## 1

#### Our Interpretation is the affirmative should defend the desirability of the hypothetical enactment of a resolution.

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Violation: They simply don’t.

#### Vote neg –

#### Non-topicality explodes limits by expanding the number of affs beyond the resolution – negatives cannot possibly prepare against every literature base which makes it functionally impossible to negate. Non-topicality also justifies affs defending non controversially true statements like “racism bad” which eviscerates neg ground and clash – Only the process of negation distinguishes debate and discussion by necessitating iterative testing and effective engagement, but an absence of constant refinement dooms revolutionary potential.

#### The impact is movements:

#### Negation over the course of a season creates the best form of movement building which is key – movement organizing skilled organization, strategic flexibility, effective management, and proto-institutionalism.

Heller 17 [Nathan Heller began contributing to The New Yorker in 2011, and joined the magazine as a staff writer in 2013. He has written on a range of subjects, including online education and the TED Conference. He is also a film and television critic, and a contributing editor, at Vogue. Previously, he was a columnist for Slate, where he was a finalist for a National Magazine Award for essays and criticism. Is There Any Point to Protesting? August 21, 2017. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/21/is-there-any-point-to-protesting]

Tufekci’s conclusions about the civil-rights movement are unsettling because of what they imply. People such as Kauffman portray direct democracy as a scrappy, passionate enterprise: the underrepresented, the oppressed, and the dissatisfied get together and, strengthened by numbers, force change. Tufekci suggests that the movements that succeed are actually proto-institutional: highly organized; strategically flexible, due to sinewy management structures; and chummy with the sorts of people we now call élites. The Montgomery N.A.A.C.P. worked with Clifford Durr, a patrician lawyer whom Franklin Roosevelt had appointed to the F.C.C., and whose brother-in-law Hugo Black was a Supreme Court Justice when Browder v. Gayle was heard. The organizers of the March on Washington turned to Bobby Kennedy—the U.S. Attorney General and the brother of the sitting President—when Rustin’s prized sound system was sabotaged the day before the protest. Kennedy enlisted the Army Signal Corps to fix it. You can’t get much cozier with the Man than that. Far from speaking truth to power, successful protests seem to speak truth through power. (The principle holds for such successful post-sixties movements as ACT UP, with its structure of caucuses and expert working groups. And it forces one to reassess the rise of well-funded “Astroturf” movements such as the Tea Party: successful grassroots lawns, it turns out, have a bit of plastic in them, too.) Democratizing technology may now give the voiceless a means to cry in the streets, but real results come to those with the same old privileges—time, money, infrastructure, an ability to call in favors—that shape mainline politics. Unsurprisingly, this realization irks the Jacobins. Hardt and Negri, as well as Srnicek and Williams, rail at length against “neoliberalism”: a fashionable bugaboo on the left, and thus, unfortunately, a term more often flaunted than defined. (Neoliberalism can broadly refer to any program that involves market-liberal policies—privatization, deregulation, etc.—and so includes everything from Thatcher’s social-expenditure reductions to Obama’s global-trade policies. A moratorium on its use would help solidify a lot of gaseous debate.) According to them, neoliberalism lurks everywhere that power resides, beckoning friendly passersby into its drippy gingerbread house. Hardt and Negri dismiss “participating in government, respecting capitalist discipline, and creating structures for labor and business to collaborate,” because, they say, “reformism in this form has proven to be impossible and the social benefits it promises are an illusion.” They favor antagonistic pressure, leading to a revolution with no central authority (a plan perhaps more promising in theory than in practice). Srnicek and Williams don’t reject working with politicians, though they think that real transformation comes from shifts in social expectation, in school curricula, and in the sorts of things that reasonable people discuss on TV (the so-called Overton window). It’s an ambitious approach but not an outlandish one: Bernie Sanders ran a popular campaign, and suddenly socialist projects were on the prime-time docket. Change does arrive through mainstream power, but this just means that your movement should be threaded through the culture’s institutional eye. The question, then, is what protest is for. Srnicek and Williams, even after all their criticism, aren’t ready to let it go—they describe it as “necessary but insufficient.” Yet they strain to say just how it fits with the idea of class struggle in a postindustrial, smartphone-linked world. “If there is no workplace to disrupt, what can be done?” they wonder. Possibly their telescope is pointing the wrong way round. Much of their book attempts to match the challenges of current life—a shrinking manufacturing sphere, a global labor surplus, a mire of race-inflected socioeconomic traps—with Marx’s quite specific precepts about the nineteenth-century European economy. They define the proletariat as “that group of people who must sell their labor powers to live.” It must be noted that this group—now comprising Olive Garden waiters, coders based in Bangalore, janitors, YouTube stars, twenty-two-year-olds at Goldman Sachs—is really very broad. A truly modern left, one cannot help but think, would be at liberty to shed a manufacturing-era, deterministic framework like Marxism, allegorized and hyperextended far beyond its time. Still, to date no better paradigm for labor economics and uprising has emerged. What comes undone here is the dream of protest as an expression of personal politics. Those of us whose days are filled with chores and meetings may be deluding ourselves to think that we can rise as “revolutionaries-for-a-weekend”—Norman Mailer’s phrase for his own bizarre foray, in 1967, as described in “The Armies of the Night.” Yet that’s not to say the twenty-four-year-old who quits his job and sleeps in a tent to affirm his commitment does more. The recent studies make it clear that protest results don’t follow the laws of life: eighty per cent isn’t just showing up. Instead, logistics reign and then constrain. Outcomes rely on how you coördinate your efforts, and on the skill with which you use existing influence as help. If that seems a deflating idea, it only goes to show how entrenched self-expressive protest has become in political identity. In one survey, half of Occupy Wall Street allies turned out to be fully employed: even that putatively radical economic movement was largely middle class. (Also, as many noted, it was largely white.) That may be because even the privileged echelons of working America are mad as hell and won’t take it anymore. But it may also be because the social threshold for protest-joining is low. A running joke in “The Armies of the Night” is that many of the people who went off to demonstrate were affluent egghead types—unsure, self-obsessed, squeamish, and, in many ways, pretty conservative. “There was an air of Ivy League intimacy to the quiet conversations on this walk—it could not really be called a March,” Mailer says. Writing of himself: “He found a friendly face. It was Gordon Rogoff, an old friend from Actors Studio, now teaching at the Yale Drama School; they talked idly about theatrical matters for a while.” This has been the cultural expectation since the late sixties, even as tactical protest has left mainstream power behind. As citizens, we get two chips—one for the ballot box, the other for the soapbox. Many of us feel compelled to make use of them both. Would casual activists be better off deploying their best skills toward change (teachers teaching, coders coding, celebrities celebritizing) and leaving direct action in the hands of organizational pros? That seems sad, and a good recipe for lax, unchecked, uncoördinated effort. Should they work indirectly—writing letters, calling senators, and politely nagging congresspeople on Twitter? That involves no cool attire or clever signs, and no friends who’ll cheer at every turn. But there’s reason to believe that it works, because even bad legislators pander to their electorates. In a new book, “The Once and Future Liberal” (Harper), Mark Lilla urges a turn back toward governmental process. “The role of social movements in American history, while important, has been seriously inflated by left-leaning activists and historians,” he writes. “The age of movement politics is over, at least for now. We need no more marchers. We need more mayors.” Folk politics, tracing a fifty-year anti-establishmentarian trend, flatters a certain idea of heroism: the system, we think, must be fought by authentic people. Yet that outlook is so widely held now that it occupies the highest offices of government. Maybe, in the end, the system is the powerless person’s best bet. Or maybe direct action is something to value independent of its results. No specific demands were made at the Women’s March, in January. The protest produced no concrete outcomes, and it held no legislators to account. And yet the march, which encompassed millions of people on every continent, including Antarctica, cannot be called a failure. At a time when identity is presumed to be clannish and insular, it offered solidarity on a vast scale. What was the Women’s March about? Empowerment, human rights, discontent—you know. Why did it matter? Because we were there. Self-government remains a messy, fussy, slow, frustrating business. We do well to remind those working its gears and levers that the public—not just the appalled me but the conjoined us whom the elected serve—is watching and aware. More than two centuries after our country took its shaky first steps, the union is miles from perfection. But it is still on its feet, sometimes striding, frequently stumbling. The march goes on, and someday, not just in our dreams, we’ll make it home.

#### TVA –

#### 1] Make the Black twitter counterplan into an aff

#### 2] Misinformation aff since media bubbles create racism

#### 3] Defend the black press as an actor that implements the aff 4] Their objectivity card is horrible – literally shows a misapplication of objectivity and the need for more objectivity within journalism

#### The TVA is terminal defense – proves compatibility of our Models AND Solvency Deficits proves ground for engagement.

#### SSD solves – it preaches self-reflexive ideologies that are key to check back dogmatism – arbitrarily bracketing off topics of discussion creates a groupthink mentality that dooms Social Movements.

#### Fairness:

#### 1] It’s a constitutive process of debate since debate is a game with a winner and loser, speech times, and flipping 30 min before the round – Constitutive Rules means any DA to our interpretation are inevitable and terminally non-unique

#### 2] Self Defeating- All the 1ar's arguments assume that the judge will evaluate them fairly which concedes it's authority – actively hack against them

#### 3] Ballot proximity – the ballot can’t solve their offense or actualize their method since arguments we read have no effect on our subjectivity, but voting negative can set good norms.

#### 4] Deliberation – Every discussion of an liberation strategy assumes an level playing field with the ability to contribute to the discussion

#### 5] Misses the boat – Their impact turns shows a misapplication of fairness not a reason why the very structure of it is bad.

#### 6] Fair Testing – since I can’t answer the aff you should assume their arguments are presumptively false – we can only come to conclusions about the world via rigorous testing of them

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention which turns anti-blackness

## 2

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on the 2021-22 NDCA LD wiki using open source or cites after the round in which they read them.

#### Violation –A screenshot of a computer Description automatically generated

#### Vote neg –

#### Prep skew and clash – leads to infinite unpredictable affirmatives that skirt clash and beat negatives that are underprepared – disclosing allows for nuanced researched objections to affs which fosters in depth debates that control the internal link to their advocacy. Uniqueness should frame disclosure – your affirmative is still being read in a public forum which answers fugitivity, so the only difference is whether the negative is able to effectively clash with your arguments. Could’ve asked doesn’t solve norming offense and still skews prep since we have to sort through 20 docs.

#### No 1ar voting issues – causes intervention since there are inevitable new 2ar responses to 2n answers and the judge has to draw the line.

## 3

#### We advocate the 1AC without their call for the ballot. To clarify, this is a PIC out of their demand to “take this round hostage” and “blacken the debate space”.

#### 1] Calls to “blacken debate” creates a parasitic and de-radicalized relationship to white recognition that turns case.

Curry 13 Tommy Curry 2013, Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, “Dr. Tommy Curry on the importance of debate for blacks,” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMmkPhvDK2E#t=174> //Re-cut by Elmer

However, with the lure of progress, more black people are participating in debate, more black judges, more conceptual debates about blackness. There comes a deradicalization of what black theory and what black people are supposed to do and represent. Despite our pretense, debate is still a very privileged world. It’s a pretend world where black people can have their queerness, their feebleness, their faux radicality recognized. For actual oppressed people, people who can’t afford debate, who have no knowledge of debate, who fight against actual mechanisms of state, who are not recognized, these very same qualities mean death. So in debate rounds we get to act, we’re the conduits of this black suffering. The demographic increase in the black population in debate, however, it’s kind of brought about a new morality that’s committed to fighting for inclusion, intellectual space, our expanded ideas of home. But in this I think we miss the extent of our dependency on white recognition. That white judge in the back of the room that’s comprehending and assimilating our goals with their own liberal and progressive existence. In other words, it’s through our appeal to white men and women, our need for their recognition, for their ballot, that frames the ultimate message of our pessimism, our gender critiques, our colonial analysis. We’re fundamentally dependent on how the white mind situates itself conceptually to the project of diversification. We appeal to their sympathy, or worse yet, to the intersectional empathies of whites as the gauge of the transformative potentialities of black theory and historic black thought. So in these spaces real radicality does not come from an appeal to white recognition, but the rejection of it. In the declaration that black knowledge or black theory or black accounts of existence in all of the economic and sexual plurality of our thought is the radicality comes from the idea that we think that those questions can be answered in the annals of how black people have historically thought about themselves. It need not depend on our alliances or allegiances with white liberals rationalizing their own existence as justifiable through their endorsement or alliances with what we think about ourselves or black people’s situation in the world. Black debate should ultimately move to the rejection of white education – adjudication if black theory is about the liberation of black people and a move to definitions of knowledge or cells or concepts that don’t currently exist then how can we expect the dilapidated ideas of white sentimentality projected from an archaic and racialized whiteness to understand or even comprehend the interrelatedness of propositions that are beyond their present being. How they understand something that is beyond their very own existence the true radicality of black people debating points to the negation of white comprehension of black ideas of liberation not their assimilation or recognition of them. So these ideas of us saying we have progressed fundamentally rooted in how white people see us is a problem.

#### Outweighs under the Refusal RoTB – we’re a refusal of white recognition that separates resistance from liberal allyship.

#### This proves the Aff is a double-turn – their claims of “inclusion” are a double-turn w/ the totalizing refusal of problematic spaces such as Debate.

#### 2] Competition corrupts the affirmative –

#### A] Debate requires negation and researching answers which is counterproductive compared to participating in the movements that the aff wants to occur.

#### B] Endorsing the affirmative through a ballot ties ballots to success which makes debaters internalize wins and losses as technical skills instead of the desirability of their solution.

## 4

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement –

#### A~ ROBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem.

#### B~ The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true so it's constitutive and jurisdictional. I denied the truth of the resolution by disagreeing with the aff which means I've met my burden.

#### C~ Nothing leaves this round other than the result on the ballot which means even if there is a higher purpose, it doesn’t change anything, and you should just write whatever is important on the ballot and vote for me.

#### Ethics begin apriori –

#### Is/Ought Gap – we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. It’s impossible to derive an ought statement from descriptive facts about the world, necessitating a priori premises.

#### Practical Reason is that procedure. To ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary. That hijacks their framework since you need reason to evaluate any relevant consequences.

#### Prefer –

#### Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

#### Put away your generic Kant indicts – our framework is a rejection of the western foundations of Kantianism in favor of a radical reconstruction of inclusion of the racialized and marginalized struggle.

**Mills 18** Charles W. Mills. “Black Radical Kantianism.” Res Philosophica, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 1–33 https:// doi.org/ 10.11612/ resphil.1622 SJCP//JG

Far from being monolithic, however, it should be regarded as a general category extending over many different variants. Depending on the respec- tive diagnoses offered of the dynamic of these regimes, and the correspond- ing prescriptions for their overturning or reform, one can derive varieties of black liberalism, black Marxism, black nationalism, black feminism, and even black conservatism (Dawson 2001). My own project in recent years has become the articulation of a “black radical liberalism” that draws on what are standardly judged to be the “radical” strains of Afro-modern thought—black Marxism, black nationalism, and black feminism—while incorporating their key insights into a modified and radicalized liberal framework (Mills 2017a, epilogue). And a “black radical Kantianism” is supposed to be a key element of this proposed synthesis, though not in the sense of documenting the actual uptake of Kant by black radical theorists (unlike their actual reading of Marx), but in the sense of demonstrating how classic themes in this literature can illuminatingly be translated into a Kantian discourse reshaped by the realities of racial subordination. So the agenda is both descriptive and prescriptive, looking at the fortunes of “personhood” as a general liberal category under illiberal circumstances, and suggesting a “Kantian” reconstruction as a de-ghettoizing approach for bringing together these segregated conversations. Why Kant, though? To begin with, there is the strategic argument from Kant’s rise to centrality in contemporary Western normative theory over the last half-century. With the demise or at least considerable diminution in significance of the utilitarian liberalism (Jeremy Bentham, James and John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick) that was hegemonic from the early 1800s to the mid-twentieth century, it is deontological/contractarian liberalism that is now most influential, whether in analytic Anglo-American political theory or Continental critical theory. Immanuel Kant is now regarded not merely as the most important ethicist of modernity, but as one of its most significant normative political theorists also.1 So a racially informed engagement with this body of discourse would have the virtues of being in dialogue with what is now the central strand in Western ethico-political theory: Afro-modern political thought in conversation with Euro-modern political thought. But second, in addition to these strategic considerations (and perhaps more importantly), the key principles and ideals of Kant’s ethico-political thought are, once deracialized, very attractive: the respect for the rights of individual persons, the ideal of the Rechtsstaat (admittedly somewhat modified from Kant’s own version), and the vision of a global cosmopolitan order of equals. The problem, in my opinion, has been less Kant’s own racism (since it is simply bracketed by most contemporary Kantians)2 than the failure to rethink these principles and ideals in the light of a modernity structured by racial domination. And that brings me to the third point. In contrast with, say, a dialogue between European and Asian political traditions, which at least for long periods of time developed largely separately from one another, the Euro-modern and the Afro-modern traditions are intimately and dialectically linked. As emphasized at the start, the latter develops in specific contestation of the former, involving both resistance to and rejection of its crucial tenets insofar as they rational- ize and justify Euro-domination, while nonetheless sometimes seeking to appropriate and modify others for emancipatory ends (Bogues 2003). So de- veloping a “black radical Kantianism” as a self-conscious enterprise should be not merely instrumentally and intrinsically valuable, but illuminative of a counter-hegemonic normative system already present in Afro-modern thought, if not self-denominatedly “Kantian,” formed in opposition to a white domination predicated on the denial of equal personhood to blacks.

#### Negate:

#### Not defending the topic is non-universalizable b/c if nobody defended the topic than a topic wouldn’t have even been created in the first place which is a contradiction in conception. That outweighs – their indicts are reliant on empiricism but that relies on some conception of coherence which the contradiction in conception denies.

## Case

#### Neuroscience – racial bias is flexible and no libidinal econ

-it would be easy to see racial history of US and conclude antiblackness is permanently fixed---this is inaccurate

-self-categorization and coalition identification more important than perception of outgrou

-coalitional affiliation trumps racial affiliation---political parties and mixed-race teams prove

-stereotypes can be tempered with additional information

-centering group interaction around a common goal breaks down bias

-where we can’t create common identity, we can break down barriers

-ultimately, only institutional change and collection action can change systemic racism

Cikara and Van Bavel 15. (Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems. June 2, 2015. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/>)

The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of Freddie Gray, a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On April 4th, Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On March 8th, Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N\*\*\*\*\* In SAE.” On March 1st, a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including hiring, sentencing, housing, and even mortgage lending. It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups. There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions. Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves. Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions. Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.) Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them. Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances. The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices. Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions. Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers. Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them. A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress – our progress – would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better." The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism. The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology**.** Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.

#### Debate and the Communication they critique are fundamentally distinct – Other brady evidence is also about the black people winning championship argument that we did not read and also proves our competition argument on the counterplan

Greer 18, G. H. "Who Needs the Undercommons? Refuge and Resistance in Public High Schools." Brock Education: A Journal of Educational Research and Practice 28.1 (2018): 5-18. (PhD candidate in Art Education at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. Their research focus is inclusion as transformation in public education systems and arts education.)//Elmer

The two pertinent qualities of this quotation are: first, it may enable or disable multiple messages; and second, the content of these messages is directly related to the lived experience of the reader. Word play is used like the map **hidden in a freedom song**. You have to know where it is going in order to read how to get there, and the readers’ relationship to emancipation determines the interpretation. Clarification is unnecessary and in fact undesirable. To use plain language would be to invite guards to a jailbreak. Giroux (1992) explores a similar line of thinking in relation to languages of academic complexity by stating “that the call for clarity suppresses difference and multiplicity” (p. 220). In an education context, similarly, polyvocal communication occurs among students in the form of **slang language, styles of dress, locations of congregation, and body language**. Such signs are only partially visible, if at all, to teachers. A cryptic phrase between students may affirm friendship as an inside joke or be part of a campaign of harassment. The effects of these communications may be apparent to educators while precise meanings remain mysterious. Entrances to the undercommons are enabled by this kind of intertextuality, distinguishing the in-group from outsiders on the basis of reference comprehension. In terms of the lived experiences of those who compose the undercommons, both in and outside of educational contexts, they are outsiders. Art education scholar David Pariser (2009) refers to “a device for distinguishing one in-group member from another” (p. 4) as a shibboleth, a term with biblical origins. A shibboleth marks individuals included in a group, while the undercommons is a kind of anti-shibboleth: distinguishing those who have been excluded. **The undercommons is formed when these excluded individuals engage each other in the social activity that Harney and Moten (2013) describe as study**. Study Study according to The Undercommons is the spontaneous sociality of lived experience: “study is already going on, including when you walk into a classroom and before you think you start a class, by the way” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 112). Reserves of compassion, willingness to risk, capacity for expression, engagement with culture, and accented voices, all emerge from this kind of study. I have yet to encounter a completely analogous concept in the field of education, however some similarity to study in the undercommons may be found in non-hierarchical modes of learning such as informal learning defined by Livingstone (2006); the pedagogy of Rancière’s Ignorant Schoolmaster (1991); and Freire’s (2005) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Like informal learning study may include: “any activity involving the pursuit of understanding, knowledge, or skill that occurs without the presence of externally imposed curricular criteria” (Livingstone, 2006, p. 206). Harney and Moten might also agree with Rancière’s (1991) statement that frames explanation as a way of subjugating learners: “the child who is explained to will devote his intelligence to the work of grieving: to understanding, that is to say, to understanding that he doesn’t understand unless he is explained to” (p. 8). Unlike these approaches, however, study in the undercommons is not necessarily intentional and is always social. Freire’s pedagogy of the oppressed is most similar to study in the undercommons because of its social nature and standpoint outside of power. However, there is a nuanced distinction: Freire’s pedagogy is intentional and emancipatory, while study in the undercommons is commonplace and unpredictable. Freire’s approach may be categorized more appropriately as a component of planning, which is discussed below. Social justice educators familiar with the concept of prior learning or knowledge may see similarities between acknowledging study in the undercommons and considering learners’ “multiple social identities, interests, expectations, needs, prior experiences, lived realities, and learning preferences” (Adams, Bell, Goodman, & Joshi, 2016, p. 57). The important difference between prior learning and study is that the former works in service of present classroom instruction, while study is its own outcome. In the undercommons, Harney and Moten (2013) state that: ... [**S]tudy is what you do with other people**. It’s talking and walking around with other people, working, dancing, suffering, some irreducible convergence of all three, held under the name of speculative practice… The point of calling it ‘study’ is to mark that the incessant and irreversible intellectuality of these activities is already present. (p. 110) The use of the word study radically democratizes the idea of learning; it is a challenge to perceptions of curricular education as a monopoly of knowing.

#### Communication Theory of Power is wrong – it’s possible – white hyper-reality is a spectrum, not an antagonism

King-Watts 15, Eric. "Critical cosmopolitanism, antagonism, and social suffering." Quarterly Journal of Speech 101.1 (2015): 271-279. (B.A. and M.A., University of Cincinnati. PhD., Northwestern University)//Elmer

I have been asked by more than one graduate student at more than one university how I hope to reconcile the claims of Afro-Pessimism with my insistence that voice is a fundamental human capacity. I maintain, more or less consistently, that voice is a public occurrence animated by the acknowledgment of the ethical and affective dimensions of speech.16 The repetition of the inquiry is energized by the fact and mode of Afro-Pessimism being taken up in debate and argument organizations, programs, and competitions. I am not going to attempt to complete this reconciliation in this space, in part because I have not quite accomplished it. But I do have to briefly sketch out the terms of the challenge in order to try to evaluate the strengths and limits of critical cosmopolitanism as an academic practice that would ask “why and how” Communication Studies might interact with the Afro-Pessimistic enclave in Black Studies. While criticizing the work of Black film theory, Frank Wilderson embarks upon an ambitious and provocative campaign meant to foster an understanding of the conditions of impossibility for Black subjectivity within the contemporary ontological paradigm. The term “Afro-Pessimism” signals the work of scholars who are “theorists of structural positionality.”17 As such, Blackness and Whiteness18 are interrogated as emerging through a conjuncture with brutal modern technologies of organization and domination, and the birth of the very idea of race. Put simply, it took the modern invention of slavery and colonialism to bring about the racial ideologies that make Blackness and Whiteness intelligible. The Slave/Black, then, should not be considered exploited labor or simply oppressed. “Rather, the gratuitous violence of the Black's first ontological instance, the Middle Passage, ‘wiped out [his or her] metaphysics … his or her customs and sources on which they are based.’”19 The Black occupies a coordinate that marks a fundamental structural antagonism with the West, with Whiteness and, indeed, with the Human. It is quite easy to see why the term “Pessimism” is apt. The Black names the condition of state violence, a flesh-object brought into the world for “accumulation and fungibility.”20 The Black is essential to the production of Western subjectivity and to notions of what it means to be human. “In short, White (Human) capacity, in advance of the event of discrimination or oppression, is parasitic on Black incapacity: Without the Negro, capacity itself is incoherent, uncertain at best.” Not only is the Black incapacitated as a structural determinate, the Black is “a structural position of noncommunicability.”21 But there is a form of communication here nevertheless because the Black paradoxically signifies the “outside” that allows for the articulation of “anti-Black solidarity.”22 There is theoretical and historical support for such an analysis. For example, the early twentieth-century Americanization projects used Blackness as an exclusionary trope meant to help spur non-White immigrants from Europe and Asia toward Whiteness.23 And here is where the term “Pessimism” seems inadequate. As a structurally overdetermined body-image in the Western imaginary and symbolic field, Blackness registers near-nothingness: In perceiving Black folk as being alive, or at least having the potential to live in the world, the same potential that any subaltern might have, the politics of Black film theorists' aesthetic methodology and desire disavowed the fact that “[Black folk] are always already dead wherever you find them.”24 Given this dire diagnosis, why and how might we interact with Afro-Pessimism? Speaking from the point of view of a Black rhetorical scholar (and a scholar of Blackness), the answer to why is virtually self-evident: thinking through Blackness as a condition of possibility for rhetorical action and social justice is a life-long pursuit that, given the tragic killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri in August 2014, feels especially burning.25 Given the affective intensity of the charge of Black noncommunicability, a failure to meaningfully interact would engender a different kind of “violence”; in this case a structural injunction sponsored by a lingering and recurring anxiety regarding the authority of Communication Studies. And so how might we interact? If I take up the orientation of critical cosmopolitanism, I need to recognize immediately that my efforts can be dismissed by the Afro-Pessimist as colonial; that is, as a reiteration of the sort of practices that presume that one's epistemologies can translate other's bodies of knowledge into comprehensible and useful concepts and constructs. And yet, we must begin where we are, not where we hope to be. Hence, I want to make two modest and one not-so-modest suggestions for how Communication Studies in general and Rhetorical Studies in particular might interact: first, Wilderson calls for “a new language of abstraction” to elaborate “Blackness's grammar of suffering.”26 But in my reading, Afro-Pessimism is already too reliant on a language of abstraction. Lois McNay, in The Misguided Search for the Political, recently contends that theories of political power are overwrought owing to a social weightlessness brought about through high abstraction. She recommends the reinvigoration of the concept of “social suffering”—not as an entrenched category of victimage but, rather, as the habitus of lived experience that must be articulated to analyses of structural positionality.27 Second, I agree with McNay (who says nothing about Afro-Pessimism, by the way) that structural antagonisms are not static, but are movable and moving configurations. The Afro-Pessimist in Wilderson's account must agree that when a non-Black person is thrust toward the horrible condition approximating (but not identical to) the Black's structural position, that adjustment can rightfully be called a “Blackening.” As a happening—and not an event that has simply always already happened—this racialized procedure makes itself felt and knowable in the dense social fabric of the everyday. If the Black is in a structural position that delimits the impossibility of capacity, might we enjoin an analysis of the vocabulary of that impossibility itself? And since a “Blackening” receives intelligibility from the structural position of the Black, might we gain some productive understanding from a scrutiny of key discursive and material forms of “Blackening”? Was not Michael Brown “Blackened” in and through (and not only a priori to) his bodily encounter with state violence? Given my ongoing scholarly interest in the Zombie, I am willing to concede that an Afro-Pessimist might claim that Brown was, at the moment he was shot to death, “the dead but sentient thing, the Black” struggling “to articulate in a world of living subjects.”28 This concession functions as an assertion: the Zombie is not wholly outside Western intelligibility; it haunts the nether regions between Human and Black. Its undead existence is material and social, and supplies some vital resources for inventing a new language—a grammar of (Black) suffering. Perhaps “there is no way to Africa through the Black,”29 but maybe there is a route through the Zombie. I have argued for such a project using the terminology of reanimating Zombie voices.30 Lastly, we might think of this gloomy predicament as a tenuous point of contact with Afro-Pessimism. Wilson's intellectual history provides the basis for such a conception. Communication Studies has been (and continues to anguish over the extent that it still is) in the structural position of inferior and alienated. There should be no shame in admitting that the discipline, in relation to both the Social Sciences and the Humanities, has been and is subject to being “Blackened.” Indeed, its originary moment, as I alluded to above, meant the rejection of a set of nationalistic proprietary politics that treated Speech teachers like disposable labor. By any reasonable measure, that structural positioning—despite the fact that the people involved were White—was a racialization, a “Blackening.” Let's be perfectly clear: there is no identification being made here with the fundamental antagonism associated with the Black. However, this racialized politics (among other political registers) might provide a new critical vocabulary for Communication scholars if we do the painful work of coming to grips with the discursive and material practices of “Blackening.” There are structures of different scales. Academic structural dynamics are not dissociated from the identity ideologies implicated in nationalism and cosmopolitanism, citizenship and exile, privilege and destitution, Whiteness and Blackness. Indeed, Wilderson's critique is launched from and resides within those very same structural dynamics. It seems to me then that, at the very least, our shared social suffering with Afro-Pessimism—although of vastly different magnitudes and qualities—should be asserted as a mode of transnational fidelity.

#### Their author flows neg – Gillespie claims reformism can be good.

1AC Gillespie 17 [John Gillespie Jr., UC Irvine and Occupy Towson leader and Co-Founder of the Organized Network of Student Resistance, "Occupy Towson was a scam," ~Towerlight~, January 28th of 2017, accessed: 8-8-2018, [http://thetowerlight.com/occupy-towson-was-a-scam/]](http://thetowerlight.com/occupy-towson-was-a-scam/%5d) // BBM

Nevertheless, **there is some hope** for Occupy Towson. There is a way for us to save its legacy or recover its radicalism. The hope lies in the **fourth demand**: the **relationship between** the **University** and the **Prison system**. This relationship is the nexus point between Occupy Towson, the University and the World. If Occupy Towson can return to affirm the politics of abolition and divestment, a politics that at the very least calls for the abolition of the relationship between the University and the prison system, then Occupy Towson can re-center its political discourse closer to the more radical rhetoric of calling for an end to anti-black and white supremacist institutions (and their network of relations) as we know them. Then, maybe, just maybe, the same rhetoric used towards the University-Prison relationship can find comfort towards the University Systems Model itself.

#### Turn - Humanism is good and better than anti-humanism – focus on difference undergirds genocidal and colonial violence

Lester 12, Alan. "Humanism, race and the colonial frontier." Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 37.1 (2012): 132-148. (Director of Interdisciplinary Research, Professor of Historical Geography, and Co-Director of the Colonial and Postcolonial Studies Network, University of Sussex)//Elmer

Conclusion: defending humanism? Although, as I have argued, both Anderson and I emphasize in practice those sets of relations on colonial frontiers that gave rise to racial discursive shifts in the nineteenth century, there are important between the different kind of discursive relations postcolonial questions hinging on the distinction that Anderson emphasizes, and those that I have tried to track above. Anderson argues that it is not an issue of extending humanity to … negatively racialised people, but of putting into question that from which such people have been excluded – that which, for liberal discourse, remains unproblematized. (2007, 199) I fear, however, that if we direct attention away from histories of humanism’s failure to deal with difference and to render that difference compatible with its fundamental universalism, and if we overlook its proponents’ failed attempts to combat dispossession, murder and oppression; if our history of race is instead understood through a critique of humanity’s conceptual separation from nature, we dilute the political potency of universalism. Historically, it was not humanism that gave rise to racial innatism, it was the specifically anti-humanist politics of settlers forging new social assemblages through **relations of violence on colonial frontiers**. Settler communities became established social assemblages in their own right specifically **through the rejection of humanist interventions**. Perhaps, as Edward Said suggested, we can learn from the implementation of humanist universalism in practice, and insist on **its potential to combat racism**, and perhaps we can insist on the contemporary conceptual hybridisation of human–non-human entities too, without necessarily abandoning all the precepts of **humanism** (Said 2004; Todorov 2002). We do not necessarily need to accord a specific value to the human, separate from and above nature, in order to make a moral and political case for a fundamental human universalism that can be wielded strategically against racial violence. Nineteenth century humanitarians’ universalism was fundamentally conditioned by their belief that British culture stood at the apex of a hierarchical order of civilisations. From the mid-nineteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century, this ethnocentrism produced what Lyotard describes as ‘the flattening of differences, or the demand for a norm (“human nature”)’, that ‘carries with it its own forms of terror’ (cited Braun 2004, 1352). The intervention of Aboriginal Protection demonstrates that humanist universalism has the potential to inflict such terror (it was the Protectorate of Aborigines Office reincarnated that was responsible, later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for Aboriginal Australia’s Stolen Generation, and it was the assimilationist vision of the Protectors’ equivalents in Canada that led to the abuses of the Residential Schools system). But we must not forget that **humanism’s alternatives**, founded upon principles of difference rather than commonality, have the potential to do the same and even **worse**. In the nineteenth century, Caribbean planters and then emigrant British settlers emphasised the multiplicity of the human species, the **absence of any universal ‘human nature’**, the incorrigibility of difference, in their upholding of biological determinism. Their assault on any notion of a fundamental commonality among human beings has disconcerting points of **intersection with the radical critique of humanism** today. The scientific argument of the nineteenth century that came closest to post-humanism’s insistence on the hybridity of humanity, promising to ‘close the ontological gap between human and non-human animals’ (Day 2008, 49), was the evolutionary theory of biological descent associated with Darwin, and yet this theory was adopted in Aotearoa New Zealand and other colonial sites precisely to legitimate the potential extinction of other, ‘**weaker’ races** in the face of British colonisation on the grounds of the natural law of a struggle for survival (Stenhouse 1999). Both the upholding and the rejection of human–nature binaries can thus result in racially oppressive actions, depending on the contingent politics of specific social assemblages. Nineteenth century colonial humanitarians, inspired as they were by an irredeemably ethnocentric and religiously exclusive form of universalism, at least combatted exterminatory settler discourses and practices at multiple sites of empire, and provided spaces on mission and protectorate stations in **which indigenous peoples could be shielded**

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)