## 1AC

### FW

#### The meta-ethic is practical reasoning

#### Infinite Regress: We can infinitely ask why for other theories but to ask why for reasons concedes reasons, so reasons are inescapable and binding, and binding theory outweigh because only they can guide action which is the purpose of ethics.

#### Action Theory: Every action has infinite sub-actions we must unify them under intent to explain the unity of action. To use intent agents must use practical reason to know the means she takes in her actions can achieve principles guiding the action.

#### To be an agent is to have the ability to rationally self-reflect, because that ability is how we derive reason and value.

Korsgaard // 96

Korsgaard, C. M., Cohen, G. A., & O'Neill, O. (1996). The sources of normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bracketed for clarity

And this sets up a problem no other animal has. It is the problem of the normative. For our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities [and desires] is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question.  I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? [but] Is this desire really a *reason* to act? The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a *reason*. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward. If the problem springs from reflection then the solution must do so as well. If the problem is that our perceptions and desires might not withstand reflective scrutiny. We [we] have reasons if they do. The normative word ‘reason’ refers to a kind of reflective success. If ‘good’ and ‘right’ are also taken to be intrinsically normative words, names for things that automatically give us reasons, then they too must refer to reflective success. And they do. Think of what they mean when we use them as *exclamations*. ‘Good!’ ‘Right!’ There they mean: I’m satisfied, I’m happy, I’m [and] committed, you’ve convinced me, let’s go. They mean [and] the work of reflection is done.

#### Agency requires universalizability. Universal willing is a prerequisite to self-determination of action. Anything else means desire controls our actions, thus the actor is no longer an agent.

**Korsgaard // 99**

Korsgaard, C. M. (1999). Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant (1st ed., Vol. 3). Spinger.

The second step is to see that particularistic willing makes it impossible for you to distinguish yourself, your principle of choice, from the various incentives on which you act. According to Kant you must always act on some incentive or other, for every action, even action from duty, involves a decision on a proposal: something must suggest the action to you. And in order to will particularistically, you must in each case wholly identify with the incentive of your action. That incentive would be, for the moment, your law, the law that defined your agency or your will. It’s important to see that if you had a particularistic will you would not identify with the incentive as representative of any sort of type, since if you took it as a representative of a type you would be taking it as universal. For instance, you couldn’t say that you decided to act on the inclination of the moment, because you were so inclined. Someone who takes “I shall do the things I am inclined to do, whatever they might be” as his maxim has adopted a universal principle, not a particular one: he has the principle of treating his inclinations as such as reasons. A truly particularistic will must embrace the incentive in its full particularity: it, in no way that is further describable, is the law of such a will. So someone who engages in particularistic willing does not even have a democratic soul. There is only the tyranny of the moment: the complete domination of the agent by something inside him.

#### If an agent regards their purpose as important, they must regard the means as important, one of which is freedom.

**Denying individuals’ independent choice, or outer freedom, is rationally contradictory. As you expand your freedom to limit someone else’s same freedom which results in contradiction and is incoherent, so we can’t limit anyone’s freedom.**

**A universal system of freedoms requires consistency with the omnilateral will.**

Ripstein // 04

[Arthur Ripstein, (University Professor of Law and Philosophy, [University of Toronto](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_org&hl=en&org=8515235176732148308)) "Authority and Coercion" Philosophy & Public Affairs, 32: 2–35, 2004, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00003.x/abstract, DOA:12-16-2017 //] Bracketed for clarity

Kant explains the need for the three branches of government in Rousseau’s vocabulary of the “general will.” Kant finds this concept helpful, since it manages to capture the way in which the specificity of the law and the monopoly on [the law’s] its enforcement do not thereby make it the unilateral imposition of one person’s will upon another. Instead, it is what Kant calls an “omnilateral” will, since all must agree to set up procedures that will make right possible. All must agree, because without such procedures, equal freedom is impossible, and so the external freedom of each is impossible. But the sense in which they must agree is not just that they should agree; it is that they cannot object to being forced to accept those procedures, because any objection would be nothing more than an assertion of the right to use force against others unilaterally. Once the concept of the General Will is introduced, it provides further constraints on the possibility of a rightful condition, and even explains the ways in which a state can legitimately coerce its citizens for reasons other than the redress of private wrongs. Kant’s treatment of these issues of “Public Right” has struck many readers as somewhat perfunctory, especially after his meticulously detailed, if not always transparent, treatment of private right. He treats these issues as he does because he takes them to follow directly from the institution of a social contract. The details of his arguments need not concern us here, because he does not claim that these exhaust the further powers of the state. Instead, he puts them forward as additional powers a state must have if it is to create a rightful condition, and it is the structure of that argument that is of concern here.

#### For the state to maintain its united will, the powerful need to be regulated so they cannot rightfully abuse positions over those subject to them to maintain equal freedom. Coercion is when your circumstance requires adopting another’s purposes because of imbalanced bargaining position.

Ripstein 9 “Force and Freedom.” Arthur Ripstein, 2009. Prof. of Philosophy and Law at University of Toronto. <https://books.google.com/books?id=W_B3oVsdOZUC&pg=PA272&lpg=PA272&dq=%22Kant+argues+that+provision+for+the+poor+follows+directly+from+the+very+idea+of+a+united+will.%22&source=bl&ots=qeZgxmZ4o0&sig=ACfU3U09Kis9KW3g9jVDf3h8LHA3lm7hdg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiW4aCQ3ePzAhX7nWoFHZIQCpIQ6AF6BAgDEAM#v=onepage&q=%22Kant%20argues%20that%20provision%20for%20the%20poor%20follows%20directly%20from%20the%20very%20idea%20of%20a%20united%20will.%22Because%20each%20person%20is%20master%20&f=false> SJMS Bracketed for clarity

Kant argues that provision for the poor follows directly from the very idea of a united will. He remarks that the idea of a united lawgiving will requires that citizens regard the state as existing in perpetuity.6 By this he does not mean to impose an absurd requirement that people live forever, or even the weaker one that it must sustain an adequate population, or make sure that all of its members survive.7 The state does need to maintain its material preconditions, and as we saw in Chapter 7, this need generates its entitlement to “administer the state’s economy and finance.”8 The state’s existence in perpetuity, however, is presented as a pure normative requirement, grounded in its ability to speak and act for everyone. That ability must be able to survive changes in the state’s membership. You are the same person you were a year ago because your normative principle of organization has stayed the same through changes in the matter making you up. As a being entitled to set and pursue your own purposes, you decide what your continuing body will do. That is why your deeds can be imputed to you even after every molecule in your body has changed, and even if you have forgotten what you did. The unity of your agency is created by the normative principle that makes your actions imputable to you.9 In the same way, the state must sustain its basic normative principle of organization through time, even as some members die or move away and new ones are born or move in. As we saw in Chapter 7, its unifying principle—“in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of the state”—is the idea of the original contract, through which people are bound by laws they have given themselves through public institutions.10 The state must have the structure that is required in order for everyone to be bound by it, so that it can legitimately claim to speak and act for all across time. The requirement of unity across time is clear in the cases of legislation by officials: if the official’s decision were only binding while a particular human being held office, a citizen would be entitled to regard laws as void once the official’s term ended. Because each person is master of him- or herself, one person is only bound by the authority of another through the idea of a united will. So the idea of a united will presupposes some manner in which it exists through time. Past legislation, like past agreement, can only bind those who come after if the structure through which laws are made is one that can bind everyone it governs. The solution to this family of problems is a self-sustaining system that guarantees that all citizens stand in the right relation to each other and, in particular, do not stand in any relation inconsistent with their sharing a united will. The most obvious way in which people could fail to share such a will is through relations of private dependence through which one person is subject to the choice of another. A serf or slave does not share a united will with his or her lord or master, so these forms of relationship are inconsistent with a rightful condition. Yet the same relation of dependence can arise through a series of rightful actions. The problem of poverty, on Kant’s analysis, is exactly that: the poor are completely subject to the choice of those in more fortunate circumstances [the rich]. Although Kant argues that there is an ethical duty to give to charity,11 the crux of his argument is that dependence on private charity is inconsistent with its benefactor and beneficiary sharing the united will that is required for them to live together in a rightful condition. The difficulty is that the poor person is subject to the choice of those who have more: they are entitled to use their powers as they see fit, and so the decision whether to give to those in need, or how much to give, or to which people, is entirely discretionary.12 So long as there are a variety of unmet wants, private persons are entitled to determine which ones to attach priority to.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will. Prefer:

#### [1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify a standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### [2] Consequences Fail:

#### [a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict or calculate.

#### [b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events.

#### [c] No extension o/w – it’s the fallacy of origin we don’t maximize oxygen even though we need it

#### [3] Use epistemic confidence.

#### [a] Truth-testing implies it – you must first determine under what conditions something could be considered true before deciding if it is true. EM begs the question of why maximizing value on your side of the resolution is good, that would require comparative worlds.

#### [b] It’s substantively true – you wouldn’t combine medicines from three different doctors just because they gave you three different opinions.

#### [c] EC promotes higher quality phil clash because it incentivizes stronger defensive arguments against phil which actually test the underlying warrants in frameworks rather than just extending args for a risk of offense

#### [d] EM is infinitely regressive since we need to use modesty to determine the probability that EM is true and that that is true and so on

#### [e] EC is better for clash people it ensures that people don’t weigh something that is 0.01% true against something that is 100% true and ignore clash

### Advocacy

#### Thus, the resolution Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. PICs affirm because they do not disprove my general thesis. CX checks on spec shells and I’ll meet them. To clarify I’ll defend implementation so your DAs link.

### Offense

#### [1] A libertarian model of labor rights would not allow union monopolization, but it would not curtail a right to strike.

Hill 11 Henry Hill (Freelance political writer), “A free market in labour: libertarians, employment and the unions,” Adam Smith Institute. 12 September 2011. <https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/regulation-industry/a-free-market-in-labour-libertarians-employment-and-the-unions> SJMS

Trade unions are an interesting problem for libertarians. Although they are essentially anti-liberal forces, most attacks on trade unions historically stem from the authoritarian Right. Too often the conflict between unions and business leads to many potential subscribers to libertarianism supporting decidedly illiberal business practises, due to a misconception that one can either be pro-business or pro-union. For a libertarian, employment must be approached in a manner that is independent of the interests and prejudices of either side. Employment legislation inspired by libertarian principles would at once counter the serious business abuses that justify trade unions whilst removing the ability of unions to act as monopolies. A libertarian believes that human beings should be free to undertake exchanges with each other free from force, fraud or coercion. Trade unions found their origins in defending workers against abuse by business, abuse often supported by the state. A libertarian state that functioned properly would not collude with anti-liberal business practises and would protect people from forceful, fraudulent or coercive practises that might necessitate trades union membership. But libertarian employment law would undermine unions too. Like most things, labour is a commodity. A job is a contract between an employer and an employee in which the latter’s labour is traded at a given rate for remuneration in wages and perhaps other perks. Despite this trades unions are not seen as what they are in business terms: cartels working to inflate prices (wage costs) by restricting the labour market. While the horrors of the closed shop and the flying picket have (for the most part, student politics aside) disappeared, the fundamental leverage behind a strike is the idea that a union can exercise a labour monopoly and use the threat of withdrawal to coerce employers. No libertarian system would ban strikes or unions. People are free to associate with each other as they wish and no libertarian would argue that a worker does not have the right to withdraw their labour. What is critical is that a libertarian recognises the right of an employer to replace that labour. In the same way in which a libertarian government would fight monopolist practises on the business side of industry, so it should strive to create a free market in labour. Not only would this be morally right in accordance with libertarian principles, but it would allow the market to adjust British wages back to internationally competitive levels.

#### [2] So long as society is not completely libertarian, libertarians should support union’s rights as a check on other threats to liberty.

Levine 12 Peter Levine (Associate Dean for Research and the Lincoln Filene Professor of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Tufts University's Tisch College of Civic Life. Concerned about civic education, civic engagement, and democratic reform in the United States and elsewhere.), “libertarians, violence, and unions,” A Blog for Civic Renewal. December 13th, 2012. <https://peterlevine.ws/?p=10340> SJMS

3. Unions promote political pluralism and countervailing force. We can debate whether a libertarian utopia is feasible and desirable, but we don’t live in one. We live under a powerful and pervasive state that not only influences corporations and markets, but is constantly used by them. So the employer with whom an individual laborer contracts is not a free individual; it is a corporation that has likely been regulated, subsidized, and protected by the state. One could imagine stripping the state of most of its powers, but that is not happening. As long as the state remains influential, liberty is best served by pluralism: by setting many different interests in peaceful conflict. Killing unions, the main countervailing force to industry, will reduce pluralism–and thus liberty.

#### [3] Recognizing the right to strike would transform dominating power structures.

Lazar 20 [Orlando; 10/6/20; St. Edmund Hall & Balliol College, University of Oxford; “Work, Domination, and the False Hope of Universal Basic Income,” <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-020-09487-9>] Justin

If workers can simply leave and subsist on an adequate level of basic income, then they can very credibly threaten to do so rather than suffer under the dominating power structures of their workplaces. More than this, employers will know that their workers have this option. In response to some gross overstep of managerial power this might take the form of an actual threat, but in normal circumstances it would function as an implicit threat on the part of the worker. The threat to strike works in the same way: where the right to strike is protected, that threat functions quietly and implicitly, and needs only rarely become explicit. The genuine ability to exit would become more than a tool to contest, after the fact, managerial decisions; it would be an ever-present possibility, raising the bargaining power of individual workers and reshaping their relationship to their employers. Rather than just the ability to exit, an adequate UBI gives workers various abilities—by the reckoning of one supporter, the powers to ‘enter, undominatedly stay, exit, and restart all kinds of social relations, starting with work relations’ (Casassas 2016, p. 9). In this sense the power structures of individual workplaces would be transformed, with managers no longer able to monopolise the residual authority described in the previous section.

#### Additionally, this means if the state denies workers this right to strike, the state will unregulate the powerful and create imbalanced bargaining position – thus violating the united will and the omnilateral will. The state must recognize this right to strike.

### UV

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory– 1AR theory is the only recourse to check back infinite NC abuse, since it’s impossible to preempt NC abuse within the AC.

#### [2] Permissibility and presumption substantively affirm:

#### [a] If I told you my name is Michael; you would believe that absent evidence to believe otherwise which proves that statements are more likely to be true.

#### [b] Negating an obligation requires proving a prohibition – they prohibit the aff action.

#### [3] The neg has to defend there is a moral prohibition on the resolution – to clarify they cannot trigger permissibility or presumption or read skep

#### [a] Logic -If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral i.e. drinking water is not morally right or wrong but if I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions.

#### [b] Reciprocity – I’ve defended that the resolution is morally good they have to defend that it’s morally bad

#### [4] The role of the ballot is to vote affirmative if the *judgment* expressed by the resolution is true, vote neg if the judgement is false.

#### The resolution should be viewed as a judgment, not a proposition. Judgments are ideas cognitively held in the mind of real subjects, propositions are linguistic artifacts that act as placeholders in computational processes.

#### Prefer:

#### [a] Inescapable: the judge is a thinking subject and not a computer – so long as the judge evaluates any claim on the flow they are committed to coming to judgments about those claims and about the round as a whole. Even if the resolution is used as a proposition in these claims, that is only as a heuristic to making judgments.

#### [b] Co-opts the predictability benefits of truth-testing without the harms of blippy NIBs and a prioris.

#### [c] Meaning is determined inferentially – you only know what the resolution means by understanding what it would mean to justify it as a true statement. Meaning is not determined by net benefits to interpretations but by the norms that govern how justification works. If I say there is no butter in the fridge, you know what I mean because you understand what is required for me to assert that there is no butter and what it would mean to negate my claim.

#### Implications:

#### [a] Judgment-testing is different than generic truth-testing – linguistic NIBs and a prioris are not relevant offense under it while normatively relevant contention-level offense is.

#### [b] Process and agent CPs don’t negate – so long as an agent determines that an alternative is not likely to occur, they can make the moral judgment that action is good. E.g. it could be good for the federal government to do gun control because it isn’t likely the 50 states will, even if that is ideally better.

#### [c] Epistemic confidence on framework – the inferences required to determine the resolution are deductively arrived at through a process of determining what it means for an act to be morally good. That means that framework claims should be viewed as preclusive impact filters because they are syllogistically related to contentions as mechanisms of making them relevant. Absence the truth of a framework, relevance cannot be established. Computers may be able to make mathematical judgments using epistemic modesty, but thinking subjects cannot.

### Advantage

#### The right to strike is Customary International Law, but the US fails to meet *opinio juris* standards. Perception of US insufficiency breeds uncertainty with confidence in international law and spirals into noncompliance – that causes a legitimacy crisis. No alt causes to legitimacy – FOA is central to the ILO and the biggest internal link.

Brudney 21 [James; 2/8/21; Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School; “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law,” THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol 46, <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil>] Justin \*\* Brackets in original

II. THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO STRIKE AS CIL That an international right to strike is widely recognized by governments does not mean the right has assumed the status of CIL. This Part seeks to forge that link, to show how the international right to strike qualifies as CIL. It begins (II.A) by identifying the two basic elements of CIL and explaining why the right to strike is an integral textual and conceptual component of FOA. It then establishes (II.B and C) that FOA and the right to strike satisfy both elements of CIL—a general practice accepted by States, stemming from a sense of legal obligation. While there are variations and qualifiers at the national level, the contours of CIL status are clear: a basic right subject to three substantive restrictions; a recognition that strikers retain their employment relationship during the strike itself; and certain procedural prerequisites or limitations. 105 This Part next demonstrates (II.D) that the two U.S. practices discussed earlier as deviating from the international right to strike—denying all public employees the right and authorizing permanent replacement of lawful strikers— contravene core aspects of the right to strike as CIL. Finally (II.E), this Part introduces the complexities of the U.S. position on FOA and the right to strike as international rights, reflected in the failure to ratify Convention 87 while both Congress and the executive branch embrace Convention 87 principles including the right to strike. A. Initial Definitions and Considerations 1. CIL Standards The two basic elements that determine the existence and content of a rule of CIL are first, the requirement of a general practice by States, and second, the requirement that the general practice be undertaken from a sense of legal right or obligation (opinio juris).106 The first element is objective: whether there is a sufficiently widespread and consistent practice of States endorsing and adhering to the rule. Evidence of such a general practice may include governmental conduct in connection with treaties; legislative or administrative acts; decisions of national courts; conduct in relation to resolutions adopted by an international organization; diplomatic acts and correspondence; and executive operational conduct on the ground.107 The second element, opinio juris, is more subjective: the general practice must be undertaken based on its acceptance as law, rather than being accepted based on mere usage or habit or some pragmatic motive. As is true for general practice, evidence of acceptance as law may come in a range of forms. These include public statements made on behalf of States; government legal opinions; decisions of national courts; treaty provisions; diplomatic correspondence; and conduct related to resolutions adopted by an international organization.108 2. The Right to Strike as Integral to FOA Freedom of association is one of the core principles on which the ILO was founded and continues to exist. 109 As set forth under Convention 87, FOA includes a series of integral elements, of which the right to strike is one. The two ILO supervisory mechanisms that have regularly applied or interpreted Convention 87 have understood it to include the right to strike from the early days of the Convention’s existence.110 Leading U.N. human rights covenants also recognize FOA as a basic right, including the right to strike as a component. 111 And the labor provisions of the 2019 U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement include the following statement: “For greater certainty, the right to strike is linked to the right to freedom of association, which cannot be realized without protecting the right to strike.”112 Accordingly, if FOA is seen as Customary International Law (CIL), and the right to strike is an essential component of FOA, then the right to strike should also be understood to be part of CIL. Consider in this regard the following integral elements of Convention 87. The fact that as part of FOA, workers and employers “shall have the right to establish and . . . to join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization”113 means the State may not impose unreasonably high membership requirements that hinder the establishment of organizations, or require that members may not join several different organizations. 114 Similarly, the fact that under FOA, workers and employers “shall have the right to . . . elect their representatives in full freedom [and that] public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof,”115 means the State may not impose limits on candidates due to their nationality, literacy, political opinions, moral standing, or for workers, their non-employment in the employer’s occupation or enterprise. 116 And the fact that as part of FOA, workers “shall have the right . . . to organize their. . . activities and to formulate their programs” free “from any interference [by the public authorities]”117 means that worker organizations, in order to defend the occupational interests of their members, have the right to hold trade union meetings, the right to have access to places of work and to communicate with management, and the right to organize nonviolent protest action including strikes. 118 B. FOA and the Right to Strike as General Practice There is ample support that FOA is widely accepted in objective terms. Convention 87 has been ratified by 155 countries, or 83 percent of the 187 ILO Member States. 119 In addition, the ILO Constitution, endorsed by all members, specifies the critical role of FOA both in its 1919 founding document and the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia as a constitutional addition.120 More recently, ILO Declarations issued in 1998 and 2008, again embraced by all members, make clear that even Member States that have not ratified Convention 87 are obligated to act in good faith to respect and effectuate FOA principles.121 Beyond the ILO realm, workers’ freedom of association, including the right to form and join trade unions and expressly the right to strike, is recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly to be effective 1976.122 The Covenant has been ratified by 171 countries, including two of the four large-population countries that have not ratified Convention 87.123 Another major UN Human Rightstreaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), also adopted by the U.N. General Assembly to be effective in 1976, recognizes FOA including the right to form and join trade unions. 124 The ICCPR has been ratified by 173 countries, including three of the four largepopulation countries that have not ratified Convention 87; its human rights committee has consistently recognized the right to strike as part of FOA under the Covenant. 125 Indeed, of the 187 ILO Member States, only 11 relatively smallpopulation countries have not ratified at least one of Convention 87, the ICESCR, or the ICCPR.126 FOA is also expressly recognized in a labor setting in the European Convention on Human Rights, which has been ratified by all 48 countries in the Council of Europe. 127 At a national level, the vast majority of constitutions provide for freedom of association, although some use general language that (unlike the international instruments just mentioned) does not specify workers or trade unions. 128 Apart from States’ nearly-universal embrace of FOA as a general matter, the right to strike itself has been broadly accepted by governments. As noted earlier, more than 90 countries have made a public commitment to the right to strike in their constitutions. 129 These commitments have translated to actual practice when national courts have relied on guidance from the CEACR and CFA in assuring compliance with their constitutional right to strike. Judicial interpretation of the international right as part of applying a domestic constitution often involves assuring compliance by governments or employers,130 though it also may require compliance by unions. 131 And compliance with the international right to strike may even emanate from application of a national constitution that endorses FOA without being explicit about the right to strike.132 Among the many national courts that have invoked the CEACR and/or CFA in support of a right to strike,133 two other cases worth noting involve Brazil and Kenya because neither country has ratified Convention 87. In 2012, the Labour Court in Brazil ordered reinstatement of workers terminated for participating in a work stoppage. 134 Under Brazil’s Constitution, “norms that define fundamental rights and guarantees are directly applicable.”135 Given that the Court found that the employer’s conduct had violated the principle of freedom of association and the free exercise of the right to strike, it seems that the “principle of freedom of association” was being directly applied as a matter of customary international law rather than through a ratified treaty or convention.136 In 2013, the Industrial Court of Kenya ordered the reinstatement of five workers dismissed for participating in a strike and strike-related activities. The Court’s reasoning derived from Kenya’s general participation in the ILO, including “respect for International Labour Standards,” rather than direct application of fundamental norms as in the Brazil case.137 The Industrial Court invoked a report by the CEACR and decisions by the CFA to support its decision; its recognition of FOA as an accepted international standard suggests that reports from the ILO supervisory bodies served as evidence of CIL.138 Finally, states’ widespread practice is reflected in the negotiation of trade agreements over the past two decades that recognize both FOA and the right to strike. Since 2003, labor provisions in U.S. trade agreements have regularly featured linkages to FOA as one of the fundamental ILO norms. 139 The commitment by signatory states to FOA as understood under the 1998 ILO Declaration has been progressively strengthened during this period—from providing that parties “shall strive to ensure” protection of FOA under domestic laws140 to specifying that parties shall “adopt and maintain [FOA rights] in [their] statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder.”141 The latest trade agreement, involving the United States, Mexico, and Canada (approved as a successor to NAFTA) expressly provides that the right to FOA necessarily includes protection for the right to strike.142 Trade agreements involving EU countries also feature commitments to respect and implement under domestic law the principles of FOA as understood in the ILO context. 143 This wide network of similarly worded, mostly bilateral trade agreements addressing the subject of FOA constitutes additional evidence of general practice for CIL purposes. 144 The pervasive nature of actual practice regarding FOA and the right to strike does not mean that the right’s content is static or fixed. To be sure, there is broad acceptance of the two previously discussed features on which U.S. law is out of step: the prohibition on permanent replacements145 and public employees’ right to strike with certain exceptions. 146 And although particular limits on the right may vary from one country to another, there is an international consensus that the right exists and that any limits should be reasonable.147 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) does not require uniformity in practice in order to establish CIL, and indeed, it has countenanced some degree of variation: The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general be consistent with such rules.148 C. FOA and the Right to Strike as Opinio Juris There is also considerable support for the proposition that the general practice of states on FOA and the right to strike stems from acceptance as a matter of legal obligation. Admittedly, while the existence of opinio juris may be inferred from a general practice, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has at times noted the insufficiency or inconclusiveness of such practice, instead seeking confirmation that “[states’] conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.’”149 Trade agreements, for instance, may represent treaty law and may qualify as evidence of general practice, but they are typically entered into by States that have specific economic or political objectives rather than from a desire to embrace obligations arising under international law.150 Further, it is possible that even with respect to ILO conventions, widespread ratification is in part a function of acculturation, insofar as endorsements across a region contribute to socialized acceptance of norms on FOA, reassuring peer countries that protecting rights to association including the right to strike will not place them in an inferior competitive position.151 That said, the ICJ often does infer the existence of opinio juris from a general practice and/or from determinations by national or international tribunals.152 And there are ample reasons to draw such an inference here. To start, FOA is consciously accepted as an obligation by ILO member states not simply through ratification of Convention 87 (covering more than 80 percent of them) but by virtue of membership itself. The ILO Constitution expressly requires support for FOA principles, and these principles are further imbedded through a tripartite governance structure that allocates power-sharing roles to worker organizations alongside governments and employers.153 Thus, ILO members understand there is an underlying obligation to respect FOA in law and practice.154 A second reason is that domestic law can provide relevant evidence regarding the presence of opinio juris among states. Commitments to FOA expressed in national constitutions, statutes, and court decisions are not necessarily evidence of a state’s belief that the principle is international as opposed to domestic law. Nonetheless, the International Law Commission has made clear that evidence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) “may take a wide range of forms,” including but not limited to “official publications; government legal opinions; [and] decisions of national courts.”155 In this regard, the CEACR in 2012 identified 92 countries where “the right to strike is explicitly recognized, including at the constitutional level”; the list includes six countries that have not ratified Convention 87.156 Recognition in domestic law of a right to strike alongside a conscious decision not to ratify Convention 87 could give rise to an inference that these six countries are rejecting the right as a principle of international law. However, as explained earlier, national courts for two of the six non-ratifying countries (Brazil and Kenya) expressly invoke ILO membership and/or principles as guidance in their domestic law decisions. 157 In addition, Canada—a country not listed among the 92 endorsing the right to strike in the 2012 General Survey— has since recognized a constitutional right to strike under national law, relying in part on international law principles including CEACR and CFA determinations. 158 The Canadian Supreme Court had previously been explicit in invoking Convention 87, ICESCR, and ICCPR as “documents [that] reflect not only international consensus but also principles that Canada has committed itself to uphold.”159 Further, a third country in the group of six—South Korea—has affirmed in its trade agreements with the United States and the EU its obligation to “adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and practices” FOA in accordance with the ILO Declaration.160 And in various CFA complaints against South Korea for violating FOA principles, including the right to strike, the Government has disputed the facts of the complaints while at the same time recognizing that such rights are embedded in international law.161 Accordingly, a more relevant reference point in this setting may be that “when States act in conformity with a treaty provision by which they are not bound . . . this may evidence the existence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) in the absence of any explanation to the contrary.”162 Stepping back, domestic law on FOA and the right to strike, which for many countries developed after Convention 87 and its initial applications by the CEACR and CFA, may be viewed in part as a window into countries’ sense of obligation in law and practice. A state may at times adopt labor provisions of a trade agreement for reasons of comity or relative competitive advantage. These reasons may play a more modest role with respect to adoption of certain human rights treaties or ILO conventions. 163 But evidence of practice and obligation in the domestic law sphere—especially when informed by regard for international instruments—seems almost by definition to be a function of acceptance as law rather than susceptibility to strategic motivations. In this regard, there are numerous instances in recent years where governments have expanded their legislative protections for the right to strike following a period of dialogue with the CEACR, and that committee has recognized and applauded the changes in law.164 Of particular relevance to the U.S. setting, these expansions have included assuring the right to strike for public sector employees and prohibiting the hiring of replacements for strikers.165 A third reason to infer opinio juris (in addition to the centrality of FOA principles within the ILO Constitution and the strong evidence of FOA and rightto-strike practice and obligation under domestic law) involves recent statements from high officials in the United Nations indicating that the right to strike is understood by its leaders as CIL. In his 2016 report to the U.N. General Assembly, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association explained, “The right to strike has been established in international law for decades, in global and regional instruments, and is also enshrined in the constitutions of at least 90 countries. The right to strike has, in fact, become customary international law.”166 In 2018, responding to a press briefing on a strike by U.N. employees following announced pay cuts, the Deputy Spokesman for the U.N. SecretaryGeneral reiterated the U.N. view that the right to strike is indeed CIL and did so in the context of the right being asserted by public employees not involved in the administration of the state: Question: Does the Secretary-General believe that U.N. staff have a right to take part in industrial action? Deputy Spokesman: We believe the right to strike is part of customary international law.167 These statements did not simply materialize in recent times. Two major U.N. Human Rights treaties—the ICESCR and the ICCPR—have been interpreted by their relevant treaty bodies to include a right to strike; these bodies have reaffirmed their joint commitment to the right to strike as part of FOA, and they regularly monitor governments’ record of compliance with this right. 168 And as noted earlier, the two treaties—each ratified by over 80 percent of U.N members—include a clause explicitly identifying respect for ILO Convention 87. In sum, the principles of FOA including the right to strike would appear to satisfy both prongs of the CIL test. The widely recognized general practice on strikes has sufficient shape and contours: a basic right, three substantive exceptions (public servants involved in administration of the state, essential services in the strict sense of the term, and acute national emergencies), a recognition that strikers retain their employment relationship during the strike itself, and certain procedural prerequisites or attached conditions. 169 There are variations in national practice and also disagreements at the margins about what the right to strike protects, but these aspects are not different in kind from diversity and contests regarding international rights prohibiting child labor, or for that matter domestic constitutional rights involving freedom of expression or the right to bear arms. As for opinio juris, a broad range of sources combine to establish that the general practice stems from a sense of acceptance and obligation: ILO foundation and structure; two widely endorsed United Nations human rights treaties; national constitutions; government representations; domestic legislative and judicial decisions that expressly refer to or impliedly accept international standards and practices; and contemporary U.N. leadership.

#### That prevents harmonization of norms and throws the functioning of international institutions into question – prefer empirics.

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For several decades, the right to strike has been one of the most controversial parts of the law of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). Even though it has not been explicitly enshrined in the Conventions on the right to freedom of association (especially not in Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) and in Convention 98 on the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (1949)), since the early 1950s, the ILO supervisory bodies have recognised the right to strike as an essential element of trade union rights enabling workers to collectively defend their economic and social interests. Since its seminal recommendation in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland case of 1952,1 the Governing Body’s Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) has considered that Article 3 of Convention 87 also guarantees the right to strike, and has developed, since then, detailed ‘case law’ which has been summarised by the International Labour Office in a ‘Digest’ and since 2018 in a ‘Compilation’.2 The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), another body established by the ILO Governing Body, has taken the same path since the late 1950s.3 Despite this long-standing interpretive practice of these two important supervisory bodies in respect of Convention No. 87, the right to strike has become controversial since the end of the Cold War. In the 81st session of the International Labour Conference (ILC) in 1994, it was already being challenged by the employers’ group.4 But the Rubicon was definitely crossed in 2012, when the employers’ representatives on the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS) refused, for the first time, to deal—as it had done previously—with a list of Member States that had seriously violated Conventions of the ILO as long as the workers’ group would not accept a revision of the mandate of the CEACR.5 At the heart of this incident was the recognition of the right to strike by the CEACR even though, according to the view of the employers’ side, the Committee was not empowered to interpret ILO law with binding effect. This incident temporarily resulted in an institutional crisis within the ILO supervisory system, since the ILO’s tripartite structure which underlies the constitution of the ILO presupposes that the three constituents cooperate in good faith within the organisation’s bodies. An attitude of refusal on the part of only one of the constituents therefore necessarily brings into question the functioning of the ILO.

#### Scenario one is SDG:

#### Harmonizing international labor standards are key to Sustainable Development Goals – compliance is key.

ILO 15 [International Labor Organization; The International Labour Organization is a United Nations agency whose mandate is to advance social and economic justice through setting international labour standards. Founded in October 1919 under the League of Nations, it is the first and oldest specialised agency of the UN; “The benefits of International Labour Standards,” No date stated but most recent event cited is 2015, <https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/the-benefits-of-international-labour-standards/lang--en/index.htm>] Justin

International labour standards are first and foremost about the development of people as human beings. In the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), the international community recognized that “labour is not a commodity”. Labour is not an inanimate product, like an apple or a television set, that can be negotiated for the highest profit or the lowest price. Work is part of everyone’s daily life and is crucial to a person’s dignity, well-being and development as a human being. Economic development should include the creation of jobs and working conditions in which people can work in freedom, safety and dignity. In short, economic development is not undertaken for its own sake, but to improve the lives of human beings. International labour standards are there to ensure that it remains focused on improving the life and dignity of men and women. Decent work resumes the aspirations of humans in relation to work. It brings together access to productive and suitably remunerated work, safety at the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for individuals to set out their claims, to organize and to participate in decisions that affect their lives, and equality of opportunity and treatment for all men and women. Decent work is not merely an objective, it is a means of achieving the specific targets of the new international programme of sustainable development. At the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015, decent work and the four pillars of the Decent Work Agenda – employment creation, social protection, rights at work and social dialogue – became the central elements of the new Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 . Goal 8 of the 2030 Agenda calls for the promotion of sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all. Moreover, the principal elements of decent work are broadly incorporated into the targets of a large number of the 16 Goals of the United Nations new vision of development. An international legal framework for fair and stable globalization Achieving the goal of decent work in the globalized economy requires action at the international level. The world community is responding to this challenge in part by developing international legal instruments on trade, finance, the environment, human rights and labour. The ILO contributes to this legal framework by elaborating and promoting international labour standards aimed at making sure that economic growth and development go hand-in-hand with the creation of decent work. The ILO’s unique tripartite structure ensures that these standards are backed by governments, employers and workers alike. International labour standards therefore lay down the basic minimum social standards agreed upon by all the players in the global economy. A level playing field An international legal framework on social standards ensures a level playing field in the global economy. It helps governments and employers to avoid the temptation of lowering labour standards in the hope that this could give them a greater comparative advantage in inter- national trade. In the long run, such practices do not benefit anyone. Lowering labour standards can encourage the spread of low-wage, low-skill and high-turnover industries and prevent a country from developing more stable high-skilled employment, while at the same time slowing the economic growth of trade partners. Because international labour standards are minimum standards adopted by governments and the social partners, it is in everyone’s interest to see these rules applied across the board, so that those who do not put them into practice do not undermine the efforts of those who do. A means of improving economic performance International labour standards have been sometimes perceived as being costly and therefore hindering economic development. However, a growing body of research has indicated that compliance with international labour standards is often accompanied by improvements in productivity and economic performance. Minimum wage and working-time standards, and respect for equality, can translate into greater satisfaction and improved performance for workers and reduced staff turnover. Investment in vocational training can result in a better trained workforce and higher employment levels. Safety standards can reduce costly accidents and expenditure on health care. Employment protection can encourage workers to take risks and to innovate. Social protection, such as unemployment schemes, and active labour market policies can facilitate labour market flexibility, and make economic liberalization and privatization sustainable and more acceptable to the public. Freedom of association and collective bargaining can lead to better labour–management consultation and cooperation, thereby improving working conditions, reducing the number of costly labour conflicts and enhancing social stability. The beneficial effects of labour standards do not go unnoticed by foreign investors. Studies have shown that in their criteria for choosing countries in which to invest, foreign investors rank workforce quality and political and social stability above low labour costs. At the same time, there is little evidence that countries which do not respect labour standards are more competitive in the global economy. International labour standards not only respond to changes in the world of work for the protection of workers, but also take into account the needs of sustainable enterprises. A safety net in times of economic crisis Even fast-growing economies with high-skilled workers can experience unforeseen economic downturns. The Asian financial crisis of 1997, the 2000 dot-com bubble burst and the 2008 financial and economic crisis showed how decades of economic growth can be undone by dramatic currency devaluations or falling market prices. For instance, during the 1997 Asian crisis, as well as the 2008 crisis, unemployment increased significantly in many of the countries affected. The disastrous effects of these crises on workers were compounded by the fact that in many of these countries social protection systems, notably unemployment and health insurance, active labour market policies and social dialogue were barely developed. The adoption of an approach that balances macroeconomic and employment goals, while at the same time taking social impacts into account, can help to address these challenges. A strategy for reducing poverty Economic development has always depended on the acceptance of rules. Legislation and functioning legal institutions ensure property rights, the enforcement of contracts, respect for procedure and protection from crime – all legal elements of good governance without which no economy can operate. A market governed by a fair set of rules and institutions is more efficient and brings benefit to everyone. The labour market is no different. Fair labour practices set out in international labour standards and applied through a national legal system ensure an efficient and stable labour market for workers and employers alike. In many developing and transition economies, a large part of the work- force is engaged in the informal economy. Moreover, such countries often lack the capacity to provide effective social justice. Yet international labour standards can also be effective tools in these situations. Most ILO standards apply to all workers, not just those working under formal employment arrangements. Some standards, such as those dealing with homeworkers, migrant and rural workers, and indigenous and tribal peoples, deal specifically with certain areas of the informal economy. The reinforcement of freedom of association, the extension of social protection, the improvement of occupational safety and health, the development of vocational training, and other measures required by international labour standards have proved to be effective strategies in reducing poverty and bringing workers into the formal economy. Furthermore, international labour standards call for the creation of institutions and mechanisms which can enforce labour rights. In combination with a set of defined rights and rules, functioning legal institutions can help formalize the economy and create a climate of trust and order which is essential for economic growth and development. (Note 1 ) The sum of international experience and knowledge International labour standards are the result of discussions among governments, employers and workers, in consultation with experts from around the world. They represent the international consensus on how a particular labour problem could be addressed at the global level and reflect knowledge and experience from all corners of the world. Governments, employers’ and workers’ organizations, international institutions, multinational enterprises and non-governmental organizations can benefit from this knowledge by incorporating the standards in their policies, operational objectives and day-to-day action. The legal nature of the standards means that they can be used in legal systems and administrations at the national level, and as part of the corpus of international law which can bring about greater integration of the international community.

#### That’s key to head off a laundry list of interacting catastrophic risks, the combination of which causes extinction and amplifies every other threat.

Tom Cernev & Richard Fenner 20, Australian National University; Centre for Sustainable Development, Cambridge University Engineering Department, "The importance of achieving foundational Sustainable Development Goals in reducing global risk," Futures, Vol. 115, January 2020, Elsevier. Recut Justin

4.1. Cascading failures Fig. 3 demonstrates that cascade failures can be transmitted through the complex inter-relationships that link the Sustainable Development Goals. Randers, Rockstrom, Stoknes, Goluke, Collste, Cornell, Donges et al. (2018) have suggested that where meeting some SDGs impact negatively on others, this may lead to “crisis and conflict accelerators” and “threat multipliers” resulting in conflicts, instability and migrations. Ecosystem stresses are likely to disproportionately affect the security and social cohesion of fragile and poor communities, amplifying latent tensions which lead to political instabilities that spread far beyond their regions. The resulting “bad fate of the poor will end up affecting the whole global system"(Mastrojeni, 2018). Such possibilities are likely to go beyond incremental damage and lead to runaway collapse. The World Economic Forums’ Global Risks Report for 2018 shows the top five global risks in terms of likelihood and impact have changed from being economic and social in 2008 to environmental and technological in 2018, and are closely aligned with many SDGs (World Economic Forum, 2018). The report notes “that we are much less competent when it comes to dealing with complex risks in systems characterised by feedback loops, tipping points and opaque cause-and-effect relationships that can make intervention problematic”. The most likely risks expected to have the greatest impact currently include extreme weather events natural disasters, cyber attacks, data fraud or theft, failure of climate change mitigation and water crises. These are represented in Fig. 3 by the following exogenous variables. “Climate change” drives the need for Climate Action (SDG 13), “Cyber threat” may adversely impact technology implementation and advancement which will disrupt Sustainable Cities and Communities (SDG 11); Decent Work and Economic Growth (SDG 8) and the rate of introduction of Affordable and Clean Energy (SDG 7), with reductions in these goals having direct consequences in also reducing progress in the other goals which they are closely linked to. “Data Fraud or Threat” has the capacity to inhibit innovation and Industrial Performance (SDG 9), reducing competitiveness (and having the potential to erode societal confidence in governance processes). “Water Crises” (linked with climate change) have a direct impact on Human Health and Well Being (SDG 3) as well as reducing access to Clean Water and Sanitation (SDG 6) and reducing agricultural production which increases Hunger (SDG 2). The causal loop diagram also highlights “Conflict” as a variable (driven by multiple environmental-socio-economic factors) which together with regions most impacted by climate degradation will lead to an increase in migrant refugees enhancing the spread of disease and global pandemic risk, thus impacting directly on Human Health and Well Being (SDG 3) 4.2. Existential and catastrophic risk The level and consequences of these risks may be severe. Existential Risks (ER) have a wide scope, with extreme danger, and are “a risk that threatens the premature extinction of humanity or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development” (Farquhar et al., 2017,) essentially being an event or scenario that is “transgenerational in scope and terminal in intensity” (Baum & Handoh, 2014). With a smaller scope, and lower level of severity, global catastrophic risk is defined as a scenario or event that results in at least 10 million fatalities, or $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom & Ćirković, 2008). Global Catastrophic Risk (GCR) events are those which are global, but they are durable in that humanity is able to recover from them (Bostrom & Ćirković, 2008; Cotton-Barratt, Farquhar, Halstead, Schubert, & Snyder-Beattie, 2016) but which still have a long-term impact (Turchin & Denkenberger, 2018b). Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals can be considered to be a means of reducing the long-term global catastrophic and existential risks for humanity. Conversely if the targets represented across the SDGs remain unachieved there is the potential for these forms of risk to develop. This association combined with the likely emergence of new challenges over the next decades (Cook, Inayatullah, Burgman, Sutherland, & Wintle, 2014) means that it is of great value to identify points within the systems representations of the Sustainable Development Goals that could both lead to global catastrophic risk and existential risk, and conversely that could act as prevention, or leverage points in order to avoid such outcomes. This identification in turn enables sensible policy responses to be constructed (Sutherland & Woodroof, 2009). Whilst existential threats are unlikely, there is extensive peril in global catastrophic risks. Despite being lesser in severity than existential risks, they increase the likelihood of human extinction (Turchin & Denkenberger, 2018a) through chain reactions (Turchin & Denkenberger, 2018a), and inhibiting humanity’s response to other risks (Farquhar et al., 2017). It is necessary to consider risks that may seem small, as when acting together, they can have extensive consequences (Tonn, 2009). Furthermore, the high adaptability potential of humans, and society, means that for humanity to become extinct, it is most likely that there would be a series of events that culminate in extinction as opposed to one large scale event (Tonn & MacGregor, 2009; Tonn, 2009). Whilst the prospect of existential risk, or global catastrophic risk can seem distant, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change estimated the risk of extinction for humanity as 0.1 % annually, which accumulates to provide the risk of extinction over the next century as 9.5 % (Cotton-Barratt et al., 2016). With respect to identifying these risks, it is known that in particular, “positive feedback loops… represent the gravest existential risks” (Kareiva & Carranza, 2018), with pollution also having the potential to pose an existential risk. With respect to reinforcing feedback loops, there is particular concern about the effects of time delay, and the level of uncertainty when feedback loops interact (Kareiva & Carranza, 2018). It is difficult to identify the exact thresholds that are associated with tipping points (Moore, 2018), which leads to global catastrophic risk or existential risk, and thus it is necessary to understand the events that can lead to existential risks (Kareiva & Carranza, 2018). Table 1 identifies possible global catastrophic risks and existential risks as reported in the literature and from Fig. 3 these are aligned to the Sustainable Development Goals they impact on the most. 4.3. Linking risks with progress in the SDGs Generally it is the Outcome/Foundational and Human input SDGs that are most directly related. For example as the movement of refugees increases pandemic risk, poverty levels in low and middle income countries increase reducing the health of the population, and so restricting access to education which further enhances poverty and birth rates rise as family sizes increases generating unsustainable population growth which furthers the migration of refugees (Fig. 5). Fig. 3 shows that leverage points to reduce refugees lies in SDG 16 (Peace Justice and Strong Institutions), reducing malnutrition through alleviating SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) and taking SDG 13 (Climate Action) to avoid the mass movement of people to avoid the impacts of global warming. Global warming itself will drive disruptive changes in both terrestial and aquatic ecosystems affecting SDG 15 (Life on Land) and SDG 14 (Life Below Water) adding to their vulnerability to increases in pollution driven by a growing economy. Loop B (in Fig. 4)shows the constraints associated with SDG 13 (Climate Action) may slow the economic investment in industry and infrastructure reducing the pollution generated, encouraging adoption of SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) whilst stimulating carbon reduction and measures such as afforestation, which will also improve the foundational environmental goals. Depletion of resources and biodiversity are strongly linked to SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production) through measures such as halving global waste, reducing waste generation through recycling reuse and reduction schemes, and striving for more efficient industrial processes. The more resources that are used, the less responsible is Consumption and Production which may thus reduce biodiversity (Fig. 3) and increase the amounts of wastes accumulating in the environment. The final driver of Global Catastrophic Risk is an agricultural shortfall which will increase global Hunger (SDG 2) and widen the Inequality (SDG 10) between rich and poor nations and individuals. Quality Education (SDG 4) is important as a key leverage point to stimulate the generation and adoption of new technologies to improve energy (SDG 7) and water supplies (6) which can enhance agricultural production. Such linkages are convincingly examined and demonstrated in the recent film “The Boy Who Harnessed the Wind” (2019), based on a factual story of water shortages in Malawi in the mid 2000s. These examples may appear self evident, but it is the connections between the goals and how they adjust together that is important to consider so the consequence of policy actions in one area can be fully understood. Because of the underlying system structures global threats can quickly transmit through the system. Water Crises will limit the water available for agriculture and basic needs which in turn will stimulate a decline in Gender Equality (SDG 5). Technology disruption from cyber attacks will restrict the ability to operate Sustainable Cities and Communities (SDG 11) and potentially expose populations to extreme events by disrupting transport, health services, and the ability to pay for adaptation and mitigation of climate related threats from a weakened economy. Conflict (in all forms) will increase refugees and climate change provides the backdrop against which all these interactions will play out.