#### \*\*Trigger Warning this K will have non-explicit mentions to anti-Semitic violence\*\*

## 1

#### Identity thinking generalizes objects under categories assuming it’s capturing the object in full thereby ignoring the inherent commitment of the non-identical. Therefore, all non-negative dialectical modern thinking fails.

Freyenhagen 13 Fabian Freyenhagen [University of Essex], 2013, “ADORNO’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY Living Less Wrongly” Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 978-1-107-03654-3, <https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/twentieth-century-philosophy/adornos-practical-philosophy-living-less-wrongly?format=HB&isbn=9781107036543> SJMS

iii The whole is untrue 2 (modern thought forms) However, it is not just capitalism (and its nominally socialist rivals) which are wrong for Adorno – modern thought forms are also problematic.39 Adorno paints a basically Kantian picture of modern thought forms. Thus, he suggests that empirical cognition is a composite of concepts and sensory input, such that the latter is subsumed under the former. This process of synthesis involves bringing something specific and particular (the manifold given to us via the senses) under something general (concepts). In effect, cognition becomes thereby a process of identification, of assigning the particular to a general class into which it falls. This means that we never cognise the thing in itself as such, but only how it appears to us, mediated by our spatio-temporal frame of reference (Kant calls this our‘forms of intuition’) and our conceptual scheme (that is, in Kant, the twelve categories). However, unlike Kant, Adorno does not think of this conceptual scheme as unchangeable or a priori.40 Instead, he historicises the Kantian idea (following the work of the early Lukács).41 For Adorno, as for Horkheimer, the conceptual schemes with which we operate are what might be called ‘historical a priori’ – given the historical and social setting we grow up and live in, we approach the world and think of it in certain ways.42 Society is always already inside human beings and their experiences.43 Both the object of experience and the way we experience it are shaped by the society we inhabit.44 These ways of structuring our experience take on a necessary and universal character within a social world, but, at least historically speaking, human beings have been subject to a series of incommensurable frameworks, such that Kant’s claim to a stronger form of necessity and universality comes out false. Kantians would reply that our conceptual scheme is not just a reflection of a particular society or stage in human history, but inherent in thought and experience as such. Perhaps human societies differ in terms of certain specifics – in their empirical concepts – but certain basic categories are necessarily operative in each of these variations. I cannot resolve this disagreement here, but merely note that, even if Adorno is right and our conceptual scheme is not necessary in any transhistorically strong sense, this does not mean that we could do without any conceptual scheme whatsoever. Adorno himself notes that to think is to use concepts and thereby to identify,45 and, hence, ‘identity thinking [Identitätsdenken]’, of which Adorno speaks frequently and critically, seems to be the only thinking there could be. However, what Adorno means by talking about identity thinking is more than just emphasising the inevitable fact that thinking is conceptual.46 While all thinking has this latter characteristic, only some forms of thinking – albeit the dominant ones in the modern world – are based on the assumption that the synthesis performed by subsuming the sensible manifold under concepts actually captures this manifold in full (or in its essential properties). We need to be careful here. Adorno is not just worried about which concept is used in a particular case – it might well be that we often do not use the most suitable concept in a given case and that this has to be corrected. (Perhaps Pluto is actually not a planet, but better conceptualised as an asteroid, despite a long tradition that thought otherwise.) What Adorno complains about is something more fundamental. It is the thought that any subsumption under concepts, even the most apt one, misses something about its object and if this mismatch is not reflected upon, then thought does injustice to the object.47 Instead of saying what something is, ‘identity thinking says what it falls under, what it is an example or representative of, what it consequently is not itself’. 48 What is missed in the object is called variously ‘the non-identical’ [das Nichtidentische] or ‘the non-conceptual’ [das Nichtbegriffliche] by Adorno. This central idea in Adorno’s work is difficult to make sense of. This is partly for philosophical reasons – that which escapes our conceptual schemes is inherently and unsurprisingly hard to grasp. Given that language is based on concepts, we struggle to express it. Still, some of the difficulty also stems from having to interpret Adorno’s texts and statements on this issue, which are far from easy and often give the impression of presenting a contradictory or otherwise problematic picture. The way to unlock some of these difficulties is to consider the following puzzle. If all thinking uses concepts, which are general rules, under which particulars are meant to be subsumed, then it is an open philosophical question how genuine experience of these particulars is possible. After all, the particular objects we encounter in experience are not concepts or mental entities (or at least we tend to presume that they are not) and how can something completely different in character – thought – have access to them? Call this the ‘Problem of Missing Affinity’. This problem is probably as old as philosophy and Adorno is very well aware of this and the traditional philosophical answers to it. His thesis is that these traditional answers all tend towards idealism – even where they are avowedly materialist – in the following sense: they all work on the basis of the assumption that we can capture the world in the conceptual framework we bring to it (or, at least, the best version of it, once we have worked that out). Putting it in terms of Hegel’s philosophy, traditional philosophy thinks that the world is rational, as long as we look at it in a sufficiently rational way.49 The danger in this assumption is, however, that instead of cognising the world, we cognise only what we bring to it – instead of knowledge of something other than thought and its categories, we might be settled with a big tautology. Empirical cognition would be like recognising that bachelors are unmarried men. In this sense, Kant’s talk of the inaccessible thing in itself at least acknowledged the problem, while Hegel’s absolute idealism extinguished all traces of it.50 Thus, the mistake of identity thinking is not that it involves identification and concepts – all thinking does this inevitably – but the mistake is that it rests on the assumption, whether explicitly or not, that the world is fundamentally accessible in full to thought.51 This assumption is problematic because it loses from view that there might be something in the object (or even the object as a whole) which is incompatible with, or inaccessible by conceptual thought. It does not sufficiently attend to the fact that identifying always involves disregarding what is non-identical and incommensurable in the particular object of our cognition. It thereby violates a commitment inherent in its conception of concepts itself: concepts are directed towards capturing what they are not; in Adorno’s terminology: concepts, incarnation of identity, aim at the nonconceptual, the non-identical.52

#### The aff fetishizes the suffering of the working class – it says they’re suffering so, in a linear historical view, they can “Revolutionary Suicide”. This just idealizes the working class and is an example of identity thinking.

Zadnikar 09 Darij Zadnikar (Assistant Professor for Philosophy of Education at University of Ljubljana). “Adorno and Post-Vanguardism,” Chapter Five in: *Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism*. Edited by John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros and Sergio Tischler. Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla. Pgs. 79-94 2009. Print. SJMS

This organisational closeness to clergy shows a deep connection with Judeo-Christian conceptions of society and history. For them history is an explicable drama with a cathartic dénouement. History is seen as a linear progression towards this dénouement. It is measured by the criteria of industrial advance. It is more a Protestant than a Catholic version of Christianity. It is always possible to recognise the “ethics” of work in the criteria of historic progress. Work that produces surplus value, of course. There is not much scope outside these criteria. I want to stress here that a linear notion of history reduces itself to a unique criterion of progress. Such a history consists of reduced narration. It is an impoverishment that is constructed with the exclusion of plural narratives, or at least with their hierarchisation. The end of history, its dénouement or Day of Judgement, is of course the revolution, which establishes the heavenly kingdom on earth, Communism or anarchy. The question is: how to identify this file rouge of history and not miss the historic point of revolutionary dénouement. The revolutionary clergy, the party intellectuals and bureaucracy have to decipher this historical point. Following their Christian predecessors, there are some revolutionaries who patiently wait for it and others who are hatching a plot in their kitchens of history. As the narratives of contemporary global movement, the multitudes are plural, dispersed, non-centric, chaotic, anarchic, non-hierarchic, etc., and history loses its onedimensional characteristic. It loses its emphatic explicability, it becomes the stage for various scripts rather than a single truth. It does not mean we have to subject ourselves to any kind of fancy, postmodern scepticism, but it does mean we have a broader task than the revolutionary bureaucrats would like to admit. From the standpoint of grassroots multitudes and the multiplicity of their resistances, the revolution is real, it is happening right now. So the multitudes are working out their plural and divergent tasks without waiting for the proper historic time or realising an emphatic programme. The notion of revolution and of the revolutionary working class from the industrial era followed the example of the French Revolution, when the revolutionary bourgeoisie overthrew the aristocracy, so that capitalism took the place of feudalism in the “historic line.” The party revolutionaries overlooked the fact that the world of bourgeois life had already overwhelmed feudalism. The alternative now existed at the level of everyday experience. In the case of the industrial party revolution, the working class has been idealised, though it did not build much in the way of positive alternatives at the level of everyday life. And this is precisely the point of Marxist understanding of the revolutionary proletariat: it is its total social negativity, which is realised through the commodification of labour. The proletariat is the excess of alienation, the point from which you have to step out from the realm of work. The proletariat is the point of self-destruction of capitalism, it is not an idealised actor of history. It is the end of humanity. It is the standpoint from which freedom is seen only beyond work. The nomadic and contingent characteristics of the multitudes regarding the systemic imperatives of neo-liberalism are opening up the cracks in the history, the pockets of resistance, the exodus from Empire, the revolution. It is productive and inventive through its negativity. The plurality of possible different worlds is actual, but not in the sense of a gigantic historical swap. The multitudes are inconsistent and contradictory, therefore the system wants to normalise them. We have to understand them in Georges Bataille’s term heterogeneity. They have to build the practices of transgression. The actual notion of revolution, which goes through and beyond the world of capital, is comparable with composting in organic gardening. The multitudes have to decompose the system by means of a plurality of rebellious life practices into something that is suitable and worth living. I can understand the position of some British comrades (for example, Callinicos 2003) from the viewpoint of the rich tradition of the British labour movement. But what they offer us is the nationalisation of industry, which could only strengthen the state and integrate the workers into the capitalist mode of production. Still more: such a nationalised economy can function only within nationalistic and protectionist frameworks. It is no coincidence that this so often idealised working class is the social basis for right extremism. The idealisation of the working class, so foreign to the Marxian concept of the proletariat as social negativity, is consequent on the contemplative view of history as linear progress. This view needs, intellectually and from above, to identify the social actors of history, the subjects of history. History no longer emerges from the rebellious negativity of social groups, but these have to fulfil the task of history as heroes. The problem is that either they do not see this historic task, or do not care about its long-term goals: the revolution is missing its revolutionary subject. As we know, it has been substituted by “revolutionary” parties, their bureaucracies and militants and leaders. They have to bring the subject to its senses, by fair means or foul. The clerical vision of history is the birthplace of vanguardism. This vanguardism is blind to all social movements which cannot be manipulated and which express their rebellious visions by themselves. Vanguardism is the absolute realisation of representative politics. As we have said, it is manipulative and totalitarian. The dictatorship of the proletariat is in fact the dictatorship of the party vanguard, which seized state power to fulfil the task of history. As they separate themselves from the heterogeneity of negative life (creativity) they cannot see emancipated society outside the visions of factory management. The “ruling” working class becomes that which it can only be inside the factory boundaries: executors of orders. The more this class is exploited and repressed, the more its social image is idealised. They become the superheroes of work (living in poor conditions). It is similar to the idealisation of women (virgin mother) in patriarchal societies. The multitudes are useless for vanguardists. They do not accept the supreme historic task. They do not accept the representatives. They are difficult to read. They are not serious. They are networking and swarming instead of organising themselves. They are useless and therefore invisible. This vanguardism constitutes an obstacle for a lot of parties, groups and trade unionists, irrespective of their socialist, anarchist or other origins. The objectives of their struggle are defined from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century books, so they are often missing the point of today’s fight. The anarchistic standpoint towards the state is as a rule defined by old-fashioned images of state power, which have little to do with the reality of the society of control that is emerging in post-industrial societies. The socialists are dreaming of a state with full employment. The communists are discussing the differences between Leninism, Maoism, Trotskyism and other “-isms”.

#### The aff is an act of positive utopianism – only Adorno's thought is appropriate to this moment – solves case and proves the link

Geuss 5 (Raymond Geuss, Emeritus Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, is a political philosopher and scholar of 19th and 20th century European philosophy.) “Art and Criticism in Adorno’s Aesthetics,” Chapter 10 in Outside Ethics, Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey. 2005. Print. https://books.google.com/books?id=u-a3TUddXYsC&pg=PA172&lpg=PA172&dq=%22A+further+reason+that+specifically+modern+art%22&source=bl&ots=32CgovDHbf&sig=ACfU3U2JpVMfTJqY-6\_SDz6rWy5vD\_M4GA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiMzemn7O\_zAhWomWoFHRJYCjkQ6AF6BAgDEAM#v=onepage&q=%22A%20further%20reason%20that%20specifically%20modern%20art%22&f=false SJMS

A further reason that specifically modern art can present only a negative rather than a positive utopian vision (in the second sense) is that there has been a historical shift in the function of utopias: to the extent to which they do still exist at all, they have become dangerous in a way they were not before. Traditional art contained positive and contentful utopian elements, such as the vision of freedom, justice, and solidarity at the end of Fidelio or of community at the end of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. Now, in the early twenty-first century, such positive utopian elements must be treated with the most extreme caution, because we have the technological powers to try to realize them fully all at one go. In fact they should be avoided altogether because of our experience that attempts at the full implementation of them in the twentieth century have been a series of nightmares: the Nazi ideal of a perfectly homogenous ethnic community or the Soviet ideal of a classless society. In our historical period, then, it is appropriate for us to return to and strictly enforce the biblical prohibition of “graven images,” that is, not to elaborate in detail any positive image of a utopian society.20

#### Identity thinking reproduces Auschwitz

Freyenhagen 13 Fabian Freyenhagen [University of Essex], 2013, “ADORNO’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY Living Less Wrongly” Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 978-1-107-03654-3, <https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/twentieth-century-philosophy/adornos-practical-philosophy-living-less-wrongly?format=HB&isbn=9781107036543> SJMS Bracketed for gendered language.

However, for Adorno, Auschwitz was not a unique set of events, standing out from history and unlike anything which came before or after. In many ways, almost the opposite is the case for him: Auschwitz is an exemplification of the general tendencies of the age.3 In particular, it is an extreme example of two (interrelated) central tendencies of modern social reality: (a) the elimination of all individuality to the point of indifference towards individual life (which includes the objectification and depersonalisation of human beings); and (b) the inversion of means and ends (which includes the subordination of human beings to their own creations). The victims of Auschwitz were not just murdered but the perpetrators also attempted to erase any sense of being a unique, irreplaceable individual in them. In Primo Levi’s words, the aim was ‘to annihilate us first as men in order to kill us more slowly afterwards’. 4 The actions of the perpetrators thereby mirrored something fundamental in the workings of modern society and rationality (according to Adorno): the elimination of particularity, such that everything and everyone becomes fungible – just another instance of a general category; one which can easily be expended or discarded, since others could take its place. Those actions foreshadowed a tendency, according to which differences matter, if at all, as inefficiencies or stopgaps to be eliminated. Auschwitz expresses also the inversion of means and ends typical of modern society (and thought forms), albeit in an extreme form: the modern means of industrialisation, transport, and bureaucratic administration (as well as technical-instrumental rationality) are not just decoupled from human ends, but actually turned against the most basic of such ends, survival. Notably, capitalism has replaced human ends and needs with its own telos – production for production’s sake or (what comes to the same thing for Adorno) the maximisation of profit – and satisfies these ends and needs, if at all, incidentally and even then in a distorted and incomplete manner. In this way, the events for which the name ‘Auschwitz’ stands were not something which went against the trend of civilisation. Rather, these events were intimately connected to some of the main tendencies of the path which civilisation has taken and to the structure of modern society and thinking in particular. The lesson of Auschwitz – at least, according to Adorno – is not that culture was replaced by a momentary fallback into a barbaric state; the lesson is that culture itself failed.5 If Auschwitz was possible in a country with an advanced economy and high culture (‘a land of poets and thinkers’, as Germany is known); if it happened despite the fact that moral theories reached into the minds of perpetrators (in the way Eichmann claimed that he had lived his whole life according to Kant’s categorical imperative of which he seemed to have a decent grasp);6 if it was carried out not so much by monsters, but ordinary men (and women) [people];7 if they thought of themselves not as acting against morality and civilisation, but as men of integrity who have taken on a heavy burden to protect them, remaining in their own eyes, with few exceptions, decent and respectful of human life (as Himmler described the work of the SS in his October 1943 speeches at Posen); and if it was not the act of a small group of people, but if a whole society contributed, in one way or another, to it;8 then it seems not altogether far-fetched to come to Adorno’s pessimistic conclusion that Auschwitz was not an accident, but an indication of a deep-seated problem of modern society, civilisation, and culture. If this view is defensible,9 then it suggests also another conclusion: as long as our modern culture – its thought forms and the social world underpinning it – continues unchanged, the reoccurrence of events such as Auschwitz remains a real possibility.

#### Enlightenment is not merely a period in 18th century Europe – because of fear of the unknown, through identity thinking, enlightenment is a process of radicalizing mythical fear in the name of demythologiziation. This all-consuming fear of the unknown maintains global systems of exploitation and oppression.

Zuidervaart 15 Zuidervaart, Lambert (Lambert Zuidervaart is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the Institute for Christian Studies in Toronto. He is the author of Adorno's Aesthetic Theory (MIT Press), Artistic Truth, Social Philosophy after Adorno, Religion, Truth, and Social Transformation, and other books.), "Theodor W. Adorno", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/adorno/>. SJMS Ellipses in original.

According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the source of today's disaster is a pattern of ~~blind~~ domination, domination in a triple sense: the domination of nature by human beings, the domination of nature within human beings, and, in both of these forms of domination, the domination of some human beings by others. What motivates such triple domination is an irrational fear of the unknown: “Humans believe themselves free of fear when there is no longer anything unknown. This has determined the path of demythologization … Enlightenment is mythical fear radicalized” (DE 11). In an unfree society whose culture pursues so-called progress no matter what the cost, that which is “other,” whether human or nonhuman, gets shoved aside, exploited, or destroyed. The means of destruction may be more sophisticated in the modern West, and the exploitation may be less direct than outright slavery, but ~~blind~~, fear-driven domination continues, with ever greater global consequences. The all-consuming engine driving this process is an ever-expanding capitalist economy, fed by scientific research and the latest technologies. Contrary to some interpretations, Horkheimer and Adorno do not reject the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Nor do they provide a negative “metanarrative” of universal historical decline. Rather, through a highly unusual combination of philosophical argument, sociological reflection, and literary and cultural commentary, they construct a “double perspective” on the modern West as a historical formation (Jarvis 1998, 23). They summarize this double perspective in two interlinked theses: “Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology” (DE xviii). The first thesis allows them to suggest that, despite being declared mythical and outmoded by the forces of secularization, older rituals, religions, and philosophies may have contributed to the process of enlightenment and may still have something worthwhile to contribute. The second thesis allows them to expose ideological and destructive tendencies within modern forces of secularization, but without denying either that these forces are progressive and enlightening or that the older conceptions they displace were themselves ideological and destructive.

#### The Alternative is to use negative dialects to confront the non-identical - this resolves the crisis posed by your violence – it understands the subordinate needs of an object come before our concepts.

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In fact, on Adorno’s view it is only through the external intervention of the subject that objects can fully unfold their potential. Whatever is contained in the objects themselves requires human subjectivity to be voiced.75 This cannot merely consist in copying the object or perceiving it. Objects require interpretation and this, in turn, requires the subject to move beyond them – not to the fixed categorisation of identity thinking, but to the more fluid forms of (the already mentioned) constellations or force fields of concepts.76 In this way, the subject can help to unlock the historical, dynamic, and relational character of the objects they cognise.77 Still, there are no guarantees here: interpretations can miss their object or fail to be illuminating; only the successful ones realise the difficult balancing act of achieving ‘bindingness [Verbindlichkeit] without system’. 78 Along with the rigid nature of identity thinking, certainty has to be given up too, and fallabilism takes its place.79 This lack of certainty is particularly acute within late modernity: within a wrong social life and against the background of the dominance of identity thinking, the objects themselves are deformed and cannot reveal their true nature.80 Instead, we have to engage in ‘negative dialectics’, that is, we have to engage in constant questioning of our thought forms and the confrontation of them with the experiences of non-identity. Such a dialectics is negative in the sense that it incorporates the denial of two assumptions: (1) the denial of the assumption that identity of our conceptual scheme with the world can be achieved; and (2) the rejection of the assumption that the conclusions of dialectics can move beyond the wrong state of the world and the wrong thought forms dominating within it.81 Negative dialectics is a reflection of this state and these thought forms, and if they were eventually overcome, then it would come to an end too.82 In that sense, it is not an eternal truth or orientation either.

#### Alt solves case in a non-vanguardian manner – means aff incapable no perms – and objectivity is also the opposite of the alt

Zadnikar 09 (Quoting Khorasanee) Darij Zadnikar (Assistant Professor for Philosophy of Education at University of Ljubljana). “Adorno and Post-Vanguardism,” Chapter Five in: *Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism*. Edited by John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros and Sergio Tischler. Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla. Pgs. 79-94 2009. Print. Quote is marked by bracketed inserts.

An example of non-vanguardism is the Colectivo Situaciones10 and its relation with/in MTD Solano, which is one of the most radical groups of Argentinian piqueteros. It is radical in the sense of a creative inventing of non-hierarchic sociability through opposition to neo-liberal capitalism, encuentrismo, reshaping of everyday life and reflective imagination. Colectivo Situaciones is a group of militant researchers who have in their projects destroyed the hierarchy of narratives and are constructing something which we could paraphrase in the Zapatista way as interpreting by listening. The interpretation, of course, is not self-sufficient, it seems that militant research is providing the conceptual possibilities and terms for actions and reflections of the piqueteros. The theory is constantly digested in the praxis, and the praxis in turn gains from theory its reflexive possibilities. [QUOTE] Situaciones tries to be a literary project ‘within’ the struggle, a phenomenology (genealogy) and not an ‘objective’ description. Because only in this manner can thought be affirmative and assume a function of creation, and stop being merely a reproduction of the already existent. And because only with this fidelity with immanence is the act of thinking a real and dynamic contribution, which is the absolute opposite of a programme or outline that frames and saturates all action. (quoted in Khorasanee 2005) [END QUOTE] The friends from the collective have been telling me how in the meetings of mostly unemployed workers and residents of the suburban neighbourhoods quite theoretical theorems were used in the discussions to cast light on the issues of everyday practices. In this way we can hardly perceive any of the vanguardism or the striving of the party intellectuals to lead the people like a herd, tending to reshape their narratives into the goals of history. Let us hope we can learn from them and build the micro-logical multiplicity of dialegein to recuperate our own world and life. In conclusion we can say that the Hegelian form of dialectics in its most primitive and degraded way embodied itself as designing history from above through vanguardism and even dictatorship, but that refuting such a vanguardism by a Deleuzian abolition of dialectical thought seems to restore an activist post-vanguardism. Adorno’s concept of the negative dialectic, which respects and preserves the differences, could survive and communicate to us (who are involved in global movements) in a fruitful way, in spite of his political withdrawal from the struggles of ’68.

#### The Role of the Ballot is to vote for the debater who best embraces Adorno’s education after Auschwitz – this means using the debate space as an educational space to instill distance of violence and atrocities

Freyenhagen 13 (Quoting Adorno) Fabian Freyenhagen [University of Essex], 2013, “ADORNO’S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY Living Less Wrongly” Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 978-1-107-03654-3, <https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/twentieth-century-philosophy/adornos-practical-philosophy-living-less-wrongly?format=HB&isbn=9781107036543> SJMS Quotes from Adorno marked by bracketed inserts.

In his essay ‘Education after Auschwitz’, Adorno draws a distinction between the subjective conditions that made Auschwitz possible and could contribute to its reoccurrence, on the one hand, and the objective conditions, on the other: [Quote] Since the possibility of changing the objective – namely, societal and political – conditions is extremely limited today, attempts to work against the repetition of Auschwitz are necessarily restricted to the subjective dimension. By this I also mean essentially the psychology of people who do such things. I do not believe it would help much to appeal to eternal values, at which the very people who are prone to commit such atrocities would merely shrug their shoulders. I also do not believe that enlightenment about the positive qualities possessed by persecuted minorities would be of much use. The roots must be sought in the persecutors, not in the victims, who are murdered under the paltriest of pretences. What is necessary is what I once called the turn to the subject. One must know the mechanisms that render people capable of such deeds, must reveal the mechanisms to them, and strive, by general awareness of those mechanisms, to prevent people from becoming so again. 86 [End Quote] With changes to the objective conditions highly unlikely, Adorno here concludes that we should concentrate on understanding the (psychological) mechanisms which make people commit atrocities. In this sense, he wants education as ‘an education toward critical self-reflection’. 87 This should proceed both via encouraging reflection and criticism from early childhood onwards, and by fostering it via public awareness campaigns about the (psychological) mechanisms in question.88 Adorno also thinks that instilling a sense of distaste for, or shame about, violence into children (and, if possible, adults) would be important to prevent Auschwitz repeating itself.89 He even makes a few suggestions about the form and content a post-Auschwitz education could have, such as recommending a focus on the concrete forms of resistance against the social horrors committed under Nazism or the opposition to parts thereof (for example, the euthanasia programme) among the German population.90 On a social level, he also suggests reminding people of the catastrophic results – authoritarianism, war, suffering – which the fascist regimes had for their own populations and reminding them that fascist revivals would come at similar costs, something which might present more of a counterweight than reminders about the (even worse) suffering of others.91 What is most important is Adorno’s insistence that this subjective dimension can at best improve the chances of people refraining from participating in such atrocities and thereby reduce the number of those carrying out the murders (though not necessarily the number of the people working in the bureaucratic machine behind the atrocities who Adorno calls ‘desktop murderers’).92 Encouraging reflection from early on and public awareness campaigns will not transform the objective conditions. Still, it might influence the ease with which people might be led by these conditions to the most barbaric excesses. As Adorno puts it in his conclusion of the essay: [Quote] Even if rational enlightenment, as psychology well knows, does not straightaway eliminate the unconscious mechanisms, then it at least reinforces in the preconscious certain counter-impulses and helps prepare a climate that does not favour the uttermost extreme. If the entire culture really became permeated with the idea of the pathogenic character of the tendencies that came into their own in Auschwitz, then perhaps people would better control those tendencies.93 [End Quote] The mere knowledge of how things go wrong may not be sufficient to stop them from going wrong, but it may, so to speak, strengthen the immune system of individuals or even whole societies against the objective tendencies towards depersonalisation, means-end reversal, and disregard of individuals.

#### Alt solves case –

#### [1] Capitalism imposes rigid binaries; my alt is the way out not a replication of it

Holloway et al 09 John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros, Sergio Tischler. “Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism,” Chapter One in: *Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism*. Edited by John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros and Sergio Tischler. Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla. 2009. Print. SJMS

The second problem is the abandonment of the idea of contradiction. The argument, as we have seen, is that the idea of contradiction operates like a straitjacket, forcing the infinite richness of life and struggle into a binary antagonism. The question, however, is whether this is the result of dialectical thought, or whether dialectics is simply reporting a process of antagonistic binarism that is actually taking place in the world. Capital is the name given to this process of antagonistic binarisation. Capital is not a thing but a social relation, a forced transformation of people’s activity into labour: an alien activity shaped by the requirements of producing profit. It is not dialectics but capital that is the name of the straitjacket that forces our multiple differences into the binary antagonism of exploited labour. The immense and multicoloured richness of useful-creative doing (useful labour, as Marx calls it) is forcefully reduced to abstract, value-producing labour: that is what capital means. Difference is reduced by capital to contradiction, to an antagonism against its own suppression. In all our variety and difference we are put in prison, the prison of capitalism. Dialectics is, then, the escape plan, the thinking-against-the-prison, thinking-against-the-wrong-world, a thinking that would no longer make sense if we were outside the prison of the wrong world – but we are not. To put aside the dialectical awareness (not creation) of contradiction is to forget that we are in a prison, that we are living in a form of social organisation that daily reduces our infinite creativity to the monotonous process of producing profit. And that is in fact what happens with this line of thought: the concept of capital and capitalism fades into the background and the struggle is seen primarily not as one against capital but as a struggle for “real democracy.” This leaves out of sight the central issue of any struggle for change: the organisation of our daily doing, the struggle of doing against labour. Our doing pushes towards difference, yearns for a world free of contradiction, but for the moment it is entrapped within contradiction, within a world of coercion enforced by money. To assert difference, then, is to make an assertion against, but the possibilities and movement of this assertion against can be understood only if we understand it as the movement of a contradiction.

#### [2] Negative dialectics contains a non-totalizing utopian potential in its micrological method. Negative Utopianism is better than total pessimism because calling attention to the false promises of the world is a better way of rallying people to the realization of how bad it is

Tillar 1 Elizabeth K. Tillar (At the time the article was written: St. Anselm College. Currently Plymouth State University Teaching Lecturer in Philosophy), “The Influence of Social Critical Theory on Edward Schillebeeckx’s Theology of Suffering for Others,” *Heythrop Journal, 42(2)*, 2001. Pgs. 148-172. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-2265.00167> Bracketed inserts mark quotations, the first from Adorno the second from David Toole. SJMS Quotes by Adorno and Toole marked by bracketed inserts

As a social critique, Adorno’s negative dialectics is predicated on the notion that nothing positive can be said about the ideal form human society should take. In his view, hope for the future of humankind lies in the non-identity of the utopian concept and the realization of such a concept, which precludes affirmation of Marxism or any totalizing system as the solution to the problem of exploitation, oppression and suffering. Significantly, however, he also maintains that non-identity implicitly contains identity: [QUOTE] Living in the rebuke that the thing is not identical with the concept is the concept’s longing to become identical with the thing. This is how the sense of nonidentity contains identity. [END QUOTE] The supposition of identity is indeed the ideological element of pure thought, all the way down to formal logic; but hidden in it is also the truth moment of ideology, the pledge that there should be no contradiction, no antagonism. In the simple identifying judgment, the pragmatist, nature-controlling element already joins with a utopian element.62 Since the linguistic formulation of an imagined utopia necessarily delimits the envisioned society (because of the non-identity of subject and object), the actual identity of any conceptualized object remains forever elusive. At the same time, the ‘longing of the concept to become identical with the thing’ creates the tension that drives the process of society’s becoming. In his article on Adorno and Deleuze, David Toole makes explicit the potentiality of utopia implicit in the tension of the non-identity of subject and object: [QUOTE] Utopia can exist, then, only as the reserve of possibility harbored within things. Hence, the micrology of negative dialectics ends neither in despair nor in utopia, but rather recognizes that the latter emerges from the former as something vital to thought. This dialogue between despair and utopia, between an inconclusive reality and an inextinguishable possibility has profound implications for negative dialectics: ‘It lies in the definition of negative dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it were total. This is its form of hope.’63 [END QUOTE]