## 1

#### Independent African satellite constellation key to push out foreign, Chinese investment – which kills African democracy

Tuerk 20 Tuerk, Miriam. CEO and cofounder of Clear Blue Technologies Inc."Africa Is The Next Frontier For The Internet." Forbes, 8 June 2020, www.forbes.com/sites/miriamtuerk/2020/06/09/africa-is-the-next-frontier-for-the-internet/?sh=1f5e9eec4900.

Expanding network connectivity across sub-Saharan Africa will open up digital services that many of us now take for granted. Mobile Banking, Whatsapp Chatting and video, e-health, e-education are key services only possible with reliable internet connectivity. For a geographically disparate population, it will mean greater access to essential services, including e-agri services. There are hugely populous cities in sub-Saharan Africa – Lagos in Nigeria is one of the fastest growing cities in the world – but even in the center on Victoria Island, the internet connection can be patchy and face frequent outages. For those populations, access to the internet means being able to save, invest and borrow money, getting an education, having access to basic healthcare, and being able to trade with bigger markets; are all fundamental to socioeconomic advancement. That has been a powerful force fueling economic growth over the past century across Europe, North America and Asia. The Demand Is There There is a lot of pent-up demand for internet services in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, a substantial portion of mobile phones have internet and messaging capabilities. Mobile usage in sub-Saharan is more widespread than electricity – in 2016, The Economist found that while less than half the population has access to electricity, two-fifths own a mobile phone. In a Pew Research survey of six sub-Saharan Africa countries, a median of 41% used the internet occasionally or had access to an internet-capable smartphone – that compares to 89% of Americans. Digital innovations have also taken off quickly in sub-Saharan Africa, partly because the younger demographic is more ready for adoption of new technologies. Compared to aging populations in developed countries, the median age in Africa is 19.2 years old. In a study by Pew Research, it notes that adults younger than 30 in six sub-Saharan African countries are more likely to use the Internet, echoing trends seen elsewhere. We’ve seen this in the quick adoption of digital technologies. Safaricom, Kenya’s largest telecom operator, has seen widespread adoption of its mobile payment app, M-Pesa, since it was launched in 2007. The app now has 24.5 million users, representing over 70% of the mobile money market in Kenya, and can be used to send and receive funds via SMS without having a bank account. The Supply Is Growing, But Still Faces Bottlenecks There are a number of mobile carriers now seeking to expand network coverage in Africa, especially in rural areas. Governments are pushing for these infrastructure roll outs as they recognize that communications and renewable energy are two key tenets of development for their countries. Telecom technology over the past decade has advanced significantly, with specialized product development to address the needs of Rural telecom particularly in terms of the off-grid renewable energy, resilience to extreme temperatures, and software driven base stations meaning that masts can placed almost anywhere. The wider need for infrastructure development in telecom and renewable energy is well recognized. The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimates that the continent of Africa will need investment of at least US$130 billion to $170 billion annually. In recent years, the majority of that capital investment into African infrastructure has come from China – foreign direct investment from China has grown 40% annually over the past decade, and it could be even higher, dwarfing investment from other economic partners, including the U.S. ZAMBIA CHINA A pedestrian runs past a Huawei Technologies Co. mural painted on a wall in Lusaka, Zambia, on ... [+] © 2018 Bloomberg Finance LP Huawei, ZTE and China Telecom CHA 0.0% have all made in-roads into the region. Huawei recently announced that it was launching a 5G transport network with Rain in South Africa, the first network operator in the country to deploy 5G. Huawei’s growth in the region has raised concerns that it could be used for surveillance; The Wall Street Journal reported last year that technicians from the company helped African governments to spy on their political opponents. At the same time, Western companies such as Vanu and Parallel Wireless are developing innovative solutions and products. While growth in technology is overall a good thing for society, it cannot come at the cost of democracy. Western governments need to do more to invest in African telecoms to secure the future of this region and our economic relationships with it.

#### Expansion in Africa escalates absent democratic relations

Maru 19 - a scholar of peace and security, law and governance, strategy and management, human rights and migration issues. (Mehari, “A new cold war in Africa” Aljazeera. July 1, 2019. DOA: November 17, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/cold-war-africa-190630102044847.html)//MGalian

Increasing tensions between China and the US will be detrimental to African prosperity and peace. Last week, the 12th US-Africa Business Summit, a high-level event attended by 11 African heads of state and government and some 1,000 business leaders, was held in Maputo, Mozambique. During the three-day event, US officials unveiled a $60bn investment agency which will seek to invest in low and middle-income countries, with a special focus on Africa. The announcement came six months after National Security Advisor John Bolton presented the Trump administration's "New Africa Strategy". According to the document: "Great power competitors, namely China and Russia, are rapidly expanding their financial and political influence across Africa. They are deliberately and aggressively targeting their investments in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States." Although both China and Russia are mentioned, over the past few months, the US has demonstrated that it is mainly concerned about the former. In fact, it already appears that Africa is set to become yet another battleground for the escalating trade war between Beijing and Washington. With increasing foreign military presence and growing diplomatic tensions, the continent is already witnessing the first signs of an emerging new cold war. And just like the previous one devastated Africa, fuelling wars and forcing African governments to make economic choices not in their best interests, this one will also be detrimental to African development and peace. Economic war China's approach to Africa has always been trade oriented. The continent became one of the top destinations for Chinese investment after Beijing introduced the so-called "Go Out" policy in 1999 which encouraged private and state-owned business to seek economic opportunities abroad. As a result, Chinese trade with Africa has increased 40-fold over the past two decades; in 2017, it stood at $140bn. Between 2003 and 2017, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have also jumped more close to 60-fold to $4bn a year; FDI stocks stand at $43bn - a significant part of which has gone to infrastructure and energy projects. China has significantly expanded African railways, investing in various projects in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Angola and Nigeria; it is currently building a massive hydropower plant in Angola and have built Africa's longest railway connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti; it has built the headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa and the West African regional bloc ECOWAS in Abuja. By contrast, for a long time the US has viewed Africa as a battlefield where it can confront its enemies, whether the Soviets during the Cold War, terrorists after 9/11 or now the Chinese. Washington has never really made a concerted effort to develop its economic relations with the continent. As a result, trade between the US and Africa has decreased from $120bn in 2012 to just over $50bn today. US FDI flows have also slumped from $9.4bn in 2009 to around $330m in 2017. The new $60bn investment fund announced last week is a welcome initiative from the US but it will not be able to challenge Chinese economic presence on the continent. Just last year Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged $60bn too but dedicated it solely to investment in Africa. The US has repeatedly accused China of using "debt to hold states in Africa captive to [its] wishes and demands" and has warned African states to avoid Chinese "debt diplomacy" which is supposedly incompatible with the independence of African nations and civil society and poses "a significant threat to US national security interests". Yet, Africa is only the fourth-biggest recipient of Chinese FDI after Europe (mainly Germany, UK and Netherlands), the Americas (mainly the US and Canada), and Asia. The US has also borrowed heavily from China; currently its debt to its rival stands at $1.12 trillion. By contrast, Africa owes China around $83bn. Africans are fully aware of and concerned about high indebtedness, trade imbalances, the relatively poor quality of Chinese goods and services and Beijing's application of lower standards of labour and environmental practices. But many do not share the American perspective that their economic relationship with China is to their detriment and rather see it as an opportunity that provides much-needed unconditional funding and that takes into account local priorities. As Djibouti's President Ismail Omar Guelleh has pointed out, "The reality is that no one but the Chinese offers a long-term partnership." The pressure the US is currently exerting on African countries to move away from partnerships with China could hurt African economies. It could force African countries into making choices that are not in their best economic interests and miss out on important development projects or funding. Meanwhile, the US-China trade war is already affecting the continent. According to the African Development Bank, it could cause as much as a 2.5 percent decrease in GDP for resource-intensive African economies and a 1.9 percent dip for oil-exporting countries. Militarisation The escalating tensions between the US and China could also end up threatening the security of the continent**.** Both countries are militarily involved in Africa. Over the past 15 years, the Chinese People's Liberation Army has been engaged in a number of security missions across the continent, making modest auxiliary troop contributions to peacekeeping operations in Sudan, South Sudan, Liberia, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It has also contributed millions of dollars of peacekeeping equipment to the African Union Mission in Somalia and provided significant funding to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development for its mediation in South Sudan. In 2017, the first Chinese overseas military base was opened in Djibouti. The facility, which currently hosts some 400 staff and troops, and has the capacity to accommodate 10,000, is officially supposed to provide support for the ongoing anti-piracy operations of the Chinese navy, but it also plays a role in securing maritime routes, part of the Belt and Road Initiative. There has also been speculation that this is the first of a number of planned bases meant to secure Chinese interests in Africa. China's military presence in Africa, however, pales in comparison to that of the US. Over the past few years, US Africa Command has run some 36 different military operations in 13 African countries, including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan and Tunisia. It has more than 7,000 troops deployed on the continent. It has a large base in Djibouti - the biggest and only permanent US military base in Africa - but it also runs at least 34 other military outposts scattered across the west, east and north of the continent where US troops are deployed and military operations (including drone attacks) are launched from. The US also directly supports the armies of Egypt, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger and others as well as the G5 Sahel force tasked with counterterrorism. While a direct confrontation between US and Chinese forces in Africa is unlikely, their growing presence is becoming an increasingly destabilising factor. Already Washington's strategy to contain Chinese influence over Africa is playing out at different conflict and social upheaval hotspots across the continent. The fallout of the US-Chinese competition is particularly apparent in the strategic Red Sea region, through which passes one of the most important maritime routes. Countries in the region are not only feeling growing US and Chinese pressure to take one side or the other, but are also increasingly exposed to outside interference by various regional powers. Growing regional tensions Djibouti has recently found itself at the centre of US-Chinese diplomatic confrontation. Being a host to military bases of both superpowers, the small country has had to play a difficult balancing game. In 2018, Djibouti seized control of its Doraleh Container Terminal from the Emirati company DP World, claiming its operation of the facility was threatening its sovereignty. The Djibouti authorities had feared that the UAE's investment in the nearby Port of Berbera in the autonomous Somali region of Somaliland could challenge its position as the main maritime hub for Ethiopia's large economy. Its decision to terminate the contract with DP World, however, triggered a sharp reaction from Washington, a close Emirati ally. The Trump administration fears that Djibouti could hand over control of the terminal to China. Bolton has warned: "Should this occur, the balance of power in the Horn of Africa - astride major arteries of maritime trade between Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia - would shift in favour of China. And, our US military personnel at Camp Lemonnier could face even further challenges in their efforts to protect the American people." Djibouti was forced to declare publicly that it would not allow China to take over the terminal but that has not assuaged US fears. Ever since, the US sought to secure a possible alternative location for its African military base: neighbouring Eritrea. It encouraged regional actors, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to pull Eritrea out of its decades-long isolation. In a matter of months, long-time enemies Ethiopia and Eritrea concluded a peace agreement to end their 20-year-old cold conflict, while the UN lifted sanctions on Asmara. As a result, Eritrea could emerge as a strategic rival to Djibouti, offering its coast for foreign military and economic facilities. The UAE, for example, has already set up a military base near the port of Assab. Sudan, to the north, has also been the battleground of the ongoing superpower turf war. China had been a long-term supporter of President Omar al-Bashir. Under his rule, Beijing came to dominate its oil industry, buying some 80 percent of its oil and thus providing Khartoum with much-needed cash to wage war against various rebel groups. It was also one of the few countries, along with Russia, that would break the UN arms embargo and sell weapons to al-Bashir's regime. After South Sudan gained independence in 2011, China continued to be a close partner of the Sudanese regime, remaining its main trading partner. Sudan in fact became the biggest beneficiary of the $60bn Africa investment package China pledged in 2018, having some $10bn in Chinese debt written off. The Chinese government also made a lot of plans to develop facilities in Port Sudan, where it already operates an oil terminal. Qatar and Turkey also signed deals with al-Bashir for various facilities in the port city. When mass protests erupted in December last year, Beijing stood by al-Bashir, who it saw as the main guarantor of stability in the country, which falls on strategic routes, part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, the US had repeatedly demonstrated that it did not want al-Bashir running for another term. His removal was approved in Washington, which has since appeared to back the interests of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the country. The two Gulf states currently hope to install another strongman sympathetic to their regional politics, who would maintain Sudan's participation in the war in Yemen and curb Turkish and Qatari influence. At this point, it seems China is at risk of being sidelined by the significant sway the UAE and Saudi Arabia have with Sudan's Transitional Military Council (TMC). Apart from Djibouti and Sudan, various other countries in the region have felt the consequences of the US bid to contain China. This political confrontation has also added to the already rising tensions between other players in the region, including Egypt, Gulf countries, Iran and Turkey. The Trump administration has particularly favoured Emirati, Saudi and Egyptian interests which have emboldened these three countries in their efforts to shape regional dynamics to their advantage. Thus, in the long-term, given the pre-existing faultlines and conflicts in the region, the US-China cold war could have a detrimental effect, not only on its economy but also on its security. At this point, to preserve its interests and its peace, Africa has only one option: to reject pressures to swear allegiance to either of the two powers. African countries should uphold their sovereignty in policy and decision-making and pursue the course that is in the best interests of their nations. If the US wants to compete with China on the continent, it should do so in good faith. It can gain a competitive advantage by offering African countries better, more credible and principled alternatives to those put forward by China. But that can only happen if the US develops a strategy that focuses on Africa itself, not on containing and undermining the business of a third party.

#### Instability causes global war

**Mead 13** – (Walter Russell, Foreign Affairs Prof @ Bard, “Peace In The Congo? Why The World Should Care”, American Interest; http://www.the-american-interest.com/2013/12/15/peace-in-the-congo-why-the-world-should-care/)

The Congo war should be a reminder to us all that the foundations of our world are **dynamite**, and that the potential for **new conflicts** on the scale of the **horrific** **wars of the 20th century** is very much **with us** **today.** The second lesson from this conflict stems from the realization of how much patience and commitment from the international community (which in this case included the Atlantic democracies and a coalition of African states working as individual countries and through various international institutions) it has taken to get this far towards peace. Particularly at a time when many Americans want the US to turn inwards, there are people who make the argument that it is really none of America’s business to invest time and energy in the often thankless task of solving these conflicts. That might be an ugly but defensible position if we didn’t live in such a tinderbox world. Someone could rationally say, yes, it’s terrible that a million plus people are being killed overseas in a horrific conflict, but the war is really very far away and America has urgent needs at home and we should husband the resources we have available for foreign policy on things that have more power to affect us directly. The problem is that **these wars spread**. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to **spread to places** that we do care **very much about**. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a **very remote place** triggers problems in places that we **care about** very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or trigger wider conflict with India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends. Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is **of** **more** **importance** to American security than many people may **understand**. The line between **Africa and the Middle** **East is** a **soft** one. The weak states that straddle the **southern approaches** of the Sahara are **ideal petri dishes** for **A**l **Q**aeda **type groups** to form and attract local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries potential **access to funds**, **fighters**, **training** and **weapons** from the Middle East. A war in the eastern Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to **create the swirling underworld** of **arms trading**, **money transfers**, **illegal commerce** and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us. This is why the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations (representing three very different kinds of American politics) have all been engaged in efforts like the peace keeping effort in the Congo. It is why, despite our budget problems at home and despite our often justifiable impatience with the complexities of dealing with international coalitions and the inadequacies of international institutions, we need to continue the slow and painstaking work that makes agreements like this one possible. The world we live in is an **explosive** one. There are **all kinds of things that can go horribly wrong**, and what happens in one corner of the world doesn’t necessarily stay there. Reducing the danger requires an active, global American foreign policy whether we like it or not. The potential for new communal and religious wars that kill millions of people and endanger American security and world peace is very real. The world seems safer than the world of the 1930s and 1940s in part because the United States and many of our friends and allies are working quietly around the world to contain outbreaks of violence, address the issues that exacerbate hatred and distrust, and in the last analysis are willing to provide the security guarantees and deterrents that prevent mass mayhem.

## 2

#### Interpretation: Appropriation of outer space” by private entities refers to the exercise of exclusive control of space.

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Violation: Megaconstellations do not appropriate – reject non-legal interpretations

Johnson 20 [Chris Johnson is the Space Law Advisor for Secure World Foundation and has nine years of professional experience in international space law and policy. He has authored and co-authored publications on international space law, national space legislation, international cooperation in space, human-robotic cooperative space exploration, and on the societal benefits of space technology for Africa. "The Legal Status of MegaLEO Constellations and Concerns About Appropriation of Large Swaths of Earth Orbit." https://swfound.org/media/206951/johnson2020\_referenceworkentry\_thelegalstatusofmegaleoconstel.pdf]

No, This Is Not Impermissible Appropriation

An opposite conclusion can also be reasonably arrived at when approached along the following lines. The counter argument would assert that the deployment and operation of these global constellations, such as SpaceX’s Starlink, OneWeb, Kepler, etc., are aligned with and in full conformity with the laws applicable to outer space. These constellations are merely the exercise and enjoyment of the freedom of exploration and use of outer space and do not constitute any impermissible appropriation of the orbits that they transit.

Freedom of Access and Use Permits Constellations

Rather than being a violation of other’s rights to access and explore outer space, the deployment of these constellations is more correctly viewed as the exercise and enjoyment of the right to access and use outer space. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes a right to access and use space without discrimination.

Not allowing an actor to deploy spacecraft, regardless of their number or destination, would be infringing with the exercise of their freedom. It would be discriminatory. Additionally, actors do not need permission from any other State, or group of States, to access and explore outer space.

Aligned with the Intentions of the Outer Space Treaty

This use of outer space by constellations in LEO, while not explicitly mentioned by the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty or other space law, actually is the fulfillment of their visions for the use of outer space. The preamble to the Outer Space Treaty (which contains the subject matter and purpose of the treaty and can be used for interpreting the operative articles of the treaty) speaks of the aspirations of humanity in exploring and using outer space. It is easy to see constellations that will provide Internet access to the world as fulfilling the visions of the drafters:

The States Parties to this Treaty, Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development, Desiring to contribute to broad international cooperation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that such cooperation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples, As such, subsequent article of the Outer Space Treaty should be read in a permissive light, as permitting constellations, rather than a restrictive light which only sees potential negative aspects of constellations. Due Regard and Harmful Contamination Will be Addressed

Operators in LEO are well aware of the challenges to space sustainability that their constellations will pose and will be taking efforts to mitigate the creation of debris. OneWeb is keenly focused on space sustainability and has even argued that the current norm, whereby spacecraft are not in space for longer than 25 years and are deorbited from lower orbits at the end of their lifetime (aka post mission disposal), is not sufficient to keep outer space clean and that shorter lifespan limits should be imposed on operators, especially operators in LEO, and operators of small satellites.

Additionally, these systems will be able to cooperate with emerging space safety and space traffic management plans and can operate in ways that do not restrict or impinge on other users of the space domain. Because due regard is therefore displayed for the space domain, and to the interests of others, these constellations do not prejudice or infringe upon the freedoms of use and exploration of the space domain and are therefore not occupation, or possession, much less appropriation.

This Does Not Constitute Possession, or Ownership, or Occupation

The use of LEO by satellite constellations is substantially similar to the use of GSO, and therefore permissible. In each region, individual actors are given permission - either from a national administrator or from an international governing body (the ITU) via a national administer–to use precoordinated subsections of space. In a way that is overwhelmingly similar to the use of orbital slots in GSO, the placement of spacecraft into orbits in LEO or higher orbits does not constitute possession, ownership, or occupation of those orbits. This is because States (and their companies) have been occupying orbital slots in GSO for decades, and these uses of GSO have never been accused of “appropriating” GSO. The users have never claimed to be appropriating GSO, and their exercising of rights to use GSO is respected by other actors in the space domain. This is the same situation for other orbits, including LEO and other non-Geostationary orbits.

And while GSO locations are relatively stable (subject to space weather and other perturbations, and require stationkeeping), spacecraft in LEO are actually moving through space and are not stationary, so it is even more difficult to see this use by constellations as occupation, much less appropriation. Moreover, Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Traffic Management (STM) will allow other uses to use these orbits, and nothing about the use of any one user necessarily precludes others. Lastly, there is no intention by operators of constellations to exclusively occupy, must less possess or appropriate, these orbits. Would not the appropriation of outer space be an intentional, volutional act? No such intention can be found in the operators of global constellations.

#### Standards:

#### 1] Precision outweighs – non-topical affs violate tournament rules so the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote on them and it controls the internal to pragmatic offense in a question of models.

#### 2] Predictable limits—including temporary occupation is a limits disaster—any aff about a single spaceship, satellite, or weapon would be T because they temporarily occupy space. Limits explodes neg prep and draws unreciprocal lines of debate.

#### 3] TVA – defend debris like strake – that’s what the core concern about megaconstellations are and is permanent.

#### Fairness is a voter—it’s a gateway issue to the ballot.

#### Drop the debater to deter future abuse.

#### CI- Reasonability is arbitrary and we don’t know the brightline while prepping. Collapses since it uses an offense/defense paradigm to win it.

#### No RVIs- A] Illogical- you don’t win for being fair B] Encourages baiting theory which proliferates abuse C] Chills checking abuse for fear of the RVI

## 3

#### Xi is tightening control over the PLA but completing goals are critical.

Krishnan 21 – Ananth, 11/18/21, [‘Xi tightened control over the PLA’, TheHindu, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/xi-tightened-control-over-the-pla/article37549460.ece>] Justin

The new resolution on history passed last week by China’s ruling Communist Party has said that President Xi Jinping had tightened control over the military to address the party’s “obviously lacking” leadership of the armed forces under his predecessors.

The full text of the resolution, released on Tuesday evening, listed some of the actions taken by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under Mr. Xi, who is also the chairman of the Central Military Commission. These included what the document described as “major operations related to border defence”.

No specifics

It did not specify what those major operations were. China has unresolved land borders with India and Bhutan. In April 2020, the PLA mobilised two divisions and carried out multiple transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, sparking the worst crisis along the border in many years. Talks to resolve the tensions are still on-going.

“The armed forces have remained committed to carrying out military struggles in a flexible manner to counter military provocations by external forces, and they have created a strong deterrent against separatist activities seeking ‘Taiwan independence,’” the resolution said.

“They have conducted major operations related to border defence, protecting China’s maritime rights, countering terrorism and maintaining stability, disaster rescue and relief, fighting COVID-19, peacekeeping and escort services, humanitarian assistance, and international military cooperation.”

Last week’s resolution on history was only third such document putting forth the official view on party history, following resolutions passed by Mao Zedong in 1945 and Deng Xiaoping in 1981.

The new resolution dealt more with the future than the past. It essentially reaffirmed the official view on history, saying that the “basic points and conclusions” of past resolutions “remain valid to this day.”

It repeated the conclusion reached in 1981 on Mao’s errors noting that “mistakes were made” and that “Mao Zedong’s theoretical and practical errors concerning class struggle in a socialist society became increasingly serious” leading to the disasters of the Cultural Revolution.

Criticism of predecessors

Much of the new resolution focuses on emphasising Mr. Xi’s leadership and calling for the party to support his “core” status. It only briefly mentioned Mr. Xi’s predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and implicitly critcised some aspects of their leadership including on military matters.

“For a period of time, the party’s leadership over the military was obviously lacking,” it noted. “If this problem had not been completely solved, it would not only have diminished the military’s combat capacity, but also undermined the key political principle that the party commands the gun.”

The document said Mr. Xi’s leadership had tightened supervision on the military including boosting “troop training and battle preparedness”, and it repeated China’s stated goals of completing the modernisation of its armed forces by 2035 and building a “world class” military by 2050, which observers see as meaning on par with the U.S.

‘Working vigorously’

“To build strong people’s armed forces, it is of paramount importance to uphold the fundamental principle and system of absolute party leadership over the military, to ensure that supreme leadership and command authority rest with the party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC), and to fully enforce the system of the CMC chairman assuming overall responsibility,” the resolution said, adding that “setting their sights on this problem, the Central Committee and the CMC have worked vigorously to govern the military with strict discipline in every respect.”

#### Megaconstellations are part of China’s core space agenda, is seen as their greatest opportunity to compete with the West, and is a national priority – the private sector is key and the plan is a 180

**Jones, 21** (Ash Jones, 4-27-2021, accessed on 1-23-2022, Industry Europe, "China's plans for a 13,000 satellite megaconstellation", https://industryeurope.com/sectors/aerospace-defence/china-s-plans-for-a-13-000-satellite-megaconstellation/)azhang

by Ash Jones 27 April 2021 14:00 China has announced plans to oversee and construct a megaconstellation - used for sending satellite internet services - made up of a little under 13,000 satellites through a coordinated effort involving many of the country's key space players. Satellites are used to project networks across the globe; pictured is an artists' rendition of a global satellite internet network. Credit: ESA Plans for this have been publicly known since at least October 2020, when analysts predicted the Chinese state would move to create a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellation to compete with major western rivals such as Amazon, OneWeb and SpaceX. Read more: NASA & California partner on methane-mapping satellite project Recent comments by Chinese state officials suggest it may already make use of existing satellite infrastructure, potentially forming part of the larger "Guoweng" network, part of its idea for a national internet network. These have come as a boost to previous plans for similar networks made last year. SpaceNews reported on April 21 that spectrum filings were submitted to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) by China in September last year. The filings show as many as 12,992 satellites will make up the constellation, although there are fears this would only serve China's interest by operating state-run media and intranet outlets. These would lie - as the name LEO suggests - in low orbit, anywhere between 500 and 1500 km and would operate under a number of frequency bands. In a March 7 interview with Shanghai Securities News, Bao Weimin, a senior official with the state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Bao Weimin. Credit: SASAC Corp. (CASC) revealed it had already launched some test satellites. “We are planning and developing space Internet satellites and have launched test satellites," he said. "A 'State Grid' company will also be established to be responsible for the overall planning and operation of space Internet construction." Washington DC-based analyst Bhavya Lal surmised that out of the 20 or so Chinese companies engaged in satellite technologies, fewer than a dozen had proposed the use of constellation at the time the filings were submitted. “Many focus on narrowband communications, targeting markets such as the Internet of Things (IoT)," he said in a statement released in October 2020, adding that many of the state-owned outlets "[had] the deeper pockets needed to rapidly launch satellite constellations." She concluded that many of the private companies lacked the required hardware to launch. Read more: The satellite drone that can beam 5G from the stratosphere She said: “However, as in other areas, the Chinese are making fast progress. The best we can tell the current focus of most companies is domestic. But as the Chinese have done in other areas such as high-speed rail, it would be not a stretch of the imagination that once the bugs in the system are worked out domestically, the Chinese will begin to market services internationally.” It is currently unknown if any of this has changed in the six months since it broke. In mid-April Ge Yujung, the president of China Spacesat, another key player, revealed the previously planned satellite clusters would be altered to fit a new plan, saying the Hongyan and Hongyun systems would "undergo major changes" by "relevant government authorities." He also revealed plans for the constellations have been in development since at least 2018 and that CASC was planning to launch at least 60 satellites by 2022. It is currently unclear how the project will proceed, but news reports indicate it has become a national priority. SpaceX's global satellite network was completed in early April, and the network is now active. It is likely China has issued this as a national priority in order to compete with western rivals.

#### That triggers backlash – they don’t support restrictions on the space sector and will do everything to convince leaders not to do the plan.

Cheng 14 [Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow in the Asia Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, Former Senior Analyst at the China Studies Division of the Center for Naval Analyses, Former Senior Analyst with Science Applications International Corporation, “Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation”, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 4/9/2014, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/prospects-us-china-space-cooperation]

At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant political support within the Chinese political system. Based on their writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to establish “space dominance,” in order to fight and win “local wars under informationized conditions.”[8] The two SOEs are seen as key parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China’s commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of China’s aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent.[9] From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on preserving its interests. China’s space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in space, these reflect positively on both China’s growing power and respect (internationally) and the CCP’s legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the world’s second-largest economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms. Prospects for Cooperation Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation with the PRC in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited. China’s past experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures (Sino–Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.–China cooperation in the 1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino–European space cooperation on the Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of the joint Russian–Chinese Phobos–Grunt mission is likely seen in Beijing as further evidence that a “go-it-alone” approach is preferable. Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial complex in expanding cooperation.[10] Moreover, as long as China’s economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space expenditures—making international cooperation far less urgent for the PRC than most other spacefaring states. [FOOTNOTE] [10]It is worth noting here that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a part of the CCP Politburo, a key power center in China. Thus, the voice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is muted, at best, in any internal debate on policy. [END FOOTNOTE] If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation in Chinese circles, there should also be skepticism in American ones. China’s space program is arguably one of the most opaque in the world. Even such basic data as China’s annual space expenditures is lacking—with little prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important, China’s decision-making processes are little understood, especially in the context of space. Seven years after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, exactly which organizations were party to that decision, and why it was undertaken, remains unclear. Consequently, any effort at cooperation would raise questions about the identity of the partners and ultimate beneficiaries—with a real likelihood that the PLA would be one of them.

#### An unhinged PLA triggers Himalayan war – goes global

Chellaney 17 [Dr. Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy, PhD in International Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, “Why the Chinese Military’s Rising Clout Troubles Xi Jinping”, The National, 9/9/2017, https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/why-the-chinese-military-s-rising-clout-troubles-xi-jinping-1.626815?videoId=5754807360001]

China’s president Xi Jinping has stepped up his domestic political moves in the run-up to the critical 19th national congress of the Chinese Communist Party next month, but he is still struggling to keep the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in line. China’s political system makes it hard to get a clear picture, yet Mr Xi’s actions underscore the troublesome civil-military relations in the country. Take the recent standoff with India that raised the spectre of a Himalayan war, with China threatening reprisals if New Delhi did not unconditionally withdraw its forces from a small Bhutanese plateau, which Beijing claims is Chinese territory. After 10 weeks, the face-off on the Doklam Plateau ended with both sides pulling back troops and equipment from the site on the same day, signalling that Beijing, not New Delhi, had blinked. The mutual-withdrawal deal was struck just after Mr Xi replaced the chief of the PLA’s joint staff department. This key position, equivalent to the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, was created only last year as part of Mr Xi’s military reforms to turn the PLA into a force “able to fight and win wars”. The Doklam pullback suggests that the removed chief, Gen Fang Fenghui, who has since been detained for alleged corruption, was an obstacle to clinching a deal with India. To be sure, this was not the first time that the PLA’s belligerent actions in the Himalayas imposed diplomatic costs on China. A classic case happened when Mr Xi reached India on a state visit in September 2014. He arrived on Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s birthday with a strange gift for his host, a predawn Chinese military encroachment deep into India’s northern region of Ladakh. The encroachment, the worst in many years in terms of the number of intruding troops, overshadowed Mr Xi’s visit. It appeared bizarre that the military of an important power would seek to mar the visit of its own head of state to a key neighbouring country. Yet Chinese premier Li Keqiang’s earlier visit to New Delhi in 2013 was similarly preceded by a PLA incursion into another part of Ladakh that lasted three weeks. Such provocations might suggest that they are intentional, with the Chinese government in the know, thus reflecting a preference for blending soft and hard tactics. But it is also possible that these actions underscore the continuing “disconnect between the military and the civilian leadership” in China that then US defence secretary Robert Gates warned about in 2011. During his 2014 India trip, Mr Xi appeared embarrassed by the accompanying PLA encroachment and assured Mr Modi that he would sort it out upon his return. Soon after he returned, the Chinese defence ministry quoted Mr Xi as telling a closed-door meeting with PLA commanders that “all PLA forces should follow the president’s instructions” and that the military must display “absolute loyalty and firm faith in the party”. Recently Xi conveyed that same message yet again when he addressed a parade marking the 90th anniversary of the PLA’s creation on August 1, 1927. Donning military fatigues, Mr Xi exhorted members of his 2.3-million-strong armed forces to “unswervingly follow the absolute leadership of the party.” Had civilian control of the PLA been working well, would Mr Xi repeatedly be demanding “absolute loyalty” from the military or asking it to “follow his instructions”? China does not have a national army; rather the party has an army. So the PLA has traditionally sworn fealty to the party, not the nation. Under Mr Xi’s two immediate predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, the PLA gradually became stronger at the expense of the party. The military’s rising clout has troubled Mr Xi because it hampers his larger ambition. As part of his effort to reassert party control over the military, Mr Xi has used his anti-corruption campaign to ensnare a number of top PLA officers. He has also cut the size of the ground force and established a new command-and-control structure. But just as a dog’s tail cannot be straightened, asserting full civil control over a politically ascendant PLA is proving unachievable. After all, the party depends on the PLA to ensure domestic order and sustain its own political monopoly. The regime’s legitimacy increasingly relies on an appeal to nationalism. But the PLA, with its soaring budgets and expanding role to safeguard China’s overseas interests, sees itself as the ultimate arbiter of nationalism. To make matters worse, Mr Xi has made many enemies at home in his effort to concentrate power in himself, including through corruption purges. It is not known whether the PLA’s upper echelon respects him to the extent to be fully guided by his instructions. In the past decade, the PLA’s increasing clout has led China to stake out a more muscular role. This includes resurrecting territorial and maritime disputes, asserting new sovereignty claims, and using construction activity to change the status quo. China’s cut-throat internal politics and troubled civil-military relations clearly have a bearing on its external policy. The risks of China’s rise as a praetorian state are real and carry major implications for international security.

#### Extinction.

We’ll conceded 1AC Rachman 20

## 4

#### Text – States should

* implement cooperative active debris removal measures aimed at mitigating debris from mega-constellations.
* cooperate on the development of a cloud-based infrastructure system between private and public entities with the purpose of advancing overall cyber security and create a protected mandatory reporting system for government contractors and critical infrastructure employees
* dismantle their antisatellite weapon systems and stop all development of space weapons

#### 1st plank solves Cyber-Attacks.

**Robertl and Vocl 21** [Christopher Robertl and Vince Vocl. Christopher is the Senior Vice President of Cyber Intelligence and Supply Chain Security Policy at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Vince VocI is the Executive Director Cyber Policy and Operations at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 5-14-2021, accessed on 8-8-2021, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, "4 Ways U.S. Government Leaders Can Protect IP and Personal Data", <https://www.uschamber.com/on-demand/cybersecurity/how-can-the-government-help-protect-intellectual-property-and-personal-data>] Adam

During the past several months, U.S. adversaries have carried out significant cyber-enabled espionage campaigns, impacting a wide range of public and private sector targets. With our nation’s cybersecurity at risk, government leaders have quickly turned to legislative solutions to protect our intellectual property and personal data.

Protected Mandatory Reporting Can Help Thwart Increasingly Sophisticated Cyberattacks

Since the [Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015](https://www.cisa.gov/publication/cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-2015-procedures-and-guidance#:~:text=of%20Mass%20Destruction-,Cybersecurity%20Information%20Sharing%20Act%20of%202015%20Procedures%20and%20Guidance,indicators%20with%20the%20Federal%20Government.) was passed, companies facing data breaches have been encouraged to share this information with the U.S. government. Yet cyberattacks have only become more sophisticated since then, according to [Sen. Mark Warner](https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

“There is an evolving belief that the 2015 structure, on a voluntary basis, is not giving us the level of comprehensive security that we need,” said Warner. “The bad guys, when they’re focused, they’re going to have a fairly high probability of getting in.”

In response, the Committee on Intelligence is working on a bipartisan level to create a structure that would mandate reporting for government contractors and critical infrastructure employees.

“Some of the privacy and other kinds of counter-incentives don’t take place,” Sen. Warner noted, adding that affected companies would have limited immunity and anonymized information. “We can pulse the overall system in a way that will allow [the] public sector and private sector to respond in a more comprehensive way.”

The U.S. Seeks to Work With Its Allies to Establish Cyber Incident Notification Systems

After creating a limited mandatory reporting system in the country, Warner hopes that the U.S. can work with its allies to establish similar notification systems as well as multilateral cyber norms.

“If our adversaries violate these norms and we can find appropriate attribution, there will be consequences to their actions,” Warner explained. “Our failure to have norms [and] a more robust notification system in existence … has allowed, in many ways, Russia and China to launch cyberattacks with virtual impunity.”

“This is a problem of protecting intellectual property … [and] personal information,” he continued. “As long as we can provide that level of limited immunity with anonymity so that those reports are then not made public, I think we can earn industry support.”

The U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission Outlines Priorities for 2021

In 2019, the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission was chartered to manage cyber risk and significant cyber events at home and abroad. With several of the Commission’s recommendations being codified into law in 2020, this year has seen a renewed focus in engaging the private sector.

“We’re looking at ways that [we] can get to a common cloud-based environment between federal government agencies, state, local, tribal, territorial and the private sector, basically to get common visibility,” said Solarium commissioner [Frank J. Cilluffo](https://www.solarium.gov/commissioners/frank-cilluffo).

“We’re also going to be zeroing in on what we’re calling SICI (systemically important critical infrastructure) ... which will basically hone in on the most critical of our critical infrastructures, our lifeline sectors, and establish a set of … benefits and burdens to truly get to that partnership between the public and private sector,” Cilluffo added.

Public and Private Sector Collaboration Is Crucial to Cybersecurity Advancement

“We want to make sure that at the end of the day, our companies, our national security agencies and our citizens as a whole are enhancing their overall cybersecurity efforts,” stated Cilluffo. “The bottom line is, we need to follow up our ideas with the resources.”

“This is not going to be accomplished through Washington alone,” he stressed. “The private sector needs a front-row seat at his table and ultimately will be most critical to any success going forward.”

[Mark Montgomery](https://www.solarium.gov/about/staff/mark-montgomery), executive director of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, agreed that partnership between the public and private sectors would be crucial for success in 2021.

“We actually have to build, pay for and establish infrastructure for collaboration,” Montgomery noted. “Once you do that, the companies will see that their equities are protected … and their opinions matter, and then we’ll get things done.”

#### 2nd solves for Mega-constellation Impacts.

Hardy 20, Brian Patrick. Long-term effects of satellite megaconstellations on the debris environment in low earth orbit. Diss. 2020. (Master of Science in Aerospace Engineering in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)//Elmer

The results of this thesis demonstrate that satellite megaconstellations have the potential to leave a significant mark on the LEO debris environment, even centuries after they cease operations. Various test cases for the Starlink megaconstellation were analyzed in a new, medium-fidelity simulation for orbital debris evolution, and a variety of PMD and ADR rates for Starlink were considered. It was shown that if Starlink adheres only to the minimum regulatory requirement of 90% PMD for large constellations, then LEO debris levels will grow almost twice as fast as the baseline scenario with no megaconstellations. Improving Starlink’s PMD rate to 95% would lead to only 19% more debris, while 99% PMD is the preferred option that prevents any significant debris contributions at all. Importantly, Starlink’s choice of PMD strategy will affect its own collision risk very little over the short term, but the impact will be noticeable on multi-century timescales by the overall LEO environment. Finally, in scenarios with 90% and 95% PMD, active debris removal of non-operating Starlink satellites yields significant, if limited, benefits. The 90% PMD scenario combined with an ADR rate of 5 Starlink satellites per year, for example, is able to reduce debris levels to those seen for the 95% PMD scenario. This result suggests that active debris removal could be a viable mitigation strategy for megaconstellations with sub-optimal PMD rates.

#### 3rd plank solves second advantage – states won’t possess asat capability to escalate

#### Reject 1AR theory- A] 7-6 time skew means it’s endlessly aff biased B] I don’t have a 3nr which allows for endless extrapolation C] 1AR theory is skewed to the aff because they have a 2ar judge psychology warrant.

#### Infinite abuse claims are wrong- A] Spikes solve-you can just preempt paradigms in the 1AC B] Functional limits- 1nc is only 7 minutes long

#### Condo is good proving a CP is bad doesn’t prove the plan is good, a logical policy maker can always choose not to act. Logic outweighs – it’s the basis of all rational arguments.