## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a just government in which a right to strike ought to be recognized

#### “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just governmnt” in the res – means that you have to prove the resolution true in a VACCUM, not in a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### Violation: they spec [x]

#### Standards:

#### [1] precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### [2] limits – the UN says there are 195 national governments but even that’s not an agreed upon brightline – explodes limits since there are tons of independent affs plus functionally infinite combinations, all with different advantages in different political situations. Kills neg prep and debatability since there are no DAs that apply to every aff – i.e. factors that affect labor shortages or unions in the US are different than in China – means the aff is always more prepared and wins just for speccing.

#### [3] tva – just read your aff as an advantage under a whole res advocacy, solves all ur offense

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

## 2

#### Infrastructure is passing now and is at the top of Bidens agenda---Biden has enough PC but continuation is critical.

Nomikos 9/1 [William; 9/1/21; Assistant professor of political science at Washington University in St. Louis and director of the Data-driven Analysis of Peace Project; "*Everyone has an opinion on Afghanistan — Do voters care?*" The Hill, <https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/570422-everyone-has-an-opinion-on-afghanistan-do-voters-care>] Justin

On Aug. 15, Taliban fighters rolled into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. They faced little resistance. Within hours, the Taliban had seized control of the city. The airport plunged into chaos as thousands of Afghans sought refuge among departing American personnel. In February 2020, the Trump administration signed a peace agreement calling for the withdraw of American troops, but it is President Biden who ultimately pushed ahead and ended what he called “America’s longest war.” Even now, with the Taliban in Kabul, Biden remains defiant and defends his decision. Democrats worry this will hurt Biden politically, and Republicans are doing their best to make sure it does. But existing research suggests otherwise. Americans don’t prioritize foreign policy when voting International relations scholars long have argued that voters punish presidents who back down from confrontations with foreign adversaries, because doing so could tarnish the U.S.’s reputation abroad. But the magnitude of the effect on presidential approval varies depending on whether Democrats or Republicans are in power, the composition of the president’s constituency, and the persuasiveness of the justification for backing down. Indeed, as my own research has shown, the actual behavior of the president in crises may not matter at all. Ultimately, voters care about whether a president makes the right policy decisions, not whether American forces remain deployed abroad to maintain their reputation. What’s more, Americans are far more likely care about domestic issues such as health care or the economy than foreign policy. For example, even as Barack Obama rode opposition to the war in Iraq to electoral victory in 2008, more than five times as many respondents to the American National Elections Survey (ANES) listed the economy as the most important problem facing the nation compared to the war. Military interventions are unpopular with voters We tend to associate wars with “rally-around-the-flag” effects, in which conflicts lead to popularity bumps for presidents and their parties. Such effects may have been true during WWII, but 21st century military interventions are long, drawn out affairs — and political losers. This is due to what I’ve identified in past research as the time inconsistency between costs and benefits of military interventions. While the costs of intervention accrue immediately, both in terms of actual money as well as human lives, the best-case scenario benefits of intervention take decades, sometimes generations to bear fruit. For politicians facing election campaigns, this means that there is just no incentive to pay the costs of war up front when you might never see the benefits. In research I conducted on troop contributions to the war in Afghanistan, I found that contributors to the war effort — including the United States — withdrew around 10 percent of their forces whenever they were up for reelection. The politics of U.S. casualties Voters do care deeply about the loss of American lives. While images from Kabul evoke memories of Saigon and withdrawal from Vietnam, the more apt comparisons are the capture and failed rescue of U.S. hostages in Teheran following the Iranian revolution in 1979 or the Benghazi embassy attacks in Libya in 2011. Both the Iran hostage crisis and Benghazi negatively affected perception of two presidential candidates, Jimmy Carter and Hillary Clinton, respectively. Biden’s ability to avoid the political fallout might hinge on whether all Americans are evacuated safely. Sadly, this political calculus suggests there may be little room for humanitarian evacuations and refugee resettlements. While Biden has pledged to bring any trapped Americans home, there simply may not be much political incentive to evacuate Afghan refugees – especially if doing so endangers American lives. Moreover, accepting refugees means finding areas in the U.S. willing to resettle them. Conservative media commentators have already seized upon this issue, with one prominent pundit warning his viewers that they will be “invaded” by Afghan refugees. Biden’s political calculation Voters are not closely engaged with current events, often seeking to avoid politics altogether. Humanitarian disasters quickly disappear from headlines. Consider that less than a week after the Taliban overtook Kabul, news from Afghanistan did not make the front page of newspapers is several major cities. On the flip said, the potential costs of staying in Afghanistan would be enormous. Currently, President Biden is focused on getting Congress to pass a $1 trillion infrastructure bill and a $3.5 trillion budget reconciliation bill that, together, would comprise much of his first term agenda. Given the importance of these domestic issues to voters relative to foreign policy, passing the bills through Congress will be the most important politically for Biden. According to estimates, the war in Afghanistan alone has already cost American taxpayers more than $2.2 trillion. Concerns about the combined price tag of Democrats’ legislative agenda have triggered concerns about federal spending and inflation. More spending on Afghanistan would make Biden and his fellow Democrats even more vulnerable to such attacks. The slim margins in Congress suggests that Biden must reserve his political capital to maintain the existing coalitions to pass these two bills, not a new war effort. Doing so would also offer the Democrats the best chance for retaining control of Congress in the 2022 midterm elections.

#### Labor reform saps PC – empirically prove with Obama, corporate opposition, and Democratic resistance

Leon 21 Luis Feliz Leon, 01-06-2021, “"If we want it, we’re going to have to fight like hell for it" - Labor faces an uphill battle to pass the PRO Act,” Strike Wave, https://www.thestrikewave.com/original-content/labor-faces-uphill-battle-to-pass-pro-act/SJKS

The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which died in the Senate during President Barack Obama’s first term, had similar potential to increase union membership, as it would have enabled workers to get union representation if a majority signed union cards (“card check”) rather than through an election. It died because Obama was unwilling to put political capital behind it to overcome opposition from Republicans and center-right Democrats. “EFCA was very close to becoming law. At the end of the day, in my view, the Obama administration did not put the necessary political capital into securing its passage,” said EPI's McNicholas. “The Obama administration decided to focus on ‘bipartisan’ and ‘reach across the aisle’ type solutions to the 2008 financial crisis, and thus didn't care about EFCA in the face of the anti-EFCA mobilization by strong ‘antis’ like the Chamber of Commerce,” says Susan Kang, a professor of political science at John Jay College who studies political economy, labor, and human rights. “Basically, labor was swept aside by the Obama administration … at the exact moment when he had the strongest mandate and political capital.” Another issue, said Patrick Burke, an organizer with United Auto Workers Local 2322 in Massachusetts, was that EFCA's card-check provisions, when framed as a replacement for elections, “became very easy to demonize and difficult to explain to people not already familiar with labor law.” “The short story is that the EFCA was doomed from a few moderate Dems not being willing to go through with card check once actually in power to enact it. The long story is that the labor movement's disappearance from the ‘adult table’ of Democratic politics has cyclical downward effects. They're less able to convince Dems to go out on the limb for them and to prioritize their legislative requests,” said Brandon Magner, a labor lawyer in Indiana. Despite a history of betrayal and rejection, labor and immigrant rights organizations, [coalesced](https://progressive.org/dispatches/power-behind-win-feliz-leon-201123/) around Biden, a self-professed “[union guy](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/16/biden-holds-joint-meeting-with-union-leaders-and-retail-auto-tech-ceos.html),” after the primaries and [helped deliver](https://progressive.org/dispatches/bargaining-rights-with-that-feliz-leon-201229/) him to the White House in the hope that doing so would lead to [executive action](https://indypendent.org/2020/12/immigrants-rights-advocates-descend-on-delaware/) on immigration and labor law reform. “We call on Congress to pass and Biden to sign the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act early in 2021 to make sure every worker who wants to form or join a union is able to do so freely and fairly,” AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka said in a [statement](https://aflcio.org/press/releases/afl-cio-looks-forward-working-president-elect-joe-biden-0) after the election. But union organizers, researchers, and labor lawyers see dim prospects for winning significant labor reform during the Biden administration. “The PRO Act is obviously dead in the Senate unless Mitch McConnell gets knocked into the minority, but I don't see it being passed without full-throated support for gutting the filibuster from Biden, Harris, Schumer, Durbin, and more,” said Magner, the labor lawyer, adding that “the history of failed labor law reform efforts indicates you need 60 votes to pass anything.” That is particularly true of Democrats in “right-to-work” states like [South Carolina](https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/scs-rep-joe-cunningham-to-vote-against-pro-union-bill-in-break-with-democrats/article_426b38e2-4862-11ea-a0d9-77a96531c47e.html) where U.S. Rep. Joe Cunningham was a reliable opponent in the House. But the greatest liability might be Biden himself. “The few times that Biden met McConnell at the negotiating table during the Obama years, McConnell [left with Biden’s wallet](https://theintercept.com/2019/06/24/joe-biden-tax-cuts-mitch-mconnell/),” dryly [observed](https://theintercept.com/2020/12/28/mcconnell-trump-election/) The Intercept’s Ryan Grim. “Even if the Democrats capture the Georgia Senate seats, their margin will be too small to overcome a Republican filibuster or, if they change the rules, more than one Democrat will break ranks, and no Republicans will support the act,” said Friedman. Even if Biden were to somehow outmaneuver McConnell’s chicanery, there would be fierce opposition to contend with on the corporate side from the likes of Americans for Tax Reform, which has [used](https://www.atr.org/ab5) Georgia runoff elections as an opportunity to fearmonger on the PRO Act, and, when backed against the wall, Biden may revert to his timeworn moderate instincts and not go to bat for labor reform unless forced to. “Prospects for major labor law reform under the Biden administration are directly tied to unions’ and union federations’ willingness to hold the administration’s feet to the fire. They are not going to do it on their own – if we want it, we’re going to have to fight like hell for it,” said Pitkin, the former UNITE HERE organizer. “The biggest question is whether there is enough street heat and organizing to prioritize legislation like this," said Burke, the UAW organizer. “Workers in motion spur labor-law reforms, not the other way around.”

#### Extinction

Castillo 21 [Rhyma; 8/16/21; News and politics writer at Elite Daily, where she's passionate about advocating for underserved communities throughout the United States. She’s covered issues in politics, immigration, environmental racism, climate change, gun violence, and more. After graduating with an English degree from Texas A&M Unversity, Rhyma has worked as a technical writer and test author at Educational Testing Service (ETS), a copywriter for Mightier Content, and as a Creative Operations Specialist at GoDaddy. She also has bylines as a freelancer at the San Antonio Current, where her reporting on local news, politics, tech, and entertainment has been widely circulated; “*Experts Explain What You Can Do About Climate Change After That Scary IPCC Report*,” Elite Daily, <https://www.elitedaily.com/news/what-you-can-do-climate-change-after-ipcc-report>] Justin

I’ll be honest: climate change is something I have a daily existential crisis over — and with its effects quite literally showing up on people’s doorsteps in the form of floods, wildfires, record heatwaves, and more, I know I’m not alone. On Aug. 9, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released an alarming report that was characterized as a “code red for humanity,” which is terrifying, to say the least. But while it’s easy to surrender to fatalist feelings of doom and gloom, there’s still time to turn things around. So, according to experts, here’s what you can do about climate change after the IPCC report. While experts agree that reducing, reusing, and recycling on an individual level is important, they acknowledge it isn’t the main solution to climate change, which is a largely institutional problem. According to a 2017 report from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), researchers found that just 100 companies were responsible for over 70% of greenhouse gas emissions since 1988, with the top 10 emitters being fossil-fuel based energy corporations. “I'm not suggesting that individual actions aren't good or important,” states Cara Horowitz, J.D., the co-executive director of the Emmett Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at UCLA School of Law. She adds that if you’re lucky enough to afford an electric vehicle, to select the green option on your energy bill, or to adopt an environmentally sustainable diet, you should absolutely do so. However, she notes that “[climate change] is not a problem that can be solved by individual lifestyle choices.” At least, not in place of widespread social, political, and institutional change. “There is an attempt, and in some ways it's often quite deliberate, to make individuals think it's their fault climate change is happening — if only they made different lifestyle choices, if only they recycled more or ate less meat, we [could] solve this problem,” Horowitz says. But one of the most effective ways to address the climate crisis head-on, she states, is to push for institutional change. Lesley Ott, Ph.D., meteorological researcher at NASA’s Global Modeling and Assimilation Office at Goddard Space Flight Center, agrees. “There’s a limit on how much good or bad any one person can do,” to combat climate change, she states. “This is a situation that’s come from billions of people over decades and decades,” she adds. While she notes that its still important to limit your energy consumption, she acknowledges that large corporations, such as those involved in natural gas, animal agriculture, and product manufacturing, can do a much better job of reducing their emissions. “As climate change is affecting more and more of our infrastructure,” she states, “there are opportunities some companies [could seize] to say ‘hey, you know, I can probably do the right thing for the planet.’” Trained HazMat workers clean up miles oil-drench sand after an off-shore oil spill occurred, Februa... Ott also explains how the climate crisis is both a very difficult and a very simple issue. “It’s simple in that we know what’s causing it,” she says. “We know this is because of greenhouse gases, and we know where the greenhouse gases come from. But it's tricky because those things [that cause greenhouse gases] are so fundamental to many aspects of our lives.” Across the United States and world, many people have no choice but to depend on large energy monopolies for light, gas, and heat. And many people simply cannot afford to purchase electric vehicles, adopt environmentally sustainable diets, or live in neighborhoods where green energy options are available. So, what’s the solution? According to Ott, the answer is clear: “We need to change the way we consume energy,” she states. “We know the path that we need to go down to combat climate change. And it's really up to our political leaders in our country and others to marshal the response, and really put the procedures in place to do just that, to reduce our emissions,” she adds. If it were up to Gavin Schmidt, Ph.D., director of GISS and Principal Investigator for the GISS ModelE Earth System Model at NASA, he’d combat the climate crisis using several strategies: shutting down coal power stations, phasing out natural gas, electrifying transportation systems, investing in infrastructure for more walk-able and bike-able cities, building a more unified power grid, and pushing for improved public transit. But while scientists have developed the technology and resources for these strategies, Schmidt notes many places — including the United States — simply haven’t invested in the infrastructure necessary to adopt these strategies. “The infrastructure is not all there,” he states. So while we certainly have the concepts and resources available, “we're still missing some practical application [for] those things,” he adds. “We have to make the investments, [and] those investments take a while to come to fruition.”

## Case

### 1NC – Heg Bad

#### First is offense-

#### 1] Counterbalancing

#### A. Pursuit of hegemony leads to Sino-Russia alliance and is unsustainable.

Porter, DPhil, 19

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### B. A strong Sino-Russian alliance combined with expanded US military presence ensures joint retaliation — that escalates to the use of nuclear force

Klare 18 – Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College. (Michael T., “The Pentagon Is Planning a Three-Front ‘Long War’ Against China and Russia,” April 4, 2018, https://fpif.org/the-pentagon-is-planning-a-three-front-long-war-against-china-and-russia/)//sy

In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries. Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an outsized effort. Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait. Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft. However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is: Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation, and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning. At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the U.S. and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat. From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences.

#### 2] Terrorism

#### A. Hegemony fails and propagates terrorism – it justifies intervention and empirically causes blowback.

Bandow 19 (Doug, senior fellow @ Cato Institute and JD Stanford, 6-2-2019, "Understanding the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy: The Albright Doctrine," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/understanding-failure-us-foreign-policy-albright-doctrine-60477)> AG

Since 9/11, Washington has been extraordinarily active militarily—invading two nations, bombing and droning several others, deploying special operations forces in yet more countries, and applying sanctions against many. Tragically, **the threat of Islamist violence and terrorism only have metastasized**. Although Al Qaeda lost its effectiveness in directly plotting attacks, it continues to inspire national offshoots. Moreover, while losing its physical “caliphate” the Islamic State added further terrorism to its portfolio.

Three successive administrations have ever more deeply ensnared the United States in the Middle East. War with Iran appears to be frighteningly possible. Ever-wealthier allies are ever-more dependent on America. Russia is actively hostile to the United States and Europe. Washington and Beijing appear to be a collision course on far more than trade. Yet the current administration appears convinced that doing more of the same will achieve different results, the best definition of insanity.

Despite his sometimes abusive and incendiary rhetoric, the president has departed little from his predecessors’ policies. For instance, American forces remain deployed in Afghanistan and Syria. Moreover, the Trump administration has increased its military and materiel deployments to Europe. Also, Washington has intensified economic sanctions on Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, and even penalized additional countries, namely Venezuela.

U.S. foreign policy suffers from systematic flaws in the thinking of the informal policy collective which former Obama aide Ben Rhodes dismissed as “The Blob.” Perhaps no official better articulated The Blob’s defective precepts than Madeleine Albright, United Nations ambassador and Secretary of State.

First is overweening hubris. In 1998 Secretary of State Albright declared that “If we have to use force, it is because we are America: **we are the indispensable nation**. We stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future, and we see the danger here to all of us.”

Even then her claim was implausible. America blundered into the Korean War and barely achieved a passable outcome. The Johnson administration infused Vietnam with dramatically outsize importance. For decades, Washington foolishly refused to engage the People’s Republic of China. Washington-backed dictators in Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, and elsewhere fell ingloriously. An economic embargo against Cuba that continues today helped turn Fidel Castro into a global folk hero. Washington veered dangerously close to nuclear war with Moscow during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and again two decades later during military exercises in Europe.

U.S. officials rarely were prepared for events that occurred in the next week or month, let alone years later. Americans did no better than the French in Vietnam. Americans managed events in Africa no better than the British, French, and Portuguese colonial overlords. Washington made more than its share of bad, even awful decisions in dealing with other nations around the globe.

Perhaps the worst failing of U.S. foreign policy was ignoring the inevitable impact of **foreign intervention**. Americans would never passively accept another nation bombing, invading, and occupying their nation, or interfering in their political system. Even if outgunned, they would resist. Yet Washington has undertaken all of these practices, with little consideration of the impact on those most affected—hence **the rise of terrorism** against the United States. Terrorism, horrid and awful though it is, became the weapon of choice of weaker peoples against intervention by the world’s industrialized national states.

The U.S. record since September 11 has been uniquely counterproductive. Rather than minimize hostility toward America, Washington adopted a policy—highlighted by launching new wars, killing more civilians, and ravaging additional societies—guaranteed to create enemies, exacerbate radicalism, and spread terrorism. **Blowback is everywhere**. Among the worst examples: Iraqi insurgents **mutated into ISIS**, which wreaked military havoc throughout the Middle East and turned to terrorism.

#### B. Unipolarity is specifically responsible for the globalization of extremism – that makes heg unsustainable.

Ibrahimi 18 (2/19/18; S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, [researcher and instructor of political science. PhD @ Carleton University] “Unipolar politics and global peace: a structural explanation of the globalizing jihad”; taylor and francis <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17467586.2018.1428763?needAccess=true)>

* JSG = Jihadi-Salafi Groups

Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the peacefulness of the contemporary unipolar system could be discussed beyond the interstate conflict and the likelihood of great powers competition debate. The new forms of asymmetric warfare, particularly the emergence of JSGs and their violent activities at different levels of the global order, could be assessed as another variable in debates on the peacefulness of the system. These actors DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 59 emerged and operate under the unipolarity conditions. Unipolarity, in this sense, has generated conflict-producing mechanisms and nonstate actors that drove sovereign states in lengthy wars against JSGs. This argument makes a significant contribution to the unipolarity-peace puzzle, which is conventionally addressed from the interstate conflict perspective. Second, unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global. In addition to other conflict-generating conditions produced under unipolarity, the United States’ unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology. As a result of the transformation of this doctrine, new forms of JSGs emerged that posed a threat to peace and security at all levels. Finally, because of the unipolarity of the system, global peace depends largely on the sole great power’s foreign and military policies. The US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power, might not generate interstate conflict. However, it would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that would emerge independently or on behalf of states to disrupt the US hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence at different levels. These all might not challenge the durability of unipolarity, drastically, but they would disrupt peace and security at all domestic, regional, and global levels.

#### C. Terrorism causes global nuclear war—collapses internal AND external stability

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But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

#### 3] China Heg Good

#### Trump’s abandoning of liberal norms creates a window for Chinese leadership

Yan Zuetong 19, Distinguished Professor and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, January/February, “The Age of Uneasy Peace,” lexis.

WHAT CHINA WANTS China’s growing influence on the world stage has as much to do with the United States’ abdication of its global leadership under President Donald Trump as with China’s own economic rise. In material terms, the gap between the two countries has not narrowed by much in recent years: since 2015, China’s GDP growth has slowed to less than seven percent a year, and recent estimates put U.S. growth above the three percent mark. In the same period, the value of the renminbi has decreased by about ten percent against the U.S. dollar, undercutting China’s import capacity and its currency’s global strength. What has changed a great deal, however, is the expectation that the United States will continue to promote—through diplomacy and, if necessary, military power—an international order built for the most part around liberal internationalist principles. Under Trump, the country has broken with this tradition, questioning the value of free trade and embracing a virulent, no-holds-barred nationalism. The Trump administration is modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal, attempting to strong-arm friends and foes alike, and withdrawing from several international accords and institutions. In 2018 alone, it ditched the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the nuclear deal with Iran, and the UN Human Rights Council. It is still unclear if this retrenchment is just a momentary lapse—a short-lived aberration from the norm—or a new U.S. foreign policy paradigm that could out-live Trump’s tenure. But the global fallout of Trumpism has already pushed some countries toward China in ways that would have seemed inconceivable a few years ago. Take Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who effectively reversed Japan’s relations with China, from barely hidden hostility to cooperation, during a state visit to Beijing in October 2018, when China and Japan signed over 50 agreements on economic cooperation. Meanwhile, structural factors keep widening the gap between the two global front-runners, China and the United States, and the rest of the world. Already, the two countries’ military spending dwarfs everybody else’s. By 2023, the U.S. defense budget may reach $800 billion, and the Chinese one may exceed $300 billion, whereas no other global power will spend more than $80 billion on its forces. The question, then, is not whether a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order will come to be but what this order will look like. At the top of Beijing’s priorities is a liberal economic order built on free trade. China’s economic transformation over the past decades from an agricultural society to a major global powerhouse—and the world’s second-largest economy—was built on exports. The country has slowly worked its way up the value chain, its exports beginning to compete with those of highly advanced economies. Now as then, these exports are the lifeblood of the Chinese economy: they ensure a consistent trade surplus, and the jobs they create are a vital engine of domestic social stability. There is no indication that this will change in the coming decade. Even amid escalating trade tensions between Beijing and Washington, China’s overall export volume continued to grow in 2018. U.S. tariffs may sting, but they will neither change Beijing’s fundamental incentives nor portend a general turn away from global free trade on its part. Quite to the contrary: because China’s exports are vital to its economic and political success, one should expect Beijing to double down on its attempts to gain and maintain access to foreign markets. This strategic impetus is at the heart of the much-touted Belt and Road Initiative, through which China hopes to develop a vast network of land and sea routes that will connect its export hubs to far-flung markets. As of August 2018, some 70 countries and organizations had signed contracts with China for projects related to the initiative, and this number is set to increase in the coming years. At its 2017 National Congress, the Chinese Communist Party went so far as to enshrine a commitment to the initiative in its constitution—a signal that the party views the infrastructure project as more than a regular foreign policy. China is also willing to further open its domestic markets to foreign goods in exchange for greater access abroad. Just in time for a major trade fair in Shanghai in November 2018—designed to showcase the country’s potential as a destination for foreign goods—China lowered its general tariff from 10.5 percent to 7.8 percent. Given this enthusiasm for the global economy, the image of a revisionist China that has gained traction in many Western capitals is misleading. Beijing relies on a global network of trade ties, so it is loath to court direct confrontation with the United States. Chinese leaders fear—not without reason—that such a confrontation might cut off its access to U.S. markets and lead U.S. allies to band together against China rather than stay neutral, stripping it of important economic partnerships and valuable diplomatic connections. As a result, caution, not assertiveness or aggressiveness, will be the order of the day in Beijing’s foreign policy in the coming years. Even as it continues to modernize and expand its military, China will carefully avoid pressing issues that might lead to war with the United States, such as those related to the South China Sea, cybersecurity, and the weaponization of space. NEW RULES? Indeed, much as Chinese leaders hope to be on par with their counterparts in Washington, they worry about the strategic implications of a bipolar U.S.-Chinese order. American leaders balk at the idea of relinquishing their position at the top of the global food chain and will likely go to great lengths to avoid having to accommodate China. Officials in Beijing, in no hurry to become the sole object of Washington’s apprehension and scorn, would much rather see a multipolar world in which other challenges—and challengers—force the United States to cooperate with China. In fact, the United States’ own rise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provides something of a model for how the coming power transition may take place. Because the United Kingdom, the world’s undisputed hegemon at the time, was preoccupied with fending off a challenger in its vicinity—Germany—it did not bother much to contain the rise of a much bigger rival across the pond. China is hoping for a similar dynamic now, and recent history suggests it could indeed play out. In the early months of George W. Bush’s presidency, for instance, relations between Beijing and Washington were souring over regional disputes in the South China Sea, reaching a boiling point when a Chinese air force pilot died in a midair collision with a U.S. surveillance plane in April 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks a few months later, however, Washington came to see China as a useful strategic partner in its global fight against terrorism, and relations improved significantly over the rest of Bush’s two terms. Today, unfortunately, the list of common threats that could force the two countries to cooperate is short. After 17 years of counterterrorism campaigns, the sense of urgency that once surrounded the issue has faded. Climate change is just as unlikely to make the list of top threats anytime soon. The most plausible scenario is that a new global economic crisis in the coming years will push U.S. and Chinese leaders to shelve their disagreements for a moment to avoid economic calamity—but this, too, remains a hypothetical. To make matters worse, some points of potential conflict are here to stay—chief among them Taiwan. Relations between Beijing and Taipei, already tense, have taken a turn for the worse in recent years. Taiwan’s current government, elected in 2016, has questioned the notion that mainland China and Taiwan form a single country, also known as the “one China” principle. A future government in Taipei might well push for de jure independence. Yet a Taiwanese independence referendum likely constitutes a redline for Beijing and may prompt it to take military action. If the United States were to respond by coming to Taiwan’s aid, a military intervention by Beijing could easily spiral into a full-fledged U.S.-Chinese war. To avoid such a crisis, Beijing is determined to nip any Taiwanese independence aspirations in the bud by political and economic means. As a result, it is likely to continue lobbying third countries to cut off their diplomatic ties with Taipei, an approach it has already taken with several Latin American countries. Cautious or not, China set somewhat different emphases in its approach to norms that undergird the international order. In particular, a more powerful China will push for a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty in international law. In recent years, some have interpreted public statements by Chinese leaders in support of globalization as a sign that Beijing seeks to fashion itself as the global liberal order’s new custodian, yet such sweeping interpretations are wishful thinking: China is merely signaling its support for a liberal economic order, not for ever-increasing political integration. Beijing remains fearful of outside interference, particularly relating to Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, as well as on matters of press freedom and online regulations. As a result, it views national sovereignty, rather than international responsibilities and norms, as the fundamental principle on which the international order should rest. Even as a new superpower in the coming decade, China will therefore pursue a less interventionist foreign policy than the United States did at the apex of its power. Consider the case of Afghanistan: even though it is an open secret that the United States expects the Chinese military to shoulder some of the burden of maintaining stability there after U.S. troops leave the country, the Chinese government has shown no interest in this idea. Increased Chinese clout may also bring attempts to promote a vision of world order that draws on ancient Chinese philosophical traditions and theories of statecraft. One term in particular has been making the rounds in Beijing: wangdao, or “humane authority.” The word represents a view of China as an enlightened, benevolent hegemon whose power and legitimacy derive from its ability to fulfill other countries’ security and economic needs—in exchange for their acquiescence to Chinese leadership.

#### The plan reverses Chinese expansion and decks heg – authoritarianism is the key

Chernin 17 Kelly Chernin, 7-24-2017, "Hong Kong's democratic struggle and the rise of Chinese authoritarianism," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/hong-kongs-democratic-struggle-and-the-rise-of-chinese-authoritarianism-81369, SJBE

In a classic David and Goliath scenario, pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong are struggling to stand up to the Chinese mainland’s increasing control over the territory. Unfortunately for Hong Kong’s democratic movement, it looks like Goliath may have the upper hand. My dissertation research on the 2014 Umbrella Movement shows that despite recent attempts to gain more political momentum, many recent pro-democracy calls to action have struggled in the face of Chinese power and Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing dominated Legislature. In fact, more radical “localist” movements that favor complete separation from China are becoming more common. The [localist movement](http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-localism-20160428-story.html), made up of different and diverse groups, gained popularity in the wake of the [2014 Umbrella Movement](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03068374.2014.994957?src=recsys) in which 100,000 people took to the streets for 79 days to demand universal suffrage. Following the Umbrella Movement, I interviewed the people of Hong Kong on their views on the territory’s political future. A year after the movement, these individuals felt optimistic about the territory’s democratic future. Two years later, people began to lose faith in Hong Kong’s political system. Many of the people I interviewed on my trips in 2015 and 2016 believed the Umbrella Movement remained peaceful because neither the Chinese government nor the people of Hong Kong wanted a repeat of [June 4, 1989 in Tiananmen Square](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03612759.1992.9950736), when the student movement that had lasted for months ended with the deaths of hundreds at the hands of Chinese forces clearing the city square. And at first, localists seemed willing to work within the political system, so long as their elected officials were able to enact policies under “one country, two systems.” But in 2016, violent skirmishes between Hong Kong police and localist activists took place in what was dubbed the “[Fishball Riots](http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1911341/mong-kok-riot-how-hong-kongs-first-night-year-monkey-descended-mayhem).” Although violence has not been the primary goal of recent protests, activists have expressed willingness to use more forceful action if Beijing continues to increase its control. I believe this new wave of protests may potentially lead to more violence. As opposed the Umbrella Movement’s call for universal suffrage, localist groups will likely unite under the rallying cry for independence from the unseen influence of Beijing. One party politics With the expulsion of the six lawmakers this year, the pro-democracy faction of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council no longer has veto power against pro-Beijing politicians. Some of the ousted politicians have announced that they will run for [office again](https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/07/24/ousted-lawmaker-edward-yiu-says-may-consider-running-direct-elections-regain-seat/), but it is unlikely that pro-democratic politicians will ever outnumber their pro-Beijing counterparts. Increasingly, Hong Kong’s government seems to be an extension of Beijing’s one-party rule: a political system in which only the Chinese Communist Party makes decisions. It’s no surprise that China is so eager to reassert its control over the territory. Hong Kong was once considered China’s [“Gateway to the World”](http://www.sunypress.edu/p-5665-lost-in-transition.aspx) and “Asia’s World City.” Yet Hong Kong was also one of the few places that kept the memory of democratic ideas alive in the region. That democratic tradition may be nearing its end. Hong Kong’s democratic traditions, remnants of British colonialism, are being challenged. Under Chinese sovereignty, Hong Kong’s political system is being pushed in the opposite direction favoring more [authoritarian policies](https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/07/24/hong-kong-democrats-must-get-smart-defending-citys-core-values-creeping-authoritarianism/). The yearly [June Fourth candlelight vigils](https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/06/06/donations-tiananmen-vigil-organiser-drop-hk340000-reduced-attendance/), established to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, were once well-attended events. In recent years, interest has dwindled. Younger generations have become more interested in their own causes. A growing number of factions seems to plague Hong Kong’s democratic movement. Hong Kong’s relative autonomy following its 1997 transition out of British rule seemed to signal that the mainland could also experience democratic reform. As both economies flourished, more political freedom seemed possible. Unfortunately, China’s authoritarian system has continued to exert control, thwarting democratic reform in both territories. If the global community does not pay attention, the prospect of a democratic China will continue to slip away. The more attention that is placed on Hong Kong’s current political crisis, the harder it will be for China to overtake the territory’s weakening democratic movement. Hong Kong’s pro-democracy camp cannot stand up to China alone.

#### Chinese hegemony is necessary to global cooperation on existential threats

Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491

As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced. The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance. Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous state in such key areas as global economic governance and climate change. Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics. The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily. All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other civilizations. So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations. Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced. China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.

#### Empirics prove authoritarian China is a credible deterrent – authoritarian military spending prevents war

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China remains an authoritarian communist state, and for two decades has been increasing its¶ military budget by more than ten percent per year. According to the Pentagon’s report on¶ China’s military power, China’s armed forces are designed to “fight and win ‘local wars under¶ conditions of informatization,’ or high-intensity, information-centric regional military operations of¶ short duration,”168 i.e., against the United States. Called “active defense,” Chinese strategy is¶ widely characterized as an “anti-access” strategy in the West, and China is spending large sums¶ to obtain capabilities to prevent U.S. assistance to Taiwan.169 Nuclear weapons play a key role¶ in China’s military strategy of “active defense.”170¶ Chinese nuclear doctrine is hidden by political propaganda, most notably a pledge of “no first¶ use” of nuclear weapons. A careful look at the Chinese wording of its “no first use” policy¶ reveals that it commits China to nothing. 171 The Pentagon report on the Chinese military¶ appears to understate when it says, “there is some ambiguity” concerning China’s first use¶ policy, including attacks on Taiwan and nuclear EMP attacks.172 The Kyodo News Agency¶ reported that it obtained classified Chinese documents which state that China “will adjust [its]¶ nuclear threat policy if a nuclear missile-possessing country carries out a series of air strikes¶ against key strategic targets in our country with absolutely superior conventional weapons…”173¶ (i.e., against the United States). Chinese generals openly threaten nuclear first use against the¶ United States if it comes to the aid of Taiwan.174¶ According to the Pentagon, China is deploying two new ICBMs, the DF-31 and DF-31A;¶ developing a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the JL-2; and building a new type of ballistic missile submarine, at least six of which reportedly will be deployed.175 Taiwan¶ confirmed the reported successful launch of JL-2 SLBMs in December 2011; this development¶ will probably result in the relatively early deployment of these missiles. 176 In 2012, China¶ reportedly tested the DF-41, a large heavily MIRVed ICBM (10 warheads). 177 China is¶ reportedly developing a rail-mobile ICBM.178 There are reports in the Asian press that China plans to deploy 576 MIRV warheads on six submarines.¶ 179¶ China has continued to develop and deploy new nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold¶ War. It conducted large nuclear tests until 1996 and may have conducted covert nuclear tests¶ since its declared testing moratorium in 1996.180 Xue Bencheng, an important Chinese nuclear¶ weapons scientist, characterized the July 1996 Chinese nuclear test as “a great spanning leap”¶ which solved the problem of nuclear weapons miniaturization.181 This test apparently set the¶ stage for the nuclear modernization programs now underway.¶ The U.S. government estimates that China’s nuclear arsenal is a few hundred weapons.182 In¶ 2011, Taiwan’s defense ministry estimated that China’s Second Artillery had between 450 and¶ 500 nuclear weapons.183 The total number of nuclear weapons would, of course, be higher¶ because the Second Artillery does not control the nuclear weapons of the naval or the air forces.¶ Some Russian experts believe China now has one thousand to several thousand nuclear¶ weapons.184 Col-Gen. (ret.) Viktor Yesin, former commander of the Strategic Missile Troops,¶ states, “My estimate of China’s nuclear arsenal today is 1,600 to 1,800 warheads.” 185¶ Irrespective of what the current number is, there is no doubt it will increase.¶ Summary¶ The Minimum Deterrence claim that Russia and China do not constitute plausible threats¶ pertinent to nuclear deterrence and will not do so in the future reflects a hope, **but considerable**¶ **available evidence suggests otherwise**. At a time when the United States is dramatically¶ reducing both defense expenditures and nuclear weapons, Russia and China are doing the¶ opposite. At a time when Minimum Deterrence proposals assert that hostilities between the¶ United States and Russia or China are implausible, both countries are talking and acting on the¶ opposite premise. Hoping that benign relations will prevail for now and the future is reasonable;¶ ignoring or discounting opponents’ expressions of hostility, and instead basing U.S. calculations¶ of deterrence requirements on hope, is not reasonable.

#### Defense-

#### Empirics go neg – most qualified studies disprove hegemonic stability theories.

Fettweis 17 –Christopher J. Fettweis is an American political scientist and the Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace, Security Studies” 26:3, 423-451; EG)

Even the most ardent supporters of the hegemonic-stability explanation do not contend that US influence extends equally to all corners of the globe. The United States has concentrated its policing in what George Kennan used to call “strong points,” or the most important parts of the world: Western Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Persian Gulf.64 By doing so, Washington may well have contributed more to great power peace than the overall global decline in warfare. If the former phenomenon contributed to the latter, by essentially providing a behavioral model for weaker states to emulate, then perhaps this lends some support to the hegemonic-stability case.65 During the Cold War, the United States played referee to a few intra-West squabbles, especially between Greece and Turkey, and provided Hobbesian reassurance to Germany’s nervous neighbors. Other, equally plausible explanations exist for stability in the first world, including the presence of a common enemy, democracy, economic interdependence, general war aversion, etc. The looming presence of the leviathan is certainly among these plausible explanations, but only inside the US sphere of influence. Bipolarity was bad for the nonaligned world, where Soviet and Western intervention routinely exacerbated local conflicts. Unipolarity has generally been much better, **but whether or not this was due to US action is again unclear.** Overall US interest in the affairs of the Global South has dropped markedly since the end of the Cold War, as has the level of violence in almost all regions. There is less US intervention in the political and military affairs of Latin America compared to any time in the twentieth century, for instance, and also less conflict. Warfare in Africa is at an all-time low, as is relative US interest outside of counterterrorism and security assistance.66 **Regional peace and stability exist where there is US active intervention, as well as where there is not**. No direct relationship seems to exist across regions. If intervention can be considered a function of direct and indirect activity, of both political and military action, a regional picture might look like what is outlined in Table 1. These assessments of conflict are by necessity relative, because there has not been a “high” level of conflict in any region outside the Middle East during the period of the New Peace. Putting aside for the moment that important caveat, some points become clear. The great powers of the world are clustered in the upper right quadrant, where US intervention has been high, but conflict levels low. **US intervention is imperfectly correlated with stability, however. Indeed, it is conceivable that the relatively high level of US interest and activity has made the security situation in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East worse.** In recent years, substantial hard power investments (Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq), moderate intervention (Libya), and reliance on diplomacy (Syria) have been equally ineffective in stabilizing states torn by conflict. While it is possible that the region is essentially unpacifiable and no amount of police work would bring peace to its people, it remains hard to make the case that the US presence has improved matters. **In this “strong point,” at least, US hegemony has failed to bring peace.** In much of the rest of the world, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Washington’s intervention choices have at best been erratic; Libya and Kosovo brought about action, but much more blood flowed uninterrupted in Rwanda, Darfur, Congo, Sri Lanka, and Syria. The US record of peacemaking is not exactly a long uninterrupted string of successes. During the turn-of-the-century conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a highlevel US delegation containing former and future National Security Advisors (Anthony Lake and Susan Rice) made a half-dozen trips to the region, but was unable to prevent either the outbreak or recurrence of the conflict. Lake and his team shuttled back and forth between the capitals with some frequency, and President Clinton made repeated phone calls to the leaders of the respective countries, offering to hold peace talks in the United States, all to no avail.67 The war ended Table 1. Post-Cold War US intervention and violence by region. High Violence Low Violence High US Intervention Middle East Europe South and Central Asia Pacific Rim North America Low US Intervention Africa South America Former Soviet Union in late 2000 when Ethiopia essentially won, and it controls the disputed territory to this day. The Horn of Africa is hardly the only region where states are free to fight one another today without fear of serious US involvement. Since they are choosing not to do so with increasing frequency, something else is probably affecting their calculations. Stability exists even in those places where the potential for intervention by the sheriff is minimal. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. It seems hard to make the case that the relative peace that has descended on so many regions is primarily due to the kind of heavy hand of the neoconservative leviathan, or its lighter, more liberal cousin. Something else appears to be at work.

#### Power transitions cause retrenchment and peace, not war.

MacDonald and Parent, PhDs in Political Science, 20

(Paul K., Columbia, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, and Joseph M., Columbia, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, The Authors Respond, *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 20(2): 176-179) BW

How do great powers respond to decline? Do they tend to embrace policies that raise the risk of war with rising challengers? These were the core questions that we set out to answer in our book Twilight of the Titans. We focused on these questions because there is a growing consensus among many policymakers and pundits that shifts in relative power are particularly perilous. In an influential 2015 Atlantic Monthly article, for example, the political scientist Graham Allison argued that “war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not” (Allison 2015; 2017). In 2017, Allison reportedly briefed these findings, which are derived from his accounting of sixteen historical power transitions, to Trump’s National Security Council (Crowley 2017). For better or worse, academic arguments about rising and falling powers are helping to shape contemporary Sino-American relations. Probably for worse, because the marquee finding in our book is that power transition theory is wrong. Ordinal transitions between rising and declining powers tend to be less—rather than more—conflict prone. The main reason why this is the case is because great powers tend to respond to decline not by lashing out against their rising rivals, but by adopting policies of strategic retrenchment. These policies do not always work, and different structural conditions can make it easier or harder for declining powers to use retrenchment to effectively manage decline. Yet to the extent that hawks in the United States are drawing on power transition theory to advocate for “confronting” a rising China or for a strategy of “great power competition,” these policy recommendations are based on flimsy intellectual foundations. We appreciate the care with which all three of the reviewers have engaged with the arguments and evidence we present in our book. All three seem to accept the basic conclusion: that the impending Sino-American power transition may be turbulent, but that conflict is less likely than not. Yet there are some important areas of dispute. One concerns what the chief source of grand strategy is and how that will affects great power relations. Along with Robert Ross, we tend to rely on structural material factors, while David Kang and Ketian Zhang rely more on domestic and/or non-material factors. The other concerns how conflictual the rise of China will be. Ironically, although we tend to share Ross’s analytical focus on systemic factors, we reach a much more optimistic conclusion about the extent to which conditions in the Asia-Pacific are “ripe for rivalry” (Friedberg 1993). Let us start with the question of what shapes grand strategy. Our book follows realist theory and argues that actors in international politics, typically states, are primarily interested in their security and survival. This is precisely why states tend to be alarmed by relative decline, because it exposes them to potential harm. Yet beyond this simple and spare assumption, we accept that states can define their security needs in a wide variety of ways, and that culture, history, and domestic politics can matter a great deal in how they do so. Here we are in complete agreement with Kang that one should not “unproblematically assume that all states are the same in the contemporary world.” He is absolutely right to be frustrated that international relations scholars know much more about European than Asian history, a regrettable legacy of imperialism and the Cold War, which is getting better too slowly. We accept that China’s conception of its security needs and its role in the Asia-Pacific region will inevitably be shaped by cultural and historical legacies, the same way that Britain’s tradition of “splendid isolation” or French conceptions of “grandeur” influenced their grand strategic responses in the cases we explore in our book. Indeed, although our research finds that shifts in relative power are among the most important factors shaping great power grand strategies, we note that the correlation is imperfect. States routinely retrench less than we expect given the depth of their declines, to highlight one notable exception (pp. 53–55). The question for contemporary US–Chinese relations is the extent to which historical or cultural differences override structural conditions or make it simply impossible to compare cases of rising and declining powers. Here we disagree with Kang that China’s experience is not just distinctive, but fundamentally sui generis. It may be true that “the historical East Asian system was hegemonic,” and that as a result, Chinese foreign policy was traditionally oriented more towards monitoring hierarchic relationships rather than managing shifts in the balance of power. Yet British grand strategy was likewise obsessed with questions of imperial management, while the expansion and contraction of contested frontiers were central preoccupations of Russian grand strategy. Similarly, it may well be the case that East Asian history highlights “the dangers of internal challenges rather than external threats.” Yet French policymakers grappled with a rising Germany amidst a contested transition from royalism to republicanism, while domestic unrest and parliamentary protest provided a fatal backdrop for late-tsarist responses to decline. Great powers are inevitably preoccupied with a range of competing concerns—external threats, imperial entanglements, domestic difficulties—all of which are impacted by decline in different ways to varying degrees. Zhang’s core contention is that the making of grand strategy is more complex than we allow for in the book. She notes that there are multiple ways to measure “rising” and “declining,” that grand strategies are sometimes too complex to capture with a single word such as “retrenchment,” and that diplomatic or economic interests can often trump security concerns. We acknowledge all of these points and do our best to defend our choices in the text. We choose one way to measure decline (relative great power share of GDP) and focus on a particular moment of decline (five year windows around an ordinal transition) not because these are the only measures or moments that matter, but because they match those of power transition theorists and are easiest to implement (pp. 5–6, 45–48). We classify and compare grand strategies based on their relative ambition—do they trend towards expansion or retrenchment—not because this is the only or necessarily the best way to think about grand strategy, but because questions of the bearing burdens and managing costs tend to be particularly salient during moments of decline (pp. 6–9, 48–50). Zhang is certainly correct that there are broader shifts in the character of international politics that may mute our findings. Perhaps globalization has fundamentally transformed the boundaries in which great power competition can take place, thereby rendering the concerns of power transition theorists obsolete (nuclear weapons, international institutions, and the spread of democracy are often cited as having a similar pacifying effect). We try to account for this in our discussion of the “conquest calculus”: when it is harder for states to profit from using force, they will be less likely to choose preventive war in response to decline (pp. 70–71). Yet many of our cases of decline come from nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe, when these pacifying forces were relatively weak, and yet great powers still tended to favor retrenchment over war (pp. 40–41, 191–192). Even in familiar and favorable cases, the evidence in favor of power transition theory is thin. Now that trade networks, international institutions, democracy, and nuclear weapons have remade the global landscape, the implications of our argument tend to be more optimistic. Decline is not destiny, and great powers have considerable latitude to manage power transitions using retrenchment, even in seemingly unfavorable circumstances. We were surprised, therefore, that Ross finds our account “especially pessimistic” about the future of Sino-American relations. Ross is right that some of the conditions we emphasize may make the United States reluctant to retrench, notably the United States’ unwillingness to surrender preeminence and the apparent absence of regional allies who are willing or able to balance against a rising China. Nevertheless, there are other conditions that appear to favor accommodation and retrenchment: vast distances separate the two biggest powers; the conquest calculus appears to favor the defense; American security commitments are relatively independent, easing worries about falling dominos; and the United States is falling gradually, which leaves time for experimentation and for reforms to bear fruit (pp. 197–198). We concur with Ross’s observation about the importance of geography, which can mute incentives to use force and provide opportunities for retrenchment (pp. 39–41). Still, we think these opportunities are not unique to maritime environments. In the 1880s, the vast and dispersed character of Russia’s imperial commitments provided it with opportunities to pull back from exposed frontiers while reinforcing key strongpoints. Declining powers often see retrenchment not as a strategy that sacrifices security, but as a means to bolster deterrence and protect vital interests.

If so, then the United States was wise to reorient its defense priorities and devote an increasing share of its resources to the Pacific. As for applications, we would like to consider two: balancing and signaling. Kang builds the case that Asian states are not balancing against China because China is not a threat, is working to reassure its neighbors, and by implication does not much threaten the United States. In contrast, we believe that Kang is excessively optimistic about the intensity of the security dilemma in Asia. At root, balance of power theory proposes that, in a self-help world, great powers generally balance against each other mostly by strengthening their own capabilities; for weaker actors, however, their behaviors are more variable. This is exactly what Kang’s Figure 1 shows and exactly what American policymakers fear: China balancing against the United States and most Asian states failing to balance against China. This has led to a rebalancing of US forces to the Asia-Pacific and increasingly fraught relations between the two superpowers. Moreover, and rather than being a sui generis feature of East Asia, this trend is also consistent with historical practice. Our data suggest that rising powers tend to increase defense spending at a faster rate than other great powers, but that they also tend to negotiate more alliance agreements and to get involved in fewer militarized disputes (pp. 64–66). Rising powers often invest in and modernize their militaries, yet also go out of their way to reassure their neighbors. This is a classic balance of power dynamic: great power poles repel each other as weaker states caught in between are generally swept into one orbit or another. Oddly enough, this allows us to close on an ungloomy note. Zhang has pervasive worries about signaling. What if kindness is mistaken for weakness and US defensive measures signal a lack of resolve? We hope our work can dampen some of these anxieties. Over more than a century, the complexities of power and statecraft have changed. In markedly worse circumstances than those in the contemporary Asia-Pacific, great powers have risen and fallen, made contradictory statements, and pursued contradictory policies, yet across many measures, and controlling for many confounding factors, moments of power transition have tended to be peaceful. For all their manifest imperfections, great powers generally sense power trends accurately, and exchange signals as intended, which has powerfully contributed to peace. While this is no reason for complacency—deterrence can break down, reassurance can fail, historical legacies can cast long shadows—it is no reason for undue alarm either. Contra Allison, the United States and China are not trapped in the same old story of war and change; they remain coauthors of their future.