# 1AC

### 1AC – Adv – Pandemics

#### Only the plan can solve covid access – inequalities heighten the risk of mutations and uneven development – neg objections miss the boat.

Kumar 21 [Rajeesh; Associate Fellow at the Institute, currently working on a project titled “Emerging Powers and the Future of Global Governance: India and International Institutions.” He has PhD in International Organization from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Prior to joining MP-IDSA in 2016, he taught at JamiaMilliaIslamia, New Delhi (2010-11& 2015-16) and University of Calicut, Kerala (2007-08). His areas of research interest are International Organizations, India and Multilateralism, Global Governance, and International Humanitarian Law. He is the co-editor of two books;Eurozone Crisis and the Future of Europe: Political Economy of Further Integration and Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and Islam, Islamist Movements and Democracy in the Middle East: Challenges, Opportunities and Responses (Delhi: Global Vision Publishing, 2013); “WTO TRIPS Waiver and COVID-19 Vaccine Equity,” IDSA Issue Briefs; <https://idsa.in/issuebrief/wto-trips-waiver-covid-vaccine-rkumar-120721>] Justin

According to Duke Global Health Innovation Center, which monitors COVID-19 vaccine purchases, rich nations representing just 14 per cent of the world population have bought up to 53 per cent of the most promising vaccines so far. As of 4 July 2021, the high-income countries (HICs) purchased more than half (6.16 billion) vaccine doses sold globally. At the same time, the low-income countries (LICs) received only 0.3 per cent of the vaccines produced. The low and middle-income countries (LMICs), which account for 81 per cent of the global adult population, purchased 33 per cent, and COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) has received 13 per cent.10 Many HICs bought enough doses to vaccinate their populations several times over. For instance, Canada procured 10.45 doses per person, while the UK, EU and the US procured 8.18, 6.89, and 4.60 doses per inhabitant, respectively.11

Consequently, there is a significant disparity between HICs and LICs in vaccine administration as well. As of 8 July 2021, 3.32 billion vaccine doses had been administered globally.12 Nonetheless, only one per cent of people in LICs have been given at least one dose. While in HICs almost one in four people have received the vaccine, in LICs, it is one in more than 500. The World Health Organization (WHO) notes that about 90 per cent of African countries will miss the September target to vaccinate at least 10 per cent of their populations as a third wave looms on the continent.13 South Africa, the most affected African country, for instance, has vaccinated less than two per cent of its population of about 59 million. This is in contrast with the US where almost 47.5 per cent of the population of more than 330 million has been fully vaccinated. In Sub-Saharan Africa, vaccine rollout remains the slowest in the world. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), at current rates, by the end of 2021, a massive global inequity will continue to exist, with Africa still experiencing meagre vaccination rates while other parts of the world move much closer to complete vaccination.14

This vaccine inequity is not only morally indefensible but also clinically counter-productive. If this situation prevails, LICs could be waiting until 2025 for vaccinating half of their people. Allowing most of the world’s population to go unvaccinated will also spawn new virus mutations, more contagious viruses leading to a steep rise in COVID-19 cases. Such a scenario could cause twice as many deaths as against distributing them globally, on a priority basis. Preventing this humanitarian catastrophe requires removing all barriers to the production and distribution of vaccines. TRIPS is one such barrier that prevents vaccine production in LMICs and hence its equitable distribution.

TRIPS: Barrier to Equitable Health Care Access

The opponents of the waiver proposal argue that IPR are not a significant barrier to equitable access to health care, and existing TRIPS flexibilities are sufficient to address the COVID-19 pandemic. However, history suggests the contrary. For instance, when South Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1997 to address the HIV/AIDS public health crisis, nearly 40 of world’s largest and influential pharma companies took the South African government to court over the violation of TRIPS. The Act, which invoked the compulsory licensing provision, allowed South Africa to produce affordable generic drugs.15 The Big Pharma also lobbied developed countries, particularly the US, to put bilateral trade sanctions against South Africa.16

Similarly, when Indian company Cipla decided to provide generic antiretrovirals (ARVs) to the African market at a lower cost, Big Pharma retaliated through patent litigations in Indian and international trade courts and branded Indian drug companies as thieves.17 Another instance was when Swiss company Roche initiated patent infringement proceedings against Cipla’s decision to launch a generic version of cancer drug, “erlotinib”. Though the Delhi High Court initially dismissed Roche's appeal by citing “public interest” and “affordability of medicines,” the continued to pressure the generic pharma companies over IPR. 18 Likewise, Pfizer’s aggressive patenting strategy prevented South Korea in developing pneumonia vaccines for children.19

A recent document by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), or Doctors Without Borders, highlights various instances of how IP hinders manufacturing and supply of diagnostics, medical equipment, treatments and vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, during the peak of the COVID-19 first wave in Europe, Roche rejected a request from the Netherlands to release the recipe of key chemical reagents needed to increase the production of diagnostic kits. Another example was patent holders threatening producers of 3D printing ventilators with patent infringement lawsuits in Italy.20 The MSF also found that patents pose a severe threat to access to affordable versions of newer vaccines.21

The opponents of the TRIPS waiver also argue that IP is the incentive for innovation and if it is undermined, future innovation will suffer. However, most of the COVID-19 medical innovations, particularly vaccines, are developed with public financing assistance. Governments spent billions of dollars for COVID-19 vaccine research. Notably, out of $6.1 billion in investment tracked up to July 2021, 98.12 per cent was public funding.22 The US and Germany are the largest investors in vaccine R&D with $2.2 billion and $1.5 billion funding.

Private companies received 94.6 per cent of this funding; Moderna received the highest $956.3 million and Janssen $910.6 million. Moreover, governments also invested $50.9 billion for advance purchase agreements (APAs) as an incentive for vaccine development. A recent IMF working paper also notes that public research institutions were a key driver of the COVID-19 R&D effort—accounting for 70 per cent of all COVID-19 clinical trials globally.23 The argument is that vaccines are developed with the support of substantial public financing, hence there is a public right to the scientific achievements. Moreover, private companies reaped billions in profits from COVID-19 vaccines.

One could argue that since the US, Germany and other HICs are spending money, their citizens are entitled to get vaccines first, hence vaccine nationalism is morally defensible. Nonetheless, it is not the case. The TRIPS Agreement includes several provisions which mandates promotion of technology transfer from developed countries to LDCs. For instance, Article 7 states that "the protection and enforcement of IP rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technical knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."24 Similarly, Article 66.2 also mandates the developed countries to transfer technologies to LDCs to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base. The LMICs opened their markets and amended domestic patent laws favouring developing countries’ products against this promise of technology transfer.

Another argument against the proposed TRIPS waiver is that a waiver would not increase the manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines. Indeed, one of the significant factors contributing to vaccine inequity is the lack of manufacturing capacity in the global south. Further, a TRIPS waiver will not automatically translate into improved manufacturing capacity. However, a waiver would be the first but essential step to increase manufacturing capacity worldwide. For instance, to export COVID-19 vaccine-related products, countries need to ensure that there are no IP restrictions at both ends – exporting and importing. The market for vaccine materials includes consumables, single-use reactors bags, filters, culture media, and vaccine ingredients. Export blockages on raw materials, equipment and finished products harm the overall output of the vaccine supply chain. If there is no TRIPS restriction, more governments and companies will invest in repurposing their facilities.

Similarly, the arguments such as that no other manufacturers can carry out the complex manufacturing process of COVID-19 vaccines and generic manufacturing as that would jeopardise quality, have also been proven wrong in the past. For instance, in the early 1990s, when Indian company Shantha Biotechnics approached a Western firm for a technology transfer of Hepatitis B vaccine, the firm responded that “India cannot afford such high technology vaccines… And even if you can afford to buy the technology, your scientists cannot understand recombinant technology in the least.”25 Later, Shantha Biotechnics developed its own vaccine at $1 per dose, and the UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund) mass inoculation programme uses this vaccine against Hepatitis B. In 2009, Shantha sold over 120 million doses of vaccines globally.

India also produces high-quality generic drugs for HIV/AIDS and cancer treatment and markets them across the globe. Now, a couple of Indian companies are in the last stage of producing mRNA (Messenger RNA) vaccines.26 Similarly, Bangladesh and Indonesia claimed that they could manufacture millions of COVID-19 vaccine doses a year if pharmaceutical companies share the know-how.27 Recently, Vietnam also said that the country could satisfy COVID-19 vaccine production requirements once it obtains vaccine patents.28 Countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina and South Korea have the capacity to produce high-quality vaccines but lack technologies and know-how. However, Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia have limited manufacturing capacities, which could also produce COVID-19 vaccines after repurposing.

Moreover, COVID-19 vaccine IPR runs across the entire value chain – vaccine development, production, use, etc. A mere patent waiver may not be enough to address the issues related to its production and distribution. What is more important here is to share the technical know-how and information such as trade secrets. Therefore, the existing TRIPS flexibilities, such as compulsory and voluntary licensing, are insufficient to address this crisis. Further, compulsory licensing and the domestic legal procedures it requires is cumbersome and not expedient in a public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic.

India’s Role in Ensuring Vaccine Equity India's response to COVID-19 at the global level was primarily two-fold. First, its proactive engagements in the regional and international platforms. Second, its policies and programmes to provide therapeutics and vaccines to the world. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, India has been advocating international cooperation and policy coordination in fighting it. For instance, in April 2020, India co-sponsored a UN resolution that called for fair and equitable access to essential medical supplies and future vaccines to COVID-19. Later, in October 2020, India also put pressure on developed countries with a joint WTO proposal for TRIPS waiver. India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative also aims vaccine equity. As of 29 May 2021, India has supplied 663.698 lakh doses of COVID-19 vaccines to 95 countries. It includes 107.15 lakh doses as a gift to more than 45 countries, 357.92 lakh doses by commercial sales, and 198.628 lakh doses to the COVAX facility.29 The COVAX initiative aims to ensure rapid and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines for all countries, regardless of their income level. India has decided to supply 10 million doses of the vaccine to Africa and one million to the UN health workers under the COVAX facility. India has also removed the IPR of Covaxin that would help platforms like C-TAP once WHO and developed countries’ regulatory bodies approve the vaccine. If agreed, the waiver would benefit India in many ways. First, more vaccines will help the country to control the pandemic and its recurring waves. Second, it will be a boost to India's pharma industry, particularly the generic medicine industry. According to the Biotechnology Innovation Organization, 834 unique active compounds are involved in the current R&D of COVID-19 therapeutics, vaccines, and diagnostics. It means that thousands of new patents are awaited, and that will hinder India's ability to produce COVID-19 related medical products. Only through a waiver, this challenge can be addressed. Similarly, scientists note that mRNA is the future of vaccine technology. However, manufacturing mRNA vaccines involves complex processes and procedures. Only a very few Indian manufacturers have access to this technology; however, that too is limited. Once Indian companies have access to mRNA technology, it will help country’s generic medicine industry and boost India’s economy. Therefore, even if the WTO agrees on a waiver for a period shorter than proposed, India should accept it. In addition, mRNA vaccines can be produced in lesser time compared to the traditional vaccines. While traditional vaccines’ production takes four to five months, mRNA needs only six to eight weeks. Access to this technology will be vital for India in expediting the fight against COVID-19 and future pandemics. Finally, a waiver may strengthen India's diplomatic soft power. At present, what hinders India's Vaccine Maitri initiative is the scarcity of vaccines at home. On the other hand, China is increasing its standing in Africa, South America and the Pacific through vaccine diplomacy. The WHO approval of the Chinese vaccines and lack of access to vaccines by most developing countries, opens up huge space for China to do its vaccine diplomacy. Here, India should convince its Quad partners, particularly Australia and Japan, who oppose the waiver that vaccine production in developing countries through TRIPS waiver will enable the grouping to deliver its pledged billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine in the Indo-Pacific region. In short, the proposed waiver, if agreed, will help India in addressing the public health crisis by producing more vaccines and distributing them at home; economically, by boosting its generic pharmaceutical industry, and diplomatically, providing vaccines to the developing and least-developed countries. Therefore, India should use all available means and methods, from trade-offs to pressurising, to make the waiver happen.

#### Yes scale-up for covid.

Erfani et al 21 [Parsa; Lawrence Gostin; Vanessa Kerry; Parsa Erfani is a Fogarty Global Health Scholar at Harvard Medical School and the University of Global Health Equity. Lawrence Gostin is a professor at Georgetown University Law Center, director of the school’s O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, and director of the World Health Organization Center on National and Global Health Law. Vanessa Kerry is a critical care physician at Massachusetts General Hospital, director of the Program for Global Public Policy at Harvard Medical School, and CEO of Seed Global Health, a nonprofit that trains health workers in countries with critical shortages; “Beyond a symbolic gesture: What’s needed to turn the IP waiver into Covid-19 vaccines,” STAT; 5/19/21; <https://www.statnews.com/2021/05/19/beyond-a-symbolic-gesture-whats-needed-to-turn-the-ip-waiver-into-covid-19-vaccines/>] Justin

Currently many idle suppliers can’t begin vaccine production until they upgrade and repurpose existing manufacturing capacity for new technology. Opponents often argue that this step is the true barrier to rapid scale-up. One high-profile detractor, BIO President and CEO Michelle McMurry-Heath, argues that “handing [needy countries] the blueprint to construct a kitchen that — in optimal conditions — can take a year to build will not help us stop the emergence of dangerous new Covid variants.”

This argument ignores two core truths: In many cases, manufacturing capacity needs only repurposing which can take mere months. And Covid-19, at the current global response and vaccination rates, will be a threat for years.

Both truths suggest that we pass the blueprint and build the kitchen.

Facilitating structures to transfer technology and capacity are already in place. The WHO launched the mRNA technology transfer hub model last month to provide manufacturers in low- and middle-income countries with the financial, training, and logistical support needed to scale up vaccine manufacturing capacity. Scores of manufacturers in these countries have already expressed interest. This initiative, however, requires recipient manufacturers to acquire the IP necessary for mRNA technologies— which is currently missing.

#### Corona escalates security threats that cause extinction – cooperation thesis is wrong.

Recna 21 [Research Center for Nuclear Weapon Abolition; Nagasaki, Japan; “Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks: The Nagasaki 75th Anniversary pandemic-nuclear nexus scenarios final report,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament; 5/28/21; <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2021.1890867>] Justin

The Challenge: Multiple Existential Threats

The relationship between pandemics and war is as long as human history. Past pandemics have set the scene for wars by weakening societies, undermining resilience, and exacerbating civil and inter-state conflict. Other disease outbreaks have erupted during wars, in part due to the appalling public health and battlefield conditions resulting from war, in turn sowing the seeds for new conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, pandemics have spread with unprecedented speed due to increased mobility created by globalization, especially between urbanized areas. Although there are positive signs that scientific advances and rapid innovation can help us manage pandemics, it is likely that deadly infectious viruses will be a challenge for years to come.

The COVID-19 is the most demonic pandemic threat in modern history. It has erupted at a juncture of other existential global threats, most importantly, accelerating climate change and resurgent nuclear threat-making. The most important issue, therefore, is how the coronavirus (and future pandemics) will increase or decrease the risks associated with these twin threats, climate change effects, and the next use of nuclear weapons in war.5

Today, the nine nuclear weapons arsenals not only can annihilate hundreds of cities, but also cause nuclear winter and mass starvation of a billion or more people, if not the entire human species. Concurrently, climate change is enveloping the planet with more frequent and intense storms, accelerating sea level rise, and advancing rapid ecological change, expressed in unprecedented forest fires across the world. Already stretched to a breaking point in many countries, the current pandemic may overcome resilience to the point of near or actual collapse of social, economic, and political order.

In this extraordinary moment, it is timely to reflect on the existence and possible uses of weapons of mass destruction under pandemic conditions – most importantly, nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons. Moments of extreme crisis and vulnerability can prompt aggressive and counterintuitive actions that in turn may destabilize already precariously balanced threat systems, underpinned by conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of weaponized chemical and biological technologies. Consequently, the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, increases at such times, possibly sharply.

The COVID-19 pandemic is clearly driving massive, rapid, and unpredictable changes that will redefine every aspect of the human condition, including WMD – just as the world wars of the first half of the 20th century led to a revolution in international affairs and entirely new ways of organizing societies, economies, and international relations, in part based on nuclear weapons and their threatened use. In a world reshaped by pandemics, nuclear weapons – as well as correlated non-nuclear WMD, nuclear alliances, “deterrence” doctrines, operational and declaratory policies, nuclear extended deterrence, organizational practices, and the **existential risks** posed by retaining these capabilities – are all up for redefinition.

A pandemic has potential to destabilize a nuclear-prone conflict by incapacitating the supreme nuclear commander or commanders who have to issue nuclear strike orders, creating uncertainty as to who is in charge, how to handle nuclear mistakes (such as errors, accidents, technological failures, and entanglement with conventional operations gone awry), and opening a brief opportunity for a first strike at a time when the COVID-infected state may not be able to retaliate efficiently – or at all – due to leadership confusion. In some nuclear-laden conflicts, a state might use a pandemic as a cover for political or military provocations in the belief that the adversary is distracted and partly disabled by the pandemic, increasing the risk of war in a nuclear-prone conflict. At the same time, a pandemic may lead nuclear armed states to increase the isolation and sanctions against a nuclear adversary, making it even harder to stop the spread of the disease, in turn creating a pandemic reservoir and transmission risk back to the nuclear armed state or its allies.

In principle, the common threat of the pandemic might induce nuclear-armed states to reduce the tension in a nuclear-prone conflict and thereby the risk of nuclear war. It may cause nuclear adversaries or their umbrella states to seek to resolve conflicts in a cooperative and collaborative manner by creating habits of communication, engagement, and mutual learning that come into play in the nuclear-military sphere. For example, militaries may cooperate to control pandemic transmission, including by working together against criminal-terrorist non-state actors that are trafficking people or by joining forces to ensure that a new pathogen is not developed as a bioweapon.

To date, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the isolation of some nuclear-armed states and provided a textbook case of the failure of states to cooperate to overcome the pandemic. Borders have slammed shut, trade shut down, and budgets blown out, creating enormous pressure to focus on immediate domestic priorities. Foreign policies have become markedly more nationalistic. Dependence on nuclear weapons may increase as states seek to buttress a global re-spatialization6 of all dimensions of human interaction at all levels to manage pandemics. The effect of nuclear threats on leaders may make it less likely – or even impossible – to achieve the kind of concert at a global level needed to respond to and administer an effective vaccine, making it harder and even impossible to revert to pre-pandemic international relations. The result is that some states may proliferate their own nuclear weapons, further reinforcing the spiral of conflicts contained by nuclear threat, with cascading effects on the risk of nuclear war.

### 1AC – Plan

#### Plan text: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines during pandemics.

#### Enforcement through limited IP waivers solve – patent term extensions are normal means and solves innovation and scale-up.

Young and Potts-Szeliga 21 [Roberta; Counsel in Seyfarth’s Litigation department and Intellectual Property and Patent Litigation practice groups in Los Angeles; Jamaica Potts-Szeliga; Partner in Seyfarth’s Litigation department and Intellectual Property and Patent Litigation practice groups in Washington, DC. She also provides advice on FDA regulatory issues and is part of the firm’s Health Care, Life Sciences, and Pharmaceuticals team; “A Third Option: Limited IP Waiver Could Solve Our Pandemic Vaccine Problems,” IP Watch Dog; 7/21/21; <https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/07/21/third-option-limited-ip-waiver-solve-pandemic-vaccine-problems/id=135732/>] Justin

Limited Waiver Approach

This article suggests a third option, between voluntary vaccine donation and the full IP waiver proposal, that may offer a way forward. The third proposed solution is incentivized limited IP waivers that could encourage (or require) private companies to engage in licensing agreements with nations to share some, but not all, of the knowledge and designs covering the COVID-19 vaccines to the developing world. The limited IP waivers could cover the minimum necessary portions of the technology to produce basic COVID-19 vaccines. The waivers could be limited in time to the duration of the pandemic, or another term agreed to by the WTO. The term could also be defined as ending when widespread vaccination and immunity goals are achieved. The incentive for pharmaceutical companies to support such limited IP waivers could be provided in the form of patent term extensions for the technology covered by the limited IP waivers.

Extensions of patent term are already known and widely used. In the U.S., patent term adjustments are automatically added on to the patent lifespan to account for any delays by the USPTO in the patent prosecution process. In some cases, these mechanisms may extend the patent term for years. Patent term extensions also are available for regulatory delays (35 U.S.C. § 156). In particular, patents covering, inter alia, drug products approved by the United States Food & Drug Administration may be eligible for up to five years of additional patent term to give back time required to complete the regulatory review process. Both patent term adjustments and patent term extensions arise from activities beyond the control of the pharmaceutical companies. A pandemic patent term extension fashioned after such known extensions could be made used to compensate for the current pressing global health needs.

This third proposal may be achievable at the WTO. Hurdles remain and it could be months or years before the WTO reaches an agreement on any waiver of IP protections, and years before countries build factories, gather materials, and gain the expertise to produce the vaccines. A steep hurdle is that mRNA is a new technology, with no machines or experts for hire. Nonetheless, the third solution offers hope to find a middle ground that may begin to be implemented before the end of the current pandemic and be in place for the future.

The patent term extension could be provided for countries with patent offices and could be adapted based on laws and conditions in each country. Pandemic-related patent term extensions could be given for a period of time that the compulsory license is in force. With current pandemic projections of six months to two years for sufficient distribution, providing a patent term extension is reasonable and in line with the time period of many patent term extensions. Given that most pharmaceutical patents are prosecuted in multiple countries, this provides an incentive to participate in a limited waiver program.

Let’s Not Repeat Past Mistakes

It’s been a century since the last pandemic devastated the globe and the only certainty is that this will not be the last pandemic. Solutions created today lay a foundation for mitigation of the next pandemic. It’s been said that those who refuse to learn from history are doomed to repeat it, a thought too painful to contemplate with a pandemic. The industrial nations of the world have technology that others are literally dying to obtain—a high price to pay. Incentivized limited IP waivers may offer a compromise to bridge the gap between maintaining IP rights (and thus relying on charity alone) and arbitrary compulsory licensing that could deter the technological investment to create life-saving solutions in the future.

### 1AC – Framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### 1] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### 2] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### 3] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store**, I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value**. Although **pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### 4] Extinction outweighs

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### 5] Weighability – only consequentialism can explain the ethical difference in breaking a promise to take someone to the hospital and breaking a promise to take someone to lunch – that outweighs –

#### A] Resolvability – there’s no way to weigh between competing offense under their fw which means their fw can’t guide action

#### B] Intuitions – they’re a necessary side constraint on all ethics – if a very well justified, logical theory concluded "rape good” you wouldn’t say “huh I guess rape is good” you would abandon it

#### 6] No intent foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the death of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### 7] Substitutability—only consequentialism explains necessary enablers – if I promise someone to mow the grass, my promise gives me moral reason to mow the grass but no reason to turn on the lawn mower.

#### 8] Reject calc indicts

#### A] Empirically denied—both individuals and policymakers carry out effective cost-benefit analysis which means even if decisions aren’t always perfect it’s still better than not acting at all

#### B] Theory—they’re functionally NIBs that everyone knows are silly but skew the aff and move the debate away from the topic and actual philosophical debate, killing valuable education

### Underview

#### 1] Aff gets 1AR theory since the neg can be infinitely abusive and I can’t check back. It’s drop the debater since the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance. No RVI or 2NR paradigm issues since they’d dump on it for 6 minutes and my 3-minute 2AR is spread too thin. Competing interps since reasonability is arbitrary and bites judge intervention.

#### 2] Alt actor fiat is a voting issue: a] ground – moots the entire aff since you can just fiat an actor responsible for aff harms which means the aff can never weigh the case b] advocacy skills – in the real world we have to debate desirability with the actors we’re given, not assume other random people can solve the harms c] limits – there are infinite number of alt actors which means I can never reasonably predict which one you could read. Fairness first – 1] debaters would quit 2] it epistemically indicts their arguments since we couldn’t respond

#### 3] Reject ontology arguments – A) Pascal’s wager – if ontology is false and we act as though it’s true we justify infinite unjust violence while cruel optimism is a marginal impact

#### B) All agents are a priori equal – everyone has equal access to subjectivity, it is only social conditions that determine that access, but those social conditions can always be reformulated

#### C) Events cannot change the structure of the subject – there’s a gap between their warrants and the conclusion that the subject can *never* change even if they win all their arguments it doesn’t actually prove progress is impossible

#### 3] Evolution proves our theory true

**Johnson and Thayer 16** – Dominic D. P. Johnson, D.Phil., Ph.D.\* and Bradley A. Thayer, Ph.D., “The evolution of offensive realism Survival under anarchy from the Pleistocene to the present,” https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/56B778004187F70B8E59609BE7FEE7A4/S073093841600006Xa.pdf/div-class-title-the-evolution-of-offensive-realism-div.pdf

Few principles unite the discipline of international relations, but one exception is anarchy—the absence of government in international politics. Anarchy is, ironically, the ‘‘ordering’’ principle of the global state system and the starting point for most major theories of international politics, such as neoliberalism and neorealism.42,43,44,45 Other theoretical approaches, such as constructivism, also acknowledge the impact of anarchy, even if only to consider why anarchy occurs and how it can be circumvented.46,47 Indeed, the anarchy concept is so profound that it defines and divides the discipline of political science into international politics (politics under conditions of anarchy) and domestic politics (politics under conditions of hierarchy, or government). Given the prominence of the concept in present-day international relations theory, it is striking that anarchy only took hold as a central feature of scholarship in recent decades, since the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in 1979. In fact, however, **anarchy has been a constant feature of the entire multimillion year history of the human lineage (and indeed the 3.5 billion–year history of the evolution of all life on Earth before that). It is not just that we lack a global Leviathan today; humans never had such a luxury. The fact that human evolution occurred under conditions of anarchy, that we evolved as hunter-gatherers in an ecological setting of predation, resource competition, and intergroup conflict, and that humans have been subject to natural selection** for millions of years **has profound consequences for understanding human behavior**, not least how humans perceive and act toward others. Scholars often argue over whether historically humans experienced a Hobbesian ‘‘state of nature,’’ but—whatever the outcome of that debate—it is certainly a much closer approximation to the prehistoric environment in which human brains and behavior evolved. **This legacy heavily influences our decision-making and behavior today, even—perhaps especially—in the anarchy of international politics**. We argue that **evolution under conditions of anarchy has predisposed human nature toward the behaviors predicted by offensive realism: Humans**, particularly men, **are strongly self-interested, often fear other groups, and seek more resources, more power, and more influence** (as we explain in full later). **These strategies** are not unique to humans and, in fact, **characterize a much broader trend in behavior among mammals as a whole—especially primates**—as well as many other major vertebrate groups, including birds, fish, and reptiles. **This recurrence of behavioral patterns** across different taxonomic groups **suggests that the behaviors characterized by offensive realism have broad and deep evolutionary roots**. This perspective does not deny the importance of institutions, norms, and governance in international politics. On the contrary, it provides or adds to the reasons why we demand and need them, and indeed why they are so hard to establish and maintain. Until recently, **international relations theorists rarely used insights from the life sciences to inform their understanding of human behavior**. However, **rapid advances in the life sciences offer increasing theoretical and empirical challenges to scholars in** the social sciences in general and **international relations** in particular, who are therefore under increasing pressure to address and integrate this knowledge rather than to suppress or ignore it. Whatever one’s personal views on evolution, **the time has come to explore the implications of evolutionary theory for mainstream theories of international relations**. **The most obvious challenge that evolutionary theory presents to international relations concerns our understanding of human nature**. Theories purporting to explain human behavior make explicit or implicit assumptions about preferences and motivations, and mainstream theories in international politics are no exception. Many **criticisms of international relations theories focus on these unsubstantiated or contested assumptions about underlying human nature.** The parsimony of general theories depends on how well they explain phenomena across space and time; in other words, the more closely they coincide with empirical observations across cultures and throughout history. The most enduring theories of international relations, therefore, will be ones that are able to incorporate (or at least do not run against the grain of) evolutionary theory. Although Thomas Hobbes claimed to have deduced Leviathan scientifically from ‘‘motion’’ and the physical senses, he was writing two hundred years before Darwin and so had no understanding of evolution.53 International relations scholars have tended to claim to deduce their own theories from Hobbes, or subsequent philosophers who followed him, and we suggest it is time to revisit the idea of foundational scientific principles. Starting with biology, or with human evolutionary history, has never been typical in international relations scholarship, but this approach is now less exotic than it once seemed as innovators in a range of social sciences, including economics, psychology, sociology, and political science, pursue this line of inquiry.54,55,56,57 International relations stands to gain from similar interdisciplinary insights.

#### 4] Implicit bias is an automatic thought function which is not pre-social – changing material conditions affects those processes

Matthew 15 (Dayna Bowen Matthew, nonresident senior fellow in the Center for Health Policy, who works at the University of Colorado School of Law, the Colorado School of Public Health, and the Center for Bioethics and Humanities at the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center specializes in health and behavioral sciences and her research interests include public health law, poverty, and ethics in health professions, “Just Medicine: A Cure for Racial Inequality in American Health Care” New York University Press 2015. Pg 43-45)

Implicit biases are attitudes, preferences, and beliefs about social groups that operate outside of human awareness or control. Neuroscientists believe there are three regions of the brain that relate to the automatic activation of implicit attitudes. First, the amygdala, a small group of nuclei located in both the left and right hemispheres of the brain, has been linked to implicit attitudes in numerous studies. The amygdala is believed to control memory, attention, and automatic responses to stimuli. It plays a role in our ability to evaluate members of other social groups. MRI studies show that elevated blood-oxygen level responses in the amygdala region of the human brain correlate to a person’s implicit attitudes, but are suppressed in the presence of explicit stimuli in the form of faces of a person from a different racial background.”¶ Activity in two other regions of the brain appears to work in a correlated fashion with the amygdala in order to keep implicit racial associations responses below the threshold of conscious awareness. Studies show that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (diPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) have both been correlated with the attenuated responses of the amygdala. In lay terms, a three-part neural model exists in which the amygdala generates automatic responses to racial stimuli, while the diPFC and ACC work to maintain those responses at an unconscious level.” While neuroscientists have measured and studied the physical activity of the brain that generates implicit attitudes, social psychologists have studied the cognitive processes that produce them.¶ Implicit bias is a form of automatic thought. According to the classic, dual processing model of human cognition, thought generally occurs on two levels. On the one hand, explicit or conscious thought occurs by processes that are intentional and deliberate. Automatic thought, on the other hand, is a system of information processing that occurs without any intentionality. There are four basic processes of automatic thought. First, a person acquires and stores social knowledge in a way that is accessible from memory when triggers or cues stir up the associations that make up social knowledge. Social knowledge is the information generally available to members of a community by virtue of the messages chronically reinforced and adopted about people or things. Stereotypes, for example, are a particular form of social knowledge in which attributes or traits are assigned to a group of people. Second, a person’s ability to retrieve social knowledge from memory is the next process of automatic thought, and social psychologists call this function “accessibility.” When cues or triggers from familiar contextual settings allow a person to “activate” social knowledge so that it is ready to direct conduct or judgments without deliberate or conscious decision-making, the second process of automatic thought is enacted. The third and fourth processes involve automatic application of social knowledge to a current situation because of the apparent fit between knowledge stored in memory and the situation at hand. However, the remarkable discovery about these processes is that stereotyping and prejudices can occur unintentionally, at an implicit or unconscious level. This means that a person can apply negative group attributes or traits, presumed from memory of social knowledge, to an individual who is a member of the group, despite the lack of evidentiary support to confirm the truth of the presumed attribute or trait, without or even against that person’s intentional will. In short, the evidence shows that implicit biases can operate automatically, unintentionally, and unconsciously.¶ Where race and ethnicity are concerned, Americans gather their social group knowledge from the environment. From the abundance of images of minorities on television and in the print media, to commentary by political leaders, lyrics in popular music, discussions among friends, entertainment outlets, chance encounters, and interracial relationships or experiences-the subconsciously gathered information that unconsciously becomes stored group knowledge is as pervasive as it is powerful. Consider this example. It is a statistical fact that white Americans receive the greatest share of public entitlement assistance, or “welfare.” Nevertheless, the social group knowledge many gathered from the 2012 presidential campaign was that it is minorities who predominantly receive welfare. One politician attempted to capitalize on the social group knowledge that presumed a poor work ethic among blacks by labeling President Barack Obama a “food stamp president,” while another candidate sought to distinguish himself from the president by promising that he will not “make black people’s lives better by giving them somebody else's money.” Neither of these campaign pitches accurately reflected the fact that whites are the predominant recipient of welfare funds, Medicaid support, and food stamps, but reference to these programs were deemed useful in the campaign against Barack Obama because they matched the subconscious impressions some voters have of blacks, even if they contradicted the truth. Let’s look at the facts: In reality, African Americans do not constitute the majority of welfare recipients. The DHHS reports that in 2012, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the cash assistance program to families in need, helped 1.8 million families; 30.1 percent of those families were white, 31.5 percent were black, and 31.1 percent were Hispanic.l3 Indeed, DHHS also reports that "the percentage of African-American TANB families has slowly decreased since 2001.”” The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) report that in 2013, Medicaid enrolled a monthly average of 57.4 million people; 41.1 percent were white, 21.6 percent were black, and 24.7 percent were Hispanic.” In 2013, a total of 22.8 million households used food stamps-the supplemental nutrition assistance program called “SNAP.” The United States Department of Agriculture reports that 40.2 percent of households receiving SNAP had white heads of households; blacks headed 25.7 percent of SNAP households; and 10.3 percent were headed by a Hispanic.16 Clearly, despite the political claims that captured the airways, blacks are not, in fact, the primary recipients of “welfare.” Whether the source is a political campaign advertisement, television news channel, sports and music personalities profiled in or permarket tabloids, Hollywood box office hits, or lessons taught in high school history classes-the negative imagery of minority Americans that is readily available in our culture tends to override reality and dominate the stored social group knowledge most whites have about people of color in this country. Social scientists have reported study after study that confirms the power of negative imagery of African Americans and Latinos which associates them with criminality, animals, and socially undesirable behavior such as drug abuse and hypersexuality. These are the associations that create stereotypes that inform implicit biases. Doe tors, nurses, pharmacists, dentists, and others in the health care industry are not insulated from this negative social group knowledge. These same types of biases influence decision-makers within the health industry as well. Thanks to the work of social scientists over the past thirty years, tools have been developed to measure implicit bias. We are now able to quantify reliably the extent to which stored social group knowledge produces implicit racial and ethnic bias.

#### 5] Youth participatory action research enables *transformative resistance* and is crucial to make activism work

Cammarota and Fine 08

(Julio, Education@Arizona, Michelle, UrbanEducation@TheGraduateCenterNYU, *Youth Participatory Action Research*

In the Matrix, Morpheus, played by Laurence Fishburne, places Keanu Reeves’ character Neo in a chair to tell him face to face about the real truth of his experience. Morpheus shows Neo a red pill in one hand and a blue one in the other, describing that the red pill will lead him “down the rabbit hole” to the truth while the blue pill will make him forget about their conversation and return everything back to “normal.” Neo looks confused and worried, hesitates for a moment, and then reaches to grab and then swallow the red pill. " e “blue and red pill” scene in ! e Matrix serves as an excellent metaphor for the relationships some educators/activists have with their students, and the kinds of choices we ask them to make. The critical educational experience offered might lead the student “down the rabbit hole” past the layers of lies to the truths of systematic exploitation and oppression as well as possibilities for resistance. A$ er he ingests the red pill, Neo ends up in the place of truth, awakening to the reality that his entire world is a lie constructed to make him believe that he lives a “normal” life, when in reality he is fully exploited day in and day out. What is “normal” is really a mirage, and what is true is the complete structural domination of people, all people. " is book, Revolutionizing Education, literally connects to the metaphorical play on chimera and veracity forwarded by the narrative in ! e Matrix. Examples are presented throughout in which young people resist the 1 normalization of systematic oppression by undertaking their own engaged praxis—critical and collective inquiry, re% ection and action focused on “reading” and speaking back to the reality of the world, their world (Freire, 1993). The praxis highlighted in the book—youth participatory action research (YPAR)—provides young people with opportunities to study social problems affecting their lives and then determine actions to rectify these problems. YPAR, and thus Revolutionizing Education, may extend the kinds of questions posed by critical youth studies (Bourgois, 1995; Fine and Weis, 1998; Giroux, 1983; Kelley, 1994; Macleod, 1987; McRobbie, 1991; Oakes et al., 2006; Rasmussen et al., 2004; Sullivan, 1989; Willis, 1977). How do youth learn the skills of critical inquiry and resistances within formal youth development, research collectives, and/or educational settings? How is it possible for their critical inquiries to evolve into formalized challenges to the “normal” practices of systematic oppression? Under what conditions can critical research be a tool of youth development and social justice work? The Matrix infers revolution by showing how Neo learns to see the reality of his experiences while understanding his capabilities for resistance. " e YPAR cases presented in this book also follow a similar pattern: young people learn through research about complex power relations,histories of struggle, and the consequences of oppression. They begin to re- vision and denaturalize the realities of their social worlds and then undertake forms of collective challenge based on the knowledge garnered through their critical inquiries. As you will read in this volume, the youth, with adult allies, have written policy briefs, engaged sticker campaigns, performed critical productions, coordinated public testimonials—all dedicated to speaking back and challenging conditions of injustice. What perhaps distinguishes young people engaged in YPAR from the standard representations in critical youth studies is that their research is designed to contest and transform systems and institutions to produce greater justice—distributive justice, procedural justice, and what Iris Marion Young calls a justice of recognition, or respect. In short, YPAR is a formal resistance that leads to transformation—systematic and institutional change to promote social justice. YPAR teaches young people that conditions of injustice are produced, not natural; are designed to privilege and oppress; but are ultimately challengeable and thus changeable. In each of these projects, young people and adult allies experience the vitality of a multi- generational collective analysis of power; we learn that sites of critical inquiry and resistance can be fortifying and nourishing to the soul, and at the same time that these projects provoke ripples of social change. YPAR shows young people how they are consistently subject to the impositions and manipulations of domi-nant exigencies. These controlling interests may take on the form of white supremacy, capitalism, sexism, homophobia, or xenophobia—all of which is meant to provide certain people with power at the expense of subordinating others, many others. Within this matrix or grid of power, the possibilities of true liberation for young people become limited. Similar to the film the Matrix, the individual, like Neo, may be unaware of the infections of power fostering oppression. The dawning of awareness emerges from a critical study of social institutions and processes in influencing one’s life course, and his/her capacity to see differently, to act anew, to provoke change. Critical youth studies demonstrate that the revolutionary lesson is not always apprehended in schools; sometimes, young people gain critical awareness through their own endogenous cultural practices. Such is the case of Willis’ (1977) Lads in Learning to Labor. Working- class youth attain insights about the reproductive function of schools through their own street cultural sensibilities. However, they use these insights to resist education en masse by forgoing school for jobs in factories. Scholars (Fine, 1991; Solórzano and Delgado- Bernal, 2001) identify this form of resistance as “self- defeating,” because the students’ choice to forgo school for manual labor contributes to reproducing them as working class. Although the Lads resist the school’s purpose of engendering uneven class relations, their resistance contributes to this engendering process by undermining any chance they had for social mobility. Young people also engage in forms of resistance that avoid self- defeating outcomes while striving for social advancement. Scholars (Fordham, 1996) identify this next level of resistance as “conformist”—in the sense that young people embrace the education system with the intention of seeking personal gains, although not necessarily agreeing with all the ideological ! ligree espoused by educational institutions. " ey use schooling for their own purposes: educational achievements that garner individual gains with social implications beyond the classroom, such as economic mobility, gender equality, and racial parity. Solórzano and Delgado- Bernal (2001: 319–20) contend that students may attain another, yet more conscious form of resistance, which they call “transformational resistance.” A transformational approach to resistance moves the student to a “deeper level of understanding and a social justice orientation.” Those engaged in transformational resistance address problems of systematic injustice and seek actions that foster “the greatest possibility for social change” (ibid.). Although Solórzano and Delgado- Bernal (2001) provide a useful typology (self- defeating, conformist, and transformational) that acknowledges the complexities of resistance, the education and development processes leading to resistances are somewhat under- discussed. Apparently, the production of cultural subjectivities (Bourgois, 1995; Levinson et al., 1996; Willis, 1977) is related to resisting ideological oppressions. However, these cultural productions tend to occur in more informal settings (non- institutional, non- organizational) such as peer groups, families, and street corners. The work presented in this volume agitates toward another framework— where youth are engaged in multi- generational collectives for critical inquiry and action, and these collectives are housed in youth development settings, schools, and/or research sites. With this series of cases, we challenge scholars, educators, and activists to consider how to create such settings in which research for resistance can be mobilized toward justice. A key question is whether resistance can develop within formal proces ses (pedagogical structures or youth development practices). If this question is left $ unattended, we risk perceiving youth resistances as “orientations” as opposed to processes. In other words, the kinds of resistances, whether self- defeating, conformist, or transformational, will be identified as emerging from some inherent fixxed, cultural sensibility. This perspective of young people sustains the ridged essentialization trap that has plagued studies of youth for years (Anderson, 1990; Newman, 1999; Ogbu, 1978). The traditional essentialized view maintains that any problem (poverty, educational failure, drug and alcohol abuse, etc.) faced by youth results of their own volition, thereby blaming the victim for the victim’s problems. Critical youth studies goes beyond the traditional pathological or patronizing view by asserting that young people have the capacity and agency to analyze their social context, to engage critical research collectively, and to challenge and resist the forces impeding their possibilities for liberation. However, another step is needed to further distance critical youth studies from essentialized perspectives by acknowledging that resistances can be attained through formal processes in “real” settings, through multi- generational collectives, and sometimes among youth alone. YPAR represents not only a formal pedagogy of resistance but also the means by which young people engage transformational resistance. (1-4)

#### 6] Disease securitization is uniquely good to mobilize action.

Mastroianni 17 [Brian Mastroianni; Covers science and technology for CBSNews.com; “We are not ready": Experts warn world is unprepared for next Ebola-size outbreak,” 3/16/17; CBS News; <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/study-says-world-underprepared-ebola-level-outbreaks/>] Elmer // Re-Cut Justin

Pandemics as global security threats What happens next time a health crisis threatens to spiral out of control? Moon said an “ideal system” would “see all countries of the world have some basic level of preparedness” when there seems to be a “suspicious pattern of infectious disease.” But it’s not just about medical practices — some experts say governments need to view pandemics as security threats. “The Neglected Dimension of Global Security,” a 2016 report from public health officials published by the National Academy of Medicine, looks at how the wave of large-scale infectious disease outbreaks over the past few decades — not just Ebola, but others like HIV/AIDS and SARS — exposed how economically and politically vulnerable nations are in the face of the ravages of future pandemics. The report finds that a range of factors, from growing population numbers to environmental degradation to increasing economic globalization, have shifted the dynamics of how disease outbreaks can affect countries. “We have not done nearly enough to prevent or prepare for such potential pandemics,” Peter Sands, the commission’s chair, wrote in the preface. “While there are certainly gaps in our scientific defenses, the bigger problem is that leaders at all levels have not been giving these threats anything close to the priority they demand.” Sands called this the “neglected dimension of global security.” This report essentially places global pandemics on the same level of seriousness as a military assault on a country. Since pandemics are generally viewed as “health problems” rather than “security risks,” the study argues that public health departments tend to put outbreak preparedness on the back burner. Rather than building up defenses as one would for a war or a terrorist attack, potential pandemics are relatively ignored. The commission issued 10 recommendations for building more effective public health resources in countries that are particularly prone to being decimated by an Ebola-level pandemic, such as developing universal benchmarks for preparedness that nations have to meet. Economic assistance for at-risk countries is also needed —and the report argues that money spent on preparedness would more than pay for itself. For instance, the study contends that if nations invested $4.5 billion a year to safeguard against the next major outbreak, $60 billion a year in losses from future pandemics could be avoided.