## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a just government in which a right to strike ought to be recognized

#### “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just governmnt” in the res – means that you have to prove the resolution true in a VACCUM, not in a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### Violation: they spec [x]

#### Standards:

#### [1] precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### [2] limits – the UN says there are 195 national governments but even that’s not an agreed upon brightline – explodes limits since there are tons of independent affs plus functionally infinite combinations, all with different advantages in different political situations. Kills neg prep and debatability since there are no DAs that apply to every aff – i.e. factors that affect labor shortages or unions in the US are different than in China – means the aff is always more prepared and wins just for speccing. There’s been China, Hungary, EU, Kazakhstan, US, India, UK, Egypt, Germany, Brazil, etc.

#### [3] tva – just read your aff as an advantage under a whole res advocacy, solves all ur offense- Potential abuse doesn’t permit 1AC abuse – allows you to be infinitely abusive in the 1AC-– if the neg doesn’t have specific prep, they’ll resort to cheaty word PICs which are net worse

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – A - Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat which outweighs on timeframe, B - discourages checking real abuse which outweighs on norm-setting and constituvisim C - Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly D – its illogical for you to win for proving you were fair – outweighs since logic is a litmus test for other arguments

#### 1NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea 3] It was introduced first so it comes lexically prior.

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to– reasonability checks 2AR sandbagging by preventing really abusive 1NCs.

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up a blippy 20 second shell to 3 min of the 2AR while I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin

#### No new theory paradigm issues in 1ar A] the 1NC has already occurred with current paradigm issues in mind so new 1ar paradigms moot any theoretical offense B] introducing them in the aff allows for them to be more rigorously tested which o/w’s on time frame since we can set higher quality norms.

## 2

#### Interpretation: Debaters may not add changes to the aff after they have disclosed the aff and the sppecific version of what it will be

#### Violation: you said v3 which doesn’t have a FW but you added one this round

A screenshot of a computer screen

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

Text

Description automatically generated

#### Prep skew – forces me to waste prep time to prep an aff that isnt the same. That incentivizes lying as a strategic tool which makes preparation impossible. Disclosing way before 30 min solves all your offense – if you needed more time then you should’ve waited – means no risk of shiftiness. Lying is an independent voter – mutual understanding is the basis for all norms of behavior in debate

## 3

#### US-China decoupling is on the brink

Dinic 2-2 Leonardo Dinic, NYU Alumnus, China-US Focus, 2-2-2021, "US-China Competition – Semiconductors and the Future of Tech Supremacy," <https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/us-china-competition-semiconductors-and-the-future-of-tech-supremacy>

While Chinese investment in the U.S. slowed down during the Trump administration, goods and services trade volumes were **less than 3 percent down** from 2016 to 2019. **The U.S. portfolio more than doubled from the end of 2016 to the end of 2019**. So, we see a $13 billion trade decrease and a **$120 billion** increase in U.S. investment in China. Therefore, **the two countries are still intimately tied.** There is undoubtedly a **threat of decoupling** in tech if China can separate and develop a self-reliant ecosystem. Thus, the biggest losers from 'tech decoupling' are U.S. firms, which are heavily reliant on revenue from China. The U.S. could subsidize American firms to kedep their R&D levels steady, but this might not be easy in the immediate post-pandemic environment. The U.S. could tax businesses instead of taxpayers, but this could also prove to be a hurdle.

#### Wage increases decreases exports and foreign investment- causes decoupling- empirics and studies prove

* Empirical data and theoretical predictions are just incredibly fire

Huang 21 Huang, Yi (The Graduate Institute, Geneva and CEPR, Switzerland) Liugang Sheng, and Gewei Wang. "How did rising labor costs erode China’s global advantage?." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 183 (2021): 632-653.

The large and seemingly unlimited supply of unskilled labor has been considered the key factor for China to attract large inflows of foreign direct investment and become the largest exporter in the world. However, labor costs in China have been rising rapidly in recent years, spurring worries that it might erode China’s comparative advantage in the global market. As shown in Fig. 1, the monthly average real wage of China’s manufacturing workers was the lowest among Asian economies in the early 1990s, but it had increased more than five-fold between 1993 and 2015, surpassing the wage level in many neighboring countries in Asia including Vietnam, Indonesia, India, and the Philippines. Rising labor costs may make China less attractive to multinational companies. For example, China has been the main sourcing country for Nike’s footwear production since 1997, contributing more than 40% of Nike’s total footwear production at the peak year of 2001, but it has been surpassed by Vietnam since 2009 (Khandelwal and Teachout, 2016). Nike is not alone. In fact, the share of foreign-invested firms in Chinese total exports had declined gradually to about 44 percent in 2016 since its peak at 58 percent in 2006. The shortage of cheap labor may also erode China’s comparative advantage in exports of labor-intensive products. Fig. 2 presents the revealed comparative advantages (RCA) for labor- and capitalintensive industries, where an industry’s RCA is defined as the ratio of the industry’s share in China’s total exports to its share in world exports. We observe a gradually declining trend in RCA for labor-intensive industries, including textile, cloth, footwear, apparel, luggage, and furniture. By contrast, the comparative advantages of capital-intensive industries such as machinery, equipment, and instruments have been improving over the years.1 This paper aims to evaluate the impact of rising labor costs on China’s attractiveness to multinationals and its competitiveness in exports, by using the regional and time-varying variations in minimum wage distortion as exogenous shocks to unskilled-labor costs and the variations in skill intensity across industries. We first develop a two-sector model by introducing the minimum wage into a general equilibrium trade model which integrates production and trade in a multi-regional setting (Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare, 2013). Minimum wages set by local governments distort labor allocation between the agricultural and the manufacturing sector, and thus reduce regional exports of manufacturing goods relatively more in unskilled-labor intensive industries. Our model delivers the classic (log) gravity equation for manufacturing exports, which can be further decomposed into exports by domestic firms and exports by foreign firms. Therefore, we can adopt the empirical gravity equations to test model predictions and examine which type of exports or firms are more sensitive to labor cost shocks such as changes in minimum wage distortions. We construct two comprehensive data sets for empirical analysis. First, we use the firm-level Chinese customs trade data for the period 2000–11 to construct a panel of Chinese manufacturing exports at the city-industry (two digits ISIC)- importer (country) level. The trade data also contains the ownership information of firms, and thus we can break down total exports into exports by domestic firms and exports by foreign-invested firms (named as domestic exports and foreign exports respectively). Moreover, the firm-level trade data also allows us to decompose exports into the extensive margin measured by the number of varieties (i.e., firm-HS code pairs) and the intensive margin measured by average exports per variety. Thus, we can explore which margin is more important for the adjustment in exports in response to labor cost shocks. Second, we collect an administrative data set of minimum wages across 337 prefectural level divisions in China from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for the period 1995–2012.2 Based on this data set, we construct a theorybased measure of minimum wage distortion (MWD) on unskilled-labor allocation, i.e., the minimum wage premium divided by rural disposable income. We use cross-city and cross-time variations in minimum wage distortions and cross-industry differences in unskilled-labor intensities to identify the effects of unskilled-labor cost shocks on regional manufacturing exports. Our empirical analysis presents three novel findings. First, we find that minimum wage distortion reduces manufacturing exports in unskilled-labor intensive industries more than in other industries. This result holds for both domestic and foreign exports, supporting our theoretical predictions. Second, the elasticity of foreign exports to minimum wage distortion is more sensitive to the unskilled-labor intensity across industries than the elasticity of domestic exports. In other words, the negative effects of minimum wage distortions on foreign exports increase faster with industrial unskilled-labor intensity than domestic exports. Third, both intensive and extensive margins matter for the larger effect of minimum wage distortion on foreign exports. More interestingly, we find that the effects of minimum wage distortion on entry and survival are insignificant for domestic exports but are economically and statistically significant for foreign exports. Thus, rising labor costs reduces the incentive of foreign firms more than Chinese domestic firms to choose a city in China as its exporting platform to produce and export to other countries. The empirical analysis also shows the robustness of our main results and substantial heterogeneity in the effects of the minimum wage distortion on exports. First, minimum wage distortion reduces both ordinary and processing exports in unskilled-labor intensive industries more than in other industries, but the effect is relatively stronger in ordinary exports. Second, exports to high-income countries are more sensitive to the rising cost of unskilled labor than exports to low-income destinations, partly because China may have an apparent comparative advantage in unskilled-labor intensive industries over high-income countries and partly because foreign-invested firms in China are mainly from advanced economies; they produce in China and then re-export to their home countries. Our main results are robust to excluding the sample after the global financial crisis in 2008 and also robust to including total factor productivity (TFP) as the city-industrial technology measure. Breaking down foreign-invested firms further into joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned firms not only confirms our baseline results but also shows that joint ventures are more vulnerable to rising unskilled-labor costs in China than wholly foreign-owned firms.

#### US-China decoupling causes war

Galen 20 Ted Galen Carpenter (senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011) 10/27/2020, Economic Decoupling Creates Grave Strategic Dangers for China and America, https://www.cato.org/commentary/economic-decoupling-creates-grave-strategic-dangers-china-america

Such worries have strengthened the campaign for an overall decoupling of the U.S. and PRC economies. But there are serious downsides to adopting that approach. Developing entirely new supply chains in multiple industries would be both expensive and disruptive. Those problems would exist even if the U.S. was willing to tolerate dependence on non‐ PRC sources in East Asia and other regions. The difficulties would be even greater if the goal was U.S. self‐ sufficiency with respect to the production of a host of products deemed strategically crucial. However, the potential costs and drawbacks are not confined to the economic arena. Several historians have pointed out that a key feature of the original Cold War was the lack of significant economic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. exports to the USSR in the 1980s, for example, fluctuated between $1.6 billion and $3.5 billion. Even adjusted for inflation, that was a trivial sum compared to the value of current U.S. exports to China—$106.6 billion in 2019. And imports from the Soviet Union were even more meager than U.S. exports to that country — a mere $558.2 million in 1986, a typical year. In one sense, that situation made it easier for leaders in both countries to wage the Cold War struggle, since there were minimal economic costs in doing so. On the other hand, the absence of meaningful commercial links meant that there was little to buffer the strategic animosity between the two superpowers. The relationship between the United States and the PRC is fundamentally different and more complex. Bilateral economic ties are both deep and wide‐ ranging. The annual trade in goods in 2019 amounted to $559 billion. The PRC also is one of America’s biggest financial creditors, holding some $1.07 trillion in U.S. Treasuries. Even a mundane cold war would be costly to both countries; full‐ scale animosity would be extremely damaging. The massive China-U.S. economic relationship especially, acts as a major impediment to any kind of military confrontation—even a limited one. Decoupling would severely weaken that restraint, and such a development would be extremely ominous. Indeed, a U.S.-China cold war could be even more dangerous than was the original version between the United States and the Soviet Union. The spheres of influence between the U.S.-led West and the Soviet empire were fairly clear after the initial post‐ World War II years. The Iron Curtain through Central Europe emphasized that point, with only capitalist‐ controlled West Berlin constituting a dangerous flashpoint in that part of the world. The DMZ separating North and South Korea was another flashpoint, but the USSR kept its distance from that one. The other arenas of contention were located in the Third World, where the geostrategic stakes were modest, and both sides were careful to limit their commitments and risks. Beijing and Washington confront a far less clearly delineated strategic environment today. There are several high‐ priority arenas for potential military clashes between the United States and China. The PRC’s expansive territorial claims and growing military presence in the South China Sea, combined with the increasingly extensive “freedom of navigation” patrols by the U.S. Navy, have produced an extremely volatile and dangerous situation in that body of water. Likewise, the competing territorial claims of China, and U.S.-allied Japan to the Senkaku/ Diaoyu island chain in the East China Sea is becoming another source of confrontation — with Washington ostentatiously declaring its support for Tokyo’s position. The host of unresolved issues on the Korean Peninsula could cause tensions between PRC‐ ally North Korea and the United States to spiral out of control, as they threatened to do during the initial year of the Trump administration. Most dangerous of all is the deterioration of relations between Mainland China and Taiwan. Beijing’s behavior in recent years indicates a growing impatience with the refusal of Taiwan’s current leadership even to discuss political reunification. Indeed, Taipei is flirting with pushing the envelope regarding independence, and Washington has transformed its own relationship with the island into one just shy of a full‐ fledged military alliance. With respect to that issue, Beijing and Washington appear dangerously close to being on a collision course. Such a volatile strategic environment makes maintaining robust bilateral economic ties imperative. Those links now constitute the main factor inhibiting possible armed conflict between the United States and the PRC. A U.S. strategy aimed at decoupling with China is not only a dubious idea from an economic standpoint, it is a potentially lethal move from the standpoint of war and peace.

#### US-China war goes nuclear.

Logan 9/18 [David; PhD Candidate on International Affairs at Princeton; 9/18/20; “The Dangerous Myths About China’s Nuclear Weapons,” War On The Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/the-dangerous-myths-about-chinas-nuclear-weapons/>] Justin

Misplaced Attention: The Real Risks of Beijing’s Nukes Although there is little evidence to support claims that China possesses a vast covert nuclear arsenal, that its no-first-use policy is a sham, or that it has developed an extensive array of tactical nuclear weapons, there are still several reasons to be concerned about China’s nuclear forces. Unlike the above myths, which often focus on China’s force modernization and potential arms racing dynamics, these legitimate concerns often relate to actual nuclear use. First, China’s nuclear expansion and modernization, though modest in comparison to the much larger and sophisticated arsenals of the United States and Russia, ease the technical constraints that have influenced its nuclear policies, making it easier for Beijing to shift to a more alerted posture if the country’s leadership ever decides to do so. China is deploying more and increasingly sophisticated solid-fueled and road-mobile land-based missiles, fielding a fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and has reassigned a nuclear role to its air force. The development of more accurate, mobile, and survivable missiles, and the realization of a complete nuclear triad of land-, air-, and sea-based delivery systems will expand Beijing’s nuclear policy options. More accurate missiles improve the potential value of using nuclear weapons on the battlefield against opposing military units. Calls by some within China’s military to raise the alert status of its nuclear forces raise questions about the long-term trajectory of China’s nuclear policies. China is reportedly working on a space-based early warning system which could support a move to a launch-on-warning posture, if such a decision were made in the future. Last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that his country would assist China in developing an early warning capability. In fact, the 2020 Department of Defense report on the Chinese military claims that “China intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces by moving to a launch-on-warning posture with an expanded silo-based force.” Some developments, like the deployment of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine fleet, may create new pressures for mating warheads in peacetime or pre-delegating launch authority in certain situations. China’s expanding fissile material production capabilities, though intended for commercial purposes, could be used to support a larger expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal. Recent reports have suggested increased activity at China’s nuclear weapons labs and testing site. Together, these developments either create new opportunities for China to use its nuclear forces or introduce new pressures on longstanding nuclear weapons policies and practices. They also, in part, drive American skepticism of Chinese nuclear policies. In the past, the operational and technical characteristics of China’s nuclear arsenal lent inherent credibility to Beijing’s claims of maintaining only a retaliatory capability. China may have pursued these new capabilities primarily to ensure the survivability of its nuclear deterrent. But today, thanks to those modernization efforts, China’s nuclear forces may nonetheless be capable of more than simply retaliation. This has occurred against the backdrop of growing U.S.-Chinese strategic competition and mutual suspicion, further heightening threat perceptions. Second, experts have increasingly warned that the possible entanglement of China’s conventional and nuclear forces could introduce dangerous escalation risks in a crisis or conflict. China fields the world’s largest and most sophisticated array of conventional and nuclear ground-based ballistic missiles. All of these missiles are under the control of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. Some of these missiles, such as the DF-21, feature both conventional- and nuclear-armed variants. One missile system, the DF-26, appears technologically capable of switching between either a conventional or nuclear payload and Chinese military reporting describes DF-26 units rapidly transitioning from conventional strikes to nuclear ones. The mobility of these systems increases the possibility of nuclear and conventional units operating far from home garrisons and within proximity of one another. This organizational, technological, and geographic overlap may make it difficult for the United States to determine which systems are nuclear and which are conventional. In a crisis or a conflict, U.S. strikes against China’s conventional capabilities might inadvertently degrade Beijing’s nuclear deterrent, introducing dangerous escalation pressures. U.S. efforts to locate and track Chinese conventional missiles could be misinterpreted in Beijing as preparations for a disarming first strike against its nuclear forces. Similarly, the United States might mistake the launch of a conventional Chinese missile as a nuclear attack. These risks stemming from entanglement are more pronounced given evidence that the United States misperceives the drivers of Chinese entanglement. Several American analysts have suggested that Beijing may have deliberately entangled its conventional and nuclear forces in order to increase the risks of nuclear use and deter the United States. While the logic is compelling and some Chinese strategists may have come to appreciate the potential deterrent benefits of entanglement, the evidence suggests that Chinese entanglement, to the degree it exists, developed from more parochial organizational dynamics (i.e., saving costs by using similar systems), not a desire to manipulate risk. This mismatch between what Americans and Chinese analysts perceive to be the drivers of entanglement could exacerbate escalation dynamics, with U.S. officials falsely believing that China is well prepared for the risks of entanglement and Chinese officials falsely believing that U.S. actions (inadvertently) targeting China’s nuclear weapons are part of a campaign to erode China’s nuclear deterrent. Together, this entanglement could increase pressures on China to use its nuclear weapons or for the United States to target them, raising the likelihood of a dangerous escalation spiral. Third, China’s longstanding opacity about its nuclear forces and policies is risky, especially given the evidence of misperceptions and misunderstandings between Beijing and Washington. China and the United States appear to have dangerously different views of escalation dynamics and the ability of countries to control the scope and intensity of a conflict. For one, while American experts frequently highlight potential escalation pathways in a crisis or conflict, Chinese strategists appear overly sanguine about the escalatory potential of steps China might take with its nuclear forces to signal resolve. This mismatch in perceptions could lead each side to misjudge the actions or intentions of the other. For example, Chinese military texts describe potentially escalatory signaling practices for demonstrating resolve in a crisis, including broadcasting operations involving its strategic forces and even launching an intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a conventional warhead against an adversary’s territory. Though there is no indication that China ever deployed conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, such future actions could be easily mistaken for preparations of an actual nuclear strike. American skepticism about China’s nuclear policies, including its no-first-use pledge, exacerbates these risks. Similarly, although skepticism about China’s no-first-use policy may be overblown, it would be dangerous to assume that it is inviolable in all possible circumstances. In a crisis or a conflict, plans can change. There are occasional reports of Chinese strategists and military officers debating the merits of the no-first-use policy, including expressing concerns about potential adversary efforts to exploit China’s no-first-use policy by mounting a conventional first strike against China’s nuclear forces. Versions of this debate have been going on for decades and there is no hard evidence that China’s no-first-use policy has changed (indeed, the existence of the debate is itself evidence that the policy is still in place). But that should not lead U.S. military planners to assume that there is no risk in non-nuclear operations intended to degrade Chinese warfighting capabilities or impose costs on China.

## 4

#### Ethics must begin a priori and the meta-ethic is bindingness.

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [2] Bindingness – I can keep asking “why should I follow this” which results in skep since obligations are predicated on ignorantly accepting rules. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason which is self-justified.

#### That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer –

#### [1] All other frameworks collapse—non-Kantian theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

#### Negate:

#### 1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

Gourevitch 18 [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ froze major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] Interpretation: affirmative teams must concede negative contention choice

#### A] Phil Clash and Time Skew- anything else allows them to concede all our framework interactions and just go for 4 minutes of turns against our NC which o/w since phil is the only thing unique to LD Debate and time is the only quantifiable metric of abuse

#### B] Skew- They have an inherent advantage on the contention debate since they get 2ar spin so they can easily sway judge psychology in contention debates that don’t err towards one side.

#### C] Depth o/w Breadth- prevents the debate from being split over two issues i.e. the framework and substance which outweighs since in depth testing is necessary to refine ideas while vague debates result in inept clash. This includes weighing, b/c all standards still apply.

## 1NC – AT: Solvency

### 1NC - TL

#### You don’t solve your aff – your solvency advocate makes the distinction between collective bargaining and strikes – read the evidence because it definitely points out that the right to strike is distinct from collective bargaining. Double-bind: either

#### A] You defend it which makes you extra-T – that’s a voter for inflating solvency and exploding limits to anything that relates to the topic.

#### B] OR you don’t – so there’s a right to strike turn – we read blue.

Dongfang 11 Han Dongfang 4-6-2011 "Liberate China's Workers" <https://archive.md/7RvDG#selection-307.0-316.0> (director of China Labour Bulletin, a nongovernmental organization that defends the rights of workers in China.)//Elmer

HONG KONG — **There is no legal right to strike in China**, but there are strikes every day. Factory workers, hotel employees, teachers and taxi drivers regularly withdraw their labor and demand a better deal from their employer. Strikes are often successful, and these days strike leaders hardly ever get put in prison. It may seem ironic that workers in a nominally Communist country don’t have the right to strike, and that workers are apparently willing to defy the Communist Party by going out on strike. But China effectively abandoned Communism and embraced capitalism many years ago. And in a capitalist economy, strikes are a fact of life. Chinese scholars, government **officials** and even some businessmen have long recognized this fact and have **called for the** **restoration of the right to strike**, **which was removed from the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 1982**. **Deng Xiaoping feared that the economic reforms he was introducing would lead to labor unrest.** Although Deng and his successors were able to quiet labor unrest and strike action for a while, the trend over the last five years or so has been clear. As the business leader Zeng Qinghong noted recently, the number of strikes is increasing every year. Mr. Zeng, who is head of the Guangzhou Automobile Co., reported that in just two months last summer, there were more than 20 strikes in the automotive industry in the Pearl River Delta alone, and that new strikes were occurring all the time. Mr. Zeng suggested in a submission to this year’s National People’s Congress, China’s annual legislature, that the right to strike should be restored because it was a basic right of workers in a market economy and a natural adjunct to the right to work. I agree with Mr. Zeng on this point and would like to take his argument one step further. The **right to strike** **is** clearly important, but the most vital and fundamental right of workers is **the right to collective bargaining**. After all, **why do workers go out on strike**? Very simply, they go on strike **for higher pay and better working conditions**. **The strike is not an end in itself but is part of a bargaining process.** And **if the collective bargaining process were more effective**, in many cases, **workers would not need to go out on strike at all**. If you talk to factory workers, most will tell you they would rather not go on strike if they can avoid it. Indeed, most only go on strike because they have no alternative. **China’s workers want and need an alternative**. They want **a system** in **which they can raise their demands** for higher pay and discuss those demands **in** peaceful, **equal and constructive negotiations** with management. **If workers can achieve their goals through peaceful collective bargaining, in the long run there will be fewer strikes**, workers will be better paid and labor relations will be vastly improved. We also have to be aware that if the right to strike is reinstated in the Constitution in isolation — without the right to collective bargaining — there would be a danger that the right of workers to go on strike might actually be eroded. Just look at the right to stage a public demonstration. Chinese citizens do have the constitutional right to demonstrate but in reality they have to apply to the police for permission, and of course very few of those applications are granted. Likewise, if workers have to apply to the authorities before they can go on strike, the right to strike will become meaningless. Moreover, the number of strikes would not be reduced because workers would continue to go out on strike regardless and labor relations will deteriorate even further. On the other hand, if the **right to strike** is framed in a way that **can** **liberate workers** and **encourage** **and empower them to engage in collective bargaining**, **safe** **in the knowledge that they have a powerful weapon that can be deployed if necessary, labor relations will be enhanced** and the number of strikes might actually decrease. There is a saying in China that “you should not only focus on your head when you have headache because the real reason for the headache could be your foot.” As Mr. Zeng noted, the rapidly increasing number of strikes in China has become a major headache, not only for business but for the government as well. If the government wants to reduce the number of strikes in China, it needs to take a holistic approach and address the root cause of the problem — the absence of an effective collective bargaining system in which democratically elected workers’ representatives can negotiate better pay and conditions with their employer. If such a system can be implemented in China it would obviously benefit workers but it would also **benefit employers** like Mr. Zeng who are **concerned** **about** **high worker turnover and the loss of production through strike action.** Crucially, it is also in the interest of the Chinese government to introduce collective bargaining. The authorities may be nervous about handing power to the workers but they should bear in mind that by doing so they would aid the development of more harmonious labor relations, which could lead to the Communist Party’s goal of creating a more prosperous, stable and harmonious society.

#### THE RIGHT TO STRIKE WOULD NEVER BE ENFORCED IN CHINA- MEANS NO SOLVENCY- SUPERCHARGED BY THAT CHINA IS THE ONLY ONE DOING THE AFF

Nham 07 Nham, Mayoung. "The right to strike or the freedom to strike: can either interpretation improve working conditions in China." Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 39 (2007): 919.

The obvious criticism and problem with legally recognizing a right to strike in China is that there are still no guarantees that protection of this right will be enforced, even if it is a human right. 139 Reports of rampant labor rights abuses in China continue to emerge; it is unclear whether these abuses are a product of facially inadequate labor laws or inadequate enforcement of these laws.' 40 Given China's history of human rights abuses, especially with respect to labor, 41 the likelihood of the state protecting a worker's fundamental right to strike is not promising. Therefore, in order to truly improve the plight of Chinese workers, measures must be taken to ensure that there is more than just an illusory right to strike. Two possible options are reforming the All-China Federation of Trade Unions or placing international pressure on China to enforce a right to strike provision. As discussed in the following subsections, however, these options are problematic and unlikely to result in real reform.

### 1NC – AT: Unions

#### TOO MANY BARRIERS TO AN EFFECTIVE LABOR MOVEMENT- CCP WOULD NEVER GIVE UP CONTROL OF UNIONS

Nham 07 Nham, Mayoung. "The right to strike or the freedom to strike: can either interpretation improve working conditions in China." Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 39 (2007): 919.

The problem with this solution, however, is that it ignores the serious impediments that hinder the ACFTU from transforming itself into an enforcer of workers' rights. Using the ACFTU or any other union to enforce the right to strike would require a serious reform of Chinese law, ACFTU ideology, and government attitudes towards independent unions and strikes. First, the Trade Union Law would have to be revised in order to remove the obligation on unions to safeguard the Communist Party's interests and policies, as well as the rights of workers. 146 Second, the ACFTU and its leaders would have to completely change their attitude towards strikes. Rather than trying to prevent strikes before they happen or condemning them when they do occur, 147 the ACFTU would have to embrace and to protect strikes. A pro-strike role for the ACFTU would be a complete shift in the ACFTU's attitude towards strikes and may require the ACFTU to change more than it can. Finally, reforming the ACFTU and using it as a means of enforcing the right to strike would face serious opposition from the Chinese government. It is more than likely that the government would be unwilling to relinquish its control over the ACFTU because doing so is perceived as a threat to the continued existence of the Communist regime. 148 One of the principal reasons why the Chinese government has maintained such tight control over unions is because it fears that a mass organization of workers could lead to an overthrow of the government. 149 If the ACFTU becomes free of government control and has the power to organize and initiate strikes, then the government would feel even more threatened. Therefore, it is not as simple for the ACFTU to transform into a protector of workers' rights as gaining independence from the government.

#### CHINESE UNIONS ARE CONTROLLED BY THE CCP, MEANS EFFECTIVE LABOR NEGOTIATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ARE IMPOSSIBLE

Estlund 18 Estlund, Cynthia (Rein Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law). "6. Can China Secure Labor Peace without Independent Unions? Strikes and Collective Bargaining with Chinese Characteristics." A New Deal for China’s Workers?. Harvard University Press, 2018. 123-148.

That leads to a more general point foreshadowed in Chapter 4: when a strike is led and organized by a union that can negotiate effectively with the employer, and that is bound by reasonable restrictions on the permissible scope of industrial action, the union can in turn “regulate” the workers, keeping them within legally prescribed boundaries. The union can tell the workers: “If you follow our lead, we will get you a better deal.” And the union can get a better deal if it can credibly promise to end the strike on that condition. Genuinely representative unions thus stand at the core of Western collective bargaining systems: unions both enable workers to advance their economic interests and enable societies to regulate the scope and intensity of industrial action by serving as intermediate regulatory institutions. But unions can play that role only if they are seen by the workers as their faithful agents. The official union in China is something quite different. It is supposed to represent workers’ interests, but its various branches are controlled by the Party above the level of the enterprise, and its enterprise branches are largely controlled by enterprise management. There have been periodic efforts to make the enterprise trade unions more accountable to the workers; that is the subject of the next chapter. But as things stand, workers who are aggrieved, and who want to make demands on their employer, do not regard the union at any level as their faithful agent. The union cannot regulate the workers because the workers do not trust the union.

#### UNIONS ARE CONTROLLED BY THE STATE AND ARE THEREFORE UNABLE TO EFFECTIVELY COLLECTIVELY BARGAIN

Estlund 18 Estlund, Cynthia (Rein Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law). "6. Can China Secure Labor Peace without Independent Unions? Strikes and Collective Bargaining with Chinese Characteristics." A New Deal for China’s Workers?. Harvard University Press, 2018. 123-148.

Collective bargaining, and especially sectoral bargaining, can constrain wages at both the high and low ends. That is so even in democratic countries with independent labor movements. Nationally organized independent unions can take a long and broad view of workers’ interests, and can bargain for a fair quid pro quo in exchange for “wage restraint” that benefits the economy as a whole. But unless workers are well represented, sectoral bargaining can become a vehicle for simple employer collusion—a way to cap wage levels below what the market would bear, and to limit employer competition in tight labor markets, without any future rewards for workers’ forbearance. The risk of employer collusion is high in China, where the workers’ official representatives answer to party officials, who are in turn often beholden to local businesses. Especially when multiemployer bargaining is a response to tight labor markets and rising wages, as in Zhejiang, one suspects it does more to restrain workers’ bargaining power than to enhance it.

### 1NC – Watered Down

#### LABOR MOVEMENTS CAN BE COOPTED TO STIFFLE WORKER DISSATISFACTION

Estlund 18 Estlund, Cynthia (Rein Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law). "6. Can China Secure Labor Peace without Independent Unions? Strikes and Collective Bargaining with Chinese Characteristics." A New Deal for China’s Workers?. Harvard University Press, 2018. 123-148.

Collective appeasement is only one facet of the official response to unrest, of course. Another option is individual appeasement or co-optation. Some grassroots leaders might be neutralized by being promoted into management or hired onto a local union staff. A Chinese labor scholar described this tactic as an application of Mao’s advice on dealing with dissenters: “Mix with sand” (chan sha zi). 28 Of course, grassroots worker activists in the West may also be co-opted by employers or entrenched union officials. But the temptation to succumb to such inducements is much greater in China. First, there is no alternative “career path” as a worker-leader within an independent union movement, as there is in the West (difficult though it may be). Second, workers who persist in their independent activism in China face a high risk of serious reprisals. For whether or not workers’ collective demands are addressed, their leaders face a range of sanctions.