## 1

#### THE DISCOURSE OF THE "RACE WAR" IS A RACIST TOOL USED TO PROPAGATE THE NARRATIVE THAT WHITES ARE THE VICTIM OF WHITE GENOCIDE.  THIS RACIST MYTH IS USED TO JUSTIFY ACTUAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND LINK TURNS RESISTANCE

Miller 12/27 MICHAEL E MILLER (REPORTER FOR WASHINGTON POST) ‘The War of Races’: How a hateful ideology echoes through American history, 12/27/2019, WASHINGTON POST

THE WAR OF RACES,” proclaimed a headline in the New York Times. The Colfax Massacre, as it would come to be known, is one chapter in the long and bloody history of “race war” in America. It is the most radical of racist visions: an apocalyptic ideology driven by the belief that whites are in imminent danger of being wiped out. Though the ideology peaked during Reconstruction, when the Klan began waging terror to roll back the advances of newly emancipated blacks across the South, it remains very much alive today. In the past five years, as white supremacy has surged in the United States, experts say there has been an uptick in attempts or plots to spark a race war. They range from Dylann Roof’s slaughter of nine African Americans at a Bible study in Charleston in 2015 to a hatred-fueled sword attack in New York City in 2017 to the arrest this August of a neo-Nazi in Las Vegas who was allegedly making a bomb to “assist in a race war.” There is a tradition of this sort of thinking or fantasizing,” said Mark Pitcavage, an expert on right-wing extremism at the ADL, who called the idea of race war “a staple” of hardcore white supremacy. The idea of race war tends to resurface “during moments of intense activism against white racism,” such as Reconstruction or, more recently, the Black Lives Matter movement, said Ibram X. Kendi, a professor at American University and the author of “Stamped from the Beginning: The Definitive History of Racist Ideas in America” and “How to Be an Antiracist.” By painting themselves as the victims, “defenders of white racism have been able to galvanize large numbers of white people into their organizations.” A threat older than the United States The concept is older than the country, beginning not with slavery but with white colonists’ anxiety over being outnumbered by Native Americans, according to Patrick Breen, a history professor at Providence College. “There was a concern that there would be a genocide if the Indians united,” he said. That fear then helped fuel centuries of violence against Native Americans. With the arrival of enslaved Africans to the English colony of Virginia in 1619, the same fear was soon aimed at blacks, especially in states such as South Carolina, Mississippi and Louisiana, where slaves outnumbered or nearly outnumbered whites by the beginning of the 19th century. The Haitian Revolution, which ended in 1804 with the slaughter of whites who had not fled the former French slave colony, frightened many American slaveholders, Breen said. “The story they tell themselves — which is not exactly right — was that blacks got in control and began killing whites willy-nilly,” he said. “Before the Civil War, you had people who argued that whites and blacks could not live together unless it was a situation where blacks were under the control of whites,” Pitcavage said. “They argued that if you had emancipation, you’d inevitably have race war.” American slaveholders used this threat of a race war in the United States to put down revolts and preserve their power, as in 1831 when whites killed 120 blacks in the wake of Nat Turner’s rebellion in Virginia.

#### They add:

**By the late 1970s, white supremacists had shifted from trying to maintain white dominance to warning that the very survival of the white race was at risk. “From the ’70s onward, white supremacy takes on an apocalyptic tone,”** said Pitcavage. “**Race war is a part of that.”** Pitcavage sorts white supremacist adherents of race war into three categories. “Reluctant” race warriors don’t want conflict but believe it’s inevitable, so they prepare by stockpiling food and weapons, he said. “Window of opportunity” race warriors may or not desire conflict, but they believe it must happen soon while whites are still in the majority. Finally, he said, there are “accelerationists” who want to bring about the destruction of society and see race war as a means to speed that up. That’s what white supremacist serial killer Joseph Paul Franklin was trying to do when he targeted blacks, Jews and interracial couples across the country from 1977 to 1980. The murder spree inspired neo-Nazi leader William Pierce to pen racist novels “Hunter,” in which one man’s quest to kill interracial couples sparks an uprising, and “The Turner Diaries,” in which such an uprising leads to nuclear war and the annihilation of nonwhites. The latter book, in particular, would inspire generations of white supremacists, from Oklahoma City bomber Timothy Mc­Veigh — who had excerpts of the book in his getaway car — to The Order, a terrorist group that robbed banks, bombed a theater and a synagogue and killed a Jewish radio host in the 1980s. It was a member of The Order who would later pen the infamous “14 words” from prison. **David Lane’s [the] slogan — “We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children” — reflects the demographic anxiety at the heart of white supremacy and its preoccupation with race war.** Thirty years later, America is once again in the midst of a surge in white supremacy, according to Pitcavage and other experts. Today, “The Turner Diaries” is circulated online. Mobs no longer gather on horseback but on college campuses or, more often, on anonymous Internet message boards. Although **it has evolved somewhat over time, the idea of race war is a common thread that connects the Klan to Charles Manson and Dylann Roof, Lane said. “**Race war is an idea that emerges at certain points in American history and fades at others,” Breen said. “**What has made it such a powerful idea, however, is not some real danger of a race war itself, but the politically useful nature of these charges. Politicians have used racially inflammatory rhetoric like this to help them attain power, whether by mobilizing one’s base or suppressing their opponents, but long after the last ballots have been counted, the legacy of the racial demagoguery remains.”**

#### DTD

#### [1] Reversibility: once oppressive rhetoric is used it cannot be taken back – you cannot sever out of your reps, the same way someone who says the n-word must be held accountable.

#### [2] Norm setting: we are part of a larger debate community with extensive norms – letting bad discourse be rampant kills the community and recreates forms of oppression – the K holds students accountable.

**[3] Competition: debate is an educational competition with no place for offensive rhetoric – that kills access to the lasting benefit debate provides and encourages students to quit.**

#### Me saying it is not a double turn because it’s about the context of the slogan they utilize it for not the the words in a blanket statement

## 2

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement

#### Scalar methods rely on intervention – the persuasion of certain DA or advantages sway decisions – only a binary resolves that and prevents intervention which is the biggest impact under fairness.

#### Substantive skews – there is always a more correct side of the topic but we compensate for flaws in the lit.

#### Most inclusive because other ROBs allow for oppression Olympics allowing personal lives and experiences to factor in decisions.

#### The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional – that outweighs – all your arguments presume the judge evaluates them and controls the IL to resistance strategies since the rules of the activity is what we base our arguments on. Without jurisdiction it allows for judges to hack against minorities- only jurisdiction keeps them in line. Means you auto negate because no matter what the affirmative says, you simply cannot evalute their arguments.

#### Logical arguments aren’t justified in a vacuum – they’re in the context of the resolution so we only defend the resolutional application – misapplications are infinitely regressive since every argument can be used to justify something bad so you should frame this debate through specificity

#### Negate:

#### 1] The aff doesn’t disprove the truth or falsity of the resolution so presume negative - statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

## 3

#### *The meta-ethic is bindingness.*

#### Ethics must begin with a re-orientation towards the subject since modernity is created by persons. Ethics must make equal personhood, rights, and freedoms accessible for all.

Mills 18 “Black Radical Kantianism.” Res Philosophica, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 1–33 https:// doi.org/ 10.11612/ resphil.1622 B1ACK ZD

We start, appropriately enough, with personhood. Deontological liberalism is, of course, classically distinguished from consequentialist liberalism in making persons and their natural rights foundational rather than social welfare. In Rawls’s (1999, 24) famous Kant-inspired indictment: “Utili- tarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons.” Kant tells us in the Groundwork (Kant 1964, 96) that “Rational beings . . . are called persons because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves,” so that one formulation of the categorical imperative is “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” [italics removed]. Persons are themselves the makers of the universal law that morally binds them, so that, as self-legislators, “Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (103). But Kant also tells us (though not in the Groundwork) that blacks “can be educated but only as servants (slaves),” that “The Negro can be disciplined and cultivated, but is never genuinely civilized. He falls of his own accord into savagery,” and that (along with Native Americans) “Blacks cannot govern themselves. They thus serve only for slaves” (see Mills 2005 for details). I submit, as I have argued elsewhere (Mills 2005; 2014), that such claims cannot plausibly be regarded as mere “inconsistencies,” but point to a radical Kantian differentiation in the ranks of humanity between those who, being capable of autonomy, reach the person threshold, and those (“natural slaves”) who, incapable of autonomy and self-legislation, do not. So as stated at the beginning, my contention is that Kant is working with a philosophical anthropology of persons and sub-persons, determined by respective degrees of rationality and proneness to character defect, which is why, in its application to this particular sub-section of humanity, the categorical imperative permits (seemingly) inequitable treatment, such as enslavement. Within critical philosophy of race, as with the metaphysics of race, competing analyses have been given of racism. But one candidate that would obviously fit perfectly here is Joshua Glasgow’s (2009) suggestion that we conceptualize racism as race-based disrespect. Blacks, then—not being capable of self-government—are appropriately deserving of disrespect rather than respect, and are creatures without essential dignity. So how does a critically rewritten discourse of “race” reconceptualize this situation—that is, a modern world [is] shaped by Atlantic racial slavery (unlike the non-racial slavery of antiquity and the medieval epoch), and other varieties of racial domination in the form of colonialism, imperialism, expropriative white settlement, Jim Crow, and apartheid? My suggestion is that the great theoretical insight and contribution of the Afro-modern political tradition is the recognition that such a world is metaphysically dramatically divergent from its Euro-modern political representations, whether mainstream or radical. To the extent that the dominant varieties of colonial/imperial liberalism were originally racist (Mehta 1999; Pitts 2005; Hobson 2012), presup- posing a hierarchy of European superiors and non-European inferiors (biologically and/or culturally), they got the social ontology wrong in an obvious way. But to the extent that postwar postcolonial (at least nom- inally) liberalism retroactively sanitized its racial past and transformed this hierarchical essentialist metaphysics into an ontology of morally equal and symmetrically positioned atomic individuals, it still continues, I would contend, to get the social ontology wrong. The Afro-modern claim is that neither is correct, because (contra the first) blacks and other people of color are equal and because (contra the second) the socially constructed inequalities and their historic legacy cannot be metaphysically ignored considering how fundamentally and asymmetrically they have shaped the modern world order and the raced individuals within that order. In other words, the Afro-modern tradition is insistent that modernity is established on and structured by a social ontology of race. It is not, of course—assuming meta-ethical objectivism—that these racist social conven- tions and structures actually make blacks and other people of color less than full persons. But the denial to them of social recognition as full persons, depriving them of equal rights, freedoms, and protections, and unjustly privileging whites at their expense, foundationally affects both these racial groups and the moral and political dynamics of the societies so created. Objectively, their personhood is unaffected, along with the rights, freedoms, and protections they should have, as persons. But intersubjectively, insofar as white social recognition is dominant and determinant, their socially effective personhood—the rights, freedoms, and protections they actually have—is denied.5 Thus, we have an ontology—races as central existents profoundly shaping one’s being as an individual—but an ontology socially rather than biologically created—the product of “sociogenesis,” in Frantz Fanon’s (1991 [1967]) famous coinage. As George Fredrickson (2015 [2002], 11–12) has pointed out, pre- modern social ontologies are characterized by social hierarchies of multiple kinds. So even if race existed then (which Fredrickson denies, as an expo- nent of the short periodization), it would not have been sharply differen- tiated from the others. It is the advent of modernity, which is supposed to flatten these systems of ascriptive hierarchy into simple personhood (as in the conventional portrayal of Kant), that sets racial inferiority so sharply into relief, since the R2s are then being stigmatized as less than human while the R1s become (making allowance for gender differentiation) coextensive with the human. The Afro-modern diagnosis of a metaphysics of personhood that is actually racialized is thus different from standard Euro-modern discussions of personhood and its implications for ethico- political theory. It is making a different claim than the anti-utilitarian critique within liberalism that it permits the disrespecting of persons. The putative problem with utilitarianism is not that it regards a set of persons as sub-persons, but that the fungibility of (equal) persons opens the door to the rights-violations of some (equal) persons if social welfare for (equal) persons as a whole can thereby be maximized. The Afro-modern analysis is saying that, independent of this issue, some persons are not recognized as equal persons in the first place. So it is also different from the Marxist critique from outside liberalism. The putative problem here, as originally stated in “On the Jewish Question” (Marx 2000) and later in Capital (Marx 1990 [1976], 279–280), is that in assuming individuals of equal moral and juridical status, equal recognized personhood, liberalism’s social ontology is ignoring the effects of the material differences in wealth and property ownership in the liberal state that in reality make the (white) working class effectively unequal. But the Afro-modern claim is that for blacks and other people of color, not even ethico-juridical equality, limited as it may be, is attained, so that their positioning in the liberal state is different from the beginning.

#### [A] Uncertainty – an inability to know others experience and structural positionality makes empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### [B] Constitutivism – Morality faces regress where we can continue asking “why.” Practical reason is the only unescapable and binding authority because to ask why I should be a reasoner concedes it’s authority since you’re actively reasoning.

#### That justifies universality – a] any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends b] Only universalizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

#### Prefer:

#### [1] Normativity outweighs: a] Obligations – lack of it doesn’t generate stable ethics so it permits anything except the one thing it condemns b] Collapses – injustices need universal ideal principles to ground them and explain why they are wrong which otherwise justifies skep since no external reason to follow ethics c] Necessity – every arg presupposes ability to set and pursue ends which collapses to my framework d] Is/Ought Gap – description of injustices only tells us what exists, not how to properly fix it or act with it which leaves all harms unresolved.

#### [2] Consequences Fail: a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict. b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. c] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify because we commit the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Negate:

#### 1] Journalists are required to respect those they report on, thus, advocacy journalism is required to alleviate suffering

Leshilo 18 Thabo Leshilo [A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals.] “Morality and Journalists: Objectivity versus Duty of Care” 13 July 2018, Johannesburg https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/26530/Morality%20and%20Journalists%20(markup)\_2.pdf?sequence=1

My view is that Detached Kevin Carter used the Sudanese child as a mere means to fame and (some mini-) fortune by simply photographing her and selling her photo; he did not treat her as a human being worthy of respect when he failed to come to her aid. In another formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant expresses the universal imperative of duty thus: “Act as though the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, a universal law of nature” ([1785] 2005, 24). The word ‘maxim’ refers to the basis on which one acts: what informs one’s action. What, indeed, would become of the world if all of us were to refuse to help people facing great hardship the way (some) journalists claim to be entitled to do? Kant also implores us to act beneficently, and might as well have had the Detached Kevin Carter in mind when he admonishes someone in a position to help, who does not: What concern of mine is it? Let each one be as happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself; I won’t take anything from him or even envy him; but I have no desire to contribute to his welfare or help him in time of need. (25) According to Kant, although it is possible that a maxim such as the one quoted above should be a universal law of nature “it is impossible to will that it [be] so . . . [f]or a will that brought that about would conflict with itself, since instances can often arise in which the person in question would need the love and sympathy of others, and he would have no hope of getting the help he desires, being robbed of it by this law of nature springing from his own will” (ibid.). Expanding on this, Charles Fried (2007,206) says that we are all required to recognise that human beings have certain basic rights to which they are all entitled as human beings: These rights are subject to qualification only in order to ensure equal protection of the same rights in others. In this sense the view is Kantian; it requires recognition of persons as ends, and forbids the overriding of their most fundamental interests for the purpose of maximizing the happiness or welfare of others. (ibib.) Fried goes on to say that this recognition that all humans have moral entitlements, correlates with the concept of respect – the attitude which is manifested when a person observes the constraints of the principle of morality in his dealings with another person, and thus respects the basic rights of the other. Respect is also an attitude which may be taken in part as defining the concept of a person: persons are those who are obliged to observe the constraints of the principle of morality in their dealings with each other, and thus show respect towards each other. (207) On Kant’s account, a person commands respect by virtue of being a rational being. “I maintain that man – and in general every rational being – exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be used by this or that at its discretion” ([1785] 2005, 28). I argue that Kant’s ‘Formula of the End in Itself’ (or ‘Principle of Humanity’) compels journalists to go the extra mile to help alleviate the suffering of those that they report on, and even take action to save their lives. When they fail to do that and instead simply report on such plight with the clinical detachment displayed by Detached Kevin Carter towards the Sudanese child, they simply use their subjects as mere means to make money and build their careers. By acting this way, journalists act unjustly and wrongfully. That is because a victim of such tragedy would ordinarily expect another human being to help to alleviate his or her suffering.

#### 2] The aff has a deontological obligation to be topical.

#### Nebel 15: Jake Nebel,"The Priority of Resolutional Semantics by Jake Nebel," Briefly, <https://www.vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/>

A second strategy denies that such pragmatic benefits are relevant. This strategy is more deontological. One version of this strategy appeals to the importance of consent or agreement. Suppose that you give your opponents prior notice that you’ll be affirming the September/October 2012 resolution instead of the current one. There is a sense in which your affirmation of that resolution is now predictable: your opponents know, or are in a position to know, what you will be defending. And suppose that the older resolution is conducive to better (i.e., more fair and more educational) debate. Still, it’s unfair of you to expect your opponents to follow suit. Why? Because they didn’t agree to debate that topic. They registered for a tournament whose invitation specified the current resolution, not the Sept/Oct 2012 resolution or a free-for-all. The “social contract” argument for topicality holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic. This claim might be contested, depending on what constitutes implicit consent. What is less contestable is this: given that *some* proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism. Someone who wishes to debate only the announced resolution has a strong claim against changing the topic, and no one has a stronger claim against debating the announced resolution (ignoring, for now, some possible exceptions to be discussed in the next subsection). So it is unfair to expect your opponent to debate anything other than the announced resolution. This unfairness is a constraint on the pursuit of education or other goods: it wrongs and is unjustifiable to your opponent.

## 4

#### We advocate for the 1ACs method of scenario analysis sans their telos of affirming the stance of the abolitionist to endorse the deconstruction of racist, unobjective reporting..

#### That solves the aff – their method of solvency is about their scenario analysis of the resolution and developing political grammars of resistance to learn about fugitivity. We’ll break this down – it’s not enough to say “advocative media is bad” in the abstract, rather, they have to have material offense from their advocacy that solves anti-blackness – if their offense is “discussions good” or “planning good” then there’s no reason the telos of their revolution is necessary.

#### They fail the control-F test in their method page – all of their cards are about race war generally and not objective media – card zero why the telos is key.

#### Their authors prove that media isn’t key and that the broader framework is better – proves the counterplan solves case- ss below

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#### The net benefit is incompleteness.

Harney and Moten 11 – Stephano Harney and Fred Moten March 2021 "Refusing Completion: A Conversation" <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/116/379446/refusing-completion-a-conversation/> (Stefano Harney is the Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University., Fred Moten is the professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa)//Elmer \*\*Modified for Problematic Rhetoric

FM: Maybe what we always also want to be doing is operating under the assumption that when it comes to thought, rigor and generosity are not separate from one another. That “intra-action,” to use Karen Barad’s term, is intra-active with another: that of black study and black studies. That’s where it’s at, as the Godfather would say. That’s what we’re interested in. And that’s also where we’re at in our lives, in our intellectual life together, and in our social life together as friends. It’s just that the syntax and the semantics that we have been given in order to try to understand that double intra-action is inadequate for the most part. We ask ourselves, how do we understand the relation between black study and black studies, and then we have to take two months to try to overcome the fact that “relation” ain’t the right word. In other words, the **intra-action of black study** and black studies **requires** something like what Barad calls “**experimental metaphysics**.” Or, maybe another way to put it is that what’s required are some experiments in anti-metaphysics. Maybe black study is just this continual experiment in anti-metaphysics. SH: All Incomplete is also **about the next town**, about what we heard about the next town, about **the next experiment** already going on, continually as Fred says. And so, for instance, I’m very grateful to the current generation of Guyanese feminist, activist scholars such as Kamala Kempadoo and Alissa Trotz who have made more available the work of the great Guyanese feminist activist intellectual Andaiye. We’ve been studying and teaching with Andaiye’s The Point Is to Change the World, and also with Lessons from the Damned by the Damned, the latter a collectively written book about a freedom school set up by black women in the late 1960s and early ’70s in Newark. Now, Andaiye talks about the research she did as part of Red Thread, an independent cross-racial organization of women in Guyana. She talks about how the poor and working class women who are keeping diaries on their social reproductive labor were doing research that she, Andaiye, could never do as well as them. Then, from the Damned, we hear the story of a key turning point in the freedom school. The women running the school have met some middle-class, teacher-qualified black women at a Vietnam protest and invited them back to the school. Much is gained by the encounter, but after a few weeks the women who run the school say something to the effect of, we loved them, but we had to send them away because they could not believe that we—in our position as black working-class women—were better placed to theorize this world. If we take these lessons from Andaiye and the Damned seriously, maybe we can get out of some of the metaphysical assumptions of our positions and roles. What Andaiye and the Damned are saying is that **poor people, poor black and Indian and indigenous women**, in these most vital instances **were better researchers and** better **theorists** than those of us who are traditionally and institutionally trained as such and rise through the “meritocracy.” So, we have to find some other reason for doing what we are doing—cause it is not because we are the best at it—and so we have to **find some other way**, **beyond** this **metaphysics of meritocracy we inhabit.** And from there it becomes clear that we are not the ones to sit in judgment, and this means we can **practice nothing but open admissions** and open promotion in the places where we teach, whether elementary schools, universities, or art academies. And what we would do is support the primary theorists and researchers as they come through, should they wish to come through, and should they wish to stay. And isn’t this serving the people? After all, serving the people never meant serving them breakfast. It meant being at the service of the people, because the people held what we all need, precariously, with only partial access sometimes themselves to this wealth, knowledge, and practice of how to learn about society and how to analyze it because it needs to be changed. That is why it was called a party of self-defense: to defend all this, not to imagine that the party was going to generate the wealth itself. Service becomes the answer to all the anxieties about allyship and class. And service is debt, partiality, incompleteness in action. SS: Your use of **incompleteness** reminds me in certain ways of how before you talked about **debt not as this crushing condition** **but** **as something that, in being unpayable**, **is the very principle of sociality**. So debt not as IMF-backed austerity measures, but **debt as** all those **things we owe to each other**. The way you talk about incompleteness strikes me as similar in that it’s **not incompleteness as a problem**—**like there’s something lacking in myself** which is fulfilled through another person—**but rather as a permanent state which is more of a blessing**, or something to be preserved. It’s not something that needs to be dealt with as a problem. Is that a fair reading? SH: Yes, I think that’s right. FM: Have you ever seen the film Jerry Maguire? The title character is this brutal drone of individuation whose whole life ends up depending upon his exploitation of a black football player, which he accomplishes with the help of a female assistant whom he later marries. The movie begins with Jerry Maguire being a successfully individuated man who’s complete, or thinks he is, until he gets stripped of all that. In order to find himself he’s got to attach himself in a more or less straight Hegelian mode to one who’s not quite really one, this player who shows out on and off the playing field while also modeling an authentic and loving family life, all of which reveals him never to have been the kind of free subject Jerry used to be. They call this a romantic comedy. It’s the story of the man who at the end of his personal (re)development—after having the biggest night of his life because the black football player literally endangers his own health in order to make a catch that will make him a superstar so that Jerry MaFuckingGuire can exploit him and attract other superstars who he can also exploit—finds that he can’t enjoy it without the woman who has made it all possible but whom he has exploited and demeaned and overlooked. That’s when this motherfucker breaks into a feminist consciousness-raising group in order to reclaim his wife. How does he get her back? Just by saying, “Hello,” according to her, but he gets to finish his speech by saying to her, “You complete me.” Like, he was at 87 percent and she was the final 13 percent. Now, he’s fucking complete when he gets her back. Well, [**screw**] ~~fuck~~ **completeness**. Not only that, ~~fuck~~ completeness **as a way of understanding** anything about what love actually is. What they call romantic comedy is really anti-romantic tragedy. It’s amazing that something like Jerry Maguire is offered as a representation of what it’s like to fall in love. If you’ve ever fallen you know that **the other person** or persons don’t complete you. They **incomplete you**. They fuck you the fuck up. It doesn’t leave you intact. It plays you, undermines you. It disturbs and **disrupts your individuation**. It obliterates not only the possibility of but the desire for individuation. If you think about it in those terms, incompleteness is a consummation devoutly to be wished. The entire genre of the romantic comedy is usually some white dude who’s being dragged against his will into the condition of incompleteness. When, finally, he submits to it, you know that the sequel of that movie will be all about the breakup, which follow’s the idea of individuation having had a chance to rally, which the regular miseries of monogamous heterosexuality—which Samuel R. Delany teaches us is the deepest perversion—are happy to provide. The idea of **completeness** **is ridiculous and genocidal**. **There’s** just no end **to the ways it continually seeks to destroy our shared capacity to breathe and ground**. It **predicates** **and requires** the constantly asserted revision of what Robinson calls “**the terms of order**.” It predicates and necessitates the constant **brutalization** of all the people in the world who resist those terms of order and who practice modalities of **social existence** that are not predicated on those terms of order, as Robinson shows in his beautifully radical use of ethnographic and anthropological work in The Terms of Order. We advocate for incompleteness. We think such advocacy is part of what it is “to preserve,” as he says, “the ontological totality.” To preserve the totality is to refuse its completion. That’s our ongoing ante- and anti-metaphysical experiment.

## Case

#### Vote neg on presumption – [A] It’s not enough to just assert that we should endorse their advocacy – they don’t have any explanation for how voting aff for their method spills-up to institutional change or provides a strategy for making debate better writ-large for other people. [B] Competitive incentives distort any impact to this aff – proven by the fact they read other affs this tournament and read T on the neg, so they’re just as complicit in any of the “silencing” stuff they’ll use to impact turn my arguments. [C] Not presuming a racist squo – conflates the pre fiat and post fiat distinction

#### Specifically, their analytic of a race war is bad and fixes identities around rubrics of antagonisms

Saul **Newman and** Michael P. **Levine 2006** --Saul Newman is a British political theorist and central post-anarchist thinker. Michael P. Levine is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Western Australia.(<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41802327.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A0bd0f7c0469462ca09e95562d89cde14> “War, Politics and Race: Reflections on Violence in the 'War on Terror'”) mba-alb

One of the advantages of Foucault's account is that it shows the way that the sovereign state of exception, rather than simply being a formal, conceptual relationship, intersects with different social and cultural forces. Indeed, as Foucault shows, the historico-political dis- course of war is also a discourse of race: the idea that war is at the basis of society, and that there is no neutral ground or universal epistemological position, springs from the idea that history is simply the recording of conflict between warring social groups or 'races’.27 According to Foucault, this metaphorical struggle is articulated in different forms: from warring Germanic tribes, to the resentments of the Saxons against their Norman conquerors, to the opposition of the French nobility to the monarchy. Moreover, as the principles of war become increasingly incorporated into the structures of sovereignty and the state, the idea of 'race war' starts to crop up in the discourse of nineteenth century nationalist movements, in the socialist idea of class struggle, eventually finding its ultimate and most perverse form in Nazi State racism: It will become the discourse of a battle that has to be waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds the power and is entitled to define the norm, against those who deviate from that norm. 28 Nazi Racism is an extreme example of what happens when the notion of race combines with the discourse of war and becomes inte- grated into the mechanisms of sovereign power. Thus, as Agamben also shows, the Nazi State was able to decide on the exception by exercising an unmitigated power over the lives of millions confined in the camps and exterminated on the basis of perceived racial differ- ences. Indeed, Foucault argues that it was precisely the discourse of war that enabled Nazism to mark out divisions in the social field between Aryan and Jew, Slav or Gypsy. In other words, the Nazi State saw itself as being engaged in a permanent state of war against the internal contaminants which threatened the purity and integrity of the German nation. However, as Foucault also shows, the idea of the race war also permeates other forms of nationalism, in which a particular group or 'nation' lays claim to a certain territory or even to a certain set of values and principles. Indeed, as Andrew Neal suggests, the importance of Foucault's seminars on war lies in showing the way that modern racism itself is closely bound up with and indeed has its ori- gins in, the union between sovereignty and a collective subjectivity defined through the nation state.29 What allows nationalist discourse to function is the designation of an enemy which threatens the integrity of the nation or offends its ideals, an enemy with which soci- ety is at war and from which society must be defended. Can we not see this nationalist and ultimately racist discourse in operation today? Increasingly 'the Muslim' is constructed as the enemy, the outsider to whom our culture and 'democratic values' are entirely alien and from which we must defend ourselves. As Neal points out, nationalism can appear in the form of the particular, nar- row identity and also as a 'universal' set of ideals and aspirations: 'The "enemy" does not simply pose a threat to " our way of life" but frequently comes to offend the liberal universalistic ideas that come to be expressed within national cultural and political space.'30 We can see these two articulations of nationalism operating in the 'war on terror': the desire to defend the integrity of our nation, our 'way of life'; but also universalistic claims to liberal and democratic values which we in the West see as our gift (or to use Bush's language, God's gift) to the rest of the world. What ultimately underpins and unites these two faces of nationalism is the need for the figure of the enemy, occupied in this case by the Muslim. In other words, despite the protestations and reassurances of those who fight the 'war on terror' that it has nothing to do with racism, that it is not a war against Mus- lims but simply a 'war against fundamentalism, extremism and intol- erance etc', we have to realize that this a veiled form of racism, one that is made possible by a historical conjuncture of war, sovereignty and politics. Foucault has charted the transformations from what was once an anti-State discourse of race war into a form of state racism and nation- alism: 'At this point, the racist thematic is no longer a moment in the struggle between one social group and another; it will promote the global strategy of social conservatisms.'31 This enigmatic phrase - the promotion of a global strategy of social conservatisms - seems to speak directly to our contemporary situation. Does it not evoke the strange resurgence of (neo)conservative ideologies around the world today in the wake of September 1 1, the disturbing climate of preju- dice, intolerance, violence, paranoia and virulent nationalism and racism that has been unleashed at a global level? One of the symp- toms of the convergence of politics with war, and the eclipse of poli- tics as an autonomous domain, has been modes of identification that seem to be emerging once again around antagonistic social groups or 'nations': we are seeing a kind of communitarianisation of the polit- ical and social space, in which people are once again identifying themselves according to their community, cultural/ethnic background or religion, an identity that they see as increasingly threatened by those who are different. The rise of anti-immigrant racism, particu- larly in Europe, might be seen in these terms: here, racist discourses have moved from extremist groups on the margins of politics to the centre of mainstream public opinion, focussing on those immigrants and outsiders who have 'come to our country yet do not share our values and remain intolerant of our ways'. So the point here is that the discourse of race war, that which posits a violent and constant antag- onism between social groups, has become fully incorporated into the mechanisms of the state, and is rearticulated in different forms of racism and intolerance: that which is now directed towards society's 'enemies' in whichever form they may appear. So it is not only that warfare reflects, to a great extent, racial prejudices, but also that racism itself is animated, intensified - indeed, made possible - by the logic and discourse of war.

#### Everytime they say BUT “the race war is happening,” that IS the link and a double turn with moten

Moten, 14

(Fred, “Blackness and Nothingness”, South Atlantic Quarterly Fall 2013, p.738-740 TAT)

Over the course of this essay, we’ll have occasion to consider what that means, by way of a discussion of my preference for the terms life and optimism over death and pessimism and in the light of Wilderson’s and Sexton’s brilliant insistence not only upon the preferential option for blackness but also upon the requirement of the most painstaking and painful attention to our damnation, a term I prefer to wretchedness, after the example of Miguel Mellino, not simply because it is a more literal translation of Fanon (though often, with regard to Fanon, I prefer the particular kinds of precision that follow from what some might dismiss as mistranslation) but also because wretchedness emerges from a standpoint that is not only not ours, that is not only one we cannot have and ought not want, but that is, in general, held within the logic of im/possibility that delineates what subjects and citizens call the real world (Mellino 2013). But this is to say, from the outset, not that I will advocate the construction of a necessarily fictive standpoint of our own but that I will seek to begin to explore not just the absence but the refusal of standpoint, to actually explore and to inhabit and to think what Bryan Wagner (2009: 1) calls “existence without standing” from no standpoint because this is what it would truly mean to remain in the hold of the ship (when the hold is thought with properly critical, and improperly celebratory, clarity). What would it be, deeper still, what is it, to think from no standpoint; to think outside the desire for a standpoint? What emerges in the desire that constitutes a certain proximity to that thought is not (just) that blackness is ontologically prior to the logistic and regulative power that is supposed to have brought it into existence but that blackness is prior to ontology; or, in a slight variation of what Chandler would say, blackness is the anoriginal displacement of ontology, that it is ontology’s anti- and ante-foundation, ontology’s underground, the irreparable disturbance of ontology’s time and space. This is to say that what I do assert, not against, I think, but certainly in apposition to Afro-pessimism, as it is, at least at one point, distilled in Sexton’s work, is not what he calls one of that project’s most polemical dimensions, “namely, that black life is not social, or rather that black life is lived in social death” (Sexton 2011b: 28). What I assert is this: that black life—which is as surely to say life as black thought is to say thought—is irreducibly social; that, moreover, black life is lived in political death or that it is lived, if you will, in the burial ground of the subject by those who, insofar as they are not subjects, are also not, in the interminable (as opposed to the last) analysis, “death-bound,” as Abdul JanMohamed (2005) would say. In this, however, I also agree with Sexton insofar as I am inclined to call this burial ground “the world” and to conceive of it and the desire for it as pathogenic. At stake, now, will be what the difference is between the pathogenic and the pathological, a difference that will have been instantiated by what we might think of as the view, as well as the point of view, of the pathologist. I don’t think I ever claimed, or meant to claim, that Afro-pessimism sees blackness as a kind of pathogen. I think I probably do, or at least hope that it is, insofar as I bear the hope that blackness bears or is the potential to end the world. The question concerning the point of view, or standpoint, of the pathologist is crucial but so is the question of what it is that the pathologist examines. What, precisely, is the morbid body upon which Fanon, the pathologist, trains his eye? What is the object of his “complete lysis” (Fanon 2008: xiv)? And if it is more proper, because more literal, to speak of a lysis of universe, rather than body, how do we think the relation between transcendental frame and the body, or nobody, that occupies, or is banished from, its confines and powers of orientation? What I offer here as a clarification of Sexton’s understanding of my relation to Afro-pessimism emerges from my sense of a kind of terminological dehiscence in Orlando Patterson’s (1982) work that emerges in what I take to be his deep but unacknowledged affinity with and indebtedness to the work of Hannah Arendt, namely, with a distinction crucial to her work between the social and the political. The “secular excommunication” that describes slavery for Patterson (1982: 5) is more precisely understood as the radical exclusion from a political order, which is tantamount, in Arendt’s formulation, with something on the order of a radical relegation to the social. The problem with slavery, for Patterson, is that it is political death, not social death; the problem is that slavery confers the paradoxically stateless status of the merely, barely living; it delineates the inhuman as unaccommodated bios. At stake is the transvaluation or, better yet, the invaluation or antivaluation, the extraction from the sciences of value (and from the very possibility of that necessarily fictional, but materially brutal, standpoint that Wagner [2009: 1] calls “being a party to exchange”). Such extraction will, in turn, be the very mark and inscription (rather than absence or eradication) of the sociality of a life, given in common, instantiated in exchange. What I am trying to get to, by way of this terminological slide in Patterson, is the consideration of a radical disjunction between sociality and the state-sanctioned, state-sponsored terror of power-laden intersubjectivity, which is, or would be, the structural foundation of Patterson’s epiphenomenology of spirit. To have honor, which is, of necessity, to be a man of honor, for Patterson, is to become a combatant in transcendental subjectivity’s perpetual civil war. To refuse the induction that Patterson desires is to enact or perform the recognition of the constitution of civil society as enmity, hostility, and civil butchery. It is, moreover, to consider that the unspoken violence of political friendship constitutes a capacity for alignment and coalition that is enhanced by the unspeakable violence that is done to what and whom the political excludes. This is to say that, yes, I am in total agreement with the Afro-pessimistic understanding of blackness as exterior to civil society and, moreover, as unmappable within the cosmological grid of the transcendental subject. However, I understand civil society and the coordinates of the transcendental aesthetic—cognate as they are not with the failed but rather with the successful state and its abstract, equivalent citizens—to be the fundamentally and essentially antisocial nursery for a necessarily necropolitical imitation of life. So that if Afro-pessimists say that social life is not the condition of black life but is, rather, the political field that would surround it, then that’s a formulation with which I would agree. Social death is not imposed upon blackness by or from the standpoint or positionality of the political; rather, it is the field of the political, from which blackness is relegated to the supposedly undifferentiated mass or blob of the social, which is, in any case, where and what blackness chooses to stay.

#### Fugitivity cannot escape the inevitable violence of institutional positioning – we should instead recognize our capacity for engagement and reconfiguration of existing structures

Love 15 – R. Jean Brownlee Term Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania (Heather, R. Jean Brownlee Term Associate Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, “Doing Being Deviant: Deviance Studies, Description, and the Queer Ordinary,” differences Vol. 26.1, pp. 89-91)

Today, queer studies—prestigious but unevenly institutionalized—still signals absolute refusal or criticality—all anti- and no normativity. In their influential 2004 essay, “The University and the Undercommons” (and in the 2013 book that followed from it), Fred Moten and Stefano Harney rely on such an understanding of queer (as well as concepts borrowed from black studies, feminism, ethnic studies, and anticolonial thought). They call for betrayal, refusal, theft, and marronage as modes of resisting the iron grip of the academy, pointing to an uncharted, underground, and collective space they call the undercommons. “To enter this space,” they write, “is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons” (103). Moten and Harney speculate whether the “thought of the outside” (105) is possible inside the university and suggest that if there is an outside, it is along the margins and at the bottom. Yet their imagination of that outside is indebted to the inside

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)