# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must define “objectivity” in a delineated line in the 1AC

#### Multiple contradictory definitions of objectivity – no consensus means spec is needed

Davis ND Jay Davis, ND "News: Beyond the Myth of Objectivity," Center For Media Literacy, (J. Francis Davis, an adult educator and media education specialist, was on the staff of the Center for Media Literacy from 1989 to 1992. He holds an M.Div. from Candler School of Theology at Emory University, Atlanta where he currently works in the computer industry and lives with his wife, Elizabeth, and their children) https://www.medialit.org/reading-room/news-beyond-myth-objectivity//Karan

Objectivity, n. (Apparently,) The practice of presenting both sides of an issue. Spend a week watching any of the network news reports and you are likely to conclude that all issues have only two sides and that middle-aged, white males have the only insight on them. From Sunday afternoon interview programs to ABC's Nightline, satisfying the U.S. media's standards of "objectivity" seems to require bringing opposing personalities together to debate issues of foreign and domestic policy. The ensuing dialogue, usually between Democrats and Republicans or some equivalent, suggests that all sides of the issue are covered. This dualism is one way media interpret news in North America. It seems clear, however, that "presenting both sides" tends to undermine creative discussion of the many shades of belief that actually represent opinion on complex issues. If all issues are presented in black-and-white, yes-and-no terms, if one is either pro-life or pro-choice, pro-intervention or anti-intervention, what happens to discussion of cases that fail to fit the neatly established dichotomy? Another traditional definition of objectivity focuses on the idea of impartiality. In this view, objectivity means keeping one's own beliefs, opinions or feelings separate from the story. This definition is more textbook than honest, however. Most journalists would agree that true impartiality is impossible. Even the most evenhanded reporter is subject to personal bias.

#### Violation: They didn’t

#### Negate:

#### 1] Shiftiness- they can redefine what type of objectivity the 1ac defends in the 1ar which decks strategy and allows them to wriggle out of negative positions by saying that their form of objectivity accounts for movements or bias – every core negative argument is dependent on what the aff defends – supercharged on this topic when we are comparing two concepts in a vacuum. Especially true against a phil aff where intrinsic qualities of something i.e. objectivity is necessary for evaluating offense

#### CX can’t resolve this and is bad because A] Not flowed B] Skews 6 min of prep C] They can lie and no way to check D] Debaters can be shady.

#### 2] Real World- policy makers will always specify what they aim to do. That outweighs since debate has no value without portable application.

#### This spec shell isn’t regressive- it literally determines what the affirmative defends

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] DTA is functionally severance which kills education and fairness because you don’t need to defend arguments

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

#### No 1ar theory – a] 7-6 skew b] spikes and 1ac theory checks

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is super aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to– reasonability checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing super abusive 1NCs while still giving the 2N a chance.

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up a blippy 20 second shell to 3 min of the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention and means 1AR theory is irresolvable so you shouldn’t stake the round on it.

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew – ows on quantifiaiblity

## 2

#### We advocate for the 1ACs method of scenario analysis sans their telos of topic.

#### That solves the aff – their method of solvency is about their scenario analysis of the resolution and developing political grammars of resistance to learn about fugitivity. We’ll break this down – it’s not enough to affirm the topic in the abstract, rather, they have to have material offense from their advocacy that solves anti-blackness – if their offense is “discussions good” or “planning good” then there’s no reason the telos of their revolution is necessary.

#### Like look at their method page and tell me this is about the topic

#### The net benefit is incompleteness.

Harney and Moten 11 – Stephano Harney and Fred Moten March 2021 "Refusing Completion: A Conversation" <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/116/379446/refusing-completion-a-conversation/> (Stefano Harney is the Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University., Fred Moten is the professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa)//Elmer \*\*Modified for Problematic Rhetoric

FM: Maybe what we always also want to be doing is operating under the assumption that when it comes to thought, rigor and generosity are not separate from one another. That “intra-action,” to use Karen Barad’s term, is intra-active with another: that of black study and black studies. That’s where it’s at, as the Godfather would say. That’s what we’re interested in. And that’s also where we’re at in our lives, in our intellectual life together, and in our social life together as friends. It’s just that the syntax and the semantics that we have been given in order to try to understand that double intra-action is inadequate for the most part. We ask ourselves, how do we understand the relation between black study and black studies, and then we have to take two months to try to overcome the fact that “relation” ain’t the right word. In other words, the **intra-action of black study** and black studies **requires** something like what Barad calls “**experimental metaphysics**.” Or, maybe another way to put it is that what’s required are some experiments in anti-metaphysics. Maybe black study is just this continual experiment in anti-metaphysics. SH: All Incomplete is also **about the next town**, about what we heard about the next town, about **the next experiment** already going on, continually as Fred says. And so, for instance, I’m very grateful to the current generation of Guyanese feminist, activist scholars such as Kamala Kempadoo and Alissa Trotz who have made more available the work of the great Guyanese feminist activist intellectual Andaiye. We’ve been studying and teaching with Andaiye’s The Point Is to Change the World, and also with Lessons from the Damned by the Damned, the latter a collectively written book about a freedom school set up by black women in the late 1960s and early ’70s in Newark. Now, Andaiye talks about the research she did as part of Red Thread, an independent cross-racial organization of women in Guyana. She talks about how the poor and working class women who are keeping diaries on their social reproductive labor were doing research that she, Andaiye, could never do as well as them. Then, from the Damned, we hear the story of a key turning point in the freedom school. The women running the school have met some middle-class, teacher-qualified black women at a Vietnam protest and invited them back to the school. Much is gained by the encounter, but after a few weeks the women who run the school say something to the effect of, we loved them, but we had to send them away because they could not believe that we—in our position as black working-class women—were better placed to theorize this world. If we take these lessons from Andaiye and the Damned seriously, maybe we can get out of some of the metaphysical assumptions of our positions and roles. What Andaiye and the Damned are saying is that **poor people, poor black and Indian and indigenous women**, in these most vital instances **were better researchers and** better **theorists** than those of us who are traditionally and institutionally trained as such and rise through the “meritocracy.” So, we have to find some other reason for doing what we are doing—cause it is not because we are the best at it—and so we have to **find some other way**, **beyond** this **metaphysics of meritocracy we inhabit.** And from there it becomes clear that we are not the ones to sit in judgment, and this means we can **practice nothing but open admissions** and open promotion in the places where we teach, whether elementary schools, universities, or art academies. And what we would do is support the primary theorists and researchers as they come through, should they wish to come through, and should they wish to stay. And isn’t this serving the people? After all, serving the people never meant serving them breakfast. It meant being at the service of the people, because the people held what we all need, precariously, with only partial access sometimes themselves to this wealth, knowledge, and practice of how to learn about society and how to analyze it because it needs to be changed. That is why it was called a party of self-defense: to defend all this, not to imagine that the party was going to generate the wealth itself. Service becomes the answer to all the anxieties about allyship and class. And service is debt, partiality, incompleteness in action. SS: Your use of **incompleteness** reminds me in certain ways of how before you talked about **debt not as this crushing condition** **but** **as something that, in being unpayable**, **is the very principle of sociality**. So debt not as IMF-backed austerity measures, but **debt as** all those **things we owe to each other**. The way you talk about incompleteness strikes me as similar in that it’s **not incompleteness as a problem**—**like there’s something lacking in myself** which is fulfilled through another person—**but rather as a permanent state which is more of a blessing**, or something to be preserved. It’s not something that needs to be dealt with as a problem. Is that a fair reading? SH: Yes, I think that’s right. FM: Have you ever seen the film Jerry Maguire? The title character is this brutal drone of individuation whose whole life ends up depending upon his exploitation of a black football player, which he accomplishes with the help of a female assistant whom he later marries. The movie begins with Jerry Maguire being a successfully individuated man who’s complete, or thinks he is, until he gets stripped of all that. In order to find himself he’s got to attach himself in a more or less straight Hegelian mode to one who’s not quite really one, this player who shows out on and off the playing field while also modeling an authentic and loving family life, all of which reveals him never to have been the kind of free subject Jerry used to be. They call this a romantic comedy. It’s the story of the man who at the end of his personal (re)development—after having the biggest night of his life because the black football player literally endangers his own health in order to make a catch that will make him a superstar so that Jerry MaFuckingGuire can exploit him and attract other superstars who he can also exploit—finds that he can’t enjoy it without the woman who has made it all possible but whom he has exploited and demeaned and overlooked. That’s when this motherfucker breaks into a feminist consciousness-raising group in order to reclaim his wife. How does he get her back? Just by saying, “Hello,” according to her, but he gets to finish his speech by saying to her, “You complete me.” Like, he was at 87 percent and she was the final 13 percent. Now, he’s fucking complete when he gets her back. Well, [**screw**] ~~fuck~~ **completeness**. Not only that, ~~fuck~~ completeness **as a way of understanding** anything about what love actually is. What they call romantic comedy is really anti-romantic tragedy. It’s amazing that something like Jerry Maguire is offered as a representation of what it’s like to fall in love. If you’ve ever fallen you know that **the other person** or persons don’t complete you. They **incomplete you**. They fuck you the fuck up. It doesn’t leave you intact. It plays you, undermines you. It disturbs and **disrupts your individuation**. It obliterates not only the possibility of but the desire for individuation. If you think about it in those terms, incompleteness is a consummation devoutly to be wished. The entire genre of the romantic comedy is usually some white dude who’s being dragged against his will into the condition of incompleteness. When, finally, he submits to it, you know that the sequel of that movie will be all about the breakup, which follow’s the idea of individuation having had a chance to rally, which the regular miseries of monogamous heterosexuality—which Samuel R. Delany teaches us is the deepest perversion—are happy to provide. The idea of **completeness** **is ridiculous and genocidal**. **There’s** just no end **to the ways it continually seeks to destroy our shared capacity to breathe and ground**. It **predicates** **and requires** the constantly asserted revision of what Robinson calls “**the terms of order**.” It predicates and necessitates the constant **brutalization** of all the people in the world who resist those terms of order and who practice modalities of **social existence** that are not predicated on those terms of order, as Robinson shows in his beautifully radical use of ethnographic and anthropological work in The Terms of Order. We advocate for incompleteness. We think such advocacy is part of what it is “to preserve,” as he says, “the ontological totality.” To preserve the totality is to refuse its completion. That’s our ongoing ante- and anti-metaphysical experiment.

## 3

#### Interpretation: If the affirmative debater defends a future oriented version of the resolution, they must specify the time in which the resolution occurs in a delineated text in the 1ac. To clarify, this would look like a date and time in which something occurs

#### Violation: They don’t

#### Shiftiness

## Case

### Framing

#### Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Comes before value-to-life.

Tännsjö 11 (Torbjörn, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” <http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf>) //BS 1-27-2018

\*\*Bracketed to avoid triggers

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all [die] commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not [die] commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I [die] kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

#### B] Mathemathically comes first

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

### The Truth

**Miscut**

**Ought “**Ought expresses ideas such as duty, necessity and moral obligation. It is not as forceful as must, but it is stronger than should. You ought to be punctual. We ought to help the poor. You ought to visit your friends once in a while. Ought generally points to present and future time. It can point to past time when it is followed by the perfect infinitive (have + past participle).**”**

**That’s English Grammar 10** [“Must and Ought to”; English Grammar; August 16, 2010; <https://www.englishgrammar.org/must-and-ought-to/> //BWSWJ]

#### Doesn’t mean you get to fiat the future – just means you get to fiat an action happens in the future

#### Net worse – 1] fairness 2] clash and topic lit 3] affs never happen

#### No discussions offense: 1] we’d impact turn those discussions 2] no reason why those would spill up from debate or how it would solve

#### This robinson evidence says literally nothing and zero extinction arguments

#### First, sustainability:

#### 1] Sustainability is nonsense – we’re nowhere near collapse. Prioritize solving extinction, even if that means more resource extraction.

Ted Nordhaus, 5-20-2021 [Ted Nordhaus is the founder and executive director of the Breakthrough Institute, an environmental policy think tank committed to technological solutions for climate problems, and the author of several books including Break Through: From the Death of Environmentalism to the Politics of Possibility and An Ecomodernist Manifesto., "Interview: Ted Nordhaus on ecomodernism," Works in Progress https://www.worksinprogress.co/issue/interview-ted-nordhaus-on-ecomodernism/ //DMcD]

Sustainability is such a gauzy, hand-wavy concept, though I find even myself using it sometimes. Insofar as “sustainability” suggests that there’s some set of natural limits that we need to keep human societies within, I think it’s just nonsense. We’ve been modifying natural environments on this planet to support numbers of humans that are much greater today than could have ever been supported even 100 or 1,000 years ago, let alone 10,000 or 100,000 years ago. There is, of course, some theoretical limit to how much energy we can harness or use, but we’re nowhere close to that. If you have cheap, clean energy, you can ultimately solve everything else. I would offer an alternate framework for sustainability. I think what we would like is for large populations of humans to be able to live materially comfortable and prosperous lives, to pursue their imaginations, their dreams, and their ideas of what a good life is. I think it’s very hard for us, sitting here today, to know what the average person or someone in 2100 will think that is, and to do that in ways that preserve as much of our deep evolutionary ecological inheritance as possible, which was always already shaped by human agency and will continue to be. And that might mean that we do end up removing carbon and geoengineering the planet to have that 1950 or an 1850 climate, for that matter. It might mean that we decide to bring mammoths back, or to genetically modify the Great Barrier Reef so that it can supply the warmer oceans, or something else. I don’t know. I want to give people living in the future the options, choices, agency, and the ability to make those decisions on their own terms. I don’t know if you would call that “sustainability” or something else, but that’s the future that I think we ought to create for those who come after us. We can do that by building out the knowledge base, technology base, wealth base, and resource base that will make that possible. Do we have functioning institutions that are adaptive and democratic, and that can navigate what are always going to be trade-offs? That’s the future that I think we ought to be pursuing.

#### 2] Yes decoupling

**Hausfather 21** – a climate scientist and energy systems analyst whose research focuses on observational temperature records, climate models, and mitigation technologies. He spent 10 years working as a data scientist and entrepreneur in the cleantech sector, where he was the lead data scientist at Essess, the chief scientist at C3.ai, and the cofounder and chief scientist of Efficiency 2.0. He also worked as a research scientist with Berkeley Earth, was the senior climate analyst at Project Drawdown, and the US analyst for Carbon Brief. He has masters degrees in environmental science from Yale University and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and a PhD in climate science from the University of California, Berkeley. (Zeke, "Absolute Decoupling of Economic Growth and Emissions in 32 Countries," Breakthrough Institute, 4-6-2021, https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/absolute-decoupling-of-economic-growth-and-emissions-in-32-countries, Accessed 4-11-2021, LASA-SC)

The past 30 years have seen immense progress **in improving the quality of life for much of humanity**. Extreme poverty — the number of people living on less than $1.90 per day — has fallen by nearly two-thirds, from 1.9 **billion to** around 650 **million**. Life expectancy has risen in most of the world, along with literacy and access to education, while infant mortality has fallen. Despite perceptions to the contrary, **the average person born today is likely to have access to more opportunities and have a better quality of life than at any other point in human history**. Much of this increase in human wellbeing has been propelled by rapid economic growth driven largely by state-led industrial policy, particularly in poor-to-middle income countries. However, this growth has come at a cost: between 1990 and 2019, global emissions of CO2 **increased by 56%.** Historically, economic growth has been closely linked to increased energy consumption — and increased CO2 emissions in particular — leading some to argue that a more prosperous world is one that necessarily has more impacts on our natural environment and climate. There is a lively academic debate about our ability to “absolutely decouple” emissions and growth — that is, the extent to which the adoption of clean energy technology can allow emissions to decline while economic growth continues. Over the past 15 years, however, **something has begun to change.** Rather than a 21st century dominated by coal that energy modelers foresaw, **global coal use peaked in 2013 and is now in structural decline**. We have succeeded in making clean energy cheap, with solar power and battery storage costs falling 10-fold since 2009. The world produced more electricity from clean energy — solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear — than from coal over the past two years. And, according to some major oil companies, **peak oil is upon us** — not because we have run out of cheap oil to produce, but because demand is falling and companies expect further decline as consumers increasingly shift to electric vehicles. The world has long been experiencing a relative **decoupling** between economic growth and CO2 emissions, with the emissions per unit of GDP **falling for the past 60 years**. This is the case even in countries like **India and China** that have been undergoing rapid economic growth. But relative decoupling alone is inadequate in a world where global CO2 emissions need to peak and decline in the next decade to give us any chance at limiting warming to well below 2℃, in line with Paris Agreement targets. Thankfully, there is increasing evidence that the world is on track **to absolutely decouple CO2 emissions and economic growth** — with global CO2 emissions potentially having peaked in 2019 **and unlikely to increase substantially in the coming decade**. While an emissions peak is just the first and easiest step towards eventually reaching the net-zero emissions required to stop the world from continuing to warm, it demonstrates that linkages between emissions and economic activity are not an immutable law, but rather simply a result of our current means of energy production. In recent years we have seen more and more examples of absolute decoupling — economic growth accompanied by falling CO2 emissions. Since 2005, 32 countries with a population of at least one million people **have absolutely decoupled** emissions from economic growth, both for terrestrial emissions (those within national borders) and consumption emissions (emissions embodied in the goods consumed in a country). This includes the United States, Japan, Mexico, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Poland, Romania, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary, Belarus, Austria, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Singapore, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, Norway, Ireland, New Zealand, Croatia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Cyprus. Figure 1, below, shows the declines in territorial emissions (blue) and increases in GDP (red). To qualify as having experienced absolute decoupling, we require countries included in this analysis to pass four separate filters: a population of at least one million (to focus the analysis on more representative cases), declining territorial emissions over the 2005-2019 period (based on a linear regression), declining consumption emissions, and increasing real GDP (on a purchasing power parity basis, using constant 2017 international $USD). We chose not to include 2020 in this analysis because it is not particularly representative of longer-term trends, and consumption and territorial emissions estimates are not yet available for many countries. There is a wide range of rates of economic growth between 2005-2019 among countries experiencing absolute decoupling. Somewhat counterintuitively, there is no significant relationship between the rate of economic growth and the magnitude of emissions reductions within the group. **While it is unlikely that there is not at least some linkage between the two factors, there are plenty of examples of countries (e.g., Singapore, Romania, and Ireland) experiencing both extremely rapid economic growth and large reductions in CO2 emissions.** One of the primary criticisms of some prior analyses of absolute decoupling is that they ignore **leakage**. Specifically, the offshoring of manufacturing from high-income countries over the past three decades to countries like China has led to “illusory” drops in emissions, where the emissions associated with high-income country consumption are simply shipped overseas and no longer show up in territorial emissions accounting. There is some truth in this critique, as there was a large increase in emissions embodied in imports from developing countries between 1990 and 2005. After 2005, however, structural changes in China and a growing domestic market led to a reversal of these trends; the amount of emissions “exported” from developed countries to developing countries **has actually declined over the past 15 years.** This means that, for many countries, both territorial emissions and consumption emissions (which include any emissions “exported” to other countries) **have jointly declined**. In fact, on average, consumption emissions have been declining slightly faster than territorial emissions since 2005 in the 32 countries we identify as experiencing absolute decoupling. Figure 2, below, shows the change in consumption emissions (teal) and GDP (red) between 2005 and 2019. There is a pretty wide variation in the extent to which these countries have reduced their territorial and consumption emissions since 2005. Some countries — such as the UK, Denmark, Finland, and Singapore – have seen territorial emissions fall faster than consumption emissions, while the US, Japan, Germany, and Spain (among others) have seen consumption emissions fall faster. Figure 3 shows reductions in consumption and territorial emissions for each country, with the size of the dot representing the size of the population in 2019. **Absolute decoupling is possible.** There is no physical law requiring economic growth — and broader increases in human wellbeing — to necessarily be linked to CO2 emissions. All of the **services that we rely on today that emit fossil fuels** — electricity, transportation, heating, food — can in principle **be replaced by near-zero carbon alternatives**, though these are more mature in some sectors (electricity, transportation, buildings) than in others (industrial processes, agriculture).

#### 3] Tech demat

**McAfee 19**, \*Andrew Paul McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management; (2019, “More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources and What Happens Next”, https://b-ok.cc/book/5327561/8acdbe)

There is **no shortage** of examples of dematerialization. I chose the ones in this chapter because they illustrate a set of fundamental principles at the intersection of business, economics, innovation, and our impact on our planet. They are:

We do want more all the time, but **not more resources**. Alfred Marshall was right, but William Jevons was wrong. Our wants and desires keep growing, evidently without end, and therefore so do our economies. But our use of the earth’s resources **does not**. We do want more beverage options, but we don’t want to keep using more aluminum in drink cans. We want to communicate and compute and listen to music, but we don’t want an arsenal of gadgets; we’re happy with a single smartphone. As our population increases, we want more food, but we don’t have any desire to consume more fertilizer or use more land for crops.

Jevons was correct at the time he wrote that total British demand for coal was increasing even though steam engines were becoming much more efficient. He was right, in other words, that the price elasticity of demand for coal-supplied power was greater than one in the 1860s. But he was wrong to conclude that this would be permanent. Elasticities of demand can change over time for several reasons, the most fundamental of which is **technological change**. Coal provides a clear example of this. When fracking made natural gas much cheaper, total **demand** for coal in the United States **went down** even though its price decreased.

With the help of **innovation** and **new technologies**, economic growth in America and other rich countries—growth in all of the wants and needs that we spend money on—has become **decoupled** from resource **consumption**. This is a recent development and a **profound** one.

Materials cost money that companies locked in competition would rather **not spend**. The root of Jevons’s mistake is simple and **boring**: resources cost **money**. He realized this, of course. What he didn’t sufficiently realize was how strong the **incentive** is for a company in a contested market to **reduce** its spending on **resources** (or anything else) and so eke out a bit more profit. After all, a penny saved is a penny earned.

Monopolists can just pass costs on to their customers, but companies with a lot of competitors can’t. So American farmers who battle with each other (and increasingly with tough rivals in other countries) are eager to cut their spending on land, water, and fertilizer. Beer and soda companies want to minimize their aluminum purchases. Producers of magnets and high-tech gear run away from REE as soon as prices start to spike. In the United States, the 1980 Staggers Act removed government subsidies for freight-hauling railroads, forcing them into **competition** and **cost cutting** and making them all the more eager to not have expensive railcars sit idle. Again and again, we see that **competition** spurs **dematerialization**.

There are multiple paths to dematerialization. As profit-hungry companies seek to use fewer resources, they can go down four main paths. First, they can simply find ways to use **less** of a **given material**. This is what happened as beverage companies and the companies that supply them with cans teamed up to use less aluminum. It’s also the story with American farmers, who keep getting bigger harvests while using less land, water, and fertilizer. Magnet makers found ways to use fewer rare earth metals when it looked as if China might cut off their supply.

Second, it often becomes possible to **substitute** one resource for **another**. Total US coal consumption started to decrease after 2007 because fracking made natural gas more attractive to electricity generators. If nuclear power becomes more popular in the United States (a topic we’ll take up in chapter 15), we could use both less coal and less gas and generate our electricity from a small amount of material indeed. A kilogram of uranium-235 fuel contains approximately 2–3 million times as much energy as the same mass of coal or oil. According to one estimate, the total amount of energy that humans consume each year could be supplied by just seven thousand tons of uranium fuel.

Third, companies can use **fewer molecules** overall by making better use of the materials they **already own**. Improving CNW’s railcar utilization from 5 percent to 10 percent would mean that the company could cut its stock of these thirty-ton behemoths in half. Companies that own expensive physical assets tend to be fanatics about getting as much use as possible out of them, for clear and compelling financial reasons. For example, the world’s commercial airlines have improved their load factors—essentially the percentage of seats occupied on flights—from 56 percent in 1971 to more than 81 percent in 2018.

Finally, some materials get replaced by **nothing** at all. When a telephone, camcorder, and tape recorder are separate devices, three total microphones are needed. When they all collapse into a smartphone, only one microphone is necessary. That smartphone also uses no audiotapes, videotapes, compact discs, or camera film. The iPhone and its descendants are among the world champions of dematerialization. They use vastly less metal, plastic, glass, and silicon than did the devices they have replaced and don’t need media such as paper, discs, tape, or film.

If we use more renewable energy, we’ll be replacing coal, gas, oil, and uranium with **photons** from the **sun** (solar power) and the **movement** of **air** (wind power) and water (hydroelectric power) on the earth. All three of these types of power are also among dematerialization’s **champions**, since they use up essentially **no resources** once they’re up and running.

I call these four paths to dematerialization slim, swap, optimize, and evaporate. They’re not mutually exclusive. Companies can and do pursue all four at the same time, and all four are going on all the time in ways both obvious and subtle.

Innovation is **hard** to **foresee**. Neither the fracking revolution nor the world-changing impact of the iPhone’s introduction were well understood in advance. Both continued to be underestimated even after they occurred. The iPhone was introduced in June of 2007, with no shortage of fanfare from Apple and Steve Jobs. Yet several months later the cover of Forbes was still asking if anyone could catch Nokia.

Innovation is not **steady** and **predictable** like the orbit of the Moon or the accumulation of interest on a certificate of deposit. It’s instead inherently jumpy, uneven, and **random**. It’s also **combinatorial**, as Erik Brynjolfsson and I discussed in our book The Second Machine Age. Most new technologies and other innovations, we argued, are combinations or recombinations of preexisting elements.

The iPhone was “just” a cellular telephone plus a bunch of sensors plus a touch screen plus an operating system and population of programs, or apps. All these elements had been around for a while before 2007. It took the vision of Steve Jobs to see what they could become when combined. Fracking was the combination of multiple abilities: to “see” where hydrocarbons were to be found in rock formations deep underground; to pump down pressurized liquid to fracture the rock; to pump up the oil and gas once they were released by the fracturing; and so on. Again, none of these was new. Their effective combination was what changed the world’s energy situation.

Erik and I described the set of innovations and technologies available at any time as **building blocks** that ingenious people could combine and recombine into useful new configurations. These new configurations then serve as more blocks that later innovators can use. Combinatorial innovation is exciting because it’s unpredictable. It’s not easy to foresee when or where powerful new combinations are going to appear, or who’s going to come up with them. But as the number of both building blocks and innovators increases, we should have **confidence** that more breakthroughs such as fracking and smartphones are ahead. Innovation is highly decentralized and largely uncoordinated, occurring as the result of **interactions** among **complex** and **interlocking** social, technological, and economic systems. So it’s going to keep surprising us.

As the Second Machine Age progresses, dematerialization **accelerates**. Erik and I coined the phrase Second Machine Age to draw a contrast with the Industrial Era, which as we’ve seen transformed the planet by allowing us to overcome the limitations of muscle power. Our current time of great progress with all things related to **computing** is allowing us to **overcome** the **limitations** of our mental power and is **transformative** in a different way: it’s allowing us to **reverse** the Industrial Era’s bad habit of taking **more** and **more** from the earth every year.

Computer-aided design tools help engineers at packaging companies design generations of aluminum cans that keep getting lighter. Fracking took off in part because oil and gas exploration companies learned how to build **accurate** computer **models** of the rock formations that lay deep underground—models that predicted where hydrocarbons were to be found.

Smartphones took the place of many separate pieces of gear. Because they serve as GPS devices, they’ve also led us to print out many fewer maps and so contributed to our current trend of using less paper. It’s easy to look at generations of computer paper, from 1960s punch cards to the eleven-by-seventeen-inch fanfold paper of the 1980s, and conclude that the Second Machine Age has caused us to chop down ever more trees. The year of peak paper consumption in the United States, however, was 1990. As our devices have become more capable and interconnected, always on and always with us, we’ve sharply turned away from paper. Humanity as a whole probably hit peak paper in 2013.

As these examples indicate, computers and their kin help us with all four paths to **dematerialization**. Hardware, software, and networks let us slim, swap, optimize, and evaporate. I contend that they’re the **best tools** we’ve **ever invented** for letting us tread more **lightly** on our planet.

All of these principles are about the **combination** of technological **progress** and **capitalism**, which are the first of the two pairs of forces causing **dematerialization**.

#### Second, transition:

#### Yes they do link – transition would never happen, and its bad even in future planning – vagueness of the 1ac vs. specificity of the 1nc should frame this debate

#### 1] Crisis causes casino capitalist efforts to rebound---that’s worse

Trainer 95 – Ted Trainer, Teaches at the School of Social Work at the University of New South Wales, The Conserver Society: Alternatives for Sustainability. p. 78-79

It has been evident since the mid-1970s that the global economy is in considerable trouble. Growth rates have been low, inflation and un­employment rates have been high, and debt has risen to extraordinary levels. This critical state is basically caused by the fact that manufacturers can't sell all the goods they can produce. They can't find profitable investment outlets for all that constantly accumulating capital. Obviously an economy which doubles the amount of capital available per person every 20 years will soon set its people an impossible and farcical problem of how to consume all the goods that can be produced, and must be produced if all that capital is to be profitably invested. Now that they can't make normal profits, producing more useful goods, what they are doing is speculating, i.e., gambling. In the last decade or so there has been a marked increase in gambling on the share markets (hence the 1987 crash), in financial markets, on commodity prices, and in company takeovers. Indeed this has been labeled the era of ‘casino capitalism’ (Strange 1986). Since the end of the long boom there has been an accelerating process of restructuring within the global economy in an effort to restore the conditions that will permit normal profits to be made again. Corporations have relocated plants, streamlined operations and worked for greater access to a more unified world market. It is important to them not to have to get permission to deal with this region and then that one, but to be able to put their goods and services on sale in, if possible, a single global market-place. Governments are desperate to ‘get their economies going’, so they accommodate to these demands of business by opening their countries to the activities of foreign corporations, deregulating economies, and privatizing and thereby reducing government activities, expenditures and taxes on firms. Getting the economy going involves giving the global business sector more of what it wants: greater access, fewer restrictions, less protection for local firms, lower taxes, a more compliant workforce and fewer trade barriers. From here on the crisis is likely to deepen, especially because of worsening resource, energy and environmental costs and because of the polarisation that condemns most people in the world to very low incomes and gives them little chance of becoming significant consumers. Con­sequently the growth and affluence economy has a powerful tendency to focus only on the relatively small sector where a few higher-income people purchase and can get jobs and where the profitable investments are to be found. Meanwhile desperate politicians and economists jump at the chance to invest in mega-buck developments like the Eastern Creek Motorcycle Speedway in Sydney, because these mean more invest­ment, turnover, subcontracts and jobs, and after all isn't that develop­ment and progress? Evidently it is beyond the capacity of conventional economists and politicians to grasp the vast gulf between this merely capitalist development and appropriate development, i.e., development of the landscape, cooperatives, farms, workshops and arrangements that would enable communities to flourish. They will scramble to get the economy going in the way they know, especially by giving the foreign corporations more favorable conditions, cutting state spending and binding us more tightly into the unifying global economy.

#### 2] Empirics conclude revolution is structurally impossible – no working class support, capitalist opposition, and results in tyranny or reversion to capitalism

Calnitsky 21 [Dr. David Calnitsky 21, Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at Western University, Sociology PhD from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 8/8/2021, “The Policy Road to Socialism,” Critical Sociology, Sage Online] Recut Jet

* Workers don’t want it
* Loss aversion phenomenon means workers err on capitalism
* Capitalists hate socialism so they would fight against it
* Current government replaced by tyranny
* If its democratic, they vote back into capitalism

I do not, however, think that the revolutionary road is implausible. Rather, it is impossible, at least inside the rich capitalist democracies. And between the implausible and the impossible the choice is clear. Again, this can be framed as an empirical hypothesis: You do not see revolutions in developed capitalist democracies. As Przeworski and Limongi (1997) have written, there has never been a revolution in a moderately middle-class democracy (see also Przeworski, 2019). Drawing on a thousand years of data, cumulatively collected across 37 democratic countries, they show that not one had collapsed with a per-capita GDP higher than that of Argentina in 1976. Among countries with half that figure, collapse was exceedingly rare. Even a modest GDP brings with it an enormous amount of regime stability. These data in fact include any kind of regime collapse; narrowing the data to socialist revolution makes the empirical case against it even more impressive. Any case for revolution must begin by acknowledging rather than ignoring this evidence. To look at this question in a different way, I draw on the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, which contains information on revolutions (rather than government collapse) for over 200 countries since 1919. Their definition of revolution is very broad (see footnote 7) and includes “attempts” to overthrow government as well as “unsuccessful” rebellions. The data were compiled from newspaper sources and warrants caution, but nonetheless constitutes the most systematic evidence available for these questions. In Figure 9, I present the GNP per capita distribution of revolutions, from 1919, where GNP is first available, to the present. By considering only those country-years with revolutions I reduce the observation count from 17,520 to 184. Unlike Przeworski, I do not further restrict the data to democracies. The graph displays an extreme skew: The vast, overwhelming majority of cases of revolutionary threat occur in countries with a per capita GNP below $5,000 USD. For reference, the figure for the US in the data is about $65,850 in 2019. The hypothesis above—that we do not see revolutions in developed democracies—seems borne out by the evidence. figure Figure 9. Histogram of country-years with revolutions. Source: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. Data drawn from 200 plus countries between 1919 and 2018 are then restricted to country-years (N = 184) in which there were “revolutions,” as well as a “major government crisis” and “anti-government protests.” Why exactly is this true and what are the mechanisms to explain it? Why is the revolutionary strategy impossible for a country like the US? There are, at bottom, three reasons, each of which stands alone as a sufficient condition to snap the last threads of one’s revolutionary faith.23 The first two suggest that revolution is unachievable, and the last suggests that even if it is achievable, socialism by revolutionary means is unachievable. The revolutionary road is closed on the following grounds: (1) Workers do not want it (2) Capitalists would sooner grant reforms (3) A smashed state is more likely to result in tyranny than deep democracy Not only has there never been a successful revolution in a developed democracy, there has never been a working class that has wanted one (e.g. Erikson and Tedin, 2015; Sassoon, 1996).24 There are no clear cases where the dominant inclination of the working class in a developed democracy was revolutionary. Recall that the above graph also includes attempts and unsuccessful cases. It is self-evident that workers have not joined revolutionary groups en masse at any point in the context of a rich democracy. Nor were their aspirations to join such groups thwarted by violence or ideology. When gains inside a capitalist democracy are available—either individual or collective ones, and this has been true even through the neoliberal period, where median living standards have continued to (slowly) go up and not down—it is not worth risking everything for an uncertain future (Thewissen et al., 2015).25 More important than the dynamic point is the static one: When standards of living are moderately high, as shown in Figure 9, the modal worker has more to lose than her chains. This is not an argument against socialism; but to revise Werner Sombart, the life raft of revolution really was shipwrecked on shoals of roast beef and apple pie. Therefore, the reasons workers are not revolutionary are materialist in character. Explaining their reformist politics does not require appeal to venal trade union leaders or false consciousness. Most people wish to minimize risk in their lives, and revolution involves taking on colossal risks. For example, home-ownership in the developed world hovers around 70%; this means that a lot of people have a lot to lose. By contrast, the materialist case for revolution proposes that people favor it when their expected post-revolutionary standards of living are greater than their current standard (Roemer, 1985). But when we add moderate risk- and loss-aversion the calculation changes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1991). Say you have a low income, but own a few assets, maybe a house, a car, and perhaps you also have a child; what risk profile would you require to gamble your modest holdings for an uncertain future which might be better but might be worse? Even if you are certain that the probability of better is greater than the probability of worse, you have to envision workers as a class of inveterate gamblers to take the bet. Moderately cautious people who prefer a bird in the hand will still view the downside risk as too great. Equal gains and losses are not experienced equally. This is the loss aversion phenomenon. But the assumption of a population confident about improved standards of living—and a willingness to take risky strategies to achieve them—is itself unwarranted. This is the risk aversion phenomenon. The modal worker is of course correct to suspect that her post-revolutionary welfare is uncertain; socialists after all do not have satisfactory answers to the problems of coordination, motivation, and innovation under socialism (for attempted answers that are provocative and oftentimes brilliant, see Albert, 2004; Cottrell and Cockshott, 1992; Corneo, 2017; Roemer, 1994; and Wright and Hahnel, 2016). When one compares the status quo to a future where both heaven and hell are seemingly plausible, it is perfectly rational that people everywhere would abandon the barricades. And abandon them they did. Now perhaps the revolutionaries have persuaded us that negative outcomes are far-fetched, that we are very confident that revolution will usher in, eventually, the land of milk and honey. It is still the case that in this model the promised land will only be reached after a social breakdown of unknown duration: A complete overhaul in the organization of production will lead to some middle period of deteriorating material welfare as capitalists rapidly exit the economy. This means chaos and uncertainty, but it could also mean war. The interregnum could last a year, but it might last two decades, and however optimistic we are about the end point, we cannot in advance know how long this interim phase will persist. In the meantime, revolutionary enthusiasm will wane, erstwhile supporters will decamp, a “stay-the-course” electoral strategy will be outflanked by competitor parties promising a return to normalcy, and the desire to consolidate gains will make the authoritarian impulse greater. From a materialist perspective, the uncertain passage through what Przeworski (1986) calls the “transition trough” makes the journey less appealing.26 To my mind, these factors explain why all working classes in all developed democracies have been decidedly reformist in orientation. The reason why revolutionary socialism has always been marginal in rich capitalist economies—and will always be outflanked by reform-oriented socialism—is that only the latter consistently deliver high (and usually increasing) standards of living and low (and usually decreasing) levels of risk. As long as the Mad Max world of catastrophic collapse can be avoided, reform-oriented parties will always better capture the enthusiasm of poor and working people. Thus, when we try to explain the non-revolutionary attitudes of our working-class friends and family, we do not need to lean on the false consciousness account, for there is a more parsimonious materialist explanation. As such, any case for revolution must be non-materialist in character: You can be a materialist or a revolutionary, but not both. This is the dilemma the revolutionaries must consider: Revolution is only possible when the forces of production are underdeveloped, but it can only be successful when they are sufficiently developed to make socialism (or communism) objectively viable.27 As Elster (1986) has argued, the circumstances under which revolutions spark and succeed never coincide. What about the capitalists? Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that they will fight far harder against a revolution than they would against reformist drives. Indeed, ignoring the response from capitalists violates Elster’s first law of political rationality: Never assume your opponent is less rational than you. If revolution were the alternative, employers would grant every imaginable reform, from far higher taxes to the rejiggering of power relations in the workplace. In a mugging, most people will surrender their wallet before their life. Actors in the state ought to respond in more or less the same way—that is, as long as you admit your adversary the competence to read the situation as well as you. If our theory of the state suggests that it acts on behalf of the capitalist class, its apparatchiks would anticipate and preempt any revolutionary crusade with a cocktail of concession and repression. And while it will certainly contest reforms, it will devote all of its resources to break the revolution. Nonetheless, this means that revolutionaries can play a crucial role, even if it is not to foment revolution. Militancy is a powerful strategy to foment reform (for an argument about the history of social democracy along these lines, see Piketty, 2014). Thus far, the main reason revolution is off the table is because no one wants it—not workers, nor employers, nor the state. The third point above asks us to imagine the prospects for revolutionary success even if we ignore the wrinkle that workers have neither an interest nor capacity to make it. But let us pretend they did: Why then would we imagine that total social breakdown would prompt a deepening of democracy rather than authoritarian entrenchment? This happy outcome has never before emerged in the wake of social collapse, and there is little reason why the final showdown with the American military ought to produce fertile ground for deepening democracy in all spheres of life. In fact, evidence from the General Social Survey suggests that in response to recession and economic downturn people tend to become less altruistic and less concerned with questions of fairness.28 After situations of economic crisis, voters tend to shift to the right (Lindvall, 2014). The old union song cries out that “we can bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old,” but life is not birthed on ash. None of the historical case studies track this narrative, and indeed everything we know about human psychology suggests that social devastation makes people more, not less, prone to demagoguery. This means that even if a revolution were achievable, it is probably undesirable. The argument I have thus far laid out against revolution contends only that it is off the table in middle-class democracies. I have in mind social dynamics within developed capitalist democracies, countries “like the US,” but the premise no longer holds true if we imagine a society that has already suffered some sort of catastrophic societal disintegration—at that point all bets are off. We are of course now talking about a world we are not living in, but it is worth considering the thought experiment nonetheless. It is possible that America, after some world-historic environmental or economic collapse, begins to look something more like Russian feudalism than contemporary developed capitalism. Revolution then might again be on the table, but the context of desperation and scarcity in this scenario gives little reason to expect it would incubate an egalitarian democratic society. The historical evidence is unambiguous: None of the communist revolutions of the 20th century ushered in deeply democratic egalitarian social structures. Not only are there no examples, but there are also no clear mechanisms on offer. The fact that this scenario generates an interest in bringing about an egalitarian society by means of revolution does not mean there will be a capacity to do so. The theory is little more than “where there is a will there is a way.” But, as Elster (1980: 124) argues, the general interests of society do not secrete the conditions for their fulfillment. Interests and capacities need not overlap. There is a final reason to be skeptical of non-evolutionary strategies: The highly dubious premise that the system we erect the morning after will actually work. A socialist economy, if plopped down tomorrow, would be so rife with unintended consequences and pathologies that it is easy to imagine a democracy voting its way back into capitalism. This is true even if we believe (mistakenly, in my view) that the socialist calculation debate is solvable in the age of big data (Morozov, 2019). Interlocutors in the calculation debate have had very little to say about the politics of transition. Indeed, it is hard to imagine success of any kind without a slow and incremental transformation, experimenting with bits and pieces along the way—as we have been doing for the past century. An experimental approach is likely the only way to avoid devastating blunders that undermine the whole project. Moments of institutional upheaval and big change may at times be necessary, but to be successful they will have to rest on a foundation of smaller changes that have been tested.

#### 3] The move away from capitalism causes mass starvation, ecological collapse, and doesn’t solve their offense.

Monbiot 9 [George Monbiot 8-17-2009. Visiting Professor in the School of the Built Environment, Oxford Brookes University; recipient of the United Nations Global 500 Award for outstanding environmental achievement; named one of the forty international prophets of the twenty-first century by the UK’S Independent. “Is There Any Point in Fighting to Stave Off Industrial Apocalypse.” Guardian. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change>.] Recut Jet

The interesting question, and the one that probably divides us, is this: to what extent should we welcome the likely collapse of industrial civilisation? Or more precisely: to what extent do we believe that some good may come of it?

I detect in your writings, and in the conversations we have had, an attraction towards – almost a yearning for – this apocalypse, a sense that you see it as a cleansing fire that will rid the world of a diseased society. If this is your view, I do not share it. I'm sure we can agree that the immediate consequences of collapse would be hideous: the breakdown of the systems that keep most of us alive; mass starvation; war. These alone surely give us sufficient reason to fight on, however faint our chances appear. But even if we were somehow able to put this out of our minds, I believe that what is likely to come out on the other side will be worse than our current settlement.

Here are three observations: 1 Our species (unlike most of its members) is tough and resilient; 2 When civilisations collapse, psychopaths take over; 3 We seldom learn from others' mistakes.

From the first observation, this follows: even if you are hardened to the fate of humans, you can surely see that our species will not become extinct without causing the extinction of almost all others. However hard we fall, we will recover sufficiently to land another hammer blow on the biosphere. We will continue to do so until there is so little left that even Homo sapiens can no longer survive. This is the ecological destiny of a species possessed of outstanding intelligence, opposable thumbs and an ability to interpret and exploit almost every possible resource – in the absence of political restraint.

From the second and third observations, this follows: instead of gathering as free collectives of happy householders, survivors of this collapse will be subject to the will of people seeking to monopolise remaining resources. This will is likely to be imposed through violence. Political accountability will be a distant memory. The chances of conserving any resource in these circumstances are approximately zero. The human and ecological consequences of the first global collapse are likely to persist for many generations, perhaps for our species' remaining time on earth. To imagine that good could come of the involuntary failure of industrial civilisation is also to succumb to denial. The answer to your question – what will we learn from this collapse? – is nothing.

This is why, despite everything, I fight on. I am not fighting to sustain economic growth. I am fighting to prevent both initial collapse and the repeated catastrophe that follows. However faint the hopes of engineering a soft landing – an ordered and structured downsizing of the global economy – might be, we must keep this possibility alive. Perhaps we are both in denial: I, because I think the fight is still worth having; you, because you think it isn't.

#### 4] Decline causes nationalism, scapegoating, and diversionary conflict – turns case

Sundaram and Popov 19 [Jomo Kwame Sundaram & Vladimir Popov 19. Former economics professor, was United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, and received the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought in 2007. Former senior economics researcher in the Soviet Union, Russia and the United Nations Secretariat, is now Research Director at the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute in Berlin “Economic Crisis Can Trigger World War.” <http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/02/economic-crisis-can-trigger-world-war/>] Recut Jet

Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict. More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war. Crisis responses limited The 2008-2009 global financial crisis almost ‘bankrupted’ governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the world economy from the brink, but soon switched from counter-cyclical fiscal efforts to unconventional monetary measures, primarily ‘quantitative easing’ and very low, if not negative real interest rates. But while these monetary interventions averted realization of the worst fears at the time by turning the US economy around, they did little to address underlying economic weaknesses, largely due to the ascendance of finance in recent decades at the expense of the real economy. Since then, despite promising to do so, policymakers have not seriously pursued, let alone achieved, such needed reforms. Instead, ostensible structural reformers have taken advantage of the crisis to pursue largely irrelevant efforts to further ‘casualize’ labour markets. This lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented liquidity central banks injected into economies has not been well allocated to stimulate resurgence of the real economy. From bust to bubble Instead, easy credit raised asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. US house prices are now 8% more than at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, while its price-to-earnings ratio in late 2018 was even higher than in 2008 and in 1929, when the Wall Street Crash precipitated the Great Depression. As monetary tightening checks asset price bubbles, another economic crisis — possibly more severe than the last, as the economy has become less responsive to such blunt monetary interventions — is considered likely. A decade of such unconventional monetary policies, with very low interest rates, has greatly depleted their ability to revive the economy. The implications beyond the economy of such developments and policy responses are already being seen. Prolonged economic distress has worsened public antipathy towards the culturally alien — not only abroad, but also within. Thus, another round of economic stress is deemed likely to foment unrest, conflict, even war as it is blamed on the foreign. International trade shrank by two-thirds within half a decade after the US passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, at the start of the Great Depression, ostensibly to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition! Liberalization’s discontents Rising economic insecurity, inequalities and deprivation are expected to strengthen ethno-populist and jingoistic nationalist sentiments, and increase social tensions and turmoil, especially among the growing precariat and others who feel vulnerable or threatened.Thus, ethno-populist inspired chauvinistic nationalism may exacerbate tensions, leading to conflicts and tensions among countries, as in the 1930s. Opportunistic leaders have been blaming such misfortunes on outsiders and may seek to reverse policies associated with the perceived causes, such as ‘globalist’ economic liberalization. Policies which successfully check such problems may reduce social tensions, as well as the likelihood of social turmoil and conflict, including among countries. However, these may also inadvertently exacerbate problems. The recent spread of anti-globalization sentiment appears correlated to slow, if not negative per capita income growth and increased economic inequality. To be sure, globalization and liberalization are statistically associated with growing economic inequality and rising ethno-populism. Declining real incomes and growing economic insecurity have apparently strengthened ethno-populism and nationalistic chauvinism, threatening economic liberalization itself, both within and among countries. Insecurity, populism, conflict Thomas Piketty has argued that a sudden increase in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Although causality is difficult to prove, with wealth and income inequality now at historical highs, this should give cause for concern. Of course, other factors also contribute to or exacerbate civil and international tensions, with some due to policies intended for other purposes. Nevertheless, even if unintended, such developments could inadvertently catalyse future crises and conflicts. Publics often have good reason to be restless, if not angry, but the emotional appeals of ethno-populism and jingoistic nationalism are leading to chauvinistic policy measures which only make things worse. At the international level, despite the world’s unprecedented and still growing interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed as the US increasingly resorts to unilateral, sovereigntist policies without bothering to even build coalitions with its usual allies. Avoiding Thucydides’ iceberg Thus, protracted economic distress, economic conflicts or another financial crisis could lead to military confrontation by the protagonists, even if unintended. Less than a decade after the Great Depression started, the Second World War had begun as the Axis powers challenged the earlier entrenched colonial powers. They patently ignored Thucydides’ warning, in chronicling the Peloponnesian wars over two millennia before, when the rise of Athens threatened the established dominance of Sparta! Anticipating and addressing such possibilities may well serve to help avoid otherwise imminent disasters by undertaking pre-emptive collective action, as difficult as that may be.

#### 5] Transition wars – Low-growth world causes great power conflict

Drezner 16 [Daniel W. Drezner 16, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, May 2016, “Five Known Unknowns about the Next Generation Global Political Economy,” <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/IOS-Drezner-web-1.pdf>]

Geopolitical ambitions could reduce economic interdependence even further.120 Russia and China have territorial and quasi-territorial ambitions beyond their recognized borders, and the United States has attempted to counter what it sees as revisionist behavior by both countries. In a low-growth world, it is possible that leaders of either country would choose to prioritize their nationalist ambitions over economic growth. More generally, it could be that the expectation of future gains from interdependence—rather than existing levels of interdependence—constrains great power bellicosity.121 If great powers expect that the future benefits of international trade and investment will wane, then commercial constraints on revisionist behavior will lessen. All else equal, this increases the likelihood of great power conflict going forward.

#### 6] Transition is worse for emissions – Socialist leaders value victories over the environment

Smith '19 [Noah; 4/5/19; Bloomberg Opinion columnist, former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; "Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet," https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism] Recut Jet

It has become fashionable on social media and in certain publications to argue that capitalism is killing the planet. Even renowned investor Jeremy Grantham, hardly a radical, made that assertion last year. The basic idea is that the profit motive drives the private sector to spew carbon into the air with reckless abandon. Though many economists and some climate activists believe that the problem is best addressed by modifying market incentives with a carbon tax, many activists believe that the problem can’t be addressed without rebuilding the economy along centrally planned lines. The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes are unlikely to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare. Even without international conflict, there’s little guarantee that moving away from capitalism would mitigate our impact on the environment. Since socialist leader Evo Morales took power in Bolivia, living standards have improved substantially for the average Bolivian, which is great. But this has come at the cost of higher emissions. Meanwhile, the capitalist U.S managed to decrease its per capita emissions a bit during this same period (though since the U.S. is a rich country, its absolute level of emissions is much higher). In other words, in terms of economic growth and carbon emissions, Bolivia looks similar to more capitalist developing countries. That suggests that faced with a choice of enriching their people or helping to save the climate, even socialist leaders will often choose the former. And that same political calculus will probably hold in China and the U.S., the world’s top carbon emitters — leaders who demand draconian cuts in living standards in pursuit of environmental goals will have trouble staying in power. The best hope for the climate therefore lies in reducing the tradeoff between material prosperity and carbon emissions. That requires technology — solar, wind and nuclear power, energy storage, electric cars and other vehicles, carbon-free cement production and so on. The best climate policy plans all involve technological improvement as a key feature.

#### 7] Turns case – bounce-back is worse for the environment.

Alexander 20 [Dr. Samuel Alexander 20, PhD, Lecturer at the University of Melbourne, Co-Director of the Simplicity Institute, and Research Fellow with the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, 3/24/2020, "Is the Economic Shut Down what Degrowth Advocates have been Calling For?" https://www.resilience.org/stories/2020-03-24/is-the-economic-shut-down-what-degrowth-advocates-have-been-calling-for/, pacc]

That’s what degrowth means. Impacts are reducing for now, but isn’t the goal a return to growth? From an environmental perspective, the risk is that everything bounces back to ‘normal’ levels of growth and consumption as soon as this pandemic passes. History shows that emissions go down during recessions or depressions but tend to rise again as soon as the growth engine starts turning again.

#### Finally, offense:

#### Yes profit motive’s key – 1] military 2] no other incentive