There’s theory spikes at the bottom in the uv

### FW

#### The meta-ethic is practical reasoning

#### Infinite Regress: We can infinitely ask why for other theories but to ask why for reasons concedes reasons, so reasons are inescapable and binding, and binding theory outweigh because only they can guide action which is the purpose of ethics.

**Velleman // 06**

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As we have seen, requirements that depend for their force on some external source of authority turn out to be [are] escapable because the authority behind them can be questioned. We can ask, "Why should I act on this desire" or "Why should I obey the U.S. Government?" or even "Why should I obey God?" And as we observed in the case of the desire to punch someone in the nose, this question demands a reason for acting. The authority we are questioning would be vindicated, in each case, by the production of a sufficient reason. What this observation suggests is that any purported source of practical authority depends on reasons for obeying it—and hence on the authority of reasons. Suppose, then, that we attempted to question the authority of reasons themselves, as we earlier questioned other authorities. Where we previously asked "Why should I act on my desire?" let us now as "Why should I act for reasons?" Shouldn't this question open up a route of escape from all requirements? As soon as we ask why we should act for reasons, however, we can hear something odd in our question. To ask "Why should I?" is to demand a reason; and so to ask "Why should I act for reasons?" is to demand a reason for acting for reasons. This demand implicitly concedes the very authority that it purports to question—namely, the authority of reasons. Why would we demand a reason if we didn't envision acting for it? If we really didn't feel required to act for reasons, then a reason for doing so certainly wouldn't help. So there is something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons. ~ The foregoing argument doesn't show that the requirement to act for reasons is inescapable. All it shows is that this requirement cannot be escaped in a particular way: we cannot escape the requirement to act for reasons by insisting on reasons for obeying it. For all that, we still may not be required to act for reasons. Yet the argument does more than close off one avenue of escape from the requirement to act for reasons. It shows that we are subject to this requirement if we are subject to any requirements at all. The requirement to act for reasons is the fundamental requirement, from which the authority of all other requirements is derived, since the authority of other requirements just consists in there being reasons for us to obey them. There may be nothing that is required of us; but if anything is required of us, then acting for reasons is required. Hence the foregoing argument, though possibly unable to foreclose escape from the requirement to act for reasons, does succeed in raising the stakes. It shows that we cannot escape the requirement to act for reasons without escaping the force of requirements altogether. Either we think of ourselves as under the requirement to act for reasons, or we think of ourselves as under no requirements at all. And we cannot stand outside both ways of thinking and ask for reasons to enter into one or the other, since to ask for reasons is already to think of ourselves as subject to requirements. ~ The requirement to act for reasons thus seems to come [is] as close as any requirement can to having intrinsic authority, in the sense of being authoritative by virtue of what it requires. This requirement therefore [it] comes as close as any requirement can to being inescapable. But remember that inescapability was supposed to be the hallmark of a moral obligation or duty: it was [is] the essential element in our concept of a duty, from which we hoped that the content of our duty could be deduced. What we have now deduced is that the requirement that bears this mark of morality is the requirement to act for reasons; and so we seem to have arrived the conclusion that "Act for reasons" is the content of our duty.

#### Action Theory: Every action has infinite sub-actions we must unify them under intent to explain the unity of action. To use intent agents must use practical reason to know the means she takes in her actions can achieve principles guiding the action.

Laurence 13 Ben Laurence, “An Anscombean Approach to Collective Action”. University of Chicago, pp.8-10. RP 9/8/13 \*\*We do not endorse gendered language\*\*

Expanding on an example from Anscombe we may **consider a** case where a **man is making tea**.12 Let us suppose **he** (i) **fills** up **the kettle**, (ii) **turns on the stove**, (iii) **puts the water [in] on** to boil, (iv) **places a tea bag** in each of several cups, (v) **waits for the** kettle to **whistle, and** then (vi) **pours the** boiling **water** into each cup. All along as he does first one thing and then another the man is making tea: there is some one thing he is doing throughout: when he is finished doing them all he will have made tea. So here we have **several actions** the performance of which **add**s **up to** the performance of **a single action**. And, furthermore, they all are done with the intention of making tea. So here, also, we have several actions that “share” an intention. But what is involved in this?Let us consider it from the perspective of the explanation of action. The sort of explanation we are interested in here is the one investigated by Anscombe in which **an explanation cites the agent’s reasons for acting. The question “Why?”,** heard in the right way, **is a request for** such an **explanation. If we ask** our man **why he is** filling the kettle he might say he is **heating** some **water.** And when we query this in turn, **he might say** that it’s **because he’s making tea**. Here we see a nested set of explanatory relations. For example, (i) and (ii) are explained with reference to (iii), and (iii) as well as each of the other items on the list— including (i) and (ii)—can be explained by adverting to the fact that the man is making tea: **the reason the man is doing all those things is** that **he is making tea**. The **several actions thus share an explanatory unity**: they are all to be explained as phases or elements of tea-making.13 We could gesture at the same explanatory point by saying that **it is no accident** that the man is filling the kettle—he is filling the kettle precisely because he’s heating water. And it is no accident **that he’s heating water—he is doing that precisely because he is making tea. Unlike a random collocation of actions**, perhaps culled haphazard from a list of actions performed by an agent on one particular day, **these actions are not arbitrarily related, but** rather are **fit together in a unified explanatory series as elements of the action they serve.**

#### To be an agent is to have the ability to rationally self-reflect, because that ability is how we derive reason and value.

Korsgaard // 96

Korsgaard, C. M., Cohen, G. A., & O'Neill, O. (1996). The sources of normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bracketed for clarity

And this sets up a problem no other animal has. It is the problem of the normative. For our capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities [and desires] is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question.  I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? [but] Is this desire really a *reason* to act? The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a *reason*. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward. If the problem springs from reflection then the solution must do so as well. If the problem is that our perceptions and desires might not withstand reflective scrutiny. We [we] have reasons if they do. The normative word ‘reason’ refers to a kind of reflective success. If ‘good’ and ‘right’ are also taken to be intrinsically normative words, names for things that automatically give us reasons, then they too must refer to reflective success. And they do. Think of what they mean when we use them as *exclamations*. ‘Good!’ ‘Right!’ There they mean: I’m satisfied, I’m happy, I’m [and] committed, you’ve convinced me, let’s go. They mean [and] the work of reflection is done.

#### Agency requires universalizability. Universal willing is a prerequisite to self-determination of action. Anything else means desire controls our actions, thus the actor is no longer an agent.

**Korsgaard // 99**

Korsgaard, C. M. (1999). Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant (1st ed., Vol. 3). Spinger.

The second step is to see that particularistic willing makes it impossible for you to distinguish yourself, your principle of choice, from the various incentives on which you act. According to Kant you must always act on some incentive or other, for every action, even action from duty, involves a decision on a proposal: something must suggest the action to you. And in order to will particularistically, you must in each case wholly identify with the incentive of your action. That incentive would be, for the moment, your law, the law that defined your agency or your will. It’s important to see that if you had a particularistic will you would not identify with the incentive as representative of any sort of type, since if you took it as a representative of a type you would be taking it as universal. For instance, you couldn’t say that you decided to act on the inclination of the moment, because you were so inclined. Someone who takes “I shall do the things I am inclined to do, whatever they might be” as his maxim has adopted a universal principle, not a particular one: he has the principle of treating his inclinations as such as reasons. A truly particularistic will must embrace the incentive in its full particularity: it, in no way that is further describable, is the law of such a will. So someone who engages in particularistic willing does not even have a democratic soul. There is only the tyranny of the moment: the complete domination of the agent by something inside him.

#### If an agent regards their purpose as important, they must regard the means as important, one of which is freedom.

**Denying individuals’ independent choice, or outer freedom, is rationally contradictory. As you expand your freedom to limit someone else’s same freedom which results in contradiction and is incoherent, so we can’t limit anyone’s freedom.**

**A universal system of freedoms requires consistency with the omnilateral will.**

Ripstein // 04

[Arthur Ripstein, (University Professor of Law and Philosophy, [University of Toronto](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_org&hl=en&org=8515235176732148308)) "Authority and Coercion" Philosophy & Public Affairs, 32: 2–35, 2004, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00003.x/abstract, DOA:12-16-2017 //] Bracketed for clarity

Kant explains the need for the three branches of government in Rousseau’s vocabulary of the “general will.” Kant finds this concept helpful, since it manages to capture the way in which the specificity of the law and the monopoly on [the law’s] its enforcement do not thereby make it the unilateral imposition of one person’s will upon another. Instead, it is what Kant calls an “omnilateral” will, since all must agree to set up procedures that will make right possible. All must agree, because without such procedures, equal freedom is impossible, and so the external freedom of each is impossible. But the sense in which they must agree is not just that they should agree; it is that they cannot object to being forced to accept those procedures, because any objection would be nothing more than an assertion of the right to use force against others unilaterally. Once the concept of the General Will is introduced, it provides further constraints on the possibility of a rightful condition, and even explains the ways in which a state can legitimately coerce its citizens for reasons other than the redress of private wrongs. Kant’s treatment of these issues of “Public Right” has struck many readers as somewhat perfunctory, especially after his meticulously detailed, if not always transparent, treatment of private right. He treats these issues as he does because he takes them to follow directly from the institution of a social contract. The details of his arguments need not concern us here, because he does not claim that these exhaust the further powers of the state. Instead, he puts them forward as additional powers a state must have if it is to create a rightful condition, and it is the structure of that argument that is of concern here.

#### For the state to maintain its united will, the powerful need to be regulated so they cannot rightfully abuse positions over those subject to them to maintain equal freedom. Coercion is when your circumstance requires adopting another’s purposes because of imbalanced bargaining position.

Ripstein 9 “Force and Freedom.” Arthur Ripstein, 2009. Prof. of Philosophy and Law at University of Toronto. <https://books.google.com/books?id=W_B3oVsdOZUC&pg=PA272&lpg=PA272&dq=%22Kant+argues+that+provision+for+the+poor+follows+directly+from+the+very+idea+of+a+united+will.%22&source=bl&ots=qeZgxmZ4o0&sig=ACfU3U09Kis9KW3g9jVDf3h8LHA3lm7hdg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiW4aCQ3ePzAhX7nWoFHZIQCpIQ6AF6BAgDEAM#v=onepage&q=%22Kant%20argues%20that%20provision%20for%20the%20poor%20follows%20directly%20from%20the%20very%20idea%20of%20a%20united%20will.%22Because%20each%20person%20is%20master%20&f=false> SJMS Bracketed for clarity

Kant argues that provision for the poor follows directly from the very idea of a united will. He remarks that the idea of a united lawgiving will requires that citizens regard the state as existing in perpetuity.6 By this he does not mean to impose an absurd requirement that people live forever, or even the weaker one that it must sustain an adequate population, or make sure that all of its members survive.7 The state does need to maintain its material preconditions, and as we saw in Chapter 7, this need generates its entitlement to “administer the state’s economy and finance.”8 The state’s existence in perpetuity, however, is presented as a pure normative requirement, grounded in its ability to speak and act for everyone. That ability must be able to survive changes in the state’s membership. You are the same person you were a year ago because your normative principle of organization has stayed the same through changes in the matter making you up. As a being entitled to set and pursue your own purposes, you decide what your continuing body will do. That is why your deeds can be imputed to you even after every molecule in your body has changed, and even if you have forgotten what you did. The unity of your agency is created by the normative principle that makes your actions imputable to you.9 In the same way, the state must sustain its basic normative principle of organization through time, even as some members die or move away and new ones are born or move in. As we saw in Chapter 7, its unifying principle—“in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of the state”—is the idea of the original contract, through which people are bound by laws they have given themselves through public institutions.10 The state must have the structure that is required in order for everyone to be bound by it, so that it can legitimately claim to speak and act for all across time. The requirement of unity across time is clear in the cases of legislation by officials: if the official’s decision were only binding while a particular human being held office, a citizen would be entitled to regard laws as void once the official’s term ended. Because each person is master of him- or herself, one person is only bound by the authority of another through the idea of a united will. So the idea of a united will presupposes some manner in which it exists through time. Past legislation, like past agreement, can only bind those who come after if the structure through which laws are made is one that can bind everyone it governs. The solution to this family of problems is a self-sustaining system that guarantees that all citizens stand in the right relation to each other and, in particular, do not stand in any relation inconsistent with their sharing a united will. The most obvious way in which people could fail to share such a will is through relations of private dependence through which one person is subject to the choice of another. A serf or slave does not share a united will with his or her lord or master, so these forms of relationship are inconsistent with a rightful condition. Yet the same relation of dependence can arise through a series of rightful actions. The problem of poverty, on Kant’s analysis, is exactly that: the poor are completely subject to the choice of those in more fortunate circumstances [the rich]. Although Kant argues that there is an ethical duty to give to charity,11 the crux of his argument is that dependence on private charity is inconsistent with its benefactor and beneficiary sharing the united will that is required for them to live together in a rightful condition. The difficulty is that the poor person is subject to the choice of those who have more: they are entitled to use their powers as they see fit, and so the decision whether to give to those in need, or how much to give, or to which people, is entirely discretionary.12 So long as there are a variety of unmet wants, private persons are entitled to determine which ones to attach priority to.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the omnilateral will. Prefer:

#### Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify a standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

### Advocacy

#### Thus, the resolution Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. CP and PICs affirm because they do not disprove my general thesis. CX checks on spec shells and spec doesn’t matter under Ripstein because it’s a general statement.

### Offense

#### [1] A libertarian model of labor rights would not allow union monopolization, but it would not curtail a right to strike.

Hill 11 Henry Hill (Freelance political writer), “A free market in labour: libertarians, employment and the unions,” Adam Smith Institute. 12 September 2011. <https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/regulation-industry/a-free-market-in-labour-libertarians-employment-and-the-unions> SJMS

Trade unions are an interesting problem for libertarians. Although they are essentially anti-liberal forces, most attacks on trade unions historically stem from the authoritarian Right. Too often the conflict between unions and business leads to many potential subscribers to libertarianism supporting decidedly illiberal business practises, due to a misconception that one can either be pro-business or pro-union. For a libertarian, employment must be approached in a manner that is independent of the interests and prejudices of either side. Employment legislation inspired by libertarian principles would at once counter the serious business abuses that justify trade unions whilst removing the ability of unions to act as monopolies. A libertarian believes that human beings should be free to undertake exchanges with each other free from force, fraud or coercion. Trade unions found their origins in defending workers against abuse by business, abuse often supported by the state. A libertarian state that functioned properly would not collude with anti-liberal business practises and would protect people from forceful, fraudulent or coercive practises that might necessitate trades union membership. But libertarian employment law would undermine unions too. Like most things, labour is a commodity. A job is a contract between an employer and an employee in which the latter’s labour is traded at a given rate for remuneration in wages and perhaps other perks. Despite this trades unions are not seen as what they are in business terms: cartels working to inflate prices (wage costs) by restricting the labour market. While the horrors of the closed shop and the flying picket have (for the most part, student politics aside) disappeared, the fundamental leverage behind a strike is the idea that a union can exercise a labour monopoly and use the threat of withdrawal to coerce employers. No libertarian system would ban strikes or unions. People are free to associate with each other as they wish and no libertarian would argue that a worker does not have the right to withdraw their labour. What is critical is that a libertarian recognises the right of an employer to replace that labour. In the same way in which a libertarian government would fight monopolist practises on the business side of industry, so it should strive to create a free market in labour. Not only would this be morally right in accordance with libertarian principles, but it would allow the market to adjust British wages back to internationally competitive levels.

#### [2] So long as society is not completely libertarian, libertarians should support union’s rights as a check on other threats to liberty.

Levine 12 Peter Levine (Associate Dean for Research and the Lincoln Filene Professor of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Tufts University's Tisch College of Civic Life. Concerned about civic education, civic engagement, and democratic reform in the United States and elsewhere.), “libertarians, violence, and unions,” A Blog for Civic Renewal. December 13th, 2012. <https://peterlevine.ws/?p=10340> SJMS

3. Unions promote political pluralism and countervailing force. We can debate whether a libertarian utopia is feasible and desirable, but we don’t live in one. We live under a powerful and pervasive state that not only influences corporations and markets, but is constantly used by them. So the employer with whom an individual laborer contracts is not a free individual; it is a corporation that has likely been regulated, subsidized, and protected by the state. One could imagine stripping the state of most of its powers, but that is not happening. As long as the state remains influential, liberty is best served by pluralism: by setting many different interests in peaceful conflict. Killing unions, the main countervailing force to industry, will reduce pluralism–and thus liberty.

#### [3] Recognizing the right to strike would transform dominating power structures.

Lazar 20 [Orlando; 10/6/20; St. Edmund Hall & Balliol College, University of Oxford; “Work, Domination, and the False Hope of Universal Basic Income,” <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-020-09487-9>] Justin

If workers can simply leave and subsist on an adequate level of basic income, then they can very credibly threaten to do so rather than suffer under the dominating power structures of their workplaces. More than this, employers will know that their workers have this option. In response to some gross overstep of managerial power this might take the form of an actual threat, but in normal circumstances it would function as an implicit threat on the part of the worker. The threat to strike works in the same way: where the right to strike is protected, that threat functions quietly and implicitly, and needs only rarely become explicit. The genuine ability to exit would become more than a tool to contest, after the fact, managerial decisions; it would be an ever-present possibility, raising the bargaining power of individual workers and reshaping their relationship to their employers. Rather than just the ability to exit, an adequate UBI gives workers various abilities—by the reckoning of one supporter, the powers to ‘enter, undominatedly stay, exit, and restart all kinds of social relations, starting with work relations’ (Casassas 2016, p. 9). In this sense the power structures of individual workplaces would be transformed, with managers no longer able to monopolise the residual authority described in the previous section.

#### Additionally, this means if the state denies workers this right to strike, the state will unregulate the powerful and create imbalanced bargaining position – thus violating the united will and the omnilateral will. The state must recognize this right to strike.

#### [4] Striking is a fundamental protection of dignity and the right of the worker to resist abusive coercive employee-employer relationships.

Mason 18 [Elinor. Elinor Mason is a senior lecturer in philosophy at Edinburgh University. On striking, and the recognition that ethics are a collective affair. “On striking, and the recognition that ethics are a collective affair”. 4-1-2018. openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/on-striking-and-recognition-that-ethics-are-collective-affair/.] SJ//VM

It is worth situating any remarks about the ethics of strike action in the legal context. In Britain, strike action is not civil disobedience, it is legal, and permitted within the framework of employment law. This situation was hard won, by generations of workers who faced terrible working conditions. At the start of the industrial revolution, workers faced day to day working conditions that were often unsanitary and dangerous, no job security, exploitative wages, no paid time off, arbitrary inequalities, and of course, no pensions. In the years following the Industrial Revolution, workers fought for the right to organize, and formed trade unions in order to use collective power to resist unfair treatment by their employers. The overall justification for a framework that allows workers to unionize, and to pursue strike action under some circumstances, is that the possibility of striking provides a safeguard against exploitation, a protection for workers in a situation of power imbalance. **Ethical Issues** 1. Preconditions Obviously, there are various [preconditions that must be met](https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/kieran-oberman/just-and-unjust-strikes) for a strike to be ethically justified. First, the question of whether what the employers are doing is unfair or not arises. The pensions issue is incredibly complicated, and I do not pretend to understand all the [actuarial details](https://twitter.com/mikeotsuka?lang=en). It seems though, that we have a just cause here, that the offers that have been made are unfair. It is worth pointing out that it is not just a question of how much money there is or will be in the pension fund, there are also ethical questions: a question about how risk should be distributed, and a question about what else the universities are doing with their money. Pensions are a kind of wage, and our wages are not paid out of any particular fund, but out of the universities’ general resources. So we should be wary of accepting frameworks for discussion that attempt to reduce all the issues to financial ones. Relatedly, if a strike is to be justified, the cause must be realistic. There is no point in striking for something that cannot be obtained. But again, we should be careful here. What counts as unrealistic depends on the values people hold. There was a time when votes for women seemed unrealistic. Twenty years ago, marriage equality might have seemed an unrealistic goal. But some people pursued those goals anyway. If we take for granted that vice chancellors will be paid a fortune and that wages will be linked to student enrolment, perhaps fair wages for lecturers is not realistic. But why would we take those things for granted? Finally, of course, less disruptive methods of persuasion should be used first. Striking is a last resort, it is only permissible when negotiation has stalled. We start by trying to persuade the employer on the basis of the reasons: that a policy or proposal is unfair, unnecessary, that there are alternatives. It is only if that fails that we should move to strike action. **2. Harm** The primary aim of a strike is to harm the interests of the employer. Public Sector workers, will, inevitably end up harming the public too. In the public sector, the work we do is a public good, and if we withdraw our labour, we hurt the public. How much harm there is depends on what area, and what sort of public good we are talking about – the potential harm from doctors striking is greater than the potential harm we do here. The harm we do to our students in striking is nonetheless significant, and it needs to be defended. I think that the harm here is justified, and I will try to defend that in what follows, but even if you do not agree with me about this case, I aim to provide a way to think clearly about what might justify this sort of harm. First though, it is worth thinking a bit more about the nature of the harm, and what role it has. We might think of students as innocent bystanders in all this, and we might think that our duty as teachers is to minimize the harm to them. I don’t think that is quite right: students are innocent bystanders in one sense, they are innocent anyway, they are not the ones deciding to cut our pensions. However, harm to students is an essential part of strike action, and we should face that head on. Here is why. Strike action occurs when negotiation has not worked. If the suggested changes are truly unjust, what should we do? Should we simply accept the injustice? The recent history of Conservative government policy in the UK, starting with Thatcher and continued by Cameron, is to weaken the power of the Unions and weaken the right to strike. Their idea is that the way to deal with unjust working condition is through individual employment tribunals. If I am being badly treated by my employer, I should initiate a tribunal. But this deprives us of the power of collective action. The whole point of the union is that we are stronger together. We bargain collectively, and so the employers cannot pit us against each other as individuals. Furthermore, we threaten collectively. Harm to the employer’s interests is a necessary part of what makes collective action effective. It is because a harm is threatened that the employer has reason to change their mind. When the employer is a public body and the work a public good, then harm to the public – the students, in this case – is inevitable. To put it another way, striking is a form of coercion. We want to make it impossible for them to say ‘no’ to us. The preconditions for a justified strike are that the workers offered the reasons that were directly relevant – the reasons relating to justice, and that failed. So now the workers offer a different sort of reason: coercive practical reasons. As I said, the right to strike is a protection against exploitation. We have the right to move on to threat of harm when our reasonable requests are ignored. Compare this situation: imagine that a student plagiarises an essay. We have both a reasons based system to discourage plagiarism (we make clear that it is wrong and unfair) and a practical reason as back up (if you plagiarize, we will take punitive action). The punitive action is essentially harmful, that’s why it is effective, and of course, that is why it is only justified when all else has failed. **3. Justifying harm** First, as I said above, I think that the pensions deal we have been offered is unfair in its own terms. But our goal here is not simply to get our pensions back. Long term, we are trying to protect the University, just as the [junior doctors’ strike](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-34775980) in 2016 was partly about the future of the NHS. If the university mistreats its employees, it will not have as good a pool of staff to draw on, and the quality of the institution will suffer. We impose harms on this generation of students, but we hope that future generations of students will be able to take advantage of a strong university system. More broadly, a strike is usually about more than just the issue at hand. Women factory workers in the early twentieth century went on [strike for equal pay](http://www.unionhistory.info/equalpay/). They were not just striking for equal pay as individuals, they were protesting about gender inequity. The strike has an expressive message. Most of your lecturers striking here are doing more than asking for their pensions back: they are sending an expressive message to University management. For many of us, the message is that we want the University to be a public good, a shared asset, a place of learning and teaching, not a business. Our students are not consumers, and market models are not the best way to run universities. In striking, we are referencing a long history of effective strike action, and we are showing that we are willing to fight for the things we value. This is not to deny that the right to strike could be abused, or could be ineffective. In the end, it is an empirical matter whether the right to strike has done more good than harm, or done more harm than good. It is not an empirical matter that is easy to settle either: labour history is one of the most ideologically polluted areas of human enquiry. On the one hand, there are the supporters of the right to strike, who point out that organization has brought us workers’ rights and tolerable working conditions. On the other hand there are those who argue, with Thatcher, that striking hurts growth; hurts industry; hurts the economy, and should be stopped. It may seem like a far fetched comparison, but think of the right to bear arms, as enshrined in the American constitution. That right has the same basic justification as the right to strike, it is there to protect the ordinary person from tyranny and exploitation by more powerful groups. However, the right to bear arms does not actually function like that. It is not a safeguard against tyranny, but rather causes immense harm. We can imagine that this is how Thatcher saw the right to strike: as a right that does not achieve its aims and causes unnecessary harm. But the opposing view is that the legal right to strike is an effective right, it does protect us, and can be, and is usually, used in a judicious way. But as I say, this is an empirical matter, and we should all know more about labour history. **4. Collective Action** Finally, I will close with a couple of thoughts about collective action. As I said, we stand for more than just this issue. That worries some people: they will not march under a banner that they do not fully endorse. Here is an interesting philosophical/sociological thought about that. As I said, the anti-union movement encourages us away from collective action and towards individual action. One of Margaret Thatcher’s major victories was to [take away the right to strike in solidarity](http://www.unionhistory.info/timeline/1960_2000_Narr_Display.php?Where=NarTitle+contains+%27Anti-Union+Legislation%3A+1980-2000%27) with other workers who have a different employer. Perhaps it is not coincidental that there is also a cultural movement towards thinking of one’s values as a very individual thing, a personal thing. Philosophically, there is one clear mistake there, and a less clear one. The clear mistake is thinking that values are not universalisable. As [Kant](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/) points out, it is part of the definition of values that they are universalisable. Values are not personal in the sense that they apply only to the person who holds them. The less clear point though, and more relevant here, is that integrity does not require that we never sign up for anything we are not fully on board with every detail of. We shouldn’t be too precious about our own values. The mistake here might be characterized as fetishization, or a quest for purity. Think of the voter who says, ‘I can’t vote for X because of something she has done that I don’t agree with, so I will not vote at all’. This is a mistake. We should think of the bigger picture, sometimes be willing to throw our lot in with those we disagree with in pursuit of bigger goals. [Solidarity](https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/mihaela-mihai/plea-to-my-students) is important, and solidarity requires that we think of our own values as robust enough to bear some minor disagreements. We should value solidarity; we should engage in it. We hugely appreciate the solidarity of our students: thank you.

### UV

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory, Drop the Debater, and no RVIs – 1AR theory is the only recourse to check back infinite NC abuse, since it’s impossible to preempt NC abuse within the AC. Aff gets drop the debater, since 1AR is too short to win both theory and substance, and 2N doesn’t get RVIs, since RVIs uniquely deter the 1AR from checking NC abuse since the 1A knows the 2N can spend 6 minutes on the RVI and win.

#### [2] The neg has to defend there is a moral prohibition on the resolution – to clarify they cannot trigger permissibility or presumption or read skep

#### [a] Logic -If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral i.e. drinking water is not morally right or wrong but if I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions.

#### [b] Reciprocity – I’ve defended that the resolution is morally good they have to defend that it’s morally bad

#### [3] Consequences Fail:

#### [a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict or calculate.

#### [b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events.

#### [c] No extension o/w – it’s the fallacy of origin we don’t maximize oxygen even though we need it

#### [3] Permissibility and presumption substantively affirm:

#### [a] If I told you my name is Michael; you would believe that absent evidence to believe otherwise which proves that statements are more likely to be true.

#### [b] Negating an obligation requires proving a prohibition – they prohibit the aff action.

#### [4] The role of the ballot is to vote affirmative if the *judgment* expressed by the resolution is true, vote neg if the judgement is false.

#### The resolution should be viewed as a judgment, not a proposition. Judgments are ideas cognitively held in the mind of real subjects, propositions are linguistic artifacts that act as placeholders in computational processes.

#### Prefer:

#### [a] Inescapable: the judge is a thinking subject and not a computer – so long as the judge evaluates any claim on the flow they are committed to coming to judgments about those claims and about the round as a whole. Even if the resolution is used as a proposition in these claims, that is only as a heuristic to making judgments.

#### [b] Co-opts the predictability benefits of truth-testing without the harms of blippy NIBs and a prioris.

#### Implications:

#### [a] Process and agent CPs don’t negate – so long as an agent determines that an alternative is not likely to occur, they can make the moral judgment that action is good.

### Method

#### [1] Ideal theory is capable of radical possibilities.

Holmstrom 12 [Holmstrom, Nancy [Prof. Emeritus @ Rutgers]. "Response to Charles Mills's." Radical Philosophy Review 15.2 (2012): 325-330.]

We have to speak to people where they are, he says, and that means appealing to core values of liberalism: individualism, equal rights and moral egalitarianism. Against what he calls the conventional wisdom among radi- cals, he argues that there is no inherent incompatibility between these values and a radical agenda. If these values are suitably interpreted, I think he is absolutely right. Over two hundred years ago, Mary Wollstonecraft and Toussaint Louverture took the abstract universalistic principles of the French Revolution and extended them to groups they were intended to exclude. Gradually and incompletely women and blacks and landless men have achieved the democratic rights promised to all (in words) by the anti-feudal revolution. So I agree with Charles that such universalistic principles have great value; even if usually applied in self-serving ways, they have a deeply radical potential and it would be foolish of radicals to reject them, any more than we should reject all of the technological developments of the Indus- trial Revolution which also developed with the rise of capitalism. in fact, few American radicals have rejected these aspects of liberalism in their politi- cal practice but have been their strongest champions since the Revolution; socialists of all kinds helped to build the labor and civil rights movements.‘

#### [2] Universality is the best way of solving oppression.

Mills 18 Charles W. Mills. “Black Radical Kantianism.” Res Philosophica, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 1–33 https:// doi.org/ 10.11612/ resphil.1622 SJ//VM Organic Intellectual

So the common theme is the demand for equal recognition, equal dignity, equal respect, equal personhood, in a white-supremacist world where disrespect rather than respect is the norm, the default mode, for blacks. A racesensitive Kantianism not merely purged of Kant’s own racism but attuned (in a way nominally color-blind Kantianism is not) to these racially demarcated particularities for the different sub-sections of the human population— a black radical Kantianism—will thus understand the need to “universalize” the categorical imperative in a very different way to register the crucial differences between those socially recognized as persons and those socially recognized as sub-persons. I suggest that we divide the different moral relations involved into two categories based on whether one is a member of the privileged race, the R1s, or the subordinated race, the R2s. That gives us the following six-way breakdown: (1) one’s duty as an R1 to give respect to oneself, (2) one’s duty as an R1 to give respect to one’s fellow-R1s, (3) one’s duty as an R1 to give respect to R2s, (4) one’s duty as an R2 to give respect to oneself, (5) one’s duty as an R2 to give respect to one’s fellow-R2s, and (6) one’s duty as an R2 to give respect to R1s. Historically, each of these will have been affected by race (as racism), leaving an ideological and psychological legacy, habits of disrespect, that will shape the “inclinations” most likely to be determinative and most imperatively to be resisted. Instead of (what could be graphically thought of as) “horizontal” relations of reciprocal and symmetrical race-indifferent respect among equal raceless persons, the R1s will have historically respected themselves and each other as R1s, while “vertically” looking down on, disrespecting, R2s as inferiors. In turn, the R2s will have been required to show racial deference to the R1s, looking up to them as R2s, and—having most probably internalized their lower ontological status—will have been prone to regard both themselves and their fellows with racial contempt.

#### [3] Pluralism is good.

**Bleiker 14** – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable