# 1AR

### 1AR – K

#### Your rhetoric of “paralysis” is an independent voting issue – use ‘freeze’ instead. Outweighs theirs because it determines if I can answer you stuff.

**Gent 10** PhD – Special Education, 2010 [Pamela,– severe disabilities, in Stewart and Webster’s Problematizing Service-Learning: Critical Reflections for Development and Action, p233] cw//az

We have said students are "paralyzed perfectionists" (Higgins 8c Boone, 2003, p. 139), "feel paralyzed, unsure of where to start or what to do," (Maryland Student Service Alliance, 2004, p. 2), "become paralyzed by a sense of impotence, rage, and cynicism" (McNall, 1999), and "are crippled by an amazingly constricted frame of reference" (Barilen, 2003, p. 107). People whose impairments have resulted in paralysis would tell us that their paralysis is not the result of feelings, rage, perfectionism, or their frame of reference. They would also tell us that it is ableist to assume that the type of temporary inactivity suggested in these quotes is in any way similar to their own lived reality. While many of us would question the use of overtly racist or sexist language in our classrooms, we may never have questioned the use of such ableist language.

# 1AC

### 1AC – Plan

#### Plan – The appropriation of outer space through the production of space debris by private entities is unjust.

#### Revising the Outer Space Treaty clarifies legal loopholes and ambiguities in space debris.

* Private entities: Non-governmental
* Space debris: Non-functional Space Objects

Shah 20. Sachin Shah is a write for Cornell Undergraduate Law and Society Review. 8/30/20 [CORNELL UNDERGRADUATE LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW “The International Legal Regulation of Space Debris,” <https://www.culsr.org/articles/the-international-legal-regulation-of-space-debris>] Justin

While many scholars agree that the Outer Space Treaty provides rudimentary regulation of the problem of space debris, therein lies the problem: it is only rudimentary. One of the most often cited problems with the Outer Space Treaty is that it was signed in 1967 (53 years ago) and that the technological climate of the space travel industry was not as advanced as it is today, reflected in a marked lack of specificity in the writing of these laws. [7] This lack of specificity highlights another issue: the imprecise language of the Treaty leaves unclear the definition of space debris, which leaves the regulation open to interpretation. Rather than agree with most scholars that space debris constitute “space objects,” scholar Chelsea Muñoz-Patchen uses the UN Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines’ definition of space debris along with the fact that space debris is non-functional and its ownership often untraceable in order to argue that space debris should be classified as “abandoned property” instead. [8] Furthermore, non-governmental private enterprises may be inclined to legally define space debris as something other than “space objects” in order to avoid the Outer Space Treaty’s aforementioned financial penalties, as will be explained below. The Outer Space Treaty also does not account for the fact that the space debris problem, especially as of late, has been becoming worse over time. As collisions between debris and satellites continue to occur, more debris is strewn across Earth’s orbit, endangering future spacecraft from safely orbiting Earth, supporting the theory of the Kessler Syndrome. [9] Thus, the Outer Space Treaty is not a very effective legal instrument with regards to mitigating the amount of space debris in orbit around Earth.

Due to the Treaty’s weakness, many of the aforementioned scholars support revising the Outer Space Treaty by clearly defining space debris, increasing its technology-specific language to combat space debris issues, and outlining specific punishments to negate the complete lack of enforcement built into the current Treaty. While nations do recognize the danger that space debris pose to orbital operations, stronger laws must be enacted in order to de-escalate an imminent arms race and incentivize them to mitigate their debris. [10] Believing that one convention or treaty would be insufficient, N. Jasentuliyana recommends the creation of a regulatory regime to solve the growing problem of space debris. Such a regime would “effectively deal with these technical problems and establish international legal rules, standards and procedures on a continuing basis.” [11] Thus, one potential solution to the legal lack of space debris mitigation is establishing a lawmaking agency which specifically focuses on the issue of space debris. In addition to the creation of a legal agency which could hold actors accountable for the amount of space debris produced, international laws guiding the actions of private companies’ activities may also provide an answer, as will be discussed in greater detail below.

Although there do exist international laws and regulations governing the use of space for states and governmental entities (albeit weak ones), the private enterprises sending objects into space are subject to even less stringent regulations than states are. SpaceX, for example, to authorize their sending of 42,000 Starlink satellites into orbit, only had to submit paperwork to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). [12] Paul Larsen posits that, in the face of less stringent regulations, nongovernmental satellite companies send many satellites into orbit in order to maximize their profit, which is their primary objective. Unlike the vagueness and lack of enforcement that came with written law (which is apparent in the Outer Space Treaty), the unwritten market-oriented incentives for profit by large-scale satellite providers and operators provide a reason for actors to mitigate space debris in orbit around Earth. Larsen states that “They have huge sums of money invested in each satellite, perhaps as much as a half-billion dollars, when all costs are included. Loss of one satellite is a major event. They want their assets to be safe.” [13] Thus, these satellite companies have a major stake in space traffic management and their market incentives do a better job of mitigating space debris than the existing legal regulation does. The company SpaceX, as mentioned above, plans to send 42,000 satellites into space. While doing so would likely result in significant profits for the company, many believe this will diminish astronomical visibility as well as increase the chance of collisions with space debris. [14] Due to these effects, scientists and space law experts alike have called for a legal delay to the ITU’s decision on whether or not to accept SpaceX’s proposal to launch more satellites. If these parties are successful, a precedent-setting legal case regarding space debris mitigation and satellite use in space may well provide a solution to the outdated Outer Space Treaty of 1967.

#### The aff interprets OST enforcement as an OUF (Orbital Use Fee). Proportionality in relation to the space industry solves best without harming it and any other solution only worsens the threat – models.

Rao et al 20. Akhil, Matthew Burgess, and Daniel Kaffine \*Department of Economics, Middlebury College, Middlebury \*\*Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences, University of Colorado, Environmental Studies Program, and Department of Economics \*\*\*Department of Economics. 2020 [PNAS, “Orbital-use fees could more than quadruple the value of the space industry,” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7293599/>] Justin

The space industry’s rapid recent growth represents the latest tragedy of the commons. Satellites launched into orbit contribute to—and risk damage from—a growing buildup of space debris and other satellites. Collision risk from this orbital congestion is costly to satellite operators. Technological and managerial solutions—such as active debris removal or end-of-life satellite deorbit guidelines—are currently being explored by regulatory authorities. However, none of these approaches address the underlying incentive problem: satellite operators do not account for costs they impose on each other via collision risk. Here, we show that an internationally harmonized orbital-use fee can correct these incentives and substantially increase the value of the space industry. We construct and analyze a coupled physical–economic model of commercial launches and debris accumulation in low-Earth orbit. Similar to carbon taxes, our model projects an optimal fee that rises at a rate of 14% per year, equal to roughly $235,000 per satellite-year in 2040. The long-run value of the satellite industry would more than quadruple by 2040—increasing from around $600 billion under business as usual to around $3 trillion. In contrast, we project that purely technological solutions are unlikely to fully address the problem of orbital congestion. Indeed, we find debris removal sometimes worsens economic damages from congestion by increasing launch incentives. In other sectors, addressing the tragedy of the commons has often been a game of catch-up with substantial social costs. The infant space industry can avert these costs before they escalate.

In 2017, 466 new satellites were launched—more than double the previous year’s launches and more than 20% of all active satellites in orbit in 2017 (1, 2). Rapid space industry growth is projected to continue, driven largely by commercial satellites (Fig. 1). This growth is driving buildup of debris in low-Earth orbit, currently including over 15,000 objects (3). Collision risk from debris is costly; collisions damage or destroy expensive capital assets that are difficult or impossible to repair. Debris buildup could eventually make some low-Earth orbits economically unviable and other orbits difficult or impossible to access (4). In the worst case—although uncertain and occurring over long time horizons—debris growth could become self-sustaining due to collisions between debris objects, a tipping point called Kessler Syndrome (4, 5).

Proposed solutions have so far largely been technological and managerial, aimed at mapping, avoiding, and removing debris (6, 7). These include end-of-life deorbit guidelines and “keep out” zones for active satellites and nets, harpoons, and lasers to deorbit debris (6). However, with open access to orbits, reducing debris and collision risk incentivizes additional satellite launches, which eventually restore the debris and risk. For instance, if firms were willing to tolerate a 0.1% annual risk of satellite loss before a technological improvement in debris removal, they will be willing to launch more satellites until the 0.1% annual risk of satellite loss was restored.

Thus, the core of the space debris problem is incentives, not technology. Since satellite operators are unable to secure exclusive property rights to their orbital paths or recover collision-related costs imposed by others, prospective operators face a choice between launching profitable satellites, thereby imposing current and future collision risk on others, or not launching and leaving those profits to competitors. This is a classic tragedy of the commons problem (1, 3, 8, 9). It can be economically efficiently addressed via incentive-based solutions, such as fees or tradable permits per year in orbit, analogous to carbon taxes or cap and trade (8, 10–12). Incentives should target objects in orbit—rather than launches—because orbiting objects are what directly imposes collision risk on other satellites (13). We quantify the economic benefits of implementing such incentives to correct the underlying open-access problem.

We use a coupled physical–economic model combining rich physical dynamics with satellite economics to quantify the benefits of an internationally harmonized “orbital-use fee” (OUF) relative to a business as usual (BAU) open-access scenario and relative to a scenario with active debris removal. An OUF is a type of Pigouvian tax—a well-known economic instrument for addressing externality problems (14). Our model accounts for the effects of each scenario on satellite launch decisions (Materials and Methods and SI Appendix). While we focus on an OUF for analytical convenience, it is conceptually equivalent to other mechanisms for pricing orbits, such as tradable permits.

Our physical model of satellite and debris evolution in orbit obeys relevant accounting identities and utilizes reduced form approximations of physical processes validated in other works (15, 16). We fit and calibrate the model using data on collision risk and orbital debris from the European Space Agency (ESA) (17) and data on active satellites from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) (2) (Materials and Methods and SI Appendix). The ESA dataset covers 1958 to 2017, and the UCS dataset covers 1957 to 2017. Our physical model assumes runaway debris growth (Kessler Syndrome) cannot occur, which likely leads our model to understate the benefits of OUFs (Materials and Methods). Our economic model assumes that satellites are launched and operated to maximize per satellite private profits, net of any fees, subject to collision risk. We calibrate the model by fitting the BAU scenario (no fees or debris removal) to historical industry data and launch trends (1, 2) (Materials and Methods and SI Appendix).

We project future launch rates to 2040 under the BAU scenario using our fitted model and published projections of future growth of the space economy (18). The projections in ref. 18 were developed by projecting how the industries constituting the space sector—telecommunications, imaging, etc.—would grow from 2017 to 2040 under different assumptions on their individual profitability over time, then aggregating up to obtain projections for the space sector. We then calculate launch rates that would maximize the long-run value of the industry, and we calculate the time series of OUFs that would incentivize these optimal launch rates. The industry value is measured as net present value (NPV)—the long-run value of the entire fleet of satellites in orbit, accounting for both the financial costs of replacing satellites due to natural retirement and collisions as well as the opportunity cost of investing funds in satellites rather than capital markets. For instance, an NPV of $1 trillion in 2020 means the sum total of the stream of net benefits, looking from 2020 into the future and accounting for the timing of the net benefits, is $1 trillion.

Although our models are deliberately simplified for tractability, they are based on previously validated approaches to orbital object modeling (15, 16), and our calibrations allow us to reproduce observed trends and magnitudes in the growth of orbital debris and satellite stocks as well as the calculated collision risk (Fig. 3). Nonetheless, our projections should be interpreted as order of magnitude approximations that can be refined as needed by more detailed models. In these respects, our approach mirrors integrated assessment modeling approaches that have been useful in developing solutions to other natural resource management problems (e.g., ref. 19).

RESULTS

We project that shifting from open access to the optimal series of OUFs in 2020 would increase the NPV of the satellite industry from around $600 billion under BAU to around $3 trillion—a more than 4-fold increase (4.18- to 6.49-fold increases in 95% of parameter sets randomly drawn from their calibrated distributions) (Fig. 2D). Assuming a 5% market rate of return, an increase of $2.5 trillion in NPV would be equivalent to annual benefits of approximately $120 billion in perpetuity. The large immediate increase in NPV that we project in each OUF scenario, relative to BAU (Fig. 2A), comes primarily from the immediate effect of reducing launch activity while the satellite and debris stocks are suboptimally high (SI Appendix).

Based on our calculations (Materials and Methods), the optimal OUF starts at roughly $14,900 per satellite-year in 2020 and escalates at roughly 14% per year (aside from some initial transition dynamics) to around $235,000 per satellite-year in 2040. Rising optimal price paths are common in environmental pricing such as carbon taxes (20), although declining optimal price paths are also possible (21). The rising price path in this case partly reflects the rising value of safer orbits (resulting in rising industry NPV) (Fig. 2A) from the OUF. For comparison, the average annual profits of operating a satellite in 2015 were roughly $2.1 million. The 2020 and 2040 OUF values we describe amount to roughly 0.7 and 11% of average annual profits generated by a satellite in 2015.

Forgone NPV from the satellite industry in 2040—which is the cost of inaction under BAU—escalates from around $300 billion if optimal management begins in 2025 to around $700 billion if optimal management begins in 2035. Without OUFs, losses remain substantial even when active debris removal (implemented in the model as removal of 50% of debris objects in orbit each year) is available. In a best-case analysis where we assume debris removal is costless (i.e., it requires no payments nor additional satellites to implement), debris removal can only recover up to 9.5% of the value lost under open access. (The satellite industry’s willingness to pay for debris removal is not easily calculable in our model [SI Appendix, section 1.9.2].) At worst, debris removal can exacerbate orbital congestion via a rebound-type effect, causing additional losses on the order of 3% of the value already lost from open access (Fig. 4 and SI Appendix). The inability of debris removal to induce efficient orbit use is driven by open-access launching behavior and underscores the importance of policies to correct economic incentives to launch satellites.

DISCUSSION

The costly buildup of debris and satellites in low-Earth orbit is fundamentally a problem of incentives—satellite operators currently lack the incentives to factor into their launch decisions the collision risks their satellites impose on other operators. Our analysis suggests that correcting these incentives, via an OUF, could have substantial economic benefits to the satellite industry, and failing to do so could have substantial and escalating economic costs.

Escalating costs of inaction are a common feature of the tragedy of the commons, evident in several other sectors in which it went unaddressed for lengthy periods (22). For example, tens of billions of dollars in net benefits are lost annually from open-access or poorly managed fisheries globally (23). Similarly, open access to oil fields in the United States at the turn of the century drove recovery rates down to 20 to 25% at competitively drilled sites, compared with 85 to 90% potential recovery under optimal management (24). Open access to roadways—somewhat analogous to orbits—is estimated to create traffic congestion costs in excess of $120 billion/y in the United States alone (25). In contrast, there is still time to get out ahead of the tragedy of the commons in the young space industry.

The international and geopolitically complex nature of the space sector poses challenges to implementing orbital-use pricing systems, but these challenges need not be insurmountable. Theory suggests countries could each collect and spend OUF revenues domestically, without losing economic efficiency, as long as the fee’s magnitude was internationally harmonized (20). Engaging in such negotiations would be in the economic interests of all parties involved (26). An example of such a system is the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) used by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) to manage tuna fisheries. Under the VDS, PNA countries each lease fishing rights within their waters, using a common price floor (27). The European Union’s Emissions Trading System provides an example of an internationally coordinated tradable permit system (28). Notably, each of these pricing programs is built on a preexisting international governance institution (the Nauru Agreement and the European Union).

An OUF could also be built within existing space governance institutions, such as the Outer Space Treaty (29). For example, Article VI states that countries supervise their space industries, which provides a framework for OUFs to be administered nationally. Article II prohibits national appropriation of outer space but does not prohibit private property rights, potentially allowing for tradable orbital permitting.

#### Resolved means immediate and certain.

Austin 11 – Vichina Austin – 8-15-2011 – “Why is “resolved” used ahead of a question in a debate title, instead of saying “the Subject, topic” or alike” – <https://english.stackexchange.com/questions/8608/why-is-resolved-used-ahead-of-a-question-in-a-debate-title-instead-of-saying> -- Program of Study and Committee at St Mary’s College – Elmer

The word resolved stated before the resolution means "obsolete", to deal with successfully, clear up, an immediate course of action, **meaning that the plan would immediately be enacted.** Therefore, if you come across a case that involves something like cooperation with other countries or anything that takes a significant amount of time, you can argue that it violates the word resolved.

### 1AC – Adv – Debris

#### The space sector is trending towards privatization – that drives feedback loops of technology creating cascading collisions.

BERNAT 20. Pawel @ Military University of Aviation. 11/4/20. [SAFETY ENGINEERING OF ANTHROPOGENIC OBJECTS, “ORBITAL SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS AND THE GROWING THREAT OF KESSLER SYNDROME IN THE LOWER EARTH ORBIT,” Volume 4, PDF] Justin

The second decade of the 21st century has brought a dynamic and somewhat surprising development of the space industry. Since 1972 – the Apollo 17 crew mission to the Moon, the humankind has not left the safe environment of Earth’s orbit, and for years the global space sector has been progressing in slow but steady pace run by a few largest space agencies like American NASA, European ESA, Japanese JAXA, and Chinese CNSA. The most significant achievement of the “old ways” of managing outer space exploration is the International Space Stations (ISS) that has facilitated more than 20 years of continuous crewed operations.

The situation started to change at the turn of the century when new generations of private entrepreneurs began to invest in and develop space technologies like rocket boosters, spaceships, and what most important for the subject of the paper – satellites and their constellations. This new shift is known among the space industry as “Space 2.0”, and its emergence is dated around 2000-2002 when the companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic were established. (Pyle, 2019). The real change, however, came in 2012 when the first SpaceX commercial mission was successfully launched to the ISS (NASA, 2012).

Since then, the participation of the private sector in the space industry has skyrocketed, especially in the United States. Today, SpaceX is the only entity that provides reusable rockets (first stage and fairings) that is capable of vertical launch and landing. Their current flagship rocket – Falcon 9 has carried out 23 successful missions in 2020 (SpaceX, 2020) and another four are planned for December of that year (Weitering, 2020). Moreover, thanks to Crew Dragon spaceship developed by the company, Americans have regained this year the capacity of sending astronauts from their own soil after nine years of buying the seats on Russian Soyuz capsule. SpaceX is now in the process of building a communication satellites constellation that will be addressed and analyzed in the paper.

Nowadays, in the space industry, we witness a very productive cybernetic feedback look between the development of space technologies, the democratization of those technologies, and a substantial reduction of prices. The latter is even more significant if we compare the cost of launching cargo into orbit now and 20 years ago – Falcon 9 is over ten times cheaper than Space Shuttle (Jones, 2018). This, of course, directly translates into the mass and number of objects that we are able to put in the orbit viably. Once the constellations consisting of thousands of satellites were unthinkable, but in the current environment, they become a reality.

Space 2.0 also has brought new threats and challenges in the sphere of national and international security. The increase in launch capacity, among other factors, has led to progressive militarization and weaponization of space and new arms race (Bernat, 2019), which has also contributed to the growing numbers of orbiting objects.

The goal of the paper is to present the argumentation that the threat posed by the cascading collisions in the Earth’s orbit (Kessler syndrome) is becoming more severe due to the construction of orbital satellite constellations; the threat that presents a real danger for people during their EVAs and orbital infrastructure, which may bare immediate consequences for safety and security systems on Earth. In order to provide the theoretical context for the above claim, the following issues will be presented and discussed: (1) space debris, (2) the Kessler syndrome, (3) orbital debris models, (4) the legal issues related to space debris and mitigation actions against their proliferation, and (5) the planned and being currently developed orbital satellite constellations and how they contribute to the growing threat of the Kessler syndrome.

#### Privatization exponentially increases debris – lack of regulations spikes it – models.

BERNAT 20. Pawel @ Military University of Aviation. 11/4/20. [SAFETY ENGINEERING OF ANTHROPOGENIC OBJECTS, “ORBITAL SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS AND THE GROWING THREAT OF KESSLER SYNDROME IN THE LOWER EARTH ORBIT,” Volume 4, PDF] Justin

5. Orbital satellite constellations and the growing threat of the Kessler syndrome

Space 2.0 – the new era of space exploration that we witness now in the 21st century means, in words of Buzz Aldrin, “moving human enterprise into space” (Pyle, 2019, p. xiv). The process of commercialization of outer space has already begun and is not limited to private companies providing technologies and services for national or international space agencies, as it was in the past. On the contrary, private companies from the space sector have now matured to carry out their own independent projects.

As for 2020, SpaceX is a company that serves as the best example – it launches satellites to the orbit, both for state and private contractors, it successfully realized two crew missions to the International Space Station, and is in the process of constructing Starlink satellite constellation that will provide high-speed internet access across the planet.

Each satellite weighs around 260 kg, is equipped with an ion propulsion system, autonomous collision avoidance system, and orbits Earth at approximately 540-560 km altitude (Starlink, 2020). At the beginning of November 2020, more than 860 Starlink satellites were orbiting the Earth (Jewett, 2020). Immediate plans include launching 12,000 satellites, but they assume a potential later extension to 42,000 (Henry, 2019a). Of course, SpaceX has employed, at least declaratively, all necessary measures to keep the space clean – the satellites are equipped with the deorbiting system, and in the event of inoperability of the propulsion system (Starlink, 2020). The orbital collisions are, however, inevitable. As it was shown before, the possibility of collisions grows with the number of orbital objects. Bastida Virgili with the team compared (2016, p. 154-155) orbital debris environment development without and with a large hypothetical constellation consisting of merely 1080 satellites, distributed across 20 orbital planes at 1,100 km altitude (Fig. 5).

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

Figure 5. Comparison of long term evolution of the number of objects in LEO with and without the constellation (Virgili et al., 2016, p. 155)

It has to be noted that although SpaceX’s Starlink is the only constellation that is being built in orbit, it is not the only one planned. There are at least a few initiatives aiming at the same goal – to construct internet infrastructure at the Earth’s orbit. The planned Kuiper Systems LLC, which is a subsidiary of Amazon and intends to place 3,236 broadband satellites in the LEO, is one of Starlink’s biggest competitors (Henry, 2019b). Now, there is even a rivalry between the two companies because Kuiper’s lowest orbital shell is planned to be 590 km, with a tolerance of 9 km either above or below (Cao, 2020), which is the altitude of Starlink satellites. Moreover, the race for space in orbit is now at the beginning.

The outer space is vast. It increasingly becomes more cluttered with both operational satellites and space debris. The threat of collisions increases and no institution or body has enough power to license, coordinate and regulate what is sent to the orbit. The UNOOSA has not such power. National states decide what the companies from the space industry can launch to space. In the United States, which is most advanced in the area of private constellations, it is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that issues the appropriate approvals. The race to put broadband internet satellites bears similarities to the gold rush – there are no rules, at the global level, apart from first-come, first-served.

#### Models are rigorous.

Virgili et al. 16 – Bastida, J.C. Dolado, H.G. Lewis, J. Radtke, H. Krag, B. Revelin, C. Cazaux b , C. Colombo, R. Crowther, M. Metz. 4/26/16. [Act Astranautica “Risk to space sustainability from large constellations of satellites,” <https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.actaastro.2016.03.034>.] Justin

1.3. Simulation approach and result analysis A Monte Carlo (MC) approach was used to simulate the evolution of the object population over a period of 200 years under different post-mission disposal requirements, with four different tools (MEDEE – Modelling the Evolution of Debris on Earth's Environment [9], LUCA – Long Term Utility for Collision Analysis [10], DAMAGE – Debris Analysis and Monitoring Architecture to the Geosynchronous Environment [11] and DELTA – Debris Environment Long Term Analysis [12]). For analysis purposes, the effective number of objects was used where the contribution to the population by each object was weighted by the proportion of the orbital period spent in LEO. In a first step, four different evolutionary models performed an analysis of two reference scenarios. One scenario considered only the evolution of the background population and non-constellation traffic. The second scenario augmented the first with the addition of the representative constellation, with the requirement that 90% of the constellation satellites achieved post-mission disposal to orbits with remaining lifetimes of 25 years. The manoeuvres performed at the mission end to meet the disposal requirement are assumed to be impulsive (i.e. instantaneous) and result in an eccentric orbit with the apogee near the original (constellation) altitude and the perigee at an altitude such that the effects of atmospheric drag would cause the orbit to decay within 25 years. Two of the models considered an apogee remaining at the operational constellation altitude, while the other two reduced the apogee by 50 km. The purpose of these scenarios is to provide a cross-comparison of the models in terms of their predictions of the total object population, which take into account the effects of the constellation. As the distribution of the MC results for the models is of the same nature and the results are independent, a bootstrapping [20] approach is used to derive the mean, the standard deviation and the confidence levels at 95% of the combined results of all the MC runs from the four models (cf. Fig. 1), although not all the models performed the same number of MC runs (see Table 1). The main source of variation inside a particular model's MC runs included the randomness in collision activity, while the different models used their own solar activity forecast.

#### Current regulatory guidelines fail – answers neg turns.

Boley and Byers 21. Aaron Boley is at the Department of Physics and Astronomy, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada and Michael Byers is at the Department of Physics and Astronomy, The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. 5/20/21. [Nature, “Satellite mega-constellations create risks in Low Earth Orbit, the atmosphere and on Earth,” <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-89909-7>] Justin

Companies are placing satellites into orbit at an unprecedented frequency to build ‘mega-constellations’ of communications satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). In two years, the number of active and defunct satellites in LEO has increased by over 50%, to about 5000 (as of 30 March 2021). SpaceX alone is on track to add 11,000 more as it builds its Starlink mega-constellation and has already fled for permission for another 30,000 satellites with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)1 . Others have similar plans, including OneWeb, Amazon, Telesat, and GW, which is a Chinese state-owned company2 . Te current governance system for LEO, while slowly changing, is ill-equipped to handle large satellite systems. Here, we outline how applying the consumer electronic model to satellites could lead to multiple tragedies of the commons. Some of these are well known, such as impediments to astronomy and an increased risk of space debris, while others have received insufcient attention, including changes to the chemistry of Earth’s upper atmosphere and increased dangers on Earth’s surface from re-entered debris. Te heavy use of certain orbital regions might also result in a de facto exclusion of other actors from them, violating the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. All of these challenges could be addressed in a coordinated manner through multilateral law-making, whether in the United Nations, the Inter-Agency Debris Committee (IADC), or an ad hoc process, rather than in an uncoordinated manner through diferent national laws. Regardless of the law-making forum, mega-constellations require a shif in perspectives and policies: from looking at single satellites, to evaluating systems of thousands of satellites, and doing so within an understanding of the limitations of Earth’s environment, including its orbits.

Tousands of satellites and 1500 rocket bodies provide considerable mass in LEO, which can break into debris upon collisions, explosions, or degradation in the harsh space environment. Fragmentations increase the cross-section of orbiting material, and with it, the collision probability per time. Eventually, collisions could dominate on-orbit evolution, a situation called the Kessler Syndrome3 . Tere are already over 12,000 trackable debris pieces in LEO, with these being typically 10 cm in diameter or larger. Including sizes down to 1 cm, there are about a million inferred debris pieces, all of which threaten satellites, spacecraf and astronauts due to their orbits crisscrossing at high relative speeds. Simulations of the long-term evolution of debris suggest that LEO is already in the protracted initial stages of the Kessler Syndrome, but that this could be managed through active debris removal4 . Te addition of satellite mega-constellations and the general proliferation of low-cost satellites in LEO stresses the environment further5–8 .

[Omitted Figures 1 and 2]

Results

The overall setting. Te rapid development of the space environment through mega-constellations, predominately by the ongoing construction of Starlink, is shown by the cumulative payload distribution function (Fig. 1). From an environmental perspective, the slope change in the distribution function defnes NewSpace, an era of dominance by commercial actors. Before 2015, changes in the total on-orbit objects came principally from fragmentations, with efects of the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test and the 2009 Kosmos-2251/Iridium-33 collisions being evident on the graph.

Although the volume of space is large, individual satellites and satellite systems have specifc functions, with associated altitudes and inclinations (Fig. 2). Tis increases congestion and requires active management for station keeping and collision avoidance9 , with automatic collision-avoidance technology still under development. Improved space situational awareness is required, with data from operators as well as ground- and space-based sensors being widely and freely shared10. Improved communications between satellite operators are also necessary: in 2019, the European Space Agency moved an Earth observation satellite to avoid colliding with a Starlink satellite, afer failing to reach SpaceX by e-mail. Internationally adopted ‘right of way’ rules are needed10 to prevent games of ‘chicken’, as companies seek to preserve thruster fuel and avoid service interruptions. SpaceX and NASA recently announced11 a cooperative agreement to help reduce the risk of collisions, but this is only one operator and one agency

When completed, Starlink will include about as many satellites as there are trackable debris pieces today, while its total mass will equal all the mass currently in LEO—over 3000 tonnes. Te satellites will be placed in narrow orbital shells, creating unprecedented congestion, with 1258 already in orbit (as of 30 March 2021). OneWeb has already placed an initial 146 satellites, and Amazon, Telesat, GW and other companies, operating under diferent national regulatory regimes, are soon likely to follow.

Enhanced collision risk. Mega-constellations are composed of mass-produced satellites with few backup systems. Tis consumer electronic model allows for short upgrade cycles and rapid expansions of capabilities, but also considerable discarded equipment. SpaceX will actively de-orbit its satellites at the end of their 5–6-year operational lives. However, this process takes 6 months, so roughly 10% will be de-orbiting at any time. If other companies do likewise, thousands of de-orbiting satellites will be slowly passing through the same congested space, posing collision risks. Failures will increase these numbers, although the long-term failure rate is difcult to project. Figure 3 is similar to the righthand portion of Fig. 2 but includes the Starlink and OneWeb megaconstellations as fled (and amended) with the FCC (see “Methods”). Te large density spikes show that some shells will have satellite number densities in excess of n = 10−6 km−3 .

Deorbiting satellites will be tracked and operational satellites can manoeuvre to avoid close conjunctions. However, this depends on ongoing communication and cooperation between operators, which at present is ad hoc and voluntary. A recent letter12 to the FCC from SpaceX suggests that some companies might be less-thanfully transparent about events13 in LEO.

Despite the congestion and trafc management challenges, FCC flings by SpaceX suggest that collision avoidance manoeuvres can in fact maintain collision-free operations in orbital shells and that the probability of a collision between a non-responsive satellite and tracked debris is negligible. However, the flings do not account for untracked debris6 , including untracked debris decaying through the shells used by Starlink. Using simple estimates (see “Methods”), the probability that a single piece of untracked debris will hit any satellite in the Starlink 550 km shell is about 0.003 afer one year. Tus, if at any time there are 230 pieces of untracked debris decaying through the 550 km orbital shell, there is a 50% chance that there will be one or more collisions between satellites in the shell and the debris. As discussed further in “Methods”, such a situation is plausible. Depending on the balance between the de-orbit and the collision rates, if subsequent fragmentation events lead to similar amounts of debris within that orbital shell, a runaway cascade of collisions could occur.

Fragmentation events are not confned to their local orbits, either. Te India 2019 ASAT test was conducted at an altitude below 300 km in an efort to minimize long-lived debris. Nevertheless, debris was placed on orbits with apogees in excess of 1000 km. As of 30 March 2021, three tracked debris pieces remain in orbit14. Such long-lived debris has high eccentricities, and thus can cross multiple orbital shells twice per orbit. A major fragmentation event from a single satellite could afect all operators in LEO.

#### Rivalrous orbits create space conflict and turn good satellites.

Samson 22 – Victoria Samson is the Washington office director for the Secure World Foundation, an organization that focuses on space sustainability, and she has over 20 years of experience in military space and security issues. Previously, Ms. Samson was a senior analyst for the Center for Defense Information. She also was a senior policy associate at the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, a consortium of arms control groups. Earlier, she was a researcher at Riverside Research Institute, where she worked on war-gaming scenarios for the Missile Defense Agency. 1/17/22. [Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “The complicating role of the private sector in space,” DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2021.2014229] Justin

At this exact moment, we are seeing the increasing dominance of commercial actors in space – specifically the rise of mega-constellations, or large numbers of small satellites flying in formation to provide global coverage for a variety of governmental and commercial uses, including both communications and Earth observation. Consequently, the fundamental nature of space is changing, to one of a domain dominated by commercial actors. This change will have major consequences for international stability, both in terms of how it demonstrates that the old governance structure for space is being left behind – and how it highlights Russia’s declining rank in global space powers. Certain orbits may be effectively taken over by a handful of entities, and there will be competition for useful portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. With eyes on the sky everywhere, there will be little or no room for state secrets – for better or worse. This is happening at the same time that Russia’s space identity is floundering, which may further upset the stability of the domain of space.

As of November 2021, there are roughly 4,800 active satellites in orbit around Earth, around 1,850 of which belong to just one entity: SpaceX’s Starlink mega-constellation (Thompson 2021). This change has happened very quickly, as Starlink satellites just began to be launched in May 2019 (O’Callaghan 2019). This is only the first wave of the megaconstellations as well. While it is hard to say exactly how many satellites will be launched as part of this new use of space, there are requests or plans for mega-constellations that could mean well over 100,000 new satellites could potentially be in low Earth orbit. While not all of these satellites will be launched, even a small fraction of that proposed number will fundamentally shift the situation so that the major actors in space will no longer be nation-states (as has been the case to date) but the private sector, changing the timbre of the space domain.

This leads to challenges in discussing space security issues: Space is a shared, international domain; if we cannot include all the stakeholders in the discussions, we will not come to complete solutions to the problems. But first, some background.

A little history

The commercial sector is not new to space. Commercial entities have been active in space for decades now; in fact, it was a dispute over what should be the extent of their role in space that shaped part of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Article VI of that treaty notes:

States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities . . .. The activities of nongovernmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. (Outer Space Treaty 1967)

This was a compromise between the United States and the USSR, in which the latter argued that there was no such thing as commercial space. Having language requiring state actors to carry out “authorization and continuing supervision” gave the United States the flexibility it wanted to develop a commercial space sector while ensuring that there would still be national oversight.

A lack of coordination

One way in which the rise of these mega-constellations may complicate international security in space is through concerns about these satellites hampering access to certain orbits. While slots in geosynchronous Earth orbit are set by the International Telecommunication Union, there is no international entity coordinating orbital slots at low Earth orbit. This means that, given the potentially tens of thousands of satellites that could be launched given company plans, certain orbits could be de facto ceded to a handful of entities – in defiance of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, which says that space “is not subject to national appropriation.” Consequently, this could lead to strife or competition over certain orbits.

It is possible that, given the number of satellites that companies are asking the United States’ Federal Communications Commission for broadcasting rights to, certain orbits may reach their carrying capacities – meaning that they are at the maximum number of satellites that can be operated, as defined by physical and radiofrequency interference aspects. This could lead to disputes over which country has the right to use certain orbits, or, alternatively, resentment when one country’s commercial sector essentially takes over a particular orbit

Competition over parts of the electromagnetic spectrum is another possible path for international security issues to arise from mega-constellations. Satellites are only as good as their ability to receive and communicate information, which requires spectrum; if one or a few entities from one country use up all the readily accessible spectrum for specific capabilities at certain orbits, that could possibly lead to confrontation as well. For the most part, the companies launching mega-constellations are largely based in the West, which can shape the global perception of their effects and intent – although there have been some plans for at least one Chinese company to launch a mega-constellation of potentially 13,000 satellites, and the South Koreans have expressed interest in their own mega-constellation.

#### Triggers space escalation and nuclear war.

Perez 21 – Veronica Delgado-Perez is a Staff Writer at The International Scholar. 12/14/21 – Note, doesn’t say date but most recent cited event is 2021, correct if I’m wrong. [The International Scholar, “Argument | The Commercialization of Space Risks Launching a Militarized Space Race,” <https://www.theintlscholar.com/periodical/12/14/2020/analysis-commercialization-space-risk-international-law-military-space-race>] Justin

With new actors on the game stage, conflicts of interest may arise. There is a risk that each actor adopts a kind of short-term Realist approach to space policy — one which is driven by self-interest in reaping the greatest benefits of extraterrestrial exploration and commercialization while controlling access to others. If unmitigated, states may choose to militarize outer space to gain a strategic edge over competitors and adversaries.

This process has already begun. Under the Trump administration, the Pentagon established the U.S. Space Force as a new branch of the Armed Forces to protect the country and allied interests in space. Already, Delta 4 — one of the U.S. Space Force’s missions — conducts strategic and theater missile warnings, manages weapon systems, and provides information to missile defense forces. The measure shows that for the U.S., outer space is not only a domain of scientific exploration but has the potential to become increasingly securitized.

With the impending expiration of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the U.S. and Russia on February 5, 2021, a number of security dilemmas could arise. If the world’s two largest nuclear powers do not edge toward extending the treaty, Washington and Moscow risk returning to the era of unrestricted expansion of launch platforms and strategically-deployed nuclear warheads — potentially with the aid of military infrastructure in space.

Although President-elect Biden has expressed his interest in negotiating an extension of New START, how Moscow and Washington might proceed remains an open question. Bilateral progress towards a new arms-control regime would require establishing limits on the number and range of long- and mid-range missiles, establishing measures to limit the expansion of traditional missile deployment to space, and banning the deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

#### Debris shreds ozone.

Josy O’Donnell 18, creator of Conservation Institute, “WHAT HAPPENS TO THE “SPACE JUNK” THAT FALLS BACK TO EARTH?,” https://ourplnt.com/space-junk-earth/#axzz5xRXia1uD

Second, as the orbits of man-made debris degrade, and they re-enter the earth’s atmosphere, a shock wave occurs in the upper reaches of the layer of ozone. This physical stress on the area can be damaging to the protective buffer. Researchers have discovered that the impact of objects entering the atmosphere at high speed can produce nitric oxide during the rapid cooling that follows the splitting of oxygen and nitrogen. Nitric oxide is very destructive to the ozone layer. Finally, though most of the debris that re-enters the earth’s atmosphere is vaporized due to the build- up of intense heat, the chemical residue of this material can also react with the ozone and deplete it. Some scientists fear that erosion of the ozone layer may cause global climate change. They predict that these altered weather patterns could transform fertile farmland into deserts and threaten human life on the planet. Thus, the environmental effect of space debris upon the ozone is of great concern to these experts.

#### **Ozone collapse causes extinction.**

Simmons 20 [Carla Simmons,, The Science Times, "A Repeat of One of the Biggest Extinctions Caused by Ozone Layer Erosion 359M Years Ago Possible, Warn Scientists | Science Times", May 27, 2020, https://www.sciencetimes.com/articles/25838/20200527/repeat-one-biggest-extinctions-caused-ozone-layer-erosion-359m-years.htm] BD

University of Southampton researchers have delved deeper into an extinction event that occurred about 360 million years ago. According to their research, the ozone layer's breakdown caused by ultraviolet (UV) radiation vanquished much of the Earth's marine life and greenery. Moreover, their discovery led to weighty indications for today's continually warming Earth.

Numerous episodes of mass extinction occurred in the geological past. One of the most notorious ones caused the extinction of dinosaurs about 66 million years ago. Their destruction was believed to have been caused by an asteroid hitting the Earth.

Additionally, two chapters were caused by large-scale volcanic eruptions that created the imbalance of oceans and atmospheres in the planets. Another one happened during the end of Permian Great Dying, which, according to Stanford, wiped out 96% of the Earth's aquatic species.

Scientists have discovered evidence pointing to high levels of UV radiation responsible for collapsing forest ecosystems and killing off water animal species during the Devonian geological period about 359 million years ago.

Their research revealed that warming temperatures after an intense ice age could have caused the ozone to collapse. The researchers suggest that the Earth might possibly reach comparable temperatures, thus might face the same consequences that occurred in the past.

The findings of their study are published in the journal Science Advances. Additionally, the research was partly funded by a grant from the National Geographic Society. It was also regulated in collaboration with The Sedgwick Museum of Earth Sciences at the University of Cambridge.

The team collected various rock samples during expeditions in locations in South America. They formed clues as to what was happening at the edge of the melting Devonian ice sheet, which allowed them to compare between the extinction event close to the pole and near the equator.

The rocks were then dissolved in hydrofluoric acid back in the laboratory. The dissolved rocks released microscopic plant spores, which were preserved for hundreds of millions of years. On microscopic examination, the scientists found many of the spores had bizarrely formed spines on their surface.

According to the researchers, the spikes were due to UV radiation damaging their DNA. Furthermore, they found that many spores had dark pigmented walls. These walls were thought to be a protective 'shield' against the increasing and damaging UV levels.

From their findings, the scientists have concluded that during a time of expeditious global warming, the ozone layer collapsed for a short while. Moreover, the ozone collapse exposed life on Earth to harmful UV radiation levels and, therefore, triggered a mass extinction event. This affected life on land and in shallow water at the Devonian-Carboniferous boundary.

From Climate Change to Climate Emergency

Professor John Marshall, the lead researcher from the University of Southampton's School of Ocean and Earth Science, said that our ozone layer is currently in a state of alteration. He adds that they have seen this pattern in the past, where a stimulant or impetus was unnecessary for the phenomenon to kick in.

He also says that current approximate calculations suggest that the Earth will reach similar global temperatures to those of 360 million years ago. Furthermore, they say it is possible that a similar collapse of the ozone layer could occur again, dangerously exposing surface and shallow sea life to harmful radiation.

#### Debris triggers miscalculated war.

Robert Farley 22, Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Robert Farley is a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020). 1/9/22. [19 Fourty Five, “Does A Space War Mean A Nuclear War?,” <https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/does-a-space-war-mean-a-nuclear-war/>] Justin

The recent Russian anti-satellite test didn’t tell the world anything new, but it did reaffirm the peril posed by warfare in space. Debris from explosions could make some earth orbits remarkably risky to use for both civilian and military purposes. But the test also highlighted a less visible danger; attacks on nuclear command and control satellites could rapidly produce an extremely dangerous escalatory situation in a war between nuclear powers. James Acton and Thomas Macdonald drew attention to this problem in a recent article at Inside Defense. As Acton and MacDonald point out, nuclear command and control satellites are the connective tissue of nuclear deterrence, assuring countries that they’re not being attacked and that they’ll be able to respond quickly if they are.

For a long time, these strategic early-warning satellites were akin to a center of gravity in ICBM warfare. Nuclear deterrence requires awareness that an attack is underway. Attacks on the monitoring system could easily be read as an attempt to ~~blind~~ an opponent in preparation for general war, and could themselves incur nuclear retaliation. Thus, the nuclear command and control satellites are critical to the maintenance of nuclear deterrence. They make it possible to distribute an order from the chief of government to the nuclear delivery systems themselves. Consequently, their destruction might lead to hesitation or delay in performing a nuclear launch order.

It was only later that the relevance of satellites for conventional warfare became clear. Satellites could reconnoiter enemy positions and, more importantly, provide communications for friendly forces. Indeed, the expansion of the role of satellites in conventional warfare has complicated the prospect of space war

#### No limited nuclear wars – extinction.

Webber 19 – Dr Philip Webber has written widely on nuclear issues and is Chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) – a membership organisation promoting responsible science and technology. We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it. 5/18/19. [METRO.UK “We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it,” <https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/18/we-will-all-end-up-killing-each-other-and-one-nuclear-blast-could-do-it-9370115/>] Recut Justin

The nuclear armed nations have inadvertently created a global Doomsday machine, built with 15,000 nuclear weapons.

Most (93%) have been built by Russia and in the US, 3,100 of them are ready to fire within hours.

Pre-programmed targets include main cities as well as a range of military and civilian targets across the world primarily in the UK, Europe, US, Russia and China but also in Japan, Australia and South America.

One nuclear blast, one mistake, one cyber attack could trigger it.

But first a reminder about the incredible destructive power of a nuclear weapon. Modern nuclear warheads are typically 20 times larger than either of the two bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. What just one nuclear warhead can do is unimaginable. We’ve drawn some of the key features to scale against cityscapes in the UK for a Russian SS-18 RS 20V (NATO designation ‘Satan’) 500kT warhead. US submarines deploy a similar weapon – the Trident II Mk5, 475kT warhead. A deafening, terrifying noise will be created, like an intense thunder that lasts for 10 seconds or longer.

After a blinding flash of light bright destroying the retina of anyone looking, and a violent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) knocking out electrical equipment several miles away, a bomb of this size quickly forms an incandescent fireball 850 metres across.

This is about the same height as the world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa. Drawn against the London Canary Wharf financial district or the Manchester skyline, the huge fireball dwarfs one Canary Sq. (240m), the South Tower Deansgate (201m) and the Beetham Tower Hilton, (170m). The fireball engulfs both city centres completely, melting glass and steel and forms an intensely radioactive 60m deep crater zone of molten earth and debris. A devastating supersonic blast wave flattens everything within a radius of two to three km, the entire Manchester centre, an area larger than the City of London, with lighter damage out to eight km. Most people in these areas would be killed or very seriously injured.

The fireball quickly rises forming an enormous characteristic mushroom shaped cloud raining highly radioactive particles (fallout). It rises to 60,000 ft (18,000m) – twice the altitude of Everest – and is 15 miles, 24km across.

This is one warhead. There are 10 such warheads on each of Russia’s 46 missiles (460 in total) and 48 on each of eight US Trident submarines (384 in total). In reality, in a nuclear conflict all of these warheads and a further 956 ready-to-fire are likely to be launched.

Whilst this scale of destruction is horrific and hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a few hours from a combination of blast, radiation and huge fires, there are also terrible longer-term effects.

Scientists predict that huge city-wide firestorms combined with very the high-altitude debris clouds would severely reduce sunlight levels and disrupt the world’s climate for a decade causing drought, a prolonged winter, global famine and catastrophic impacts for all life on earth and in the seas due to intense levels of UV with the destruction of the ozone layer.

But even at the level of a few hundred nuclear warheads, the consequences of a nuclear war would be extremely severe across the world far beyond the areas hit directly. A nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan with ‘only’ 100 small warheads would kill hundreds of millions and cause climate damage leading to a global famine. The sheer destructive nature of nuclear explosions combined with long lasting radiation, means that nuclear weapons are of no military use. ‘Enemy’ territory would be unusable for years because of intense radiation – especially when nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants are hit.

Even if your own country is not hit, radiation and climate damage will spread across the globe. No one escapes the consequences.

But the nuclear nations argue that they build and keep nuclear weapons to make sure that they are never used. After all no one would be stupid enough to actually launch a nuclear weapon facing such terrible retaliation? It sounds obvious. If you threaten any attacker with terrible nuclear devastation of course they won’t attack you. That might be true most of the time. It is very unlikely that any country would launch a nuclear attack deliberately. But there are two very major problems. First, a terrorist organisation with a nuclear weapon cannot be deterred in this way. Secondly, there are several ways in which a nuclear war can start by mistake. A report by the prestigious Chatham House in 2014 documents 30 instances between 1962 and 2002 when nuclear weapons came within minutes of being launched due to miscalculation, miscommunication, or technical errors. What prevented their use on many of these occasions was the intervention of individuals who, against military orders, either refused to authorise a nuclear strike or relay information that would have led to launch. Examples include a weather rocket launch mistaken for an attack on Russia, a US satellite misinterpreting sunlight reflecting off clouds as multiple missiles firings, a 42c chip fault creating a false warning of 220 missiles launched at the United States. Such risks are heightened during political crises.

The risk of mistake is very high because, in a hangover from the Cold War, the USA and Russia each keep 900 warheads ready to fire in a few minutes, in a ‘launch on warning’ status, should a warning of nuclear attack come in.

These nuclear weapons form a dangerous nuclear stand-off – rather like two people holding guns to each other’s heads.

With only a few minutes to evaluate a warning of nuclear attack before warheads would strike, one mistake can trigger disaster. A similar nuclear stand-off exists between India and Pakistan.

### 1AC – Adv – Larp

#### Advantage 2 is No Kant Pls ☹

#### In outer space, there is no governing authority and thus claiming property imposes your will over others.

Stilz 2 (Anna Stilz, Anna Stilz is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. , 2009, accessed on 12-18-2021, Muse.jhu, "Project MUSE - Liberal Loyalty", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30179)//phs st

It might seem, then, that Kant, like Simmons, would hold that although our acquired rights are initially indefinite, our private acts of appropria- tion in a state of nature can function to more clearly delimit their contours. Once I appropriate an external object—for example, my piece of land in the state of nature—the boundaries of my right to external freedom might simply be equivalent to those of the things and spaces that I have appropriated. If this were so, then individuals could succeed in more precisely defining property without the help of the state, and simply by coordinating expectations based on their private acts. In order to respect and acknowledge my external freedom, on this view, you would just have to cede me the spot I have rightfully occupied and to refrain from infringing on my choices within that sphere. Yet Kant does not take this position: he argues that the rights made possible by the postulate of practical reason are problematic. Whatever rights our private acts of appropriation outside the state confer upon us can only be understood as provisional rights, that is, they are not conclusive and settled (peremp- torische): indeed, for him, “It is possible to have something external as one’s own only in a rightful condition, giving laws publicly, that is, a civil condition” (MM, 6:255). What is the problem with these private methods of defining our rights to property? Why are they so unsatisfactory, from Kant’s perspective? The essential problem with acquiring property rights in a state of nature, for Kant, seems to be that we cannot unilaterally—through private will— impose a new obligation on other persons to respect our property that they would not otherwise have had.30 “By my unilateral choice I cannot bind another to refrain from using a thing, an obligation he would not otherwise have; hence I can do this only through the united choice of all who possess it in common” (MM, 6:261).31 Even claiming to interpret the a priori general will on another person’s behalf, says Kant, is at- tempting to impose a law on them on my own private authority, since every act of appropriation is “the giving of a law that holds for everyone” (MM, 6:253).32 And he worries that this claim to private authority over others is a potential source of injustice: “Now when someone makes ar- rangements about another, it is always possible for him to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard to himself (for volenti non fit inuria)” (MM, 6:314). My will to appro- priate, in the belief that my appropriation is justifiable to others, cannot yet serve as a (coercive) law for everyone else, because it cannot put them under an obligation. Kant suggests, in other words, that figuring out how to carve up shares of the external world consistently with everyone’s freedom does not ex- haust the entire problem of justice involved in acquiring rights to prop- erty. We might appeal to criteria of salience or convention to help coordi- nate our expectations on which of the many possible property distributions to choose. But we face an additional difficulty: how do we impose one of these distributions without at the same time arrogating to ourselves the private authority to lay down the law for an equally free being, one who has an innate right not to be constrained by our private will? In coercing someone to respect our view of our property rights, we are also necessarily claiming the right to impose our private will upon that person. If it is to really respect everyone’s freedom, Kant thinks, a property distribution cannot be unilaterally imposed in this way. This additional dimension of the problem of justly acquiring rights— the problem of unilateral imposition—is rooted in each person’s basic “right to do what seems right and good to him and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this” (MM, 6:312). This right to do what seems right and good to him derives from the moral equality of persons: no one has an innate right to decide in another person’s behalf. And be- cause each person is an equally authoritative judge, it is therefore impossi- ble—in a state of nature—to put [them] under an obligation of justice that [they] himself does not recognize. The will of all others except for himself, which proposes to put him under obligation to give up a certain possession, is merely unilateral, and hence has as little lawful force in denying him possession as he has in asserting it (since this can be found only in a general will). (MM, 6:257) In conditions of equal authority—such as those that exist in any state of nature—one is obligated only by what one recognizes, by one’s own lights, as an objectively valid requirement of justice. For that reason, no other person’s merely unilateral will can bind one in the face of one’s own disagreement. Kant concludes from this that “no particular will can be legislative for the commonwealth” (TP, 8:295), since no private person’s will can effec- tively claim to impose an obligation on others. Instead, Kant says that “all right,” that is to say all claims that impose binding duties on others, “depends on laws” (TP, 8:294). Law overcomes the problem of unilater- alism inherent in imposing new obligations on others on one’s own au- thority, by substituting an omnilateral will in place of a unilateral one: “Only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all, and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative” (MM, 6:314). But why is law—imposed from a public perspective—consistent with everyone’s freedom in a way that particular wills—based on our private judgments—are not? Fundamentally, Kant argues that defining and enforcing both our rights over our bodies and our rights to external objects through public and nonarbitrary laws is the only way to secure ourselves against the coercive interference of other private persons in our affairs. For Kant, then, the only sort of property distribution to which we could all hypothetically consent must necessarily be one that is defined and enforced by the state, since all privately enforced distributions have the inevitable side-effect of subjecting us to the wills of others. To show this in more detail, Kant points out two different ways that unilateral private enforcement under- mines our right to independence: first, through unilateral interpretation— a particularly pervasive problem in the enforcement of property rights, since these rights are fully conventional in a way our rights over our bod- ies are not; and second, through unilateral coercion, which threatens in- terference by others in all our rights, both our rights over our bodies and our rights over external things.

### Framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being –

#### 1] Only moral naturalism can explain the influence of moral facts on the physical world – ethics must be understood a posteriori.

Papineau David [Professor of Philosophy King's College London], First published Thu Feb 22, 2007; substantive revision Tue Mar 31, 2020 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/#MorFac

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts constitute a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of physically-grounded natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world (Harman 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don’t have any physical effects). But it has awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them. The traditional non-naturalist answer to this problem is to posit a non-natural faculty of “moral intuition” that gives us some kind of direct access to the moral realm (as explained in Ridge 2014: Section 3). However, causal closure once more makes it difficult to make good sense of this suggestion. Presumably at some point the posited intuitive faculty will need to make a causal difference in the physical world (by affecting what people say and do, for example). And at this point the causal closure argument will bite once more, to show that a non-natural intuitive faculty would implausibly imply that some of our actions are strongly overdetermined by two metaphysically independent antecedents. Moral non-naturalism has had something of a revival in recent years, with defenders including Russ Shaffer-Landau (2003), Ralph Wedgwood (2007), Derek Parfit (2011) and David Enoch (2011). Still, the challenge of accounting for our access to non-natural moral facts remains, and it is debatable whether any of these writers has found a satisfactory alternative to a causally problematic faculty of intuition. Perhaps the most developed suggestion is Enoch’s (2011) appeal to the indispensability of non-natural moral facts to moral reasoning, a line of argument that is analogous to Hilary Putnam’s case for non-natural mathematical objects, to be discussed in the next section below. But Enoch’s appeal arguably faces many of the same general objections as Putnam’s argument, as well as objections specific to the moral realm (see Leng 2016). In light of the difficulties facing moral non-naturalism, most contemporary moral philosophers opt instead for some species of naturalist view. We can divide the naturalist options here into two broad categories: irrealist and realist. Irrealist moral naturalists aim to account for moral discourse by offering naturalist accounts of the social and linguistic and practices that govern it, but without supposing that moral utterances report on moral facts with a substantial independent existence (Joyce 2015). By contrast, naturalist moral realists agree with moral non-naturalists that substantial moral facts exist, but seek to locate them in the natural realm rather than in some sui generis non-natural realm (Lenman 2014). Both these broad categories have further sub-divisions. Among the irrealists, we can distinguish explicitly non-cognitivist views like emotivism and prescriptivism which deny that moral judgements express beliefs (Hare 1952, Blackburn 1993, Gibbard 2003) from cognitivist views that accept that moral judgements do express beliefs but deny a substantial reality to the putative facts to which they answer; and among the latter cognitivist views we can distinguish error-theoretic fictionalist options which view moral judgements as simply false (Mackie 1977, Kalderon 2005) from projectivist options which hold that moral discourse is sufficiently disciplined for its judgements to qualify for a species of truth even though they do not report on independently existing causally significant facts (Wright 1992, Price 2011). Naturalist moral realism also comes in different varieties. In recent debates two versions have figured prominently; “Cornell realism”, which includes moral facts among the causally significant facts but resists their type-reducibility to non-moral facts (Sturgeon 1985, Boyd 1988), and “moral functionalism” which is happy to equate moral facts with straightforwardly descriptive facts (Jackson 1998). Any kind of moral naturalist realist needs to reject Moore’s open question argument. There are two alternatives here. One is to insist that Moore’s posited openness is relatively superficial, and that there is no principled barrier to inferring moral facts a priori from the non-moral natural facts, even if such inferences will sometimes require a significant amount of information and reflection. The other is to argue that the constitution of moral facts by non-moral natural facts is an a posteriori matter, akin to the relation between water and H2O, and that therefore Moore’s openness only points to a conceptual gap, not a metaphysical one (Ridge 2014: Section 2).

#### 2] Extinction outweighs

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### 3] Substitutability—only consequentialism explains necessary enablers.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

A moral reason to do an act is consequential if and only if the reason depends only on the consequences of either doing the act or not doing the act. For example, a moral reason not to hit someone is that this will hurt her or him. A moral reason to turn your car to the left might be that, if you do not do so, you will run over and kill someone. A moral reason to feed a starving child is that the child will lose important mental or physical abilities if you do not feed it. All such reasons are consequential reasons. All other moral reasons are non-consequential. Thus, a moral reason to do an act is non-consequential if and only if the reason depends even partly on some property that the act has independently of its consequences. For example, an act can be a lie regardless of what happens as a result of the lie (since some lies are not believed), and some moral theories claim that that property of being a lie provides amoral reason not to tell a lie regardless of the consequences of this lie. Similarly, the fact that an act fulfills a promise is often seen as a moral reason to do the act, even though the act has that property of fulfilling a promise independently ofits consequences. All such moral reasons are non-consequential. In order to avoid so many negations, I will also call them 'deontological'. This distinction would not make sense if we did not restrict the notion of consequences. If I promise to mow the lawn, then one consequence of my mowing might seem to be that my promise is fulfilled. One way to avoid this problem is to specify that the consequences of an act must be distinct from the act itself. My act of fulfilling my promise and my act of mowing are not distinct, because they are done by the same bodily movements.10 Thus, my fulfilling my promise is not a consequence of my mowing. A consequence of an act need not be later in time than the act, since causation can be simultaneous, but the consequence must at least be different from the act. Even with this clarification, it is still hard to classify some moral reasons as consequential or deontological,11 but I will stick to examples that are clear. In accordance with this distinction between kinds of moral reasons, I can now distinguish different kinds of moral theories. I will say that a moral theory is consequentialist if and only if it implies that all basic moral reasons are consequential. A moral theory is then non-consequentialist or deontological if it includes any basic moral reasons which are not consequential. 5. Against Deontology So defined, the class of deontological moral theories is very large and diverse. This makes it hard to say anything in general about it. Nonetheless, I will argue that no deontological moral theory can explain why moral substitutability holds. My argument applies to all deontological theories because it depends only on what is common to them all, namely, the claim that some basic moral reasons are not consequential. Some deontological theories allow very many weighty moral reasons that are consequential, and these theories might be able to explain why moral substitutability holds for some of their moral reasons: the consequential ones. But even these theories cannot explain why moral substitutability holds for all moral reasons, including the non-consequential reasons that make the theory deontological. The failure of deontological moral theories to explain moral substitutability in the very cases that make them deontological is a reason to reject all deontological moral theories. I cannot discuss every deontological moral theory, so I will discuss only a few paradigm examples and show why they cannot explain moral substitutability. After this, I will argue that similar problems are bound to arise for all other deontological theories by their very nature. The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that, when someone promises to do something, 'This we consider obligatory in its own nature, just because it is a fulfillment of a promise, and not because of its consequences.'12 Such deontologists claim in effect that, if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass, and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass, even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However, if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass, then, even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower, and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass, it still would not follow that I have any moral reason to start my mower, since I did not promise to start my mower, and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus, a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability if it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons.

#### 4] Tradeoffs -- governments are forced to decide between tradeoffs ie welfare for the rich and welfare for the poor which means they’re forced to aggregate – any nonconsequential framework can’t decide where to allocate resources or which promise to keep in the instance of conflicting promises

#### 5] No intent foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the death of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### Outweighs- A] Parsimony- metaphysics relies on long chains of questionable claims that make conclusions less likely. B] Hijacks- intuitions are inevitable since even every framework must take some unjustified assumption as a starting point.

#### 7] Calc indicts fail: A] Ethics- it would indict everything since they use events to understand how their ethics have worked B] Reciprocity- they are NIBs that create a 2:1 skew where I have to answer them to access offense while they only have to win one C] Internalism- asking why we value pain and pleasure is nonsensical cuz the answer is intrinsic since we just do, which means we still prefer hedonism despite shortcomings.

### Underview

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer – 1AR are too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs – 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time.

#### 2] Reject triggering skep/permissibility – it’s an abhorrent view of the world that makes the debate space horrible which ow on accessibility – making args in favor of an alternate ethic solves.

#### But, if they trigger it, presumption and permissibility affirm

#### A] We always default to assuming something true until proven false ie if I told you my name is Jet you would believe me

#### B] Unjust[[1]](#footnote-1) is “not morally right; not fair” and permissibility disproves the positive obligation which is aff ground

#### C] Freeze- otherwise we would not be able to justify morally neutral actions since there isn’t a prohibition and we would have to prove an obligation.

#### D] The Law of Excluded Middles- if something is not false, it must be true, which means that if something is not prohibited, it must be obligatory, and permissibility is the same as obligatory.

#### E] Negation Theory- Negating requires a complete absence of an existing obligation

Negate: to deny the existence of

That’s Dictionary.com- “Negate” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/negate.

1. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unjust

   [↑](#footnote-ref-1)