# 1AC R2 TOC

### 1AC – Underview

#### 1] Reject negative alternative advocacies i.e. anything besides the squo

#### A] They get access to infinite alternative advocacies but I only get one aff

#### B] I can’t predict every alternative advocacy which means its impossible to test their desirability

#### C] They don’t disprove the general thesis of the aff

#### D] Negating requires a complete absence of an existing action not an alternative

Negate: to deny the existence of

That’s Dictionary.com- “Negate” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/negate. VHS AI

#### E] Forces debaters to prep out every possible alternative advocacy which is impossible

#### F] Moots the entire aff since you can just fiat an actor responsible for aff harms which means the aff can never weigh the case

#### G] Affirming is harder - A] 7-4-6-3-time skew makes every 1ar speech a time crunch that can’t justify a proactive obligation B] They know the aff but we don’t know the NC so the burden is on them. Structural skew O/W on reversibility since it can’t be changed.

#### 2] No neg analytics - I don’t have time to cover 100 blippy arguments in the NC since you can read 7 min of analytics and extend any of them to win.

#### 3] The neg may not read meta-theory – I only have time to check abuse 1 time but you can do it in the NC and 2N, up-layering my attempt means we never get to the best norm. This means reject any reason why an aff spike is bad since they claim aff theory is unfair.

#### 4] Theory or K indicts on spikes is drop the arg – my theory paradigms are simply presented models for debate

#### 5] Combo shells are bad – 1] Can’t norm set since its only a specific instance 2] still allows for the abuse of a combination of the planks separately to occur which doesn’t solve abuse

#### 7] No neg arguments – skews me to answer those. Answering this triggers a contradiction since it relies on an analytic argument and those affirm since I spoke first and they were your fault for creating.

### 1AC – disclosure

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2021-22 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.

#### Violation – screenshots in the doc prove I do and they don’t

Table

Description automatically generated

#### 1] Levels the playing field

Overing 18 – Bob Overing, LD Scholar (“Holiday Disclosure Post #6 – 10 Things Edition” JANUARY 12, 2018. http://www.premierdebate.com/disclosure-post-6/)

**Open source improves on usual disclosure practices** in the obvious way – **you can read their evidence for better prep**aration – and in a number of smaller ways too. **It solves the analytics problem** I discussed above, **so round-altering uncarded arguments are available** (though this doesn’t really apply to Harvard-Westlake), **and it gives access to evidence from paywalled articles**. **Every season I coach debaters who lack access to major databases; for schools without robust online library offerings or teams without college coaches, this matters a lot**.

#### 2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat. Not disclosing certain rounds because they’re lay incentivizes lying by calling everything lay and doesn’t solve our offense since those cards can still be evidence ethics and read against other people.

#### CI on 1ac theory – 1n has sufficient time to justify norms. No RVIs otherwise 7 minute 1n would just beat the 1 minute shell.

### 1AC – Plan

#### The negative and I affirm – The appropriation of outer space through the production of orbital debris by private entities is unjust. I’ll defend the resolution as a value statement.

#### Orbital debris is

NASA.gov 21 [NASA – 5/26/21. “Space Debris and Human Spacecraft.” <https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html>] Justin

Orbital Debris

Space debris encompasses both natural meteoroid and artificial (human-made) orbital debris. Meteoroids are in orbit about the sun, while most artificial debris is in orbit about the Earth (hence the term “orbital” debris).

Orbital debris is any human-made object in orbit about the Earth that no longer serves a useful function. Such debris includes nonfunctional spacecraft, abandoned launch vehicle stages, mission-related debris, and fragmentation debris.

#### Articles are defined in context to how they are used.

#### Outer Space definition

DoC 16 [Department of Commerce; February 22, 2016; National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration, “Where is Space?”, <https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/news/where-space>] brett

But where is “space” exactly? This may seem like a simple question, but any answer beyond “up” may be more complicated than you think. Although most people are generally in agreement that space begins when Earth’s atmosphere ends— where exactly that is depends on who you ask.

International law states that outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all, but there is no definitive law stating where national air space actually ends and outer space begins. This leaves the door open for a variety of interpretations.

A common definition of space is known as the Kármán Line, an imaginary boundary 100 kilometers (62 miles) above mean sea level. In theory, once this 100 km line is crossed, the atmosphere becomes too thin to provide enough lift for conventional aircraft to maintain flight. At this altitude, a conventional plane would need to reach orbital velocity or risk falling back to Earth.

The world governing body for aeronautic and astronautic records, the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI), and many other organizations use the Kármán Line as a way of determining when space flight has been achieved.

#### Private entities are non-governmental.

Dunk 11 – Frans G. von der Dunk, 2011, [“The Origins of Authorisation: Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and International Space Law,” University of Nebraska] Justin

4. Interpreting Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty One main novel feature of Article VI stood out with reference to the role of private enterprise in this context. Contrary to the version of the concept applicable under general international law, where “direct state responsibility” only pertained to acts somehow directly attributable to a state and states could only be addressed for acts by private actors under “indirect,” “due care”/“due diligence” responsibility,18 Article VI made no difference as to whether the activities at issue were the state’s own (“whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies” . . .) or those of private actors (. . . “or by non-governmental entities”). The interests of the Soviet Union in ensuring that, whomever would actually conduct a certain space activity, some state or other could be held responsible for its compliance with applicable rules of space law to that extent had prevailed. However, the general acceptance of Article VI as cornerstone of the Outer Space Treaty unfortunately was far from the end of the story. Partly, this was the consequence of key principles being left undefined.

#### Resolved is defined as “settle or **find a solution** **to** (**a** problem, dispute, or **contentious matter**)” so resolved means the resolution has been already proven true.

<https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/resolve>

### 1AC – Advantage

#### The private sector locks in the Kessler Syndrome as a structurally inevitability by 2035. The debris threat isn’t internalized, engineering studies, profit-motive AND inefficient guidelines.

Rao and Rondina 2/16/22 [Akhil Rao and Giacomo Rondina. \*Middlebury College in the Department of Economics. \*\*University of California, San Diego. “Open access to orbit and runaway space debris growth.” <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2202.07442.pdf>] Justin

In this paper we present a dynamic physico-economic model of orbit use under rational expectations with endogenous collision probability and Kessler Syndrome. We show how both economic and physical parameters drive equilibrium short- and long-run orbital-use patterns, derive the marginal external cost of a satellite, explore the multiplicity and stability of openaccess steady states, and examine the relationships between open-access orbit use, optimal orbit use, and Kessler Syndrome. We then calibrate the model to an important region of LEO and estimate the likely times when Kessler Syndrome will occur under different patterns of satellite industry economics. We highlight three messages regarding orbital-use management.

First, under open access too many firms will launch satellites because they won’t internalize the risks they impose on other orbit users. Though profit maximizing satellite owners have incentives to reduce launches as the risk of a collision grows, they do not respond to debris growth or collision risk optimally. This inefficiency is independent of whether Kessler Syndrome is possible or not. Unlike many other bioeconomic commons problems, higher discount rates can induce less (rather than more) open-access overexploitation.

Second, Kessler Syndrome is possible as long as debris objects can collide with each other and generate new fragments, i.e the new fragment formation debris coupling exists. Engineering studies indicate that this coupling does in fact exist. Due to open access, even profit maximizing firms with rational expectations may continue to launch satellites despite recognizing their role in causing Kessler Syndrome and even after the Kessler threshold has been crossed.

Third, under open access Kessler Syndrome is more likely as the excess return on a satellite rises, even if firms will respond to orbital congestion by launching fewer satellites. As launch costs fall and new commercial satellite applications become viable, LEO is thus increasingly and inefficiently likely to experience Kessler Syndrome. While it may seem paradoxical that the very changes which make orbit use profitable can also increase the risk of resource collapse, such dynamics occur frequently in bioeconomic commons problems. Calibrated simulations reveal that space economy growth rates projected by investment banks and industry associations are consistent with Kessler Syndrome occurring as early as 2035. Our results suggest that, absent institutional reform, continued growth of the space economy may trigger Kessler Syndrome in the near future. This can occur even in regions perceived to have relatively high rates of natural renewability, providing new evidence that compliance with the 25-year rule is insufficient to ensure sustainable orbit use.

#### Fragmentation leads to speedy debris – that’s laws of physics.

Aerospace.org n.d. [As an independent, nonprofit corporation operating the only FFRDC for the space enterprise, The Aerospace Corporation performs objective technical analyses and assessments for a variety of government, civil, and commercial customers. “SPACE DEBRIS 101.” AEROSPACE. <https://aerospace.org/article/space-debris-101>] Justin

Can you see space debris coming at you?

It is very unlikely that you would see space debris. Relative to a person in orbit, space debris is moving about ten times faster than a bullet, and the vast majority of debris is as small as or smaller than a bullet. No one can see a bullet coming, let alone an object moving ten times faster.

What is an on-orbit collision like?

It looks more like an explosion of each object, as if they passed through each other and exploded on the other side. A hyper-velocity collision like those at orbital speed doesn’t behave like collisions that we are used to seeing. The objects are moving so fast that they travel through each other faster than the shock waves can travel. The shock waves in the structures of each object then shatter them into fragments of varying sizes and, in the process, give each fragment a boost in a different direction. Each one of these fragments is then in a different orbit than the original object and will move away according to the laws of orbital motion. With thousands of fragments, each moving in slightly different directions, it looks a lot like an explosion.

Do breakups look like the movies?

For dramatic purposes, movies, TV, and commercials tend to show space breakups at a much slower speed than they would happen at in real life. A breakup in space, especially a collision, can involve a lot of energy, and the pieces are flung away at extremely high speeds. Since there is no air to slow the pieces down the fragments would all fly away from one another and rapidly disappear from view. For many breakups, a softball-sized fragment would fly the length of the space station (a little less than a football field) in less than half a second. If you were watching it from nearby, you would see a flash, and the object that broke up would just disappear and be gone. It would be very unlikely for you to see pieces drifting away. Similarly, a low orbit space collision is unlikely to look much like a car crash — the speeds are much too high. The collisions would look like explosions to a nearby observer.

#### Debris triggers miscalculated war.

Robert Farley 22, Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Robert Farley is a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). 1/9/22. [19 Fourty Five, “Does A Space War Mean A Nuclear War?,” <https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/does-a-space-war-mean-a-nuclear-war/>] Justin

The recent Russian anti-satellite test didn’t tell the world anything new, but it did reaffirm the peril posed by warfare in space. Debris from explosions could make some earth orbits remarkably risky to use for both civilian and military purposes. But the test also highlighted a less visible danger; attacks on nuclear command and control satellites could rapidly produce an extremely dangerous escalatory situation in a war between nuclear powers. James Acton and Thomas Macdonald drew attention to this problem in a recent article at Inside Defense. As Acton and MacDonald point out, nuclear command and control satellites are the connective tissue of nuclear deterrence, assuring countries that they’re not being attacked and that they’ll be able to respond quickly if they are.

For a long time, these strategic early-warning satellites were akin to a center of gravity in ICBM warfare. Nuclear deterrence requires awareness that an attack is underway. Attacks on the monitoring system could easily be read as an attempt to ~~blind~~ an opponent in preparation for general war, and could themselves incur nuclear retaliation. Thus, the nuclear command and control satellites are critical to the maintenance of nuclear deterrence. They make it possible to distribute an order from the chief of government to the nuclear delivery systems themselves. Consequently, their destruction might lead to hesitation or delay in performing a nuclear launch order.

It was only later that the relevance of satellites for conventional warfare became clear. Satellites could reconnoiter enemy positions and, more importantly, provide communications for friendly forces. Indeed, the expansion of the role of satellites in conventional warfare has complicated the prospect of space warfare. States have a clear reason for targeting enemy satellites which support conventional warfare, as those satellites enable the most lethal part of the kill chain, the communications and recon networks that link targets with shooters. Thus, we now have a situation in which space military assets have both nuclear and conventional roles. In a conflict confusion and misperception could rapidly become lethal. If one combatant views an attack against nuclear command and control as a prelude to a general nuclear attack, it might choose to pre-empt.

Nuclear powers have dealt with problems in this general category for a good long while; would a conventional attack against tactical nuclear staging areas represent an escalation, for example? Would the use of ballistic missiles that can carry either conventional or nuclear weapons trigger a nuclear response? Do attacks against air defense networks that have both strategic and tactical responsibilities run the risk of triggering a nuclear response? There’s also the danger that damage to communications networks designated for conventional combat could force traffic onto the nuclear control systems, further confusing the issue.

#### **No checks on escalation.**

MacDonald 18. Bruce W. MacDonald, professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), ("Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation," August 2018, *NSI* white paper, <https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/SMA-White-Paper_Chinese-Persepectives-on-Space_-Aug-2018.pdf>, accessed 7-14-2019) bm

Challenges across all five phases: Another escalation threat is the inexperience that nations share in the space and cyber domains, unlike in conventional domains of conflict and in the nuclear domain to a lesser extent. This inexperience gives rise to a “sorcerer’s apprentice” problem, placing leaders at risk of making potentially unwise judgment calls without a full grasp of their implications. The space and cyber domains are sufficiently new and dynamic that such decisions are highly likely. Adding to this uncertainty is the ever-growing interdependence of infrastructures within and among advanced countries, making the impact of major attacks against a country’s space and/or cyber infrastructures inherently unknowable. In considering all these factors, it is important to keep in mind that events in space do not happen in isolation. Any space conflict would likely be part of a multidimensional field of play, with space being important because of the effects it has on the earth. Significant instability in space is unlikely to lead to war if there is stability in other domains and in the larger geopolitical relationship between participants, while conflict could easily spread to a stable space domain if war in other domains appeared preferable to the alternative. While any use of nuclear weapons would pose a serious threat of escalation to full-scale nuclear war, any use of space or cyber offense would not pose a comparable escalation threat. That said, a series of reciprocal escalations could easily become unstable. No clear-cut escalation barrier exists in the space and cyber domains, and given the short-term tactical benefits of escalating ahead of an adversary, each additional escalation could create incentives for further escalation that an adversary would not always anticipate. Escalation in space, then, is a slippery slope with few off-ramps.

#### Extinction and GCD – I am the greatest conceivable debater so vote for me because I am infinitely good. To prove this, I will make them contest the aff and say they are not under my control.

Webber 19 – Dr Philip Webber has written widely on nuclear issues and is Chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) – a membership organisation promoting responsible science and technology. We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it. 5/18/19. [METRO.UK “We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it,” <https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/18/we-will-all-end-up-killing-each-other-and-one-nuclear-blast-could-do-it-9370115/>] Recut Justin

The nuclear armed nations have inadvertently created a global Doomsday machine, built with 15,000 nuclear weapons.

Most (93%) have been built by Russia and in the US, 3,100 of them are ready to fire within hours.

Pre-programmed targets include main cities as well as a range of military and civilian targets across the world primarily in the UK, Europe, US, Russia and China but also in Japan, Australia and South America.

One nuclear blast, one mistake, one cyber attack could trigger it.

But first a reminder about the incredible destructive power of a nuclear weapon. Modern nuclear warheads are typically 20 times larger than either of the two bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. What just one nuclear warhead can do is unimaginable. We’ve drawn some of the key features to scale against cityscapes in the UK for a Russian SS-18 RS 20V (NATO designation ‘Satan’) 500kT warhead. US submarines deploy a similar weapon – the Trident II Mk5, 475kT warhead. A deafening, terrifying noise will be created, like an intense thunder that lasts for 10 seconds or longer.

After a blinding flash of light bright destroying the retina of anyone looking, and a violent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) knocking out electrical equipment several miles away, a bomb of this size quickly forms an incandescent fireball 850 metres across.

This is about the same height as the world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa. Drawn against the London Canary Wharf financial district or the Manchester skyline, the huge fireball dwarfs one Canary Sq. (240m), the South Tower Deansgate (201m) and the Beetham Tower Hilton, (170m). The fireball engulfs both city centres completely, melting glass and steel and forms an intensely radioactive 60m deep crater zone of molten earth and debris. A devastating supersonic blast wave flattens everything within a radius of two to three km, the entire Manchester centre, an area larger than the City of London, with lighter damage out to eight km. Most people in these areas would be killed or very seriously injured.

The fireball quickly rises forming an enormous characteristic mushroom shaped cloud raining highly radioactive particles (fallout). It rises to 60,000 ft (18,000m) – twice the altitude of Everest – and is 15 miles, 24km across.

This is one warhead. There are 10 such warheads on each of Russia’s 46 missiles (460 in total) and 48 on each of eight US Trident submarines (384 in total). In reality, in a nuclear conflict all of these warheads and a further 956 ready-to-fire are likely to be launched.

Whilst this scale of destruction is horrific and hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a few hours from a combination of blast, radiation and huge fires, there are also terrible longer-term effects.

Scientists predict that huge city-wide firestorms combined with very the high-altitude debris clouds would severely reduce sunlight levels and disrupt the world’s climate for a decade causing drought, a prolonged winter, global famine and catastrophic impacts for all life on earth and in the seas due to intense levels of UV with the destruction of the ozone layer.

But even at the level of a few hundred nuclear warheads, the consequences of a nuclear war would be extremely severe across the world far beyond the areas hit directly. A nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan with ‘only’ 100 small warheads would kill hundreds of millions and cause climate damage leading to a global famine. The sheer destructive nature of nuclear explosions combined with long lasting radiation, means that nuclear weapons are of no military use. ‘Enemy’ territory would be unusable for years because of intense radiation – especially when nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants are hit.

Even if your own country is not hit, radiation and climate damage will spread across the globe. No one escapes the consequences.

But the nuclear nations argue that they build and keep nuclear weapons to make sure that they are never used. After all no one would be stupid enough to actually launch a nuclear weapon facing such terrible retaliation? It sounds obvious. If you threaten any attacker with terrible nuclear devastation of course they won’t attack you. That might be true most of the time. It is very unlikely that any country would launch a nuclear attack deliberately. But there are two very major problems. First, a terrorist organisation with a nuclear weapon cannot be deterred in this way. Secondly, there are several ways in which a nuclear war can start by mistake. A report by the prestigious Chatham House in 2014 documents 30 instances between 1962 and 2002 when nuclear weapons came within minutes of being launched due to miscalculation, miscommunication, or technical errors. What prevented their use on many of these occasions was the intervention of individuals who, against military orders, either refused to authorise a nuclear strike or relay information that would have led to launch. Examples include a weather rocket launch mistaken for an attack on Russia, a US satellite misinterpreting sunlight reflecting off clouds as multiple missiles firings, a 42c chip fault creating a false warning of 220 missiles launched at the United States. Such risks are heightened during political crises.

The risk of mistake is very high because, in a hangover from the Cold War, the USA and Russia each keep 900 warheads ready to fire in a few minutes, in a ‘launch on warning’ status, should a warning of nuclear attack come in.

These nuclear weapons form a dangerous nuclear stand-off – rather like two people holding guns to each other’s heads.

With only a few minutes to evaluate a warning of nuclear attack before warheads would strike, one mistake can trigger disaster. A similar nuclear stand-off exists between India and Pakistan.

### 1AC – Framework

#### Permissibility and presumption affirm.

**A] Freeze- otherwise we would not be able to justify morally neutral actions since there isn’t a prohibition and we would have to prove an obligation.**

**B] Trivialism- statements are true until proven false, if I told you my name you’d believe me.**

#### C] Negation Theory- Negating requires a complete absence of an existing obligation

Negate: to deny the existence of

That’s Dictionary.com- “Negate” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/negate.

#### D] The Law of Excluded Middles- if something is not false, it must be true, which means that if something is not prohibited, it must be obligatory, and permissibility is the same as obligatory.

#### The meta-ethic is moral naturalism. Non-natural moral facts are epistemically inaccessible

Papineau 7 [David, Academic philosopher. He works as Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College London, having previously taught for several years at Cambridge University and been a fellow of Robinson College, Cambridge, “Naturalism”. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/))]

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If **all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world** (Harman, 1986). At first sight **this** may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it **has** **very awkward epistemological consequences.** For beings like us, **knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.**

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. To clarify, hedonic act utilitarianism.

#### Prefer:

#### 1] No intent-foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the dxeath of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### 2] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to not kill. Only consequences explain why which is intuitive. Outweighs—a) parsimony—metaphysics relies on long chains of questionable claims that make conclusions less likely b) hijacks—intuitions are inevitable since every framework must take some starting point.

#### 4] The negative cannot contest the affirmative framework provided that the affirmative framework is maximizing expected wellbeing – the 1nc is always reactive and can uplayer the aff with things like procedurals and Ks – only AFC rectifies that by forcing the 1n to commit to the aff on substance.

#### Impact calc –

#### 1] Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities. Negating affirms because it assumes that the 1ac is a statement that is worthy of contestation which means are arguments are legitimate.

#### B] Mathematically outweighs.

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have s trong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### 2] Calc indicts fail: A] Ethics- it would indict everything cuz they use events to understand how ethics have worked B] Reciprocity- they are NIBs that create a 2:1 skew where I have to answer them to access offense while they only have to win one C] Action under one framework doesn’t preclude another. I can still have an obligation under the categorical imperative, even if the aff is bad under Hobbes so framing issues don’t exclude the offense.

### 1AC – Underview 2

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer – 1AR are too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time. Fairness is a gateway issue to the ballot and education is the reason schools fund debate.