## 1

#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation by governments that “The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.”

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Appropriation

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

Topicality is key to limits and ground---redefining portions of the resolution permits endless reclarification AND creates incentives for avoidance---only aligning research with agent and mechanism solves.

#### Two impacts:

#### 1---Fairness---an unlimited, unpredictable topic disparately raises the research burden for the negative –

#### Outweighs:

#### 1] It’s a constitutive process of debate since debate is a game with a winner and loser, speech times, and flipping 30 min before the round – Constitutive Rules means any DA to our interpretation are inevitable and terminally non-unique

#### 2] Self Defeating- All the 1ar's arguments assume that the judge will evaluate them fairly which concedes it's authority – actively hack against them

#### 3] Ballot proximity – the ballot can’t solve their offense or actualize their method since arguments we read have no effect on our subjectivity, but voting negative can set good norms.

#### 4] Deliberation – Every discussion of an liberation strategy assumes an level playing field with the ability to contribute to the discussion

#### 5] Misses the boat – Their impact turns shows a misapplication of fairness not a reason why the very structure of it is bad.

#### 6] Fair Testing – since I can’t answer the aff you should assume their arguments are presumptively false – we can only come to conclusions about the world via rigorous testing of them

#### 7] turns minorities quit

#### 2---Clash---forfeiting government action sanctions retreat from controversy and forces the negative to concede solvency before winning a link -- clash is the necessary condition for distinguishing debate from discussion, but negation exists on a sliding scale -- that jumpstarts the process of critical thinking, reflexivity, and argument refinement.

#### 3---Movement Lawyering Skills – contingent, focused debates around locus points of difference are key to develop activists skills for political justice.

Archer 18, Deborah N. "Political Lawyering for the 21st Century." Denv. L. Rev. 96 (2018): 399. (Associate Professor of Clinical Law at NYU School of Law)//Elmer

Political justice lawyers must be able to break apart a systemic problem into manageable components. The complexity of social problems, can cause law students, and even experienced political lawyers, to become overwhelmed. In describing his work challenging United States military and economic interventions abroad, civil rights advocate and law professor Jules Lobel wrote of this process: “Our foreign-policy litigation became a sort of Sisyphean quest as we maneuvered through a hazy maze cluttered with gates. Each gate we unlocked led to yet another that blocked our path, with the elusive goal of judicial relief always shrouded in the twilight mist of the never-ending maze.”144 Pulling apart a larger, systemic problem into its smaller components can help elucidate options for advocacy. An instructive example is the use of excessive force by police officers against people of color. Every week seems to bring a new video featuring graphic police violence against Black men and women. Law students are frequently outraged by these incidents. But the sheer frequency of these videos and lack of repercussions for perpetrators overwhelm those students just as often. What can be done about a problem so big and so pervasive? To move toward justice, advocates must be able to break apart the forces that came together to lead to that moment: intentional discrimination, implicit bias, ineffective training, racial segregation, lack of economic opportunity, the over-policing of minority communities, and the failure to invest in non-criminal justice interventions that adequately respond to homelessness, mental illness, and drug addiction. None of these component problems are easily addressed, but breaking them apart is more manageable—and more realistic—than acting as though there is a single lever that will solve the problem. After identifying the component problems, advocates can select one and repeat the process of breaking down that problem until they get to a point of entry for their advocacy. 2. Identifying Advocacy Alternatives As discussed earlier, political justice lawyering embraces litigation, community organizing, interdisciplinary collaboration, legislative reform, public education, direct action, and other forms of advocacy to achieve social change. After parsing the underlying issues, lawyers need to identify what a lawyer can and should do on behalf of impacted communities and individuals, and this includes determining the most effective advocacy approach. Advocates must also strategize about what can be achieved in the short term versus the long term. The fight for justice is a marathon, not a sprint. Many law students experience frustration with advocacy because they expect immediate justice now. They have read the opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, but forget that the decision was the result of a decades-long advocacy strategy.145 Indeed, the decision itself was no magic wand, as the country continues to work to give full effect to the decision 70 years hence. Advocates cannot only fight for change they will see in their lifetime, they must also fight for the future.146 Change did not happen over night in Brown and lasting change cannot happen over night today. Small victories can be building blocks for systemic reform, and advocates must learn to see the benefit of short-term responsiveness as a component of long-term advocacy. Many lawyers subscribe to the American culture of success, with its uncompromising focus on immediate accomplishments and victories.147 However, those interested in social justice must adjust their expectations. Many pivotal civil rights victories were made possible by the seemingly hopeless cases that were brought, and lost, before them.148 In the fight for justice, “success inheres in the creation of a tradition, of a commitment to struggle, of a narrative of resistance that can inspire others similarly to resist.”149 Again, Professor Lobel’s words are instructive: “the current commitment of civil rights groups, women’s groups, and gay and lesbian groups to a legal discourse to legal activism to protect their rights stems in part from the willingness of activists in political and social movements in the nineteenth century to fight for rights, even when they realized the courts would be unsympathetic.”150 Professor Lobel also wrote about Helmuth James Von Moltke, who served as legal advisor to the German Armed Services until he was executed in 1945 by Nazis: “In battle after losing legal battle to protect the rights of Poles, to save Jews, and to oppose German troops’ war crimes, he made it clear that he struggled not just to win in the moment but to build a future.”151 3. Creating a Hierarchy of Values Advocates challenging complex social justice problems can find it difficult to identify the correct solution when one of their social justice values is in conflict with another. A simple example: a social justice lawyer’s demands for swift justice for the victim of police brutality may conflict with the lawyer’s belief in the officer’s fundamental right to due process and a fair trial. While social justice lawyers regularly face these dilemmas, law students are not often forced to struggle through them to resolution in real world scenarios—to make difficult decisions and manage the fallout from the choices they make in resolving the conflict. Engaging in complex cases can force students to work through conflicts, helping them to articulate and sharpen their beliefs and goals, forcing them to clearly define what justice means broadly and in the specific context presented. Lawyers advocating in the tradition of political lawyering anticipate the inevitable conflict between rights, and must seek to resolve these conflicts through a “hierarchy of values.”152 Moreover, in creating the hierarchy, the perspectives of those directly impacted and marginalized should be elevated “because it is in listening to and standing with the victims of injustice that the need for critical thinking and action become clear.”153 One articulation of a hierarchy of values asserts “people must be valued more than property. Human rights must be valued more than property rights. Minimum standards of living must be valued more than the privileged liberty of accumulated political, social and economic power. Finally, the goal of increasing the political, social, and economic power of those who are left out of the current arrangements must be valued more than the preservation of the existing order that created and maintains unjust privilege.”154 C. Rethinking the Role of the Clinical Law Professor: Moving From Expert to Colleague Law students can learn a new dimension of lawyering by watching their clinical law professor work through innovative social justice challenges alongside them, as colleagues. This is an opportunity not often presented in work on small cases where the clinical professor is so deeply steeped in the doctrine and process, the case is largely routine to her and she can predict what is to come and adjust supervision strategies accordingly.155 However, when engaged in political lawyering on complex and novel legal issues, both the student and the teacher may be on new ground that transforms the nature of the student-teacher relationship. A colleague often speaks about acknowledging the persona professors take on when they teach and how that persona embodies who they want to be in the classroom—essentially, whenever law professors teach they establish a character. The persona that a clinical professor adopts can have a profound effect on the students, because the character is the means by which the teacher subtly models for the student—without necessarily ever saying so— the professional the teacher holds herself to be and the student may yet become. In working on complex matters where the advocacy strategy is unclear, the clinical professor makes himself vulnerable by inviting students to witness his struggles as they work together to develop the most effective strategy. By making clear that he does not have all of the answers, partnering with his students to discover the answers, and sharing his own missteps along the way, a clinical law professor can reclaim opportunities to model how an experienced attorney acquires new knowledge and takes on new challenges that may be lost in smaller case representation.156 Clinical law faculty who wholeheartedly subscribe to the belief that professors fail to optimize student learning if students do not have primary control of a matter from beginning to end may view a decision to work in true partnership with students on a matter as a failure of clinical legal education. Indeed, this partnership model will inevitably impact student autonomy and ownership of the case.157 But, there is a unique value to a professor working with her student as a colleague and partner to navigate subject matter new to both student and professor.158 In this relationship, the professor can model how to exercise judgment and how to learn from practice: to independently learn new areas of law; to consult with outside colleagues, experts in the field, and community members without divulging confidential information; and to advise a client in the midst of ones own learning process.159 III. A Pedagogical Course Correction “If it offends your sense of justice, there’s a cause of action.” - Florence Roisman, Professor, Indiana University School of Law160 In response to the shifts in my students’ perspectives on racism and systemic discrimination, their reluctance to tackle systemic problems, their conditioned belief that strategic litigation should be a tool of last resort, and my own discomfort with reliance on small cases in my clinical teaching, I took a step back in my own practice. How could I better teach my students to be champions for justice even when they are overwhelmed by society’s injustice; to challenge the complex and systemic discrimination strangling minority communities, and to approach their work in the tradition of political lawyering. I reflected not only on my teaching, but also on my experiences as a civil rights litigator, to focus on what has helped me to continue doing the work despite the frustrations and difficulties. I realized I was spending too much time teaching my students foundational lawyering skills, and too little time focused on the broader array of skills I knew to be critical in the fight for racial justice. We regularly discussed systemic racism during my clinic seminars in order to place the students’ work on behalf of their clients within a larger context. But by relying on carefully curated small cases I was inadvertently desensitizing my students to a lawyer’s responsibility to challenge these systemic problems, and sending the message that the law operates independently from this background and context. I have an obligation to move beyond teaching my students to be “good soldiers for the status quo” to ensuring that the next generation is truly prepared to fight for justice.161 And, if my teaching methods are encouraging the reproduction of the status quo it is my obligation to develop new interventions.162 Jane Aiken’s work on “justice readiness” is instructive on this point. To graduate lawyers who better understand their role in advancing justice, Jane Aiken believes clinics should move beyond providing opportunities for students to have a social justice experience to promoting a desire and ability to do justice.163 She suggests creating disorienting moments by selecting cases where students have no outside authority on which to rely, requiring that they draw from their own knowledge base and values to develop a legal theory.164 Disorienting moments give students: experiences that surprise them because they did not expect to experience what they experienced. This can be as simple as learning that the maximum monthly welfare benefit for a family of four is about $350. Or they can read a [ ] Supreme Court case that upheld Charles Carlisle’s conviction because a wyer missed a deadline by one day even though the district court found there was insufficient evidence to prove his guilt. These facts are often disorienting. They require the student to step back and examine why they thought that the benefit amount would be so much more, or that innocence would always result in release. That is an amazing teaching moment. It is at this moment that we can ask students to examine their own privilege, how it has made them assume that the world operated differently, allowing them to be oblivious to the indignities and injustices that occur every day.165 Giving students an opportunity to “face the fact that they cannot rely on ‘the way things are’ and meet the needs of their clients” is a powerful approach to teaching and engaging students.166 But, complex problems call for larger and more sustained disorienting moments. Working with students on impact advocacy in the model of political lawyering provides a range of opportunities to immerse students in disorienting moments. A. Immersing Students in “Disorienting Moments”: Race, Poverty, and Pregnancy Today, I try to immerse my students in disorienting moments to make them justice ready and move them in the direction of political lawyering. My clinic docket has always included a small number of impact litigation matters. However, in the past these cases were carefully screened to ensure that they involved discrete legal issues and client groups. In addition, our representation always began after our outside co-counsel had already conducted an initial factual investigation, identified the core legal issues, and developed an overall advocacy strategy, freeing my students from these responsibilities. Now, my clinic takes on impact matters at earlier stages where the strategies are less clear and the legal questions are multifaceted and ill- defined. This mirrors the experiences of practicing social justice lawyers, who faced with an injustice, must discover the facts, identify the legal claims, develop strategy, cultivate allies, and ultimately determine what can be done—with the knowledge that “nothing” is not an option. This approach provides students with the space to wrestle with larger, systemic issues in a structured and supportive educational environment, taking on cases that seem difficult to resolve and working to bring some justice to that situation. They are also gaining experience in many of the fundamentals of political lawyering advocacy. Recently, my students began work on a new case. Several public and private hospitals in low-income New York City neighborhoods are drug testing pregnant women or new mothers without their knowledge or informed consent. This practice reflects a disturbing convergence between racial and economic disparities, and can have a profound impact on the lives of the poor women of color being tested at precisely the time when they are most in need of support. We began our work when a community organization reached out to the clinic and spoke to us about complaints that hospitals around New York City were regularly testing pregnant women—almost exclusively women of color—for drug use during prenatal check ups, during the chaos and stress of labor and delivery, or during post-delivery. The hospitals report positive test results to the City’s Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”), which is responsible for protecting children from abuse and neglect, for further action.167 Most of the positive tests are for marijuana use. After a report is made, ACS commences an investigation to determine whether child abuse or neglect has taken place, and these investigations trigger inquiries into every aspect of a family’s life. They can lead to the institution of child neglect proceedings, and potentially to the temporary or permanent removal of children from the household. Even where that extreme result is avoided, an ACS investigation can open the door to the City’s continued, and potentially unwelcome, involvement in the lives of these families. These policies reflect deeply inequitable practices. Investigating a family after a positive drug test is not necessarily a bad thing. After all, ACS offers a number of supportive services that can help stabilize and strengthen vulnerable families. And of course, where children’s safety is at risk, removal may sometimes be the appropriate result. However, hospitals do not conduct regular drug tests of mothers in all New York City communities. Private hospitals in wealthy areas rarely test pregnant women or new mothers for drug misuse. In contrast, at hospitals serving poor women, drug testing is routine. Race and class should not determine whether such testing, and the consequences that result, take place. Investigating the New York City drug-testing program immersed the students in disorienting moments at every stage of their work. During our conversations, the students regularly expressed surprise and discomfort with the hospitals’ practices. They were disturbed that public hospitals— institutions on which poor women and women of color rely for something as essential as health care—would use these women’s pregnancy as a point of entry to control their lives.168 They struggled to explain how the simple act of seeking medical care from a hospital serving predominantly poor communities could deprive patients of the respect, privacy, and legal protections enjoyed by pregnant women in other parts of the City. And, they were shocked by the way institutions conditioned poor women to unquestioningly submit to authority.169 Many of the women did not know that they were drug tested until the hospital told them about the positive result and referred them to ACS. Still, these women were not surprised: that kind of disregard, marginalization, and lack of consent were a regular aspect of their lives as poor women of color. These women were more concerned about not upsetting ACS than they were about the drug testing. That so many of these women could be resigned to such a gross violation of their rights was entirely foreign to most of my students. B. Advocacy in the Face of Systemic Injustice Although the students are still in the early stages of their work, they have already engaged in many aspects of political justice lawyering. They approached their advocacy focused on the essence of political lawyering— enabling poor, pregnant women of color who enjoy little power or respect to claim and enjoy their rights, and altering the allocation of power from government agencies and institutions back into the hands of these women. They questioned whose interests these policies and practices were designed to serve, and have grounded their work in a vision of an alternative societal construct in which their clients and the community are respected and supported. The clinic students were given an opportunity to learn about social, legal, and administrative systems as they simultaneously explored opportunities to change those systems. The students worked to identify the short and long term goals of the impacted women as well the goals of the larger community, and to think strategically about the means best suited to accomplish these goals. And, importantly, while collaborating with partners from the community and legal advocacy organizations, the students always tried to keep these women centered in their advocacy. In breaking down the problem of drug testing poor women of color, the students worked through an issue that lives at the intersection of reproductive freedom, family law, racial justice, economic inequality, access to health care, and the war on drugs. In their factual investigation, which included interviews of impacted women, advocates, and hospital personnel, and the review of records obtained through Freedom of Information Law requests, the students began to break down this complex problem. They explored the disparate treatment of poor women and women of color by health care providers and government entities, implicit and explicit bias in healthcare, the disproportionate referral of women of color to ACS, the challenges of providing medical services to underserved communities, the meaning of informed consent, the diminished rights of people who rely on public services, and the criminalization of poverty. The students found that list almost as overwhelming as the initial problem itself, but identifying the components allowed the students to dig deeper and focus on possible avenues of challenge and advocacy. It was also critically important to make the invisible forces visible, even if the law currently does not provide a remedy. Working on this case also gave the students and me the opportunity to work through more nuanced applications of some of the lawyering concepts that were introduced in their smaller cases, including client-centered lawyering when working on behalf of the community; large-scale fact investigation; transferring their “social justice knowledge” to different contexts; crafting legal and factual narratives that are not only true to the communities’ experience, but can persuade and influence others; and how to develop an integrated advocacy plan. The students frequently asked whether we should even pursue the matter, questioning whether this work was client- centered when it was no longer the most pressing concern for many of the women we met. These doubts opened the door to many rich discussions: can we achieve meaningful social change if we only address immediate crises; can we progress on larger social justice issues without challenging their root causes; how do we recognize and address assumptions advocates may have about what is best for a client; and how can we keep past, present, and future victims centered in our advocacy? The work on the case also forced the clinic students to work through their own understanding of a hierarchy of values. They struggled with their desire to support these community hospitals and the public servants who work there under difficult circumstances on the one hand, and their desire to protect women, potentially through litigation, from discriminatory practices. They also struggled to reconcile their belief that hospitals should take all reasonable steps to protect the health and safety of children, as well as their emotional reaction to pregnant mothers putting their unborn children in harms way by using illegal drugs against the privacy rights of poor and marginalized women. They were forced to pause and think deeply about what justice would look like for those mothers, children, and communities. CONCLUSION America continues to grapple with systemic injustice. Political justice lawyering offers powerful strategies to advance the cause of justice—through integrated advocacy comprising the full array of tools available to social justice advocates, including strategic systemic reform litigation. It is the job of legal education to prepare law students to become effective lawyers. For those aspiring to social justice that should include training students to utilize the tools of political justice lawyers. Clinical legal offers a tremendous opportunity to teach the next generation of racial and social justice advocates how to advance equality in the face of structural inequality, if only it will embrace the full array of available tools to do so. In doing so, clinical legal education will not only prepare lawyers to enact social change, they can inspire lawyers overwhelmed by the challenges of change. In order to provide transformative learning experiences, clinical education must supplement traditional pedagogical tools and should consider political lawyering’s potential to empower law students and communities.

TVA---bans US from outer space – no more securitization

Switch side debate solves all of their offense—there’s no specific reason why their arguments have to be read on the aff—that solves predictability and accesses their education impact turns because plans on the aff and Ks on the neg can challenge perspectives, stances, representations, and epistemologies

#### No rvis –

#### Illogical, outweighs

## 2

#### The 1AC’s attempts to use the voice of some Asian Americans to speak for all is a form of essentialism that precludes understanding of individual forms of oppression faced by other Asian Americans.

Joan W. **Scott 92** Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Summer 92, October, Vol. 61, “The Identity in Question,” p. 12-19, JStor

There is nothing wrong, on the face of it, with teaching individuals about how to behave decently in relation to others and about how to empathize with each other's pain. The problem is that difficult analyses of how history and social standing, privilege, and subordination are involved in personal behavior entirely drop out. Chandra Mohanty puts it this way: **There has been an erosion of the politics of collectivity through the reformulation of race and difference in individualistic terms**. The 1960s and '70s slogan "the personal is political" has been recrafted in the 1980s as "the political is personal." In other words, **all politics is collapsed into the personal**, and questions of individual behaviors, attitudes, and life-styles stand in for political analysis of the social. Individual political struggles are seen as the only relevant and legit- imate form of political struggle.5 Paradoxically, **individuals then generalize their perceptions and claim to speak for a whole group,** but the groups are also conceived as unitary and autonomous. This individualizing, personalizing conception has also been be- hind some of the recent identity politics of minorities; indeed it gave rise to the intolerant, doctrinaire behavior that was dubbed, initially by its internal critics, "political correctness." It is particularly in the notion of "experience" that one sees this operating. **In much current usage of "experience," references to structure and history are implied but not made explicit; instead, personal testimony of oppression re-places analysis, and this testimony comes to stand for the experience of the whole group**. The fact of belonging to an identity group is taken as authority enough for one's speech; the direct experience of a group or culture-that is, membership in it-becomes the **only test of true knowledge.** The **exclusionary implications of this are twofold: all those not of the group are denied even intellectual access to it, and those within the group whose experiences or interpretations do not conform to the established terms of identity must either suppress their views or drop out. An appeal to "experience" of this kind forecloses discussion and criticism and turns politics into a policing operation: the borders of identity are patrolled for signs of nonconformity;** the test of membership in a group becomes less one's willingness to endorse certain principles and engage in specific political actions, less one's positioning in specific relationships of power, than one's ability to use the prescribed languages that are taken as signs that one is inherently "of" the group. That all of this isn't recognized as a highly political process that produces identities is troubling indeed, especially because it so closely mimics the politics of the powerful, naturalizing and deeming as discernably objective facts the prerequisites for inclusion in any group.

#### Asian coalitions are key to their method.

* Colitations good
* Solves all their offense shakes off stereotypes or smthing
* Only way to actualize “back up intentions with actions” and “we uplift and support each other”
* Nuance is bad surrounding w absolutism ignores nuances between intersectionality and dif ethnicities of asians

Arti **Kohli** and Becky **Belcore, 21** [Aarti Kohli, (Aarti Kohli is the executive director of Asian Americans Advancing Justice–Asian Law Caucus, the organization that convenes the Asian American Leaders Table.) Becky Belcore, (Becky Belcore is executive director of the National Korean American Service and Education Consortium (NAKASEC), a progressive grassroots organization and a member of the Asian American Leaders Table.)]. "Coalitions and solidarity with others are vital to Asian American activism." Prism, 6-10-2021, Accessed 1-9-2022. https://prismreports.org/2021/06/10/coalitions-and-solidarity-with-others-are-vital-to-asian-american-activism/ // duongie

For many Asian Americans, it can feel as if we live surrounded by absolutism and extremes, with little room for nuance. But we often occupy “in-between” spaces and identities, and nuance is necessary in order to understand our work with Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) communities. It’s also essential when it comes to understanding ourselves as immigrants from colonized nations, and as Indigenous people, multi-racial people, undocumented people, or trans-racial adoptees. It may be uncomfortable, but we must persist in the complex work of making progress toward racial solidarity so that we can create a more just future for our communities. In the wake of increased violence targeting Asian Americans, a new network of 100+ organizations serving AAPI communities was convened. Its goal is to coalesce and leverage our power toward policy change, solidarity, and shifting the public narrative. The “Asian American Leaders Table” provides a ray of hope in the type of coalition building and mutual support that can buoy us during hard times. Our work broadens our understanding of our own communities, revealing layers that influence how we uplift and support each other, or step aside when necessary. For example, we acknowledge that Pacific Islanders were deliberately combined together with Asian Americans by government systems that have no knowledge or interest in our distinct histories and needs. We know Southeast Asians face higher risks when it comes to criminalization and deportation. We see that East Asians are more likely to be targeted for street harassment and assault due to racist COVID-19 narratives. We know that our Indian American colleagues are feeling high levels of stress with families in the homeland who are struggling with a raging pandemic. Sikh American communities were severely targeted post-9/11, and were the target of a mass shooting in Indianapolis. And our Muslim siblings need our solidarity and support amidst the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Our coalition work doesn’t shy away from these complicated aspects of Asian American and Pacific Islander identities. We cleave deeper into the histories, identities, and stories that make us different from one another, and back up our intentions with actions. Our vision is to shift the narrative around heritage and solidarity. For example, portraying Asian Americans solely as victims does a disservice to the many examples of Asian American resistance, solidarity, organizing, and community development that has benefited our society. Our campaign, “Resistance is our Heritage,” tells stories to inspire current generations of people to change their actions, to effect change within our systems, and catalyze a better future for new generations of Asian American and Pacific Islander communities. In addition to stories of resistance, it’s also important to share stories of solidarity in order to counteract stereotypes that pit Asian Americans against other marginalized groups and paint Asian Americans as disengaged in politics and activism. That’s why we’ve launched a new series of videos with stories and educational guides that we hope will spark discussions around solidarity in service of transformative change, including stories like: How Indo-Caribbean populations have organized around economic justice, resulting in new budgetary earmarks for exploited workers affected by COVID-19 in the New York state budget. Efforts to build a broad multi-racial coalition to end the surveillance of Muslim, South Asian, and Arab community members by local law enforcement and federal authorities. Using the experience of Japanese American internment to end detention sites and support immigrant and refugee communities targeted by racism, state violence, injustice, and oppression in the United States. Resistance as heritage carries us through our day-to-day work as well. We owe so much to the work of Black activists and civil rights movements that influences the ethics, values, and strategies that allow us to meet the diverse needs of all communities of color, and enact necessary changes that ultimately make for a stronger U.S. This includes work like advocating for language access at the polls—not just Asian languages, but Spanish and African languages, too, so that a greater and more diverse cross-section of our citizenry can engage in free, fair, and accessible elections. We advocate for justice for those whose citizenship, legal status, and livelihood hang in the balance due to outdated immigration laws that hurt families in the U.S. and internationally. For generations, the model minority myth painted Asian Americans as a successful monolith and stymied policymakers’ understanding of the widening Asian American wealth gap—neglecting the fact that Asian Americans are the most economically unequal racial group in the U.S. Our work channels the voices of millions of Asian Americans calling for good jobs, union rights, affordable housing, strong public education, and reliable health care, not just for us but for all of the groups who depend on these rights. We remember the lessons of the 1982 garment workers’ strike in New York’s Chinatown and the impact Asian American coalition building had on workers’ rights. As COVID-19 cases drop, the number of vaccinated people grows, and we “return to normal,” workers need to be paid fair wages and get basic safety and health protections. Without those at minimum, the economic divide will only keep growing. The benefits of cross-racial solidarity work are clear. The hard part is figuring out how to do it. We are inspired by the stories of our predecessors because it’s helpful to remind ourselves that the idea of co-liberation is not a new one. The history of Asian American and Pacific Islander coalitions with other oppressed groups includes the Filipino and Mexican farmworkers who organized the Delano grape strike, the civil rights collaboration between Grace Lee Boggs and Malcom X, Japanese Americans first protesting the anti-Muslim and xenophobic violence that followed 9/11, and later the inhumane treatment of migrants and immigrants at the U.S. southern borders. Solidarity and co-liberation isn’t a rarity for Asian Americans; it’s a vital part of our activism. Systems and communication methods have changed, but the intent remains the same. We’re inspired by the energy and dedication of the groups involved with the Asian American Leaders Table, and we hope that others will join us as we forge new paths toward allyship and a co-liberated future.

## Case

#### Presumption

#### Reading the aff as a criticism of anti-chinese discourse solves – it would still prove that theory is incorrect

#### Framing issue is that you should view this just as a security K – if we’re winning threats real, it impact turns their aff – all of our cards are criticisms of official chinese policy, not china writ large

#### Criticism’s good – checks regimes from gaining unlimited power over their people

#### Psychoanalysis fails

#### a] Bindingness – Desire isn’t binding as we go against our own desires on a daily basis

#### Discourse not key – material change internal link turns reps

Thierry Balzacq 5, Professor of Political Science and IR @ Namar University, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context” European Journal of International Relations, London: Jun 2005, Volume 11, Issue 2

However, despite important insights, this position remains highly disputable. The reason behind this qualification is not hard to understand. With great trepidation my contention is that one of the main distinctions we need to take into account while examining securitization is that between 'institutional' and 'brute' threats. In its attempts to follow a more radical approach to security problems wherein threats are institutional, that is, mere products of communicative relations between agents, the CS has neglected the importance of 'external or brute threats', that is, threats that do not depend on language mediation to be what they are - hazards for human life. In methodological terms, however, any framework over-emphasizing either institutional or brute threat risks losing sight of important aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, securitization, as suggested earlier, is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development. In this scheme, there is no security problem except through the language game. Therefore, how problems are 'out there' is exclusively contingent upon how we linguistically depict them. This is not always true. For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would determine its essence. For instance, what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence. The consequence of this position, which would require a deeper articulation, is that some security problems are the attribute of the development itself. In short, threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language. Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments, affect securitization. Thus, far from being a departure from constructivist approaches to security, external developments are central to it.

#### There is no monolithic IR---the field is reflexive and effective---its track record of prediction proves. AND, sweeping criticisms of a fragmented field of research don’t answer the specificity of our studies.

Dan Reiter 15. Professor of Political Science at Emory University. “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools.” War on the Rocks. 8-27-2015. <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/>

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s.

But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether:

Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants.

This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective.

A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy. Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome.

Or, put differently, bad research designs make for bad public policy. A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets.

Sophisticated technical methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences, and can help solve other empirical problems. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India.

Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians?

Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings.

Or consider public health policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality.

#### The K of China Threat Rhetoric is a self-fulfilling propaganda that plays into violent Chinese nationalism

David Martin Jones 14. Professor of Politics at the University of Glasgow. "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen Incident" Australian Journal of Political. Vol. 49, No. 1. 2-21-14. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10361146.2013.878897?journalCode=cajp20

Notwithstanding this Western fascination with China and the positive response of former Marxists, such as Jacques, to the new China, Pan discerns an Orientalist ideology distorting Western commentary on the party state, and especially its international relations (6). Following Edward Said, Pan claims that such Western Orientalism reveals ‘not something concrete about the orient, but something about the orientalists themselves, their recurring latent desire of fears and fantasies about the orient’ (16). In order to unmask the limits of Western representations of China’s rise, Pan employs a critical ‘methodology’ that ‘draws on constructivist and deconstructivist approaches’ (9). Whereas the ‘former questions the underlying dichotomy of reality/knowledge in Western study of China’s international relations’, the latter shows how paradigmatic representations of China ‘condition the way we give meaning to that country’ and ‘are socially constitutive of it’ (9). Pan maintains that the two paradigms of ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ in Western discourse shape China’s reality for Western ‘China watchers’ (3). These discourses, Pan claims, are ‘ambivalent’ (65). He contends that this ‘bifocal representation of China, like Western discourses of China more generally, tell us a great deal about the west itself, its self -imagination, its torn, anxious, subjectivity, as well as its discursive effects of othering’ (65). This is a large claim. Interestingly, Pan fails to note that after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, Chinese new left scholarship also embraced Said’s critique of Orientalism in order to reinforce both the party state and a burgeoning sense of Chinese nationalism. To counter Western liberal discourse, academics associated with the Central Party School promoted an ideology of Occidentalism to deflect domestic and international pressure to democratise China. In this, they drew not only upon Said, but also upon Foucault and the post-1968 school of French radical thought that, as Richard Wolin has demonstrated, was itself initiated in an appreciation of Mao’s cultural revolution. In other words, the critical and deconstructive methodologies that came to influence American and European social science from the 1980s had a Maoist inspiration (Wolin 2010: 12–18). Subsequently, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, as American sinologist Fewsmith has shown, young Chinese scholars ‘adopted a variety of postmodernist and critical methodologies’ (2008: 125). Paradoxically, these scholars, such as Wang Hui and Zhang Kuan (Wang 2011), had been educated in the USA and were familiar with fashionable academic criticism of a postmodern and deconstructionist hue that ‘demythified’ the West (Fewsmith 2008: 125–29). This approach, promulgated in the academic journal Dushu (Readings), deconstructed, via Said and Foucault, Western narratives about China. Zhang Kuan, in particular, rejected Enlightenment values and saw postmodern critical theory as a method to build up a national ‘discourse of resistance’ and counter Western demands regarding issues such as human rights and intellectual property. It is through its affinity with this self-strengthening, Occidentalist lens, that Pan’s critical study should perhaps be critically read. Simply put, Pan identifies a political economy of fear and desire that informs and complicates Western foreign policy and, Pan asserts, tells us more about the West’s ‘self-imagination’ than it does about Chinese reality. Pan attempts to sustain this claim via an analysis, in Chapter 5, of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the China threat, followed, in Chapters 6 and 7, by exposure of the false promises and premises of the China ‘opportunity’. Pan certainly offers a provocative insight into Western attitudes to China and their impact on Chinese political thinking. In particular, he demonstrates that China’s foreign policy-makers react negatively to what they view as a hostile American strategy of containment (101). In this context, Pan contends, accurately, that Sino–US relations are mutually constitutive and the USA must take some responsibility for the rise of China threat (107). This latter point, however, is one that Australian realists like Owen Harries, whom Pan cites approvingly, have made consistently since the late 1990s. In other words, not all Western analysis uncritically endorses the view that China’s rise is threatening. Nor is all Western perception of this rise reducible to the threat scenario advanced by recent US administrations. Pan’s subsequent argument that the China opportunity thesis leads to inevitable disappointment and subtly reinforces the China threat paradigm is, also, somewhat misleading. On the one hand, Pan notes that Western anticipation of ‘China’s transformation and democratization’ has ‘become a burgeoning cottage industry’ (111). Yet, on the other hand, Pan observes that Western commentators, such as Jacques, demonstrate a growing awareness that the democratisation thesis is a fantasy. That is, Pan, like Jacques, argues that China ‘will neither democratize nor collapse, but may instead remain politically authoritarian and economically stable at the same time’ (132). To merge, as Pan does, the democratisation thesis into its authoritarian antithesis in order to evoke ‘present Western disillusionment’ (132) with China is somewhat reductionist. Pan’s contention that we need a new paradigm shift ‘to free ourselves from the positivist aspiration to grand theory or transcendental scientific paradigm itself’ (157) might be admirable, but this will not be achieved by a constructivism that would ultimately meet with the approval of what Brady terms China’s thought managers (Brady: 6).

#### They have it backwards- the US government *underestimates* the China threat, not the other way around- three warrants.

Beinart 15 (Peter, “Where are the China Hawks?” The Atlantic, June 3, 2015, [**http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/china-isis-iran-threat/394799/**](http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/china-isis-iran-threat/394799/). **Peter Alexander Beinart is an**[**American**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USA)**columnist, journalist, and political commentator. A former editor of**[**The New Republic**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_Republic)**, he has written for**[**Time**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_(magazine))**,**[**The New York Times**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Times)**,**[**The New York Review of Books**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_York_Review_of_Books)**among other periodicals, and is the author of three books. He is associate professor of journalism and political science at**[**City University of New York**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_University_of_New_York)**. He is a senior columnist at**[**Haaretz**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haaretz)**and contributor to The Atlantic and National Journal, and a political contributor to programs on**[**CNN**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CNN) **// EMS).**

China, by contrast, is not a midsize power. It’s a superpower. At current prices, its GDP is [28 times](http://knoema.com/nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2015-data-and-charts) larger than Iran’s. Its military budget is roughly [13 times larger](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database). Its willingness to invest vast sums in the economic development of other nations gives it tremendous soft power. And [it is claiming](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinese-military-sets-course-to-expand-global-reach-as-national-interests-grow/2015/05/26/395fff14-3fb1-4056-aed0-264ffcbbcdb4_story.html) much of the South China Sea as its own, thus asserting dominion over a territory with vast [oil and gas reserves](http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-tensions/p29790) through which [one-third](http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=73214) of the world’s shipping travels.¶ From 1941 to 1989, the United States risked war to prevent great powers from dominating the world’s economic and industrial heartlands, and thus gaining veto power over America’s ability to conduct international commerce. That’s what China is seeking today. ¶ So why aren’t Lindsey Graham and his GOP presidential competitors talking more about China? (To be fair, Hillary Clinton isn’t talking much about China either. But her campaign thus far has been much less weighted toward foreign policy in general.)¶ Three reasons come to mind.¶ The first is that the Chinese threat isn’t visually spectacular. What made ISIS a [household name](http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/09/why-americas-pursuing-isis-to-the-gates-of-hell/379622/) in the United States last year, even more than the group’s territorial gains, were its gruesome murders, especially of Westerners. The horrific images of those killings, broadcast endlessly on television, bred a primal fear that Washington politicians were quick to exploit. Those politicians pressured the Obama administration to begin its bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria, which gave the story even more juice because the United States was now at war. ¶ Via the catchall of “radical Islam,” American politicians have transferred some of the anxiety sparked by ISIS to Iran: Today they have butcher’s knives; tomorrow, nukes! By contrast, China’s incremental moves to [build islands](http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/06/02/pentagon-acknowledges-weapons-on-chinas-artificial-islands.html) in the South China Sea or even ram the occasional Filipino fishing boat produce far less drama. No matter how serious a challenge they pose to America’s role in the Pacific, they don’t appear to threaten American lives. And they won’t—until a confrontation between the Chinese and American militaries, in disputed ocean or airspace, raises the prospect of war. Until that happens, China’s challenge will remain on Page A17 of the newspaper.¶ The second reason presidential candidates devote so much more attention to “radical Islam” than to China is money. There’s no conspiracy here. Sheldon Adelson, who along with the Koch brothers is the most influential donor in today’s GOP, proudly acknowledges that, for him, Israel’s “security”—and thus, Iran’s nuclear program—is issue number one. And there are mini-Adelsons backing all the leading Republican candidates who talk tough on Iran. China hawks, by contrast, are far harder to find in the GOP donor class. In fact, given the stake many financial and corporate types have in U.S.-Chinese economic ties, it’s not clear that GOP donors even want GOP presidential candidates to take a hard line against Beijing.¶ The third reason is ideological. For the American right, it’s very important that U.S. adversaries be “evil.” From Whittaker Chambers, William F. Buckley, and Barry Goldwater in the first decades of the Cold War to Jerry Falwell, Jesse Helms, and Ronald Reagan in the 1970s and 1980s, conservatives insisted that the Soviet Union was both a geopolitical threat and a demonic force. On the right, the U.S.S.R. was often portrayed as not merely an ideological foe but a quasi-theological one. It’s no coincidence that Reagan called the Soviet Union an “[evil empire](http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3409)” in a speech to the National Association of Evangelicals.¶

#### Space – that escalates

Pomeroy 15 (Caleb, “Discursively Constructing a Space Threat: ‘China Threat’ & US Security,” June 06, 2015, E-International Relations Students, <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/06/06/discursively-constructing-a-space-threat-china-threat-u-s-security/>. // EMS).

On the other hand, if one answers that China is not a threat, the U.S. risks becoming ambivalent and could face an increasing perceived threat from China. U.S. Air Force General William Shelton explains that U.S. military satellites are effectively defenseless, and an attack would severely limit the U.S.’s civil, commercial, and military capabilities (“U.S. military satellites,” 2014). A report on the People’s Liberation Army’s space strategy published by the American Enterprise Institute (Wortzel, 2007) concludes that evidence exists that the PLA is preparing as though they might have to militarily engage the U.S. in space, citing weapons tests, legal justifications, and PLA literature as evidence. The report argues that justifications exist for the U.S. to develop space weapons systems, whether for defensive measures or offensive capabilities in future space conflicts. If the U.S. becomes ambivalent while China develops space arms, a U.S. perception of a China threat in space could increase as China becomes better armed relative to the U.S. Yet, as Zhang (2008) argues, arming space will likely evoke a military response from China. Therefore, even answering this essay’s question of a possible China threat in the affirmative or negative increases the risk of conflict.

#### Taiwan – draws in and goes nuclear

Lowther 16 (William, “China Sees Taiwan as a Key Security Threat: US Report,” March 17, 2016, Taipei Times, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/03/17/2003641785>. Lowther is a foreign policy journalist and staff writer at Taipei Times // EMS).

China now believes that the most important threat to its security interests might come from Taiwan, a new US congressional report said.¶ “The most salient challenge to Chinese interests perceived by leaders in Beijing relates to sovereignty vis-a-vis Taiwan,” said the report, released on Tuesday by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.¶ Following its fears that Taiwan might move toward independence, the situation in the East and South China seas top Beijing’s concerns.¶ “China is seeking to become the dominant power in Asia and a counter or balancing power to the presence of the US in the Asia Pacific,” said the report on China’s efforts to counter the US’ forward presence.¶ “Should Chinese leaders decide to employ military force to address these sovereignty concerns, it would destabilize the region, put pressure on the US to respond and would affect American allies,” the report said.¶ The commission, created by US Congress to monitor Chinese military developments, produces a series of staff research reports each year to help keep Capitol Hill informed.¶ “While China benefits from the security and stability the US and US allies bring to Asia, China is seeking to reduce the People’s Liberation Army’s [PLA] vulnerability to US forces in the region should a conflict occur,” the report said.¶ China continues to build anti-access and area denial capabilities to deter or delay a US military response to a conflict, the report said.¶ “China conducts activities intended to drive a wedge between US allies and partners to undermine the development of a unified, US-led security architecture in the Asia-Pacific and hinder US presence and force projection capability,” it said.¶ The reality of the situation is that because of its own assertive and aggressive actions, Beijing has has been the primary driver of instability in the Asia-Pacific region, the report said.¶ Beijing’s concerns about the US military presence in the region and the ability of the US to intervene in areas considered core interests — such as Taiwan — have led China to pursue capabilities that would enable the PLA to deny US intervention or to complicate US intervention during a conflict “should denial efforts fail,” the report said.¶ China uses psychological, media and legal warfare to help it control and shape its security environment, the report said.¶ “China’s espionage campaign against Taiwan could constitute, among other things, a form of psychological warfare,” the report said.¶ In addition to the traditional reasons for espionage, Beijing also seeks to weaken the morale of the Taiwanese military, the report said.¶ “Each spy case uncovered and revealed by Taiwan has the potential to achieve psychological benefits for Beijing, creating an environment where China’s capture of Taiwan’s defense secrets could be perceived as an inevitability,” the report said.¶ “China’s efforts to erode US influence in the Asia Pacific almost certainly will continue. The US and it allies must be aware of these efforts and be prepared to counter them,” it said.¶

#### Experts good for existential risk -- my neighbor shouldn’t make war decisions -- refusing experts reproduces hegemony of the loudest -- turns the K AND causes case impacts

Trewavas 8. Anthony. Professor of molecular and cell biology at the University of Edinburgh. “The cult of the amateur in agriculture threatens food security,” Trends in Biotechnology, Vol. 26, Issue 9, p. 475-478, Emory Libraries.

The Cult of the Amateur, a book authored by Keen [19], is particularly applicable to agriculture. His concern is the blurring of the distinction between the qualified and informed professional and the uninformed and unqualified amateur that results from instant internet access. Hecorrectly observed that: ‘We are facing the law of digital darwinism, the survival of the loudest and most opinionated’ and ‘In a world where everyone has a say, the words of a wise man count for no more than the mutterings of a fool’ [19]. He states that societies create structures of authority that aim to provide reliable expert knowledge to a public otherwise unable to discriminate between the foolish, the fundamentalist, the vociferous or the wise. Is it wise to obtain reliable information on open heart surgery from a local butcher or from a skilled heart surgeon? Is it wise to ask a bus driver how to fly a jumbo jet or instead ask a long-experienced jumbo jet pilot? Or should we ask someone whose experience of shipping is limited to rowing a boat how to captain a supertanker? Although 70% of air crashes are due to pilot error, medical mistakes are not uncommon and occasionally even supertankers sink, amateur involvement would guarantee almost certain immediate disaster. But in agriculture, pesticides, food and farming, expert scientific knowledge and experience is seemingly regarded as having no more weight than that of the opinionated, unqualified (and inexperienced) environmentalist. If scientific knowledge is not the foundation of policy, then ignorance will directly lead the way to starvation, as indeed has already begun to happen. People are entitled to their opinions, but unless they are based on extensive qualification and experience, they are of little or no value for policy A typical example of Keen’s concern is the International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD; http://www.agassessment.org/ index.cfm?page=plenary&ItemID=2713). The original intention of this report was to investigate how science and technology could reduce hunger and improve nutrition and sustainability in the developing and third world. Unwisely, the organizer failed to limit contributors to those who could provide a balanced scientific input and instead included a large number with marginal agricultural science connections, including environmentalists (reference [20] outlines environmentalist attitude to scientific knowledge). The title, IAASTD, is now a misnomer; the science unsurprisingly is marginalized and an evident need for scientific research omitted. The components (minerals, prices, seed, crop and others) that contribute to agricultural yield are linked together in a farming network [4]. Like any network, the sensitivity with which any component can be used to increase yield is dependent on the context within which the farming network is embedded. Long experience has shown, however, that application of scientific and technical knowledge is far and away the most efficient way in which to increase and sustain yield, no matter where the farm is located. Sociology, agroecology, spirituality or any other of the marginal topics dealt with at length by the IAASTD will not put bread on the poor farmer’s table, increase food security or stabilize food price when the soil is phosphatedeficient, as many of the African soils are. The government of Malawi simply subsidized fertilizer price, and Malawi now feeds itself. The most sensitive constituent in its agricultural network was simple knowledge of crop growth requirements. The desire of many individuals who are marginal to agricultural science to impose their own political views (under the guise of science and technology) on third world countries in this flawed IAASTD report smacks strongly of the discredited social engineering of the last century. The International Council for Science produced a much simpler but balanced approach to agricultural sustainabilityy written, of course, by scientists, and the Sasakawa-Global 2000 programmez exemplifies science in practice. For over 20 years this excellent programme organized by Normal Borlaug, father of the green revolution, has tirelessly worked in Africa to provide the highest quality seed to African farmers, to provide demonstration plots illustrating how to improve yields more than fourfold and to provide local agricultural education, local machinery construction and water storage and irrigation. No long, inappropriate, US$12 million dollar, misleading reports; just quietly introducing an African green revolution. Conclusion It is essential that all scientists assert the primacy of properly established and critically assessed scientific knowledge not only in the formulation of agricultural policy but in all areas of human activity. If knowledge is not used, only catastrophe will follow ignorance.

#### The Xi doctrine proves our attempt to “know China” is accurate

Thayer and Han 19 – \*Bradley A. Thayer, University of Chicago, Ph.D. His academic and research interests include a wide range of topics having to do with international defense and security issues, such as information warfare, nuclear proliferation and its causes and potential hazards, the role of ethnic conflict in the origins of war, terrorism, and the national security policies of the United States. \*\*Lianchao Han worked in the U.S. Senate for 12 years, serving as legislative counsel and policy director for three active U.S. Senators, an expert on China’s economic and political development, and currently serves as a Visiting Fellow at the Hudson Institute. Holds graduate degrees from China Foreign Affairs University, Yale University, George Mason University and Johns Hopkins University. (“The ‘Xi Doctrine’: Proclaiming and Rationalizing China’s Aggression” The National Interest. June 12, 2019. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/%E2%80%98xi-doctrine%E2%80%99-proclaiming-and-rationalizing-china%E2%80%99s-aggression-62402)//GK>

Specifically, there are four elements that comprise the Xi Doctrine and are indications of China’s signaling its willingness to use force. The first component is a **new and alarming proclamation** of the undisguised threats to use force or wage an unlimited war. China is becoming bolder as its military power grows. This is evidenced in Wei’s muscular remarks on the People’s Republic of China’s approach against Taiwan, his explicit statement that China does not renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and his effort to deter the United States and its allies from intervention should an attack occur. Wei forcefully stated: “If anyone dares to separate Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but must go to war, and must fight for the reunification of the motherland at all costs.” “At all cost” means that **China will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons** or launching another Pearl Harbor to take over Taiwan. This is a clear warning of an invasion. Second, the Xi Doctrine **legitimizes territorial expansion**. Through his remarks, Wei sought to convince the rest of the world that China’s seizure of most of the South China Sea is **an accomplished fact that cannot be overturned.** He made bogus accusations, which included blaming the United States for “raking in profits by stirring up troubles” in the region. He insisted that only ASEAN and China must resolve the issue. He claimed that China’s militarization on South China Sea islands and reefs were an act of self-defense. Should this be allowed to stand, then the Xi Doctrine will set a perilous precedent of successful territorial expansion, which will **further entice China and jeopardize the peace of the region.** Third, the doctrine targets the United States as a cause of the world’s major problems and **envisions a powerful China evicting the United States from the region.** Wei obliquely identified the United States as the cause wars, conflicts, and unrest, and sought to convey that the United States will abandon the states of the South China Sea (SCS) when it is confronted by Chinese power, a typical divide and conquer strategy used by the CCP regime.

#### Extinction is possible – their authors underestimate the risk

Anderson 12 (Ross Anderson, deputy director of Aeon Magazine, “We’re Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”, The Atlantic, March 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/)

Unthinkable as it may be, humanity, every last person, could someday be wiped from the face of the Earth. We have learned to worry about asteroids and supervolcanoes, but the more-likely scenario, according to Nick Bostrom, a professor of philosophy at Oxford, is that we humans will destroy ourselves. Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century. Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.

#### Changing internal subjectivity is incapable of resolving material structures – aff doesn’t solve.

Naomi **Zack 17**. Professor of philosophy at the University of Oregon. 02/2017. “Ideal, Nonideal, and Empirical Theories of Social Justice: The Need for Applicative Justice in Addressing Injustice.” The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, Oxford University Press.

Ideals of justice may do little toward the correction of injustice in real life. The influence of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has led some philosophers of race to focus on “nonideal theory” as a way to bring conditions in unjust societies closer to conditions of justice described by ideal theory. However, a more direct approach to injustice may be needed to address unfair public policy and existing conditions for minorities in racist societies. Applicative justice describes the applications of principles of justice that are now “good enough” for whites to nonwhites (based on prior comparisons of how whites and nonwhites are treated). Social information just dribbles in, bit by bit, and we simply get used to it. A single story about a person really hits home at once, but the grinding injustices of daily life are endured. It is easy to ignore them and we do. Judith Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (Shklar 1990, 110) IDEAL theory about justice extends from Plato’s Republic to John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, including many careers devoted to analyses and criticism about such texts in political philosophy. Rawls offers a picture of the basic institutional structures of a just society, on the premise that in order to correct injustice, we must first know what justice is. According to Rawls, while “partial compliance theory” studies the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice, full compliance theory, or ideal theory, studies the institutional principles of justice in a stable society where citizens obey the law. Rawls began A Theory of Justice with the claim: “The reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic grasp of these more pressing problems” (Rawls 1971, 8). Rawls’s ideal theory is too abstract to correct injustice or provide justice for victims of injustice in reality, because it is based on a thought experiment and the assumption of a “well-ordered” society in which there already is compliance with law (Zack 2016, 1–64). What people care about in reality concerning justice is not what ideal justice is or would be, but how immediate injustice can be corrected. Injustice is always specific in concrete events that are recognizable as certain types, for example, theft, murder, or police racial profiling. Injustice can be corrected by punishing those responsible for it in specific cases and instituting social changes that prevent or reduce future occurrences of the same type. Rawlsian nonideal theories of justice, constructed for societies where people do not comply with just laws, rely on ideal theory as a standard for just institutional structures. The main question driving nonideal theory is how to construct a model or picture of justice that will result in the future correction or avoidance of present injustices. John Simmons quotes John Rawls from Law of Peoples, on this matter. Nonideal theory asks how this long-term goal might be achieved, or worked toward, usually in gradual steps. It looks for courses of action that are morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective [LOP p. 89]. (Simmons 2010, 7) However, injured or indignant parties may not care about the long-term goal of justice that could lead to balance or compensation for their situations. Not only are what P. F. Strawson (1962) called “reactive attitudes,” such as moral indignation, blame, and a desire for deserved punishment, strong in their focus on injustice, but the best theory of justice in the world does not tell us what to do about the injustices we are faced with in the here and now, especially “the more pressing problems” of race-related injustices. Such questions cannot be answered with reference to ideal theory or some application of ideal or nonideal theory to their concrete situations, because the a priori nature of both of these does not provide a fit with specific contingencies—ideal and nonideal theories do not generate practical bridge principles. As theories, they posit ideal entities, but without the apparatus of scientific theories which provides connections to observable entities or events. (Moulines 1985). The correction of injustice or injustice theory requires a philosophical foundation for itself. Models of justice have often been naïvely utopian throughout the history of philosophy, because they are based on an assumption of automatic total compliance, as though the right words or pictures by themselves have the power to transform reality, or as though agreement with those right words or pictures will automatically result in action that will automatically make the world instantiate those words or pictures. When they are not fantastically and ineffectively utopian in this way, such models have been used to justify the already-existing dominance of some groups over others. (A prime example is John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, written decades before 1688 Glorious Revolution, to express the interests of the new rising class of landed gentry, which were eventually fulfilled by a Protestant king on the throne and a strong representative parliament after that revolution [Laslett 1988].) Models of justice have legitimately served to inspire law in modern societies with government constitutions and national and local law. But, sometimes, as in US founding documents, although universal and absolute justice is proclaimed, subsequent events make it clear that this language was intended to legitimize just treatment for members of selected groups only, that is, white male property owners, at first. As a result of just law and its selective application, over time, there comes to be justice for an expanding group, but still not everyone in society. However, what is written, together with descriptions of real justice for some, can be a powerful lever for obtaining justice for at least some of the excluded. To understand how that works, it is necessary to develop an approach to justice that begins with injustice, in real situations where there is already some degree of justice in a larger whole. The extension of existing practices of justice to members of new groups is applicative justice, a concept with substantial historical and intellectual precedent, although not by that name. In what follows, more will be said about the idea of applicative justice and then its history will be considered. Voting rights and housing rights are examples of candidates for applicative justice in our time. Finally, content in the form of narrative may be motivational for social change. The Idea of Applicative Justice Applicative justice is an approach to justice with the goal of making the unjust treatment of some comparable to those who already receive just treatment. Applicative justice takes a comparative approach, for example, comparing how young black males are treated by police officers in contemporary US society, to how young white males are treated (Jones 2013; Zack 2013, 2015). Applicative justice rests on a pragmatic approach to social ills, which includes the premise, based on Arthur Bentley’s 1908 insights in The Process of Government, that government is much more than the apparatus of state and written laws and court decisions. Government is an extended, dynamic process, an ongoing contention among interest groups