## 1

#### Interpretation: On the 2021-2022 NDCA LD Wiki, the affirmative debater must disclose all theory interpretations that have been read in the 1AR and 1AC in open source documents, cite boxes, or round reports

#### Violation: they don’t – its not in osource, cite boxes, or round reports – I’ll attach osource in the chain

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#### Standards:

#### 1] Norming – none of your shells set norms because we don’t know what they are – wiki’s key because its where most people get information about debates – only the interp allows for the negative to be fair and respect norms. Turns aff flex because we could’ve made the debate round fair for you.

#### 2] Prep skew – you can see what a fair affirmative is since I have disclosed all my neg theory interps but it’s impossible for the negative to be fair because we don’t know what you want us to meet. That outweighs aff theory because we could’ve been fair but you chose not to let us.

#### 3] Not disclosing open source documents on the NDCA 2021-22 wiki is also a voting issue for evidence ethics – we can’t check if their evidence is unethically highlighted which outweighs because cheating is a side constraint on educational activities.

#### 4] New, undisclosed affirmatives are a voting issue – kills clash and prep because you can break cheap shot affs with no lit and win based off it being new, not good. Explodes neg prep burden because we don’t know what the aff is. Plan text standard text solves fairness and innovation.

#### Out of round violations outweigh – lexically prior and magnitude – affects the entire round including prep

#### Paradigm issues –

#### Vote neg on substance – a] I was so skewed on substance so that I couldn’t win it b] I couldn’t engage in the aff in the first place

#### Fairness – its constitutive to debate as competitive activity that requires objective evaluation. Controls the I/L to education because you don’t learn from an already skewed round.

#### No wiki glitches – a] you could’ve just disclosed it with your other arguments that did not glitch b] you need to provide verifiable proof otherwise this isn’t an argument c] here’s a link to dan xu’s wiki who reads the same affs as you: https://hsld.debatecoaches.org/Houston%20Memorial/Xu%20Aff

#### No “I could’ve asked” – doesn’t solve any of our norming offense, skews pre-round preparation, and the burden to disclose and set norms is on you not me.

#### DTD – a] deters future abuse b] my strat has already been skewed so it’s the only way to rectify the abuse c] new aff theory interps should also be disclosed before the round to maximize neg fairness and its better for norming if we choose not the violate

#### Not disclosing the underview before the round is a voting issue – prevents us from rigorously testing your norm and we could’ve crafted a fair 1nc – 4 minutes of prep isn’t enough to create a new one.

#### Competing interps – a] reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation b] reasonability collapses since brightlines operate on an offense-defense paradigm

#### Norming outweighs – a] constitutivism– it’s the intrinsic purpose of theory and magnitude – it’s the only out of round impact which link turns their arguments because they assume a good model of debate b] out of round violations are a voting issue if they cause in-round skews

#### No RVIs – a] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, b] Encourages Baiting since the 1AC will purposely be abusive, and c] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

#### No cross-apps, overviews, or aff meta theory – engagement – we don’t get the theoretical clash benefits of debating a specific counterinterp

#### NC theory first - 1] They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] We have more speeches to norm over it 3] It was introduced first so it comes lexically prior.

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology 3] 1st and last speech 4] Infinite perms and up layering in the 1AR.

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR but I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention

#### Theory outweighs the ROB: 1] Procedural – determines the rules of the game which turns jurisdiction 2] turns – we couldn’t answer your argument

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew

## 2

#### The subject is alienated when it articulates its desires – incomplete signifiers structure the emergence of subjectivity and produce repetitive drives to fill the lack that justify coercive violence. Use reasonability on theory read against Ks – if you could reasonably clash with the K, the inclusion benefits we get from critical discussions sequentially outweighs marginal fairness concerns. Thus, the ROB is to traverse the fantasy – that means exposing drives.

Matheson 15 Calum Matheson, PhD, 2015, “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive,” University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, [Calum Matheson is author of Desiring the Bomb: Communication, Psychoanalysis, and the Atomic Age (University of Alabama). He is a former high school debater. His research focuses on intersections of rhetoric, media, and theories of psychoanalysis and deconstruction. His current work focuses on right-wing political extremism, conspiracy thinking, and Lacanian concepts of anxiety and psychosis. He has also published work on argument, history of rhetoric, and games. Dr. Matheson is a former debate coach at Harvard University and a current candidate at the Pittsburgh Psychoanalytic Center.], <https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/concern/dissertations/6682x4537>, SJBE

The Real Jacques Lacan’s notion of the Real is notoriously difficult to define. In his book on the subject, Tom Eyers calls it the “most elusive” of Lacan’s concepts, but one that is also one that is “central” and “determining” for psychoanalysis (1). There are common elements of the various definitions. First, an agreement that both the economy of tropes that allows the conditions for meaning to emerge (the Symbolic) and the meanings and values invested in these tropes, including the subject itself (the Imaginary), do not and cannot perfectly capture all of existence or experience. Second, this unassimilable remainder structures the Symbolic and Imaginary, just as they structure each other, and thus all three registers are knitted together as demonstrated in Lacan’s famous “Borromean Knot.” The Real is what escapes mediation, what disrupts language itself. To explain its significance and relationship to desire requires examining its foundational role in the formation of the subject. The Real can be understood as the constitutive lack of the subject, its separation from the rest of existence by the self-definition necessary for it to come into being in the first place. This is made clear in the mirror stage, where the subject moves from a fragmented, disorganized concept of the body to the “finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his [sic] entire mental development with its rigid structure” (Lacan, “Mirror Stage” 78). The formation of a discrete subject (a function in the Imaginary register) is a compromise. Its formation allows for participation in the Symbolic because to participate in that economy of exchange requires a “social I” (Lacan, “Mirror stage,” 79). This participation comes at the cost of alienation because the subject trades in a world of symbols which by their nature stand in for what is not present, and thus inescapably mediate the (Real) world outside of the subject, rather than making it present. This lack built in to the subject is the engine of desire: the subject’s divide from an object is a prerequisite for the desire of such an object, but the condition of mediation makes it impossible to ever incorporate it in a perfectly satisfying way. Thus desire remains unfulfilled and each chase for a symbol leads to another in loop which the very constitution of the subject dictates must be endless. This is the basic operation of the death drive which is not distinct from Eros. Were the impossible to occur and the drive of Eros to be fulfilled, it would be extinguished, as there would be nothing left to desire. Thus all drives aim, in a sense, at their own extinction, and therefore there is in a sense only one—the drive that aims towards the extinction of desire through its complete fulfillment in continuity with the world that was lost when the subject became distinct from it in the mirror stage. Although the death drive might stand in for the singular character of the drive, it should not be understood as a desire for the actual biological death of the subject’s body, or even the desire to inflict death on others. The self-destruction of the death drive is a desire to break the limits of the self as the alienating armor of the subject by experiencing unmediated contact with the Real. Death still defines its operation in other ways. The last portion of Lacan’s “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” explains the metaphorical centrality of death as the center of a torus formed by incessant symbolization. The fort-da game is most significant not because it shows that the child wishes to destroy its mother or even inoculate itself against that possibility, but because it assimilates the child into the Symbolic order through the repetition of the signifiers fort and da, which stand in for presence and absence. Death is central to language because the symbol itself invokes the absence and loss of nonexistence since its function is to stand in for something that is gone. Language swirls around this absent center of death, a primordial absence encased in the inner ring of the torus, while the outer surfaces of language hold all else that cannot be symbolized at bay on the outside (Lacan, “Function and Field” 260-264). Paradoxically, death is necessarily evoked by the symbol as that which is absent and also made possible in the first place by that same symbol. The separation of the subject into its alienating identity as a social object makes a meaningful concept of death possible because without it there is no dasein, no individual, no singular human to die. George Bataille explains this with an entomological example. If a scientist picks one fly from a swarm, that fly is subject to death, because its end means the end of the discontinuous being selected by the entomologist. Without differentiation of its members, however, the swarm lives on; the selection of the fly is for the entomologist, not the animal (Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” 14-16). Thus it is with human beings. The subject is founded by a rejection of its sole animal nature by participating in a world of work and accumulation, mediated by language—essentially Lacan’s Symbolic. Thus individuals are made discontinuous with the general economy of matter and energy from which all things are formed by a conceptual separation inextricably bound up in death. Our existences are thus defined by discontinuity from a world of continuity, and for Bataille as for Lacan, our drives are singular in the sense that sex is a coupling that unifies with another and momentarily overcomes discontinuity just as death is the end of the subject’s brief separation from a universe differentiated only by the dismembering violence of our imposition of symbols upon it (Bataille, Erotism 13-17). The experience of death may still be unique because it suggests the absence implied by the sign and because it can be experienced only once by the subject—and for obvious reasons, cannot be symbolized by anyone with first-hand experience. As Freud argues in “Thoughts For The Times On War and Death,” we cannot even hope to imagine our own deaths because to do so demands that we imagine them from some perspective which would be destroyed in the experience itself. Death and the Real are therefore not identical, but are closely linked. The most important characteristic of the Real is not just that it suggests existence beyond language, but that this world-for-itself (to borrow from Eugene Thacker) intrudes on human reality and reveals it to be incomplete. Encompassing Max Picard’s concept of silence, the Real is not the absence of human reality so much as the traumatic revelation that that reality was always incomplete, always feigned in the face of existence so much more than human mediation has already covered. Chris Lundberg uses Lacan’s distinction between reality, being the social world of human construction, and the Real, being the occasional but inevitable failure of that reality, to develop his own distinction between failed unicity and feigned unicity. The Symbolic operates as an economy of interconnected and mutually-referential tropes weaving a kind of fabric that is the precondition for meaning, an environment in which social relationships can be understood in context. When the unified illusion of the social fails, we are compelled to stitch the tears in that fabric to maintain the world that gives us meaning (Lacan in Public 2-3). An account by Bill Laurence, the only journalist allowed to witness the Trinity test, provides evidence for this rupture and repair. While “not a sound could be heard” for the period after the flash and before the thunder, Laurence saw civilization itself collapse in an instant: The big boom came about one hundred seconds after the great flash—the first cry of a newborn world. It brought the silent, motionless silhouettes to life, gave them a voice. A loud cry filled the air. The little groups that had hitherto stood rooted to the earth like desert plants broke into a dance—the rhythm of primitive man dancing at one of his fire festivals at the coming of spring. They clapped their hands as they leaped from the ground…The dance of the primitive man lasted but a few seconds, during which an evolutionary period of about 10,000 years telescoped. Primitive man was metamorphosed into modern man—shaking hands, slapping his fellow on the back, all laughing like happy children. (12)

#### Their deployment of debate is an agential fantasy – the affirmative is an investment into subjectivity as a teleological entity dependent on external recognition to satisfy its goals, which is addicting and causes passivity. Proves theory and the K answer different questions – one says ur unfair and one says ur violent – not a contradiction because they both think you should lose

Lundberg 12 Dr. Christian Lundberg, 2012, “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric,” The University of Alabama Press, Dr. Lundberg is an associate professor and co-director of the University Program in Cultural Studies at UNC, he has a B.A. from the University of Redlands, a Master of Divinity from Emory University, and a Ph.D. in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, sjbe

“Ego,” then,names the economy of compensatory subjectivization driven by the repetition and refusal of demands. The nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfillment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the meta- phor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of develop- ment, must not be fulfilled. Thus, pop psychology observations that the in- cessant demands of children for impermissible objects (“may i have a fourth helping of dessert”) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authori- tative pronouncements (the game of asking never ending “whys”) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity-producing effects of the pa- rental “no.” in “The Question of Lay Analysis,” freud argues that “if . . . demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise . . . [and] . . . the ego begins to function. . . . [T]he driving force that sets the vehicle in mo- tion is derived from the id, the ego . . . undertakes the steering. . . . The task of the ego [is] . . . to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world.”31 Later, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and Civilization and Its Discontents, freud relocates the site of the ego’s genesis beyond the parent/child relationship and in the broader social relationships that animate it. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the indi- vidual’s attempts to fulfill certain desires, since some demands for the fulfill- ment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. The frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes and, by ex- tension, civilization writ large, although it does so at the cost of imposing a contested relationship between desire and social mores.32 Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” under- standing the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan’s theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and constraining political subject position. Lacan’s theory of the demand picks up at freud’s movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the parent/ child and individual/civilization toward a more general account of the sub- ject, sociality, and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoreti- cal movement transposes freud’s comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject’s entry into signification. As already noted, the Lacanian aphorism that “the signifier represents a subject for another signifier inverts the conventional wisdom that a pre-given subject uses language as an instrument to communicate its subjective inten- tions.”33 The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is si- multaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. An Es assumes an identity as a subject as a way of ac- commodating to the Symbolic’s demands and as a node for producing de- mands on its others or of being recognized as a subject.34 As i have already argued, the demand demonstrates that the enjoyment of one’s own subjec- tivity is useless surplus produced in the gap between the Es (or it) and the ideal i. As a result, there is excess jouissance that remains even after its reduc- tion to hegemony. This remainder may even be logically prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the subject and therefore conditions possibility for investment in an identitarian configuration. The site of this excess, where the subject negotiates the terms of a non- relationship with the Symbolic, is also the primary site differentiating need, demand, and desire. need approximates the position of the freudian id, in that it is a precursor to demand. Demand is the filtering of the need through signification, but as Sheridan notes, “there is no adequation between need and demand.”35 The same type of split that inheres in the freudian demand inheres in the Lacanian demand, although in Lacan’s case it is crucial to no- tice that the split does not derive from the empirical impossibility of ful- filling demands as much as it stems from the impossibility of articulating needs to or receiving a satisfactory response from the other. Thus, the speci- ficity of the demand becomes less relevant than the structural fact that de- mand presupposes the ability of the addressee to fulfill the demand.This im- possibility points to the paradoxical nature of demand: the demand is less a way of addressing need to the other than a call for love and recognition by it. “in this way,” writes Lacan, “demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very sat- isfactions that it obtains for need are reduced to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.”36 The other cannot, by definition, ever give this gift: the starting presupposition of the mirror stage is the con- stitutive impossibility of comfortably inhabiting the Symbolic. The struc- tural impossibility of fulfilling demands resonates with the freudian de- mand in that the frustration of demand produces the articulation of desire. Thus, Lacan argues that “desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second.”37 This sentiment animates the crucial Lacanian claim for the impossibility of the other giving a gift that it does not have, namely the gift of love: “all demand implies . . . a request for love. . . . Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need: this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which can be unconditional only in regards to the other . . . having no universal satisfaction. . . . it is this whim that introduces the phantom of omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the other in which his demand is installed.”38 This framing of demand reverses the classically liberal presupposition regarding demand and agency. Contemporary and classical liberal democratic theories presume that the demand is a way of exerting agency and, further, that the more firmly the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand, the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfill it. Hypothetically, demands ought reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an in- stitution or order to proffer a response should produce a reevaluation of the economy of demand and desire. in analytic terms, this is the moment of sub- traction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this “subtraction” is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoid- ances, or transposition but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, demanding subjects are either learning to reassert the centrality of their demand or coming to terms with the impotence of the other as a satisfier of demands: “But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered. . . . [T]his test of the desire of the other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it.”39 The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might “recognize and name” their own desire and, as a re- sult, become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or orga- nizing principle for political identity. Thus, desire has both a general status and a specific status for each subject. it is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: “Lacan is sure that everyone’s de- sire is somehow different and their own—lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language . . . passing through demand into desire, something from the Real, from the individual’s being before lan- guage, is retained as a trace enough to determine that i desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a . . . petit a is dif- ferent for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which i try to refind it.”40 Though individuated, this naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of thinking the uniqueness of individual subjects as a product of discourses that produce them. Thus, this is an account of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented toward or determined by the locus of the demand but that is also determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a sub- ject toward others and a political order and serve as the condition of possi- bility for demands.As Lacan argues,this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence or a new political possibility:“That the subject should come to recognize and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognizing something which would be en- tirely given. . . . in naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world.”41 Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit their desire, or as fink argues, “an analysis . . . that . . . does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand . . . unable to truly desire.”42 A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is by definition a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the ex- pense of ever articulating a desire that is theirs. in the Ethics of Psychoanaly- sis, Lacan argues that the hysteric’s demand that the other produce an object is the support of an aversion toward one’s desire: “the behavior of the hys- teric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centered on the object, in- sofar as this object . . . is . . . the support of an aversion.”43 This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their de- mands. on one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority, over the other.yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoy- ing the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus, “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the reg- ister of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an os- tensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the stu- dents’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. if not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impos- sibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straight- forward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hy- pothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoy- ment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria rep- resents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization.

#### That destroys politics, ethics, and the value to life

Ruti ‘14 (mari, English, Toronto, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 297–314) SJBE, recut from Harvard BoSu

On the other hand, Lacan – again like Marcuse – recognizes that the symbolic order is repressive beyond the demands of subject formation, that it includes forms of violence that exceed the ubiquitous violence of the signifier. Indeed, even the violence of the signifier is not equally distributed, so that some of us are much more vulnerable to its injurious effects than others (consider, for instance, hate speech). Lacan does not necessarily talk about the unequal distribution of resources in the manner Marcuse does, but there is no doubt that his analysis of symbolic law as the Law of the Father elucidates a historically specific, deeply heteropatriarchal and hierarchical organization of social life. In point of fact, one reason I have taken a detour through Marcuse is to illustrate the obvious ways in which Lacan’s portraiture of the symbolic mirrors that of Marcuse’s explicitly historical account: what Marcuse calls “the performance principle,” Lacan calls the “service of goods.” Both thinkers identify the underpinnings of a social order dominated by the ideal of productivity – an ideal that is, moreover, placed in direct opposition to the pleasure principle. Both emphasize that the dominant morality of this symbolic – what Lacan calls “the morality of the master” – measures the merit of lives based on largely pragmatic criteria. And both acknowledge that the model citizen of this symbolic is a subject who shows up at work reliably every morning, performs its duties with a degree of diligence, does not let its desires get the better of its productivity, and seeks satisfaction (“enjoys”) in moderate, socially sanctioned ways. “Part of the world has resolutely turned in the directions of the service of goods,” Lacan writes, “thereby rejecting everything that has to do with the relationship of man to desire” (318). This, he adds, “is what is known as the postrevolutionary perspective” (318). In other words, the service of goods reflects the mindset of the levelheaded utilitarian subject who has deemed revolutionary change to be unrealistic. Lacan is here referring to the kind of depoliticization that is arguably the hallmark of Western subjectivity under capitalism. Lacan’s point is by no means, as critics such as Butler have suggested, that a different kind of symbolic is intrinsically impossible but rather that the configuration of subjectivity that Western modernity has produced – a subjectivity that has been subjected to a particular form of surplus-repression (the performance principle, the service of goods) – makes it virtually impossible for us to entertain the idea that the symbolic could be organized differently, that it could be centered around a different version of the reality principle. As Marcuse remarks, one reason the performance principle is so powerful is that it has managed to convince us that all alternatives to it are either utopian or otherwise unpalatable. Yet, for Marcuse, the fact that this principle has been so successful also points to the possibility of transcending it. As he states, “The very progress of civilization under the performance principle has attained a level of productivity at which the social demands upon instinctual energy to be spent in alienated labor could be considerably reduced. Consequently, the continued repressive organization of the instincts seems to be necessitated less by the ‘struggle for existence’ than by the interest in prolonging this struggle – by the interest in domination” (pp. 129–130). This is to say that there is really nothing besides social power that keeps us invested in the notion that our welfare demands relentless toil. The performance principle has outlived its usefulness in the sense that our collective productivity these days surpasses what is necessary for the provision of food, clothing, housing, and other basic amenities. The fact that these amenities have not yet reached all corners of the world, or even all corners of our own society (the homeless, innercity dwellers, etc.), is a function of domination (the unequal distribution of resources) rather than of any deficiencies of productivity. As a result, in Marcuse’s view, all we would need to do to bring about a more “non-repressive civilization” (p. 134) would be to refuse the parameters of the current symbolic; even something as simple as reducing the length of the working day would immediately realign our priorities, perhaps even impacting the very organization of our psychic lives. Our standard of living might drop somewhat, but we might also learn to assess the value of our lives according to other, less performance-oriented, measurements. Psychoanalysis, particularly Lacanian analysis, does not have a normative goal; it does not seek to tell us how we should desire but merely to explore the idiosyncratic contours of our desire. But this does not change the fact that Lacan, at least as a theorist, was exasperated by people’s inability to make their way out of the maze of the master’s morality, including its performance principle; he was frustrated by individuals who were so out of touch with the truth of their desire that they were willing to sacrifice this desire for the sake of social conformity and that they were, furthermore, willing to do so to the point of self-betrayal. As he explains, “What I call ‘giving ground relative to one’s desire’ is always accompanied in the destiny of the subject by some betrayal – you will observe it in every case and should note its importance. Either the subject betrays his own way, betrays himself, and the result is significant for him, or, more simply, he tolerates the fact that someone with whom he has more or less vowed to do something betrays his hope and doesn’t do for him what their pact entailed” (p. 321). Such a betrayal invariably results in the reassertion of the status quo, sending the subject back to the service of goods, what Lacan in this context calls “the common path” (p. 321). And given that desire, for Lacan, is “the metonymy of our being” (p. 321), betraying it in this way leads to the kind of psychic death that extinguishes the subject’s sense of agency. To use Lacan’s wording, “Doing things in the name of the good, and even more in the name of the good of the other, is something that is far from protecting us not only from guilt but also from all kinds of inner catastrophes” (p. 319). It is precisely such inner catastrophes that Lacanian clinical practice was designed to counter, though it may be Julia Kristeva – rather than Lacan himself – who has most clearly developed this interpretation of analytic work. Kristeva depicts psychoanalysis as a means of restoring the subject’s psychic aliveness, as an explicit revolt against the numbing impact of what she calls “the society of the spectacle” (2002, p. 4). This society of the spectacle – of technology, image, and speed – shares many parallels with Adorno’s “culture industry”: a flattened surface of the life world, a constriction of psychic space, a death of critical thought, the worship of efficiency over intellectual curiosity, and the incapacity to revolt. Against this backdrop, psychoanalysis – along with art, writing, and some forms of religious experience – offers, for Kristeva, a gateway to revolt, a way of resurrecting “the life of the mind” (a phrase Kristeva borrows from Hannah Arendt) through ongoing questioning, interrogation, and psychic recreation. “Freud founded psychoanalysis as an invitation to anamnesis in the goal of a rebirth, that is, a psychical restructuring,” Kristeva writes: “Through a narrative of free association and in the regenerative revolt against the old law (familial taboos, superego, ideals, oedipal or narcissistic limits, etc.) comes the singular autonomy of each, as well as a renewed link with the other” (2002, p. 8). In the context of my overall argument in this essay, it is worth stressing that it is “the desire of the subject” that, in Kristeva’s view, reserves a place “for initiative, autonomy” (2002, p. 11). This is in part because the “Freudian journey into the night of desire was followed by attention to the capacity to think: never one without the other” (2010, p. 41). In other words, the exploration of desire, in psychoanalysis, is akin to the critical (or at least curious) movement of thought – the very movement that Arendt also saw as vital to the life of the mind. This is why psychoanalysis has, Kristeva asserts, “the (unique?) privilege today of accompanying the emergence of new capacities of thinking/representing/thinking, beyond the frequent and increasingly noticeable disasters of psychosomatic space – capacities that are so many new bodies and new lives” (2010, pp. 41–42). Kristeva therefore draws the same link between desire and autonomy (in this instance, the capacity for critical thought) as Lacan does. Furthermore, to translate Kristeva’s point into Marcuse’s terminology, one might say that psychoanalysis, at least the kind of analysis that refuses to uphold social adaptation as a therapeutic goal, presents the possibility of sidestepping, or at the very least diminishing, the effects of surplus-repression. This, in turn, creates space for the truth of the subject’s desire in the Lacanian sense. This does not mean that repression as such is defeated. Quite the contrary, as we will see shortly, the truth of the subject’s desire is inextricable from the primary (constitutive) repression that accompanies subject formation. But as I have already suggested, the lifting of surplus-repression renders the imprint of primary repression more clearly discernable, for when surplus-repression is removed, what remains are the always highly singular outlines of primary repression. And if Lacan – like Marcuse – sought to remove surplus-repression, it was because he understood that it was on the level of primary repression (fundamental fantasies) that one could find the most basic building blocks of the subject’s psychic destiny; primary repression was the layer of psychic life that expressed something essential about the distinctive ways in which the pleasure principle, in the subject’s life, had become bound up with the repetition compulsion. This is why Lacan states, “If analysis has a meaning, desire is nothing other than that which supports an unconscious theme, the very articulation of that which roots us in a particular destiny, and that destiny demands insistently that the debt be paid, and desire keeps coming back, keeps returning, and situates us once again in a given track, the track of something that is specifically our business” (p. 319).According to Lacan, analysis aims to enable us to understand something about the eccentric specificity (or truth) of our most fundamental desire as well as about the track of destiny that this desire carves out for us (and that is therefore “specifically our business”). If it is indeed the case, as I have conceded, that most of us tend to be alienated from our desire, Lacanian analysis strives to undo this alienation by familiarizing us with the truth of this desire. This process entails, among other things, recognizing that the destiny we owe to this desire can never be definitively overcome, that the debt of desire can never be fully redeemed (for how are we to compensate the signifier for having brought us into being as subjects of desire?). Our destiny – which might initially coincide quite seamlessly with our repetition compulsion – consists of recurring efforts to pay off this debt, which is why it keeps ushering us to the same track of desire, the same nexus of psychic conundrums, our unconscious hope being that if we wear out the track of our desire by incessant reiteration, one day we might be able to absolve ourselves of our debt. But since we cannot, the only thing to be done is to “own” our destiny even as we might seek to mitigate its more painful dimensions. That is, the only way to arrive at the kind of psychic rebirth Kristeva is talking about is to take full responsibility for our (unconsciously generated) destiny. In the ethical act, our impulse is to embrace this destiny wholesale regardless of consequences (this is one way to understand what it means to plunge into the jouissance of the real). In analysis, the exploration of our destiny is more gradual, more self-reflexive. But in both cases, the point is not to obliterate our foundational destiny (or fundamental fantasies) but merely to elaborate it in more satisfying directions, away from the incapacitating effects of the repetition compulsion and toward the rewards of subjective autonomy. And, if we are to achieve this goal, nothing is more important than staying faithful to the truth of desire that, on the most elementary level, determines our destiny.

#### Vote negative to embrace the lack – this requires being open to the anxiety that occurs from an encounter with the other and breaks down fantasy and drives.

McGowan 13 Todd McGowan, 2013, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London, SJBE

The alternative — the ethical path that psychoanalysis identifies — demands an embrace of the anxiety that stems from the encounter with the enjoying other. If there is a certain ethical dimension to anxiety, it lies in the rela- tionship that exists between anxiety and enjoyment. Contra Heidegger, the ethics of anxiety does not stem from anxiety’s relation to absence but from its relation to presence — to the overwhelming presence of the other’s enjoyment. In some sense, the encounter with absence or nothing is easier than the encounter with presence. Even though it traumatizes us, absence allows us to constitute ourselves as desiring subjects. Rather than producing anxiety, absence leads the subject out of anxiety into desire. Confronted with the lost object as a structuring absence, the subject is able to embark on the pursuit of the enjoyment embodied by this object, and this pursuit provides the subject with a clear sense of direction and even meaning. This is precisely what the subject lacks when it does not encounter a lack in the symbolic structure. When the subject encounters enjoyment at the point where it should encounter the absence of enjoyment, anxiety overwhelms the subject. In this situation, the subject cannot constitute itself along the path of desire. It lacks the lack — the absence — that would provide the space through which desire could develop. Consequently, this subject confronts the enjoying other and experiences anxiety. Unlike the subject of desire — or the subject of Heideggerean anxiety — the subject who suffers this sort of anxiety actually experiences the other in its real dimension.¶ The real other is the other caught up in its obscene enjoyment, caught up in this enjoyment in a way that intrudes on the subject. There is no safe distance from this enjoyment, and one cannot simply avoid it. There is nowhere in the contemporary world to hide from it. As a result, the contem- porary subject is necessarily a subject haunted by anxiety triggered by the omnipresent enjoyment of the other. And yet, this enjoyment offers us an ethical possibility. As Slavoj Žižek puts it, “It is this excessive and intrusive jouissance that we should learn to tolerate.”27 When we tolerate the other’s “excessive and intrusive jouissance” and when we endure the anxiety that it produces, we acknowledge and sustain the other in its real dimension.¶ Tolerance is the ethical watchword of our epoch. However, the problem with contemporary tolerance is its insistence on tolerating the other only insofar as the other cedes its enjoyment and accepts the prevailing symbolic structure. That is to say, we readily tolerate the other in its symbolic dimen- sion, the other that plays by the rules of our game. This type of tolerance allows the subject to feel good about itself and to sustain its symbolic identity. The problem is that, at the same time, it destroys what is in the other more than the other — the particular way that the other enjoys.¶ It is only the encounter with the other in its real dimension — the encounter that produces anxiety in the subject — that sustains that which defines the other as such. Authentic tolerance tolerates the real other, not simply the other as mediated through a symbolic structure. In this sense, it involves the experience of anxiety on the part of the subject. This is a difficult posi- tion to sustain, as it involves enduring the “whole opaque weight of alien enjoyment on your chest.”The obscene enjoyment of the other bombards the authentically tolerant subject, but this subject does not retreat from the anxiety that this enjoyment produces. If the embrace of the anxiety that accompanies the other’s proximate enjoyment represents the ethical position today, this does not necessarily provide us with an incentive for occupying it. Who wants to be ethical when it involves enduring anxiety rather than finding a way — a drug, a new authority, or something — to alleviate it? What good does it do to sustain oneself in anxiety? In fact, anxiety does the subject no good at all, which is why it offers the subject the possibility of enjoyment. When the subject encounters the other’s enjoyment, this is the form that its own enjoyment takes as well. To endure the anxiety caused by the other’s enjoyment is to experience one’s own simultaneously. As Lacan points out, when it comes to the enjoyment of the other and my own enjoyment, “nothing indicates they are distinct.” Thus, not only is anxiety an ethical position, it is also the key to embracing the experience of enjoyment. To reject the experience of anxiety is to flee one’s own enjoyment.¶ The notion that the other’s enjoyment is also our own enjoyment seems at first glance difficult to accept. Few people enjoy themselves when they hear someone else screaming profanities in the workplace or when they see a couple passionately kissing in public, to take just two examples. In these instances, we tend to recoil at the inappropriateness of the activity rather than enjoy it, and this reaction seems completely justified. The public display of enjoyment violates the social pact with its intrusiveness; it doesn’t let us alone but assaults our senses. It violates the implicit agreement of the public sphere constituted as an enjoyment-free zone. And yet, recoiling from the other’s enjoyment deprives us of our own.¶ How we comport ourselves in relation to the other’s enjoyment indi- cates our relationship to our own. What bothers us about the other — the disturbance that the other’s enjoyment creates in our existence — is our own mode of enjoying. If we did not derive enjoyment from the other’s enjoyment, witnessing it would not bother us psychically. We would sim- ply be indifferent to it and focused on our own concerns. Of course, we might ask an offending car radio listener to turn the radio down so that we wouldn’t have to hear the unwanted music, but we would not experience the mere exhibition of alien enjoyment through the playing of that music as an affront. The very fact that the other’s enjoyment captures our attention demonstrates our intimate — or extimate — relation to it. This relation becomes even clearer when we consider the epistemo- logical status of the enjoying other. Because the real or enjoying other is irreducible to any observable identity, we have no way of knowing whether or not the other really is enjoying. A stream of profanity may be the result of someone hurting a toe. The person playing the car radio too loud while sitting at the traffic light may have simply forgotten to turn down the radio after driving on the highway. Or the person may have difficulty hearing. The couple’s amorous behavior in public may reflect an absence of enjoyment in their relationship that they are trying to hide from both themselves and the public.¶ Considering the enjoyment of the other, we never know whether it is there or not. If we experience it, we do so through the lens of our own fantasy. We fantasize that the person blasting the radio is caught up in the enjoyment of the music to the exclusion of everything else; we fantasize that the public kisses of the couple suggest an enjoyment that has no concern for the outside world. Without the fantasy frame, the enjoying other would never appear within our experience.¶ The role of the fantasy frame for accessing the enjoying other becomes apparent within Fascist ideology. Fascism posits an internal enemy — the figure of the Jew or some analogue — that enjoys illicitly at the expense of the social body as a whole. By attempting to eliminate the enjoying other, Fascism hopes to create a pure social body bereft of any stain of enjoy- ment. This purity would allow for the ultimate enjoyment, but it would be completely licit. This hope for a future society free of any stain is not where Fascism’s true enjoyment lies, however. Fascists experience their own enjoyment through the enjoying other that they persecute. The enjoy- ment that the figure of the Jew embodies is the Fascists’ own enjoyment, though they cannot avow it as their own. More than any other social form, Fascism is founded on the disavowal of enjoyment — the attempt to enjoy while keeping enjoyment at arm’s length. But this effort is not confined to Fascism; it predominates everywhere, because no subjects anywhere can simply feel comfortable with their own mode of enjoying.¶ The very structure of enjoyment is such that we cannot experience it directly: when we experience enjoyment, we don’t have it; it has us. We experience our own enjoyment as an assault coming from the outside that dominates our conscious intentions. This is why we must fantasize our own enjoyment through the enjoying other. Compelled by our enjoyment, we can’t do otherwise; we act against our self-interest and against our own good. Enjoyment overwhelms the subject, even though the subject’s mode of enjoying marks what is most singular about the subject.¶ Even though the encounter with the enjoying other apprehends the real other through the apparatus of fantasy, this encounter is nonetheless genuine and has an ethical status. Unlike the experience of the nonexistent symbolic identity, which closes down the space in which the real other might appear, the fantasized encounter with the enjoying other leaves this space open. By allowing itself to be disturbed by the other on the level of fantasy, the subject acknowledges the singularity of the real other — its mode of enjoying — without confining this singularity to a prescribed identity.¶ The implications of privileging the encounter with the disturbing enjoy- ment of the real other over the assimilable symbolic identity are themselves disturbing. The tolerant attitude that never allows itself to be jarred by the enjoying other becomes, according to this way of seeing things, further from really encountering the real other than the attitude of hate and mis- trust. The liberal subject who welcomes illegal immigrants as fellow citizens completely shuts down the space for the other in the real. The immigrant as fellow citizen is not the real other. The xenophobic conservative, on the other hand, constructs a fantasy that envisions the illegal immigrant awash in a linguistic and cultural enjoyment that excludes natives. This fantasy, paradoxically, permits an encounter with the real other that liberal tolerance forecloses. Of course, xenophobes retreat from this encounter and from their own enjoyment, but they do have an experience of it that liberals do not. The tolerant liberal is open to the other but eliminates the otherness, while the xenophobic conservative is closed to the other but allows for the otherness. The ethical position thus involves sustaining the liberal’s toler- ance within the conservative’s encounter with the real other.

## Case

### Underview

#### 1] Spikes that aren’t on top are a voting issue- it means I have to wait for the 1ac to finish to formulate a strategy since I don’t know what you’re going to read which moots 6 min of prep

#### 2] Aff underviews are a voting issue—one small theory analytic can take out huge chunks of the 1nc which kills substantive clash which outweighs because you initiated it

#### 3] New 2NR Responses- A] none of the spikes have a clear implication in the 1ac B] It’s key to robustly contest their norm. C] Stops them from hiding tricks in random parts of the aff

#### 4] Negating is harder so auto reject aff fairness claims – they have a 2ar judge psychology advantage and have infinite prep before round

#### 5] No time skew –

#### A] 13-13

#### B] you can do drills and get faster

#### C] time skew is good for critical thinking

#### D] justifying time skew can be generically applied to answer 1nc theory arguments which kills norming

#### E] The aff can read theory in the 1ac to check abuse

#### 6] No invincible 2NR – the 2ar has judge persuasion and the last word

#### 7] No ROB spec arguments – conditions of specification are arbitrary which means we can never meet

### Framing

#### 1] Form over content – a] their speech-act controls the way that we understand and interpret their framework, b] it shouldn’t matter how correct you are if you engaged in unethical practices along the way, both of these mean that you should evaluate the K as a side-constraint on how we view things like the affirmative framework.

#### 2] Their Framing speaks to the judge as a subject but psychoanalysis controls the identity formation that allows them to identify with their framework – we hijack their understanding of subjectivity

Seshadri-Crooks 2k Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, “Desiring Whiteness: A Lacanian analysis of race,” Routledge, ISBN 0-203-45478-2 SJBE

One of the major problems of this commonplace view of Freud’s psychical topography is that it produces an atomized notion of “the individual subject” (an oxymoron that Paul Smith [1988] has convincingly argued against) whose private pathology seems to resist the possibility of generalization. Not only does this view reproduce the problems of the private versus the public, but it also disengages the subject from what Lacan terms the big “Other,” or the structure of language that constitutes the subject qua subject in the symbolic order. In short, it makes inter-subjectivity a matter of object relations between unified and wholly knowable “selves.” For Lacan, Freud’s “promethean discovery” (E: 34) is the emphasis on the primacy of speech and language. “Whether it sees itself as an instrument of healing, of training, or of exploration in depth, psychoanalysis has only a single medium: the patient’s speech” (E: 40). Thus “what the psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious is the whole structure of language” (E: 147). This radical shift in emphasis of the “meaning” of the unconscious has two immediate consequences for psychoanalysis in general that become pivotal for the analysis of race: first, it interrogates the intensely private notion of the individual as a product of personal psychology; second, this interrogation, grounded as it is in the structure of language, permits a level of generalization that opens psychoanalysis to an interrogation of the structure of language, and thus of the subject, prior to the meaning and the identities it produces. In the “Rome report,” Lacan writes: the unconscious is that part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of the subject in reestablishing the continuity of his conscious discourse. This disposes of the paradox presented by the concept of the unconscious if it is related to an individual reality. (E: 49–50) Thus the unconscious is to be conceived not so much as an individual construct as an entity that bridges the subject to the general economy of signification. In other words, the necessary insertion of the subject into language implies his/ her subjection to the general or shared universe of signifiers, which must come to represent one’s desire. The important point here is that insofar as language pre-exists each of us, the subject in his or her specificity can come into existence only by borrowing the signifiers of its desire from the Other.10 It follows then, that desire is always desire of the Other. Thus it becomes logically impossible to conceive of the atomized “individual” with an unconscious interior. On the contrary, in Lacan, the unconscious is outside rather than inside, in that it is the discourse of the Other, which is primarily meaningless, that produces subjective effects. Given this perspective of the subject in language, the discourse of race and so-called racial identity is necessarily a function of language that situates the subject as raced within an economy of linguistic difference and meaning. It follows that the analysis of race should not be confined to the level of the ego and the ego ideal with its attendant mechanisms such as identification and introjection (and/or incorporation) of an object. In Seminar I, Lacan insists that “introjection is always accompanied by a symbolic denomination. Introjection is always introjection of the speech of the Other” (83). Thus bodily identity as well as one’s own historical identity is engendered by the symbolic. What we introject as race is a signifier, a certain structure of signification, a way of slicing the world, of making meaning and of representing difference, that has its own logic or law that invests us as subjects with a semblance of coherence. My argument is that “Whiteness” should be discerned as an unconscious signifier, one that generates a combinatory with its own set of inclusions and exclusions that determine the subject. To be a raced subject is to be subjected to the signifier Whiteness. The law of Whiteness establishes race as a “neutral” description of human difference. Thus, as a mode of ordering the world, the signifier Whiteness installs a system of racial difference that is unconsciously assimilated by all raced subjects as a factor of language, and thus as “natural.” In other words, Whiteness, as the inaugural term of difference, is the primary signifier of the symbolic order of race. In this sense, Whiteness is the transindividual aspect of the unconscious which subjects us all “equally” to the logic of race. The law of the symbolic order must be grasped in its dual function as the determinant of the structure of speech and as the inexorable term of prohibition. In fact, language depends upon prohibition or a logic of exclusion, which gets manifested as cultural organization through the taboo against incest. We must therefore understand the discourse of race as a law with a certain structure, or productive capacity to organize difference founded upon a prohibition or exclusion of some sort. (I will take up the interdictory aspect of the law in the section on the racial symbolic and the moral law.) Let us here follow, very briefly, Lacan’s thinking on the law as structuration in its pertinence to “race.” It is, of course, well known that Lacan derived his notion of the symbolic order from Lévi-Strauss’ notion of the symbolic organization of culture. In his “Rome report,” he elaborates on the relationship of language to the structure of kinship systems that Lévi-Strauss observed as a “universal” factor of social organization: In this structure, whose harmony or conflicts govern the restricted or generalized exchange discerned in it by the social anthropologist, the startled theoretician finds the whole logic of combinations: Thus the laws of number—that is to say, the laws of the most refined of all symbols— prove to be immanent in the original symbolism. (E: 66) For Lacan, it is the discovery that the abstract, even meaningless, laws of number are ultimately manifested as social structure or kinship that fuels his entire theory of the Other. This Other is constitutive of the subject as the subject of language, and whose psychical organization is made possible by a fundamental prohibition. The reference here is, of course, to the structure of kinship as based on the incest taboo and the exchange of women. Lacan’s emphasis here falls, in what has been perceived as a controversial move, not on the reduction of women to signs that are exchanged on the basis of patriarchally ordered kinship nominations (the name of the father), but on the fact that this law, then, is revealed clearly enough as identical with an order of language. For without kinship nominations no power is capable of momentarily. I will for the moment look more closely at Lacan’s theory of the symbolic law in its function as structure. In his lecture on psychoanalysis and cybernetics, Lacan speaks of the game of odds and evens to ask “what is the chance of the unconscious, which in some way lies behind man?” (III: 300). Cybernetics, he suggests, has to do with conjecture, the order of binary oppositions that has an internal logic and does not necessarily convey meaning. Lacan uses the metaphor of the door— its peculiar oscillation between closing and opening—to describe the scansion of binary logic, its ordered action of a series of combinations. “The important thing here is to realise that the chain of possible combinations of the encounter can be studied as such, as an order which subsists in its rigour, independently of all subjectivity” (II: 304). The absence of inherent meaning in such a combinatory prompts Lacan to ask: What is the meaning of meaning? Meaning is the fact that the human being isn’t master of this primordial, primitive language. He has been thrown into it, committed, caught up in its gears.... We must marvel at the paradox. Here man isn’t master in his own house. There is something into which he integrates himself, which through its combinations already governs. The passage of man from the order of nature to the order of culture follows the same mathematical combinations which will be used to classify and explain. Claude Lévi-Strauss calls them the elementary structures of kinship. And yet primitive men are not supposed to have been Pascals. Man is engaged with all his being in the procession of numbers, in a primitive symbolism which is distinct from imaginary representations. It is in the middle of that that something of man has to gain recognition. But what has to be recognised, Freud teaches us, is not expressed, but repressed. (II: 307) The subject integrates himself into the order of meanings, which is governed by an abstract non-representational structure of material signifiers. “Man” must find confirmation of his place in the chain of signifiers, but paradoxically he is “man” because it is unavailable to him; he is marked or constituted by the signifier, which remains repressed. In relation to “race,” we can assume the prevalence of a master signifier that is “introjected,” that we identify with in our unconscious, and which gives us our sense of having a racial identity. We can already see how the discourse of race, insofar as it is symbolic, is already intimately related to or even dissimulates kinship and the nature of sexual difference that kinship entails. Though Lacan stresses the autonomy of the signifying chain in the constitution of the unconscious as that which carries its own logic of possibilities and impossibilities, he nevertheless underscores its subjective effects: While the subject doesn’t think about it, the symbols continue to mount one another, to copulate, to proliferate, to fertilise each other, to jump on each other, to tear each other apart. And when you take one out, you can project on to it the speech of this unconscious subject we’ve been talking about. In other words, even if the word of my life had to be sought in something as long as an entire recital of the Aeneid, it isn’t unthinkable that a machine would in time succeed in reconstituting it. Now, any machine can be reduced to a series of relays which are simply pluses and minuses. Everything, in the symbolic order, can be represented with the aid of such a series. (II: 185) This fecund structure, marked by the play of signifiers, determines the subject’s existence. This also implies that the structure, or this Other, speaks in and for the subject and remembers for him or her. The subject’s memory, usually unconscious, is to be distinguished from remembering in the more narrativistic sense of the term. Lacan suggests that we mustn’t confuse the history, in which the unconscious subject inscribes himself, with his memory.... On the contrary, at the point we have reached, it is important to draw a very sharp distinction between memory and remembering [rememoration], which pertains to the order of history. Memory has been spoken of as a means of characterising the living organism as such. One then says that a living substance, following a given experience, undergoes a transformation such that it will no longer react to the same experience in the same way as before.... [T]here is no reason to identify this memory, a definable property of living substance, with remembering, the grouping and the succession of symbolically defined events, the pure symbol engendering in its turn a succession. (II: 185) Subjective memory works like an automaton, marking and manipulating the subject even as it produces him or her in one’s particularity. In relation to race, this model is again useful in catalyzing a major shift from essentialist, or even historicist notions of “racial memory,” as hoary contents coded genetically, spiritually, discursively, culturally, in particular groups characterizing identity, to memory of race as contentless signifiers, a chain of difference reproduced mechanically by the functioning of language. How does such an understanding of the “memory” of race affect analysis? First, it must be acknowledged that the account I have given of “the subject of race” using Lacan’s model of the symbolic is too deterministic. It is also incomplete. The subject is not simply the figure that emerges when all the dots are connected; the subject is also constituted or determined by the not fully inscribed page—the gaps in the chain that connect the pieces. This is a fundamental proposition in Lacan, and it is not the question of a shift in emphasis referred to earlier. What the unconscious also registers is the lack or the desire of the subject that can never be fully expressed in language. “The unconscious is, in the subject, a schism of the symbolic system, a limitation, an alienation induced by the symbolic system” (I: 196). This discovery of fundamental disjunction in the subject, that he/she merely marks a place between signifiers in a chain of signifiers, is the aim of analysis. The subject goes well beyond what is experienced “subjectively” by the individual, exactly as far as the truth he is able to attain.... Yes, this truth of his history is not all contained in his script, and yet the place marked there by the painful shock he feels from knowing only his own lines, and not simply there, but also in pages whose disorder gives him little comfort. (E: 55) In the deployment of Lacan’s theory of the subject of the symbolic to “the subject of race,” it is necessary to inquire what the subject of race desires. Also, what kind of access does race, as a chain of signifiers that determines the symbolic subject, have to “being,” or that which is excluded by the chain? I will be suggesting that racial visibility is to be located precisely at this point of interrogation: it is the level at which race, or more properly its master signifier “Whiteness” aspires to being. The above questions suggest that the model of the subject as determined by a chain of signifiers is necessarily incomplete insofar as it cannot account for sexual difference or more properly for the body. More questions emerge: If the unconscious is structured like a language, then how is the body constituted? If sexual difference is merely a question of the signifier, how do we account for the body’s drives, or for sexuality that is often at odds with the logic of sexual difference? In relation to “race,” to stop with the account of the symbolic function of Whiteness would be too premature, for it does not address the issue of visibility, or the relation of the signifier to the visible body, which is, after all, the inaugural point of this inquiry. In order to take up in earnest the question of the body and of its constitution as raced, it is necessary to clarify the relation between the ego as body image and racial visibility. First, one must repudiate the notion that race is merely a process of specular identification, where a pre-discursive and pre-raced entity assumes a racial identity on the basis of certain familial others whose image it identifies with in a mirror relation. Such a notion is based on a simplified account of Lacan’s concept of the imaginary and the mirror stage. I undertake the following discussion of the imaginary for two reasons: to suggest that insofar as the symbolic underwrites the imaginary, race must be understood as a symbolic phenomenon. It is a logic of difference inaugurated by a signifier, Whiteness, that is grounded in the unconscious structured like a language. This signifier subjects us all equally to its law regardless of our identities as “black,” “white,” etc. Racial visibility is a remainder of this symbolic system. Second, the process of becoming racially visible is not coterminous with the organization of the ego or the acquisition of the body image. In other words, the visibility of the body does not necessarily have to be a racial visibility. It is important that one disarticulate the two processes; otherwise racial visibility will seem to be an ontological necessity that is a universal verity of subjective existence as such.

#### Dogmatism paradox assumes you know the aff is true and negates because I know the 1nc is true

#### Principle of explosion negates – the appropriation of outer space is unjust or vote negative and we know the first part is false.

#### Fake news negates – negative is true so vote negative and don’t evaluate aff arguments because they’re fake news

#### Decision making paradox – vote neg to break the paradox since they should be punished for starting the regress – outweighs on pre meditated murder

#### Multiple worlds negates – infinite worlds negate but only one affirms. We live in the one that negates which outweighs

#### Condo logic negates – A] if either the aff or neg is winning, the neg should get the ballot B] if either Tommy or Jet is winning, Jet should get the ballot. Outweighs because we have 2 statements that encompass yours

#### Negating affirms – Worthy of contestation doesn’t mean they’re true. Also I disprove them.

#### I am the GCD so vote for me because I’m infinitely good.

#### A] EmpiricsTable Description automatically generated with medium confidence

#### B] I will mind control them to contest the neg.

#### TJF’s –

#### They’re a voting issue because they skirt phil ed since they make the framework debate about theoretical reasons – outweighs because phil ed is intrinsic to LD

#### Inclusion flips neg – pragmatism greenlights violent argumentation as well and the K is a pre-req because we need to be subjects to make arguments

#### Resource disparities negates because Ks are generics but you need topic specific offense

#### I don’t affirm

#### You are so undetermined right now