## 1AC

### FW

#### The meta-ethic is practical reasoning

#### Infinite Regress: We can infinitely ask why for other theories but to ask why for reasons concedes reasons, so reasons are inescapable and binding, and binding theory outweigh because only they can guide action which is the purpose of ethics.

#### Action Theory: Every action has infinite sub-actions we must unify them under intent to explain the unity of action. To use intent agents must use practical reason to know the means she takes in her actions can achieve principles guiding the action.

#### To be an agent is to have the ability to rationally self-reflect, because that ability is how we derive reason and value.

Korsgaard // 96

Korsgaard, C. M., Cohen, G. A., & O'Neill, O. (1996). The sources of normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bracketed for clarity

And this sets up a problem no other animal has. It is the problem of the normative. For our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities [and desires] is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question.  I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? [but] Is this desire really a *reason* to act? The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a *reason*. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward. If the problem springs from reflection then the solution must do so as well. If the problem is that our perceptions and desires might not withstand reflective scrutiny. We [we] have reasons if they do. The normative word ‘reason’ refers to a kind of reflective success. If ‘good’ and ‘right’ are also taken to be intrinsically normative words, names for things that automatically give us reasons, then they too must refer to reflective success. And they do. Think of what they mean when we use them as *exclamations*. ‘Good!’ ‘Right!’ There they mean: I’m satisfied, I’m happy, I’m [and] committed, you’ve convinced me, let’s go. They mean [and] the work of reflection is done.

#### Agency requires universalizability. Universal willing is a prerequisite to self-determination of action. Anything else means desire controls our actions, thus the actor is no longer an agent.

**Korsgaard // 99**

Korsgaard, C. M. (1999). Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant (1st ed., Vol. 3). Spinger.

The second step is to see that particularistic willing makes it impossible for you to distinguish yourself, your principle of choice, from the various incentives on which you act. According to Kant you must always act on some incentive or other, for every action, even action from duty, involves a decision on a proposal: something must suggest the action to you. And in order to will particularistically, you must in each case wholly identify with the incentive of your action. That incentive would be, for the moment, your law, the law that defined your agency or your will. It’s important to see that if you had a particularistic will you would not identify with the incentive as representative of any sort of type, since if you took it as a representative of a type you would be taking it as universal. For instance, you couldn’t say that you decided to act on the inclination of the moment, because you were so inclined. Someone who takes “I shall do the things I am inclined to do, whatever they might be” as his maxim has adopted a universal principle, not a particular one: he has the principle of treating his inclinations as such as reasons. A truly particularistic will must embrace the incentive in its full particularity: it, in no way that is further describable, is the law of such a will. So someone who engages in particularistic willing does not even have a democratic soul. There is only the tyranny of the moment: the complete domination of the agent by something inside him.

#### If an agent regards their purpose as important, they must regard the means as important, one of which is freedom.

**Denying individuals’ independent choice, or outer freedom, is rationally contradictory. As you expand your freedom to limit someone else’s same freedom which results in contradiction and is incoherent, so we can’t limit anyone’s freedom.**

**A universal system of freedoms requires consistency with the omnilateral will.**

Ripstein // 04

[Arthur Ripstein, (University Professor of Law and Philosophy, [University of Toronto](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_org&hl=en&org=8515235176732148308)) "Authority and Coercion" Philosophy & Public Affairs, 32: 2–35, 2004, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00003.x/abstract, DOA:12-16-2017 //] Bracketed for clarity

Kant explains the need for the three branches of government in Rousseau’s vocabulary of the “general will.” Kant finds this concept helpful, since it manages to capture the way in which the specificity of the law and the monopoly on [the law’s] its enforcement do not thereby make it the unilateral imposition of one person’s will upon another. Instead, it is what Kant calls an “omnilateral” will, since all must agree to set up procedures that will make right possible. All must agree, because without such procedures, equal freedom is impossible, and so the external freedom of each is impossible. But the sense in which they must agree is not just that they should agree; it is that they cannot object to being forced to accept those procedures, because any objection would be nothing more than an assertion of the right to use force against others unilaterally. Once the concept of the General Will is introduced, it provides further constraints on the possibility of a rightful condition, and even explains the ways in which a state can legitimately coerce its citizens for reasons other than the redress of private wrongs. Kant’s treatment of these issues of “Public Right” has struck many readers as somewhat perfunctory, especially after his meticulously detailed, if not always transparent, treatment of private right. He treats these issues as he does because he takes them to follow directly from the institution of a social contract. The details of his arguments need not concern us here, because he does not claim that these exhaust the further powers of the state. Instead, he puts them forward as additional powers a state must have if it is to create a rightful condition, and it is the structure of that argument that is of concern here.

#### For the state to maintain its united will, the powerful need to be regulated so they cannot rightfully abuse positions over those subject to them to maintain equal freedom. Coercion is when your circumstance requires adopting another’s purposes because of imbalanced bargaining position.

Ripstein 9 “Force and Freedom.” Arthur Ripstein, 2009. Prof. of Philosophy and Law at University of Toronto. <https://books.google.com/books?id=W_B3oVsdOZUC&pg=PA272&lpg=PA272&dq=%22Kant+argues+that+provision+for+the+poor+follows+directly+from+the+very+idea+of+a+united+will.%22&source=bl&ots=qeZgxmZ4o0&sig=ACfU3U09Kis9KW3g9jVDf3h8LHA3lm7hdg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiW4aCQ3ePzAhX7nWoFHZIQCpIQ6AF6BAgDEAM#v=onepage&q=%22Kant%20argues%20that%20provision%20for%20the%20poor%20follows%20directly%20from%20the%20very%20idea%20of%20a%20united%20will.%22Because%20each%20person%20is%20master%20&f=false> SJMS Bracketed for clarity

Kant argues that provision for the poor follows directly from the very idea of a united will. He remarks that the idea of a united lawgiving will requires that citizens regard the state as existing in perpetuity.6 By this he does not mean to impose an absurd requirement that people live forever, or even the weaker one that it must sustain an adequate population, or make sure that all of its members survive.7 The state does need to maintain its material preconditions, and as we saw in Chapter 7, this need generates its entitlement to “administer the state’s economy and finance.”8 The state’s existence in perpetuity, however, is presented as a pure normative requirement, grounded in its ability to speak and act for everyone. That ability must be able to survive changes in the state’s membership. You are the same person you were a year ago because your normative principle of organization has stayed the same through changes in the matter making you up. As a being entitled to set and pursue your own purposes, you decide what your continuing body will do. That is why your deeds can be imputed to you even after every molecule in your body has changed, and even if you have forgotten what you did. The unity of your agency is created by the normative principle that makes your actions imputable to you.9 In the same way, the state must sustain its basic normative principle of organization through time, even as some members die or move away and new ones are born or move in. As we saw in Chapter 7, its unifying principle—“in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of the state”—is the idea of the original contract, through which people are bound by laws they have given themselves through public institutions.10 The state must have the structure that is required in order for everyone to be bound by it, so that it can legitimately claim to speak and act for all across time. The requirement of unity across time is clear in the cases of legislation by officials: if the official’s decision were only binding while a particular human being held office, a citizen would be entitled to regard laws as void once the official’s term ended. Because each person is master of him- or herself, one person is only bound by the authority of another through the idea of a united will. So the idea of a united will presupposes some manner in which it exists through time. Past legislation, like past agreement, can only bind those who come after if the structure through which laws are made is one that can bind everyone it governs. The solution to this family of problems is a self-sustaining system that guarantees that all citizens stand in the right relation to each other and, in particular, do not stand in any relation inconsistent with their sharing a united will. The most obvious way in which people could fail to share such a will is through relations of private dependence through which one person is subject to the choice of another. A serf or slave does not share a united will with his or her lord or master, so these forms of relationship are inconsistent with a rightful condition. Yet the same relation of dependence can arise through a series of rightful actions. The problem of poverty, on Kant’s analysis, is exactly that: the poor are completely subject to the choice of those in more fortunate circumstances [the rich]. Although Kant argues that there is an ethical duty to give to charity,11 the crux of his argument is that dependence on private charity is inconsistent with its benefactor and beneficiary sharing the united will that is required for them to live together in a rightful condition. The difficulty is that the poor person is subject to the choice of those who have more: they are entitled to use their powers as they see fit, and so the decision whether to give to those in need, or how much to give, or to which people, is entirely discretionary.12 So long as there are a variety of unmet wants, private persons are entitled to determine which ones to attach priority to.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will. Prefer:

#### [1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify a standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### [2] Use epistemic confidence.

#### [a] It’s substantively true – you wouldn’t combine medicines from three different doctors just because they gave you three different opinions.

#### [b] EC promotes higher quality phil clash because it incentivizes stronger defensive arguments against phil which actually test the underlying warrants in frameworks rather than just extending args for a risk of offense

#### [c] EM is infinitely regressive since we need to use modesty to determine the probability that EM is true and that that is true and so on

#### [5] Aspec - Ripstein has a better explanation of how states can take action because different politicians can have different views on aggregation proven by opposition in the political world but everyone is bound to universal maxims and the state is bound to the original contract as a state and not individual policy makers so only we assign the state obligations

### Advocacy

#### Thus, the resolution Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. PICs affirm because they do not disprove my general thesis. CX checks on spec shells and I’ll meet them. To clarify I’ll defend implementation so your DAs link.

### Offense

#### [1] A libertarian model of labor rights would not allow union monopolization, but it would not curtail a right to strike.

Hill 11 Henry Hill (Freelance political writer), “A free market in labour: libertarians, employment and the unions,” Adam Smith Institute. 12 September 2011. <https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/regulation-industry/a-free-market-in-labour-libertarians-employment-and-the-unions> SJMS

Trade unions are an interesting problem for libertarians. Although they are essentially anti-liberal forces, most attacks on trade unions historically stem from the authoritarian Right. Too often the conflict between unions and business leads to many potential subscribers to libertarianism supporting decidedly illiberal business practises, due to a misconception that one can either be pro-business or pro-union. For a libertarian, employment must be approached in a manner that is independent of the interests and prejudices of either side. Employment legislation inspired by libertarian principles would at once counter the serious business abuses that justify trade unions whilst removing the ability of unions to act as monopolies. A libertarian believes that human beings should be free to undertake exchanges with each other free from force, fraud or coercion. Trade unions found their origins in defending workers against abuse by business, abuse often supported by the state. A libertarian state that functioned properly would not collude with anti-liberal business practises and would protect people from forceful, fraudulent or coercive practises that might necessitate trades union membership. But libertarian employment law would undermine unions too. Like most things, labour is a commodity. A job is a contract between an employer and an employee in which the latter’s labour is traded at a given rate for remuneration in wages and perhaps other perks. Despite this trades unions are not seen as what they are in business terms: cartels working to inflate prices (wage costs) by restricting the labour market. While the horrors of the closed shop and the flying picket have (for the most part, student politics aside) disappeared, the fundamental leverage behind a strike is the idea that a union can exercise a labour monopoly and use the threat of withdrawal to coerce employers. No libertarian system would ban strikes or unions. People are free to associate with each other as they wish and no libertarian would argue that a worker does not have the right to withdraw their labour. What is critical is that a libertarian recognises the right of an employer to replace that labour. In the same way in which a libertarian government would fight monopolist practises on the business side of industry, so it should strive to create a free market in labour. Not only would this be morally right in accordance with libertarian principles, but it would allow the market to adjust British wages back to internationally competitive levels.

#### [2] So long as society is not completely libertarian, libertarians should support union’s rights as a check on other threats to liberty.

Levine 12 Peter Levine (Associate Dean for Research and the Lincoln Filene Professor of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Tufts University's Tisch College of Civic Life. Concerned about civic education, civic engagement, and democratic reform in the United States and elsewhere.), “libertarians, violence, and unions,” A Blog for Civic Renewal. December 13th, 2012. <https://peterlevine.ws/?p=10340> SJMS

3. Unions promote political pluralism and countervailing force. We can debate whether a libertarian utopia is feasible and desirable, but we don’t live in one. We live under a powerful and pervasive state that not only influences corporations and markets, but is constantly used by them. So the employer with whom an individual laborer contracts is not a free individual; it is a corporation that has likely been regulated, subsidized, and protected by the state. One could imagine stripping the state of most of its powers, but that is not happening. As long as the state remains influential, liberty is best served by pluralism: by setting many different interests in peaceful conflict. Killing unions, the main countervailing force to industry, will reduce pluralism–and thus liberty.

#### [3] Recognizing the right to strike would transform dominating power structures.

Lazar 20 [Orlando; 10/6/20; St. Edmund Hall & Balliol College, University of Oxford; “Work, Domination, and the False Hope of Universal Basic Income,” <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-020-09487-9>] Justin

If workers can simply leave and subsist on an adequate level of basic income, then they can very credibly threaten to do so rather than suffer under the dominating power structures of their workplaces. More than this, employers will know that their workers have this option. In response to some gross overstep of managerial power this might take the form of an actual threat, but in normal circumstances it would function as an implicit threat on the part of the worker. The threat to strike works in the same way: where the right to strike is protected, that threat functions quietly and implicitly, and needs only rarely become explicit. The genuine ability to exit would become more than a tool to contest, after the fact, managerial decisions; it would be an ever-present possibility, raising the bargaining power of individual workers and reshaping their relationship to their employers. Rather than just the ability to exit, an adequate UBI gives workers various abilities—by the reckoning of one supporter, the powers to ‘enter, undominatedly stay, exit, and restart all kinds of social relations, starting with work relations’ (Casassas 2016, p. 9). In this sense the power structures of individual workplaces would be transformed, with managers no longer able to monopolise the residual authority described in the previous section.

#### Additionally, this means if the state denies workers this right to strike, the state will unregulate the powerful and create imbalanced bargaining position – thus violating the united will and the omnilateral will. The state must recognize this right to strike.

#### [4] Non-domination requires restriction of the employer’s power to arbitrarily impose their will on employees.

Bogg 17 [Alan. Alan L Bogg is Professor in Law at the [University of Bristol Law School](https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/organisations/university-of-bristol-law-school). 'Republican Non-Domination and Labour Law: New Normativity or Trojan Horse?', (2017), 33, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Issue 3, pp. 391-417, <https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/International+Journal+of+Comparative+Labour+Law+and+Industrial+Relations/33.3/IJCL2017017>] SJ//VM

According to Pettit, this equal civic status requires the effective public resourcing and protection of ‘basic liberties’ in the relations between private citizens.46 These ‘basic liberties’ consist of those freedoms that are capable of being exercised and enjoyed equally by all citizens. This would require the republican state to entrench such freedoms as ‘the freedom to think what you like’ and ‘the freedom to travel within the society’ as ‘basic liberties’.47 The specification and content of these ‘basic liberties’ is determined through Pettit’s ‘free-person heuristic,’ or ‘eyeball test’: ‘people should securely enjoy resources and protections to the point where they … can look others in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that a power of interference might inspire; they can walk tall and assume the public status, objective and subjective, of being equal in this regard with the best.’48 It is a great strength of Pettit’s account of ‘basic liberties’ that it is rooted in a concern to ameliorate private domination between citizens. By contrast, standard liberal accounts of freedom focus on state infringement of freedom, and are sometimes sceptical of the ‘horizontal’ extension of public rights into the private sphere.49 This also marks an important difference with the structure of Lovett’s republican argument, where his discussion of basic liberties is framed as a concern to impose constitutional limits on public democratic processes.50 On Pettit’s republican account, the ‘basic liberties’ demarcate a protected zone of freedoms that must be insulated from arbitrary interference by other private parties.51 In particular, Pettit’s eyeball test leads to the need for ‘special insulation’ of the ‘basic liberties’ within ‘relationships like those of wife and husband, employee and employer, debtor and creditor, where there are often asymmetries of power’.52 Pettit is therefore concerned to elaborate a republican account of labour standards, and the employment relation lies at the centre of Pettit’s democratic theory. This ‘special insulation’ regime of republican labour law requires the state to impose legal duties on the stronger party to restrain the arbitrary exercise of private power. This would include ‘for cause’ dismissal protection, encompassing ‘constraints within workplace relations that deny an employer the right to fire without cause, imposing something like a requirement to defend an appeal against dismissal in an agreed forum.’53 It also includes ‘legalizing the unionization of employees and recourse to strike action’.54 This is because ‘the resort to collective action…may represent the only hope of winning freedom as non-domination for those who are employed.’55 Pettit defends the public provision of unemployment insurance to resource effective ‘exit’ rights for workers, as part of a public republican programme of insurance for citizens. 56 Pettit’s approach to ‘special insulation’ is also attuned to the specific vulnerabilities of precarious workers. For example, in their republican audit of Spanish governmental reforms implemented under Prime Minister Zapatero, Luis Marti and Pettit offer a favourable assessment of specific legal measures to protect illegal migrant-workers and those employed on fixed term contracts.57

#### [5] Striking is a fundamental protection of dignity and the right of the worker to resist abusive coercive employee-employer relationships.

Mason 18 [Elinor. Elinor Mason is a senior lecturer in philosophy at Edinburgh University. On striking, and the recognition that ethics are a collective affair. “On striking, and the recognition that ethics are a collective affair”. 4-1-2018. openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/on-striking-and-recognition-that-ethics-are-collective-affair/.] SJ//VM

It is worth situating any remarks about the ethics of strike action in the legal context. In Britain, strike action is not civil disobedience, it is legal, and permitted within the framework of employment law. This situation was hard won, by generations of workers who faced terrible working conditions. At the start of the industrial revolution, workers faced day to day working conditions that were often unsanitary and dangerous, no job security, exploitative wages, no paid time off, arbitrary inequalities, and of course, no pensions. In the years following the Industrial Revolution, workers fought for the right to organize, and formed trade unions in order to use collective power to resist unfair treatment by their employers. The overall justification for a framework that allows workers to unionize, and to pursue strike action under some circumstances, is that the possibility of striking provides a safeguard against exploitation, a protection for workers in a situation of power imbalance. **Ethical Issues** 1. Preconditions Obviously, there are various [preconditions that must be met](https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/kieran-oberman/just-and-unjust-strikes) for a strike to be ethically justified. First, the question of whether what the employers are doing is unfair or not arises. The pensions issue is incredibly complicated, and I do not pretend to understand all the [actuarial details](https://twitter.com/mikeotsuka?lang=en). It seems though, that we have a just cause here, that the offers that have been made are unfair. It is worth pointing out that it is not just a question of how much money there is or will be in the pension fund, there are also ethical questions: a question about how risk should be distributed, and a question about what else the universities are doing with their money. Pensions are a kind of wage, and our wages are not paid out of any particular fund, but out of the universities’ general resources. So we should be wary of accepting frameworks for discussion that attempt to reduce all the issues to financial ones. Relatedly, if a strike is to be justified, the cause must be realistic. There is no point in striking for something that cannot be obtained. But again, we should be careful here. What counts as unrealistic depends on the values people hold. There was a time when votes for women seemed unrealistic. Twenty years ago, marriage equality might have seemed an unrealistic goal. But some people pursued those goals anyway. If we take for granted that vice chancellors will be paid a fortune and that wages will be linked to student enrolment, perhaps fair wages for lecturers is not realistic. But why would we take those things for granted? Finally, of course, less disruptive methods of persuasion should be used first. Striking is a last resort, it is only permissible when negotiation has stalled. We start by trying to persuade the employer on the basis of the reasons: that a policy or proposal is unfair, unnecessary, that there are alternatives. It is only if that fails that we should move to strike action. **2. Harm** The primary aim of a strike is to harm the interests of the employer. Public Sector workers, will, inevitably end up harming the public too. In the public sector, the work we do is a public good, and if we withdraw our labour, we hurt the public. How much harm there is depends on what area, and what sort of public good we are talking about – the potential harm from doctors striking is greater than the potential harm we do here. The harm we do to our students in striking is nonetheless significant, and it needs to be defended. I think that the harm here is justified, and I will try to defend that in what follows, but even if you do not agree with me about this case, I aim to provide a way to think clearly about what might justify this sort of harm. First though, it is worth thinking a bit more about the nature of the harm, and what role it has. We might think of students as innocent bystanders in all this, and we might think that our duty as teachers is to minimize the harm to them. I don’t think that is quite right: students are innocent bystanders in one sense, they are innocent anyway, they are not the ones deciding to cut our pensions. However, harm to students is an essential part of strike action, and we should face that head on. Here is why. Strike action occurs when negotiation has not worked. If the suggested changes are truly unjust, what should we do? Should we simply accept the injustice? The recent history of Conservative government policy in the UK, starting with Thatcher and continued by Cameron, is to weaken the power of the Unions and weaken the right to strike. Their idea is that the way to deal with unjust working condition is through individual employment tribunals. If I am being badly treated by my employer, I should initiate a tribunal. But this deprives us of the power of collective action. The whole point of the union is that we are stronger together. We bargain collectively, and so the employers cannot pit us against each other as individuals. Furthermore, we threaten collectively. Harm to the employer’s interests is a necessary part of what makes collective action effective. It is because a harm is threatened that the employer has reason to change their mind. When the employer is a public body and the work a public good, then harm to the public – the students, in this case – is inevitable. To put it another way, striking is a form of coercion. We want to make it impossible for them to say ‘no’ to us. The preconditions for a justified strike are that the workers offered the reasons that were directly relevant – the reasons relating to justice, and that failed. So now the workers offer a different sort of reason: coercive practical reasons. As I said, the right to strike is a protection against exploitation. We have the right to move on to threat of harm when our reasonable requests are ignored. Compare this situation: imagine that a student plagiarises an essay. We have both a reasons based system to discourage plagiarism (we make clear that it is wrong and unfair) and a practical reason as back up (if you plagiarize, we will take punitive action). The punitive action is essentially harmful, that’s why it is effective, and of course, that is why it is only justified when all else has failed. **3. Justifying harm** First, as I said above, I think that the pensions deal we have been offered is unfair in its own terms. But our goal here is not simply to get our pensions back. Long term, we are trying to protect the University, just as the [junior doctors’ strike](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-34775980) in 2016 was partly about the future of the NHS. If the university mistreats its employees, it will not have as good a pool of staff to draw on, and the quality of the institution will suffer. We impose harms on this generation of students, but we hope that future generations of students will be able to take advantage of a strong university system. More broadly, a strike is usually about more than just the issue at hand. Women factory workers in the early twentieth century went on [strike for equal pay](http://www.unionhistory.info/equalpay/). They were not just striking for equal pay as individuals, they were protesting about gender inequity. The strike has an expressive message. Most of your lecturers striking here are doing more than asking for their pensions back: they are sending an expressive message to University management. For many of us, the message is that we want the University to be a public good, a shared asset, a place of learning and teaching, not a business. Our students are not consumers, and market models are not the best way to run universities. In striking, we are referencing a long history of effective strike action, and we are showing that we are willing to fight for the things we value. This is not to deny that the right to strike could be abused, or could be ineffective. In the end, it is an empirical matter whether the right to strike has done more good than harm, or done more harm than good. It is not an empirical matter that is easy to settle either: labour history is one of the most ideologically polluted areas of human enquiry. On the one hand, there are the supporters of the right to strike, who point out that organization has brought us workers’ rights and tolerable working conditions. On the other hand there are those who argue, with Thatcher, that striking hurts growth; hurts industry; hurts the economy, and should be stopped. It may seem like a far fetched comparison, but think of the right to bear arms, as enshrined in the American constitution. That right has the same basic justification as the right to strike, it is there to protect the ordinary person from tyranny and exploitation by more powerful groups. However, the right to bear arms does not actually function like that. It is not a safeguard against tyranny, but rather causes immense harm. We can imagine that this is how Thatcher saw the right to strike: as a right that does not achieve its aims and causes unnecessary harm. But the opposing view is that the legal right to strike is an effective right, it does protect us, and can be, and is usually, used in a judicious way. But as I say, this is an empirical matter, and we should all know more about labour history. **4. Collective Action** Finally, I will close with a couple of thoughts about collective action. As I said, we stand for more than just this issue. That worries some people: they will not march under a banner that they do not fully endorse. Here is an interesting philosophical/sociological thought about that. As I said, the anti-union movement encourages us away from collective action and towards individual action. One of Margaret Thatcher’s major victories was to [take away the right to strike in solidarity](http://www.unionhistory.info/timeline/1960_2000_Narr_Display.php?Where=NarTitle+contains+%27Anti-Union+Legislation%3A+1980-2000%27) with other workers who have a different employer. Perhaps it is not coincidental that there is also a cultural movement towards thinking of one’s values as a very individual thing, a personal thing. Philosophically, there is one clear mistake there, and a less clear one. The clear mistake is thinking that values are not universalisable. As [Kant](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/) points out, it is part of the definition of values that they are universalisable. Values are not personal in the sense that they apply only to the person who holds them. The less clear point though, and more relevant here, is that integrity does not require that we never sign up for anything we are not fully on board with every detail of. We shouldn’t be too precious about our own values. The mistake here might be characterized as fetishization, or a quest for purity. Think of the voter who says, ‘I can’t vote for X because of something she has done that I don’t agree with, so I will not vote at all’. This is a mistake. We should think of the bigger picture, sometimes be willing to throw our lot in with those we disagree with in pursuit of bigger goals. [Solidarity](https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/mihaela-mihai/plea-to-my-students) is important, and solidarity requires that we think of our own values as robust enough to bear some minor disagreements. We should value solidarity; we should engage in it. We hugely appreciate the solidarity of our students: thank you.

### UV

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory, Drop the Debater, and no RVIs – 1AR theory is the only recourse to check back infinite NC abuse, since it’s impossible to preempt NC abuse within the AC. Aff gets drop the debater, since 1AR is too short to win both theory and substance, and 2N doesn’t get RVIs, since RVIs uniquely deter the 1AR from checking NC abuse since the 1A knows the 2N can spend 6 minutes on the RVI and win. 1AR theory is the highest layer – Else, the NC has 7 minutes to be abusive and 6 minutes to leverage the abuse against 1A theory in the 2N, making checking abuse lexically impossible.

#### [2] Permissibility and presumption substantively affirm:

#### [a] If I told you my name is Michael; you would believe that absent evidence to believe otherwise which proves that statements are more likely to be true.

#### [b] Negating an obligation requires proving a prohibition – they prohibit the aff action.

#### [c] Logic -If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral i.e. drinking water is not morally right or wrong but if I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions.

#### [4] Extinction doesn’t come first

#### [a] Fallacy of origin – you don’t maximize oxygen in this debate round thus we shouldn’t maximize life

#### [b] Relies on consequences which we indite

#### [c] Double bind either we know Kant is truer in this debate round or it conflates post-pre fiat distinction

#### [d] It freezes action and is incoherent – everything can lead to extinction

#### [e] consent should be understood deontologically, people shouldn't be violated just to minimize other violations or you undermine the principle of inviolable consent in the first place

#### [f] We aren't killing them, there's intervening actors who flip the switch on the nukes or whatever - not responsible for their bad choices

#### [g] the true philosophy wouldn’t say someone should sacrifice themselves for knowledge of it – can’t go into a burning house for the last copy of the book - therefore, we shouldn't violate people’s freedom and ignore the aff just to find this ethical theory

### Advantage

#### The right to strike is Customary International Law, but the US fails to meet *opinio juris* standards. Perception of US insufficiency breeds uncertainty with confidence in international law and spirals into noncompliance – that causes a legitimacy crisis. No alt causes to legitimacy – FOA is central to the ILO and the biggest internal link.

Brudney 21 [James; 2/8/21; Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School; “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law,” THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol 46, <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil>] Justin \*\* Brackets in original

II. THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO STRIKE AS CIL That an international right to strike is widely recognized by governments does not mean the right has assumed the status of CIL. This Part seeks to forge that link, to show how the international right to strike qualifies as CIL. It begins (II.A) by identifying the two basic elements of CIL and explaining why the right to strike is an integral textual and conceptual component of FOA. It then establishes (II.B and C) that FOA and the right to strike satisfy both elements of CIL—a general practice accepted by States, stemming from a sense of legal obligation. While there are variations and qualifiers at the national level, the contours of CIL status are clear: a basic right subject to three substantive restrictions; a recognition that strikers retain their employment relationship during the strike itself; and certain procedural prerequisites or limitations. 105 This Part next demonstrates (II.D) that the two U.S. practices discussed earlier as deviating from the international right to strike—denying all public employees the right and authorizing permanent replacement of lawful strikers— contravene core aspects of the right to strike as CIL. Finally (II.E), this Part introduces the complexities of the U.S. position on FOA and the right to strike as international rights, reflected in the failure to ratify Convention 87 while both Congress and the executive branch embrace Convention 87 principles including the right to strike. A. Initial Definitions and Considerations 1. CIL Standards The two basic elements that determine the existence and content of a rule of CIL are first, the requirement of a general practice by States, and second, the requirement that the general practice be undertaken from a sense of legal right or obligation (opinio juris).106 The first element is objective: whether there is a sufficiently widespread and consistent practice of States endorsing and adhering to the rule. Evidence of such a general practice may include governmental conduct in connection with treaties; legislative or administrative acts; decisions of national courts; conduct in relation to resolutions adopted by an international organization; diplomatic acts and correspondence; and executive operational conduct on the ground.107 The second element, opinio juris, is more subjective: the general practice must be undertaken based on its acceptance as law, rather than being accepted based on mere usage or habit or some pragmatic motive. As is true for general practice, evidence of acceptance as law may come in a range of forms. These include public statements made on behalf of States; government legal opinions; decisions of national courts; treaty provisions; diplomatic correspondence; and conduct related to resolutions adopted by an international organization.108 2. The Right to Strike as Integral to FOA Freedom of association is one of the core principles on which the ILO was founded and continues to exist. 109 As set forth under Convention 87, FOA includes a series of integral elements, of which the right to strike is one. The two ILO supervisory mechanisms that have regularly applied or interpreted Convention 87 have understood it to include the right to strike from the early days of the Convention’s existence.110 Leading U.N. human rights covenants also recognize FOA as a basic right, including the right to strike as a component. 111 And the labor provisions of the 2019 U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement include the following statement: “For greater certainty, the right to strike is linked to the right to freedom of association, which cannot be realized without protecting the right to strike.”112 Accordingly, if FOA is seen as Customary International Law (CIL), and the right to strike is an essential component of FOA, then the right to strike should also be understood to be part of CIL. Consider in this regard the following integral elements of Convention 87. The fact that as part of FOA, workers and employers “shall have the right to establish and . . . to join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization”113 means the State may not impose unreasonably high membership requirements that hinder the establishment of organizations, or require that members may not join several different organizations. 114 Similarly, the fact that under FOA, workers and employers “shall have the right to . . . elect their representatives in full freedom [and that] public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof,”115 means the State may not impose limits on candidates due to their nationality, literacy, political opinions, moral standing, or for workers, their non-employment in the employer’s occupation or enterprise. 116 And the fact that as part of FOA, workers “shall have the right . . . to organize their. . . activities and to formulate their programs” free “from any interference [by the public authorities]”117 means that worker organizations, in order to defend the occupational interests of their members, have the right to hold trade union meetings, the right to have access to places of work and to communicate with management, and the right to organize nonviolent protest action including strikes. 118 B. FOA and the Right to Strike as General Practice There is ample support that FOA is widely accepted in objective terms. Convention 87 has been ratified by 155 countries, or 83 percent of the 187 ILO Member States. 119 In addition, the ILO Constitution, endorsed by all members, specifies the critical role of FOA both in its 1919 founding document and the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia as a constitutional addition.120 More recently, ILO Declarations issued in 1998 and 2008, again embraced by all members, make clear that even Member States that have not ratified Convention 87 are obligated to act in good faith to respect and effectuate FOA principles.121 Beyond the ILO realm, workers’ freedom of association, including the right to form and join trade unions and expressly the right to strike, is recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly to be effective 1976.122 The Covenant has been ratified by 171 countries, including two of the four large-population countries that have not ratified Convention 87.123 Another major UN Human Rightstreaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), also adopted by the U.N. General Assembly to be effective in 1976, recognizes FOA including the right to form and join trade unions. 124 The ICCPR has been ratified by 173 countries, including three of the four largepopulation countries that have not ratified Convention 87; its human rights committee has consistently recognized the right to strike as part of FOA under the Covenant. 125 Indeed, of the 187 ILO Member States, only 11 relatively smallpopulation countries have not ratified at least one of Convention 87, the ICESCR, or the ICCPR.126 FOA is also expressly recognized in a labor setting in the European Convention on Human Rights, which has been ratified by all 48 countries in the Council of Europe. 127 At a national level, the vast majority of constitutions provide for freedom of association, although some use general language that (unlike the international instruments just mentioned) does not specify workers or trade unions. 128 Apart from States’ nearly-universal embrace of FOA as a general matter, the right to strike itself has been broadly accepted by governments. As noted earlier, more than 90 countries have made a public commitment to the right to strike in their constitutions. 129 These commitments have translated to actual practice when national courts have relied on guidance from the CEACR and CFA in assuring compliance with their constitutional right to strike. Judicial interpretation of the international right as part of applying a domestic constitution often involves assuring compliance by governments or employers,130 though it also may require compliance by unions. 131 And compliance with the international right to strike may even emanate from application of a national constitution that endorses FOA without being explicit about the right to strike.132 Among the many national courts that have invoked the CEACR and/or CFA in support of a right to strike,133 two other cases worth noting involve Brazil and Kenya because neither country has ratified Convention 87. In 2012, the Labour Court in Brazil ordered reinstatement of workers terminated for participating in a work stoppage. 134 Under Brazil’s Constitution, “norms that define fundamental rights and guarantees are directly applicable.”135 Given that the Court found that the employer’s conduct had violated the principle of freedom of association and the free exercise of the right to strike, it seems that the “principle of freedom of association” was being directly applied as a matter of customary international law rather than through a ratified treaty or convention.136 In 2013, the Industrial Court of Kenya ordered the reinstatement of five workers dismissed for participating in a strike and strike-related activities. The Court’s reasoning derived from Kenya’s general participation in the ILO, including “respect for International Labour Standards,” rather than direct application of fundamental norms as in the Brazil case.137 The Industrial Court invoked a report by the CEACR and decisions by the CFA to support its decision; its recognition of FOA as an accepted international standard suggests that reports from the ILO supervisory bodies served as evidence of CIL.138 Finally, states’ widespread practice is reflected in the negotiation of trade agreements over the past two decades that recognize both FOA and the right to strike. Since 2003, labor provisions in U.S. trade agreements have regularly featured linkages to FOA as one of the fundamental ILO norms. 139 The commitment by signatory states to FOA as understood under the 1998 ILO Declaration has been progressively strengthened during this period—from providing that parties “shall strive to ensure” protection of FOA under domestic laws140 to specifying that parties shall “adopt and maintain [FOA rights] in [their] statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder.”141 The latest trade agreement, involving the United States, Mexico, and Canada (approved as a successor to NAFTA) expressly provides that the right to FOA necessarily includes protection for the right to strike.142 Trade agreements involving EU countries also feature commitments to respect and implement under domestic law the principles of FOA as understood in the ILO context. 143 This wide network of similarly worded, mostly bilateral trade agreements addressing the subject of FOA constitutes additional evidence of general practice for CIL purposes. 144 The pervasive nature of actual practice regarding FOA and the right to strike does not mean that the right’s content is static or fixed. To be sure, there is broad acceptance of the two previously discussed features on which U.S. law is out of step: the prohibition on permanent replacements145 and public employees’ right to strike with certain exceptions. 146 And although particular limits on the right may vary from one country to another, there is an international consensus that the right exists and that any limits should be reasonable.147 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) does not require uniformity in practice in order to establish CIL, and indeed, it has countenanced some degree of variation: The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general be consistent with such rules.148 C. FOA and the Right to Strike as Opinio Juris There is also considerable support for the proposition that the general practice of states on FOA and the right to strike stems from acceptance as a matter of legal obligation. Admittedly, while the existence of opinio juris may be inferred from a general practice, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has at times noted the insufficiency or inconclusiveness of such practice, instead seeking confirmation that “[states’] conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.’”149 Trade agreements, for instance, may represent treaty law and may qualify as evidence of general practice, but they are typically entered into by States that have specific economic or political objectives rather than from a desire to embrace obligations arising under international law.150 Further, it is possible that even with respect to ILO conventions, widespread ratification is in part a function of acculturation, insofar as endorsements across a region contribute to socialized acceptance of norms on FOA, reassuring peer countries that protecting rights to association including the right to strike will not place them in an inferior competitive position.151 That said, the ICJ often does infer the existence of opinio juris from a general practice and/or from determinations by national or international tribunals.152 And there are ample reasons to draw such an inference here. To start, FOA is consciously accepted as an obligation by ILO member states not simply through ratification of Convention 87 (covering more than 80 percent of them) but by virtue of membership itself. The ILO Constitution expressly requires support for FOA principles, and these principles are further imbedded through a tripartite governance structure that allocates power-sharing roles to worker organizations alongside governments and employers.153 Thus, ILO members understand there is an underlying obligation to respect FOA in law and practice.154 A second reason is that domestic law can provide relevant evidence regarding the presence of opinio juris among states. Commitments to FOA expressed in national constitutions, statutes, and court decisions are not necessarily evidence of a state’s belief that the principle is international as opposed to domestic law. Nonetheless, the International Law Commission has made clear that evidence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) “may take a wide range of forms,” including but not limited to “official publications; government legal opinions; [and] decisions of national courts.”155 In this regard, the CEACR in 2012 identified 92 countries where “the right to strike is explicitly recognized, including at the constitutional level”; the list includes six countries that have not ratified Convention 87.156 Recognition in domestic law of a right to strike alongside a conscious decision not to ratify Convention 87 could give rise to an inference that these six countries are rejecting the right as a principle of international law. However, as explained earlier, national courts for two of the six non-ratifying countries (Brazil and Kenya) expressly invoke ILO membership and/or principles as guidance in their domestic law decisions. 157 In addition, Canada—a country not listed among the 92 endorsing the right to strike in the 2012 General Survey— has since recognized a constitutional right to strike under national law, relying in part on international law principles including CEACR and CFA determinations. 158 The Canadian Supreme Court had previously been explicit in invoking Convention 87, ICESCR, and ICCPR as “documents [that] reflect not only international consensus but also principles that Canada has committed itself to uphold.”159 Further, a third country in the group of six—South Korea—has affirmed in its trade agreements with the United States and the EU its obligation to “adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and practices” FOA in accordance with the ILO Declaration.160 And in various CFA complaints against South Korea for violating FOA principles, including the right to strike, the Government has disputed the facts of the complaints while at the same time recognizing that such rights are embedded in international law.161 Accordingly, a more relevant reference point in this setting may be that “when States act in conformity with a treaty provision by which they are not bound . . . this may evidence the existence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) in the absence of any explanation to the contrary.”162 Stepping back, domestic law on FOA and the right to strike, which for many countries developed after Convention 87 and its initial applications by the CEACR and CFA, may be viewed in part as a window into countries’ sense of obligation in law and practice. A state may at times adopt labor provisions of a trade agreement for reasons of comity or relative competitive advantage. These reasons may play a more modest role with respect to adoption of certain human rights treaties or ILO conventions. 163 But evidence of practice and obligation in the domestic law sphere—especially when informed by regard for international instruments—seems almost by definition to be a function of acceptance as law rather than susceptibility to strategic motivations. In this regard, there are numerous instances in recent years where governments have expanded their legislative protections for the right to strike following a period of dialogue with the CEACR, and that committee has recognized and applauded the changes in law.164 Of particular relevance to the U.S. setting, these expansions have included assuring the right to strike for public sector employees and prohibiting the hiring of replacements for strikers.165 A third reason to infer opinio juris (in addition to the centrality of FOA principles within the ILO Constitution and the strong evidence of FOA and rightto-strike practice and obligation under domestic law) involves recent statements from high officials in the United Nations indicating that the right to strike is understood by its leaders as CIL. In his 2016 report to the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association explained, “The right to strike has been established in international law for decades, in global and regional instruments, and is also enshrined in the constitutions of at least 90 countries. The right to strike has, in fact, become customary international law.”166 In 2018, responding to a press briefing on a strike by U.N. employees following announced pay cuts, the Deputy Spokesman for the U.N. SecretaryGeneral reiterated the U.N. view that the right to strike is indeed CIL and did so in the context of the right being asserted by public employees not involved in the administration of the state: Question: Does the Secretary-General believe that U.N. staff have a right to take part in industrial action? Deputy Spokesman: We believe the right to strike is part of customary international law.167 These statements did not simply materialize in recent times. Two major U.N. Human Rights treaties—the ICESCR and the ICCPR—have been interpreted by their relevant treaty bodies to include a right to strike; these bodies have reaffirmed their joint commitment to the right to strike as part of FOA, and they regularly monitor governments’ record of compliance with this right. 168 And as noted earlier, the two treaties—each ratified by over 80 percent of U.N members—include a clause explicitly identifying respect for ILO Convention 87. In sum, the principles of FOA including the right to strike would appear to satisfy both prongs of the CIL test. The widely recognized general practice on strikes has sufficient shape and contours: a basic right, three substantive exceptions (public servants involved in administration of the state, essential services in the strict sense of the term, and acute national emergencies), a recognition that strikers retain their employment relationship during the strike itself, and certain procedural prerequisites or attached conditions. 169 There are variations in national practice and also disagreements at the margins about what the right to strike protects, but these aspects are not different in kind from diversity and contests regarding international rights prohibiting child labor, or for that matter domestic constitutional rights involving freedom of expression or the right to bear arms. As for opinio juris, a broad range of sources combine to establish that the general practice stems from a sense of acceptance and obligation: ILO foundation and structure; two widely endorsed United Nations human rights treaties; national constitutions; government representations; domestic legislative and judicial decisions that expressly refer to or impliedly accept international standards and practices; and contemporary U.N. leadership.

#### That prevents harmonization of norms and throws the functioning of international institutions into question – prefer empirics.

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For several decades, the right to strike has been one of the most controversial parts of the law of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Even though it has not been explicitly enshrined in the Conventions on the right to freedom of association (especially not in Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) and in Convention 98 on the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (1949)), since the early 1950s, the ILO supervisory bodies have recognised the right to strike as an essential element of trade union rights enabling workers to collectively defend their economic and social interests. Since its seminal recommendation in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland case of 1952,1 the Governing Body’s Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) has considered that Article 3 of Convention 87 also guarantees the right to strike, and has developed, since then, detailed ‘case law’ which has been summarised by the International Labour Office in a ‘Digest’ and since 2018 in a ‘Compilation’.2 The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), another body established by the ILO Governing Body, has taken the same path since the late 1950s.3 Despite this long-standing interpretive practice of these two important supervisory bodies in respect of Convention No. 87, the right to strike has become controversial since the end of the Cold War. In the 81st session of the International Labour Conference (ILC) in 1994, it was already being challenged by the employers’ group.4 But the Rubicon was definitely crossed in 2012, when the employers’ representatives on the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) refused, for the first time, to deal—as it had done previously—with a list of Member States that had seriously violated Conventions of the ILO as long as the workers’ group would not accept a revision of the mandate of the CEACR.5 At the heart of this incident was the recognition of the right to strike by the CEACR even though, according to the view of the employers’ side, the Committee was not empowered to interpret ILO law with binding effect. This incident temporarily resulted in an institutional crisis within the ILO supervisory system, since the ILO’s tripartite structure which underlies the constitution of the ILO presupposes that the three constituents cooperate in good faith within the organisation’s bodies. An attitude of refusal on the part of only one of the constituents therefore necessarily brings into question the functioning of the ILO.