## 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not add change the advantage areas of the aff after they have disclosed what the advantage areas will be

Graphical user interface, text, application, chat or text message

Description automatically generated

#### Violation: They said there would be a warming advantage but replaced it with democraccy

#### Prep skew – forces me to waste prep time to prep an aff that isnt the same. That incentivizes lying as a strategic tool which makes preparation impossible. Disclosing way before 30 min solves all your offense – if you needed more time then you should’ve waited – means no risk of shiftiness. Lying is an independent voter – mutual understanding is the basis for all norms of behavior in debate

#### Fairness is a voter – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and answers to it rely on the judge evaluating the argument fairly

#### No RVIs – A - Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat which outweighs on timeframe, B - discourages checking real abuse which outweighs on norm-setting and constituvisim C - Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly D – its illogical for you to win for proving you were fair – outweighs since logic is a litmus test for other arguments

#### Use competing interpretations: a. Reasonability causes a race to the bottom with testing the limit of it b. Judge intervention shouldn’t be allowed bc it produces bias

#### Drop the debater: for being abusive – we can’t restart the round from pre 1AC and I’m skewed for the rest of the debate.

## 2

#### PIC Text: In a democracy except Ukraine, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy. In Ukraine, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy except in Ukrainian propaganda against Russia’s invasion.

#### Ukraine war is optimistic, but maintaining outside support and low Russian morale’s key

* Ukraine getting outside help from west
* Kyiv’s history in soviet union and ties to Russia lowers morale
* Low morale destroys new conscriptions which is key for Russia
* Gives example of Ukrainian propaganda dissolving Russian army

Knispel interviewing Goemans 3-9 [Sandra Knispel, (Hein Goemans, a professor of political science at the University of Rochester, is an expert on international conflicts—on how they begin and end.) 3-9-2022, "How to end the war in Ukraine," NewsCenter, https://www.rochester.edu/newscenter/how-to-end-the-ukraine-war-514522/] Jet

Q&A with Hein Goemans One or both sides must change their demands as a precursor to ending the war. What’s likely to happen in the current scenario? Putin made a big mistake by committing himself to total victory in Ukraine. Goemans: It depends on the performance on the battlefield, and a country’s expectations of outside help. Russia should have become more pessimistic in the last few days because Ukraine has shown its ability to inflict far greater costs on Russia than the Kremlin had anticipated. One would expect Russia therefore to lower its demands but we’ve seen very little evidence of that so far—only the demand of denazification seems to have been dropped. Overall, Putin still maintains that everything is going according to plan. If this continues, Ukrainian sovereignty may be at stake, which is dangerous and perhaps even stupid of Putin, who seems to be committing himself to total victory. If he can’t get it, he’ll be responsible and that makes a coup against him more likely. How has the situation changed for Ukraine and its demands for ending the war? Ukraine right now is not likely to accept anything less than full independence as a nation. Goemans: Ukraine must have gotten a lot more optimistic in recent days. Not just because its army has been doing reasonably well but because of the demonstrated incompetence of the Russian army. Yes, the Russians are still much stronger and much bigger, but there are problems with morale in the Russian army, and you see the remarkable level of Ukrainian support from the West. Ukrainians are still fighting for independence of their homeland and may maintain their claims to Luhansk and Donetsk in the Donbas region in south-eastern Ukraine. I don’t know whether they’d willing to give up Crimea at this point. One avenue worth exploring in peace negotiations might be true plebiscites, overseen by international observers. Can Putin credibly commit not to go beyond the invasion of Ukraine? In his February 21 speech, he expressed his aim to reconstitute the Russian Empire. Goemans: No, he cannot. Nobody would believe him if he said he’d stop at Ukraine. People are pointing to the failed attempt to appease Hitler with the Munich Agreement in 1938. So that’s a non-starter, especially with Putin’s February 21st speech in which he said he wants to reconstitute greater Russia or the Russian Empire. Western nations can no longer say, ‘Oh, he doesn’t mean that. We can still do business there and we can have gas if we give him just a little bit, maybe two Ukrainian towns or so.’ He made that impossible. Yes, the analogy is overused, but it really is like Hitler in 1938. People heard the speech and the appeasement alarm bells went off. Global view of Russia and former Soviet satellite countries labeled. (University of Rochester illustration / Michael Osadciw) A deciding factor in this war is going to happen in the next couple of weeks. Can you explain the role of Russian conscripts in this context? The question is how many new conscripts will actually show up because it’ll determine the strength of the Russian army on the ground in Ukraine. Goemans: There are two things to keep in mind: First, the new Russian conscription class is going to be drafted in April. It’ll be very informative to see how many people do not show up. Secondly, are the Russians really going to bomb Kyiv, a so-called “hero city of the Soviet Union,” into rubble like they did with Chechnya’s capital Grosny? Are they willing to kill tens of thousands of people? Those two benchmarks will happen in the next few weeks. How precarious is the situation for Putin’s own survival? He may keep fighting, even if he knows he’s losing, because the alternative may mean signing his own death warrant. Goemans: Putin may count on the fact that Ukrainians will give in if Kyiv is bombed. But if they don’t, that should make him more pessimistic. One would think that he’d have to lower his demands, and that at that point, some kind of deal would be possible. But Putin must come home with some kind of victory because otherwise he’s literally dead. That means he may keep fighting, even if he knows he’s losing, because the alternative is signing his own death warrant. That’s what happened in the First World War. Germany kept fighting for years, even though the leadership knew that they were losing within the first weeks of the war. You’re not hyperbolic when you say Putin is signing his own death warrant with a defeat? History has plenty of examples here. Goemans: No, I’m not. In a regime like Russia—which is clearly not a democracy, but also not quite a dictatorship—if you win a war, you’re the great hero; if you lose a war, you have shown your incompetence and you’ll be removed, which I have explored in my own research. You’ll be held as what’s known as a “culpable leader”—culpable for the fact that the gains of the war do not outweigh the losses. Historically such leaders have been removed from office, and they either have gone into exile, or have been jailed or killed. A recent example is the former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. What’s frightening, and there are already signs of this, is that Putin is moving towards a dictatorship because only full repression will prevent a coup against him. In that case, both the Russian and the Ukrainian people will suffer horribly. What do you think would happen with the war if Putin’s regime were to be overthrown? “Most likely, Ukraine would strengthen its demands and now want Crimea back.” Goemans: It’s possible that the entire Russian superstructure would be wiped out—not just Putin, but all his cronies, his security advisers, the oligarchs. That whole top layer could be removed. So the question is, if there’s a coup against Putin, what would the new Russian government insist on? They’re not necessarily all going to say, “Okay, sorry Ukraine, we made a mistake. Please excuse us.” And Ukrainians would not necessarily accept that anyway. Most likely, Ukraine would strengthen its demands and want Crimea back. Putin has said he wants to effect regime change in Ukraine—would a new government even have any credibility with Ukrainians? Ukrainians have become unified against Russia. Goemans: I don’t think so. There’s a new serious form of unity among the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian identity, and it’s in direct opposition to the Russians. It would be very dangerous for any Ukrainian government to be seen as colluding with Russia. Any such attempt would likely result in the formation of independent fighting units that would keep going to get the Russians out of Ukraine. What are the minimum terms the West can accept? The West cannot accept Putin’s winning in Ukraine, but they might we willing to accept concessions on the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, if Ukraine is willing to entertain that. Goemans: That’s an important question. The West—that is Western Democracies—cannot, in my opinion, accept a victorious Putin. The West is genuinely and correctly afraid of “salami tactics”—if he takes Ukraine, he will next take Georgia, and then he will go to the Baltics. Annexation wouldn’t end, so it has to stop now. Particularly because Putin so unmistakably declared his intentions in that speech on February 21st. Would the West accept Crimea as being Russian? I don’t know. Would the West accept Luhansk along the provincial administrative borders (which is not the same as the current line of control, which is currently roughly half of the of the provinces)? I doubt that. I think the West may demand a return to the status quo ante. I don’t know if they can get that. Maybe Ukraine would have to give up the entire administrative region of Luhansk and Donetsk. But the West will want to go back to the status quo. When do you think the war will end? Either in the next month and a half, or it’ll be years. Goemans: Either in the next month and a half, or it’ll be years. Months, if the new class of Russian conscripts in April fails to turn up. Otherwise I’m not optimistic. It’ll be ongoing bloodshed, pulverizing of Ukrainian cities, coupled with insurgencies, and Russia will never have full control of Ukraine. But going back to the video of the captured Russian soldier who was ashamed of taking part in the invasion of Ukraine: If he returns to Russia, he’ll most likely be killed. Yet, he’s speaking up and he’s hoping that he affects another guy, and then maybe two other guys, and it spreads like that. That’s how an army dissolves. On the other hand, that’s also how a Ukrainian army becomes more determined.

#### Ukrainian propaganda is key to defeating Russia.

Stuart A. Thompson 22 (reporter in the technology department covering misinformation and disinformation.) and Davey Alba (technology reporter covering disinformation. In 2019, she won a Livingston Award for excellence in international reporting and a Mirror Award) 3/3/2022, nytimes, Fact and Mythmaking Blend in Ukraine’s Information War, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/technology/ukraine-war-misinfo.html

Just days into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a pilot with a mysterious nickname was quickly becoming the conflict’s first wartime hero. Named the Ghost of Kyiv, the ace fighter had apparently single-handedly shot down several Russian fighter jets. The story was shared by the official Ukraine Twitter account on Sunday in a thrilling montage video set to thumping music, showing the fighter swooping through the Ukrainian skies as enemy planes exploded around him. The Security Service of Ukraine, the country’s main security agency, also relayed the tale on its official Telegram channel, which has over 700,000 subscribers. The story of a single pilot’s beating the superior Russian air force found wide appeal online, thanks to the official Ukraine accounts and many others. Videos of the so-called Ghost of Kyiv had more than 9.3 million views on Twitter, and the flier was mentioned in thousands of Facebook groups reaching up to 717 million followers. On YouTube, videos promoting the Ukrainian fighter collected 6.5 million views, while TikTok videos with the hashtag #ghostofkyiv reached 200 million views. There was just one problem: The Ghost of Kyiv may be a myth. While there are reports of some Russian planes that were destroyed in combat, there is no information linking them to a single Ukrainian pilot. One of the first videos that went viral, which was included in the montage shared by the official Ukraine Twitter account, was a computer rendering from a combat flight simulator originally uploaded by a YouTube user with just 3,000 subscribers. And a photo supposedly confirming the fighter’s existence, shared by a former president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, was from a 2019 Twitter post by the Ukrainian defense ministry. When the fact-checking website Snopes published an article debunking the video, some social media users pushed back. “Why can’t we just let people believe some things?” one Twitter user replied. “If the Russians believe it, it brings fear. If the Ukrainians believe it, it gives them hope.” **In the information war over the invasion of Ukraine, some of the country’s official accounts have pushed stories with questionable veracity, spreading anecdotes, gripping on-the-ground accounts and even some unverified information that was later proved false, in a rapid jumble of fact and myth.** The claims by Ukraine do not compare to the falsehoods being spread by Russia, which laid the groundwork for a “false flag” operation in the lead-up to the invasion, which the Biden administration sought to derail. As the invasion neared, Russia falsely claimed that it was responding to Ukrainian aggression and liberating citizens from fascists and neo-Nazis. And since the assault began, Russia made baseless claims that Ukrainians had indiscriminately bombed hospitals and killed civilians. **Instead, Ukraine’s online propaganda is largely focused on its heroes and martyrs, characters who help dramatize tales of Ukrainian fortitude and Russian aggression.** But the Ukrainian claims on social media have also raised thorny questions about how false and unproven content should be handled during war — when lives are at stake and a Western ally is fighting for its survival against a powerful invading force. **“Ukraine is involved in pretty classic propaganda,” said Laura Edelson, a computer scientist studying misinformation at New York University. “They are telling stories that support their narrative. Sometimes false information is making its way in there, too, and more of it is getting through because of the overall environment.” Anecdotes detailing Ukrainian bravery or Russian brutality are crucial to the country’s war plan, according to experts, and they are part of established war doctrine that values winning not just individual skirmishes but also the hearts and minds of citizens and international observers. That is especially important during this conflict, as Ukrainians try to keep morale high among the fighters and marshal global support for their cause. “If Ukraine had no messages of the righteousness of its cause, the popularity of its cause, the valor of its heroes, the suffering of its populace, then it would lose,” said Peter W. Singer, a strategist and senior fellow at New America, a think tank in Washington. “Not just the information war, but it would lose the overall war.”** In previous wars, combatants would try to sabotage enemy communication and limit the spread of wartime propaganda, even cutting physical communication lines like telegraph cables. **But there are fewer such cables in the internet age, so in addition to downing communication towers and disrupting pockets of internet access, the modern strategy involves flooding the internet with viral messages that drown out opposing narratives. That digital battle moved at startling speed, experts noted, using an array of social media accounts, official websites and news conferences streamed online to spread Ukraine’s message. “You have to have the message that goes the most viral,” Mr. Singer said.** That was the case with another report from Ukraine involving a remarkable confrontation on Snake Island, an outpost in the Black Sea. According to an audio recording released by Pravda, a Ukrainian newspaper, and later verified by Ukraine officials, 13 border guards were offered a frightening ultimatum by an advancing Russian military unit: Surrender or face an attack. The Ukrainians responded instead with an expletive, before apparently being killed. Audio of the exchange went viral on social media, and the clip posted on Feb. 24 by Pravda received more than 3.5 million views on YouTube. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine personally announced the deaths in a video, saying each guard would be awarded the title Hero of Ukraine. But just days later, Ukrainian officials confirmed in a Facebook post that the men were still alive, taken prisoner by Russian forces. Social media has become the main conduit for pushing the information, verified or not, giving tech companies a role in the information war, too. The fake Ghost of Kyiv video, for instance, was flagged as “out of context” by Twitter, but the montage posted to Ukraine’s official Twitter account received no such flag. The false photo posted by Mr. Poroshenko, the former Ukrainian president, also had no flag. While Twitter monitors its service for harmful content, including manipulated or mislabeled videos, it said tweets simply mentioning the Ghost of Kyiv did not violate its rules. “When we identify content and accounts that violate the Twitter Rules, we’ll take enforcement action,” the company said. In exercising discretion over how unverified or false content is moderated, social media companies have decided to “pick a side,” said Alex Stamos, the director of the Stanford Internet Observatory and a former head of security at Facebook. **“I think this demonstrates the limits of ‘fact-checking’ in a fast-moving battle with real lives at stake,” Mr. Stamos said. He added that technology platforms never created rules against misinformation overall, instead targeting specific behaviors, actors and content. That leaves the truth behind some wartime narratives, like an apparent assassination plot against Mr. Zelensky or simply the number of troops killed in battle, fairly elusive, even as official accounts and news media share the information.** Those narratives have continued as the war marches on, revealing the contours of an information war aimed not just at Western audiences but also at Russian citizens. At the United Nations on Monday, the Ukrainian ambassador, Sergiy Kyslytsya, shared a series of text messages that he said had been retrieved from the phone of a dead Russian soldier. **“Mama, I’m in Ukraine. There is a real war raging here. I’m afraid,” the Russian soldier apparently wrote, according to Mr. Kyslytsya’s account, which he read in Russian. The tale seemed to evoke a narrative advanced by officials and shared extensively on social media that Russian soldiers are poorly trained and too young, and don’t want to be fighting their Ukrainian neighbors. “We are bombing all of the cities together, even targeting civilians.” The story, whether true or not, appears tailor-made for Russian civilians — particularly parents fretting over the fate of their enlisted children, experts said. “This is an age-old tactic that the Ukrainians are trying to use, and that is to draw the attention of the mothers and the families in Russia away from the more grandiose aims for war onto, instead, the human costs of war,” said Ian Garner, a historian focusing on Russia who has followed Russian-language propaganda during the conflict. “We know that this is really effective.”** Official Ukrainian accounts have also uploaded dozens of videos purportedly showing Russian prisoners of war, some with bloody bandages covering their arms or face. In the videos, the prisoners are heard denouncing the invasion. The videos may raise questions about whether Ukraine is violating the Geneva Conventions, which has rules about sharing images of war prisoners. Russia has also engaged in its own form of mythmaking, but experts say it has been far less effective. Rather than targeting international observers with emotional appeals, Russia has focused on swaying its own population to build support for the battle, Dr. Garner said. Since Russian state media is still calling the conflict a “special military operation” and not a war — in line with the description used by President Vladimir V. Putin — state broadcasters are left “trying to talk about a war that is apparently not happening,” Dr. Garner said. **The Russian government “can’t play to its strongest narratives of individual sacrifice,” he added, instead relying on stories of Ukrainians bombing hospitals and civilians, providing no evidence. Ukraine’s efforts to amplify its own messages also leave little room for Russia to dominate the conversation, said Mr. Singer, the strategist from New America.** “A key to information warfare in the age of social media is to recognize that the audience is both target of and participant in it,” he said. He added that social media users were “hopefully sharing out those messages, which makes them combatants of a sort as well.”

#### Ukraine’s info war is key to defeating Russia.

Sinan Aral 22 (director of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy and author of "The Hype Machine) 3/1/2022, Ukraine is winning the information war, Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/01/information-war-zelensky-ukraine-putin-russia/>

**Today, the information war in Ukraine is more intense, more tightly contested and arguably more important than ever because motivating volunteer fighters at home and encouraging foreign support abroad are critical to success. And this time, it seems, Russia is losing. Reports abound on social media of more than 4,000 Russian casualties, images of crippled Russian helicopters and armored vehicles and cellphone videos of savage Russian missile attacks on civilian targets. This mix of official Ukrainian war statistics combined with videos (both verified and unverified), posted by Ukrainian citizens and sympathizers from the front lines, is painting a vivid picture of a homegrown resistance successfully slowing the advance of a much larger and ostensibly better organized military machine. Facebook posts showing Ukrainians kneeling in front of tanks to stop their progress and Twitter images of women and children sheltering in subways and basements set the emotional backdrop of senseless aggression against a peaceful nation. Viral videos and audio clips evoke a defiant optimism impossible to ignore: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appearing via his cellphone walking the streets of Kyiv, unharmed, in a “proof of life” demonstration emphasizing his willingness to stay and fight for his country, despite a U.S. offer to evacuate him, for example, or the recording of soldiers in an isolated Ukrainian outpost on Snake Island, in the Black Sea, cursing and telling off the Russian Black Sea Fleet. These stories are spreading rapidly on social media and subsequently echoing through official news channels in a media feedback loop that amplifies the information war and broadcasts it on television sets all over the world.** Zelensky, in particular, is deftly outmaneuvering Putin in this information war. He rallied Ukrainian men to defend their homeland, used the encrypted messaging platform [Telegram to speak directly to the Russian people](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMTeSsnNCw0) to counter Putin’s narrative, urged the West to step up its assistance in defense of law, order and peace, and even [pleaded with foreigners](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/russia-ukraine-live-updates-n1290057/ncrd1290087#liveBlogCards) to cross the border into Ukraine to defend Western democracy. While misinformation exists on both sides, Zelensky gives the impression that he’s more committed to truth and transparency. In contrast, Russia has been secretive, obfuscating the true extent of its incursion into Ukraine, and out of touch, airing the rambling addresses of its leader. It’s as if Putin has forgotten that social media transitioned from text to real-time video around the time of the Crimean annexation. In today’s information war, Russian news claiming Zelensky had turned tail and fled was swiftly countered by a video selfie of the Ukrainian president in Kyiv, vowing to defend his homeland. The symbolic contrast between Zelensky striding through war-torn streets, confident even under fire, and Putin, seated, hunched over a large wooden desk in the safety of a secure office hundreds of miles away from the fighting, is stark. This time, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Google are also proactively engaged in the information war. During the Crimean annexation, they were reactive and struggled to keep up with misinformation and false abuse reports. Today, in Ukraine, they have [banned Russian state-owned media from advertising on their platforms](https://www.axios.com/youtube-meta-twitter-restrict-russian-state-media-323d966f-531e-40f5-aa06-3b82998589df.html) and [defiantly fact-checked](https://www.theverge.com/2022/2/25/22950874/russia-facebook-blocked-roskomnadzor-media-censorship) Putin’s propaganda despite Russia’s protests and a full ban of Twitter and a partial ban of Facebook in Russia. Facebook has spun up a special operations center, staffed with native Russian and Ukrainian speakers, to monitor misinformation posted about the war, added warning labels to war-related images that its software detects are more than a year old, and restricted access to content from the state-affiliated Russian media outlets RT and Sputnik. YouTube is restricting access to Russian state-owned media outlets for users in Ukraine, removing Russian state-owned channels from recommendations, and limiting their content’s reach across the platform. Twitter has temporarily banned all ads in Ukraine and Russia, added labels to tweets with links to Russian state-affiliated media and downranked their content in algorithmic timelines. While numerous fake videos are circulating on TikTok about Ukraine, the Chinese-owned platform has no comprehensive policy on policing information about the conflict. Despite blocking state-owned Russian media in the European Union, this information flows freely in Ukraine and Russia on the platform, now dubbed “WarTok” by some observers, in part because it is organizing such videos into a convenient discover playlist by the same name. **The information war is critical to what happens next in Ukraine for several reasons. It motivates the resistance by inspiring Ukrainian citizens to take up arms in defense of their country and motivating them with social proof that they are united and not fighting alone. It encourages foreign assistance, pressuring Europe and the United States to step up their efforts to end the conflict. It fans the flames of protest in Russia, mobilizing the antiwar movement in Moscow and elsewhere in defiance of Putin’s aggression. And it may even eventually demoralize Russian troops, who must be wondering what on earth they are doing in Ukraine if the motivation for the intervention has been a lie all along. When Russia struck a Ukrainian television tower on Tuesday, it seemed to confirm Moscow’s keen awareness of the need to counter Ukraine’s information war and to highlight the importance of information in modern conflicts. Information campaigns are difficult to quantify during the fog of war. But while it is hard to pinpoint the extent to which the information war is contributing to the overwhelming international unity against Putin’s aggression, one thing is clear: Social media, mainstream media and the narrative framing of the invasion of Ukraine undoubtedly will play an important role in how this conflict ends. Now, vigilance and fortitude are not only needed on the battlefield, where lives and territory will be won and lost, but also will be essential online, where the hearts and minds of the world will be won or lost.**

#### Russian win would lead to escalation in multiple forums – goes global.

LIANA FIX 22 (Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, in Washington, D.C). MICHAEL KIMMAGE (Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. )2/18/22, What If Russia Wins? A Kremlin-Controlled Ukraine Would Transform Europe, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins>

If Russia gains control of Ukraine or manages to destabilize it on a major scale, a new era for the United States and for Europe will begin. U.S. and European leaders would face the dual challenge of rethinking European security and of not being drawn into a larger war with Russia. All sides would have to consider the potential of nuclear-armed adversaries in direct confrontation. These two responsibilities—robustly defending European peace and prudently avoiding military escalation with Russia—will not necessarily be compatible. The United States and its allies could find themselves deeply unprepared for the task of having to create a new European security order as a result of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine.

MANY WAYS TO WIN

For Russia, victory in Ukraine could take various forms. As in [Syria](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-03-20/russias-pyrrhic-victory-syria), victory does not have to result in a sustainable settlement. It could involve the installation of a compliant government in Kyiv or the partition of the country. Alternatively, the defeat of the Ukrainian military and the negotiation of a Ukrainian surrender could effectively transform Ukraine into a failed state. Russia could also employ devastating cyberattacks and disinformation tools, backed by the threat of force, to cripple the country and induce regime change. With any of these outcomes, Ukraine will have been effectively detached from the West.

If Russia achieves its political aims in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not be what it was before the war. Not only will U.S. primacy in Europe have been qualified; any sense that the European Union or NATO can ensure peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost age. Instead, security in Europe will have to be reduced to defending the core members of the EU and NATO. Everyone outside the clubs will stand alone, with the exception of Finland and Sweden. This may not necessarily be a conscious decision to end enlargement or association policies; but it will be de facto policy. Under a perceived siege by Russia, the EU and NATO will no longer have the capacity for ambitious policies beyond their own borders.

The United States and Europe will also be in a state of permanent economic war with Russia. The West will seek to enforce sweeping sanctions, which Russia is likely to parry with cyber-measures and energy blackmailing, given the economic asymmetries. China might well stand on Russia’s side in this economic tit for tat. Meanwhile, domestic politics in European countries will resemble a twenty-first-century great game, in which Russia will be studying Europe for any breakdown in the commitment to NATO and to the transatlantic relationship. Through methods fair and foul, Russia will take whatever opportunity comes its way to influence public opinion and elections in European countries. Russia will be an anarchic presence—sometimes real, sometimes imagined—in every instance of European political instability.

Cold War analogies will not be helpful in a world with a Russianized Ukraine. The Cold War border in Europe had its flash points, but it was stabilized in a mutually acceptable fashion in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. By contrast, Russian suzerainty over Ukraine would open a vast zone of destabilization and insecurity from Estonia to Poland to Romania to Turkey. For as long as it lasts, Russia’s presence in Ukraine will be perceived by Ukraine’s neighbors as provocative and unacceptable and, for some, as a threat to their own security. Amid this shifting dynamic, order in Europe will have to be conceived of in primarily military terms—which, since Russia has a stronger hand in the military than in the economic realm, will be in the Kremlin’s interest—sidelining nonmilitary institutions such as the European Union.

Russia has Europe’s largest conventional military, which it is more than ready to use. The EU’s defense policy—in contrast to NATO’s—is far from being able to provide security for its members. Thus will military reassurance, especially of the EU’s eastern members, be key. Responding to a revanchist Russia with sanctions and with the rhetorical proclamation of a rules-based international order will not be sufficient.

IMPERILING EUROPE'S EAST

In the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, Germany‘s position in Europe will be severely challenged. Germany is a marginal military power that has based its postwar political identity on the rejection of war. The ring of friends it has surrounded itself with, especially in the east with Poland and the Baltic states, risks being destabilized by Russia. France and the United Kingdom will assume leading roles in European affairs by virtue of their comparatively strong militaries and long tradition of military interventions. The key factor in Europe, however, will remain the United States. NATO will depend on U.S. support as will the anxious and imperiled countries of Europe’s east, the frontline nations arrayed along a now very large, expanded, and uncertain line of contact with Russia, including Belarus and the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine.

Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, will likely have substantial numbers of NATO troops permanently stationed on their soil. A request from Finland and Sweden to gain an Article 5 commitment and to join NATO would be impossible to reject. In Ukraine, EU and NATO countries will never recognize a new Russian-backed regime created by Moscow. But they will face the same challenge they do with Belarus: wielding sanctions without punishing the population and supporting those in need without having access to them. Some NATO members will bolster a Ukrainian insurgency, to which Russia will respond by threatening NATO members.

Ukraine’s predicament will be very great. Refugees will flee in multiple directions, quite possibly in the millions. And those parts of the Ukrainian military that are not directly defeated will continue fighting, echoing the partisan warfare that tore apart this whole region of Europe during and after World War II.

The permanent state of escalation between Russia and Europe may stay cold from a military perspective. It is likely, though, to be economically hot. The sanctions put on Russia in 2014, which were connected to formal diplomacy (often referred to as the “Minsk” process, after the city in which the negotiations were held), were not draconian. They were reversible as well as conditional. Following a Russian invasion of Ukraine, new sanctions on banking and on technology transfer would be significant and permanent. They would come in the wake of failed diplomacy and would start at “the top of the ladder,” according to the U.S. administration. In response, Russia will retaliate, quite possibly in the cyber-domain as well as in the energy sector. Moscow will limit access to critical goods such as titanium, of which Russia has been the world’s second-largest exporter. This war of attrition will test both sides. Russia will be ruthless in trying to get one or several European states to back away from economic conflict by linking a relaxation in tension to these countries’ self-interest, thus undermining consensus in the EU and NATO.

Europe’s strong suit is its economic leverage. Russia’s asset will be any source of domestic division or disruption in Europe or in Europe’s transatlantic partners. Here Russia will be proactive and opportunistic. If a pro-Russian movement or candidate shows up, that candidate can be encouraged directly or indirectly. If an economic or political sore point diminishes the foreign policy efficacy of the United States and its allies, it will be a weapon for Russian propaganda efforts and for Russian espionage.

Much of this is already happening. But a war in Ukraine will up the ante. Russia will use more resources and be unchained in its choice of instruments. The massive refugee flows arriving in Europe will exacerbate the EU’s unresolved refugee policy and provide fertile ground for populists. The holy grail of these informational, political, and cyberbattles will be the 2024 presidential election in the United States. Europe’s future will depend on this election. The election of Donald Trump or of a Trumpian candidate might destroy the transatlantic relationship at Europe’s hour of maximum peril, putting into question NATO’s position and its security guarantees for Europe.

TURNING NATO INWARD

For the United States, a Russian victory would have profound effects on its grand strategy in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. First, Russian success in Ukraine would require Washington to pivot to Europe. No ambiguity about NATO’s Article 5 (of the kind experienced under Trump) will be permissible. Only a strong U.S. commitment to European security will prevent Russia from dividing European countries from one another. This will be difficult in light of competing priorities, especially those that confront the United States in a deteriorating relationship with China. But the interests at stake are fundamental. The United States has very large commercial equities in Europe. The European Union and the United States are each other’s largest trade and investment partners, with trade in goods and services totaling $1.1 trillion in 2019. A well-functioning, peaceful Europe augments American foreign policy—on climate change, on nonproliferation, on global public health, and on the management of tensions with China or Russia. If Europe is destabilized, then the United States will be much more alone in the world.

NATO is the logical means by which the United States can provide security reassurance to Europe and deter Russia. A war in Ukraine would revive NATO not as a democracy-building enterprise or as a tool for out-of-area expeditions like the war in Afghanistan but as the unsurpassed defensive military alliance that it was designed to be. Although Europeans will be demanding a greater military commitment to Europe from the United States, a broader Russian invasion of Ukraine should drive every NATO member to increase its defense spending. For Europeans, this would be the final call to improve Europe’s defensive capabilities—in tandem with the United States—in order to help the United States manage the Russian-Chinese dilemma.

For a Moscow now in permanent confrontation with the West, Beijing could serve as an economic backstop and a partner in opposing U.S. hegemony. In the worst case for U.S. grand strategy, China might be emboldened by Russia’s assertiveness and threaten confrontation over Taiwan. But there is no guarantee that an escalation in Ukraine will benefit the Sino-Russian relationship. China’s ambition to become the central node of the Eurasian economy will be damaged by war in Europe, because of the brutal uncertainties war brings. Chinese irritation with a Russia on the march will not enable a rapprochement between Washington and [Beijing](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe), but it may initiate new conversations.

#### No limited nuclear wars – extinction.

Webber 19 – Dr Philip Webber has written widely on nuclear issues and is Chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) – a membership organisation promoting responsible science and technology. We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it. 5/18/19. [METRO.UK “We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it,” <https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/18/we-will-all-end-up-killing-each-other-and-one-nuclear-blast-could-do-it-9370115/>] Recut Justin

The nuclear armed nations have inadvertently created a global Doomsday machine, built with 15,000 nuclear weapons.

Most (93%) have been built by Russia and in the US, 3,100 of them are ready to fire within hours.

Pre-programmed targets include main cities as well as a range of military and civilian targets across the world primarily in the UK, Europe, US, Russia and China but also in Japan, Australia and South America.

One nuclear blast, one mistake, one cyber attack could trigger it.

But first a reminder about the incredible destructive power of a nuclear weapon. Modern nuclear warheads are typically 20 times larger than either of the two bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. What just one nuclear warhead can do is unimaginable. We’ve drawn some of the key features to scale against cityscapes in the UK for a Russian SS-18 RS 20V (NATO designation ‘Satan’) 500kT warhead. US submarines deploy a similar weapon – the Trident II Mk5, 475kT warhead. A deafening, terrifying noise will be created, like an intense thunder that lasts for 10 seconds or longer.

After a blinding flash of light bright destroying the retina of anyone looking, and a violent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) knocking out electrical equipment several miles away, a bomb of this size quickly forms an incandescent fireball 850 metres across.

This is about the same height as the world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa. Drawn against the London Canary Wharf financial district or the Manchester skyline, the huge fireball dwarfs one Canary Sq. (240m), the South Tower Deansgate (201m) and the Beetham Tower Hilton, (170m). The fireball engulfs both city centres completely, melting glass and steel and forms an intensely radioactive 60m deep crater zone of molten earth and debris. A devastating supersonic blast wave flattens everything within a radius of two to three km, the entire Manchester centre, an area larger than the City of London, with lighter damage out to eight km. Most people in these areas would be killed or very seriously injured.

The fireball quickly rises forming an enormous characteristic mushroom shaped cloud raining highly radioactive particles (fallout). It rises to 60,000 ft (18,000m) – twice the altitude of Everest – and is 15 miles, 24km across.

This is one warhead. There are 10 such warheads on each of Russia’s 46 missiles (460 in total) and 48 on each of eight US Trident submarines (384 in total). In reality, in a nuclear conflict all of these warheads and a further 956 ready-to-fire are likely to be launched.

Whilst this scale of destruction is horrific and hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a few hours from a combination of blast, radiation and huge fires, there are also terrible longer-term effects.

Scientists predict that huge city-wide firestorms combined with very the high-altitude debris clouds would severely reduce sunlight levels and disrupt the world’s climate for a decade causing drought, a prolonged winter, global famine and catastrophic impacts for all life on earth and in the seas due to intense levels of UV with the destruction of the ozone layer.

But even at the level of a few hundred nuclear warheads, the consequences of a nuclear war would be extremely severe across the world far beyond the areas hit directly. A nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan with ‘only’ 100 small warheads would kill hundreds of millions and cause climate damage leading to a global famine. The sheer destructive nature of nuclear explosions combined with long lasting radiation, means that nuclear weapons are of no military use. ‘Enemy’ territory would be unusable for years because of intense radiation – especially when nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants are hit.

Even if your own country is not hit, radiation and climate damage will spread across the globe. No one escapes the consequences.

But the nuclear nations argue that they build and keep nuclear weapons to make sure that they are never used. After all no one would be stupid enough to actually launch a nuclear weapon facing such terrible retaliation? It sounds obvious. If you threaten any attacker with terrible nuclear devastation of course they won’t attack you. That might be true most of the time. It is very unlikely that any country would launch a nuclear attack deliberately. But there are two very major problems. First, a terrorist organisation with a nuclear weapon cannot be deterred in this way. Secondly, there are several ways in which a nuclear war can start by mistake. A report by the prestigious Chatham House in 2014 documents 30 instances between 1962 and 2002 when nuclear weapons came within minutes of being launched due to miscalculation, miscommunication, or technical errors. What prevented their use on many of these occasions was the intervention of individuals who, against military orders, either refused to authorise a nuclear strike or relay information that would have led to launch. Examples include a weather rocket launch mistaken for an attack on Russia, a US satellite misinterpreting sunlight reflecting off clouds as multiple missiles firings, a 42c chip fault creating a false warning of 220 missiles launched at the United States. Such risks are heightened during political crises.

The risk of mistake is very high because, in a hangover from the Cold War, the USA and Russia each keep 900 warheads ready to fire in a few minutes, in a ‘launch on warning’ status, should a warning of nuclear attack come in.

These nuclear weapons form a dangerous nuclear stand-off – rather like two people holding guns to each other’s heads.

With only a few minutes to evaluate a warning of nuclear attack before warheads would strike, one mistake can trigger disaster. A similar nuclear stand-off exists between India and Pakistan.

## 3

#### Ethics must begin a priori and the meta-ethic is bindingness.

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [2] Bindingness – I can keep asking “why should I follow this” which results in skep since obligations are predicated on ignorantly accepting rules. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason which is self-justified.

#### That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer –

#### [1] All other frameworks collapse—non-Kantian theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

#### [2] Theory – Frameworks are topicality interps of the word ought so they should be theoretically justified. Prefer on resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since huge evidence files aren’t required.

#### [3] No New 1AR Framework: It moots 7 minutes of the 1NC and exacerbates the AFF infinite prep time so I should be able to compensate by choosing. They justify substantive skews by shifting frame of offense.

#### [4] Aspec: JOURNALISTS CAN’T USE UTIL, PREFER DUTY BASED ETHICS

Christians 7 Christians, Clifford (Research Professor of Comunications, Professor of Journalism and Professor of Media Studies Emeritus at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) "Utilitarianism in media ethics and its discontents." Journal of Mass Media Ethics 22.2-3 (2007): 113-131.

Utilitarian ethics has major weaknesses, despite its democratic appeal. It depends on assessing the consequences accurately, when in everyday affairs the results of our choices are often unknown, at least in the long term. Blogging is a revolution in journalism at present, but how can we calculate all the changes even a decade from now? The short-term benefits of exposing corruption in a political campaign may be offset by long-term negative consequences—public hostility to an overly aggressive press. The results are frequently complicated and intertwined so that a theory staking itself on results often does not provide adequate guidelines for morally acceptable action. Among moral philosophers, the most influential critique of utilitarianism has been developed by W. David Ross.9 Ross argued against the utilitarian claim that others are morally significant to us only when our actions impact them pro or con (1930, pp. 17–21).10 We usually find ourselves confronting more than one moral claim at the same time involving different ethical principles. Asking only what produces the most good is too limiting. It does not cover the ordinary range of human relationships and circumstances. People recognize promise keeping, equal distribution, nonviolence, and preventing injury as moral principles. In various situations any of them might be the most stringent. Ordinary moral sensitivities suggest that when someone fulfills a promise because he thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear that he does so with no thought of its total consequences:: : : What makes him think it’s right to act in a certain way is the fact that he has promised to do so—that and, usually, nothing more. (Ross, 1930, p. 17) Utilitarianism as a single-consideration theory does not simply demand that we maximize general happiness, but renders irrelevant other moral imperatives that conflict with it. As Charles Taylor argued, the exactness of this one-factor model is appealing, but represents only ‘‘a semblance of validity’’ by leaving out whatever cannot be calculated (Taylor, 1982, p. 143; cf. Bowers, 2002). In some media situations, consequences are a reliable guide. But in many of the most crucial issues we face at present, utility is not adequate—for understanding distributive justice, diversity in popular culture, violence in television and cinema, truth telling, digital manipulation, conflict of interest, and so forth. We face the anomaly that the ethical system most entrenched in the media industry is not ideally suited for resolving its most persistent headaches. In an ethics of consequences, ‘‘only the future counts with respect to what is morally significant, and not the past’’ (Dyck, 1977, p. 60). Future results, even though they are hypothetical, are determinative. But why should possible benefits in the future count more, for example, than gratitude to parents for their deeds of the past? If I made a promise in the pxast, for instance, this moral duty would be the most urgent in the present. If my previous acts have harmed someone, I have a duty of reparation, that is, making up for earlier wrongs. There are duties of justice that require us to ignore or even upset the balance of happiness (Ross, 1930, p. 21). Thus an ethics of duty is a more compelling model of moral decision making. It covers the entire time frame rather than only anticipating future effects. Duty responds to a broader range of human experiences and relations. Duty recognizes that the human community requires dutiful actions to maintain its humanness. H. Richard Niebuhr, in fact, saw responsibility as inherent in our personhood. Our selfhood is manifest in the action of answering. Our relation to other selves carries moral obligation; we respond to responders; we live in responsive relations (1963, pp. 59–61, 152–160). With a similar understanding of humans as responsible agents, Emmanuel Levinas (1981) insisted that our duties to others are more fundamental to human identity than are individual rights. An ethics of duty provides a critical framework that prevents us from having our ethical theory and democratic practice slide into one another. In terms of the overall task of developing a theoretically credible media ethics, the most promising direction is a deontological one.

#### Negate:

#### [1] Objectivity censors’ journalists’ personal views and biases- that’s non universalizable

Greven 21 Greven, Alec, "Speech and Sovereignty: A Kantian Defense of Freedom of Expression" (2021). Honors Theses. 1579.  
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses/1579 Karan

I will now outline the value of communication. The capacity to effectively communicate with others is crucial for an agent to realize their distinct ends, projects, and values. All agents need to will a world in which the value of communication is preserved in order to realize their ends. Lying and censorship are two actions that subvert the value of communication. Thus, engaging in lying and censorship is usually a hypocritical action that commits an agent to a practical contradiction. It simultaneously commits an agent to a principle that the value of communication in the world should be preserved while performing actions that subvert the value of communication. If everyone lied and censored at will then the structure of communication that the agent is practically committed to would collapse. Therefore, the liar or censor makes themselves an exception to a rule which is hypocritical and fails to respect the unity of their agency and treat others with equal moral standing.

#### [2] Journalists are required to respect those they report on, thus, advocacy journalism is required to alleviate suffering

Leshilo 18 Thabo Leshilo [A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals.] “Morality and Journalists: Objectivity versus Duty of Care” 13 July 2018, Johannesburg https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/26530/Morality%20and%20Journalists%20(markup)\_2.pdf?sequence=1

My view is that Detached Kevin Carter used the Sudanese child as a mere means to fame and (some mini-) fortune by simply photographing her and selling her photo; he did not treat her as a human being worthy of respect when he failed to come to her aid. In another formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant expresses the universal imperative of duty thus: “Act as though the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, a universal law of nature” ([1785] 2005, 24). The word ‘maxim’ refers to the basis on which one acts: what informs one’s action. What, indeed, would become of the world if all of us were to refuse to help people facing great hardship the way (some) journalists claim to be entitled to do? Kant also implores us to act beneficently, and might as well have had the Detached Kevin Carter in mind when he admonishes someone in a position to help, who does not: What concern of mine is it? Let each one be as happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself; I won’t take anything from him or even envy him; but I have no desire to contribute to his welfare or help him in time of need. (25) According to Kant, although it is possible that a maxim such as the one quoted above should be a universal law of nature “it is impossible to will that it [be] so . . . [f]or a will that brought that about would conflict with itself, since instances can often arise in which the person in question would need the love and sympathy of others, and he would have no hope of getting the help he desires, being robbed of it by this law of nature springing from his own will” (ibid.). Expanding on this, Charles Fried (2007,206) says that we are all required to recognise that human beings have certain basic rights to which they are all entitled as human beings: These rights are subject to qualification only in order to ensure equal protection of the same rights in others. In this sense the view is Kantian; it requires recognition of persons as ends, and forbids the overriding of their most fundamental interests for the purpose of maximizing the happiness or welfare of others. (ibib.) Fried goes on to say that this recognition that all humans have moral entitlements, correlates with the concept of respect – the attitude which is manifested when a person observes the constraints of the principle of morality in his dealings with another person, and thus respects the basic rights of the other. Respect is also an attitude which may be taken in part as defining the concept of a person: persons are those who are obliged to observe the constraints of the principle of morality in their dealings with each other, and thus show respect towards each other. (207) On Kant’s account, a person commands respect by virtue of being a rational being. “I maintain that man – and in general every rational being – exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be used by this or that at its discretion” ([1785] 2005, 28). I argue that Kant’s ‘Formula of the End in Itself’ (or ‘Principle of Humanity’) compels journalists to go the extra mile to help alleviate the suffering of those that they report on, and even take action to save their lives. When they fail to do that and instead simply report on such plight with the clinical detachment displayed by Detached Kevin Carter towards the Sudanese child, they simply use their subjects as mere means to make money and build their careers. By acting this way, journalists act unjustly and wrongfully. That is because a victim of such tragedy would ordinarily expect another human being to help to alleviate his or her suffering.

## Case

### Pandemics

#### Disease doesn’t cause extinction

Adalja 16 [Amesh Adalja is an infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh. Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race? June 17, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/]

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained.

I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience.

For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived.

Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like.

So what would it take for a disease to wipe out humanity now?

In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely.

Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians.

The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies.

HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk.

Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care.

Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions.

### Democracy

#### Democracy is resilient, but it solves nothing.

Doorenspleet 19 Renske Doorenspleet, Politics Professor at the University of Warwick. [Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 239-243]//BPS

The value of democracy has been taken for granted until recently, but this assumption seems to be under threat now more than ever before. As was explained in Chapter 1, democracy’s claim to be valuable does not rest on just one particular merit, and scholars tend to distinguish three different types of values (Sen 1999). This book focused on the instrumental value of democracy (and hence not on the intrinsic and constructive value), and investigated the value of democracy for peace (Chapters 3 and 4), control of corruption (Chapter 5) and economic development (Chapter 6). This study was based on a search of an enormous academic database for certain keywords,6 then pruned the thousands of articles down to a few hundred articles (see Appendix) which statistically analysed the connection between the democracy and the four expected outcomes. The frst fiding is that a reverse wave away from democracy has not happened (see Chapter 2). Not yet, at least. Democracy is not doing worse than before, at least not in comparative perspective. While it is true that there is a dramatic decline in democracy in some countries,7 a general trend downwards cannot yet be detected. It would be better to talk about ‘stagnation’, as not many dictatorships have democratized recently, while democracies have not yet collapsed. Another fnding is that the instrumental value of democracy is very questionable. The feld has been deeply polarized between researchers who endorse a link between democracy and positive outcomes, and those who reject this optimistic idea and instead emphasize the negative effects of democracy. There has been ‘no consensus’ in the quantitative literature on whether democracy has instrumental value which leads some beneficial general outcomes. Some scholars claim there is a consensus, but they only do so by ignoring a huge amount of literature which rejects their own point of view. After undertaking a large-scale analysis of carefully selected articles published on the topic (see Appendix), this book can conclude that the connections between democracy and expected benefts are not as strong as they seem. Hence, we should not overstate the links between the phenomena. The overall evidence is weak. Take the expected impact of democracy on peace for example. As Chapter 3 showed, the study of democracy and interstate war has been a fourishing theme in political science, particularly since the 1970s. However, there are four reasons why democracy does not cause peace between countries, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak. Most statistical studies have not found a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level. They show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, and even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one (caveat 1). Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear (caveat 2). In addition, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive (caveat 3). Finally, the process of democratization is dangerous. Living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country (caveat 4). With regard to peace between countries, we cannot defend the idea that democracy has instrumental value. Can the (instrumental) value of democracy be found in the prevention of civil war? Or is the evidence for the opposite idea more convincing, and does democracy have a ‘dark side’ which makes civil war more likely? The findings are confusing, which is exacerbated by the fact that different aspects of civil war (prevalence, onset, duration and severity) are mixed up in some civil war studies. Moreover, defining civil war is a delicate, politically sensitive issue. Determining whether there is a civil war in a particular country is incredibly diffcult, while measurements suffer from many weaknesses (caveat 1). Moreover, there is no linear link: civil wars are just as unlikely in democracies as in dictatorships (caveat 2). Civil war is most likely in times of political change. Democratization is a very unpredictable, dangerous process, increasing the chance of civil war significantly. Hybrid systems are at risk as well: the chance of civil war is much higher compared to other political systems (caveat 3). More specifcally, both the strength and type of political institutions matter when explaining civil war. However, the type of political system (e.g. democracy or dictatorship) is not the decisive factor at all (caveat 4). Finally, democracy has only limited explanatory power (caveat 5). Economic factors are far more significant than political factors (such as having a democratic system) when explaining the onset, duration and severity of civil war. To prevent civil war, it would make more sense to make poorer countries richer, instead of promoting democracy. Helping countries to democratize would even be a very dangerous idea, as countries with changing levels of democracy are most vulnerable, making civil wars most likely. It is true that there is evidence that the chance of civil war decreases when the extent of democracy increases considerably. The problem however is that most countries do not go through big political changes but through small changes instead; those small steps—away or towards more democracy—are dangerous. Not only is the onset of civil war likely under such circumstances, but civil wars also tend to be longer, and the confict is more cruel leading to more victims, destruction and killings (see Chapter 4). A more encouraging story can be told around the value for democracy to control corruption in a country (see Chapter 5). Fighting corruption has been high on the agenda of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Moreover, the theme of corruption has been studied thoroughly in many different academic disciplines—mainly in economics, but also in sociology, political science and law. Democracy has often been suggested as one of the remedies when fghting against high levels of continuous corruption. So far, the statistical evidence has strongly supported this idea. As Chapter 5 showed, dozens of studies with broad quantitative, cross-national and comparative research have found statistically signifcant associations between (less) democracy and (more) corruption. However, there are vast problems around conceptualization (caveat 1) and measurement (caveat 2) of ‘corruption’. Another caveat is that democratizing countries are the poorest performers with regard to controlling corruption (caveat 3). Moreover, it is not democracy in general, but particular political institutions which have an impact on the control of corruption; and a free press also helps a lot in order to limit corruptive practices in a country (caveat 4). In addition, democracies seem to be less affected by corruption than dictatorships, but at the same time, there is clear evidence that economic factors have more explanatory power (caveat 5). In conclusion, more democracy means less corruption, but we need to be modest (as other factors matter more) and cautious (as there are many caveats). The perceived impact of democracy on development has been highly contested as well (see Chapter 6). Some scholars argue that democratic systems have a positive impact, while others argue that high levels of democracy actually reduce the levels of economic growth and development. Particularly since the 1990s, statistical studies have focused on this debate, and the empirical evidence is clear: there is no direct impact of democracy on development. Hence, both approaches cannot be supported (see caveat 1). The indirect impact via other factors is also questionable (caveat 2). Moreover, there is too much variation in levels of economic growth and development among the dictatorial systems, and there are huge regional differences (caveat 3). Adopting a one-size-ftsall approach would not be wise at all. In addition, in order to increase development, it would be better to focus on alternative factors such as improving institutional quality and good governance (caveat 4). There is not suffcient evidence to state that democracy has instrumental value, at least not with regard to economic growth. However, future research needs to include broader concepts and measurements of development in their models, as so far studies have mainly focused on explaining cross-national differences in growth of GDP (caveat 5). Overall, the instrumental value of democracy is—at best—tentative, or—if being less mild—simply non-existent. Democracy is not necessarily better than any alternative form of government. With regard to many of the expected benefts—such as less war, less corruption and more economic development—democracy does deliver, but so do nondemocratic systems. High or low levels of democracy do not make a distinctive difference. Mid-range democracy levels do matter though. Hybrid systems can be associated with many negative outcomes, while this is also the case for democratizing countries. Moreover, other explanations—typically certain favourable economic factors in a country—are much more powerful to explain the expected benefts, at least compared to the single fact that a country is a democracy or not. The impact of democracy fades away in the powerful shadows of the economic factors.8

### 1NC – War

#### Democratic peace is statistically disproven---it’s conflict driving

Dr. Daina Chiba 21, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Ph.D. in Political Science from Rice University, LL.M in Jurisprudence and International Relations from Hitotsubashi University, and Dr. Erik Gartzke, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, PhD in Political Science from the University of Iowa, “Make Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: Endogenous Regime Type and the Democratic Peace”, 2/19/2021, https://dainachiba.github.io/research/make2dem/Make2Dem.pdf

The democratic peace—the observation that democracies are less likely to fight each other than are other pairings of states—is one of the most widely acknowledged empirical regularities in international relations. Prominent scholars have even characterized the relationship as an empirical law (Levy 1988; Gleditsch 1992). The discovery of a special peace in liberal dyads stimulated enormous scholarly debate and led to, or reinforced, a number of policy initiatives by various governments and international organizations. Although a broad consensus has emerged among researchers regarding the empirical correlation between joint democracy and peace, disagreement remains as to its logical foundations. Numerous theories have been proposed to account for how democracy produces peace, if only dyadically (e.g., Russett 1993; Rummel 1996; Doyle 1997; Schultz 2001).

At the same time, peace appears likely to foster or maintain democracy (Thompson 1996; James, Solberg, andWolfson 1999). A vast swath of research in political science and economics proposes explanations for the origins of liberal government involving variables such as economic development (Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Epstein et al. 2006) and inequality (Boix 2003), political interests (Downs 1957; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), power hierarchies (Moore 1966; Lake 2009), third party inducements (Pevehouse 2005) or impositions (Peceny 1995; Meernik 1996), geography (Gleditsch 2002b), and natural resource endowments (Ross 2001), to list just a few examples. Each of these putative causes of democracy is also associated with various explanations for international conflict. Indeed, some as yet poorly defined set of canonical factors may contribute both to democracy and to peace, making it look as if the two variables are directly related, even if possibly they are not.

We seek to contribute to this literature, not by proposing yet another theory to explain how democracy vanquishes war, but by estimating the causal effect of joint democracy on the probability of militarized disputes using a quasi-experimental research design. We begin by noting that some of the common causes of democracy and peace may be unobservable, generating an endogenous relationship between the two. Theories of democracy and explanations for peace are at a formative state; it is not possible to utilize detailed, validated and widely accepted models of each of these processes to assess their interaction. Indeed, to a remarkable degree democracy and peace each remain poorly understood and weakly accounted for empirically, despite their central roles in international politics. We address the risk of spurious correlation by applying an instrumental variables approach. Having taken into account possible endogeneity between democracy and peace, we find that joint democracy does not have an independent pacifying effect on interstate conflict. Instead, our findings show that democratic countries are more likely to attack other democracies than are non-democracies. Our results call into question the large body of theory that has been proposed to account for the apparent pacifism of democratic dyads.

#### Autocratic peace is true – DPT is a statistical mirage

Gartzke & Weisiger 13 [Erik Gartzke, University of California, and Alex Weisiger, University of Pennsylvania. “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace” http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/publications/gartzke\_weisiger\_isq\_2013.pdf]

The “autocratic peace” involves a class of arguments about the conflictual consequences of regime similarity and difference. Theories disagree over whether demo- cratic and autocratic relations are distinct or equivalent. Early studies of the autocratic peace typically focused on certain geographic regions. Despite having little democracy, low levels of economic development, arbitrary national borders, and widespread civil conflict, Africa experiences surprisingly little interstate war. Several stud- ies attribute the “African peace” to historical norms and to the strategic behavior of insecure leaders who recog- nize that challenging existing borders invites continental war while encouraging secessionist movements risks reci- procal meddling in the country’s own domestic affairs (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 1989, 1990). 6 How- ever, these arguments fail to address tensions between individual (state, leader) interests and social goods. The security dilemma implies precisely that leaders act aggres- sively despite lacking revisionist objectives (Jervis 1978). Initial statistical evidence of an autocratic peace emerged in a negative form with the observation that mixed democratic – autocratic dyads are more conflict prone than either jointly democratic or jointly autocratic dyads (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997). Studies have sought systematic evidence for or against an autocratic peace. Oren and Hays (1997) evalu- ate several data sets, finding that autocracies are less war prone than democracy – autocracy pairs. Indeed, they find that socialist countries with advanced industrialized econ- omies are more peaceful than democracies. Werner (2000) finds an effect of political similarity that coexists with the widely recognized effect of joint democracy. She attributes the result to shared preferences arising from a reduced likelihood of disputes over domestic politics. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) break down the broad category of autocracy into multiple subgroups and find evidence that shared autocratic type (personalistic dictatorships, single-party regimes, or military juntas) reduces conflict, although the observed effects are less pronounced than for joint democracy. Henderson (2002) goes further by arguing that there is no empirically verifi able democratic peace. Instead, political dissimilarity causes conflict. Souva (2004) argues and finds that simi- larity of both political and economic institutions encour- ages peace. In the most sophisticated analysis to date, Bennett (2006) finds a robust autocratic peace, though the effect is smaller than for joint democracy and limited to coherent autocratic regimes. Petersen (2004), in con- trast, uses an alternate categorization of autocracy and finds no support for the claim that similarity prevents or limits conflict. Still, the bulk of evidence suggests that similar polities are associated with relative peace, even among nondemocracies. The autocratic peace poses unique challenges for demo- cratic peace theories. Given that the democratic peace highlights apparently unique characteristics of joint democracy, many explanations are predicated on attributes found only in democratic regimes. An autocratic peace implies that scholars should focus on corollaries or conse- quences of shared regime type, in addition to, or perhaps even instead of democracy. In this context, arguments about democratic norms (Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994), improved democratic signaling ability (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998, 1999, 2001), the peculiar incentives imposed on leaders by democratic institutions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003), and democratic learning (Cederman 2001a) all invite additional scrutiny. While it is theoretically possible that a democratic peace and an autocratic peace could arise from independent causal processes, logical ele- gance and the empirical similarities inherent in shared regime type provide cause to explore theoretical argu- ments that spring from regime similarity in general.

#### Democracies are warlike – audience costs raise the incentive for leaders to escalate and initiate conflict. Autocracies are more peaceful.

CalTech 18 [Caltech is a world-renowned science and engineering institute that marshals some of the world's brightest minds and most innovative tools to address fundamental scientific questions and pressing societal challenges. "Democracies More Prone to Start Wars – Except When They're Not." https://www.caltech.edu/about/news/democracies-more-prone-start-wars-except-when-theyre-not-82879]

What kind of political leader is most likely to start a war—an invective-spewing dictator or the elected head of a democratic nation? Surprisingly, science says it's probably not the autocrat.

Leaders of democratic nations actually have stronger incentives to start and exacerbate conflicts with other countries than their autocratic counterparts, suggests a new study published by the American Journal of Political Science.

The difference boils down to public pressure, say the study's authors, Michael Gibilisco of Caltech and Casey Crisman-Cox of Texas A&M University. Because of pressure from voters to not back down and appear weak, democratic leaders tend to act more aggressively in international conflicts. An autocrat, on the other hand, is answerable to no one and can back down from a conflict without facing personal consequences.

"If an elected leader makes a threat during a conflict with another country and the threat isn't followed through, they may face a decrease in approval ratings, or they may lose an election," says Gibilisco, assistant professor of political science. In democracies, he notes, voters can punish their leaders for appearing weak—these punishments or consequences are known as "audience costs" in political science parlance. To avoid those costs, leaders in representative governments become more aggressive during disputes.

In their study, Gibilisco and Crisman-Cox, who is also an assistant professor of political science, first developed a mathematical model of dispute initiation between countries and then fit the model to data of actual conflicts that occurred among 125 countries between 1993–2007.

#### Democracies are more aggressive and choose bad grand strategies – it causes deterrence collapse

Causes international instability

Moral hazard causes overstretch and irrational grand strageis

Caverley 14 [Jonathan D. Caverley, Professor of Political Science at MIT, “Democratic Militarism: Voting, Wealth, and War” https://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/international-relations-and-international-organisations/democratic-militarism-voting-wealth-and-war?format=PB]

Do the effects of capitalization mean that democracies can easily build militaries allowing them to act like any other state or docs it show a path for democracies to act in ways that systematically differ from other regime types? While much of the book deals exclusively with democracies (in part due to data availability), the book did rest for differences between regime types in terms of conflict behavior, allowing me to adjudicate between these weak (realist) and strong (liberal) versions of cost distribution theory. Based on the statistical evidence, democracies with high levels of capitalization and/or volunteer militaries act more aggressively in terms of military contact. If there is any relationship between these two explanatory variables and arming in non-democracies, it is the opposite. The book's findings contradict the structural realist tenet that regime type should not affect how a state prepares for war.\* However, the theory suggests that the role played by democracy is more complex than simple cost aversion. From the perspective of a democratic government, developing the correct military structure gives the executive wide latitude for action by insulating its foreign policy from popular pressure. Military capitalization may provide a liberal path to neorealist behavior. More disturbingly, a median voter who successfully transfers the financial burden of war onto a wealthy minority, while simultaneously minimizing the possibility of casualties and conscription, may be just as susceptible to the temptation of imperial overstretch as any other type of political elite. Thus regime type may contribute to the aggressiveness or' states, but in ways unanticipated by democratic exceptional ism. If the burden of providing security shifts sufficiently, voters may be non-realists in the "wrong" direction, aggressively pursuing their own interests at the state's expense. Quantitative analysis using better data, statistical estimators that adhere more closely to the non-monotonic portions of the theoretical model, and better techniques for analyzing near-integrated panel data will help provide a more satisfying answer to this question. Across-case qualitative work is also likely to be essential. An investigation of the Soviet war in Afghanistan as well as Russia's two wars in Chechnya would appear to be a natural series of cases for study given the enticing amount of variation in the explanatory variable of regime type within (approximately) the same state. At first glance, it is not clear that the Soviets fought a war much different in capital-intensity than the Americans in Vietnam. At the very least such an investigation will help to build theory on how different types of non-democracies pursue security, rather than lumping all regime types together in the category non-democracy," as does this book (and most of the field of IR). 8.2 Adjusting and extending democratic exceptionalism Whether or not the weak/realist or strong/liberal versions of the theory ultimately carries the day empirically, we are left with some novel and remarkable findings that have important implications for democratic except ion alism. lb evaluate its contribution. I revisit exceptionalism's central conclusions first listed in the Introduction; (i) Democracies tend to pursue public goods, including security. (ii) Democracies tend to win military conflicts, largely due to choosing "unfair fights." (iii) Democracies expend fewer resources on defense in peacetime, but try harder in wartime. (iv) Democracies employ their resources efficiently in wartime. (v) Democracies are less likely to fight and more likely to negotiate during crises. (vi) Democracies are more likely to exit expensive wars and accept a negotiated outcome. The hook's Theoretical and empirical work give us a better understanding of how much security democracies will provide, why democracies bother to fight unfair fights, and what wartime effort entails. Point three only receives partial support; theory suggest that peace can be quite expensive it the median voter does not feel the costs of arming. The theory adds an extremely important qualification to the fourth item, noting the importance of technology and war type and the possibility for inefficient war prosecution. The book gives further reason to be skeptical of item five, often called the monadic democratic peace. Cases and recent history show that democracies can fight small wars without agreeing to a settlement. In this book I have intentionally taken the "hard core" of democratic excepdonalist theory - rational individuals in a perfect marketplace of ideas in a democracy located in an anarchic international system - and added one assumption: economic inequality. In this spirit of progressive research, I suggest avenues of inquiry opened up by this book, many derived from relaxing the assumptions of its models. The model of redistribution, arming, and war presented in this book can be generalized to other types of regimes. Early twentieth-century Spain's Catholic oligarchy appears to conform to the theory's implications in its own colonial misadventures. Its military served primarily as a source of oligarchic rents, with an officer for every seven soldiers, and military pay (mostly lor officers) consuming half the budget (compared to France's sixth). Wealthy Spaniards could pay the equivalent of 300 days of the average laborer's wage to avoid conscription. Despite its colonial possessions, the metropolitan army consumed 77 percent of the defense budger yet could not field a division to reinforce Morocco in 1921 (Balfour, 2002, 10). Although its colonial involvement in Morocco dated back to 1893, by 1920 Spain controlled less than a quarter of her "possession" (Woolman, 1994). The under-equipped and poorly trained conscript force was decimated in 1921 by Kifiau rebel forces at Annual, "the greatest defeat suffered by a European power in an African colonial conflict in the 20th century" (Alvarez, 1999, SI). However, ir remains unclear where some regime types fall on the democracy-plutocracy spectrum suggested by cost distribution theory. Not all regimes are necessarily more prone than democracies to the dangerous cartelization necessary for imperial overstretch (Snyder, 1991;. And there are ways for the public to influence non-democratic leaders. When in 1909 the Spanish government called up draftees to fight in colonial Morocco, rioting broke out, particularly in Barcelona. The government's massive, repressive response, still known as the "tragic week." resulted in the removal of the prime minster in favor of a more liberal one, and the creation of the Regulates, a military force consisting of indigenous Moroccan soldiers to replace conscripts, following the long-standing, successful model of democratic France (Alvarez, 1999),6 One can also imagine that other regimes (or a democracy with specific types of checks and balances favoring the rich; may reflect a broader range of preferences and thus conform more closely ro the cost internalization ideal. This may have a dampening effect, similar to the relationship this book identifies in democracies with extremely high levels of economic inequality. The interaction between two redistribute regimes in conflict suggested in Chapter 2 as well as the subsequent, qualitative chapters should be investigated further. A follow-on model to those presented in Chapter 2\ appendix would endogeni/e the compcller's choice of strategy, for example by allowing a strong state to choose between two strategies (capital- or labor-intensive) and a weak actor to choose between fighting conventionally or unconventionally. Such a model would allow us to further probe the circumstances under which a strong democracy lor any type of actor) would choose a Strategy that poorly matches the likely strategic choice of the target. Cost distribution theory requires the armed forces to provide a pure public good. This assumption is axiomatical I y violated when the military in a democracy is called to intervene in an internal conflict. 1 acknowledge this when looking ai only Jewish respondents in Israeli public opinion polls, hocusing only on public goods and international politics excludes some of the most interesting examples of democracies at war such as Colombia and India. Fruitful work on the democratic way of civil war lies in the future. In related logic, given that the military plays a fundamental and often brutal role in preserving non-democratic regimes, an extension of cost distribution theory would expect that fledgling democracies should reduce their funding to their potential repressors. This effect should diminish over time as civilians gain confidence in their control of the military (and thus its status as a pure public good). Such an analysis would amount to a competitive test between cost distribution theory and Mansfield and Snyder (2005), which suggests that states undergoing democratic transition axe more prone to aggression. For example, while regional military spending dipped significantly with the demise of several South American juntas, the volume of international arms transfers to the Americas increased by 34 per cent between 2003-2007 and 2008-12 (SIPRI, 2013a).7 This may partly explain the book's finding that support for defense spending and international aggressiveness drop at very high levels of inequality. What if nobody within the state pays for war? Kant (1991, 100) -along with other liberals such as Adam Smith, Cobdcn, and Hobton -considered war's "crowning evil" to be citizens "having to take upon themselves a burden of debt which will embitter peace itself." Yet contemporary events suggest that, at least in the American case, debt may enable militarism. Deficit spending is a form of temporarily persuading other actors (many outside of the state, particularly in the case of the United States today) to pay for defense and war. It is relatively easy to dismiss this argument in the abstract by arguing for Ricar-dian equivalence (Barro, 1974); ultimately taxpayers will pay the same amount with interest and thus the Meltzcr-Richard lope should hold. However, there is little doubt that government borrowing makes the short-term fiscal pain of militarization smaller for all citizens. Lyndon Johnson certainly made clear his preferences to the Chair of the Federal Reserve, William Martin. Johnson "asked the Secret Service to leave the room. And he physically beat him, he slammed him against the wall, and said, 'Martin, my boys are dying in Vietnam, and you won't print the money I need!"\* (Lowenstein, 2008). Deficit spending may contain an additional element of redistribution if the resulting inflation tends to hurt the wealthy more than the poor. The potentially important role that borrowing abroad may have on arming and war does not obviate my theoretical and empirical claims, but it certainly bears investigation. The United States funds its budget in substantial part through debt rather than taxes. The Chinese government in particular invests heavily in US treasuries in part to keep its exports competitive, at the cost of reduced standards of living for much of its population (Fallows, 20081. It would appear that this would increase American moral hazard over the costs of conflict on top of the mechanism laid out in this book. United States military asserriveness may be funded through a combination of rich Americans and poor Chinese. Indeed, the link between American military protection and debt assumption is quite explicit in the case of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (Art, 2009, 20). International financial tics may play a role in another way. One of the assumptions of the microfoundational model is the inability of capital to leave the country. Future research should examine the interaction of capital mobility and military capitalization. The threat of capital flight may constrain the median voter's ability to tax the rich and build a highly capitalized military or fund expensive wars. Finding a link between the two would deftly incorporate two legs of the "Kantian Triangle" (Russett and Oneal, 2001). In this sense the book is part of a progressive social science research program, building on the previous theories and findings of democratic exceptionalism. However, the book also proposes a large revision to this program, showing that the median voter is as happy to go to war as any other actor, so long as someone else picks up the tab. Not only that, but the median voter's ability to do so is increasing, and thus this book predicts that we will see increasing levels of democratic aggression in the foreseeable future. The differences arc even more stark when comparing my theory to classical liberalism. 8.3 The empirical case against classical liberalism The most powerful objection to my theory rests on the classical liberal logic that the covariance between inequality, capitalization, and aggression is explained by my argument's inverse: the power of the extremely rich rather than the relatively poor. Why is the evidence of massive (and potentially wasteful) spending on military capital not evidence of the "unwarranted influence, sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex" (Eisenhower, 1961)? Or, less specifically P162 but more convincingly, perhaps the wealthy have much more to lose in an insecure state than do the poor, (or whom even a small amount of taxes may amount to a considerable reduction in one's basic qualm of life. It is helpful to unpack this logic into its two components. The first suggests that the wealthy have more to lose, and therefore a more unequal state will build bigger militaries in peacetime and fight harder in wartime. Second, building a capital-intensive military benefits the wealthy due to their private gains from pork barrel spending. On the larger point that military expenditure and even aggression tends to favor the wealthy, while several of my empirical findings can be explained by either mechanism, some very important results support my claim and contradict the competing explanation. Both the public opinion data and the curvilinear relationship of inequality to militarism suggest that the wealthy are, on average, more dovish. A recent survey of wealthy Americans ('the top 1 percent or so of US wealth-holders"), finds significantly more enthusiasm for cutting defense spending relative to the broader public (Pageet al., 2013). Turning to a more specific instance of an elite-militarism connection, the so-called military-industrial complex is simply too small to have an effect in a democracy without logrolling. While Eisenhower could report in his 1961 farewell speech that "We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations, " even the highest estimate of peak post-9/11 US defense spending (including war spending for Iraq and Afghanistan) is about half of the 1.6 trillion dollars in US corporate profits for 2007.8 In 2011. the I'nited States-based companies made up nearly half ol the world's top 100 defense and aerospace firms based on revenues. Their combined revenue, $261 billion, was $160 billion less than Wal-Mart's alone.' It is true that defense spenJing makes up a tremendous portion of the federal government's discretionary spending, but this only shows how diffuse the benefits are. The average American voter, or at least the pivotal voter in a great number of congressional districts and states, does quite well from this expenditure. The Defense Department estimates that it has about 20 percent more infrastructure capacity (i.e. buildings and installations) than it requires, but Congress refuses to authorize the base closure procedure necessary' to generate these efficiencies (Pincus, 2013). The past few decades have seen a shift in American military spending, as well as all other redistributive federal expenditure, towards the south and west, the so-called "gun belt" (Markuscn, 1991). This book suggests this is no coincidence. If sonic subsection of wealthy elites benefit from defense spending and war, it is only done by logrolling with the median voter.10 Consider as another example Israel's economy: 6.7 percent of its GDP went to the domestic procurement of arms and other materiel for the IDF (Zrahiya, 2007)." While Israel exports large amounts of arms, it is still a small sector compared to the rest of its booming hightech economy. The defense industry accounts for 2-3 percent of Israeli GDP, depending on the level of arms exports (Lifshitz, 2010). The bulk of the Israeli arms industry is state-owned. In two of the world's most militarized democratic economies, it is hard to think the owners of defense firms have that much more influence than possessors of other types of wealth. Finally, I wish to emphasize that this book and its use of median voter theory is not an explanation of what "the poor" want. In the Vietnam case, the steadfast avoidance of reserve mobilization was designed to protect the politically powerful middle class rather than the poor, who were more likely to be drafted.1- Likewise, the British Empire, given the restrictions on voting that remained in place even after three Reform Act\*, was not a working-class phenomenon. Jingoism - at least during the B«>er War, an imperial misadventure par excellence - appeared largely confined to the middle class (Met, 1972), in part because working-class associations were more concerned with social reform at home. Kvcn if one's material condition does affect one's approach to international security, the middle class are likely to both have something to lose and a means for getting someone even wealthier to pay for its defense. Perhaps like unemployment insurance, security may be an impure public good targeting the needs of the politically powerful middle class (Moenc and Wallerstcin, 2001). Future research should explore defense efforts as a form of "Director's Law" in which those at the median take taxes from those who have more wealth and labor from those who have less {Stigler, 1970). In Chapter 5 I suggested a reexamination of the classical liberal assumption that imperialism and militarism inevitably lead to tyranny at home based on political developments in Britain compared to those in the European continental states. It seems clear that the (lip side of this liberal logic also requires reassessment; under the wrong circumstances, political liberalism at home can produce aggressive behavior abroad. The misplaced confidence of John Hobson at the rum of the twentieth century that democracies eschewed aggression may be even less appropriate now. This book concludes by speculating on possible trends towards increased democratic belligerence in the foreseeable future. Ironically, even as Stephen Brooks {2005) makes the claim that technology has enabled one classical liberal tenet (trade leads to peace) to finally come true, I argue that the same process may make it less likely that another (democracy leads to peace) will continue to remain intact. 8.4 The revolution in military affairs Early in the Cold War Bernard Bnidie (1959) noted that "stratcgy wears a dollar sign," and Colin Powell's maxim "show me your budget and I will show you your strategy," indicates that not much has changed in 50 years. What has changed over this period is what can be done with this money. As preparing and prosecuting wars becomes increasingly an exercise in fiscal rather than social mobilization, we may very well see some dangerous democracies emerge. Before its cancellation in 2009, at 15 billion dollars the US Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) was the largest research program in Department of Defense history. Envisioned to incorporate at least ten unmanned vehicles and sensors. Army briefings claimed the system would reduce logistical support requirements by up to 70 percent, cut a battalion's worth of combat troops by half, and increase survivability by 60 to 80 percent (Fekkert, 2005, 152). In its 2010 budget request, the Pentagon cut 700 million dollars in research funding for FCS manned components, deciding to develop a successor ground vehicle with increased armor more suited for conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq. 2.9 billion dollars was still requested for the unmanned portions of the program. Additionally, the Pentagon advocated equipping all 45 of the Army's brigades with this new system rarher than the 15 originally planned for FCS, most likely at considerably more expense than the original program. The manned "Ground Combat Vehicle" would equip 22 brigades at an estimated cost of $28.8 billion (Congressional Budget Office, 2013; Feickert, 2013). The FCS and the programs that succeed it represent the largest and latest instance of the continuing attempt to create a "new American way of war," one that increases the speed of warmaking, widens the military power gap between the United States and the rest of the world, minimizes American casualties, and raises the financial costs of defense for American taxpayers (Hoffman, 1996; Boot, 2003; Ferris, 2003). The United States is not alone in this shift. Democracies as varied as Australia, Great Britain, Israel, and South Korea {Bennett, 2006) are in the midst or have recently completed capital-intensive retool-ings of their militaries. For example, France's sweeping 2008 Defense White Paper (Ministry of Defense, 2008) promised to cut personnel by 17 percent (the majority trom the Army) with the savings applied to military hardware upgrades - a military space program, improved airlift, and armored platforms designed to protect the remaining soldiers in the force - at a cost of about 300 billion dollars through 2020. Despite the curs in personnel, the White Paper defines French strategic interests expansively, extending into the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and the Middle East (with a new, permanent naval base established in Abu Dhabi). Even in austerity, France continues to shift its capital-to-pcrsonnel ratio. France's 2013 Defense White Paper operates with very different resource assumptions relative to 2008. 34.000 people will be cut from the defense ministry, but its budget will remain stable. Army personnel will be cut by 25 percent, but special operations forces will increase from 3,000 to 4,000. Helicopter numbers will rise by 21 percent. While fighter aircraft numbers will decline by 25 percent, this is largely because older, less sophisticated aircraft will be retired and UAVs will be used in much greater numbers (Ministry of Defense, 2013).,J I argue that such militaries and expansive aims are developed with the average voter's blessing in spite of - indeed because of - the hefty capital investment they require. Military technology can clearly have distributive implications, and allows the median voter to shift the burden of conflict away from themselves and simultaneously reduce the state's overall marginal costs for defense. Given the continuing acceleration of the capital-intensive "revolution in military affairs," this effect requires increased attention. 8.4.1 Overweighting of the military option and unilateralism I have argued that if the costs of creating security are shifted away from the politically powerful, then their demand for security and the ambition of a state's grand strategy will increase. Similarly, as the cost of using the military declines for the politically powerful, its attractiveness rises relative to other means of providing security.14 Consider the alternative to increasing one's own defense effort: relying on other states.1\* The arms-allies tradeoff is a classic example of what ccoriomists call the "make-or-buy" problem for corporations (Braucr and Van Tuyll, 2008, 312). Both are costly, but in different ways. Arms require the investment of one's own resources but deliver the state near-absolute discretion in their use. Allies do not consume as many resources but, by potentially obligating a state to enter a conflict on behalf of another actor as well as by relying on another sovereign state for defense alliances, entail their own costs (Morrow, 1993; Morgan and Palmer, 2003). If technology does not allow the substitution of capital for labor, one can use faxes to find an alternate labor source either through mercenaries, alliances, or imperialism. Democratic France and autocratic Spain teamed up to fight the Rif Rebellion, and World War II was largely won through expending Soviet bodies and American dollars. But this is a second-best option for the median voter; capital-intensive militaries are preferred over finding alternative labor sources for a variety or reasons. Allies are uncertain partners, and mercenaries harder to regulate than one's own soldiers. If technology allows for the relatively easy substitution of capital for labor, and the median voter pa>s little of the cost of building this capital-intensive military, then" such a democracy is likely to aggressively use internal balancing and act in an increasingly unilateral manner. Drones operated by officers who commute from their homes to Creech Air Force Base (a 45-minute drive from Las Vegas) have attacked suspected American enemies in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. While the minimal cost to American lives is obvious, the effectiveness of such attacks is less apparent. This make-or-buy logic applies to any kind of institution. International organizations can be an efficient way of achieving security gains, but a state will always prefer its own way if it is not costly (Keoh.ine, 1984; Glascr, 1994). Similarly, economic sanctions can be a coercive alternative to military force, but it is also likely to entail domestic costs for the sender IDrezncr, 2003; Lekczian and Sprechcr, 2007). As the costs of the military instrument decline for the median voter relative to other foreign policy tools, the less relevant institutions and sanctions become. Finally, while grand strategy usually requires tough choices and prioritization, if costs are low enough, or resources large enough, states may make little effort to develop a coherent grand strategy. Because of its vast resources, Stephen Biddle (2005, I) observes, "the United States can avoid making hard chokes and instead pursue ill-defined goals with limited penalties." When things are not costly, few choices need be made, especially when threats are low but persistent, amorphous, or ideological. 8.4.2 Aggressive democracies in the "age of terror\* Only after several years of little progress in Iraq did the United States respond by changing its strategy. Tremendous public attention was paid to the 2007 surge" of 30,000 American personnel in Iraq, representing a 20 percent increase in deployed personnel. Lest attention has been given to the fivefold increase in Coalition air strikes over 2006. Simultaneously, in Afghanistan, such sorties nearly doubled from 1,770 to 2,926 ;Cordesman, 2008). Yef dcspiie a consensus that Islamic terrorism remains a threat, particularly in Europe, NATO cannot find soldiers to prevent Afghanistan from slipping into chaos. Robert Pape (1996: 2005) argues that while punishment strategies do not work in general, suicide terrorism can often produce >traregic gains for the weak, especially when targeting democracies. Terrorism is designed to have an effect disproportionate to the damage it causes. Indeed, in some cases terrorism is not only designed to engender the maximum of fear in its target but to provoke the target into extreme reactions. Whether or not such a response is entirely rational on the part of the target is beyond this study's scope. With a heavily capitalized military doctrine, one constraint on such responses, :he hica cost of military action, has been removed. The combination may prove volatile. Cost distribution theory is agnostic about the motivations behind democracies' coercive behavior, as long as the outcome may provide a public good. Normative goals, such as the spread of democracy, are also public goods, albeit ones that Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) describe as "not remotely equivalent" in value to other more material gains. But if the costs drop sufficiently, these operations become more feasible. The suggestion adds an clement of irony to Disraeli's speech to Parliament following the Aby>sinian expedirion: "In an age accused, and perhaps not unjustly, of selfishness, and a too great regard for material interests, it is something, in so striking and significant a manner, for a great nation to have vindicated the higher principles of humanity" (Monypenny and Buckle, 1920.1. 45). Disraeli's "selfless" invasion of Ethiopia to rescue five hostages was only contemplated because the private costs for the voter were modest, and the political gains for the Tories substantial. Linking low costs with the possibility of achieving vague, normative goals (especially when tied to security) will likely lead to more aggression. Creating incentives for powerful democracies to extend deterrence against a wide variety of threats (material or normative) may actually result in further instability. In cases of moral hazard by third-party intervention in civil war -Crawford and Kuperman, 20061, my theory-suggests an additional knock-on effect. The domestic moral hazard described in this book may lead to more offers of extended deterrence by powerful democracies, which in turn may result in increased international instability due to more moral hazard situations for proteges. While scholars have speculated that economic inequality can be a source of internal instability in weak states (Boix, 2003; Pearon and Laiun, 20031, cost distribution theory suggests that inequality can also lead to international instability instigated by mature, developed democracies, Democracies with a high (but not extremely high) level of inequality, a highly capitalized military, or both (the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel being three examples) will find the costs of any conflict more bearable, particularly as military technology increasingly favors capital.

### 1NC – Nigerian War

#### Democracy causes Nigerian state collapse and civil war

Dr. Moses E. Ochonu 19, Cornelius Vanderbilt Chair in History and Professor of African History at Vanderbilt University, PhD and MA in African History from the University of Michigan, BA in History from Bayero University, Graduate Certificate in Conflict Management from Liscomb University, “Why Liberal Democracy is a Threat to Nigeria’s Stability”, Logos: A Journal of Modern Society & Culture, May 2019, http://logosjournal.com/2019/liberal-democracy-is-a-threat-to-nigerias-stability/

In 2015, Nigeria, a country of about 190 million, spent $625 million to conduct federal and local elections. By comparison, India, with a population of 1.2 billion, spent $600 million on its 2015 election, according to figures released by the Electoral Commission of India (ECI).[1]

In 2019, the election budget of Nigeria’s Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) rose to $670 million. This represents about 2.5 percent of Nigeria’s $28.8 billion budget for 2019, a portion of which is being financed through borrowing. To put the electoral spending in context, more than half of the country subsists on about a dollar a day, and the country recently acquired the dubious distinction of being named the poverty capital of the world, with more people living in extreme poverty there than in any other country.[2] Key infrastructures and services such as roads, railway, electricity, water supply, healthcare, and education are severely inadequate, requiring urgent investments and interventions.

Election-related expenditure is expected to rise in the near future as INEC implements a wider slate of digital technologies to combat manipulation and improve the integrity of the electoral process. For comparison, Nigeria typically devotes about 7 percent of its budget to education. And yet Nigeria continues to maintain a four-year election cycle, with smaller by-elections occurring in between. This electoral calendar guarantees that about $1 billion is spent on elections every four years. As the electoral price tag has grown, democratic dividends have plummeted.

Nigeria’s predicament is a microcosm of the phenomenon of rising financial costs of elections in Africa and diminishing returns on democracy. Across the continent, the cost of electoral democracy is increasing and threatens the delivery of social goods. As African countries battle myriad socioeconomic challenges, the question needs to posed: is it wise for these countries to continue to spend a large percentage of their revenue every four or five years on a political ritual with fewer and fewer positive socioeconomic consequences for their populations? Is this expensive, periodic democratic ritual called election worth its price?

It is not only the monetary cost of elections that now threatens to defeat their purpose and engender disillusionment and, along with disillusionment, the erosion of trust in the state and its ability to produce and distribute public goods. The social cost of periodic elections has been arguably greater, depleting, with each election cycle, the residual stability of the state and the credibility of its institutions.

Elections conducted in Nigeria since the return of civilian rule in 1999 have brought with them anxiety, tension, death, violence, and dangerous rhetoric that, taken together, have frayed the national political and social fabric. Elections have widened fissures and intensified preexisting primordial cleavages.

I can recall no electoral cycle since at least 2003 that was not been accompanied by fears of Nigeria’s disintegration or at the very least the acceleration of its demise. In 2007 and 2011, post-election violence claimed hundreds of lives in Northern Nigeria as supporters of then candidate Muhammadu Buhari rioted after his loss. In the 2019 presidential and national assembly elections, at least 46 people were reported to have died from election-related violence. In the state assembly and governorship elections two weeks later on March 9, 2019, another 10 people died across five states in what the Sunday Tribune newspaper described in its headline as “another bloody election.”[3]

Two riders below the same Sunday Tribune headline encapsulate the turbulent character of Nigerian elections. One was “Thugs, vote buyers, arsonists take over on election day”; the other was “Nigerians condemn militarization of elections in Rivers, Bayelsa, Kwara, Akwa Ibom, Benue,” a reference to the government’s deployment of soldiers and other military assets to opposition strongholds before and during the election. The involvement of soldiers and other military personnel in the election was a brazen violation of Nigeria’s Electoral Act, an action which many observers interpreted as the incumbent administration’s effort to use its might to manipulate the election in states held by the opposition.

Every election cycle in Nigeria sees massive, fear-induced demographic mobility as members of different ethnic groups and religions relocate to areas considered dominated by their kinsmen and co-religionists to await the conclusion of elections that often degenerate into communal clashes especially in the volatile north of the country.

Periodic national elections have thus worsened Nigeria’s notoriously frail union and caused apathy and discontent. The Nigerian people, the major stakeholders in Nigeria’s democracy, have grown weary of being periodically endangered and rendered pawns in an elaborate elite ritual with little or no consequence for their lives.

Electoral aftermaths have not improved economic conditions or strengthened the capacity of citizens to hold elected leaders accountable. Moreover, as I shall discuss shortly, the familiar abstract freedoms that democracy, lubricated by periodic elections, can confer on citizens who participate in such exercises, have eluded Nigerians.

The result has been noticeable apathy represented most poignantly by voter turnout, which declined from a peak of 69.1 percent in 2003 to 46.3 percent in 2015 and to about 35 percent in 2019. In the same 2019 election cycle, turnout declined to less than 20 percent in the governorship and state assembly elections, with many Nigerians on social media stating that they had lost faith in the electoral process and that the official results of the presidential elections two weeks earlier had shown that their votes would not count towards the declared outcome.

Voter apathy alone is not an indication of democratic disillusionment but it can portend or indicate something more devastating: diminishing trust in the state, its institutions, and its processes.

Such a trust deficit exists already and it predated the return of civilian rule in 1999 after about two decades of military dictatorship. However, by all theoretical formulations, such a cumulative loss of confidence in the transactional sociopolitical contract between the state and citizens should be corrected by the democratic ideals of voting, representation, and accountability. This has not happened in Nigeria. In fact, the opposite scenario is visible: a negative correlation between successive electoral cycles and citizens’ trust in the Nigerian state. Therein lay the paradoxical consequences of democratic practice in Nigeria.

If elections are increasingly burdensome as they have become in Nigeria, the corrective potential of democracy, broadly speaking, is lost. Citizens consequently lose faith in the state and resort to self-help, including criminal self-help. That is how states collapse. Nigeria is not far off this possibility.

In Nigeria, recent political realities reveal a blind spot of pro-democracy advocacy: without the modulating effect of decentralization, sustained economic growth, a growing, secure middle class, and a literate, hopeful poor, liberal democracy can do and has done more damage than good. Liberal democracy has ironically become both an incubator and protector of mediocrity, corruption, and bad governance. The overarching casualty has been Nigeria’s very stability.

#### Nigerian instability escalates to global great power war

Charles A. Ray 21, Member of the Board of Trustees and Chair of the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe, “Does Africa Matter to the United States?”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1/11/2021, https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/does-africa-matter-to-the-united-states/

Africa matters in terms of size, population, and rate of population growth. It is the continent currently most affected by climate change but is also a continent that can have a devastating impact on climate change globally because of the importance of the Congo Basin rainforest, which is the second-largest absorber of heat after the Amazon rainforest. The destruction of this important ecosystem could further accelerate global warming. As residents of the region come into increasing contact with the animals of the rainforest, this region could be the origin of the world’s next viral pandemic. Violent extremism and terrorism are increasing in Africa, and while now mostly localized, the danger has the potential to spread beyond the continent. Crises—natural and man-made—cause massive relocations of populations, both on the continent and abroad, which can have negative economic, social, and political impacts.

Why Africa Matters

The African continent is the world’s second-largest, with the second-fastest growth rate after Asia. With 54 sovereign countries, four territories, and two de facto independent states with little international recognition, the continent has a current population of 1.3 billion. By 2050, the continent’s population is predicted to rise to 2.4 billion. By 2100, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, will have a population of one billion, and half the world’s population growth will be in Africa by then.

The population of African countries is also overwhelmingly young. Approximately 40% of Africans are under 15, and, in some countries, over 50% is under 25. By 2050, two of every five children born in the world will be in Africa, and the continent’s population is expected to triple. These developments have positive and negative potential impacts on the United States and the rest of the world. Young Africans have, for the most part, completely skipped the analog age and gone directly digital. Comfortable with technology, they form a huge potential consumer and labor market. If, on the other hand, the countries of Africa fail to develop economically and do not create gainful employment for this young population, then there is the risk that they will become a huge potential source of recruits to extremist and terrorist movements, which currently target disadvantaged and disenchanted youth.

Lack of economic opportunity, increased urbanization, and climate-fueled disasters will also contribute to movement of people seeking better lives, which will impact economies and security not only on the continent of Africa, but also the economic and security situations around the world. Nations, lacking adequate critical infrastructure, education, and job opportunities are ripe for internal unrest and radicalization. In particular, inadequate health delivery systems, when coupled with natural disasters, such as droughts or floods that limit food production, cause famine and mass movements of populations.

The Challenges for U.S. Policy

Prior to World War II, the U.S. policy towards Africa was not as active as it was toward Europe, Asia, or Latin America. During the Cold War, Africa policy was primarily viewed from a perspective of super-power competition. The end of the Cold War and the rise of international terrorism introduced this as a major component in U.S. Africa policy along with competition with a rising China and increased Chinese engagement in Africa.

Before his first official trip to Kenya, U.S. President Barack Obama said, “Africa had become an idea more than an actual place . . . with the benefit of distance, we engaged Africa in a selective embrace.” This is probably an apt description of U.S. policy towards African nations despite the bipartisan nature of that policy. The United States, with the many domestic and international issues it has to cope with, can ill afford to continue to ignore Africa. Going forward, U.S. policy must include a hard-headed look at where Africa fits in policy priorities.

The incoming Biden administration will face a number of important issues and challenges as it develops its Africa policy. The most pressing issues are the following:

Climate Change: Climate change is an existential problem that affects the entire globe, but Africa has probably suffered more from the effects of climate change than other continents—and the problem will only get worse with time. In an October 2020 article, World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Secretary-General Petteri Taalas said,

Climate change is having a growing impact on the African continent, hitting the most vulnerable hardest, and contributing to food insecurity, population displacement and stress on water resources. In recent months we have seen devastating floods, an invasion of desert locusts and now face the looming specter of drought because of a La Nina event. The human and economic toll has been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Climate change impacts water quality and availability, and millions in Africa will likely face persistent increased water stress due to these impacts. A multi-year drought in parts of South Africa, for instance, threatened total water failure in several small towns and had livestock farmers facing financial ruin. Another pressing climate-change issue is the need for protection of the Congo Basin rainforest. This 178-million-hectare rainforest is the world’s second largest after the Amazon and is currently threatened by agricultural activities in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Countries in the Congo Basin need to address the preservation issue, while also enabling sustainable agricultural activities to ensure food security for the region’s population. In addition to the impact on global climate caused by destruction of the rainforest, such destruction also brings human populations into closer contact with the region’s animals, creating the risk of future animal-to-human transmission of new and possibly more virulent viruses similar to COVID-19, which will have a global impact. In a January 2021 CNN report, Dr. Jean-Jacques Muyembe Tamfum, who as a researcher helped discover the Ebola virus in 1976, warned of possible new pathogens that could be as infectious as COVID-19 and as virulent as Ebola.

Rule of Law/Mitigation of Corruption: A key to African development, given the increasing urbanization, population increases, and youthfulness of the continent’s population, will be an increase in domestic and international investment to build the industries that can provide meaningful employment and improved standards of living. In order for this to be successful, African nations will need to address the issues of rule of law and corruption. Investors will not risk money if the business climate comes with a level of political risk that is too high. Government leaders throughout Africa need to establish legislation that provides an acceptable level of security for investments and take action to curb the endemic corruption that currently discourages investment. Corruption in Africa ranges from wholesale political corruption on the scale of General Sani Abachi’s looting of $3-5 billion of state money during his five years as Nigeria’s military ruler to the bribes paid by businessmen to police and customs officials. The “tradition” of having to pay bribes, or “sweeteners,” drives away domestic investment and scares away foreign investment, leaving many countries mired in poverty.

Violent Extremism and Terrorism: A number of African nations are currently plagued with rising extremist movements. While primarily a domestic issue, the mass movement of people fleeing violence and the disruption of economic activity have the potential to negatively impact the rest of the world. African nations need regional responses to curb extremist and terrorist organizations, many of which are supported by international terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaeda. In addition, the underlying conditions that helped to create these movements must be addressed. Terrorist groups in Africa range from relatively large and dangerous groups, such as Boko Haram, a group in Nigeria that has received support from al Qaeda and that aims to implement sharia law in the country; Al-Shabab, an al Qaeda affiliate aiming to overthrow the government in Somalia and to punish neighboring countries for their support of the Somali regime; and Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army, a fundamentalist Christian group. Terrorist groups in the fragile political climate of Libya also pose a threat to sub-Saharan Africa.

Great Power Competition: As the world’s second-largest economy, and with its increasing participation in international activities, China will continue to be a factor in Africa for the foreseeable future. This, however, is more a problem for the nations of Africa than it is for the rest of the world. The West can compete best by outperforming China in areas of strength by providing those goods and services that are unquestionably superior, and let African governments decide how to deal with China and its often-predatory lending practices and the Chinese tendency to import Chinese workers for its projects and investments rather than hiring locals. At the same time, Russia, which did not completely turn away from Africa at the end of the Cold War as many in the West sometimes believe, must still be considered a significant factor on the African landscape. In an effort to compensate for Western sanctions and to counter U.S. and Western influence, Russia is once again increasing its presence on the continent. Russian mercenaries, in exchange for diamond mining rights, have trained military forces in the Central African Republic, raising concerns about human rights abuses. Of particular concern is the presence of the Wagner Group, a private military company associated with Yevgeny Progozhin, a Russian oligarch with close ties to Vladimir Putin, who was indicted in the United States for trying to disrupt the 2016 U.S. elections. To date, Russia has, in addition to seeking basing rights, signed military cooperation agreements with 28 African nations. Russian activity is a combination of military and commercial, with Progozhin at the center of both. From 2010 to 2018, Russia nearly tripled its trade with African countries. While the activities of both Russia and China in Africa are of concern, and should be closely monitored, neither is of critical importance to U.S. national security.

With climate change, disease outbreaks, famine, extremism, and inter-ethnic violence, Africa will still experience crises in the foreseeable future that will be beyond the capacity of most nations on the continent to deal with. Climate change is probably the greatest cause of humanitarian crises in Africa, but mainstream media outside the continent either fail to notice or under-report them. Some of the crises, like Ebola or the next viral infection, can impact the rest of the world. These crises will cause starvation, mass movement of people, and increase internal and regional instability. Africa matters to the United States and the rest of the world. Its impacts can be felt far beyond the continent’s borders, but if approached as a partner rather than as a patron—with a focus on assisting African nations to improve governance, build critical infrastructure, boost domestic economies, and provide essential services to all—then Africa can be a positive contributor on the global stage.