubordinate particulars. He continues: [I]f the ruling ideology performatively ‘cheats’ by undermining…its own officially asserted universality, progressive politics should precisely openly practice performative contradiction, asserting on behalf of the given universality the very content this universality (in its hegemonic form) excludes. (“Class Struggle” 102) The self-imposed cheating of a particular subject refers to the ideological practice of performative contradiction that the ruling ideology carries out to maintain its own universal 100 hegemony via the paradoxical denial of its own totality; moreover, the universal edifice of the ruling ideology fundamentally depends on the exclusion of its particular subjects inassimilable to it. On the other hand, such a paradoxical, which Žižek translates as cheating, identity of the inassimilable subjects also creates a performative locus of inconsistency, exclusion, and exception in the hegemonic space of the ruling ideology as a kind of buffer zone between the universal (the ruling ideology) and the particular (the subject of exclusion). This buffer zone, or ideological gap, works as a sort of structural short circuit between them, for the act of cheating is what they both want from each other for their own sake. In light of progressive politics, the particular subject, the inconsistent site of exclusion, can appropriate the self-contradictory performance of cheating for its own exclusive inclusion as the perverse site of exception. The performative contradiction of the U.S. neoliberal expansionism enables Mei-Li to become the inconsistent subject of exception—a female Oriental illegal-immigrant who marries for love and can be naturalized as a lawful citizen subject. Nonetheless, it is not so much obvious as problematic to assume that her desire to be American citizen is spontaneously transparent and self-oriented. On the one hand, the hegemonic ideology of Cold War neoliberalism wants the particular Oriental to be exceptionally included in its ideological edifice and thus to function as its ideological utility. Ethnic minorities, on the other hand, look for American citizenship in pursuit of their full inclusion as legitimate members of U.S. society and want to be blessed with what the liberal tropes of freedom and consumer culture promise to them. But the promise of making free choices in the liberal society of U.S. consumer culture is not made as purely sincere but pretended. In Transnational America, Inderpal Grewal premises that the dissemination of American neoliberalism played a crucial role in upholding the hegemonic authority of the U.S. as neoliberal Empire. She posits that this role “could not be limited to the institutions of the state but circulated within what came to be called a ‘global civil society’” (1-2). The universalizing force of global civil society leaves no choice for people in its consumer culture 101 but to be participants in “the civilizing work of post industrial society, in which serious labor is put into producing the conditions of consciousness in which buying can occur” (30). Asians’ desire for American citizenship should be considered not so much a transparently self-serving choice as a constituted one, for no other choices can possibly be made to remain un-civilized in U.S. neoliberal capitalism. In this framework, Mei-Li’s double identity bears upon her politically-salient use of “performative contradiction,” by which she becomes a member of American civil society with a free but pretended choice—namely, a choice only to become American and thus civilized.

#### This is a debate about debate so yes give us the ballot

Reid-Brinkley 8, Shanara Rose. The Harsh Realities of" acting Black": How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance and Style. Diss. University of Georgia, 2008. (MA University of Alabama)//Elmer

**But you see, I’m really just trying to change the halls of Congress, that meets on the Capitol Hill of debate tournament tab rooms where pieces of legislation or ballots signed by judges enact the policies of our community. My words right here, right now can’t 113 change the State, but they can change the state of debate. The University of Louisville enacts a full withdrawal from the traditional norms and procedures of this debate activity. Because this institution, like every other institution in society, has also grown from the roots of racism.** Seemingly neutral practices and policies have exclusionary effects on different groups for different reasons. These practices have a long and perpetuating history.108 Signifyin’ on institutional symbols of American democracy, Jones’ draws attention to the parallels in power structures between the federal government and the decision-making arms of the debate community. **The “halls of Congress” represent the halls of debate tournaments. “Capitol Hill” where the laws of this country are enacted is a metaphor for debate tournament tabrooms where wins and losses are catalogued. Tournament ballots metaphorically represent the signing of the judges ballot at the conclusion of debates. In facts, debaters often argue that the “impacts” they identify or the solvency for their plan happens “once the judge signs the ballot,” as if assigning a winner or loser actually results in the passage of a policy. Jones argues that it is the ballot that is the most significant tool in influencing the practices and procedures of the community. In other words, the competitive nature of debate guarantees that teams and coaches remain responsive to trends amongst the judging pool. Ultimately, debate competition is a run to capture or win the judges ballot. That the ballot “enacts” the “policies” of the debate “community,” makes the space of competition a critical arena from which to attempt community change.** Up until this point, the policy debate community had dealt with issues of diversity and inclusion outside of tournament competition. Directors, coaches, assistants, and debaters may have engaged in outreach and recruitment practices designed to diversify the debate community, but discussions and support for such actions were not generated from debate tournament competition. Those discussions occurred in collaborative versus competitive settings where stakeholders were encouraged to dialogue without concern for winners or losers. For example, OSI (the original non-profit arm of the UDL) sponsored Ideafests to bring stakeholders in the debate community together to discuss the national expansion of the UDL. Thus, Green’s following argument during tournament competition directly violates the traditional practice of discussing issues of diversity and inclusion in the community, outside of competitive debate rounds: **Racism is one of the leading exports of the United States Federal Government and it exploits it on to other countries. It doesn’t acknowledge its problems at home and the debate community replicates those values by playing in this fantasy world that we cannot change. By sitting silent, by not acknowledging, or addressing the problems within this community. It is easy for us to say that there are problems racism and sexism but the problem comes when we recognize those systemic issues and do nothing to change our methods of how we challenge those problems**.109 Green is holding the debate community accountable for its failure in significantly increasing diversity and inclusion. **They hold teams accountable for their methodological choices in debate participation forcing other teams and judges to consider whether or not the traditional or normative ways of engaging in competition result in an activity and environment hostile to those debate bodies marked by difference.**

#### The ROB is to reject every instance of anti-asianness in the classroom – anything else normalizes violence

Eng & Han 1 [Asian], DAVID L. ENG & SHINHEE HAN [David L. Eng is Richard L. Fisher Professor of English as well as Graduate Chair of the English Department at UPenn. He is also Professor in the Program in Asian American Studies, the Program in Comparative Litera Racial Castration: Managing Masculinity in Asian America (Duke University Press) as well as the Coeditor (with Alice Y. Hom) of Q&A: Queer in Asian America (Temple University Press, 1998). His current project is a co-edited collection (with David Kazanjian) entitled Loss: Mourning and Melancholia in the Twentieth Century. Shinhee Han, C.S.W., is a psychotherapist at the Counseling & Psychological Services of Columbia University. She is a doctoral candidate in the Shirley M. Ehrenkranz School of Social Work at New York University and maintains a private practice in New York City.], RACIAL MELANCHOLIA, RACIAL DISSOCIATION: On the Social and Psychic Lives of Asian Americans, DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS, Durham and London, 2019, ghs//BZ Recut/Tagged Nato

NATIONAL MELANCHOLIA For Asian Americans and other people of color, suspended assimilation into mainstream culture may involve not only debilitating personal consequences; ultimately, it also constitutes the foundation for a type of national melancholia, a collective national haunting, with destructive effects. In Caucasia, the ambivalence characterizing the narrator’s passing into whiteness leaves her with the constant and eerie feeling of “contamination.”13 Writing about the nature of collective identifications, Freud notes in “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego” (1921), “In a group every sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest. This is an aptitude very contrary to his nature, and of which a man is scarcely capable, except when he makes part of a group.”14 Our analysis insists on a consideration of what happens when the demand to sacrifice the personal to collective interest is accompanied not by inclusion in—but rather exclusion from—the larger group. It reorients psychic problems of racial melancholia toward social problems concerning legal histories of whiteness as property and, in particular, exclusion laws and bars to naturalization and citizenship for Asian Americans as a type of property right. As we know, the formation of the US nation-state entailed—and continues to entail—a history of institutionalized exclusions, legal and otherwise. Part of our introduction focused on the transatlantic slave trade and indigenous dispossession. Here, it is vital to consider the long history of legalized exclusion of Asian American immigrants and citizens alike—from Japanese internment and indefinite detention during World War II to earlier exclusion acts legislated by Congress, brokered by the executive, and upheld by the judiciary against every Asian immigrant group.15 For example, from 1882 to 1943, Chinese immigrants experienced the longest legalized history of exclusion and bars to naturalization and citizenship—the first raced-based exclusions in US history. To cite but one specific instance, in 1888 the US Congress retroactively terminated the legal right of some twenty thousand Chinese residents to reenter the United States after visiting China. Those excluded from reentry were also barred from recovering their personal property remaining in the country, underscoring the ways in which race, citizenship, and property were simultaneously managed by the state to control and restrict flows of both Asian labor and capital. This law was followed by a series of further exclusion laws, as well as accompanied by legislative acts against miscegenation and the ownership of private property, culminating in the National Origins Act (1924) and the Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934), which effectively halted all immigration from Asia for an indefinite period. As Teemu Ruskola notes, at the very historical moment when “the United States was pleased to refer to its China policy as Open Door … it hardly escaped the Chinese that the door swung one way only.”16 Yet, in our multicultural and colorblind age, few people remember this history of racially motivated discrimination against Asian Americans that laid the legal foundation for the emergence of the figure of the “illegal immigrant” and of “alien citizenship” preoccupying so much of political debate concerning immigration today. This history of exclusion is barely taught in US universities or high schools—indeed, colorblindness and the model minority myth demand a forgetting of these events of group discrimination in the name of abstract equality and individual meritocracy. A return to this history thus expands our prior analyses of race as relation and whiteness as property to consider how the legal mechanisms of citizenship have broadly functioned as a kind of restricted property right. For Asian immigrants, these mechanisms have mediated a long history of social exclusion and inclusion in US law and society. Racial melancholia can be seen as one profound psychic effect marking these histories of legal exclusion from the nation-state and prohibitions from national belonging. Today, discourses of American exceptionalism and democratic myths of abstract equality and individualism demand a forgetting of these formative losses and exclusions, an enforced psychic amnesia that can return only as a type of repetitive national haunting—a type of negative or absent presence.17 The contemporary model minority stereotype that defines Asian Americans is both a product of—and productive of—this negative or absent presence.18 Asian American model minority discourse emerged in the postwar period after the lifting of legalized exclusion—in the wake of Cold War conflict, the US civil rights movements, and the reformation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Hart-Celler Act) of 1965. The Hart-Celler Act abolished the earlier immigration quotas based on national origins at the heart of US immigration policy for nearly half a century, replacing it with a system of preferences focused on the technical skills of immigrants and on family reunification. It dramatically shifted immigration patterns to the United States and spurred a “brain drain” of settlers from Asia (and Latin America). At the same time, Hart-Celler also created a vast and largely unacknowledged force of low-income and undocumented migrants from South Asia, new areas of China, particularly Fujian province, and Southeast Asia. This “yellowing” of the US nation-state reversed a long history of anti-Asian exclusion precisely under the banner of model minority citizenship and the collective forgetting of this history of exclusion and its unauthorized subjects. The model minority myth identifies the academic success of second-generation Asian American immigrant children as dispositive of the United States as a land of equal opportunity free of racial discrimination or distress. Thereby, it functions as a national tool that manages and erases a long history of institutionalized exclusion by characterizing Asian American success precisely as the result—rather than something that occurred despite the lack—of equal opportunity in the United States. In turn, the deployment of the model minority myth configures the unequal status of African Americans in US culture and society as a self-inflicted injury. Resisting the invidious political juxtaposition of Asian American “success” with African American “failure,” comparative race scholars have sought to reformulate this regulatory dialectic. Over a hundred years ago, W. E. B. Du Bois asked African Americans in The Souls of Black Folk (1903), “How does it feel to be a problem?”19 Today, comparative race scholars have revised Du Bois’s earlier inquiry, asking Asian Americans, “How does it feel to be a solution?”20 (We return to this dynamic in detail is chapter 3 on parachute children and psychic nowhere.) Put in terms of comparative race relations, Ellen Wu observes that during the prewar era of exclusion and yellow peril, Asians were defined as definitely not white. However, following the postwar era of inclusion, citizenship, and the emergence of model minority stereotype, Asians were defined as definitely not black.21 Understanding this triangulation is key to apprehending the ways in which racial binaries of black and white mask complex social relations of race while preventing political coalitions and alliances. Effacing unequal histories of racial discrimination, this divide and conquer strategy emerges most forcefully today in contemporary debates about affirmative action that seek to pit the interests of African Americans and Asian Americans against one another. The model minority stereotype is a myth because it homogenizes widely disparate Asian American and Asian immigrant groups by generalizing them all as academically and economically successful, with no social problems to speak of. In this manner, the stereotype works to deny, in Lisa Lowe’s words, the “heterogeneity, hybridity, and multiplicity” of various Asian American individuals and groups who do not fit its ideals of model citizenry.22 The pervasiveness of the model minority stereotype in our contemporary national imagination thus works as one important melancholic mechanism facilitating the erasure and loss of repressed Asian American identities as well as histories of discrimination and exclusion. These identities and histories can return only as a type of ghostly presence. In this sense, the Asian American model minority subject also endures in the US historical imaginary as a melancholic national object—as a haunting specter to democratic ideals of inclusion that cannot quite get over these legislated histories of loss. The psychic consequences that this model of national melancholia has exacted on the Asian American psyche are extensively explored and interrogated in Asian American cultural productions. One compelling example comes from Maxine Hong Kingston’s China Men (1980). In Kingston’s historical novel, an imaginary chronicle of several successive generations of male ancestors in the United States, the narrator speculates about the disappearance of the “Grandfather of the Sierra Nevada Mountains.” After he helps to complete the transcontinental railroad, the greatest technological feat of ﻿the nineteenth century, Ah Goong vanishes. Kingston writes, “Maybe he hadn’t died in San Francisco, it was just his papers that burned; it was just that his existence was outlawed by Chinese Exclusion Acts. The family called him Fleaman. They did not understand his accomplishments as an American ancestor, a holding, homing ancestor of this place.”23 Kingston understands that the law’s refusal to recognize Chinese immigrants as citizens “outlaws” their existence, subjecting them to legal erasure as well as institutional violence: “It was dangerous to stay,” she observes in the context of the “Golden Spike” ceremony commemorating the railroad’s completion. “The Driving Out had begun. Ah Goong does not appear in railroad photographs.”24 At the same time, Kingston also underscores how this historical repudiation of the Asian laborer gains its psychic efficacy through a simultaneous internalization of its interdictions on the part of those excluded themselves. That is, the grandfather’s own family members refuse to recognize him as “an American ancestor, a holding, homing ancestor of this place.” They cannot perceive the “Fleaman’s” accomplishments building the transcontinental railroad as legitimizing his membership in the American nation. How, in turn, can it be possible to see themselves as legitimate members of this society? In this regard, racial melancholia can be described as splitting the Asian American psyche. This cleaving of the psyche can be productively thought about in terms of an altered, racialized model of classic Freudian fetishism.25 That is, assimilation into the national fabric demands a psychic splitting on the part of the Asian American subject who knows and does not know, at once, that she or he is part of the larger social body. In the same breath, fetishism also describes mainstream society’s disavowal and projection of otherness onto a disparaged group that is then homogenized and reduced to a stereotype. In this manner, racial fetishism delineates a psychic process by which difference is assumed and projected and then negated and denied, returning us to social dynamics of Myrdal’s “American dilemma.”

#### Permutation of methods are good

Ty 17 [Asian] [Eleanor Ty, Professor in the Department of English and Film Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University. She holds a PhD and MA in English from McMaster University, and a BA Hons from the University of Toronto., University Of Illinois Press, "Asian Fail Narratives Of Disenchantment And the Model Minority ", 2017]//lydiaw

In their own ways, the works I have studied in this book contribute to the growing awareness of the need to re-examine the “good life”—its high cost not only to youths but also to older members of the community, and its viability in the twenty-first century. Through inventive narrative and representational strategies that reveal precarious conditions, these works illuminate the critical social, cultural, historical, and political issues that most concern Asian North Americans in the twenty-first century. These issues, ranging from environmental degradation, the loss of stability from the financial crisis of 2007–8 and following, the suspicion and paranoia after 9/11, postwar trauma and memory, racialization and typecasting, and real and imagined cultural and familial expectations, mark the experiences of these artists I have studied. Between 2000 and 2015 the economic conditions in the United States and Canada have worsened due to the increasing neoliberal policies under the governments of Presidents Bill Clinton (1993–2001) and George W. Bush (2001–8) and of Prime Ministers Paul Martin (2003–6) and Stephen Harper (2006–15). **American-model neoliberalism has been criticized because it results in “substantial levels of social exclusion, including high levels of income inequality, high relative and absolute poverty rates, poor and unequal educational outcomes, poor health outcomes, and high rates of crime incarceration” (Schmitt and Zipperer 15). For example, popular stances of both the U.S. and Canadian governments have been that we should be “tough on crime” and wage a “war on drugs.” These notions resulted in an unprecedented rise of blacks and other minorities in U.S. prisons and of Aboriginal peoples in Canadian prisons**. As Bruce Western notes, “Incarceration would be used less for rehabilitation than for incapacitation, deterrence, and punishment. … Tough new sentences were attached to narcotics offenses as the federal government waged first a war on crime, then a war on drugs. Locked facilities proliferated around the country to cope with the burgeoning penal population. Prison construction became an instrument for regional development as small towns lobbied for correctional facilities and resisted prison closure” (2–3). Although these details do not directly relate to Asian North Americans, I argue that the movement from an ethic of care to the politics of the punitive, from rehabilitation to penal discipline, creates an atmosphere of fear, anxiety, and distrust in contemporary society. Only one of the texts in this study features incarceration of an Asian immigrant, but what is important is the institutional change, “shifts in the structure of society and politics” that have “large consequences for the quality of American democracy” (Western 2). If in the 1960s **and early 1970s** Asian **American** movements were formed in solidarity with **and as a response to** the Black Panther and Women’s Liberation **movements**, then in the twenty-first century the criminalization of **large numbers of young** African Americans **and First Nations Canadians** has considerable effects on **American and Canadian racial and** social inequality, on the collective **affective** experiences of p**eople** o**f** c**olor** and minorities. In the works I examined, we see the affect of fear in Vietnamese refugees who do not understand enough English to follow rules in The Gangster We Are All Looking For, or the dire consequences of the misrecognition of a Filipino immigrant in Gilvarry’s From the Memoirs of a Non-Enemy Combatant. The fear of the racial Other in the last decade has been exacerbated by the decline of manufacturing and industry and the dismantling of welfare state. It is not surprising that one of the most popular TV series in the last five or six years has been the American horror show The Walking Dead (2010– ), where the fearful flesh-eating zombie Others turn out to be our own family members and neighbors rather than invaders from an external nation. People now fear contagion from those who are within rather than from strangers from a distant shore. **For this reason,** it is heartening to see Asian **American**s **and Asian Canadians** expressing solidarity with other disenfranchised groups **and working for global environmental causes. The affiliations work** to defy **and counter** the **racially** divisive idealization of **Asian North Americans perpetuated by** the model minority **myth**. For example, #Asians4Blacklives **is a “diverse group of Asian voices coming from the Philippines, Vietnam, India, China, Pakistan, Korea, Burma, Japan, and other nations, based in the Bay Area,” who “**have come together **in response to a call from Black Lives Matter Bay Area”** to show solidarity **with black people. The group recognizes that Asians, like blacks, are subjected to racism, misrecognition, and negative stereotyping**. In her most recent book, Undercurrent, Asian Canadian poet Rita Wong vows to “honour what the flow of water teaches us” (“Declaration of Intent”), to be led by the “healing walkers” of the “Cree and Dene elders and everyday people” and to “reassert human responsibilities to land, water, life” (“Fresh Ancient Ground”). **Wong stresses** the need to form alliances with feminists and First Nations communities, **recognizing that they will protect water and resist corporations that want to use the earth’s resources as commodities. Similarly, the Chinese Canadian Historical Society of BC is making a concerted effort to discover links between Chinese Canadians and First Nations people, producing videos called “Cedar and Bamboo” that highlight stories of marginalization by mixed-race Chinese/First Nations Canadians**. The project goes beyond the history of Chinese immigrants in relationship to the gold rush, the building of the railroad, and Chinatowns to the historical and continuing relationships between the Chinese population and First Nations in British Columbia. Started by Chinese Canadian history professor Henry Yu, the online “Chinese Canadian Stories” feature information about key historical events in Chinese Canadian history as well as short videos made by university students about their background and issues that concern them. The project highlights the multiplicity of identities and ways of expressing these identities in the twenty-first century. One funny video that is a fine example of Asianfail is Jennifer Yip’s “Hybrid Husband.” The short video humorously depicts the pressure Yip feels at twenty-two to find a fiancé. Embarking on her twenty-seventh blind date to find the perfect Chinese/Canadian boyfriend, she meets a young man who seems to pass all the requirements set out by her family and herself. He speaks Cantonese and English, snowboards, skis, is learning to fly a plane, and understands her complicated hybrid culture. But by the end of the video, Yip is shocked and confounded by the discovery from his Facebook page that he already has a girlfriend. The video uses irony, humor, and exaggeration to cut through the tensions between a third-generation Asian Canadian and Old World cultural beliefs. **These instances I have been discussing here** illustrate the increasing diversity of Asian **North American** subjects, and their responses to failure **of various sorts**. The works I have discussed show how Asian Americans and Asian Canadians are negotiating and reconfiguring their desires and aspirations. Although the works document different types of failure and depression, they also present alternatives to the current definitions of success, which center on professional and economic achievement. These novels, films, graphic narratives, and memoirs explore the consequences and rewards of not following or not being able to follow society’s prescribed roads to success. As we have seen, the depicted reasons for failure include mental breakdown, shame, lingering memories of trauma and pain, the refusal to subscribe to capitalism’s notion of success, and the rejection of the heteronormative romance script. Further failures are caused by bullying, misidentification and misrecognition, or the internalization of others’ false assumptions and expectations. It is only through the telling of their stories that we understand the dystopic space in which many of these Asian North American people exist. They illuminate the precarity in the lives of some members of a group that has been perceived to be in a privileged space. An inadvertent positive result of some members’ failure to conform has been the production of an incredible assortment of works that question, in sometimes humorous, witty, ironic, and entertaining ways, our apprehension of our modern world, including our perception of the passing of time, of beauty, happiness, aging, gender, family life, and love. Sometimes, the failure to follow traditional routes leads to a new and unexpected way of finding peace and contentment, or an unexplored career path. In keeping with the motif of finding pleasures in the unpredictable, I deliberately sought to examine works that play with the conventions and forms of genre: the use of poetic prose, postmodern reiterations of Buddhist beliefs, stage performance with an inanimate character, a fake memoir, and a graphic narrative not contained by frames and sequences. This book is one of many efforts to participate in the ongoing and much-needed dialogue about priorities and values for our society, global environment, and political identities in the twenty-first century.

### 1AC – Disclosure

#### Interpretation: Debaters must have a NDCA LD wiki with at least contact information disclosed

#### Violation: You don’t have a wiki – ss attached

Graphical user interface, text, chat or text message

Description automatically generated

#### Standards:

#### 1] Trigger Warnings and Pronouns: having contact info before round allows debaters to let their opponents know what their trigger warnings are and their pronouns so that there aren’t any conflicts in round. Anything else risks violence and only contact info solves. Violence ow – people will quit debate which kills accessibility and controls the internal link to all voters because we need to be able to debate in the first place.

#### C/A Paradigm issues