## 1

#### Interpretation – “A” in the resolution indicates that you must defend that all just governments recognize an unconditional right to strike.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Limits – there’s 195 different governments that you could potentially specify, which explodes the number of affs – there’s no universal disad to every government since each has different political scenarios so we lose core neg ground like the business confidence DA or the Grids/Police PIC. Limits outweighs – it controls the internal link to the possibility of engagement which turns education.

#### Drop the debater since drop the arg is severance – restarts the debate so the aff gets 7-6 time skew and too late for new neg offense.

#### Use competing interps—[a] leads to a race to the top where we find the best norms [b] reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention [c] reasonability collapses—you use offense/defense on the paradigm debate.

#### No RVIs—[a] logic – you don’t win for being fair, [b] means you bait theory and go for the RVI

## Case

### 1NC – AT: Taiwan War

#### US will stay out – their draw in warrant is horrible

Metz 2/8/19 [Steven Metz is the author of “Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy.” His WPR column appears every Friday. You can follow him on Twitter @steven\_metz. "How Committed Is the U.S. to Fending Off a War Over Taiwan?" https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27395/how-committed-is-the-u-s-to-fending-off-a-war-over-taiwan]

But would Trump use military force to defend Taiwan? Even without large-scale U.S. involvement, China might not be able to conquer Taiwan outright. Conventional military invasions across bodies of water are extremely difficult. And time would not be on Beijing’s side since any invasion would be disruptive, even catastrophic, for both the global economy and China, which depends on exports of manufactured goods and imports of energy and raw materials to sustain its economy.

The United States might respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan with long-range military strikes plus standoff air defense, anti-ship, space and cyber operations. But “might” is the operative word. U.S. involvement would entail massive risk. There is the potential that Americans might simply accept the conquest of Taiwan.

Things would be even more difficult for Washington if China opted for the sort of “gray zone” aggression that Russia has used to weaken Ukraine—avoiding an outright military invasion and relying on other destabilizing methods that combine political, economic, military and technological interference to avoid provoking a devastating response from the United States. This would be particularly tricky for Washington if China were able to replicate what Russia did in Ukraine and find local allies or proxies.

#### China wouldn’t win

Roy 18 [Denny Roy is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii "What would the US do if Beijing decided to take Taiwan by force?" https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2156237/what-would-us-do-if-beijing-decided-take-taiwan-force]

The only sure way to compel Taiwan’s surrender would be for PLA soldiers to occupy Taiwan’s major cities. But even as China’s military capabilities improve, the chances of success in an all-out invasion of Taiwan are low – even if the United States did not intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. China would need to ferry its troops, most of them packed into slow-moving and highly visible ships, across the 160km wide Taiwan Strait, where they would be highly vulnerable to attack, and then unload them and huge amounts of ammunition and other supplies while trudging through sand or mud and under heavy fire. China has the capacity to transport only a few tens of thousands of troops at a time. Much of this force would not make it across the strait. Awaiting the survivors would be 180,000 active duty Taiwanese soldiers plus 1.5 million reservists.

If the United States chose to intervene, US aircraft from bases in the region could begin flying missions within hours. China might try to impede this by firing missiles to temporarily knock out runways used by US aircraft, but this would reduce the number of missiles available to hit Taiwan, and also bring Japan’s military forces fully into a war.

Even if it won the military campaign, Beijing would face the daunting prospect of trying to rule a society that was accustomed to democratic governance and would be inveterately hostile towards China for generations to come. Tibet would appear quiescent by comparison.

#### Talmadge says war unlikely AND stays conventional

Caitlin Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, November/December 2018, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 5

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself.

#### The US won’t intervene for a non-recognized, non-allied state.

Babones 16 (Salvatore, Associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), 1-12-2016, “One China, One Taiwan” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/taiwan/2016-01-12/one-china-one-taiwan)

Although a Taiwanese declaration of independence would arouse much sympathy in the United States, it would not likely result in American diplomatic recognition. Taiwan may be a fellow democracy with free and vibrant political institutions, but the United States is a [global hegemon](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/american-hegemony-here-stay-13089) with global responsibilities and a massive stake in the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The United States may [sell weapons](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-taiwan-arms-idUSKBN0TZ2C520151217) to Taiwan in a tit-for-tat response to [Chinese expansionism](http://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/22/china-spratlys-island-building-is-to-protect-reefs-make-civilian-facilities.html) in the South China Sea, but it is not about to start World War III over Taiwanese sovereignty. The real revolution of a DPP victory in Taiwan will be a revolution in identity. There is already a [pitched battle](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/21/taiwan-textbook-controversy-china-independence-history/) in Taiwan over the teaching of history. In the old textbooks, the history of the Chinese people began in the fertile valley of the Yellow River and ended in exile on the rocky island of Taiwan. In the new textbooks, the lush island of Taiwan was buffeted by historical forces beyond its control but ultimately found its way to democracy, prosperity, and independence. The emergence of a distinctively Taiwanese identity is bitterly resisted by the old guard of the KMT, but the people of Taiwan [overwhelmingly identify](https://www.aei.org/publication/chinese-check-forging-new-identities-hong-kong-taiwan-2/) either as Taiwanese or as a mix of Taiwanese and Chinese. Nearly 90 percent of Taiwanese want [equal status](http://www.taiwan.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=13053&ctNode=1937&mp=999) for their country in the international community. While these numbers are somewhat suspect—the questions seem designed in such a way as to elicit a positive response—the [overall trend](http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=167) is clear. Although most can trace a Chinese heritage,[very few](http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166) people in Taiwan want to be Chinese. American pundits often discuss whether the United States should accommodate China through the [Finlandization](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2010-01-01/not-so-dire-straits) of Taiwan or even [abandon Taiwan](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2011-03-01/will-chinas-rise-lead-war) to China. Such analyses are at least 30 years too late. Taiwan will never again be part of China. That train has left the station. Taiwan is a [highly successful](https://www.aei.org/publication/why-giving-up-taiwan-will-not-help-us-with-china/) country of more than 23 million people with its own politics and its own place in the world. Admittedly, that place may fall short of what many Taiwanese people want for their country, but it is nonetheless secure. January’s election won’t change that.

#### Empirics and geography prove.

Roger **Jiang, 17**, "To protect Taiwan, would the United States go to war with China if China were determined to take it back?," Quora, https://www.quora.com/To-protect-Taiwan-would-the-United-States-go-to-war-with-China-if-China-were-determined-to-take-it-back)SEM

If the US didn’t intervene militarily when Russia annexed Crimea, why do people think it will go into war with China over Taiwan? Let us first take a look at war potentials - Russia GDP was 1/5 of the US in 2016 in PPP terms while China’s GDP in PPP was about 10% higher than that of the US, according to IMF data. Moreover, Chinese manufacuring output in value terms is roughly equal to those of the US and Japan, COMBINED. China also controls most of the rare earth in the world, a key ingredient for modern electronics. And China boasts the largest ship building capacity and ouput globally - China is building FOUR 12,000 ton warships simultaneously, and the same shipyards are still working on the commercial orders at the same time, AND that is just the shipyards in Shanghai and Dalian that we are talking about - another major shipyard in Guangzhou is not yet involved. People simply have no idea how massive Chinese industrial capacity is. Lastly, Taiwan is about 200km away from mainland China but about 10,000km away from mainland US. Who do you think has the geographical advantage here? Now let us talk about economics - Russia barely had any trade with the US but China is the largest trading partner with both the US and the EU. China is the largest car market in the world where both European and American car companies have made massive investments. China is also the largest customer of Boeing, Airbus, BMW and Qualcom, etc. GE, Intel, Pfizer etc. are doing billions of business in China. And China buys tons and tons of American agricultural and fishery products. When the economic benefits are large enough, they always trump geo-political considerations - why was UK, the long time ally of the US, the first country to join China’s Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), despite strong US opposition? Didn’t the Europeans know that AIIB is China’s attempt to build another global financial framework in challenge to World Bank and IMF? I am sure the Europeans know it pretty well but they are smart enough not to let ideological difference stop them from making a buck or two. And they also wanna hedge their bets. The Brits are known for stratigic vision and they surely know how to adjust the ship when the tide is changing. Many Taiwanese have this ludicrous belief that Taiwan is of such an importance to the world that the whole world would come to Taiwan’s rescue should China invade Taiwan. But the reality is that most people outside East Asia cannot even find Taiwan on a map and couldn’t care less about a remote island somewhere in the Pacific… Yeah, the West loves talking about democracy, freedom and human rights. But to risk a global economic recession, huge loss of lives and even nuclear holocaust, to rescue some island that has always been officially recognized as a part of China by world governments? Nah… If China invades Taiwan, clearly a small skirmish is simply not enough to stop China. But a large scale fully blown war will have unbearable costs. So when fighting small wont work and fighting big is too costly, what do you do? You do nothing. So, no, the US will not go into war with China over Taiwan.

#### Even if they intervene, no extinction

David J. Lonsdale 19 {David Lonsdale is the Director of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull, UK. 5/17/2019. “The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A return to nuclear warfighting?” https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2019.1573074}//JM

The important question is: what objectives would the U.S. pursue within a nuclear conflict, and how would they be achieved? It appears that the primary objectives sought would be damage limitation (an important component of warfighting) and the reestablishment of deterrence. This fits with the preliminary qualifying statement to this section of the review, in which it is stated that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons in compliance with the law of armed conflict.86 Indeed, the NPR is at pains to note that nuclear forces would only be used for defensive purposes. One assumes that this rules out counter-value targeting (deliberate attacks against enemy population centers). This leaves counterforce operations as the only option. Strikes against enemy nuclear forces and their command and control, in conjunction with active ballistic missile defenses (BMD), would help ensure damage limitation for the U.S. and its allies.87 A focus on counterforce options is reminiscent of later Cold War strategy, when the U.S. increasingly procured weapon systems with increased accuracy and penetrative capability designed for warfighting. Indeed, Lieber and Press argue that increases in accuracy and remote sensing have enhanced the potency of counterforce options, to the point that low-casualty counterforce options are possible for the first time.88 One can reasonably assume, although it is not explicitly noted in the review, that the restoration of deterrence would be achieved through a combination of intra-war deterrence by denial (as noted above in relation to counter-escalation strategies) and punishment for coercive purposes. Inclusion of the latter is premised on references to “unacceptable consequences” resulting from nuclear attack elsewhere in the NPR. 89 However, in the face of no counter-value targeting, it is reasonable to question how these costs would be inflicted. There are three possible answers, although none of them is discussed in the NPR. First, it may be that the enemy values highly their nuclear forces; so that the loss of them would inflict unacceptable costs. Alternatively, there may be an unwritten assumption that counterforce strikes would inevitably produce “bonus” counter-value damage. Much of the nuclear force infrastructure (including command and control, airbases, etc.) is within or near population centers. Thus, even a limited counterforce strike is likely to have a significant detrimental effect on counter-value targets. This assumption, however, is somewhat thrown into question by the stated desire to procure accurate limited-yield weapons and to operate within the norms of the war convention. Low-yield accurate weapons would be ideal for counterforce missions and would minimize damage to counter-value target sets. Thus, bonus damage is likely to be limited. Finally, although again not explicitly noted in the NPR, perhaps there is a return to the notion of attacking targets associated with political control. Yet again, though, concerns over collateral damage would likely restrict a campaign aimed at the means of political control. We are, thus, left with many questions concerning how the coercive effects of nuclear weapons would be administered. This is problematic, for as Thomas C. Schelling eloquently noted, “The power to hurt can be counted among the most impressive attributes of military force.” 90 It has to be concluded that the uncertainties in this area of strategy reflect either a paradox or incomplete strategic thinking in the NPR. Clarity on these matters would be welcome, especially as it would enhance deterrence credibility still further. Although countervailing is back on the agenda in the 2018 NPR, there is no mention of prevailing in a nuclear conflict. Indeed, the review quotes Defense Secretary Mattis, echoing the early thoughts of Brodie, that nuclear war can never be won, and thus must never be fought.91 This is both curious and disappointing from a warfighting perspective, and speaks to the need for the further development of strategic thinking in U.S. nuclear strategy under Trump. Damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence are perfectly admirable goals within the context of nuclear conflict. However, if the U.S. is to achieve its objectives in a post-deterrence environment, it must have a comprehensive theory of victory. Damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence are limited negative objectives. They do not provide a positive driving force for the use of nuclear weapons. To reiterate, victory refers to a policy objective that must be achieved in the face of the enemy. And, as Clausewitz reminds us, the will of the enemy must be broken by destroying his ability to resist, or putting him in such a position as his defeat is inevitable.92 If we consider the conditions under which U.S. nuclear weapons could be used, as stipulated by the 2018 NPR, then we can assume that an enemy power (likely Russia, China, North Korea, or a state-sponsored terror group) has launched a substantial attack on either the U.S. or one of its allies. We can think in terms of a Russian assault on the Baltic States, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or perhaps a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Alternatively, the U.S. may have been subjected to a substantial strategic attack, involving either weapons of mass destruction (including biological or chemical) or a crippling cyberattack. In any of these scenarios, more expansive objectives would be required. As Lieber and Press note, “In some cases, wars may be triggered by events that compel U.S. leaders to pursue decisive victory, conquest, and/or regime change.” 93 Thus, in order to achieve its objectives, the U.S. would variously need to: punish an aggressor to reinstate deterrence; defeat enemy forces for damage limitation or to reclaim lost territory; and, in the North Korean case, presumably overthrow a communist regime. In some of these cases, damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence would not be enough. Enemy forces would have to be defeated, removed, destroyed, or coerced (to withdraw from allied territory). Any operations in pursuit of these goals would need a theory of victory built on a detailed understanding of the use of nuclear weapons in the service of military objectives; i.e., nuclear warfighting. This could include defeating enemy nuclear forces for force protection of U.S. and allied conventional forces. Alternatively, U.S. nuclear forces may be required to defeat regionally superior enemy conventional forces. And yet, as previously noted, the NPR rules out a return to nuclear warfighting. This is a significant disjuncture in U.S. nuclear strategy. It is even more curious when one considers the range of modern forces the Trump administration seeks to acquire under the 2018 NPR.

## Taiwan War Good

### China Transition

#### Chinese invasion of Taiwan would result in a quagmire that would stimulate democratic forces in China

Wang Mouzhou 17, pen name of a former NSA intelligence officer, 3-24-2017, “What Happens After China Invades Taiwan?” The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/what-happens-after-china-invades-taiwan/

Let’s assume, hypothetically, that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) successfully conquers Taiwan. Most analyses of an attempted invasion consider only if the PRC could successfully subdue Taiwan. The consequences of an attempted invasion –even a tactically successful one – have received little thought, however. This analysis considers some likely consequences for the PRC if it attempts and/or completes an invasion of Taiwan. Likely consequences include: the direct human and economic expenditures of the invasion itself; the costs of garrisoning Taiwan; the PRC’s post-war diplomatic and economic isolation; and, finally, the significant and potentially destabilizing process of incorporating 23 million individuals into the PRC. It is still too soon to say if Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in Crimea and the Donbass produced a strategic defeat or victory for Russia. However, the elements that advantaged Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine will not avail themselves to the PRC in a cross-straits crisis. Invading Taiwan would prove highly dangerous and costly for Beijing. Incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC would prove to be, at best, a Pyrrhic victory if attempted in the near or medium term. The Invasion of Taiwan While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a highly capable and formidable force, a conventional military invasion of Taiwan would prove highly costly in treasure and blood and could fail to achieve the Communist Party of China’s (CPC’s) objectives. Ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore landings are extremely hazardous for the invasion force. In the first Gulf War, American military planners were rumored to estimate that an amphibious invasion of Saddam Hussein-occupied Kuwait would cost up to 10,000 American lives, despite the considerable relative military superiority of U.S. forces. The Republic of China (ROC) possesses a much more sophisticated military than Hussein did in 1991 and, due to advances in anti-access area denial doctrine and capabilities, can impose asymmetric costs on an invader. Additionally, American forces (and, potentially, other actors) would impose punishing costs on any invasion force. A 2015 RAND study estimated that United States submarines alone could sink 41 percent of Chinese amphibious ships in a theoretical 2017 conflict. A direct invasion attempt by the PRC would likely lead to significant – and potentially massive – casualties for all involved actors, as well as a regional or even global economic depression. In the “best-case” scenario for the PRC, a successful invasion would still suffer substantial casualties and cost tens of billions of dollars. Moreover, the consequences of an invasion would persist, as health expenses and pensions would burden the Chinese state for decades (at a time when Chinese veterans are already protesting about unpaid pensions). An invasion and the one-child policy could exacerbate an already hellish social crisis for the mainland, as wounded and deceased veterans – often only children – would be unable to support their elderly parents and grandparents. Instead of a direct invasion, the PRC could employ a blockade or another form of so-called “asymmetrical warfare.” Russia used the tactics of asymmetric warfare to achieve short-term political objectives in Crimea, the Donbass, and, according to some reports, the 2016 United States presidential election. It may also potentially achieve the dissolution of the European Union and stimulate a worldwide financial crisis through its intervention in European elections. Leaving aside, for now, the wisdom of these actions, it is worth noting that the PRC’s invasion of Taiwan would confront an environment hostile to asymmetric means. Several factors aided Russia’s asymmetric/hybrid invasion of Ukraine: popular support in Crimea and the Donbass for close political ties with Russia; a significant number of former Russian (and Soviet) citizens and even veterans in the invaded territories, especially in Crimea; a largely ineffective opposing military force; and the element of surprise. A PRC invasion of Taiwan would confront much more challenging conditions. Few in Taiwan desire reunification with the CPC-dominated mainland: a 2014 public opinion poll by the ROC’s Mainland Affairs Council found that 84 percent of respondents on the island wanted to “maintain the status quo defined in a broader sense.” The PRC could surely count on some fifth-column support in the event of an invasion or asymmetric campaign but the reality is that most individuals in Taiwan fear PRC rule and would actively resist a reduction in their political freedoms and economic prosperity. Finally, the ROC’s military – and other militaries – are unlikely to be surprised by asymmetric warfare and would respond vigorously. Therefore, in the highly likely event of an asymmetric invasion’s failure, the CPC’s political leadership would have to face a hard choice: accept a massive symbolic defeat, which could jeopardize the Party’s legitimacy, or escalate an asymmetric operation into a full military invasion with all attendant risks. Garrison Island The costs of invading Taiwan could, perhaps surprisingly, pale in comparison to the costs of maintaining control over it. In the best-case scenario for the PRC, the island would fall with minimal damage to its physical (not to mention human) infrastructure. It is perhaps more realistic to expect that a PRC invasion would lead to catastrophic destruction of private property (much of it owned by mainland elites); severe damages to Taiwan’s transportation infrastructure, such as railroads, bridges, ports, airports, and metro systems; ecological devastation from landmines and unexploded ordinance; and, perhaps, an anti-Communist insurgency. As many Chinese officials and scholars like to point out (especially when they are upset at American actions), the United States has spent significant blood and treasure in Iraq and Afghanistan and has achieved relatively few results. An invasion of Taiwan could provide the PRC with an object lesson in the difficulties of counterinsurgency (for an excellent exposition on guerrilla war in the cross-strait context, see the CSBA’s 2014 “Hard ROC 2.0” report). It is extremely difficult to pacify an invaded region. Unlike, say, Crimea, individuals in Taiwan are quite likely to actively resist their occupiers. If the PRC successfully invades Taiwan, it will likely re-learn many of the hard lessons that Washington experienced in the first two decades of the 21st century. PRC planners should perhaps consider some unpleasant questions. Would ROC security forces be disbanded immediately upon conquest of the island? If so, does the PRC have sufficient financial resources to bribe former ROC soldiers and security officials from conducting an insurgency? If the PRC bribed former ROC soldiers and security officials, how would PLA veterans respond to enemy combatants receiving higher pensions? More broadly, given that Taiwan’s per capita PPP GDP is, at $49,400, over three times larger than the mainland’s per capita GDP, who would finance Taiwan’s reconstruction? Would these expenditures provoke or sharpen resentments on either or both sides of the strait? And how would the PRC handle Taiwan’s old political leadership? Would the PRC murder the old leadership, ensuring a massive backlash from the international community and the people on the island? Would the PLA merely imprison them, perhaps creating a sustained, symbolic threat to the Party? Or would the PLA exile the old political leadership, constructing a sophisticated opposition with governing experience, international stature, and, for the CPC, an uncomfortable historical parallel to Sun Yat-sen, founder of the ROC and one of the few individuals revered on both sides of the strait? Subduing Taiwan would require massive investments of time, personnel, and resources. Counterinsurgency experts suggest that counterinsurgents often need to employ several times as many combatants as the insurgents. Therefore, garrisoning Taiwan would require a minimum occupying force numbering in the tens of thousands. Higher manpower requirements are probable. A PLA counterinsurgency force in Taiwan could require hundreds of thousands soldiers and paramilitary forces, tying down PRC military and financial resources for decades. The PRC’s Legitimacy Post-Invasion An invasion of Taiwan would signal the emergence of aggressive, might-makes-right Chinese nationalism. Indo-Pacific countries would likely respond by coalescing into a military and economic alliance aimed at countering PRC aggression. The PRC’s international isolation would constrain its economic potential and, ultimately, likely lead CPC leadership to seek an alternative legitimation model. Under Mao Zedong, the CPC derived political legitimacy from its assertion of Chinese autonomy, Marxist ideology, and, to a lesser degree, rising living standards (the survivors of Mao experienced improvements in life expectancy, literacy, and infant mortality). Under Deng Xiaoping, the CPC increasingly tied its legitimacy to rising living standards, while notionally adhering to Marxist ideology. An invasion of Taiwan would represent the end of the Deng Xiaoping epoch. Under a new political paradigm, the CPC would mainly legitimate itself through nationalism, not economics: the state would seek to maximize China’s international prestige, perhaps even at the expense of domestic welfare. In other words, the CPC would increasingly resemble Russia under President Vladimir Putin. Under the new legitimation model, several features would emerge. First, living standards would likely stall – while remaining relatively high. Second, China would increasingly seek to derive legitimacy from the domination of other sovereign countries. Third, China’s appetite would likely grow larger with eating: Chinese claims to former territories currently occupied by India, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia could grow increasingly strident. This new legitimation model would present several challenges for the CPC. First, Chinese and Russians have different historical experiences and psychological expectations. Russians endured a profoundly scarring economic and financial crisis in the 1990s, increasing their tolerance for economic misery while largely sapping demand for free-market economics (not to mention rules-based government). Chinese, on the other hand, have enjoyed near-continuous economic and social improvements for nearly 40 years. A nationalism-induced recession – or even stagnation – could lead to a political backlash from Chinese accustomed to rising living standards. As Samuel P. Huntington wrote, “Urbanization, increases in literacy, education, and media exposure all give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations which, if unsatisfied, galvanize individuals and groups into politics.” An invasion of Taiwan could trigger an economic crisis and political struggle on the mainland.

#### New pressures result in a soft democratic landing – but public buy-in is key

Pei 13 (Minxin, Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government and director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College, “5 Ways China Could Become a Democracy”, http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/5-ways-china-could-become-a-democracy/1/)

“Happy ending” would be the most preferable mode of democratic transition for China. Typically, a peaceful exit from power managed by the ruling elites of the old regime goes through several stages. It starts with the emergence of a legitimacy crisis, which may be caused by many factors (such as poor economic performance, military defeat, rising popular resistance, unbearable costs of repression, and endemic corruption). Recognition of such a crisis convinces some leaders of the regime that the days of authoritarian rule are numbered and they should start managing a graceful withdrawal from power. If such leaders gain political dominance inside the regime, they start a process of liberalization by freeing the media and loosening control over civil society. Then they negotiate with opposition leaders to set the rules of the post-transition political system. Most critically, such negotiations center on the protection of the ruling elites of the old regime who have committed human rights abuses and the preservation of the privileges of the state institutions that have supported the old regime (such as the military and the secret police). Once such negotiations are concluded, elections are held. In most cases (Taiwan and Spain being the exceptions), parties representing the old regime lose such elections, thus ushering in a new democratic era. At the moment, the transition in Burma is unfolding according to this script. But for China, the probability of such a happy ending hinges on, among other things, whether the ruling elites start reform before the old regime suffers irreparable loss of legitimacy. The historical record of peaceful transition from post-totalitarian regimes is abysmal mainly because such regimes resist reform until it is too late. Successful cases of “happy ending” transitions, such as those in Taiwan, Mexico, and Brazil, took place because the old regime still maintained sufficient political strength and some degree of support from key social groups. So the sooner the ruling elites start this process, the greater their chances of success. The paradox, however, is that regimes that are strong enough are unwilling to reform and regimes that are weak cannot reform. In the Chinese case, the odds of a soft landing are likely to be determined by what China’s new leadership does in the coming five years because the window of opportunity for a political soft landing will not remain open forever.

#### China has the pre-requisites for a stable transition

Rowen 7—Henry S. Rowen, Professor emeritus in the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace [July 2007, “When Will the Chinese People Be Free?” *Journal of Democracy* 18.3, Project Muse]

I observed in 1996 that a democratic China in a region with many democracies would be good for peace because democracies do not fight each other (which does not imply that democracies are inherently peaceable). Yet all is not necessarily well. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder find that countries making the transition from authoritarian to democratic governance are more likely to start foreign broils than are consolidated democracies because internal contests for power can cause a faction to identify, or to conjure up, a foreign enemy as a means of rallying mass support.26 Mansfield and Snyder hold that this is most likely where elections are held in countries with a weak sense of nationhood, a shaky rule of law, feeble bureaucracies, poor civilian control of the military, a winner-take-all attitude among contending parties, and few safeguards for press freedom. This leads them to recommend that, where possible, elections should come on the heels and not ahead of institution-building, with a competent central government and legal system needed most urgently of all. If these premises are correct, China's prospects are not bad. The Chinese today possess a strong sense of nationhood, a legal system that is moving in the right direction, a military that seems firmly under civilian control, increased professionalism in many organizations, and nothing like the shadow of "premature" elections on the horizon. Other positives for peace are China's high trade-to-GDP ratio and membership in several international organizations.

### South Asia war

#### Zero reverse casual evidence read for diplomacy – their ev was about when china’s econ was strong in 2018 during a miracle, no reason why political conditions are the same especially with their ev

#### South Asian deterrence is stable – mutually assured destruction is uniquely true

Ladwig 15 – Walter C. Ladwig III, Lecturer in International Relations at King's College London, Ph.D. in International Relations from Merton College, Oxford, 2015 (“Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, May 11th, Taylor & Francis Online)

Headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense budget and a high-profile military modernization program have alarmed observers who worry that these developments could undermine the conventional military balance credited with maintaining ‘ugly stability’ in South Asia. While on their face these concerns have validity, upon deeper examination, there is still good reason to continue to be optimistic about the prospects for conventional deterrence. India’s defense procurement continues to under perform, producing far less in terms of military power than its spending would suggest. Conversely, Pakistan –assisted by China and others –has prevented the emergence of sharp asymmetries in the conventional military balance and even narrowed previously existing gaps. Modernizing or not, the Indian military is capable of bringing far less force to bear in a limited conflict with Pakistan than the pessimists realize. As a result, it is unlikely that Indian policymakers would conclude that they can either achieve strategic surprise against Pakistan or carry out highly-effective air strikes with little escalatory risk, each of which is a necessary condition for deterrence failure. Consequently, Pakistan’s justification for its current efforts to develop tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems on security grounds lacks a firm foundation. These systems only increase the likelihood of an inadvertent nuclear exchange, while adding little to the deterrence value of Pakistan’s force posture. There may be a variety of reasons why Islamabad is expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal, but a rational response to the threat posed by India’s on-going military modernization is not one of them.140

#### They won’t attack each other.

**Herrera 19**, Jack. “Could the Conflict Between Pakistan and India Lead to Nuclear War?” Pacific Standard, 27 Feb. 2019, psmag.com/news/could-the-conflict-between-pakistan-and-india-lead-to-nuclear-war

Does that mean the current conflict between Pakistan and India could escalate into a nuclear confrontation? Commentators regard that possibility as unlikely. Pakistan first began developing nuclear weapons in response to its humiliating loss of territory in 1971. Thus far, the current conflict with India does not appear to be a land grab, which suggests Pakistan does not have reason to engage its nuclear option. "To be clear, escalating tensions to the point of nuclear conflict would be catastrophic for both India and Pakistan and would destabilize the entire region—an option unlikely to be taken by either New Delhi or Islamabad," Saheli Roy Choudhury wrote for [CNBC](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/27/india-pakistan-air-strike-claims-what-you-need-to-know.html) on Wednesday. History bolsters Choudhury's analysis. In 1999, Pakistan and India became the first nuclear powers ever to engage in direct war with each others' forces. On the ice of the Kargil Glacier, nestled nine miles above sea level between Himalayan peaks, Pakistani soldiers, initially disguised as a Kashmiri militants, exchanged fire with Indian soldiers. The high-altitude fighting only lasted two months before the two sides agreed to de-escalate.

#### Transition solves aggressive pursuit of regional domination

Michael Mandelbaum 19, PhD in political science from Harvard University, Christian A. Herter Professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies., March, "In Praise of Regime Change," Commentary, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/in-praise-of-regime-change/

If revolution, as the word was defined in the last century, has become obsolete, its successor, regime change, has become discredited. The American military engagements in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq not only failed to yield democratic governments; they proved, in the last two cases, costly to the United States, both in lives and treasure. The American public has, consequently, little appetite for more such ventures. Yet there is another type of regime change to consider: the peaceful replacement of dictatorship by democracy through the efforts of local people rather than the American military. That’s occurred with heartening frequency over the past four decades, and, in 2019, it has greater relevance and importance than ever. Such regime change offers the solution to the most dangerous challenge facing the United States and its friends and allies. That challenge comes from the ambitions of three major countries to overturn the existing political arrangements in their regions and to expand their own power and influence at the expense both of their neighbors and of the United States. All have already used force for this purpose. In Europe, Russia has seized Crimea and invaded and occupied eastern Ukraine. In East Asia, China has laid claim, contrary to international law, to virtually the entire western Pacific, where it has built artificial islands on which it has placed military installations. In the Middle East, Iran has funded, trained, equipped, and directed military forces outside the control of the local government in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. At best, these revisionist ambitions portend Cold War–like political and military competition in the three regions. At worst, they will lead to wars involving the United States. These aggressive policies have, in each case, a variety of sources. But they have one major cause in common. Each of these aggressive governments is a dictatorship operating in what is still a predominantly democratic world, and each feels an acute need for domestic support and political legitimacy. To be sure, the rule of the current Russian, Chinese, and Iranian governments rests ultimately on coercion, but Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and the Iranian mullahs are wary of relying on coercion alone to remain in power. The leaders of Russia and China, in particular, are known to monitor public sentiment carefully, if not obsessively. For the purpose of generating the support they believe they need, however, these dictators have few options. None can afford to indulge in the most common source of 21st-century legitimacy: democracy. For genuinely democratic politics would sweep them all away. Ideology was an important basis for autocratic regimes’ claims to rule in the 20th century. But ideology is unavailable to Russia and China, which have renounced, in the first case, and effectively abandoned, in the second, orthodox Marxism-Leninism (and in China, Maoism as well). The Iranian regime retains an ideological foundation—the Persian-Shia version of Islamic fundamentalism—but few Iranians outside the regime believe in it. Authoritarian Russia and China, although not Iran, have relied on economic success to produce support for, or at least acceptance of, their rulers; but their economic performance and future economic prospects have taken a turn for the worse. The Russian economy depends on the sale of energy. The price of oil reached record heights during Vladimir Putin’s first stint as president, which generated income that underpinned the high levels of popularity that he enjoyed. The price has since fallen and is unlikely to return to its peak, which makes Russia’s economic outlook a gloomy one. As for China, the ruling Communist Party presided over three decades of double-digit annual growth based on the large-scale movement of labor from the countryside to the cities, massive investment, and ever-growing exports. That model for growth has run its course: China needs a new one that, even in the best of circumstances, will not deliver the extraordinary advances to which the Chinese people have become accustomed. The Islamic Republic of Iran has seen only economic failure since its establishment in 1979, and unashamedly so. Its founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, said that the regime he installed was “not about the price of watermelons.” Still, the country’s poor economic performance, now aggravated by American sanctions, has increased the public’s already considerable discontent with its clerical rulers. In the face of this common predicament, the three revisionists have turned to the one source of support on which they believe they can rely: aggressive nationalism. This underlies the policies that all three use to threaten their neighbors. In this way, aggression is a form of regime protection. Putin, Xi, and the Iranian clerics tell the people they rule that such policies are designed to achieve regional dominance, which, for reasons of history and culture, they deserve. The Russian, Chinese, and Iranian governments also justify their aggressive foreign policies as necessary to ward off the hostility of their enemies—above all the United States—which, the dictators tell their subjects, are bent on weakening, subverting, and even destroying Russia, China, and Iran. Putin claimed that the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine in 2014, which triggered his invasion of that country, was part of an anti-Russian plot by the West. The Chinese government has repeatedly denounced what it alleges are American efforts to thwart China. The mullahs have, from the outset of the Islamic Republic, made opposition to the United States, “the Great Satan,” a cornerstone of their rule. Such evidence as there is suggests that this political tactic works for all three regimes. Putin’s aggressive policies in Ukraine and Syria, for example, have raised his popularity among Russians. The successful employment of such policies in bolstering each regime’s standing at home increases the temptation to employ it repeatedly, which makes Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East increasingly dangerous places. In sum, the roots of the greatest international problem that the United States and its friends and allies face—the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian challenges to the global order—lie in the nature of the regime that governs each country. The solution to the problem, it follows, is to change those regimes, and to change them not just to any other form of government but specifically to democracy. Democracy here means liberal democracy, a combination of popular sovereignty, whereby the people choose the government through free and fair elections, and liberty—the protection of religious, economic, and political freedom. The historical record shows that, in the modern era at least, liberal democracies seldom if ever go to war with one another. This is so because democracy’s basic features counteract the age-old incentives for armed conflict. Popular sovereignty, for example, imposes a check on the government’s freedom of action, including the freedom to wage war. Democracies resolve domestic differences by peaceful means and so are inclined to act similarly with respect to international disputes. None of this is to say that the spread of democracy guarantees the elimination of war: Nothing can do so. What has come to be called the “democratic peace” theory does not rise to the level of an iron law of politics because there are no such laws. It is to say, however, that were Russia, China, and Iran to become full-fledged democracies, each would surely conduct less belligerent foreign policies toward its neighbors.

#### It prevents inevitable war in Asia and leads to regional threat reduction

Aaron Friedberg 11, PhD in Government from Harvard, professor of politics and international affairs @ Princeton University, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,” <http://users.clas.ufl.edu/zselden/coursereading2011/friedberg.pdf>

Though not everyone is convinced, it is likely that a more democratic China would ultimately create a more peaceful, less war-prone environment in Asia. In the view of some realists, domestic reforms will only make Beijing richer, stronger and hence a more potent competitor without deflecting it from its desire to dominate East Asia and settle scores with some of its neighbors. It is undoubtedly true that even if, in the long run, China becomes a stable, peaceful democracy, its passage will prove rocky. The opening of the nation’s political system to dissent and debate is likely to introduce an element of instability into its foreign policy as new voices are heard and aspiring leaders vie for popular support. As one observer, economist David Hale, ruefully points out: “An authoritarian China has been highly predictable. A more open and democratic China could produce new uncertainties about both domestic policy and international relations.” Nationalism, perhaps in its most virulent and aggressive form, is one factor likely to play a prominent role in shaping the foreign policy of a liberalizing Middle Kingdom. Thanks to the spread of the Internet and the relaxation of restraints on at least some forms of “patriotic” political expression, the current regime already finds itself subject to criticism whenever it takes what some “netizens” regard as an overly accommodating stance toward Japan, Taiwan or the United States. Beijing has sought at times to stir up patriotic sentiment, but, fearful that anger at foreigners could all too easily be turned against the party, the regime has also gone to great lengths to keep popular passions in check. A democratically elected government might be far less inhibited. U.S.-based political scientist Fei-Ling Wang argues that a post-Communist regime would actually be more forceful in asserting its sovereignty over Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea. As he explains: A “democratic” regime in Beijing, free from the debilitating concerns for its own survival but likely driven by popular emotions, could make the rising Chinese power a much more assertive, impatient, belligerent, even aggressive force, at least during the unstable period of fast ascendance to the ranks of a world-class power. The last proviso is key. Even those who are most confident of the long-term pacifying effects of democratization recognize the possibility of a turbulent transition. In his book China’s Democratic Future, Bruce Gilley acknowledges that democratic revolutions in other countries have often led to bursts of external aggression and he notes that, since the start of the twentieth century, pro-democracy movements in China have also been highly nationalistic. Despite these precedents, Gilley predicts that, after an interval of perhaps a decade, a transformed nation will settle into more stable and cooperative relationships with the United States as well as with its democratic neighbors. Such an outcome is by no means certain, of course, and would be contingent upon events and interactions that are difficult to anticipate and even harder to control. If initial frictions between a fledgling democracy and its better established counterparts are mishandled, resulting in actual armed conflict, history could spin off in very different and far less promising directions than if they are successfully resolved. Assuming the transition can be navigated without disaster, however, there are good reasons to believe that relations will improve with the passage of time. One Chinese advocate of political reform, Liu Junning, summarizes the prospects well. Whereas a “nationalistic and authoritarian China will be an emerging threat,” a liberal, democratic China will ultimately prove “a constructive partner.” This expectation is rooted in more than mere wishful thinking. As the values and institutions of liberal democracy become more firmly entrenched, there will begin to be open and politically meaningful debate and real competition over national goals and the allocation of national resources. Aspiring leaders and opinion makers preoccupied with prestige, honor, power and score settling will have to compete with others who emphasize the virtues of international stability, cooperation, reconciliation and the promotion of social welfare. The demands of the military and its industrial allies will be counterbalanced, at least to some degree, by groups who favor spending more on education, health care and the elderly. The assertive, hypernationalist version of China’s history and its grievances will be challenged by accounts that acknowledge the culpability of the Communist regime in repressing minorities and refusing to seek compromise on questions of sovereignty. A leadership obsessed with its own survival and with countering perceived threats from foreign powers will be replaced by a government secure in its legitimacy and with no cause to fear that the world’s democracies are seeking to encircle and overthrow it. A democratic China would find it easier to get along with Japan, India and South Korea, among others. The trust and mutual respect that eventually grows up between democracies, and the diminished fear that one will use force against another, should increase the odds of attaining negotiated settlements of outstanding disputes over borders, offshore islands and resources. A democratic government in Beijing would also stand a better chance of achieving a mutually acceptable resolution to its sixtyyear standoff with Taiwan. In contrast to today’s ccp rulers, a popularly elected mainland regime would have less to gain from keeping this conflict alive, it would be more likely to show respect for the preferences of another democratic government, and it would be more attractive to the Taiwanese people as a partner in some kind of federated arrangement that would satisfy the desires and ease the fears of both sides. For as long as China continues to be governed as it is today, its growing strength will pose a deepening challenge to American interests. If they want to deter aggression, discourage coercion and preserve a plural, open order, Washington and its friends and allies are going to have to work harder, and to cooperate more closely, in order to maintain a favorable balance of regional power. In the long run, the United States can learn to live with a democratic China as the dominant power in East Asia, much as Great Britain came to accept America as the preponderant power in the Western Hemisphere. Until that day, Washington and Beijing are going to remain locked in an increasingly intense struggle for mastery in Asia.

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### Democracy

#### The CCP spreads autocracy globally and props up dictatorships – dooms global democratic transitions and ensures backsliding

David **Shullman, 19**, Senior Advisor at the International Republican Institute and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “CHINESE MALIGN INFLUENCE AND THE CORROSION OF DEMOCRACY: An Assessment of Chinese Interference in Thirteen Key Countries,” IRI, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/chinese\_malign\_influence\_report.pdf)SEM

From Europe to West Africa, China’s malign influence corrodes developing countries’ democracies, undermines their independence, and presents a daunting and novel strategic challenge to the United States and the rules-based, liberal democratic order. The U.S. and its democratic partners have only just begun to comprehend the scale of the threat posed by the CCP’s campaign to shape the world to serve China’s interests — an effort that is directly at odds with democratic principles and sustainable development. As the case studies explored in this report demonstrate, Beijing has utilized sophisticated influence methods tailored to exploit local conditions and governance weaknesses in countries at varying stages of development. Given their success rate thus far and the relationship of these efforts to China’s long-term needs and ambitions, these efforts are likely to intensify. The CCP’s approach to the developing world is integral to fueling the Chinese economy and ensuring the promised “rejuvenation” of China to great power status — both of which are crucial to the Party’s continued legitimacy. As China’s economy continues to slow, it will leverage countries’ financial dependence to achieve quick returns on investments and use heavy-handed “sharp power” efforts to shape the narrative in a way that protects Chinese interests. As part of this effort, the CCP is likely to redouble advocacy in the developing world to shore up the legitimacy of China’s authoritarian model, casting doubt on the value of democracy as a catalyst for rapid economic development. China’s provision of a greater array of surveillance and monitoring tools to friendly autocrats will help those rulers to stay in power while corroding civic rights in those countries. Moreover, the continuation of opaque investment deals and the proliferation of risky debt will undermine sustainable development, nourish kleptocracy and threaten the independence of countries that have welcomed Chinese investment and either turned a blind eye to malign interference or remain unaware of its consequences.

#### Chinese democracy is enough to incentivize wider democratization

Gilley 5 (Bruce, Professor of International Affairs @ New School University and Former Contributing Editor @ the Far Eastern Economic Review, “China’s Democratic Future,” mss)

Just as China's own democratization was influenced by democratic diplomacy and "border effects," it would now project those same effects abroad. It would be expected to join in the condemnation of human rights abuses in other countries, ending its much-touted though frequently violated policy of "noninterference," in other countries. It might have a special role in monitoring human rights abuses and encouraging democratization in remaining dictatorships in Asia—North Korea, Burma, and Vietnam. Even without a spirited democratic diplomacy, China's democratization would be a powerful incentive to people and elites in remaining dictatorships around the world. China's democratization would itself constitute an entire "fourth wave," but others may be brought along in the eddies. In Asia, it would almost certainly cause ruptures in North Korea, Burma, and Vietnam, whose dictatorships have benefited in varying ways from ongoing dictatorship in China. Singapore and Malaysia, which sit on the line between dictatorship and democracy, might be urged to move more firmly into the democratic camp.

#### Backsliding causes global conflict

Andrea Kendall-Taylor 16, Senior Associate (Non-resident) @ CSIS, Human Rights Initiative, How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order, 1-15-16, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order

Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. International relations literature tells us that democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines. Moreover, within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an “authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability. Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way, democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows.

Finally, widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for ~~strongman~~ strong-person tactics.

Since 9/11, and particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Western enthusiasm for democracy support has waned. Rising levels of instability, including in Ukraine and the Middle East, fragile governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sustained threats from terrorist groups such as ISIL have increased Western focus on security and stability. U.S. preoccupation with intelligence sharing, basing and overflight rights, along with the perception that autocracy equates with stability, are trumping democracy and human rights considerations.

While rising levels of global instability explain part of Washington’s shift from an historical commitment to democracy, the nature of the policy process itself is a less appreciated factor. Policy discussions tend to occur on a country-by-country basis—leading to choices that weigh the costs and benefits of democracy support within the confines of a single country. From this perspective, the benefits of counterterrorism cooperation or access to natural resources are regularly judged to outweigh the perceived costs of supporting human rights. A serious problem arises, however, when this process is replicated across countries. The bilateral focus rarely incorporates the risks to the U.S.-led global order that arise from widespread democratic decline across multiple countries.

Many of the threats to the current global order, such as China’s rise or the diffusion of power, are driven by factors that the United States and West more generally have little leverage to influence or control. Democracy, however, is an area where Western actions can affect outcomes. Factoring in the risks that arise from a global democratic decline into policy discussions is a vital step to building a comprehensive approach to democracy support. Bringing this perspective to the table may not lead to dramatic shifts in foreign policy, but it would ensure that we are having the right conversation.