## 1

#### Interpretation: Affirmatives must disclose the plan text and standard text to their new affirmative at the coin flip.

#### Violation: They didn’t disclose the standard text

#### Vote negative –

#### Prep skew and Clash – only plan text standard text gives the negative an idea of what to prepare. Our interpretation is goldilocks for argument innovation since you can still read new warrants and scenarios, they just need to be disclosed. Especially true for whole rez affs that don’t disclose standard text – they can read infinite phil affs on the topic which all have different pieces of offense which independently explodes limits. Also, turns innovation since it discourages cheap shot affs that win just because they’re new and encourages well researched affs that actually have topic literature.

## 2

#### Ethics must begin a priori and the meta-ethic is bindingness.

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [2] Bindingness – I can keep asking “why should I follow this” which results in skep since obligations are predicated on ignorantly accepting rules. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason which is self-justified.

#### That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer –

#### [1] All other frameworks collapse—non-Kantian theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

#### 2] No 1AR Framework: It moots 7 minutes of the 1NC and exacerbates the AFF infinite prep time so I should be able to compensate by choosing. They justify substantive skews by shifting frame of offense.

#### 3] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place.

#### 4] Theory – Frameworks are topicality interps of the word ought so they should be theoretically justified. Prefer on resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since huge evidence files aren’t required.

#### B] Resolvability – other debates create a mess of weighing and link turns, but using Kant is easily resolvable because it becomes a question of whether or not it violates

#### Put away your generic Kant indicts – our framework is a rejection of the western foundations of Kantianism in favor of a radical reconstruction of inclusion of the racialized and marginalized struggle.

**Mills 18** Charles W. Mills. “Black Radical Kantianism.” Res Philosophica, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 1–33 https:// doi.org/ 10.11612/ resphil.1622 SJCP//JG

Far from being monolithic, however, it should be regarded as a general category extending over many different variants. Depending on the respec- tive diagnoses offered of the dynamic of these regimes, and the correspond- ing prescriptions for their overturning or reform, one can derive varieties of black liberalism, black Marxism, black nationalism, black feminism, and even black conservatism (Dawson 2001). My own project in recent years has become the articulation of a “black radical liberalism” that draws on what are standardly judged to be the “radical” strains of Afro-modern thought—black Marxism, black nationalism, and black feminism—while incorporating their key insights into a modified and radicalized liberal framework (Mills 2017a, epilogue). And a “black radical Kantianism” is supposed to be a key element of this proposed synthesis, though not in the sense of documenting the actual uptake of Kant by black radical theorists (unlike their actual reading of Marx), but in the sense of demonstrating how classic themes in this literature can illuminatingly be translated into a Kantian discourse reshaped by the realities of racial subordination. So the agenda is both descriptive and prescriptive, looking at the fortunes of “personhood” as a general liberal category under illiberal circumstances, and suggesting a “Kantian” reconstruction as a de-ghettoizing approach for bringing together these segregated conversations. Why Kant, though? To begin with, there is the strategic argument from Kant’s rise to centrality in contemporary Western normative theory over the last half-century. With the demise or at least considerable diminution in significance of the utilitarian liberalism (Jeremy Bentham, James and John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick) that was hegemonic from the early 1800s to the mid-twentieth century, it is deontological/contractarian liberalism that is now most influential, whether in analytic Anglo-American political theory or Continental critical theory. Immanuel Kant is now regarded not merely as the most important ethicist of modernity, but as one of its most significant normative political theorists also.1 So a racially informed engagement with this body of discourse would have the virtues of being in dialogue with what is now the central strand in Western ethico-political theory: Afro-modern political thought in conversation with Euro-modern political thought. But second, in addition to these strategic considerations (and perhaps more importantly), the key principles and ideals of Kant’s ethico-political thought are, once deracialized, very attractive: the respect for the rights of individual persons, the ideal of the Rechtsstaat (admittedly somewhat modified from Kant’s own version), and the vision of a global cosmopolitan order of equals. The problem, in my opinion, has been less Kant’s own racism (since it is simply bracketed by most contemporary Kantians)2 than the failure to rethink these principles and ideals in the light of a modernity structured by racial domination. And that brings me to the third point. In contrast with, say, a dialogue between European and Asian political traditions, which at least for long periods of time developed largely separately from one another, the Euro-modern and the Afro-modern traditions are intimately and dialectically linked. As emphasized at the start, the latter develops in specific contestation of the former, involving both resistance to and rejection of its crucial tenets insofar as they rational- ize and justify Euro-domination, while nonetheless sometimes seeking to appropriate and modify others for emancipatory ends (Bogues 2003). So de- veloping a “black radical Kantianism” as a self-conscious enterprise should be not merely instrumentally and intrinsically valuable, but illuminative of a counter-hegemonic normative system already present in Afro-modern thought, if not self-denominatedly “Kantian,” formed in opposition to a white domination predicated on the denial of equal personhood to blacks.

#### Negate:

#### [1] Objectivity censors’ journalists’ personal views and biases- that’s non universalizable

Greven 21 Greven, Alec, "Speech and Sovereignty: A Kantian Defense of Freedom of Expression" (2021). Honors Theses. 1579.  
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses/1579 Karan

I will now outline the value of communication. The capacity to effectively communicate with others is crucial for an agent to realize their distinct ends, projects, and values. All agents need to will a world in which the value of communication is preserved in order to realize their ends. Lying and censorship are two actions that subvert the value of communication. Thus, engaging in lying and censorship is usually a hypocritical action that commits an agent to a practical contradiction. It simultaneously commits an agent to a principle that the value of communication in the world should be preserved while performing actions that subvert the value of communication. If everyone lied and censored at will then the structure of communication that the agent is practically committed to would collapse. Therefore, the liar or censor makes themselves an exception to a rule which is hypocritical and fails to respect the unity of their agency and treat others with equal moral standing.

#### [2] Journalists are required to respect those they report on, thus, advocacy journalism is required to alleviate suffering

Leshilo 18 Thabo Leshilo [A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals.] “Morality and Journalists: Objectivity versus Duty of Care” 13 July 2018, Johannesburg https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/26530/Morality%20and%20Journalists%20(markup)\_2.pdf?sequence=1

My view is that Detached Kevin Carter used the Sudanese child as a mere means to fame and (some mini-) fortune by simply photographing her and selling her photo; he did not treat her as a human being worthy of respect when he failed to come to her aid. In another formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant expresses the universal imperative of duty thus: “Act as though the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, a universal law of nature” ([1785] 2005, 24). The word ‘maxim’ refers to the basis on which one acts: what informs one’s action. What, indeed, would become of the world if all of us were to refuse to help people facing great hardship the way (some) journalists claim to be entitled to do? Kant also implores us to act beneficently, and might as well have had the Detached Kevin Carter in mind when he admonishes someone in a position to help, who does not: What concern of mine is it? Let each one be as happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself; I won’t take anything from him or even envy him; but I have no desire to contribute to his welfare or help him in time of need. (25) According to Kant, although it is possible that a maxim such as the one quoted above should be a universal law of nature “it is impossible to will that it [be] so . . . [f]or a will that brought that about would conflict with itself, since instances can often arise in which the person in question would need the love and sympathy of others, and he would have no hope of getting the help he desires, being robbed of it by this law of nature springing from his own will” (ibid.). Expanding on this, Charles Fried (2007,206) says that we are all required to recognise that human beings have certain basic rights to which they are all entitled as human beings: These rights are subject to qualification only in order to ensure equal protection of the same rights in others. In this sense the view is Kantian; it requires recognition of persons as ends, and forbids the overriding of their most fundamental interests for the purpose of maximizing the happiness or welfare of others. (ibib.) Fried goes on to say that this recognition that all humans have moral entitlements, correlates with the concept of respect – the attitude which is manifested when a person observes the constraints of the principle of morality in his dealings with another person, and thus respects the basic rights of the other. Respect is also an attitude which may be taken in part as defining the concept of a person: persons are those who are obliged to observe the constraints of the principle of morality in their dealings with each other, and thus show respect towards each other. (207) On Kant’s account, a person commands respect by virtue of being a rational being. “I maintain that man – and in general every rational being – exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be used by this or that at its discretion” ([1785] 2005, 28). I argue that Kant’s ‘Formula of the End in Itself’ (or ‘Principle of Humanity’) compels journalists to go the extra mile to help alleviate the suffering of those that they report on, and even take action to save their lives. When they fail to do that and instead simply report on such plight with the clinical detachment displayed by Detached Kevin Carter towards the Sudanese child, they simply use their subjects as mere means to make money and build their careers. By acting this way, journalists act unjustly and wrongfully. That is because a victim of such tragedy would ordinarily expect another human being to help to alleviate his or her suffering.

## 3

#### CP Text: A free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy except for when reporting on police incidents and reports by police

#### Not specifying an actor is an voting issue

#### Objectivity is synonymous with whiteness and police narratives disguise sketchy antiblackness and manipulate Black reporters

Mattar 22 Pacinthe Mattar, 2-10-2022, "Objectivity Is a Privilege Afforded to White Journalists," Walrus, <https://thewalrus.ca/objectivity-is-a-privilege-afforded-to-white-journalists/> B1ack ZD

ON MAY 27, a twenty-nine-year-old Black Indigenous woman named Regis Korchinski-Paquet fell from a twenty-fourth floor balcony in Toronto while police were in her apartment, responding to the family’s call for help with her mental health crisis. Police were the only ones there during the fall, and questions about the moments before her death remain unanswered. The tragedy has also boosted calls from racialized journalists to challenge the media’s overreliance on police narratives. It wasn’t until the next day that media reports included any of her family members’ voices or began questioning the role of police in Korchinski-Paquet’s death. Not because the family didn’t want to talk to the media: the family’s social media posts are what had raised initial awareness about Korchinski-Paquet’s death. One journalist described arriving at the scene to talk to family members and seeing other reporters there. (This gap in the reporting may have stemmed from some family members’ initial social media posts, which effectively accused the police of killing Korchinski-Paquet and would have been impossible to independently verify at the time. The family’s lawyer later clarified their initial statements, saying they believed police actions may have played a role in Korchinski-Paquet’s death.) Instead, the very first news stories about Korchinski-Paquet’s death were based solely on a statement from the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), the civilian-oversight agency in Ontario that is automatically called to investigate circumstances involving police that have resulted in death, serious injury, or allegations of sexual assault. Some journalists asked their newsrooms and organizations to explain why early coverage excluded the family’s narrative. I know one journalist whose editor questioned her for reporting what the family had told her in the early hours. Korchinski-Paquet’s death is just the latest reminder of why some journalists have long been arguing that police versions of events—whether their own actions or the actions of those they police—should be subject to the same levels of scrutiny other powerful bodies garner, and that their accounts cannot be relied on as the only source. “The police are not, in and of themselves, objective observers of things,” said Wesley Lowery—who was part of a Washington Post team that won a Pulitzer Prize for its coverage of fatal shootings by police officers—in a Longform Podcast interview in June. “They are political and government entities who are the literal characters in the story.” Nor do police watchdogs offer a sufficient counternarrative. The SIU has long been plagued with concerns about its power and credibility. Former Ontario ombudsman André Marin released a 2008 report stating that Ontario’s system of police oversight has failed to live up to its promise due to a “complacent” culture and a lack of rigour in ensuring police follow the rules. More recently, the limited powers of the SIU have been made clear in the aftermath of the fatal shooting of D’Andre Campbell, a twenty-six-year-old Black man with schizophrenia, who was shot by a Peel police officer in April after he called the police for help. So far, that officer has refused to be interviewed by the SIU and has not submitted any notes to the police watchdog—nor can the officer be legally compelled to do so. In 2018, I would see these obstacles play out in my own reporting. I had helped produce a series of live town halls on racism across the country. The Vancouver edition focused on racism in health care, with one conversation centring the experiences of two Indigenous nurses. Diane Lingren, provincial chair for the Indigenous leadership caucus of the BC Nurses’ Union, recounted how she often saw non-Indigenous people who appeared to be intoxicated be “told to settle down, and then they get a cab ride” to an overnight shelter. With Indigenous people, she said, “I see the RCMP called. . . . I see them handcuff their ankles to their wrists so they can’t walk. . . . I see those people get taken away in the police cars.” The RCMP denied that account; their response included a statement about their practice of a “bias free policing policy.” In response to that statement, the executive producer on the series wanted to cut the Indigenous nurses’ anecdotes from the show entirely. (The producer could not be reached for confirmation.) My co-producers and I fought to retain them, to present them along with the RCMP’s statement. This shouldn’t have been a battle: our very role as journalists is to present all the facts, fairly, with context. But, in many newsrooms, police narratives carry enough weight to effectively negate, silence, and disappear the experiences of racialized people. That it’s racialized journalists who have had to challenge police narratives and counter this tradition is an immense burden—and it’s risky. “The views and inclinations of whiteness are accepted as the objective neutral,” Wesley Lowery wrote in a June op-ed in the New York Times. “When Black and Brown reporters and editors challenge those conventions, it’s not uncommon for them to be pushed out, reprimanded, or robbed of new opportunities.” That last point rings entirely too true for me.

## 4

#### Policies that promote objectivity become the pretext for government crackdowns on legitimate journalism

West 17 Darrell M. West (Vice President and Director - Governance Studies Senior Fellow - Center for Technology Innovation Douglas Dillon Chair in Governmental Studies) 12/18/2017, How to combat fake news and disinformation, Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/>Karan

Government harassment of journalists is a serious problem in many parts of the world. United Nations Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur David Kaye notes that “all too many leaders see journalism as the enemy, reporters as rogue actors, tweeps as terrorists, and bloggers as blasphemers.”[[23]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/#footnote-23) In Freedom House’s most recent report on global press freedoms, researchers found that media freedom was at its lowest point in 13 years and there were “unprecedented threats to journalists and media outlets in major democracies and new moves by authoritarian states to control the media, including beyond their borders.”[[24]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/" \l "footnote-24) Journalists can often be accused of generating fake news and there have been numerous cases of legitimate journalists being arrested or their work being subject to official scrutiny. In Egypt, an Al-Jazeera producer was arrested on charges of “incitement against state institutions and broadcasting fake news with the aim of spreading chaos.”[[25]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/" \l "footnote-25) This was after the network broadcast a documentary criticizing Egyptian military conscription. Some governments have also moved to create government regulations to control information flows and censor content on social media platforms. Indonesia has established a government agency to “monitor news circulating online” and “tackle fake news.”[[26]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/#footnote-26) In the Philippines, Senator Joel Villanueva has introduced a bill that would impose up to a five-year prison term for those who publish or distribute “fake news,” which the legislation defined as activities that “cause panic, division, chaos, violence, and hate, or those which exhibit a propaganda to blacken or discredit one’s reputation.”[[27]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/" \l "footnote-27) Critics have condemned the bill’s definition of social networks, misinformation, hate speech, and illegal speech as too broad, and believe that it risks criminalizing investigative journalism and limiting freedom of expression. Newspaper columnist Jarius Bondoc noted “the bill is prone to abuse. A bigot administration can apply it to suppress the opposition. By prosecuting critics as news fakers, the government can stifle legitimate dissent. Whistleblowers, not the grafters, would be imprisoned and fined for daring to talk. Investigative journalists would cram the jails.”[[28]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/#footnote-28) In a situation of false information, it is tempting for legal authorities to deal with offensive content and false news by forbidding or regulating it. For example, in Germany, legislation was passed in June 2017 that forces digital platforms to delete hate speech and misinformation. It requires large social media companies to “delete illegal, racist or slanderous comments and posts within 24 hours.” Companies can be fined up to $57 million for content that is not deleted from the platform, such as Nazi symbols, Holocaust denials, or language classified as hate speech.[[29]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/" \l "footnote-29) The German legislation’s critics have complained that its definition of “obviously” illegal speech risks censorship and a loss of freedom of speech. As an illustration, the law applies the rules to social media platforms in the country with more than 2 million users. Commentators have noted that is not a reasonable way to define relevant social networks. There could be much smaller networks that inflict greater social damage. In addition, it is not always clear how to identify objectionable content.[[30]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/" \l "footnote-30) While it is pretty clear how to define speech advocating violence or harm to other people, it is less apparent when talking about hate speech or “defamation of the state.” What is considered “hateful” to one individual may not be to someone else. There is some ambiguity regarding what constitutes hate speech in a digital context. Does it include mistakes in reporting, opinion piece commentary, political satire, leader misstatements, or outright fabrications? Watchdog organizations complained that “overly broad language could affect a range of platforms and services and put decisions about what is illegal content into the hands of private companies that may be inclined to over-censor in order to avoid potential fines.”[[31]](https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combat-fake-news-and-disinformation/" \l "footnote-31) Overly restrictive regulation of internet platforms in open societies sets a dangerous precedent and can encourage authoritarian regimes to continue and/or expand censorship. This will restrict global freedom of expression and generate hostility to democratic governance. Democracies that place undue limits on speech risk legitimizing authoritarian leaders and their efforts to crackdown basic human rights. It is crucial that efforts to improve news quality not weaken journalistic content or the investigative landscape facing reporters.

#### Gov. crackdowns on media are a form of soft authoritarianism that escalates into complete tyranny

Christensen 21 Christensen, Devin (PhD in Political Science, UNC, Chapel Hill), John Lovett, and John A. Curiel. "Mainstream Media Recirculation of Trust-Reducing Social Media Messages." American Politics Research (2021): 1532673X211023931.

Trump’s consistent hostility and violent reactivity to criticism on Twitter mimicked the media outreach strategies of so-called “soft” authoritarian leaders seeking to undermine democratic norms and institutions in order to consolidate power in themselves. **“Soft” authoritarianism differs from the more brutal “hard” authoritarianism associated with tyrannical regimes such as Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR. While infamous authoritarians, such as Stalin or Pol Pot, could compliment their cult of personality with the unfettered coercive power of the state, soft authoritarians are forced to grapple with adversarial democratic institutions that split and balance authority (Gandhi & Okar, 2009; Márquez, 2016, 2018; Schatz, 2009). In order to consolidate power, soft authoritarians must play a long game where they start by undermining these adversarial institutions until the institutions are too weak to resist the authoritarian’s bid for power (Cheibub et al., 2010; Gandhi & Okar, 2009; Márquez, 2016, 2018). The media is one adversarial institution that soft authoritarians must either degrade or coopt in order to consolidate power in themselves.** As Schatz (2009) notes, through “discursive preemption,” the soft authoritarian seeks to “maintain the upper hand in guiding the media to project images that strengthen his position” in a way that “may flirt with outright propaganda” but which maintains a veneer of transparency and legitimacy (207). For example, in 2005, Kazahki President Nazarbaev preempted charges of electoral fraud in his reelection with what appeared to be leaked documents showing that the opposition planned to allege fraud against the regime regardless, which in turn blunted the impact of the scandal (Schatz, 2011). By diluting public discourse with misinformation and false labels of inaccuracy, citizens lose faith in journalistic credibility (Freeze et al., 2020) and “no one can criticize power, because there is no basis upon which to do so” (Snyder, 2017, p. 65, 71**). Authoritarians then capitalize on growing distrust in institutions by promulgating their own salvation narrative, usually in defense of the “common man” (Schatz, 2009). Effective salvation narratives require the social amplification of a crisis, followed by blaming the “other” for the crisis and other problems that can stick (Waring, 2013; Waring & Glendon, 1998; Waring & Paxton, 2018). By controlling the media, authoritarians can deny wrongdoing, delegitimize their opponents and oppositional institutions (including traditional media outlets themselves), and spin a narrative that the state is sick. The only cure for this sickness, the authoritarian claims, is to trust in the leader and grant them the authority to set things straight (Svilicic & Maldini, 2014).**

#### Authoritarianism causes a laundry list of catastrophic impacts.

Kasparov and Halvorssen 17 [Garry Kasparov and Thor Halvorssen \*Chairman of the New York-based Human Rights Foundation \*\*Thor Halvorssen is the foundation’s president and chief executive. “Opinion: Why the rise of authoritarianism is a global catastrophe.” Washington Post. 2/13/17. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/02/13/why-the-rise-of-authoritarianism-is-a-global-catastrophe/>] Justin

Last month the world’s elite listened politely as Chinese President Xi Jinping offered the keynote address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Of course, the leader of the Chinese dictatorship didn’t mention how he and his cronies jail and disappear human rights activists, persecute ethnic minorities and religious groups, and operate a vast censorship and surveillance system, among other evils. It is striking that a forum dedicated to “improving the state of the world” would offer such an important stage to the leader of a repressive regime. Xi began his remarks in part by asking “What has gone wrong with the world?” The fact is, he’s part of the problem. At present, the authoritarianism business is booming. According to the Human Rights Foundation’s research, the citizens of 94 countries suffer under non-democratic regimes, meaning that 3.97 billion people are currently controlled by tyrants, absolute monarchs, military juntas or competitive authoritarians. That’s 53 percent of the world’s population. Statistically, then, authoritarianism is one of the largest — if not the largest — challenges facing humanity. Consider the scale of some of the world’s other crises. About 836 million live under extreme poverty, and 783 million lack clean drinking water. War and conflict have displaced 65 million from their homes. Between 1994 and 2013 an annual average of 218 million people were affected by natural disasters. These are terrible, seemingly intractable problems — but at least there are United Nations bodies, aid organizations and State Department teams dedicated to each one of them. Dictators and elected authoritarians, by contrast, get a free pass. The World Bank bails out repressive regimes on a regular basis. There is no anti-tyrant U.N. task force, no Sustainable Development Goals against tyranny, no army of activists. We, the authors, have experienced the ills of authoritarianism personally. One of us has been beaten, blacklisted and forced into exile by operatives of the Kremlin. Russian President Vladimir Putin has relentlessly pushed to crush freedom of speech, brazenly annex Crimea and increase his global military activities in ways that hark back to the Cold War. The other author has seen his mother shot by Venezuelan security forces and his first cousin languish for nearly three years in a military jail as a prisoner of conscience. Today Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro runs a regime that regularly imprisons dissidents, abuses protesters and engages in such widespread graft and corruption that the country is now undergoing a catastrophic economic collapse. Putin and Maduro have co-conspirators in all parts of the world, fellow would-be tyrants who are dismantling the free press, jailing opponents, manipulating elections and committing a host of human rights violations. In Turkey, a once-promising democracy is gasping for air. Its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has shut down 149 media outlets, shuttered more than 2,000 schools and universities, fired more than 120,000 civil servants and jailed more than 45,000 suspected dissenters. In North Korea, Kim Jong Un rules the most totalitarian government on Earth, brainwashing 25 million people and terrorizing them with public executions, forced famines and a vast network of concentration camps that reminded U.N. investigators of Pol Pot’s Cambodia and Nazi Germany. And there are so many lesser-known dictators in countries such as Bahrain, Kazakhstan and Equatorial Guinea, where tyrants pilfer their countries’ natural resources and pocket the profits in private off-shore accounts. To cover their atrocities, they hire lobbyists, public relations firms and even policy groups in the free world to whitewash their actions. If injustice and oppression aren’t bad enough, authoritarian governments bear an enormous social cost. Dictator-led countries have higher rates of mental illness, lower levels of health and life expectancy, and, as Amartya Sen famously argued, higher susceptibility to famine. Their citizens are less educated and file fewer patents. In 2016, more patents were filed in France than in the entire Arab world — not because Arabs are less entrepreneurial than the French, but because nearly all of them live under stifling authoritarianism. Clearly, the suppression of free expression and creativity has harmful effects on innovation and economic growth. Citizens of free and open societies such as Germany, South Korea and Chile witness advances in business, science and technology that Belarusans, Burmese and Cubans can only dream of. And consider that free nations do not go to war with each other. History has shown this to be the only ironclad law of political theory. Meanwhile, dictators are always at war, often with a foreign power and always with their own people. If you are worried about public health, poverty or peace, your mandate is clear: Oppose tyranny. Tragically, world institutions and organizations have failed to properly address authoritarianism. Western governments sometimes protest human rights violations in countries such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea — but routinely ignore them in places such as China and Saudi Arabia, in favor of upholding trade deals and security agreements. The United Nations, established to bring peace and justice to the world, includes Cuba, Egypt and Rwanda on its Human Rights Council. Here, a representative from a democracy carries the same legitimacy as a representative from a dictatorship. One acts on behalf of its citizens, while the other acts to silence them. Between June 2006 and August 2015 the Human Rights Council issued zero condemnations of repressive regimes in China, Cuba, Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Despite the fact that dictatorship is at the root of many global ills — poor health, failing education systems and global poverty among them — authoritarianism is hardly ever addressed at major conferences worldwide. And no wonder: Many, including the World Economic Forum and the now-defunct Clinton Global Initiative, receive ample funding from authoritarians. Few human rights groups focus exclusively on authoritarianism, and most establishment ones spend significant chunks of their budgets on criticizing democratic governments and their policies. Dictators are rarely in the spotlight. The noble struggle against tyranny has fallen upon individual activists and dissidents living under authoritarian rule or working from exile. Citizen journalists Abdalaziz Alhamza and Meron Estefanos found that few people in peaceful, free countries were interested in reporting on Syria and Eritrea, so they took it upon themselves to do so, despite the enormous danger this put them in. Hyeonseo Lee defected from North Korea to find that victims of sex trafficking in China are often abandoned and ignored, so she started pressuring the Chinese government herself. When Rosa María Payá’s father, Cuban democracy leader Oswaldo Payá, died in mysterious circumstances in 2012, it fell to her to demand a formal investigation and fair treatment for dissidents in Cuba. Such individuals are in constant need of support, because in their home countries there is no legal way to protest, no ACLU, no Washington Post and no opposition party to stand up for their rights. If authoritarianism and dictatorship are to be properly challenged — and if so many resulting crises, including military conflict, poverty and extremism, are to be addressed at their root cause — such dissidents need funding, strategic advice, technical training, attention and solidarity. To turn the tide against repression, people across all industries need to join the movement. Artists, entrepreneurs, technologists, investors, diplomats, students — no matter who you are, you can reach out to a civil society organization at risk and ask how you can help by using your knowledge, resources or skills. Today, authoritarians rule an increasingly large part of the globe, but the leaders of the free world lack the motivation and gumption to create a new U.N.-style League of Democracies. In the meantime, as individuals living in a free society, we believe it is our moral obligation to take action to expose human rights violations and to use our freedom to help others achieve theirs.

#### Extinction outweighs

1] uncertainty

2] turns the case 2 ways

3] pre-req and reversibility

## Case

#### Permissibility negates

#### Framework fails –

1] culpability

2] inf

4] induction fails

5] normativity outweighs – coalitions

#### No solvency:

#### 1] can’t fiat increased coverage

#### 2] Police unionization thumps – proven by the past 2 years of status quo reporting creating worse backlash

#### Interpretation: Affirmatives must defend a policy action, not follow-on or compliance. Utopian fiat—they can say something like “States ought to not go to war” making it impossible to negate. The violation is preemptive.

#### AFF SOLVES NONE OF THEIR OFFENSE. MISINFORMATION IS NOT A PROBLEM IF THE FREE PRESS, IT’S STATE-OWNED TROLL FARMS.

Alba 19 Davey Alba (tech reporter, NY Times) and Adam Satariano 9/26/2019, At Least 70 Countries Have Had Disinformation Campaigns, Study Finds, NY TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/technology/government-disinformation-cyber-troops.html

But the **research shows that use of the tactics, which include bots, fake social media accounts and hired “trolls,” is growing.** In the past two months, the platforms have suspended accounts linked to governments in China and Saudi Arabia. Ben Nimmo, director of investigations at Graphika, a company that specializes in analyzing social media, said the growing use of internet disinformation is concerning for the 2020 United States election. A mix of domestic and foreign groups, operating autonomously or with loose ties to a government, are building from the methods used by Russia in the last presidential election, making it difficult for the platforms to police, he said. “The danger is the proliferation” of the techniques, he said. “Anybody who wants to influence the 2020 election may be tempted to copy what the Russian operation did in 2016.” China’s emergence as a powerful force in global disinformation is one of the most significant developments of the past year, researchers said. The country has long used propaganda domestically, but the protests this year in Hong Kong brought evidence that it was expanding its efforts. In August, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube suspended accounts linked to Beijing that were spreading disinformation about the protests. Philip N. Howard, director of the Oxford Internet Institute and one of the authors of the report, said that such **online disinformation campaigns can no longer be understood to be the work of “lone hackers, or individual activists, or teenagers in the basement doing things for clickbait.” There is a new professionalism to the activity, with formal organizations that use hiring plans, performance bonuses and receptionists**, he said. **In recent years, governments have used “cyber troops” to shape public opinion, including networks of bots to amplify a message, groups of “trolls” to harass political dissidents or journalists, and scores of fake social media accounts to misrepresent how many people engaged with an issue.** The tactics are no longer limited to large countries. Smaller states can now easily set up internet influence operations as well. The Oxford researchers said social media was increasingly being co-opted by governments to suppress human rights, discredit political opponents and stifle dissent, including in countries like Azerbaijan, Zimbabwe and Bahrain. In Tajikistan, university students were recruited to set up fake accounts and share pro-government views. During investigations into disinformation campaigns in Myanmar, evidence emerged that military officials were trained by Russian operatives on how to use social media. Most government-linked disinformation efforts were focused domestically, researchers concluded. **But at least seven countries had tried to influence views outside their borders: China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.**

#### CIRCUMVENTION- EVEN IF INDIA’S PRESS STOPS PROMOTING MISINFORMATION THE GOVERNMENT WILL JUST GET FOREIGN COMPANIES TO SPREAD MISINFORMATION. GOVERNMENTS HAVE DENIABILITY BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT THE ONES PROPAGATING THE MISINFORMATION.

Fisher 7/25 Max Fisher (international reporter and columnist for The New York Times).7/25/21, Disinformation for Hire, a Shadow Industry, Is Quietly Booming, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/25/world/europe/disinformation-social-media.html>, NY TIMES,

**The scheme appears to be part of a secretive industry that security analysts and American officials say is exploding in scale: disinformation for hire. Private firms, straddling traditional marketing and the shadow world of geopolitical influence operations, are selling services once conducted principally by intelligence agencies. They sow discord, meddle in elections, seed false narratives and push viral conspiracies, mostly on social media. And they offer clients something precious: deniability. “Disinfo-for-hire actors being employed by government or government-adjacent actors is growing and serious,” said Graham Brookie, director of the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, calling it “a boom industry.” Similar campaigns have been recently found promoting India’s ruling party, Egyptian foreign policy aims and political figures in Bolivia and Venezuela. Mr. Brookie’s organization tracked one operating amid a mayoral race in Serra, a small city in Brazil. An ideologically promiscuous Ukrainian firm boosted several competing political parties.** In the Central African Republic, two separate operations flooded social media with dueling pro-French and pro-Russian disinformation. Both powers are vying for influence in the country. A wave of anti-American posts in Iraq, seemingly organic, were tracked to a public relations company that was separately accused of faking anti-government sentiment in Israel. Most trace to back-alley firms whose legitimate services resemble those of a bottom-rate marketer or email spammer. Job postings and employee LinkedIn profiles associated with Fazze describe it as a subsidiary of a Moscow-based company called Adnow. Some Fazze web domains are registered as owned by Adnow, as first reported by the German outlets Netzpolitik and ARD Kontraste. Third-party reviews portray Adnow as a struggling ad service provider. European officials say they are investigating who hired Adnow. Sections of Fazze’s anti-Pfizer talking points resemble promotional materials for Russia’s Sputnik-V vaccine. For-hire disinformation, though only sometimes effective, is growing more sophisticated as practitioners iterate and learn. Experts say it is becoming more common in every part of the world, outpacing operations conducted directly by governments. The result is an accelerating rise in polarizing conspiracies, phony citizen groups and fabricated public sentiment, deteriorating our shared reality beyond even the depths of recent years. An Open Frontier The trend emerged after the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018, experts say. Cambridge, a political consulting firm linked to members of Donald J. Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, was found to have harvested data on millions of Facebook users. The controversy drew attention to methods common among social media marketers. Cambridge used its data to target hyper-specific audiences with tailored messages. It tested what resonated by tracking likes and shares. The episode taught a generation of consultants and opportunists that there was big money in social media marketing for political causes, all disguised as organic activity. Some newcomers eventually reached the same conclusion as Russian operatives had in 2016: Disinformation performs especially well on social platforms. At the same time, backlash to Russia’s influence-peddling appeared to have left governments wary of being caught — while also demonstrating the power of such operations. **“There is, unfortunately, a huge market demand for disinformation,” Mr. Brookie said, “and a lot of places across the ecosystem that are more than willing to fill that demand.” Commercial firms conducted for-hire disinformation in at least 48 countries last year** — nearly double from the year before, according to an Oxford University study. The researchers identified 65 companies offering such services. Last summer, Facebook removed a network of Bolivian citizen groups and journalistic fact-checking organizations. It said the pages, which had promoted falsehoods supporting the country’s right-wing government, were fake. Stanford University researchers traced the content to CLS Strategies, a Washington-based communications firm that had registered as a consultant with the Bolivian government. The firm had done similar work in Venezuela and Mexico. A spokesman referred to the company’s statement last year saying its regional chief had been placed on leave but disputed Facebook’s accusation that the work qualified as foreign interference.

#### OBJECTIVITY IS WHAT MAKES FAKE NEWS POSSIBLE, ANY HINT OF BIAS OR FACTUAL ERROR MAKE THE MEDIA LOSE CREDIBILITY. THIS ALLOWS PEOPLE TO REJECT NEWS REPORTS AS FABRICATIONS

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Populism 101 holds that disagreeing with the leader is never an honest difference of opinions. To disagree with the leader, criticise the leader, be anything less than fanatically supportive of the leader, is always an attack on not just the leader, but the nation, deliberately intending it harm. Whether a private citizen, a judge, or a journalist, why else would you do it? But enough about all that. The part of this that matters the most in the context of our argument is that tackling this type of Trumpian notion of fakery (which never includes his own fabrications) with endless cross-checked rebuttals is to address the wrong issue. All the advice currently being offered in the marketplace of ideas on how to sort the news from the dross is never going to be foolproof. Only skepticism in the context of one’s own prior knowledge, or ‘collateral experience’ (to use a phrase of Charles Peirce)24 of the world, will ‘protect’ you from the fake, and even that is obviously far from infallible. The rhetoric (at least) of a fake news/news dichotomy, however, must be noticed as it serves to re-enforce a vision of good and bad media which comforts ‘good’ (all too often simply meaning ‘mainstream’) media. This carries a significant cost: the current focus on the dichotomy masks the news media’s deepest problems, which, as we suggest above, are located in the ideology and practice of journalism itself, rather than in the credulity of those who consume it. Trumpian attacks gain traction because journalism promises what it conspicuously fails to deliver: the more loudly it insists on its truth, the greater the threat to its credibility. Fake news flourishes not so much because of pure lying as because seeking to provide unassailable accounts capturing reality in its entirety, the impossible ideal of the news (as supposedly produced by objective journalism), proves indeed to be exactly that – impossible – and so every visible failure can seem like further evidence that the news is not to be trusted. What is most concerning, then, is not fiction shot through with fact and then labelled as journalism, but the truths, such as they are, of well-intentioned journalism appearing to be tainted, whether by lies or otherwise, while claiming a high standard of objectivity, honesty, accuracy, etc. The news’s truth can be undermined by mendacities but is, far more often, compromised by accidental errors of one kind or another. Moreover, it is inevitably also contaminated, at the very least, by incompleteness and subjectivity. As we have explained, hopefully persuasively, these ingredients can never be entirely excluded from the recipe. However hard it may strive to avoid such impurities, they are always present, meaning that journalism itself is always doomed to be impure. Noticing this cannot amount to a crisis. Nor is it valuable to postulate a straightforward dichotomy between truth and falsehood in looking for fake news’s roots. Doing this only obscures the real nature of the issue which is grounded, as it has been for half a millennium, in journalism’s essential challenges. Against that fake news may be presented as a matter of truth and lies, just as it is presented as being a recent and suddenly all-pervasive phenomenon, but, as we will endeavour to demonstrate, that’s just wrong. Naive. Foolish. Deceptive. Fake News.

#### Populism causes extinction.

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The international system is at a **historical inflection point.** As Asia continues its economic ascent, two centuries of Western domination of the world, first under Pax Britannica and then under Pax Americana, are coming to an end. The West is losing not only its material dominance but also its ideological sway. Around the world, democracies are **falling prey** to illiberalism and **populist dissension** while a rising China, assisted by a pugnacious Russia, seeks to challenge the West’s authority and republican approaches to both domestic and international governance. U.S. President Joe Biden is committed to refurbishing American democracy, restoring U.S. leadership in the world, and taming a pandemic that has had devastating human and economic consequences. But Biden’s victory was a close call;on neither side of the Atlantic will **angry populism or illiberal temptations readily abate**. Moreover, even if Western democracies overcome polarization, beat back illiberalism, and pull off an economic rebound, they will not forestall the arrival of a world that is both multipolar and ideologically diverse. History makes clear that such **periods of tumultuous** **change** come with **great peril**. Indeed, **great-power** **contests** over hierarchy and ideology regularly lead to **major wars**. Averting this outcome requires soberly acknowledging that the Western-led liberal order that emerged after World War II cannot anchor global stability in the twenty-first century. The search is on for a viable and effective way forward. The best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a global concert of major powers. As the history of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe demonstrated—its members were the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria—a steering group of leading countries can curb the geopolitical and ideological competition that usually accompanies multipolarity. Concerts have two characteristics that make them well suited to the emerging global landscape: political inclusivity and procedural informality. A concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there, regardless of their regime type. In so doing, it largely separates ideological differences over domestic governance from matters of international cooperation. A concert’s informality means that it eschews binding and enforceable procedures and agreements, clearly distinguishing it from the UN Security Council. The UNSC serves too often as a public forum for grandstanding and is regularly paralyzed by disputes among its veto-wielding permanent members. In contrast, a concert offers a private venue that combines consensus building with cajoling and jockeying—a must since major powers will have both common and competing interests. By providing a vehicle for genuine and sustained strategic dialogue, a global concert can realistically mute and manage inescapable geopolitical and ideological differences. A global concert would be a consultative, not a decision-making, body. It would address emerging crises yet ensure that urgent issues would not crowd out important ones, and it would deliberate on reforms to existing norms and institutions. This steering group would help fashion new rules of the road and build support for collective initiatives but leave operational matters, such as deploying peacekeeping missions, delivering pandemic relief, and concluding new climate deals, to the UN and other existing bodies. The concert would thus tee up decisions that could then be taken and implemented elsewhere. It would sit atop and backstop, not supplant, the current international architecture by maintaining a dialogue that does not now exist. The UN is too big, too bureaucratic, and too formalistic. Fly-in, fly-out G-7 or G-20 summits can be useful but even at their best are woefully inadequate, in part because so much effort goes toward haggling over detailed, but often anodyne, communiqués. Phone calls between heads of state, foreign ministers, and national security advisers are too episodic and often narrow in scope. Fashioning major-power consensus on the international norms that guide statecraft, accepting both liberal and illiberal governments as legitimate and authoritative, advancing shared approaches to crises—the Concert of Europe relied on these important innovations to preserve peace in a multipolar world. By drawing on lessons from its nineteenth-century forebearer, a twenty-first-century global concert can do the same. Concerts do lack the certitude, predictability, and enforceability of alliances and other formalized pacts. But in designing mechanisms to preserve peace amid geopolitical flux, policymakers should strive for the workable and the attainable, not the desirable but impossible. A GLOBAL CONCERT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY A global concert would have six members: China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Democracies and nondemocracies would have equal standing, and inclusion would be a function of power and influence, not values or regime type. The concert’s members would collectively represent roughly 70 percent of both global GDP and global military spending. Including these six heavyweights in the concert’s ranks would give it geopolitical clout while preventing it from becoming an unwieldy talk shop. Members would send permanent representatives of the highest diplomatic rank to the global concert’s standing headquarters. Although they would not be formal members of the concert, four regional organizations—the African Union, Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Organization of American States (OAS)—would maintain permanent delegations at the concert’s headquarters. These organizations would provide their regions with representation and the ability to help shape the concert’s agenda. When discussing issues affecting these regions, concert members would invite delegates from these bodies as well as select member states to join meetings. For example, were concert members to address a dispute in the Middle East, they could request the participation of the Arab League, its relevant members, and other involved parties, such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey. A global concert would shun codified rules, instead relying on dialogue to build consensus. Like the Concert of Europe, it would privilege the territorial status quo and a view of sovereignty that precludes, except in the case of international consensus, using military force or other coercive tools to alter existing borders or topple regimes. This relatively conservative baseline would encourage buy-in from all members. At the same time, the concert would provide an ideal venue for discussing globalization’s impact on sovereignty and the potential need to deny sovereign immunity to nations that engage in certain egregious activities. Those activities might include committing genocide, harboring or sponsoring terrorists, or severely exacerbating climate change by destroying rainforests. Policymakers should strive for the workable and the attainable, not the desirable but impossible. A global concert would thus put a premium on dialogue and consensus. The steering group would also acknowledge, however, that great powers in a multipolar world will be driven by realist concerns about hierarchy, security, and regime continuity, making discord inescapable. Members would reserve the right to take unilateral action, alone or through coalitions, when they deem their vital interests to be at stake. Direct strategic dialogue would, though, make surprise moves less common and, ideally, unilateral action less frequent. Regular and open consultation between Moscow and Washington, for example, might have produced less friction over NATO enlargement. China and the United States are better off directly communicating with each other over Taiwan than sidestepping the issue and risking a military mishap in the Taiwan Strait or provocations that could escalate tensions. A global concert could also make unilateral moves less disruptive. Conflicts of interest would hardly disappear, but a new vehicle devoted exclusively to great-power diplomacy would help make those conflicts more manageable. Although members would, in principle, endorse a norm-governed international order, they would also embrace realistic expectations about the limits of cooperation and compartmentalize their differences. During the nineteenth-century concert, its members frequently confronted stubborn disagreements over, for instance, how to respond to liberal revolts in Greece, Naples, and Spain. But they kept their differences at bay through dialogue and compromise, returning to the battlefield in the Crimean War in 1853 only after the revolutions of 1848 spawned destabilizing currents of nationalism. A global concert would give its members wide leeway when it comes to domestic governance. They would effectively agree to disagree on questions of democracy and political rights, ensuring that such differences do not hinder international cooperation. The United States and its democratic allies would not cease criticizing illiberalism in China, Russia, or anywhere else, and neither would they abandon their effort to spread democratic values and practices. On the contrary, they would continue to raise their voices and wield their influence to defend universal political and human rights. At the same time, China and Russia would be free to criticize the domestic policies of the concert’s democratic members and publicly promote their own vision of governance. But the concert would also work toward a shared understanding of what constitutes unacceptable interference in other countries’ domestic affairs and, as a result, are to be avoided. OUR BEST HOPE Establishing a global concert would admittedly constitute a setback to the liberalizing project launched by the world’s democracies after World War II. The proposed steering group’s aspirations set a modest bar compared with the West’s long-standing aim of spreading republican governance and globalizing a liberal international order. Nonetheless, this scaling back of expectations is unavoidable given the twenty-first century’s geopolitical realities. The international system, for one, will exhibit characteristics of both bipolarity and multipolarity. There will be two peer competitors—the United States and China. Unlike during the Cold War, however, ideological and geopolitical competition between them will not encompass the world. On the contrary, the EU, Russia, and India, as well as other large states such as Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey, and South Africa, will likely play the two superpowers off each other and seek to preserve a significant measure of autonomy. Both China and the United States will also likely limit their involvement in unstable zones of less strategic interest, leaving it to others—or no one—to manage potential conflicts. China has long been smart enough to keep its political distance from far-off conflict zones, while the United States, which is currently pulling back from the Middle East and Africa, has learned that the hard way. The international system of the twenty-first century will therefore resemble that of nineteenth-century Europe, which had two major powers—the United Kingdom and Russia—and three powers of lesser rank—France, Prussia, and Austria. The Concert of Europe’s primary objective was to preserve peace among its members through a mutual commitment to upholding the territorial settlement reached at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The pact rested on good faith and a shared sense of obligation, not contractual agreement. Any actions required to enforce their mutual commitments, according to a British memorandum, “have been deliberately left to arise out of the circumstances of the time and of the case.” Concert members recognized their competing interests, especially when it came to Europe’s periphery, but sought to manage their differences and prevent them from jeopardizing group solidarity. The United Kingdom, for example, opposed Austria’s proposed intervention to reverse a liberal revolt that took place in Naples in 1820. Nonetheless, British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh eventually assented to Austria’s plans provided that “they were ready to give every reasonable assurance that their views were not directed to purposes of aggrandizement subversive of the Territorial System of Europe.” A global concert would give its members wide leeway when it comes to domestic governance. A global concert, like the Concert of Europe, is well suited to promoting stability amid multipolarity. Concerts limit their membership to a manageable size. Their informality allows them to adapt to changing circumstances and prevents them from scaring off powers averse to binding commitments. Under conditions of rising populism and nationalism, widespread during the nineteenth century and again today, powerful countries prefer looser groupings and diplomatic flexibility to fixed formats and obligations. It is no accident that major states have already been turning to concert-like groupings or so-called contact groups to tackle tough challenges; examples include the six-party talks that addressed North Korea’s nuclear program, the P5+1 coalition that negotiated the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and the Normandy grouping that has been seeking a diplomatic resolution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The concert can be understood as a standing contact group with a global purview. Separately, the twenty-first century will be politically and ideologically diverse. Depending on the trajectory of the populist revolts afflicting the West, liberal democracies may well be able to hold their own. But so too will illiberal regimes. Moscow and Beijing are tightening their grip at home, not opening up. Stable democracy is **hard to find** in the Middle East and Africa. Indeed, **democracy is receding,** not advancing, worldwide—a trend that could well continue. The international order that comes next must make room for ideological diversity. A concert has the necessary informality and flexibility to do so; it separates issues of domestic rule from those of international teamwork. During the nineteenth century, it was precisely this hands-off approach to regime type that enabled two liberalizing powers—the United Kingdom and France—to work with Russia, Prussia, and Austria, three countries determined to defend absolute monarchy. Finally, the inadequacies of the current international architecture underscore the need for a global concert. The rivalry between the United States and China is heating up fast, the **world is suffering** through a devastating pandemic, climate change is advancing, and the evolution of cyberspace poses new threats. These and other challenges mean that clinging to the status quo and banking on existing international norms and institutions would be dangerously naive. The Concert of Europe was formed in 1815 owing to the years of devastation wrought by the Napoleonic Wars. But the lack of great-power war today should not be cause for complacency. And even though the world has passed through previous eras of multipolarity, the advance of globalization increases the demand for and importance of new approaches to global governance. Globalization unfolded during Pax Britannica, with London overseeing it until World War I. After a dark interwar hiatus, the United States took up the mantle of global leadership from World War II into the twenty-first century. But Pax Americana is now running on fumes. The United States and its traditional democratic partners have neither the capability nor the will to anchor an interdependent international system and universalize the liberal order that they erected after World War II. The absence of U.S. leadership during the COVID-19 crisis was striking; each country was on its own. President Biden is guiding the United States back to being a team player, but the nation’s pressing domestic priorities and the onset of multipolarity will deny Washington the outsize influence it once enjoyed. Allowing the world to slide toward regional blocs or a two-bloc structure similar to that of the Cold War is a nonstarter. The United States, China, and the rest of the globe cannot fully uncouple when national economies, financial markets, and supply chains are irreversibly tethered together. A great-power steering group is the best option for managing an integrated world no longer overseen by a hegemon. A global concert fits the bill.