## 1

#### The standard is consistency with the logical consequence of the resolution. Prefer this –

#### Text – Oxford Dictionary defines ought as “used to indicate something that is probable.”

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ought> //Massa

#### Ought is “used to express logical consequence” as defined by Merriam-Webster

(<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought>) //Massa

#### Prior Question to argumentation and key to education – It doesn't matter what you’re warranting, everything stems from logical reasoning.

**Muchika**, Celestine. “The Concept of Logic in Education.” Kenyaplex.com, **2018**, [www.kenyaplex.com/resources/14317-the-concept-of-logic-in-education.aspx](http://www.kenyaplex.com/resources/14317-the-concept-of-logic-in-education.aspx). //Massa

**Logic refers to the philosophical study of correct reasoning**. It deals with principles of sound arguments. **On our daily basis, individuals engage in various forms of arguments where statements are made and conclusion drawn.** In most cases, wrong conclusions are arrived at involving wrong premises and undue generalizations. **Logic is therefore essential because it stipulates how arguments should be made and how fallacies can be detected in an argument and avoided.** Within logic, two forms of reasoning can be distinguished:  
\*Deductive reasoning  
\*Inductive reasoning  
**Deductive Reasoning**It involves reasoning from general to particular incidences. In this course, a conclusion is inferred or deduced from general statements (syllogism). Consider the following example;  
1. All university students are immoral.  
2 John is a university student.  
3. Therefore John is immoral.  
The following reasoning has been expressed in syllogism form. The first two statements need to be stated before the third can follow. This type of reasoning **is prevalent in philosophy, religion and mathematics.**Inductive Reasoning  
Involves reasoning from general laws or conclusions being inferred from particular incidences. It is the reverse of deductive reasoning. In this type of reasoning, various incidences of a give specimen are observed over a given period of time. This type of reasoning is applicable with empirical sciences(The challenge of general ability)  
In modern philosophy, logic is expressed in two dimensions that is symbolic logic and analytic logic. Symbolic logic is applied in mathematics where symbols are used to explain a phenomenon. For example  
a+b=4  
a=4-b  
Analytic logic is prevalently used by analytic philosophers who emphasize the logical analysis of language to arrive at a clear meaning of terms.  
Importance of **Logic  
1. It helps us to reason correctly and avoid fallacies** (errors in reasoning)  
**2. It is** a **necessary** tool **for philosophical** and scientific **thinking.  
3. Helps in conceptualizing educational policies** and realization of educational objectives.  
4. It equips the teacher with the right reasoning and right language for curriculum content delivery.  
5. Helps seek clarity and meaning of concepts and statements.

#### Log con isn’t mutually exclusive with comparative worlds a) logic is a side constraint on desirability b) proves why it’s not desirable since taking impossible actions are net bad since they produce no benefits and only opportunity costs c) reinterprets to the more logical world rather than more desireable world.

#### Presumption negates – there are infinite ways to prove a statement false so err neg on probability

**Negate:**

#### 1] Inherency – either a) the aff is non-inherent and you vote neg on presumption or b) it is and it isn’t going to happen.

#### 2] NO STRIKE CLAUSES IN UNION CONTRACTS MEAN STRIKES WON’T HAPPEN EVEN IF GOVERNMENTS PERMIT THEM

Hamilton 5-4 HAMILTON NOLAN (labor reporter for In These Times. He has spent the past decade writing about labor and politics for Gawker, Splinter, The Guardian, and elsewhere) 5/4/21, Get Rid of No-Strike Clauses and Stop Begging, https://inthesetimes.com/article/no-strike-clause-labor-peace-union-contracts

Two of the candidates running for president of a 100,000-member public employee union in California, SEIU Local 1000, have a notable plank in their platforms: they want to get no-strike clauses out of their union contracts. They have an uphill battle, in large part because, on this particular issue, the labor movement will tend to act as a rock pulling them down, rather than helping them up. In post WWII America, union contracts work more or less like this: The company guarantees workers certain wages and benefits, and the workers agree to give up their right to strike for the term of the contract. This fundamental agreement — material gains in exchange for labor peace — defines modern labor relations. And where has this arrangement gotten the labor movement? Near death. For decades, union membership has declined, wages have stagnated, and capital has gained more and more power over working people. This devastating collapse in the power of organized labor has coincided with the post ​“Treaty of Detroit” period in which a very dangerous idea was cemented and enshrined as conventional wisdom. That is the idea that employers agree to union contracts in order to purchase labor peace—that the incentive for a company to bargain and sign a contract with its workers is to receive, in turn, a guarantee that those workers will be quiescent.

## 2

#### Counterplan text: All just governments except for the United States should recognize an unconditional right to strike for workers.

#### The fifty states and appropriate territories of the United States should ratify a cooperative horizontal federalism model interstate compact to recognize an unconditional right to strike for workers.

#### The counterplan solves and creates a cooperative horizontal federalism model – the perm also fails

Hall, 6 [Noah D., Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School, “Toward a New Horizontal Federal Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region,” <https://www.greatlakeslaw.org/blog/files/Hall_Colorado.pdf>, Corrigan]

For over one hundred years, federal and state governments have struggled with management of the Great Lakes. A vast resource shared by two countries, ten states and provinces, and hundreds of Indian tribes and First Nations, the Great Lakes are a quintessential commons that have seen their share of tragedies. Addressing the potentially competing pressures of economic development and environmental protection is only part of the challenge. The real struggle has been in governance: How is management of an international transboundary resource best accomplished under the legal and political limitations of constitutional federalism? This question is not unique to the Great Lakes. With the federal government stepping back (or being pushed back) from environmental protection, states need to explore new options for managing regional resources and environmental problems that cross political boundaries. A proposal being considered by the Great Lakes states and provinces takes a new approach to interstate environmental protection. Under the proposed Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact1 and companion Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement,2 the world’s largest freshwater resource would be protected and managed pursuant to minimum standards administered primarily under the authority of individual states and provinces. The proposed compact and agreement put riparian water use rules and environmental protection standards into a proactive public law regime in eight states and two Canadian provinces. The standards represent numerous advances in the development of water use law, including uniform treatment for ground and surface water withdrawals, water conservation, return flow, and prevention of environmental impacts. The significance of the proposed compact and agreement goes far beyond water law and the Great Lakes region. What has been proposed is a new federalist model for creating common state environmental standards to protect interstate natural resources. The model can be termed “cooperative horizontal federalism.” Cooperative horizontal federalism is an approach in which states jointly develop common minimum legal standards (substantive and/or procedural) to manage a shared resource, but leave the individual states with the flexibility and autonomy to administer those standards under state law. In the context of Great Lakes water management, cooperative horizontal federalism provides a mechanism for the states to craft regional minimum standards to govern water withdrawals, while allowing states to develop individual programs tailored to their specific needs. The discretion given to states is not absolute; they are subject to programmatic review and enforcement by their peers. Under this approach, the regulatory standards, programmatic obligations, and enforcement mechanisms come from the states’ obligations to each other, not from a congressional mandate. This cooperative horizontal federalism model for interstate environmental protection creates a third option to federal and individual state policymaking.

#### Lack of new horizontal federalism framework undermines national stability and escalates conflict

Gerken and Holtzblatt, 14 [Heather K., “Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor of Law at Yale Law School, and Ari, Partner, Wilmer Hale, practice focuses on appellate and government and public policy litigation, “The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism,” Michigan Law Review, p. Jstor, Corrigan]

Spillovers and Democracy Other scholars worry that spillovers threaten our democracy. Some fear that they undermine national unity. Professor Zimmerman has offered the most comprehensive social-science account of interstate conflict, devoting an entire book to identifying the best means for promoting cooperative state relations.42 Erbsen has offered the most detailed account of this concern on the law side, going so far as to catalogue eight sources of "constitutionally significant interstate friction."43 Nor are these scholars alone. The worry that the friction generated by spillovers can threaten national unity has become something of a trope in the literature.44 In the worst case, the worry is that interstate tension will lead to violent confrontation, whether on a mass scale, as with the Civil War, or on a more limited basis, as with armed border skirmishes.45 Even tensions that do not escalate to violence are thought to be prob lematic. Some commentators, like Erbsen, worry that such tensions might encourage citizens to identify more with their state or region than with the nation and thus generate "entrenched regionally-defined factions that would undermine national stability" over time.46 Others worry about maintaining interstate relations.47 Metzger, for instance, argues that unchecked poli cymaking spillovers in "contexts of sharp public contestation" can threaten "interstate harmony."48 She writes, for instance, that "states' fears that they would be forced to recognize same-sex marriages absent DOMA . . . could have led to interstate strife."49 Spillovers, then, bring to the fore all the wor ries about the centrifugal effects of federalism. A number of scholars worry that spillovers violate a different set of democratic values: those having to do with state sovereignty.50 As we detail in Part IV, sovereignty is a stand-in for a larger set of concerns about state autonomy, equality among the states, territoriality, and self-rule. These prin ciples amount to something of a mantra in the horizontal federalism litera ture and are regularly invoked, separately and together, in much of the work on the subject even by those who don't use similar tendency within the doctrinal silos that fall within the ambit of hori zontal federalism.52 Spillovers impinge on state sovereignty by depriving a state of full control over its territorial domain. These arguments also tap into a deeply intuitive concern about territori ality and self-rule. We worry about spillovers because they prevent citizens within a state from exercising control over their own destinies. In essence, spillovers allow the representatives of one state's citizens to tell another's what to do.53

#### Internal war escalates and turns biological and nuclear

**Donahue 2018 [**Chris, Editor for the Carolina Political Review, Guns will not save us from Tyranny, Carolina Political Review, March 31, <https://www.carolinapoliticalreview.org/editorial-content/2018/3/31/guns-will-not-save-us-from-tyranny>, Abe Corrigan]

In the event of an actual revolt among the American people, the government would be fighting for its own self preservation and there would be no restraint from the military. As we’ve seen in historical examples of tyrannical governments battling civil revolts, the hunger for self preservation drives excessive force, horrific atrocities, and disregard for civilian lives. Look to the Spanish Civil War in the 1930’s and the bombing of Guernica, or the more recent Syrian Civil War, in which civilians have been gassed in chemical attacks and entire cities turned into battlegrounds.

Rierson fails to recognize the desperation of an all out war for survival, and so the argument that the government may decide that winning is “more trouble than it's worth” doesn’t apply. With the trillion dollar military industrial complex behind the government, along with the rest of the world’s elite who depend on the status quo of the US government, a fight to the bitter end would be worth every penny.

I’m willing to grant Rierson that the fight may not end immediately, but modern technologies like nuclear and biochemical weapons make this kind of war for self-preservation unwinnable. The last time the United States fought directly for its survival was World War II, and it ended very poorly for its opponent. Even if a revolt against the US was successful, there would be nothing left to claim victory over but rubble. To return to President Eisenhower, on the topic of nuclear weapons he once said, “You cannot have this type of war. There just aren’t enough bulldozers to scrape the bodies off the streets.”

## 3

[For the wiki: this position was exempted in the round]

Interpretation: The affirmative debater may not garner offense from anything other than the desirability of the affirmative policy action. To clarify, extra T is a voting issue.

Violation – Cx

Standards:

Ground – a] uncontestable b] uplayers

Limits –

DTD

CI

No RVI

## Case

### 1NC – Framing

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate the hypothetical consequences of the plan – clash controls the internal link to every one of their framework args. Only weighing the case allows us to determine the practical impacts of politics and preserves the predictability and aff leverage that fosters engagement. Rigorous contestation and third and fourth-line testing are key to generate the self-reflexivity that creates ethical subjects.

#### 1] Don’t let them weigh the sum total of their impact – they only get to weigh the impact of the affirmative – filter the debate through solvency – there’s no impact to their aff if they do nothing

#### 2] No 1AR Impact Turns, Independent Voters, or Perfcons – a] Resolvability: Either you auto accept all responses to 2NR standards and they auto win since I can't respond, or you intervene to give 2AR credence b] No infinite abuse: 1NC is 7 minutes and 1AC spikes check a c] Hurts engagement in strategies since you would just spam blip storms d] 7-6 time 2-1 speech skew

#### 4] Focus on large scale catastrophes is good and they outweigh – appeals to social costs, moral rules, and securitization play into cognitive biases and flawed risk calculus – 2020 is living proof

Weber 20 (ELKE U. WEBER is Gerhard R. Andlinger Professor in Energy and the Environment and Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at Princeton University.), November-December 2020 Issue, "Heads in the Sand," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-10-13/heads-sand> mvp

We are living in a time of crisis. From the immediate challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic to the looming existential threat of climate change, the world is grappling with massive global dangers—to say nothing of countless problems within countries, such as inequality, cyberattacks, unemployment, systemic racism, and obesity. In any given crisis, the right response is often clear. Wear a mask and keep away from other people. Burn less fossil fuel. Redistribute income. Protect digital infrastructure. The answers are out there. What’s lacking are governments that can translate them into actual policy. As a result, the crises continue. The death toll from the pandemic skyrockets, and the world makes dangerously slow progress on climate change, and so on. It’s no secret how governments should react in times of crisis. First, they need to be nimble. Nimble means moving quickly, because problems often grow at exponential rates: a contagious virus, for example, or greenhouse gas emissions. That makes early action crucial and procrastination disastrous. Nimble also means adaptive. Policymakers need to continuously adjust their responses to crises as they learn from their own experience and from the work of scientists. Second, governments need to act wisely. That means incorporating the full range of scientific knowledge available about the problem at hand. It means embracing uncertainty, rather than willfully ignoring it. And it means thinking in terms of a long time horizon, rather than merely until the next election. But so often, policymakers are anything but nimble and wise. They are slow, inflexible, uninformed, overconfident, and myopic. Why is everyone doing so badly? Part of the explanation lies in the inherent qualities of crises. Crises typically require navigating between risks. In the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers want to save lives and jobs. With climate change, they seek a balance between avoiding extreme weather and allowing economic growth. Such tradeoffs are hard as it is, and they are further complicated by the fact that costs and benefits are not evenly distributed among stakeholders, making conflict a seemingly unavoidable part of any policy choice. Vested interests attempt to forestall needed action, using their money to influence decision-makers and the media. To make matters worse, policymakers must pay sustained attention to multiple issues and multiple constituencies over time. They must accept large amounts of uncertainty. Often, then, the easiest response is to stick with the status quo. But that can be a singularly dangerous response to many new hazards. After all, with the pandemic, business as usual would mean no social distancing. With climate change, it would mean continuing to burn fossil fuels. But the explanation for humanity’s woeful response to crises goes beyond politics and incentives. To truly understand the failure to act, one must turn to human psychology. It is there that one can grasp the full impediments to proper decision-making—the cognitive biases, emotional reactions, and suboptimal shortcuts that hold policymakers back—and the tools to overcome them. AVOIDING THE UNCOMFORTABLE People are singularly bad at predicting and preparing for catastrophes. Many of these events are “black swans,” rare and unpredictable occurrences that most people find difficult to imagine, seemingly falling into the realm of science fiction. Others are “gray rhinos,” large and not uncommon threats that are still neglected until they stare you in the face (such as a coronavirus outbreak). Then there are “invisible gorillas,” threats in full view that should be noticed but aren’t—so named for a psychological experiment in which subjects watching a clip of a basketball game were so fixated on the players that they missed a person in a gorilla costume walking through the frame. Even professional forecasters, including security analysts, have a poor track record when it comes to accurately anticipating events. The COVID-19 crisis, in which a dystopic science-fiction narrative came to life and took everyone by surprise, serves as a cautionary tale about humans’ inability to foresee important events. Not only do humans fail to anticipate crises; they also fail to respond rationally to them. At best, people display “bounded rationality,” the idea that instead of carefully considering their options and making perfectly rational decisions that optimize their preferences, humans in the real world act quickly and imperfectly, limited as they are by time and cognitive capacity. Add in the stress generated by crises, and their performance gets even worse. Because humans don’t have enough time, information, or processing power to deliberate rationally, they have evolved easier ways of making decisions. They rely on their emotions, which serve as an early warning system of sorts: alerting people that they are in a positive context that can be explored and exploited or in a negative context where fight or flight is the appropriate response. They also rely on rules. To simplify decision-making, they might follow standard operating procedures or abide by some sort of moral code. They might decide to imitate the action taken by other people whom they trust or admire. They might follow what they perceive to be widespread norms. Out of habit, they might continue to do what they have been doing unless there is overwhelming evidence against it. Not only do humans fail to anticipate crises; they also fail to respond rationally to them. Humans evolved these shortcuts because they require little effort and work well in a broad range of situations. Without access to a real-time map of prey in different hunting grounds, for example, a prehistoric hunter might have resorted to a simple rule of thumb: look for animals where his fellow tribesmen found them yesterday. But in times of crisis, emotions and rules are not always helpful drivers of decision-making. High stakes, uncertainty, tradeoffs, and conflict—all elicit negative emotions, which can impede wise responses. Uncertainty is scary, as it signals an inability to predict what will happen, and what cannot be predicted might be deadly. The vast majority of people are already risk averse under normal circumstances. Under stress, they become even more so, and they retreat to the familiar comfort of the status quo. From gun laws to fossil fuel subsidies, once a piece of legislation is in place, it is hard to dislodge it, even when cost-benefit analysis argues for change.

#### 5] Extinction outweighs---

#### A] Reversibility- it forecloses the alternative because we can’t improve society if we are all dead

#### B] Objectivity- body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### C] Uncertainty- if we’re unsure about which interpretation of the world is true, we should preserve the world to keep debating about

#### D] It’s the upmost moral evil.

Elizabeth Finneron-Burns 17, Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, “What’s wrong with human extinction?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017, T&F.

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

#### E] Evolution proves our theory true

**Johnson and Thayer 16** – Dominic D. P. Johnson, D.Phil., Ph.D.\* and Bradley A. Thayer, Ph.D., “The evolution of offensive realism Survival under anarchy from the Pleistocene to the present,” https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/56B778004187F70B8E59609BE7FEE7A4/S073093841600006Xa.pdf/div-class-title-the-evolution-of-offensive-realism-div.pdf

Few principles unite the discipline of international relations, but one exception is anarchy—the absence of government in international politics. Anarchy is, ironically, the ‘‘ordering’’ principle of the global state system and the starting point for most major theories of international politics, such as neoliberalism and neorealism.42,43,44,45 Other theoretical approaches, such as constructivism, also acknowledge the impact of anarchy, even if only to consider why anarchy occurs and how it can be circumvented.46,47 Indeed, the anarchy concept is so profound that it defines and divides the discipline of political science into international politics (politics under conditions of anarchy) and domestic politics (politics under conditions of hierarchy, or government). Given the prominence of the concept in present-day international relations theory, it is striking that anarchy only took hold as a central feature of scholarship in recent decades, since the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in 1979. In fact, however, **anarchy has been a constant feature of the entire multimillion year history of the human lineage (and indeed the 3.5 billion–year history of the evolution of all life on Earth before that). It is not just that we lack a global Leviathan today; humans never had such a luxury. The fact that human evolution occurred under conditions of anarchy, that we evolved as hunter-gatherers in an ecological setting of predation, resource competition, and intergroup conflict, and that humans have been subject to natural selection** for millions of years **has profound consequences for understanding human behavior**, not least how humans perceive and act toward others. Scholars often argue over whether historically humans experienced a Hobbesian ‘‘state of nature,’’ but—whatever the outcome of that debate—it is certainly a much closer approximation to the prehistoric environment in which human brains and behavior evolved. **This legacy heavily influences our decision-making and behavior today, even—perhaps especially—in the anarchy of international politics**. We argue that **evolution under conditions of anarchy has predisposed human nature toward the behaviors predicted by offensive realism: Humans**, particularly men, **are strongly self-interested, often fear other groups, and seek more resources, more power, and more influence** (as we explain in full later). **These strategies** are not unique to humans and, in fact, **characterize a much broader trend in behavior among mammals as a whole—especially primates**—as well as many other major vertebrate groups, including birds, fish, and reptiles. **This recurrence of behavioral patterns** across different taxonomic groups **suggests that the behaviors characterized by offensive realism have broad and deep evolutionary roots**. This perspective does not deny the importance of institutions, norms, and governance in international politics. On the contrary, it provides or adds to the reasons why we demand and need them, and indeed why they are so hard to establish and maintain. Until recently, **international relations theorists rarely used insights from the life sciences to inform their understanding of human behavior**. However, **rapid advances in the life sciences offer increasing theoretical and empirical challenges to scholars in** the social sciences in general and **international relations** in particular, who are therefore under increasing pressure to address and integrate this knowledge rather than to suppress or ignore it. Whatever one’s personal views on evolution, **the time has come to explore the implications of evolutionary theory for mainstream theories of international relations**. **The most obvious challenge that evolutionary theory presents to international relations concerns our understanding of human nature**. Theories purporting to explain human behavior make explicit or implicit assumptions about preferences and motivations, and mainstream theories in international politics are no exception. Many **criticisms of international relations theories focus on these unsubstantiated or contested assumptions about underlying human nature.**

### 1NC – Fascism v2

#### STRIKES ARE HIGH NOW AND MORE ARE COMING- PROVES NO UNIQUENESS OR REASON WHY THE AFF IS KEY

Romero 10-21 Dani Romero (REPORTER, yahoo finance) 10/21/21, ‘Strikes are contagious’: Wave of labor unrest signals crisis in tight job market, <https://news.yahoo.com/strikes-are-contagious-wave-of-labor-unrest-signals-crisis-in-tight-jobs-market-135052770.html>

As employers of all sizes grapple with an acute worker shortage amid what’s being called the pandemic era’s Great Resignation, it’s become increasingly clear that people with jobs aren’t all that happy, either. At an ever-lengthening list of workplaces around the country, workers this year have been getting loud about the state of wages, working hours and conditions. From healthcare to entertainment, nearly 100,000 U.S. workers are either striking or preparing to strike in a bid to improve working conditions. New data signals that worker unrest is growing: a Cornell Labor Action Tracker shows that more than 180 strikes have been recorded this year, and over 24,000 workers have walked off the job this month. This all plays out against a backdrop of an economy bouncing back from an economic shutdown during the pandemic. More than 10,000 John Deere workers went on strike Thursday, the first major walkout at the agricultural machinery giant in more than three decades. “We have noticed a bit of an uptick in late September into early October, for example, we've already documented 39 strikes on the month of October,” Johnnie Kallas, a Ph.D. student at Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations, or ILR, who tracks labor actions across the country, said in an interview. “Those numbers are already the largest of any month in 2021,” he added. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which records only large work stoppages, has documented 12 strikes involving 1,000 or more workers. That represents a big jump from when the pandemic started over 19 months ago. “What will happen is you'll see more workers going on strike,” Kate Bronfenbrenner, director of labor education research and senior lecturer at Cornell school of industrial and labor relations, told Yahoo Finance. “Each time there's a ripple effect with each one of those, if the John Deere strike isn’t settled, you're going to see another big group go out,” she said. “If companies don't move, you're going to see this spread from one group to another. Strikes are contagious,” Bronfenbrenner added.

#### Capitalism is good –

#### Capitalism is self-correcting and sustainable.

Kaletsky ’11 (Anatole, editor-at-large of *The Times* of London, where he writes weekly columns on economics, politics, and international relationsand on the governing board of the New York-based Institute for New Economic Theory (INET), a nonprofit created after the 2007-2009 crisis to promote and finance academic research in economics, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis, p. 19-21)

Democratic capitalism is a system built for survival. It has adapted successfully to shocks of every kind, to upheavals in technology and economics, to political revolutions and world wars. Capitalism has been able to do this because, unlike communism or socialism or feudalism, it has an inner dynamic akin to a living thing. It can adapt and refine itself in response to the changing environment. And it will evolve into a new species of the same capitalist genus if that is what it takes to survive. In the panic of 2008—09, many politicians, businesses, and pundits forgot about the astonishing adaptability of the capitalist system. Predictions of global collapse were based on static views of the world that extrapolated a few months of admittedly terrifying financial chaos into the indefinite future. The self-correcting mechanisms that market economies and democratic societies have evolved over several centuries were either forgotten or assumed defunct. The language of biology has been applied to politics and economics, but rarely to the way they interact. Democratic capitalism’s equivalent of the biological survival instinct is a built-in capacity for solving social problems and meeting material needs. This capacity stems from the principle of competition, which drives both democratic politics and capitalist markets. Because market forces generally reward the creation of wealth rather than its destruction, they direct the independent efforts and ambitions of millions of individuals toward satisfying material demands

#### 1] Growth is sustainable and solves climate change.

Bailey 18 [Ronald; February 16; B.A. in Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Is Degrowth the Only Way to Save the World?” https://reason.com/2018/02/16/is-degrowth-the-only-way-to-save-the-wor; RP] Re-Cut Justin

Unless us folks in rich countries drastically reduce our material living standards and distribute most of what we have to people living in poor countries, the world will come to an end. Or at least that's the stark conclusion of a study published earlier this month in the journal Nature Sustainability. The researchers who wrote it, led by the Leeds University ecological economist Dan O'Neill, think the way to prevent the apocalypse is "degrowth." Vice, pestilence, war, and "gigantic inevitable famine" were the planetary boundaries set on human population by the 18th-century economist Robert Thomas Malthus. The new study gussies up old-fashioned Malthusianism by devising a set of seven biophysical indicators of national environmental pressure, which they then link to 11 indicators of social outcomes. The aim of the exercise is to concoct a "safe and just space" for humanity. Using data from 2011, the researchers calculate that the annual per capita boundaries for the world's 7 billion people consist of the emission of 1.6 tons of carbon dioxide per year and the annual ceonsumption of 0.9 kilograms of phosphorus, 8.9 kilograms of nitrogen, 574 cubic meters of water, 2.6 tons of biomass (crops and wood), plus the ecological services of 1.7 hectares of land and 7.2 tons of material per person. On the social side, meanwhile, the researchers say that life satisfaction in each country should exceed 6.5 on the 10-point Cantril scale, that healthy life expectancy should average at least 65 years, and that nutrition should be over 2,700 calories per day. At least 95 percent of each country's citizens must have access to good sanitation, earn more than $1.90 per day, and pass through secondary school. Ninety percent of citizens must have friends and family they can depend on. The threshold for democratic quality must exceed 0.8 on an index scale stretching from -1 to +1, while the threshold for equality is set at no higher than 70 on a Gini Index where 0 represents perfect equality and 100 implies perfect inequality. They set the threshold for percent of labor force employed at 94 percent. So how does the U.S. do with regard to their biophysical boundaries and social outcomes measures? We Americans transgress all seven of the biophysical boundaries. Carbon dioxide emissions stand at 21.2 tons per person; we each use an average of 7 kilograms of phosphorus, 59.1 kilograms of nitrogen, 611 cubic meters of water, and 3.7 tons of biomass; we rely on the ecological services of 6.8 hectares of land and 27.2 tons of material. Although the researchers urge us to move "beyond the pursuit of GDP growth to embrace new measures of progress," it is worth noting that U.S. GDP is $59,609 per capita. On the other hand, those transgressions have provided a pretty good life for Americans. For example, life satisfaction is 7.1; healthy life expectancy is 69.7 years; and democratic quality stands at 0.8 points. The only two social indicators we just missed on were employment (91 percent) and secondary education (94.7 percent). On the other hand, our hemisphere is home to one paragon of sustainability—Haiti. Haitians breach none of the researchers' biophysical boundaries. But the Caribbean country performs abysmally on all 11 social indicators. Life satisfaction scores at 4.8; healthy life expectancy is 52.3 years; and Haitians average 2,105 calories per day. The country tallies -0.9 on the democratic quality index. Haiti's GDP is $719 per capita. Other near-sustainability champions include Malawi, Nepal, Myanmar, and Nicaragua. All of them score dismally on the social indicators, and their GDPs per capita are $322, $799, $1,375, and $2,208, respectively. The country that currently comes closest to the researchers' ideal of remaining within its biophysical boundaries while sufficient social indicators is…Vietnam. For the record, Vietnam's per capita GDP is $2,306. "Countries with higher levels of life satisfaction and healthy life expectancy also tend to transgress more biophysical boundaries," the researchers note. A better way to put this relationship is that more wealth and technology tend to make people happier, healthier, and freer. O'Neill and his unhappy team fail drastically to understand how human ingenuity unleashed in markets is already well on the way toward making their supposed planetary boundaries irrelevant. Take carbon dioxide emissions: Supporters of renewable energy technologies say that their costs are already or will soon be lower than those of fossil fuels. Boosters of advanced nuclear reactors similarly argue that they can supply all of the carbon-free energy the world will need. There's a good chance that fleets of battery-powered self-driving vehicles will largely replace private cars and mass transit later in this century. Are we about to run out of phosphorous to fertilize our crops? Peak phosphorus is not at hand. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) reports that at current rates of mining, the world's known reserves will last 266 years. The estimated total resources of phosphate rock would last over 1,140 years. "There are no imminent shortages of phosphate rock," notes the USGS. With respect to the deleterious effects that using phosphorus to fertilize crops might have outside of farm fields, researchers are working on ways to endow crops with traits that enable them to use less while maintaining yields. O'Neill and his colleagues are also concerned that farmers are using too much nitrogen fertilizer, which runs off fields into the natural environment and contributes to deoxygenated dead zones in the oceans, among other ill effects. This is a problem, but one that plant breeders are already working to solve. For example, researchers at Arcadia Biosciences have used biotechnology to create nitrogen-efficient varieties of staples like rice and wheat that enable farmers to increase yields while significantly reducing fertilizer use. Meanwhile, other researchers are moving on projects to engineer the nitrogen fixation trait from legumes into cereal crops. In other words, the crops would make their own fertilizer from air. Water? Most water is devoted to the irrigation of crops; the ongoing development of drought-resistant and saline-tolerant crops will help with that. Hectares per capita? Humanity has probably already reached peak farmland, and nearly 400 million hectares will be restored to nature by 2060—an area almost double the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. In fact, it is entirely possible that most animal farming will be replaced by resource-sparing lab-grown steaks, chops, and milk. Such developments in food production undermine the researchers' worries about overconsumption of biomass. And humanity's material footprint is likely to get smaller too as trends toward further dematerialization take hold. The price system is a superb mechanism for encouraging innovators to find ways to wring ever more value out less and less stuff. Rockefeller University researcher Jesse Ausubel has shown that this process of absolute dematerialization has already taken off for many commodities. After cranking their way through their models of doom, O'Neill and his colleagues lugubriously conclude: "If all people are to lead a good life within planetary boundaries, then the level of resource use associated with meeting basic needs must be dramatically reduced." They are right, but they are entirely backward with regard to how to achieve those goals. Economic growth provides the wealth and technologies needed to lift people from poverty while simultaneously lightening humanity's footprint on the natural world. Rather than degrowth, the planet—and especially its poor people—need more and faster economic growth.

#### 4] Yes Transition Wars and they cause Extinction

Nyquist 5 J.R. Nyquist 2-4-2005 “The Political Consequences of a Financial Crash” [www.financialsense.com/stormw...2005/0204.html](http://www.financialsense.com/stormw...2005/0204.html) (renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations)//Elmer

Should the United States experience a severe economic contraction during the second term of President Bush, the American people will likely support politicians who advocate further restrictions and controls on our market economy – guaranteeing its strangulation and the steady pauperization of the country. In Congress today, Sen. Edward Kennedy supports nearly all the economic dogmas listed above. It is easy to see, therefore, that the coming economic contraction, due in part to a policy of massive credit expansion, will have serious political consequences for the Republican Party (to the benefit of the Democrats). Furthermore, an economic contraction will encourage the formation of **anti-capitalist** majorities and a turning away from the free market system. The danger here is not merely economic. The political left openly favors the collapse of America’s strategic position abroad. The withdrawal of the **U**nited **S**tates from the Middle East, the Far East and Europe would **catastrophically impact an international system that presently allows 6 billion** people to live on the earth’s surface in relative peace. Should anti-capitalist dogmas overwhelm the global market and trading system that evolved under American leadership, the planet’s economy would contract and untold **millions would die of starvation**. Nationalistic totalitarianism, fueled by a politics of blame, would once again bring war to Asia and Europe. But this time the war would be **waged with mass destruction weapons** and the United States would be blamed because it is the center of global capitalism. Furthermore, if the anti-capitalist party gains power in Washington, we can expect to see policies of appeasement and unilateral disarmament enacted. American appeasement and disarmament, in this context, would be an admission of guilt before the court of world opinion. Russia and China, above all, would exploit this admission to justify aggressive wars, invasions and mass destruction attacks. A future financial crash, therefore, must be prevented at all costs.