## 1

#### The subject is alienated when it articulates its desires – incomplete signifiers structure the emergence of subjectivity and produce repetitive drives to fill the lack that justify coercive violence. Thus, the ROB is to traverse the fantasy – that means exposing drives.

Matheson 15 Calum Matheson, PhD, 2015, “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive,” University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, [Calum Matheson is author of Desiring the Bomb: Communication, Psychoanalysis, and the Atomic Age (University of Alabama). He is a former high school debater. His research focuses on intersections of rhetoric, media, and theories of psychoanalysis and deconstruction. His current work focuses on right-wing political extremism, conspiracy thinking, and Lacanian concepts of anxiety and psychosis. He has also published work on argument, history of rhetoric, and games. Dr. Matheson is a former debate coach at Harvard University and a current candidate at the Pittsburgh Psychoanalytic Center.], <https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/concern/dissertations/6682x4537>, SJBE

The Real Jacques Lacan’s notion of the Real is notoriously difficult to define. In his book on the subject, Tom Eyers calls it the “most elusive” of Lacan’s concepts, but one that is also one that is “central” and “determining” for psychoanalysis (1). There are common elements of the various definitions. First, an agreement that both the economy of tropes that allows the conditions for meaning to emerge (the Symbolic) and the meanings and values invested in these tropes, including the subject itself (the Imaginary), do not and cannot perfectly capture all of existence or experience. Second, this unassimilable remainder structures the Symbolic and Imaginary, just as they structure each other, and thus all three registers are knitted together as demonstrated in Lacan’s famous “Borromean Knot.” The Real is what escapes mediation, what disrupts language itself. To explain its significance and relationship to desire requires examining its foundational role in the formation of the subject. The Real can be understood as the constitutive lack of the subject, its separation from the rest of existence by the self-definition necessary for it to come into being in the first place. This is made clear in the mirror stage, where the subject moves from a fragmented, disorganized concept of the body to the “finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his [sic] entire mental development with its rigid structure” (Lacan, “Mirror Stage” 78). The formation of a discrete subject (a function in the Imaginary register) is a compromise. Its formation allows for participation in the Symbolic because to participate in that economy of exchange requires a “social I” (Lacan, “Mirror stage,” 79). This participation comes at the cost of alienation because the subject trades in a world of symbols which by their nature stand in for what is not present, and thus inescapably mediate the (Real) world outside of the subject, rather than making it present. This lack built in to the subject is the engine of desire: the subject’s divide from an object is a prerequisite for the desire of such an object, but the condition of mediation makes it impossible to ever incorporate it in a perfectly satisfying way. Thus desire remains unfulfilled and each chase for a symbol leads to another in loop which the very constitution of the subject dictates must be endless. This is the basic operation of the death drive which is not distinct from Eros. Were the impossible to occur and the drive of Eros to be fulfilled, it would be extinguished, as there would be nothing left to desire. Thus all drives aim, in a sense, at their own extinction, and therefore there is in a sense only one—the drive that aims towards the extinction of desire through its complete fulfillment in continuity with the world that was lost when the subject became distinct from it in the mirror stage. Although the death drive might stand in for the singular character of the drive, it should not be understood as a desire for the actual biological death of the subject’s body, or even the desire to inflict death on others. The self-destruction of the death drive is a desire to break the limits of the self as the alienating armor of the subject by experiencing unmediated contact with the Real. Death still defines its operation in other ways. The last portion of Lacan’s “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” explains the metaphorical centrality of death as the center of a torus formed by incessant symbolization. The fort-da game is most significant not because it shows that the child wishes to destroy its mother or even inoculate itself against that possibility, but because it assimilates the child into the Symbolic order through the repetition of the signifiers fort and da, which stand in for presence and absence. Death is central to language because the symbol itself invokes the absence and loss of nonexistence since its function is to stand in for something that is gone. Language swirls around this absent center of death, a primordial absence encased in the inner ring of the torus, while the outer surfaces of language hold all else that cannot be symbolized at bay on the outside (Lacan, “Function and Field” 260-264). Paradoxically, death is necessarily evoked by the symbol as that which is absent and also made possible in the first place by that same symbol. The separation of the subject into its alienating identity as a social object makes a meaningful concept of death possible because without it there is no dasein, no individual, no singular human to die. George Bataille explains this with an entomological example. If a scientist picks one fly from a swarm, that fly is subject to death, because its end means the end of the discontinuous being selected by the entomologist. Without differentiation of its members, however, the swarm lives on; the selection of the fly is for the entomologist, not the animal (Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” 14-16). Thus it is with human beings. The subject is founded by a rejection of its sole animal nature by participating in a world of work and accumulation, mediated by language—essentially Lacan’s Symbolic. Thus individuals are made discontinuous with the general economy of matter and energy from which all things are formed by a conceptual separation inextricably bound up in death. Our existences are thus defined by discontinuity from a world of continuity, and for Bataille as for Lacan, our drives are singular in the sense that sex is a coupling that unifies with another and momentarily overcomes discontinuity just as death is the end of the subject’s brief separation from a universe differentiated only by the dismembering violence of our imposition of symbols upon it (Bataille, Erotism 13-17). The experience of death may still be unique because it suggests the absence implied by the sign and because it can be experienced only once by the subject—and for obvious reasons, cannot be symbolized by anyone with first-hand experience. As Freud argues in “Thoughts For The Times On War and Death,” we cannot even hope to imagine our own deaths because to do so demands that we imagine them from some perspective which would be destroyed in the experience itself. Death and the Real are therefore not identical, but are closely linked. The most important characteristic of the Real is not just that it suggests existence beyond language, but that this world-for-itself (to borrow from Eugene Thacker) intrudes on human reality and reveals it to be incomplete. Encompassing Max Picard’s concept of silence, the Real is not the absence of human reality so much as the traumatic revelation that that reality was always incomplete, always feigned in the face of existence so much more than human mediation has already covered. Chris Lundberg uses Lacan’s distinction between reality, being the social world of human construction, and the Real, being the occasional but inevitable failure of that reality, to develop his own distinction between failed unicity and feigned unicity. The Symbolic operates as an economy of interconnected and mutually-referential tropes weaving a kind of fabric that is the precondition for meaning, an environment in which social relationships can be understood in context. When the unified illusion of the social fails, we are compelled to stitch the tears in that fabric to maintain the world that gives us meaning (Lacan in Public 2-3). An account by Bill Laurence, the only journalist allowed to witness the Trinity test, provides evidence for this rupture and repair. While “not a sound could be heard” for the period after the flash and before the thunder, Laurence saw civilization itself collapse in an instant: The big boom came about one hundred seconds after the great flash—the first cry of a newborn world. It brought the silent, motionless silhouettes to life, gave them a voice. A loud cry filled the air. The little groups that had hitherto stood rooted to the earth like desert plants broke into a dance—the rhythm of primitive man dancing at one of his fire festivals at the coming of spring. They clapped their hands as they leaped from the ground…The dance of the primitive man lasted but a few seconds, during which an evolutionary period of about 10,000 years telescoped. Primitive man was metamorphosed into modern man—shaking hands, slapping his fellow on the back, all laughing like happy children. (12)

#### The 1AC is an ideological fantasy constructed by relentless planning at the expense of scapegoated identities, all for recognition from the Other in an attempt to fill the lack.

Gunder 05 Michael Gunder, 2005, “The Production of Desirous Space: Mere Fantasies of the Utopian City?” Planning Theory 2005 4: 173, DOI: 10.1177/1473095205054604, all brackets were in the original text, SJBE

Jouissance is one of the four structuring elements of social discourse,4 or social interactions, links and relationships, where synchronic language meets diachronic speech to evoke an effect on the Other (Lacan, 2004: 3). Zupancic (2004) associates Lacan’s (2004) theory of the Four Discourses (see Gunder, 2003a, 2004; Hillier and Gunder, 2005) with the Marxian theory of commodification and surplus-value via Lacan’s concept of surplus-enjoyment (plus-de-jouir). Lacan (2004: 111) contends that surplusvalue and surplus-enjoyment are historically equivalent, especially in the situation of the Master’s injunction of ‘No!’ in the emerging early phase of Calvinistic repressive capitalism. In contrast to the historical authority and rationality of the Master’s repressive command, late capitalism is structured under a rationality of the university or bureaucracy. Now knowledge and technology, not the Master’s injunction, become ‘agency expressing a logic of governmentality and expertise (including that of planning) that does not prohibit enjoyment, but rather channels jouissance in ways that produces a “bio-politics” (after Foucault) of an alienated subject that has no option, but to enjoy and be satisfied’ (Hillier and Gunder, 2005; McGowan, 2004; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b; Zupancic, 2004). In this regard, ‘a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialised in a set of social practices and submitted through national myths [or fantasies] that structure these practices’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1993: 202). This is taken further by the barely challenged international hegemonic discourse of global capitalization and the fantasies it induces in externally structuring the nation state’s very enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 63; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 61). Even the ruling British Labour government, with its ‘Third Way’, in contrast to its tradition of socialism, has placed ‘economic globalisation’ as ‘the most significant factor in shaping Labour Party thinking since the early 1990s’ (Allmendinger, 2003: 326). As McGowan (2004) observes: we trust fully in the staying power of global capitalism. The alternatives, which once seemed to be just around the corner, have become unimaginable today. The universe of global capitalism is, or so we think, here to stay, and we best not do anything to risk our status within it. Hence, we pledge our allegiance to it, and we put our trust in it. This is the fundamental mode of contemporary obedience to authority. Only by coming to understand this obedience to the dictates of global capitalism as obedience can we hope to break out of it. Global capitalism seems an unsurpassable horizon simply because we have not properly recognized our own investment in sustaining it. We see it as unsurpassable because we don’t want to lose it – and the imaginary satisfaction that it provides. (McGowan, 2004: 193) Illusion resides under this global fantasy of capital where ‘the basic feature of’ this dominant cultural imperative ‘no longer operates on the level of ideals and identifications, but directly on the level of regulating jouissance’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 113). Even in Lefebvre’s day, this was a capitalism where surplus-value was synonymous with surplus-enjoyment supporting the injunction: ‘you must enjoy!’. In this light, the role of planning is to facilitate enjoyment by sustainably providing the correct space – healthy, competitive, fit and attractive – where enjoyment can be effectively materialized and maximized under the imperative of global capitalism. Consequently: urbanism is nothing more than an ideology that claims to be either ‘art’ or ‘technology’ or ‘science’, depending on the context. This ideology pretends to be straightforward, yet it obfuscates, harbours things unsaid: which it covers, which it contains, as a form of will tending towards efficiency. Urbanism is doubly fetishistic. First, it implies the fetishism of satisfaction. What about vested interests? They must be satisfied, and therefore their needs must be understood and catered to, unchanged . . . Second, it implies the fetishism of space. Space is creation. Whoever creates space creates whatever it is that fills space. The place engenders the thing and the good place engenders good things. (Lefebvre, 2003: 159) This is exacerbated further in the current milieu of consumerist post-democracy personified by the master signifier: global capitalism. ‘Post-democracy is founded on an attempt to exclude the political awareness of lack and negativity from the political domain, leading to a political order which retains the token institutions of liberal democracy but neutralizes the centrality of political antagonism’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 59). In response to the dominant ‘logic’ of global competitiveness, the technocrats and experts including planners, shape, contextualize and implement public policy in the interest of the dominant hegemonic bloc. This is constructed under the logics and knowledges of university discourses (see Gunder, 2004), with an objective to remove existing or potential urban blight,‘dis-ease’ and dysfunction detracting from local enjoyment and global competitiveness (Gunder, 2005; McGuirk, 2004). Of course, the hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debate as to what constitutes desired enjoyment and what is lacking in urban competitiveness. In turn, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of planning remedy. This is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness, is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Planners, programmers, and users want solutions. For what? To make people happy. To order them to be happy. It is a strange way of interpreting happiness. The science of the urban phenomenon cannot respond to these demands without the risk of validating external restrictions imposed by ideology and power. (Lefebvre, 2003: 141) Yet this lack and its resolution are more often technical in nature, rather than political. As a consequence, the technocrats in partnership with their ‘dominant stakeholders’ can ensure the impression of happiness for the many, while, not to mention, achieving the stakeholders’ specific interests. Material happiness for all but that evil other Lacanian theory suggests that a subject’s jouissance is given freest rein when an act of desire contains a dimension of transgression. It is the ‘little sin’ that gives the most pleasure; it is the prohibition as such which elevates a common everyday object into an object of desire (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 177). The bio-politics of contemporary planning are predicated on enjoyment – you will enjoy! – not the prior duality of repression/freedom of the Weberian capitalist master’s injunction: ‘No you cannot do that!’. The achievements of traditional utopian goals were ones of freedom to act against the repression of the negative injunction. Contemporary injunctions are to enjoy – or at least to sustain our happiness – regardless of what we actually desire. Happiness is not a class of truth, but one of an ontological class of being where: ‘happiness’ relies on the subject’s inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desires. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we ‘officially’ desire. Happiness is thus hypocritical: it is the happiness dreaming about things we do not really want. (Zˇ izˇek, 2002a: 59–60) Planning continues to succeed because it underpins the primal desire of most subjects in society for a conflict-free, safe and assured happy future, even if it can only deliver this as a fantasy-scenario of material happiness, rather than as an impossible reality that actually sates all desires (Gunder, 2003a, 2003b). This is a fantasy predicated on an obedience to a shallow consumptive quantitative imperative to be materially happy, which often occurs at the expense of our actual qualitative psychic desires. In our contemporary global society the ‘moral law’ is no longer the imperative that acts as a limitation, stopping us from enjoying too much. Instead, the cultural imperative, the now dominant moral Law itself, in its injunction for us to enjoy becomes ‘the ultimate “transgression”’ should one wish to pursue a life of moderation (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 174). Further, ‘the fantasy of a utopian harmonious social world can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder . . . a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated, but instead must be eliminated’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 108). This is the stranger, the Other that is not us that can act as the ‘“scapegoat” to be stigmatised as the one who is blamed for our lack, the Evil force that stole our precious jouissance’ and stopped the fantasy from achieving its utopian vision (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 58). Even our ‘“complex” contemporary societies rely on the basic divide between included and excluded’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 86). Zˇ izˇek (2004b: 86) continues: in any society ‘there is a multitude within the system and a multitude of those excluded, and simply to encompass them both within the scope of the same notion amounts to the same obscenity as equating starvation with dieting.’ It is continually this Other that permits the delusion of harmony in our identity defining groups and for this to transpire we require an Other, external to the group for the group to define itself. We require a disparity, or gap, to allocate a degree of difference to an Other to conceptualize the group identification as who we are not and on this Other we can attribute all the signs of disharmony that jeopardize our shared fantasy (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 5). Difference is essential to complete our fantasy of harmony, but only by providing the sacrificial Other on which we can blame the disappointment of the fantasy to deliver (Zˇ izˇek, 2004a: 158–9). In this light, planning,‘as part of the apparatus of the modern state, makes its own imprint, has its own powers for good and evil’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). This is especially so as planning identifies, or at least names and legitimizes, what constitutes an urban pathology that detracts from what is desirous of the globally competitive city. Planning then sets out to remedy this lack or deficiency. Civil society, i.e. the public stage, and media of information dissemination are central to this process. Of course, our media are not ideologically neutral. As a consequence, media access for putting forth particular tropes of desire constitutes a central component of social, as well as economic, capital. This is well documented by Flyvbjerg (1998a) where the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce controlled the editorial content of the local newspaper. This argument is central to that of Chomsky’s (2003) multinational corporate steering of mass media content in the, so-called, ‘free’ press. This is where the mass media are free to publish almost anything, provided, of course, they do not alienate their corporate clients who provide their majority of income and profits via their advertising payments. Gunder (2003b) documented how planning actors and their affiliated partners gained public agreement via the rhetorical use of culturally shared ‘master signifiers’ and their related metonymies and metaphors. Here each signifier was linked to associations in the public’s unconscious that induced a conscious expression of desire for a particular set of values or specific consequential actions. Effective deployment of rhetorical tropes can seduce subjects ‘to relinquish previous desires (including identifications and embrace new ones) – or alternatively, to invest all the more completely in old ones’ (Bracher, 1993: 51–2). For example, does anyone wish to live in a city that is losing enjoyment to other locations because it lacks the fitness to compete? In Lacan, the construction of reality is continuous with the field of desire. Desire and reality are intimately connected . . . The nature of their link can only be revealed in fantasy . . . when harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent. It has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction. (Stavrakakis, 1999: 62–3) This is where, from a Lacanian outlook, by accepting rationalization as the means to fulfil a desire for completeness – via the utilization of falsifying words – ‘man does not adapt himself to reality; he adapts reality to himself’ (Roudinesco, 1997: 114). Ideological fantasies as to what constitutes an enjoyable and satisfying city are deployed to hide the dysfunctions and unpredictabilities that are ubiquitous throughout all social spheres, particularly for those lacking in sufficient capital to offset adversity. Social reality ‘is sustained by the “as if”, the fantasy of what things are like’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Rationalization, or realrationalität as Flyvbjerg (1998a) calls it, exists between the everyday activities of social life and the held universal ideals or values of what ought to be, even if it is not so, in social reality. The belief that planning is not political, but technical ‘allows the myths of objectivity, value neutrality, and technical reason to persist, and thereby fosters a certain delusion about planning practice’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). Sandercock (2004: 134) continues: planning ‘helps to redefine political debate, producing new sources of power and legitimacy, changing the force field in which we operate’. Lefebvre suggests that planning is based on a strategy of mixing scientificity and rationality with ideology. ‘Here, as elsewhere, scientificity is an ideology, an excrescence grafted onto real, but fragmentary, knowledge’ (Lefebvre, 2003: 166). In particular, Lefebvre argues that quantitative expertise including the technology of urban planning is largely a myth. This is because planning administrators: and bad administrators at that, rarely use much actual technology. However, they have the ability to persuade the people as a whole that because these are technological decisions they should be accepted. In other words, a large part of Lefebvre’s criticism [of planners] is not that technocrats are technocrats, but that they are precisely the opposite. Technology should be put to the service of everyday life, of social life rather than being precisely the condition of its suppression and control. Urbanism, for example, is an ideology that operates under the cover of this myth of technology. (Elden, 2004: 145) Social reality can only exist in the symbolic and imaginary registries as it is composed, that is constructed, as a ‘result of a certain historically specific set of discursive practices and power mechanisms’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 66). Flyvbjerg (1998a) illustrates this well in his exposé of the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce’s intervention in that city’s planning process. Here this grouping of dominant business people is given hegemonic voice to determine what constitutes acceptable transportation modes and spatial development in Aalborg’s town centre. In this example the planner’s technical facts, by themselves, produced the weaker argument. This was perhaps because the dissemination of these facts and their implications for planning action were ineffectively articulated to the public, if at all, via the local information media controlled by the Chamber of Commerce. In contrast, in Sydney, McGuirk (2004) documented how planners actively participated in and facilitated the dominant network of actors successfully pushing for a series of local, regional and national policies supporting Sydney’s global competitiveness. It appeared to be of little consequence that these policies induced adverse effects on the rest of the country, not to mention many of Sydney’s residents. Not dissimilarly, the Auckland case cited in the introduction illustrates how the planners actively consulted the dominant commercial stakeholders in developing their growth strategy, yet failed to have direct consultation with the Region’s actual residents (ARGF, 1999; Gunder, 2003a). Planners and their governance forum of dominant stakeholders appeared to inherently know what is in the best interests of their region’s residents. Planning as agonistic ethics Notwithstanding the ‘full rendering of the antagonisms which traverse our society, we indulge in the notion of society as an organic whole, kept together by forces of solidarity and co-operation’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 6). Planning is one such instrument that shapes and justifies the governing ideals of utopian desire and in this ‘sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is dominant’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 110). The subtle and not so subtle application of power defines truth, reason and rationality and this particularly comprises the deployment of power in our planning and related practices (Flyvbjerg, 1998a). Moreover, a Lacanian line of reasoning about knowledge and truth indicates that the constituting components of these induced fantasies of truth and rationality are mediated on the wants and needs of actors with the capacity to inflict their desires and wants on the Other and, as if, these desires belong to those who have been imposed on. This is via assertions of unquestionable ‘truth’, which are often supported and empowered by selected ‘distorted’ knowledge, practices and language put forward by their ideological supporters, employed professional experts and controlled media. Further, in this light traditional Kantian and related enlightenment ‘ethics is nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology that tries to pass off its own commandments as authentic, spontaneous, and “honorable” inclinations of the subject’ (Zupancic, 1998: 41). In contrast to traditional ethics, Lacan’s (1992) theorizing may provide an alternative way to develop new values beyond those already constituted by society as traditional morals of good or evil shaping acceptable behaviours. Traditional ethics is predicated on a reality principle as to what is possible without transgression in social reality. As Zupancic (2003: 77) observes, this ‘reality principle itself is ideologically mediated; one could even claim that it constitutes the highest form of ideology, the ideology that presents itself as empirical factor or (biological, economic . . .) necessity.’ This ‘beyond good or evil’ does not have to lead to postmodern nihilism, rather Lacan lays a groundwork for an ethics of the Real, where through acknowledgement of this Real that we cannot know or articulate we can establish new ‘truths’ in relationship to the ‘good’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b; Zupancic, 2000, 2003). This is through a mechanism of ethical sublimation where we create ‘a certain space, scene, or “stage” that enables us to value something that is situated beyond the reality principle, as well as beyond the principle of common good’ (Zupancic, 2003: 78). It is the space, or stage, created when the planner, or other actor, makes the ethical decision to recommend an action or permission that is contrary to existing regulations, precedence, professional expectations, or cultural imperatives. This is perhaps because somehow for the planner, perhaps simply driven by strong feelings, the ‘correct’ and expected action is perceived as not being the right thing to do. From the Lacanian perspective of the ethics of the Real, to make the sensed wrong into a rightness is the ethically correct task, even if this requires the agent to act against what he/she thinks society expects of that actor. This act of transcending the reality principle, and being true to the actor’s desires,5 makes possible a new good, a new potential, it changes the rules as to what is possible (Gunder and Hillier, 2004: 230). ‘The ethical, then, is the constellation of events in which the subject frees herself from the symbolic law (“freedom”), commits herself to an act (“agency”), and thereby makes it possible for the law to be rethought’ (Kay, 2003: 109). The ethical ‘act is an “excessive”, trans-strategic intervention which redefines the rules and contours of the existing order’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 81). Viewed from this perspective, Kant’s categorical imperative must be rethought itself as purely transgressive: the ethical act proper is a transgression of the legal norm – a transgression which, in contrast to a simple criminal violation, does not simply violate the legal norm, but redefines what is a legal norm. The moral law does not follow the Good – it generates a new shape of what counts as ‘Good’. (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 170) This is a transgression that introduces new spaces for what can be considered ‘good’ and hence a wider space for jouissance, beyond that of mere technically produced materialist satisfaction. Of course, a key question becomes: how can a credible planner, or other actor, transcend the accepted norms and expectations of a society to create a new space for a new concept of ‘good’? Further, how can one effectively and reasonably mobilize such an ethics of the Real in everyday life when it is so contrary to the consensual instrumental rationality of the modern project and its ready-made solutions, that are, arguably planning’s purpose and foundations? Planning theorists (e.g. Gunder and Hillier, 2004; Pløger, 2004) and researchers in other disciplines (e.g. Mouffe, 1999, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2003a; Thrift, 2004a, 2004b) are currently attempting to address these complex issues that essentially require new insight and perhaps even profound change in our very relationships towards social reality, itself. Further, they are attempting to do so in a manner that does not simply impose a new intransigent set of ideals to replace our late-modern cultural imperatives, but rather to encourage diverse opportunities for multiple opening in which imminence may continually occur (after Deleuze). Coherent and implementable means to achieve this desired state are yet to emerge as new knowledges and practices, if they can ever do so. Yet, this author suggests that mere awareness and articulation of the impossible implications that the Lacanian Real has on traditional rationality are perhaps one of many points of commencement. Of course, this discourse also may fall into the trap leading to transcendental idealism, i.e. a process of identifying a lack, or void, in our knowledge and practices and then presenting a hegemonic solution that must be implemented, regardless of effect and affect! This author suggests that to change social reality, to begin to question and where necessary traverse our norms and laws, while avoiding the imperative of idealism, calls for a return to agonism that reawakens the political awareness of lack and negativity in place of the technical injunction: you will enjoy! This permits a space for an inclusive acceptance of strife or agonism that does not exclude the Others’ voice attempting to articulate their desires and wants in response to the ‘irreducibility of the Real’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b: 331). Rather this re-politicization of the planning problematic from that of the technical, quantified, solution is one that values Lacan’s Real and Lefebvre’s lived space by making the ‘key “jump from quantity to quality”, from antagonisms subordinated to differences to the predominant role of antagonism’ as pure agonism (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 92). In Lefebvre’s city ‘unconscious desires and passions lay dormant, dormant beneath the surface of the real, within the surreal . . . waiting for . . . the day they can be realized in actual conscious life’ (Merrifield, 2000: 178). In this regard, rather than continuing to fill the lack generating the urban problematic and produce a largely phallic enjoyment, Stavrakakis (2003b: 332) reminds us that in Lacan’s later teachings he spoke of another form ‘of jouissance – female or feminine jouissance – which values this lack per se as something that entails a different kind of enjoyment.’ Perhaps this feminine jouissance may be more appropriate to politicize the needs and wants of lived space. Yet, to do so would require a politics that acknowledges the impossibility of the Lacanian Real. In contrast to the notion that what is meant by an utopia is an imagined ‘ideal society; what characterizes utopia is literally the construction of a u-topic space, a social space outside the existing parameters, the parameters of what appears to be “possible” in the existing social universe’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 123). This proposed utopia is one that may permit, at least aspects of Lefebvre’s ‘lived space’ of the qualitative to be both visible and articulated in conscious life. Rather than contestant cities and regions competing globally under one cultural imperative to attract and retain finite capital and resources via one ‘logic’ and vision, this article calls for a planning ethos that encourages diverse groups within cities and regions to actively contest their perspectives and desires without threat of exclusion. To achieve such a state requires planning ‘to find ways of working with agonism without automatically recurring to procedures, voting, representativity, forced consensus or compromises’ that inherently exclude (Pløger, 2004: 87). This requires a planning ethos predicated on a central awareness of the irreducible Real. This is an understanding that any forced resolution always excludes a remainder, what cannot be articulated or perceived. Further, this remainder will continue to have unconscious effect in terms of what drives our materialized actions. This suggests an overt democratic planning process, representative of a society that is explicitly and overtly hegemonic for all participants, not tacitly hegemonic in its privileging of specific groups with access to power and technocratic justification that is constituted under a logic implicitly desiring social order (Critchley, cited in Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 95). This is in contrast to the existing social reality, where political processes, such as planning, appear to strive for public participation culminating in an harmonious public consensus, when of course this is but an ideological foil that excludes in the name of a ‘general interest’ defined by a privileged few and legitimized by technocratic ‘reason’. In contrast, a strong society ‘places conflict and power at its centre’ by guaranteeing the very ‘existence of conflict’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998b: 229). Our current dominating fantasy of harmony is sustained by the illusion of continued consumer abundance produced and brought by the cornucopia of global capitalism, at least for the first world. This enjoyment of global capitalism ‘constitutes a (partial) reality with hegemonic appeal, a horizon sustained by the hegemony of an administration of desire with seemingly unlimited resources’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 61). Of course, resources and global carrying capacities are axiomatically finite. So perhaps must be our desires, for they can never be sated. Traversing our fundamental fantasy for harmony: a start, not a conclusion! Lacan and his followers, such as Stavrakakis, Zˇ izˇek or Zupancic, produce valid arguments for a psychoanalytically derived philosophy of reality and ideology ‘capable of theorizing the ways our deepest commitments bind us to practices of domination’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Revealing and transversing the ideological constructs that shape and structure our social reality is inadequate in itself as a mere academic critical exercise of knowledge production. This author argues that we must radically challenge our underlying beliefs for ourselves, and, in particular, not externalize them to ‘larger cultural practices and technologies’ so that hegemonic networks, or partnerships, of dominant actors, including intellectuals and bureaucratic professionals, can do our believing and desiring for us through planning and related diverse agencies of social guidance (Dean, 2001: 628). To do so we must traverse our fundamental fantasies that seek harmony and security. This article’s application of Lacan, augmented with some of Lefebvre’s urban insights, gives us a combination of Freudian and Marxist thought that is considerably at odds to that conjured up by the Frankfurt School’s vision of society as ‘a liberated collective culture’ with little space for the individual histories of unique subjects (Jameson, 2003: 8). The latter is the School, or project, drawing on Marx and Freud, which eventually created the Habermasian product of communicative rationality. This is a rationality that sought as its seldom if ever achieved ideal, to produce undistorted (ideologically free) speech acts ‘based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensiveness, truth, truthfulness, and rightness’ constituting a basis for consensually agreement as to how we should act (Habermas, 1979: 3). Yet, as Hillier (2003) illustrates, this is an ideal of undistorted speech that is an impossibility because of the Lacanian Real and the incompleteness it always induces in language, not to mention the impossibility of absolute truth. Yet, this author would agree with Habermas’ call for the supremacy of discourse over mere technical reason. Habermas’ last two validity claims of truthfulness to our desires and the need to act in regard of what our unconscious feeling says is rightness, even if this sense is perhaps not readily justifiable with symbolic knowledge and reasoned argument, should be given due regard through our discourses. In contrast to Habermas’ validity claims of truth and comprehensiveness, Lacan’s theorizing suggests a much more fundamental contextualization of urban ideology based on the fantasies we construct to paper over the lack induced by the Real. This is a perspective that situates our very social reality, including space and social interaction, as principally constituted and composed of ideological fantasy constructs, misrecognitions and misunderstandings (see Hillier, 2003). As Jameson (2003: 37–8) observes, we owe to Lacan ‘the first new and as yet insufficiently developed concept of the nature of ideology since Marx’. Drawing on Althusser, Jameson (2003: 37–8) continues that ideology is ‘the “representation” of the Imaginary relationships of individuals to their Real conditions of existence’, so that ‘the individual subject invents a “lived” relationship with collective systems.’ This is a symbolic, materialized, relationship of practices and rituals (Krips, 2003: 149). Here, it is the desire of this Other that we fundamentally seek and wish to please as we constantly strive to return to our idealized primordial desire for infant maternal security and contentment (Hillier and Gunder, 2005). So we construct and share illusions and fantasies – ideologies – that we are somehow achieving this impossible task. It is the aggregate of these Others, and the illusions we generate about them and ourselves, that constitutes the social reality that is our lived space.

#### The repetition of drives makes life the enemy and causes extinction

Themi 08 (Tim, Prof @ Deakin U, “How Lacan’s Ethics Might Improve Our Understanding of Nietzsche’s Critique of Platonism: The Neurosis & Nihilism of a ‘Life’ Against Life,” *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy* 4.1-2, 2008) SJBE, recut from Harvard BoSu

For to circle in too close to the Thing which is ethically forbidden by our reality principles––yet too the real truth of much desire––does hardly give us pleasure at all but anguish of the heaviest kind. Even if done so only as a thought experiment; as a free-association. So go there we generally don’t, and our ‘realities’ reflect as much. But henceforth when desire builds up, damns and flares return of the Thing: this is how Lacan specifically characterises the move we might make that goes beyond the pleasure principle, whose other name for Freud is ‘death-drive’. There where there is no, not pleasure yet jouissance in the transgression that the Thing would bring, a jouissance of transgression which Lacan suggests is the most direct satisfaction of a drive humanly possible[48]. But it’s also one perhaps unconsciously masochistic, that which Freud writes up as being only preliminarily sadistic, in eventually expressing itself as an “unconscious need for punishment”[49]. And if indeed we are feeling guilty, then we may yet still seek to pay the price. Why? For unknowingly possessing and inadvertently re-accessing this Thing in our real, beyond the pleasure-reality principle, our moral transgressions casting shadow long into the unconscious we know next to nothing about, and refuse even to acknowledge.¶ Could it not be thusly then that our time is behind now a sadomasochistic, wilfully ignorant drive towards death for nigh the entire species? Such punishment would too overly suffice, to be sure, for even a two-millennium length in repression…¶ But with our advancements in technological power outmatching by far any correlative advance in the awareness gained as a whole of our prehistoric Thing within: the great 21st century ecological disaster that too many academics and activists now increasingly predict, seems more than just a little possible. But to this increasingly macabre scenario, we must also add the renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons which occurs, no less, amidst a world where vital resources for energy and democracy are wearing thin[50]. For just such reasons, wilful ignorance of the Thing now bares results which Lacan’s Ethics reveals as far too terrifyingly possible to rationally accept; given that we have the Thing armed to the teeth now from that primitive id-like part of the brain, with no Sovereign Good, and all the way into a nuclear age.¶ CONCLUSION: THE NEUROSIS & NIHILISM OF A ‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE.¶ This is why Lacan proposes that his enquiry into ethics must be one to go “more deeply into the notion of the real”(LE:11). Further into what he would rather call the real, given that previous notions of ‘nature’ have been too far ‘different’––from being far too Platonic––than his own; and because it’s the very exclusions in these previous notions which upon return, as return of excess, are yielding our most tragic problems.¶ Today when faced with problems of the magnitude of global warming––a special but by no means solo case of adverse environment change at present due to our physical treatment of the planet––we often think the answer is to be more moral, more good, and we are thankful when exponents of the Good in some way bring attention to the problem. However, the idea of the Good as introduced by Plato, and nigh all of its descendants whether secular, rationalist, religious or not, continue to predicate themselves on a radically false picture of the human-condition: if not still of the entire cosmos––which only then lines itself up aside of an age-old repression, a repression of das Ding, that Freudian Thing in our inner real which, when it returns after being disavowed and denied in the name of the Good too long, is even more devastating.¶ Presently we are accelerating along the path of what Lacan discloses as our civilisation’s “race towards destruction”, a “massive destruction”, “a resurgence of savagery”, snaking the paths traced out before us by the centuries long dominion of Western morality [51]; and the nihilism detected by Nietzsche before the turn of the 20th has never threatened to reach such the grand finale. But what I would have us take from this enquiry here is that this is not because we aren’t in accordance enough with a moral ideal of the Sovereign good, but rather, it’s because we aren’t in accordance enough with a proper understanding of the real. It’s because we still at some level think that being more moral, in accordance with the Good’s inherited repressive structures towards our drives, desire, and truthfulness about the real, is actually the answer to––rather than the source of––our most tragic problems.¶ The goal here is by no means then to encourage all to let their Things run wild––which would probably be nothing short of an instant conflagration––but this is why and precisely why we must desist from deluding ourselves under the tightening grip of a Sovereign Good, for this is precisely the move which cuts the Thing loose after pressing down for far too long, a slippery hand’s palming on the coils of a spring, forever readying the subsequent explosion. For when that which is really real––as opposed to what Christian-Platonism falsely called the ‘real’––is forced from mind, it can’t really disappear because it is real, and it tends to end up only in our gun-sights as an imaginary overlaying of an external other, when the signifier ‘enmity’ appears. The earth itself can even seem like the enemy after while, one which like Plato in his Phaedo, we might think then to escape from “as if from a prison”, and especially from “the bonds of the body”, in the hope that we may live one day without the earthly altogether[52]. Following such negations to their logical conclusion, life itself becomes enemy too, for as being made up of the earthly and organic, life could never be free of what it is in essence. And what is the death-drive Freud tells from the start, if not to return us sundry to that dust-bowl of the inorganic; as per that “second death”[53] fantasm Lacan salvages from the Monstre de Sade, which wills to go beyond the destruction of mere beings, by destroying too the principle from which fresh sets could emerge. Such negative devaluations of our earthly, organic life though are really of our own construction: as de Sade, like any pervert, is only the mirror which shows expressed what Platonic-neurotics are but hide inside––a cess-pit of loathing contempt for life, built up from the unconscious and disowned, distorted and damned up, built up, instinctual-ideational elements of their own subjective psyches, phobically ferocious of that Thingly real lying not so dormant, and readying within…¶ But is it now still possible as Nietzsche teaches to say ‘Yes’ to the real of nature both without and within––to return to it!––even though it is more frightful and we are less guaranteed protection of it than the Platonic history of metaphysicians taught? For with the further disclosures of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis––Lacan’s following up and extension of the meta-ethical implications of Freud: perhaps even Nietzsche, our great intellectual übermensch, may too have bitten off more snake-head than he could chew? From certain moments in Nietzsche’s texts we can perhaps interpret that he may have had this Thing in his sights, but saw nothing much to come of it, so instead, elected to turn away, though not without some perhaps hinted at self-amusement.[54]¶ But with psychoanalysis, rightly or wrongly, such truths are out. It doesn’t seem all positive at first, and perhaps it never entirely will. But we must not let this deeper disclosure desist us now from the core Nietzschean project of locating and overcoming the nihilism which begs us to take cover in idealising fictions, as if life as life is not worth living. Not because nihilism and the annihilation of the species is wrong in the sense of being immoral, but rather because it is bad art, mediocre art, and the ‘knowledge’ claims it trumpets on should only make us flare. If we are at our full intellectual and creative will to power, we can only consider such cultural-civil regressions as we saw on display with that whole propaganda comedy that surrounded the war for more oil in Iraq as infantile; the hapless results of sibling rivalries gone too far astray. But we must also resist being caught up in the imaginary of those who would only re-preach to us now of a return to the Good, who would only redeploy such versions of nihilism’s precursory defensive fictions, the pernicious ones, which would only then re-falsify our data, and leave us disappointed when the truth then re-emerges. Doing more harm than good does Platonism in the end by leaving us untrained for the real, with the habit instead to take some truth as ‘error’, and error as ‘truth’––as ‘real’––to the point even of epistemic dysfunction. Take the grotesque intellectual poverty of that whole Christian middle-ages for example, whence put into relation with the heights of Aristotle and his fellow Greeks, as Augustine and Aquinas amplified some of the worst bits of Platonism, and threw the rest into abyss.¶ The overcoming of the moralising good of Christian-Platonism though does by no means imply then a subsequent affirmation of all that brutal Roman like greed, slavery, decadence, circus-bread corruption and mindless colonial expansion that we’ve heard all about, and are hardly so free of with our corporate today––just ask a Latin-American for instance![55] For it is possible within the perspectives opened up by Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, as Silvia Ons puts it, to view a social-historical or individual neurosis of any kind: including the expressed acted-out, perverse-sadistic form that escapes when the Good is temporarily loosed of its repressive grip––and say to the would be Platonist: ‘No, not that, that’s not a cure, that’s a mirage; that’s sheer fantasy, resentment, spite; that’s not a cure it will only make things worse; worse in a different way, but worse nonetheless!’¶ By greater mindfulness then, with guided affirmation towards even that fearsome Freudian Thing that The Ethics of Psychoanalysis has us find now in our inner natures: we can eventually again say ‘Yes’-to-life in such the way that it overcomes the nihilism of not caring too much whether we as individuals or species live or die, whether we as culture or civilisation advance or decline. But we can only do this with fullest efficacy by freeing ourselves of all that wasted neurosis sickness that feels it must deny our Thing like aspect of the real: because from all those Christian-Platonic prejudices of the Good, it has been taught that such ‘things’ are too far beneath it. We must continue instead to train ourselves to stare the real directly in the face, without flinching, and that’s all we can do at least to start. For unless we can continue to utilise, sublimate, enjoy and get a positive, well-guided jouissance out of all aspects of life––including that Freudian Ding in our real––then the chances are we’re going to be at least in part, happy enough in no longer living it: offering not even a puff of genuine political praxis! We either face up to the death-drive snaking long beneath the dank, hidden history of the un-real, anti-real Good of Platonism––or let the disowned, un-understood drive resurge of its own volition until it accidentally finishes us!

#### Vote negative to embrace the lack – this requires being open to the anxiety that occurs from an encounter with the other and breaks down fantasy and drives.

McGowan 13 Todd McGowan, 2013, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London, SJBE

The alternative — the ethical path that psychoanalysis identifies — demands an embrace of the anxiety that stems from the encounter with the enjoying other. If there is a certain ethical dimension to anxiety, it lies in the rela- tionship that exists between anxiety and enjoyment. Contra Heidegger, the ethics of anxiety does not stem from anxiety’s relation to absence but from its relation to presence — to the overwhelming presence of the other’s enjoyment. In some sense, the encounter with absence or nothing is easier than the encounter with presence. Even though it traumatizes us, absence allows us to constitute ourselves as desiring subjects. Rather than producing anxiety, absence leads the subject out of anxiety into desire. Confronted with the lost object as a structuring absence, the subject is able to embark on the pursuit of the enjoyment embodied by this object, and this pursuit provides the subject with a clear sense of direction and even meaning. This is precisely what the subject lacks when it does not encounter a lack in the symbolic structure. When the subject encounters enjoyment at the point where it should encounter the absence of enjoyment, anxiety overwhelms the subject. In this situation, the subject cannot constitute itself along the path of desire. It lacks the lack — the absence — that would provide the space through which desire could develop. Consequently, this subject confronts the enjoying other and experiences anxiety. Unlike the subject of desire — or the subject of Heideggerean anxiety — the subject who suffers this sort of anxiety actually experiences the other in its real dimension.¶ The real other is the other caught up in its obscene enjoyment, caught up in this enjoyment in a way that intrudes on the subject. There is no safe distance from this enjoyment, and one cannot simply avoid it. There is nowhere in the contemporary world to hide from it. As a result, the contem- porary subject is necessarily a subject haunted by anxiety triggered by the omnipresent enjoyment of the other. And yet, this enjoyment offers us an ethical possibility. As Slavoj Žižek puts it, “It is this excessive and intrusive jouissance that we should learn to tolerate.”27 When we tolerate the other’s “excessive and intrusive jouissance” and when we endure the anxiety that it produces, we acknowledge and sustain the other in its real dimension.¶ Tolerance is the ethical watchword of our epoch. However, the problem with contemporary tolerance is its insistence on tolerating the other only insofar as the other cedes its enjoyment and accepts the prevailing symbolic structure. That is to say, we readily tolerate the other in its symbolic dimen- sion, the other that plays by the rules of our game. This type of tolerance allows the subject to feel good about itself and to sustain its symbolic identity. The problem is that, at the same time, it destroys what is in the other more than the other — the particular way that the other enjoys.¶ It is only the encounter with the other in its real dimension — the encounter that produces anxiety in the subject — that sustains that which defines the other as such. Authentic tolerance tolerates the real other, not simply the other as mediated through a symbolic structure. In this sense, it involves the experience of anxiety on the part of the subject. This is a difficult posi- tion to sustain, as it involves enduring the “whole opaque weight of alien enjoyment on your chest.”The obscene enjoyment of the other bombards the authentically tolerant subject, but this subject does not retreat from the anxiety that this enjoyment produces. If the embrace of the anxiety that accompanies the other’s proximate enjoyment represents the ethical position today, this does not necessarily provide us with an incentive for occupying it. Who wants to be ethical when it involves enduring anxiety rather than finding a way — a drug, a new authority, or something — to alleviate it? What good does it do to sustain oneself in anxiety? In fact, anxiety does the subject no good at all, which is why it offers the subject the possibility of enjoyment. When the subject encounters the other’s enjoyment, this is the form that its own enjoyment takes as well. To endure the anxiety caused by the other’s enjoyment is to experience one’s own simultaneously. As Lacan points out, when it comes to the enjoyment of the other and my own enjoyment, “nothing indicates they are distinct.” Thus, not only is anxiety an ethical position, it is also the key to embracing the experience of enjoyment. To reject the experience of anxiety is to flee one’s own enjoyment.¶ The notion that the other’s enjoyment is also our own enjoyment seems at first glance difficult to accept. Few people enjoy themselves when they hear someone else screaming profanities in the workplace or when they see a couple passionately kissing in public, to take just two examples. In these instances, we tend to recoil at the inappropriateness of the activity rather than enjoy it, and this reaction seems completely justified. The public display of enjoyment violates the social pact with its intrusiveness; it doesn’t let us alone but assaults our senses. It violates the implicit agreement of the public sphere constituted as an enjoyment-free zone. And yet, recoiling from the other’s enjoyment deprives us of our own.¶ How we comport ourselves in relation to the other’s enjoyment indi- cates our relationship to our own. What bothers us about the other — the disturbance that the other’s enjoyment creates in our existence — is our own mode of enjoying. If we did not derive enjoyment from the other’s enjoyment, witnessing it would not bother us psychically. We would sim- ply be indifferent to it and focused on our own concerns. Of course, we might ask an offending car radio listener to turn the radio down so that we wouldn’t have to hear the unwanted music, but we would not experience the mere exhibition of alien enjoyment through the playing of that music as an affront. The very fact that the other’s enjoyment captures our attention demonstrates our intimate — or extimate — relation to it. This relation becomes even clearer when we consider the epistemo- logical status of the enjoying other. Because the real or enjoying other is irreducible to any observable identity, we have no way of knowing whether or not the other really is enjoying. A stream of profanity may be the result of someone hurting a toe. The person playing the car radio too loud while sitting at the traffic light may have simply forgotten to turn down the radio after driving on the highway. Or the person may have difficulty hearing. The couple’s amorous behavior in public may reflect an absence of enjoyment in their relationship that they are trying to hide from both themselves and the public.¶ Considering the enjoyment of the other, we never know whether it is there or not. If we experience it, we do so through the lens of our own fantasy. We fantasize that the person blasting the radio is caught up in the enjoyment of the music to the exclusion of everything else; we fantasize that the public kisses of the couple suggest an enjoyment that has no concern for the outside world. Without the fantasy frame, the enjoying other would never appear within our experience.¶ The role of the fantasy frame for accessing the enjoying other becomes apparent within Fascist ideology. Fascism posits an internal enemy — the figure of the Jew or some analogue — that enjoys illicitly at the expense of the social body as a whole. By attempting to eliminate the enjoying other, Fascism hopes to create a pure social body bereft of any stain of enjoy- ment. This purity would allow for the ultimate enjoyment, but it would be completely licit. This hope for a future society free of any stain is not where Fascism’s true enjoyment lies, however. Fascists experience their own enjoyment through the enjoying other that they persecute. The enjoy- ment that the figure of the Jew embodies is the Fascists’ own enjoyment, though they cannot avow it as their own. More than any other social form, Fascism is founded on the disavowal of enjoyment — the attempt to enjoy while keeping enjoyment at arm’s length. But this effort is not confined to Fascism; it predominates everywhere, because no subjects anywhere can simply feel comfortable with their own mode of enjoying.¶ The very structure of enjoyment is such that we cannot experience it directly: when we experience enjoyment, we don’t have it; it has us. We experience our own enjoyment as an assault coming from the outside that dominates our conscious intentions. This is why we must fantasize our own enjoyment through the enjoying other. Compelled by our enjoyment, we can’t do otherwise; we act against our self-interest and against our own good. Enjoyment overwhelms the subject, even though the subject’s mode of enjoying marks what is most singular about the subject.¶ Even though the encounter with the enjoying other apprehends the real other through the apparatus of fantasy, this encounter is nonetheless genuine and has an ethical status. Unlike the experience of the nonexistent symbolic identity, which closes down the space in which the real other might appear, the fantasized encounter with the enjoying other leaves this space open. By allowing itself to be disturbed by the other on the level of fantasy, the subject acknowledges the singularity of the real other — its mode of enjoying — without confining this singularity to a prescribed identity.¶ The implications of privileging the encounter with the disturbing enjoy- ment of the real other over the assimilable symbolic identity are themselves disturbing. The tolerant attitude that never allows itself to be jarred by the enjoying other becomes, according to this way of seeing things, further from really encountering the real other than the attitude of hate and mis- trust. The liberal subject who welcomes illegal immigrants as fellow citizens completely shuts down the space for the other in the real. The immigrant as fellow citizen is not the real other. The xenophobic conservative, on the other hand, constructs a fantasy that envisions the illegal immigrant awash in a linguistic and cultural enjoyment that excludes natives. This fantasy, paradoxically, permits an encounter with the real other that liberal tolerance forecloses. Of course, xenophobes retreat from this encounter and from their own enjoyment, but they do have an experience of it that liberals do not. The tolerant liberal is open to the other but eliminates the otherness, while the xenophobic conservative is closed to the other but allows for the otherness. The ethical position thus involves sustaining the liberal’s toler- ance within the conservative’s encounter with the real other.

## 2

#### The United States federal government should:

#### -- substantially increase development and deployment of defensive ‘bodyguard’ satellites;

#### -- substantially increase investment in and development of space resilience measures including hosted payloads, on-orbit spares, and increased rapid replacement abilities, ground-based resilience measures including proliferating ground control links, additional mission control facilities, and non-fixed launch sites, alternatives to space reliance in the design of weapons systems, an counter-ASAT attribution capabilities.

#### -- negotiate a new multiple-link hotline system that communicates linking the United States National Security Council directly to the Security Council of Russia and the People’s Liberation Army

#### Bodyguards solve.

Chow 18 [Brian, independent policy analyst, 25 years as a senior physical scientist specializing in space and national security; PhD in physics from Case Western Reserve University; MBA/PhD in finance from the University of Michigan, “Rescind the proposed budget cut for launching DARPA’s RSGS robotic servicing spacecraft,” August 29, 2018, <https://spacenews.com/rescind-the-proposed-budget-cut-for-launching-darpas-rsgs-robotic-servicing-spacecraft>]

By the early 2020s, China and Russia will have robotic spacecraft threatening our satellites particularly those at the geosynchronous orbits, which are difficult to reach by other types of antisatellite weapons (ASATs). We have suggested that DARPA’s developing spacecraft for robotic servicing of geosynchronous satellites (RSGS) should also serve as bodyguard spacecraft to protect our critical satellites against adversaries’ robotic servicing spacecraft being used as ASATs. The need to use these spacecraft also as bodyguards is the strongest reason to rescind the proposed budget cut for launching our first robotic servicing spacecraft. Any delay in its launch would greatly increase the chance of a space Pearl Harbor. On Aug. 23, the Senate passed a “minibus” appropriation bill for the fiscal year 2019 cutting out $209 million, which is the budget requested by the Air Force for launching the robotic servicing spacecraft in March 2021 as planned. The Air Force said it would need to buy the launch two years in advance (i.e., 2019) of the actual launch. On the other hand, Senate appropriators cut the launch budget on the grounds that the spacecraft will not be ready as scheduled and justified their funding cut as “[too] early to need.” Even if the Senate appropriators were right about the spacecraft not being ready, appropriating the launch funding a year or two too early would amount to at most $20 million in interest charge; a minuscule amount given military spending. In any case, this $20 million is needed insurance against the dangerous outcome of spacecraft ready by March 2021 but unable to be launched as scheduled though ungently required. The administration, Air Force and DARPA are putting forth good reasons for the cut to be rescinded as Congress goes forward in its budget deliberations. For example, the White House said RSGS is an “innovative public-private partnership to demonstrate on-orbit repair, refuel and other servicing capabilities” and failure to get funding for launch by 2019 would put “at risk substantial private investment and future public-private partnerships.” As stated above, we need bodyguards to protect our satellites against these Chinese and Russian robotic servicing spacecraft re-tasked as ASATs (hereafter, space stalkers), which can grab and disable our satellites while creating little space debris. We should buy many more of RSGS spacecraft so as to also use them as bodyguard satellites against space stalkers. These bodyguards can be used to block and/or wrestle with the space stalkers moving in to grab and disable our satellites. There are two reasons why these RSGS spacecraft are particularly suitable to serve as bodyguards: RSGS spacecraft will have been developed by 2021 and can fly as bodyguards in quantity commensurate with the growing number of space stalkers, which will emerge by the early 2020s. No other spacecraft has been developed or can be developed in time to serve as bodyguards. China and Russia cannot argue that we need not have bodyguards against their ASAT-capable RSGS-equivalent spacecraft. Besides, our use of RSGS spacecraft as bodyguards is most non-escalatory in crisis or conflict. Also, using RSGS spacecraft as bodyguards is a proportional response to the threat and attack, not a space arms race. To minimize a space arms race, we should not use a defense system with a longer range or more lethal as bodyguards, unless we are forced by more potent threats. Former RSGS program manager Gordon Roesler said there are other applications for RSGS that have yet to be examined. For example, the robotic arms could be used to install sensor modules on the outside of any satellite, allowing the satellite to see objects in its vicinity and report back to Earth. That is to say, RSGS serves critical national security space missions as well. Opponents of the U.S. employing bodyguard satellites can no longer claim that the alarm over the rapidly emerging space stalking threat is simply crying wolf. On June 26, Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said that U.S. lead in space is diminishing and ‘in the near future’ skies will be filled with enemy robot satellites. On Aug. 14, Yleem Poblete, the State Department’s assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance told an audience in Geneva, Switzerland: A Russian satellite made a series of maneuvers in October 2017 that was “inconsistent” with its expected behavior and marks “a very troubling development.” On Aug. 9, Department of Defense released the Final Report on Organizational and Management Structure for the National Security Space Components of the Department of Defense, which stated that, “using existing authorities,” the Department of Defense is immediately pursuing four components: Space Development Agency, Space Operations Force, Services and Support, and Space Command. In less than two months since President Trump’s announcement of his desire to form a separate Space Force, short of Congress to combine these components into the sixth branch of the Armed Forces, the Department of Defense has moved fast and accomplished a lot to re-organize the space enterprise for the future. However, if we overlook the devastating space stalking threat, which will be upon us in a few years, all the more distant promises of peace and prosperity in space from the Space Force would mean little to us. It would be even more tragic, if we could have effectively, affordably and timely deterred and defended against this threat but were just too preoccupied to notice the calamity from this seemingly inconsequential budget cut. Let’s rescind this proposed budget cut now, before it is too late.

#### Investing in a suite of resilience and diversity measures as well as non-space alternatives for future weapons systems changes China’s calculus on ASAT attacks by denying benefit

Cheng 17 [Dean, Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, 2017, “Space Deterrence, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Asian Security: A U.S. Perspective,” in The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Gray Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains, p. 88-90]

For the United States and China, each is the other’s most challenging potential adversary in the western Pacific, and hence a major focus of their respective political, diplomatic, and military activities has been dissuading the other from challenging key security concerns. The space domain has been steadily rising in importance in this regard. Given the very different extent to which each side relies on space, as well as the diverging demands of alliances, the potential for deterring conflict in space is increasingly challenging. But while there may be clashes in space, the actual source of any Sino-American conflict will remain earthbound, most likely stemming from tensions associated with the situation in the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, or the South China Sea. This suggests that U.S. and allied decisionmakers (both in Asia and Europe) should be focusing on deterring aggression in general, rather than concentrating primarily on trying to forestall actions in space. Indeed, there is little evidence that Chinese military planners are contemplating a conflict limited to space. While there may be actions against space systems, Chinese writings suggest that they would either be limited in nature, as part of a signaling and coercive effort, or else would be integrated with broader terrestrial military operations. This would suggest that current U.S. strategy can be effective in at least limiting the success of any Chinese effort at degrading and denying space to the United States and its allies. Enhancing resilience of space-based systems—including through hosted payloads, deployment of on-orbit spares, and increased ability to rapidly replace space systems—will likely affect the Chinese calculus for undertaking action against space-based systems. At the same time, efforts must be made to improve the resilience of the terrestrial components of space-based systems’ architectures. Proliferating ground control links (as is under way with the GPS constellation), establishing additional mission control facilities, and moving away from a handful of fixed launch sites (e.g., through sea-based space launch options) all need to be taken into consideration as part of a solution to complicating adversary targeting and thereby bolstering deterrence through denial. The growing array of nongovernmental space players, including space launch (e.g., SpaceX, Blue Horizons) and remote sensing (e.g., GeoEye, Digital Globe), may provide additional resiliency because they can augment governmental assets and capabilities. This has long been the case in the area of satellite communications, with such firms as Intelsat and Inmarsat providing the bulk of global satellite communications services. Decreasing reliance on space-based systems might also make attacks on them less inviting— or at least reduce the impact should they occur. GPS has proven marvelously versatile, with myriad new applications and uses for both the location and timing functions, but it is also a potential single-point failure. Returning to training U.S. sailors in the art of celestial navigation and other similar steps can be employed to maintain at least a minimal level of effectiveness, but no more than that. Such steps cannot replace the timing function on which so many systems depend. Similarly, communications satellites are vital for the operation of many UAVs, relaying commands and data. Interference with those constellations would therefore affect the viability of many UAV operations. Future weapon developments should therefore incorporate nonspace means, including high-altitude air-breathing systems and near-space capabilities, into their initial design.

#### hotlines solve miscalc

Erwin 21 [Sandra Erwin, 11-3-2021, "One way to help prevent wars in space? Military hotlines with Russia and China," SpaceNews, https://spacenews.com/one-way-to-help-prevent-wars-in-space-military-hotlines-with-russia-and-china/] Jet

WASHINGTON — Hotlines between heads of states have long been established to reduce the risk that an accident or miscalculation might trigger a nuclear war. During recent U.S. military operations in the airspace above Syria, a hotline was set up with Russia to ensure safety of flight. With space now considered a domain of war, hotlines between U.S. and foreign rivals might be worth contemplating, said Lt. Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, U.S. Space Force deputy chief of space operations for operations, cyber and nuclear. Before joining the Space Force, Saltzman led air campaigns at U.S. Air Forces Central Command in the Middle East. “We had a hotline to the Russians because we were very concerned that a miscommunication with aircraft flying in close proximity in Syria would lead to a problem,” he said Nov. 3 during a conference call with U.S. and European reporters. “I don’t see any reason why a similar approach couldn’t work for the space domain,” Saltzman said. Saltzman is in Europe this week visiting allies. He said many of the conversations were about the “strategic competition” that is unfolding in the space domain between the U.S., China and Russia and the “lessons learned from history about miscommunication,” he said. During the air campaign over Syria, “the hotline that we used was to make as many of our operations as transparent as possible and attempt to avoid those miscommunications.” The risk of a mischaracterizing what any country is doing in space is even greater than in the air because objects in orbit are “hard to see,” he said. A civilian satellite conducting surveillance, for example, could be mistaken for a hostile counterspace weapon. “In space we literally can’t use our visual reference points. We have to rely on radar. We have to rely on telescopes, and that creates a level of uncertainty.” If there was a hotline, “at least we would have a discussion before we draw the wrong conclusions. And we currently don’t have that capability. But I think the idea merits a full scale discussion.” Saltzman on Nov. 3 gave a keynote speech at the Global Milsatcom 2021 conference in London. He said one of the themes was the desire for greater cooperation on space security. “Establishing responsible norms and behaviors is really a global concern. No one nation can establish those independently, and there’s so much shared capacity that we could leverage.”

## 3

#### JCPOA passes now, but it’s tentative and the window is closing

Norman 3/15 [(Laurence, deputy bureau chief at Dow Jones Newswires and The Wall Street Journal based in London) “Russia Softens Iran Demands, Re-Opening Way for Nuclear Deal,” The Wall Street Journal, 3/15/2022] JL

Russia walked back recently made demands on Washington related to the Iran nuclear deal, clearing the way for Tehran and Washington to revive the 2015 agreement, senior western diplomats said.

On Tuesday, after Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met in Moscow with his Iranian counterpart, both Mr. Lavrov and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said Russia wasn’t standing in the way of the accord.

Russia earlier this month had demanded guarantees from Washington that its economic ties with Iran wouldn’t be affected by the Western sanctions imposed on Moscow over Ukraine. The last-minute move was the driving factor that prevented a deal to revive the 2015 nuclear agreement over the past 10 days, western diplomats have said.

The European Union, which coordinates the talks, announced a break in the negotiations on Friday, blaming “external factors” for preventing a deal that is “essentially ready.”

A senior Western diplomat said Tuesday evening that Russia’s chief negotiator at the talks, Mikhail Ulyanov, had informed the EU that Russia would accept narrower guarantees ensuring that Russia could carry out the nuclear work it is mandated to do under the 2015 nuclear deal. That includes a uranium swap with Iran, the redesign of the Fordow nuclear facility and the provision of nuclear fuel to Iranian reactors.

“Russia says happy with guarantees on nuclear projects and not asking for anything else,” said the diplomat, who asked to remain unidentified because of the sensitive nature of the talks. “So we can go ahead with negotiations that are now exclusively US-Iran.”

State Department spokesman Ned Price said Tuesday evening that “we are not going to sanction Russia for undertaking, for participating in nuclear projects that are part of the” nuclear deal.

The negotiations, which have taken place for almost a year now, aim to reach agreement on the steps Washington and Tehran will take to return into compliance with the 2015 agreement, which lifted most international sanctions on Tehran in exchange for tight but temporary restrictions on Iran’s nuclear work.

After the Trump administration took the U.S. out of the accord and reimposed sweeping sanctions on Iran, saying the accord was too weak, Tehran expanded its nuclear work and has now gathered almost enough nuclear high-grade enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, according to the United Nations nuclear agency.

Iran says its nuclear program is purely peaceful and U.S. officials have said there is no evidence Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon.

Over the weekend, a senior U.S. official told The Wall Street Journal that only “a handful of issues left” remained between the U.S. and Iran to reach an accord, mainly on the issue of the scope of sanctions relief Iran would receive from Washington. The official said the U.S. side felt the resolution of these issues was “within reach.”

The U.S. official and senior European diplomats said they wouldn’t negotiate broad carve-outs from Western sanctions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with Moscow to save the nuclear deal. They warned that if Russia didn’t back off its demands, they would seek to complete an agreement with Iran, bypassing Russia.

Mr. Ulyanov said Tuesday evening on Twitter it was a lie that Russia had stood in the way of the accord with its demands for guarantees. He added that “some demands were accepted.” Iran, which has friendly ties with Moscow, has also continued to blame Washington for not completing the deal.

Negotiations between the U.S. and Iran could resume without negotiators returning to Vienna, where the talks have been held since April 2021, the senior western diplomat said. Iran so far has refused to talk directly with the Americans and instead have negotiated through the European powers at the talks. With so few issues still to be resolved, negotiators could work from capitals to resolve the remaining differences.

Time is pressing. U.S. and European officials say that Iran’s nuclear work has expanded close to a point that the deal’s main benefit to the West—keeping Iran months away from amassing enough nuclear fuel for a nuclear weapon—would be impossible.

European diplomats in particular have warned that with the war in Ukraine becoming ever-deadlier, the diplomatic window for concluding the deal is closing.

#### Space diplomacy directly trades off with nonproliferation agreements – finite manpower, money, and political will within the AVC

Johnson-Freeze 16 [(Joan, Professor and former Chair of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island) “Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens,” Cass Military Studies, 11/8/2016] JL

 \*The plan is legislated in the AVC (same bureau of the State Department that’s concerned with the JCPOA)

Proactive policymaking takes commitment, manpower, and money. A quick look at the money and manpower devoted to diplomacy in the US State and Defense departments compared to the resources available for the hardwareproducing military–industrial complex efforts described in Chapter 5 is enlightening. The Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC) leads space-related diplomacy in the State Department. The AVC Bureau is responsible for “all matters related to the implementation of certain international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments; this includes staffing and managing treaty implementation commissions.”34 The AVC arms control portfolio includes nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and all related issues. The AVC section charged with space issues is the Office of Emerging Security Challenges; this office also handles missile defense issues and the promotion of transparency, cooperation, and building confidence regarding cybersecurity. As of financial year 2013, AVC had a budget of $31.2 million and 141 employees35 to be active participants and leaders in all of these issues.

By way of comparison, the Space Security and Defense Program, a joint program of the DoD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was programmed for a similar budget amount in financial year 2015: $32.3 million. That program is described as a “center of excellence for options and strategies (materiel, non-materiel, cross-Title, cross-domain) leading to a more resilient and enduring National Security Space (NSS) Enterprise.”36 A majority of SSDP funding is allocated to the development of offensive space control strategies. So basically, the same budget is allocated for all US global space diplomacy efforts as for an in-house Pentagon think tank to devise counterspace strategies.

Within the Pentagon, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy is charged with all issues related to space policy, including diplomacy. The responsibilities of the Space Policy office are to:

• Develop policy and strategy for a domain that is increasingly congested, competitive, and contested

• Implement across DoD — plans, programs, doctrine, operations — and with the IC and other agencies

• Engage with allies and other space-faring countries in establishing norms and augmenting our capabilities.37

The breadth of those responsibilities, which includes reviewing space acquisitions, means that there may be only a handful of individuals actually engaged in multilateral diplomatic efforts, acting, for example, as advisors to diplomatic discussions such as those through the United Nations. Additionally, the expanse of the Pentagon results in a chain of command that makes organizational competition for attention to subject matter challenging at best. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy reports to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, who then reports to the Principle Deputy Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, who then reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Defense Policy. There are also a multitude of space players in other governmental organizations to coordinate and contend with, particularly within the Air Force and intelligence communities. Personnel are spread thin.

US government-wide space diplomacy needs a mandate, manpower, and a supporting budget. Diplomacy, especially multilateral diplomacy, can be timeconsuming, manpower-intensive, and frustrating; and patience is not a strong American virtue. The recent experience in the UN LTS Working Group is emblematic of everything that causes the United States to shun multilateralism. Under the auspices of this group, countries had worked in good faith over the past five years to develop technical guidelines as reciprocal constraints, as insisted upon by the developing countries when they rejected the ICOC. Yet group success appeared thwarted at the February 2016 meeting of the LTS Working Group by one country, Russia.

#### The JCPOA returns Iran to global oil markets – increased supply and perception solve market volatility

Shokri 3/3 [(Omid, visiting research scholar at the School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and is an analyst at Gulf State Analytics (GSA) who specializes in energy security, author of US Energy Diplomacy in the Caspian Sea Basin: Changing Trends Since 2001) “Can Iranian oil stabilize a volatile market?” Atlantic Council, 3/3/2022] JL

As fuel prices skyrocket following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, another major supplier of oil and natural gas is poised to play an important role.

Before Donald Trump‘s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal and the imposition of sanctions on Iran’s oil exports, Iran produced 3.8 million barrels of oil per day. Afterwards, this dropped as low as 1.9 million barrels and currently it is about 2.4 million barrels. It will take time for the country’s production to return to pre-sanction levels due to this significant drop as well as low levels of investment in recent years. However, Iran’s oil and gas condensate reserves in tankers, as well as onshore oil storage facilities, will help Iran accelerate its exports which currently total more than 1 million barrels per day.  Some sources predict that with the lifting of the sanctions, Iran could ship an additional 500,000 barrels of oil per day to international markets from April to May, and by the end of this year this figure could reach an additional 1.3 million barrels per day.

All of this assumes that current talks in Vienna on reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are successful. Without sanctions relief, any new disruptions in US supplies could boost oil prices beyond $100 a barrel to as high as $150. As reported by GasBuddy**,** the United States is already struggling to cope with its highest level of inflation in four decades. The price of gasoline has risen about $4 a gallon in many parts of the country since the Ukraine crisis began.

Iran has said that it is ready to increase its oil exports significantly if sanctions imposed by the Trump administration are lifted, but it will take time to restore relationships with customers in Europe and Asia. In February, officials from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) traveled to Seoul, the capital of South Korea, to hold talks with several refineries on the prospects for resuming oil deliveries.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) has increased its forecast for demand growth in 2022, stating that global demand for oil will increase by 3.2 million barrels per day this year to a record 100.6 million barrels per day. These forecasts show that there is a market for more oil and that this is an opportunity for producers to increase oil sales and export revenues.

Iran will clearly be a major beneficiary of this increase if it can resolve its problems with the United States over a return to the JCPOA.  Iran is asking the US government to remain committed to the deal in the event of a change of administration in Washington. But this is something that President Joe Biden, or any other US leader, cannot promise. Tehran must decide whether it is worthwhile to reach an agreement that could last only three years.

After the JCPOA went into implementation in 2016, Iran increased its oil production much faster than expected. Most analysts had predicted that Iran would increase its production by 500,000 barrels per day within a year after the lifting of sanctions, but in fact Iran reached this figure in less than four months, and by the end of the year had increased production by nearly one million barrels.

After sanctions were reimposed following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran stored oil in tankers. It is estimated that Iran has stored more than 85 million barrels of oil and gas condensate at sea. These supplies can be exported rapidly if sanctions are lifted.

The elimination of important oil exporting countries from the market has major ripple effects. Other producers often raise prices and pursue their own interests. Even if Iran returns to the market, not all problems of oil and gas will be solved, but an Iranian return can have a major psychological impact in helping the oil market move towards equilibrium. There is also the possibility that Iran can play a role in replacing Russian gas exports to Europe.

#### High oil prices and volatility cause nuclear war

King 8 [(Neil King, Global Economics Editor for the WSJ), Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, September, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\_Working%20Paper\_PeakOil\_King\_Sept2008.pdf] TDI

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.”7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round an d very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.”9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. It’s not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty.

## Case

Form over content – a] their speech-act controls the way that we understand and interpret their framework, b] it shouldn’t matter how correct you are if you engaged in unethical practices along the way, both of these mean that you should evaluate the K as a side-constraint on how we view things like the affirmative framework.

#### No ASAT attacks --- there’s a taboo against debris, and delays in reconstitution prevent large-scale wars which caps the impact

Handberg, 18 – Faculty and Research, School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs, UCF

Roger Handberg, “War and rumours of war, do improvements in space technologies bring space conflict closer?” Defese & Security Analysis. 2018. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14751798.2018.1478181>

Why ASATs have not been used

The reasons why the space sanctuary approach survived intellectual and political attack is the reality that the result would be a graveyard in terms of sustaining any viable operational presence in low Earth orbit and likely out to the orbital arc. Attacking satellites initially involved nuclear warheads, which could be as devastating to the attacker as to the target. EMP effects from nuclear blasts, even if mitigated for national security space assets, meant that civilian electronic systems in the affected areas are likely to be junk. That effectively defeats the justification for the defensive use of ASAT weapons. The idea being that you defeat the enemy and take possession of the resulting open area, either in space, or on the ground.

Alternatively, you reject the use of nuclear weapons because of the after-effects of EMP and radiation depending on the circumstances. Instead, you employ kinetic hit-to-kill (HTK) weapons. The debris fields produced can be extraordinarily large and persistent. The Chinese 2007 ASAT test destroying their aging weather satellite produced one of the largest debris fields ever observed.11 This problem draws much attention, but few remedies exist except establishing international standards calling for de-orbiting satellites if possible, or at the geosynchronous orbit (35,790 km), lifting up out of the orbit into a higher storage orbit. Attacks on orbiting satellites produces much space debris, which only slowly re-enters the atmosphere to burn up on re-entry. For example, Vanguard 1 launched in March 1958 remains in space until the twenty-second century.12

Even more detrimental to any idea of space conflict with its debris issues was the question that became a bigger problem going forward. Whenever a satellite prematurely went out of service, for whatever reason, satellite replacement took time, sometimes multiple years. Replacement was not a particular problem initially when space applications were in their infancy. Terrestrial systems still existed, but as space applications are more integrated into routine military operations; especially when deployed globally, earlier systems either disappear, or are downgraded in importance.

#### Experts agree it’s legitimately zero risk --- the geopolitical climate means nobody would chance attribution

Alver et al, 19 – MA of Int’l Science and Technology Policy (Space Policy) at George Washington

James Alver, Andrew Garza, Christopher May, “An Analysis of the Potential Misuse of Active Debris Removal, On-Orbit

Servicing, and Rendezvous & Proximity Operations Technologies,” Secure World Foundation, May 6, 2019. <https://swfound.org/media/206800/misuse_commercial_adr_oos_jul2019.pdf>

A notable key finding from the survey-driven research effort was the similar response to the quantitative estimation questions. Every expert that was interviewed expressed concerns of the value of trying to capture probability metrics for such unlikely events, with some experts poignantly stating that the international stage would have to shift drastically before it was even worth discussing probability. This is a relevant outlook for the counterargument. The certainty of detection and attribution would make RPO misuse a high-risk venture for any spacefaring nation, and the geopolitical climate is simply not conducive to taking such a risk, nor will it likely be anytime soon. Contemporarily speaking, it would be the equivalent of a country sending a uniformed military officer on a diplomatic mission to another country just to attempt a public assassination. Again, in the face of definitive attribution, an intentional stealth ASAT system is more effective choice.

#### No RPO attacks --- attribution makes miscalculation unlikely

Alver et al, 19 – MA of Int’l Science and Technology Policy (Space Policy) at George Washington

James Alver, Andrew Garza, Christopher May, “An Analysis of the Potential Misuse of Active Debris Removal, On-Orbit

Servicing, and Rendezvous & Proximity Operations Technologies,” Secure World Foundation, May 6, 2019. <https://swfound.org/media/206800/misuse_commercial_adr_oos_jul2019.pdf>

The counterargument to misuse concerns, and the unanimous position of the experts interviewed, is that when these systems go operational, there will be enough mitigating factors in place to make the misuse of ADR/OOS/RPO technology a terminally unattractive option for ASAT attacks. Firstly, any hostile actor that aims to misuse these services will find it nearly impossible to avoid attribution. Satellite systems, especially the non-stealth systems that ADR/OOS/RPO would be, are observable and trackable from launch. If a spacecraft attempts to deviate from its original target, it would be immediately clear to the new target’s operator where the servicer came from, when it will intercept, and more critically, who owns it. Additionally, the attribution mitigation factor would likely be stronger in a future when these RPO systems are commonplace, as SSA data will then be more refined, more accurate, and more widely used, being built into the monitoring and verification processes of behavioral norm enforcement.

#### Doesn’t solve advantage 2 – no reverse

#### No preemption or escalation

Christopher J. Fettweis 19. Associate professor of political science at Tulane University in New Orleans. 2019. “Pessimism and Nostalgia in the Second Nuclear Age.” Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 12–41. JSTOR.

Preventive War

How much credit can prevention take for these negative proliferation trends? The only unambiguously preventive war of the second nuclear age—the 2003 invasion of Iraq—had nothing to do with nuclear weapons, even if it was occasionally (and disingenuously) sold that way. “We know he [Saddam Hussein] has been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons,” Vice President Dick Cheney said on Meet the Press four days before the tanks rolled. “And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons.”49 It is unclear who the vice president meant by “we,” because no one in the US government or security community thought that Iraq had “reconstituted” nuclear weapons in March 2003.50 Erroneous beliefs regarding other weapons of mass destruction were among the reasons for the war, but it was not the kind of preventive strike on a nuclear program foreseen by SNA theorists.

Iran was not the only rogue state to abandon its nuclear program without a fight. At times de-nuclearization occurred by choice, as with South Africa and Libya, while at other times nonproliferation was thrust upon states, as was the case with the inchoate Syrian program. Colonel Mu‘ammar Gadhafi’s motivation for his decision to shut down his WMD programs has been the subject of ferocious and heavily partisan debate. At issue is the extent to which the war in Iraq affected his calculations: Was Gadhafi concerned about being the next target of US counterproliferation, or was his decision a reflection of a broader effort to remove his government from the list of international pariahs? Supporters of the Bush administration posit a direct connection between the war and Gadhafi’s sudden change of heart. Negotiations with him had begun some years earlier under the Clinton administration, however, leading a number of observers to conclude that Libya would have abandoned its program regardless of what happened in Iraq.51 More recent work on the issue suggests that fear of being next on the US target list did affect Gadhafi’s thinking and can at the very least account for the timing of his offer to disarm.52 “Disarm” is probably not the right word, however, since Libya had nowhere near the requisite state capacity to build a bomb, and Gadhafi probably knew it. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors found centrifuges and other crucial materials in their original packing crates, where they had apparently been for years.53 Libya may have announced it would not be joining the nuclear club following the invasion of Iraq, but that was likely a conclusion it had reached some time before. For these purposes, it is sufficient to note that Libya abandoned its program for the foreseeable future. Diplomacy worked, the nonproliferation regime held, and the rogue-state list shrank by one member.54

While it cannot yet be said that the 2007 Israeli airstrikes on a reactor construction site permanently removed the possibility of a Syrian nuclear weapon, the program has not restarted since the attack. Threeand-a-half years passed between those strikes and the current civil war, during which Assad presumably had plenty of time to re-establish his reactors, should he have desired to do so. Instead it appears that his government abandoned its efforts, which had not progressed very far anyway.55 American intelligence had never been confident about Syria’s desire to build nuclear weapons in the first place, in large part because additional facilities required for such an effort were not under construction.56

Overall, while prevention occurred in the second nuclear age, its pace is not increasing.57 Israel, for example, struck facilities of its Arab neighbors during the first nuclear age as often as in the second. Nonproliferation in the Middle East has come in different forms in the unipolar era, from high-level diplomacy to air strikes. But the outcomes have been roughly the same, and nightmares of a region in a “nuclear context,” or a gallery of nuclear-armed rogues, have not come to pass.

#### China and Russia will cheat and get a head start on space dominance --- game theory proves

Chanock, 13

Alexander Chanock, J.D. 2014, UCLA School of Law, “THE PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS RELATED TO THE EMERGENCE OF SPACE WEAPONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY,” Journal of Air, Law, and Commerce. Volume 78, Issue 3. 2013. <https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1327&context=jalc>

Although space doves have many valid arguments for reducing the danger of space weaponization, in reality, it is unlikely that their ideas will prevail. One problem with a complete ban on space weaponization is that it invokes the problems of the prisoners' dilemma.116 If the United States decides to stop production of space weapons and the other superpowers, such as China and Russia, do the same, then all of the parties win. However, if a country like China or Russia decides to violate a prohibition agreement by developing weapons, it could potentially have a significant head start in the space weapons race, which would weaken the United States' military ability. Whether such a scenario will occur is difficult to predict, but the principles of the prisoners' dilemma indicate that there remains a strong possibility that the parties will secretly develop the weapons to gain an advantage. The incentive to "defect" will always remain, which makes a long-term solution addressing space weaponization almost impossible to achieve, even if the United States spearheads the effort."' Thus, there is a strong argument against space doves that the most rational choice is to develop space weapons to ensure that the United States gets placed in an advantageous position in the prisoners' dilemma.

#### Space norms fail---countries overwhelmingly follow their own interests

Steve Lambakis 17, Director of Space Studies at the National Institute for Public Policy, PhD in IR and military strategy, “Foreign Space Capabilities: Implications for U.S. National Security,” September 2017, http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Foreign-Space-Capabilities-pub-2017.pdf

There is significant discussion in official circles today about bolstering behavioral norms in space. But to whose “norms” will nations adhere? As the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space, Doug Loverro put it, “we don’t want people shooting at satellites, we don’t believe that’s a good thing for mankind.”280 It has also been said that the establishment of norms “serves as a reminder that any battle for control over the use of space to support military operations begins well before forces begin to mobilize on Earth.”281

We cannot assume, however, that the norms which other states adopt will be those norms we deem appropriate to ensure peaceful actions and safe behavior in space. The last decade is replete with examples of other countries, some of which are potential adversaries of the United States, practicing direct ascent ASAT maneuvers; one of these was destructive, demonstrating co-orbital ASAT operations, and practicing reversible interference through jamming of radio signals or dazzling infrared sensors. The norm of self-serving behavior that advances national goals is the norm that has been most obvious in international relations for centuries. And, this norm has been reflected in space over the past 10 years. Are efforts to create benign “rules of the road” likely to replace this norm? While possible in principle, it seems extremely unlikely, and would be highly imprudent to assume as a basis for defense planning.

Another norm that characterizes the current age and should inform our thinking about space is invasion of sovereign nations. In February 2014, Russia’s president Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, starting with the annexation of Crimea (part of Ukraine). Since the invasion, more than 10,000 Ukrainians have been killed. This has happened despite international norms, treaties, and agreements that condemn such aggressive behavior and consider it to be politically shameful; indeed, international agreements and shaming speeches have been entirely ineffectual. The Ukrainians either did not consider that such a transgression could occur, or believed that the world would rally to their side to push back the invasion. Neither belief, of course, was based in reality. All that matters today are the facts on the ground—i.e., the nature of the regimes confronting us and the strategies they are pursuing.

There are broad national security implications of not having access to space. On land, at sea, and in the air, the United States customarily strives for peaceful, safe, and responsible behavior to avoid accidents, ensure international tensions do not flare up, and essentially collaborate with other states to ensure a stable, predictable environment—but it does so armed all the same, prepared to defend interests in each of those environments. Why? Because history is replete with violations of broken conventions and international agreements, and because peace does not last.

#### No miscalc now---space deterrence is stable

Pellerin 17 – independent science writer for broadcast and print. Her work appears regularly on the Discovery Channel and The Learning Channel

Cheryl, 1/26. “Hyten: Deterrence in Space Means No War Will be Fought There.” <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/1061833/hyten-deterrence-in-space-means-no-war-will-be-fought-there/>

--deterrence stable now – we have guaranteed attribution and know whats happening

--GSSAP sees everything and relays it publicly + space enterprise relays ssa directly to military

--means no risk – prefer ev from commander of stratcom

Space capabilities have created a revolution in military affairs, an environment in which information is key to the battlespace and deterrence means war will never be fought in space, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command said this week at Stanford University in California.

Air Force Gen. John E. Hyten spoke at the university’s Center for Security and Cooperation on Stratcom’s perspectives on 21st century deterrence in space. In the audience were Stanford faculty, postgraduate national security students, grad students and some undergrads, and retired government policymakers and national laboratory scientists.

Hyten was nominated for reassignment to head Stratcom in September 2016. He commanded Air Force Space Command from 2014 to 2016.

“I have two jobs as commander of Strategic Command,” he said.

Job No. 1 is defending America against all threats, Hyten explained, and job No. 2 is defending and protecting the space environment so space is available for exploration to every generation in every nation.

The space domain is critical to every military operation, the general said, noting that everything from humanitarian to major combat operations critically depend on space capabilities.

21st Century Deterrence

Hyten said the most important element of space is geosynchronous orbit, a circular orbit 22,300 miles above the planet where satellites appear to be stationary above the surface of the earth. British science fiction writer, futurist and inventor Arthur C. Clark mathematically determined the orbit in 1947, the general said.

The orbit, also called GEO, is important for communications, television and radio satellites and for critical military satellites, Hyten said.

“That’s where we do our special communications, from national command-and-control communications [to] … our nuclear business,” he added. “If somebody wants to threaten that and if they do something to geosynchronous orbit because of where that orbit is, the debris that's created will be there forever.”

Preventing potential aggression in space requires deterrence, Hyten said.

“We have to deter bad behavior in space and we have to deter conflict in space,” he added, especially against adversaries like China and Russia that are building weapons in low earth orbit and in GEO that will deploy from the ground to these areas of space.

As Stratcom commander, Hyten said, “that means I have to figure out with the 184,000 people who work under Strategic Command how we defend the nation against that kind of threat and how I deter that conflict from ever happening.”

China, Russia and Space Weapons

Hyten said China has stated publicly that its goal is to use space only for peaceful purposes.

China also has been a vocal supporter of the United Nation’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, he added, “and at the same time they're the most aggressive nation in the world, building weapons that will challenge the United States in space in the future.”

The Chinese government tested its low earth orbit capability in 2007, the general said, “and ... they continue to test that capability today … at multiple orbital regimes.”

He added, “In the not-too-distant future, they will be able to use that capability to threaten every spacecraft we have in space. We have to prevent that, and the best way to prevent war is to be prepared for war. So the United States is going to do that, and we're going to make sure that everybody knows we're prepared for war.”

Russia, which has had an anti-satellite capability since the 1980s, now is exploring significant anti-satellite capabilities, including lasers for use in space and other “capabilities that would threaten our satellites, and many of which would create debris” that could hinder access to space, Hyten said.

Space Enterprise

To make sure war never happens in space, the general said, the United States has been working since after the first Gulf War in 1990-1991 to bolster and build new space capabilities.

“In February three years ago we announced the existence of a program called the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program -- GSSAP,” Hyten said, adding that the Air Force has four satellites in GEO now that are “basically a neighborhood watch program for everything that goes on in that high-value orbit.”

The Air Force made the formerly classified program public because it wanted the world to know that nothing could be done in GEO that would catch the United States by surprise, he said.

The Air Force also began a series or war games at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado, where players explore “what conflict would look like if it extends into space someday and how we would fight it,” Hyten said.

And they developed something called the Space Enterprise Vision.

This, according to a 2016 Air Force Space Command news release, is an integrated approach across all space mission areas, coupling the delivery of space mission effects to the warfighter -- including communications, positioning, navigation and timing, missile warning and weather data -- with the ability to protect and defend space capabilities against emerging threats.

Building Capability

In October 2015, Stratcom launched the Joint Interagency Combined Space Operations Center, or JICSpOC, a collaboration among Stratcom, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Air Force Space Command, the Air Force Research Laboratory, the intelligence community and commercial data providers, after Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work announced its development at a National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency conference in June, said Stratcom spokesman Army Lt. Col. Martin O’Donnell.

Hyten said JICSpOC is a place “where we experiment on war that extends into space so we understand what that is.”

There was no commercial industry to speak of when the Air Force started building its current architectures in the 1990s in response to the first Gulf War, the general said, but now there’s a huge commercial enterprise with companies that maintain their own satellite constellations and provide services such as space launch, satellite imagery and more.

“All those things are out there right now, and a lot of folks in the military think it doesn’t pertain to us,” Hyten said. “But it pertains to us in two ways. No. 1, it creates an economic environment that the U.S. military will have to defend at some point, and it creates an opportunity for us to take advantage of a commercial sector ... to do the missions that we have to do.”

#### Space capabilities provide early warning systems and means of building trust---solves miscalc

Yoo and Rabkin, 17 – Yoo is the Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley. Rabkin is a professor of law at Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, specializing in international law

John Yoo and Jeremy Rabkin, “Chapter 7: Coercion in Space,” in “Striking Power: How Cyber, Robots, and Space Weapons Change the Rules for War,”. Encounter Books. 2017

--Satellites needed for early warning – creates strategic stability and avoids use or lose

--Can use it to detect compliance for arms control agreements – that improves dialogue and trust

These capabilities have military roles too. Strategists divide military space missions into four areas. First is space support, which refers to the launching of missiles and satellites and the management of satellites in orbit. The second is force enhancement, which seeks to improve the effectiveness of terrestrial military operations. These missions include the use of space for passive surveillance and support of terrestrial operations, both military and civilian. Indeed, the very first satellites performed a critical surveillance role in the strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.