## 1

#### Interp: Debaters must disclose round reports on the 2021-22 NDCA LD wiki for every round they have debated this season. Round reports disclose which positions (AC, NC, K, T, Theory, etc.) were read/gone for in every speech.

#### Violation: you haven’t for many rounds (just a 1 or 2 rounds each tournament does not cut it)

Table

Description automatically generated

#### Standards:

#### 1] Level Playing Field – big schools can go around and scout and collect flows but independents are left in the dark so round reports are key to prep- they give you an idea of overall what layers debaters like going for so you can best prepare your strategy when you hit them. Accessibility first and independent voter – it’s an impact multiplier

#### 2] Strategy Education – round reports help novices understand the context in which positions are read by good debaters and help with brainstorming potential 1NCs vs affs – helps compensate for kids who can’t afford coaches to prep out affs.

## 2

#### Interpretation and Violation: The affirmative must defend the desirability of the hypothetical implementation of a just government recognizing an unconditional worker’s right to strike. This doesn’t entail a specific method of engaging in the topic, just that the affirmative must derive offense from a legal recognition of it. They don’t.

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

**Vote Neg –**

#### Limits – aff gets to choose literally anything they want, which justifies infinite variations of affirmatives that are impossible for the neg to prep against, ensuring they’ll always be ahead and use competition standards like perms to erase neg ground. Key to fairness since we need to predict arguments to be able to make viable responses. Additionally, cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters – kills inclusion which is a prerequisite to engaging in your method and turns case.

#### TVA- your aff just with government implementation- any DA to it proves workable clash under our interp

#### Testing – topical debate allows in depth analysis of tangible solutions for real world problems. Abstracting to arbitrary advocacies deteriorates from those skills, making debate meaningless. They turn the debate into a monologue where the negative debater is robbed of opportunities to learn which turns aff solvency to their method since I can’t engage. Advocacy skills controls the internal link to education and outweighs on portability since it is applicable to the real world.

#### Fairness is an impact –

#### 1] probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews in this round

#### 2] internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### 3] comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. This means they don’t get to weigh the aff and proves you should be epistemically suspect of their truth claims.

#### No impact turns or RVIs

#### [1] Perfcon – if T’s bad and you vote for them on that arg, you’re voting on T.

#### [2] Substance – if T’s bad then we should try debating on substance – impact turns force me to go for T since I need to defend my position.

#### Theory is competing interps – a) reasonability is arbitrary and so is any brightline they set, b) norming – competing interps causes a race to the top where we find the best possible norm for debate instead of setting a brightline and testing how abusive we can be without violating.

#### Drop the debater on T – a) indicts the aff advocacy so drop the argument would be dropping the aff anyways, b) deter future abuse and set good norms.

## 3

#### Permissibility and presumption negate – [a] the resolution indicates the aff has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation [b] Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

#### *The meta-ethic is bindingness.*

#### Ethics must begin with a re-orientation towards the subject since modernity is created by persons. Ethics must make equal personhood, rights, and freedoms accessible for all.

Mills 18 “Black Radical Kantianism.” Res Philosophica, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 1–33 https:// doi.org/ 10.11612/ resphil.1622 B1ACK ZD

We start, appropriately enough, with personhood. Deontological liberalism is, of course, classically distinguished from consequentialist liberalism in making persons and their natural rights foundational rather than social welfare. In Rawls’s (1999, 24) famous Kant-inspired indictment: “Utili- tarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons.” Kant tells us in the Groundwork (Kant 1964, 96) that “Rational beings . . . are called persons because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves,” so that one formulation of the categorical imperative is “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” [italics removed]. Persons are themselves the makers of the universal law that morally binds them, so that, as self-legislators, “Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (103). But Kant also tells us (though not in the Groundwork) that blacks “can be educated but only as servants (slaves),” that “The Negro can be disciplined and cultivated, but is never genuinely civilized. He falls of his own accord into savagery,” and that (along with Native Americans) “Blacks cannot govern themselves. They thus serve only for slaves” (see Mills 2005 for details). I submit, as I have argued elsewhere (Mills 2005; 2014), that such claims cannot plausibly be regarded as mere “inconsistencies,” but point to a radical Kantian differentiation in the ranks of humanity between those who, being capable of autonomy, reach the person threshold, and those (“natural slaves”) who, incapable of autonomy and self-legislation, do not. So as stated at the beginning, my contention is that Kant is working with a philosophical anthropology of persons and sub-persons, determined by respective degrees of rationality and proneness to character defect, which is why, in its application to this particular sub-section of humanity, the categorical imperative permits (seemingly) inequitable treatment, such as enslavement. Within critical philosophy of race, as with the metaphysics of race, competing analyses have been given of racism. But one candidate that would obviously fit perfectly here is Joshua Glasgow’s (2009) suggestion that we conceptualize racism as race-based disrespect. Blacks, then—not being capable of self-government—are appropriately deserving of disrespect rather than respect, and are creatures without essential dignity. So how does a critically rewritten discourse of “race” reconceptualize this situation—that is, a modern world [is] shaped by Atlantic racial slavery (unlike the non-racial slavery of antiquity and the medieval epoch), and other varieties of racial domination in the form of colonialism, imperialism, expropriative white settlement, Jim Crow, and apartheid? My suggestion is that the great theoretical insight and contribution of the Afro-modern political tradition is the recognition that such a world is metaphysically dramatically divergent from its Euro-modern political representations, whether mainstream or radical. To the extent that the dominant varieties of colonial/imperial liberalism were originally racist (Mehta 1999; Pitts 2005; Hobson 2012), presup- posing a hierarchy of European superiors and non-European inferiors (biologically and/or culturally), they got the social ontology wrong in an obvious way. But to the extent that postwar postcolonial (at least nom- inally) liberalism retroactively sanitized its racial past and transformed this hierarchical essentialist metaphysics into an ontology of morally equal and symmetrically positioned atomic individuals, it still continues, I would contend, to get the social ontology wrong. The Afro-modern claim is that neither is correct, because (contra the first) blacks and other people of color are equal and because (contra the second) the socially constructed inequalities and their historic legacy cannot be metaphysically ignored considering how fundamentally and asymmetrically they have shaped the modern world order and the raced individuals within that order. In other words, the Afro-modern tradition is insistent that modernity is established on and structured by a social ontology of race. It is not, of course—assuming meta-ethical objectivism—that these racist social conven- tions and structures actually make blacks and other people of color less than full persons. But the denial to them of social recognition as full persons, depriving them of equal rights, freedoms, and protections, and unjustly privileging whites at their expense, foundationally affects both these racial groups and the moral and political dynamics of the societies so created. Objectively, their personhood is unaffected, along with the rights, freedoms, and protections they should have, as persons. But intersubjectively, insofar as white social recognition is dominant and determinant, their socially effective personhood—the rights, freedoms, and protections they actually have—is denied.5 Thus, we have an ontology—races as central existents profoundly shaping one’s being as an individual—but an ontology socially rather than biologically created—the product of “sociogenesis,” in Frantz Fanon’s (1991 [1967]) famous coinage. As George Fredrickson (2015 [2002], 11–12) has pointed out, pre- modern social ontologies are characterized by social hierarchies of multiple kinds. So even if race existed then (which Fredrickson denies, as an expo- nent of the short periodization), it would not have been sharply differen- tiated from the others. It is the advent of modernity, which is supposed to flatten these systems of ascriptive hierarchy into simple personhood (as in the conventional portrayal of Kant), that sets racial inferiority so sharply into relief, since the R2s are then being stigmatized as less than human while the R1s become (making allowance for gender differentiation) coextensive with the human. The Afro-modern diagnosis of a metaphysics of personhood that is actually racialized is thus different from standard Euro-modern discussions of personhood and its implications for ethico- political theory. It is making a different claim than the anti-utilitarian critique within liberalism that it permits the disrespecting of persons. The putative problem with utilitarianism is not that it regards a set of persons as sub-persons, but that the fungibility of (equal) persons opens the door to the rights-violations of some (equal) persons if social welfare for (equal) persons as a whole can thereby be maximized. The Afro-modern analysis is saying that, independent of this issue, some persons are not recognized as equal persons in the first place. So it is also different from the Marxist critique from outside liberalism. The putative problem here, as originally stated in “On the Jewish Question” (Marx 2000) and later in Capital (Marx 1990 [1976], 279–280), is that in assuming individuals of equal moral and juridical status, equal recognized personhood, liberalism’s social ontology is ignoring the effects of the material differences in wealth and property ownership in the liberal state that in reality make the (white) working class effectively unequal. But the Afro-modern claim is that for blacks and other people of color, not even ethico-juridical equality, limited as it may be, is attained, so that their positioning in the liberal state is different from the beginning.

#### [A] Uncertainty – an inability to know others experience and structural positionality makes empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### [B] Constitutivism – Morality faces regress where we can continue asking “why.” Practical reason is the only unescapable and binding authority because to ask why I should be a reasoner concedes it’s authority since you’re actively reasoning.

#### That justifies universality – a] any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends b] Only universalizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

#### Prefer:

#### [1] Normativity outweighs: a] Obligations – lack of it doesn’t generate stable ethics so it permits anything except the one thing it condemns b] Collapses – injustices need universal ideal principles to ground them and explain why they are wrong which otherwise justifies skep since no external reason to follow ethics c] Necessity – every arg presupposes ability to set and pursue ends which collapses to my framework d] Is/Ought Gap – description of injustices only tells us what exists, not how to properly fix it or act with it which leaves all harms unresolved.

#### [2] Consequences Fail: a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict. b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. c] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify because we commit the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Negate:

#### 1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

Gourevitch 18 [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ froze major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### The aff has a deontological obligation to be topical.

#### Nebel 15: Jake Nebel,"The Priority of Resolutional Semantics by Jake Nebel," Briefly, <https://www.vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/>

A second strategy denies that such pragmatic benefits are relevant. This strategy is more deontological. One version of this strategy appeals to the importance of consent or agreement. Suppose that you give your opponents prior notice that you’ll be affirming the September/October 2012 resolution instead of the current one. There is a sense in which your affirmation of that resolution is now predictable: your opponents know, or are in a position to know, what you will be defending. And suppose that the older resolution is conducive to better (i.e., more fair and more educational) debate. Still, it’s unfair of you to expect your opponents to follow suit. Why? Because they didn’t agree to debate that topic. They registered for a tournament whose invitation specified the current resolution, not the Sept/Oct 2012 resolution or a free-for-all. The “social contract” argument for topicality holds that accepting a tournament invitation constitutes implicit consent to debate the specified topic. This claim might be contested, depending on what constitutes implicit consent. What is less contestable is this: given that *some* proposition must be debated in each round and that the tournament has specified a resolution, no one can reasonably reject a principle that requires everyone to debate the announced resolution as worded. This appeals to Scanlon’s contractualism. Someone who wishes to debate only the announced resolution has a strong claim against changing the topic, and no one has a stronger claim against debating the announced resolution (ignoring, for now, some possible exceptions to be discussed in the next subsection). So it is unfair to expect your opponent to debate anything other than the announced resolution. This unfairness is a constraint on the pursuit of education or other goods: it wrongs and is unjustifiable to your opponent.

## Case

### Presumption

Vote negative on presumtpion

1] nothing the affimrative does cales up to solve violene- i.e peiple have been readind diability non T affs for years now, and violence operates

### TOP

#### Embracing futurity is necessary for liberation – even if they are right that disabled violence is an ontological phenomenon – it should not be treated as such b/c it denies agency and engenders violence

Kafer 13 - MA, PhD, Claremont Graduate University 2005, BA, Wake Forest University 1993 (Alison, 5/16/13, Indiana University press, “Feminist, Queer, Crip”, pages 45-46)EB

Thus my desire for crip futures is, as Heather Love puts it, “a hope inseparable from despair.”97 I feel this hope—and the hope has the fierce intensity that it does— because it is birthed out of and coexists with this despair about our impoverished imaginations. What I need is to follow some of these longings out, even if they put me in the realm of fantasy. Changing our imaginations, suggests Judith Butler, allows us to change our situations. Fantasy carries a “critical promise,” she argues, “allow[ing] us to imagine ourselves and others otherwise.”98 This intermingling of recognition and absence, of despair and hope, renders my desire quite queer. Queer in that my want, my longing, my pleasure intensifies with the queerness of these crip bodies, these crip futures. Queer, too, in that in imagining crip futures, I mean more than particular, identifiable bodies. I mean possibility, unpredictability, promise: the promise of recognizing crip where I did not expect to find it, the possibility of watching “crip” change meanings before my eyes. I name this desire “queer” in part because of its ambiguity. Becoming more “visible”—by increasing and publicizing the presence of disabled people in public, perhaps—does not guarantee acceptance or inclusion, especially for those not already privileged by race and class.99 As feminists from Minnie Bruce Pratt to Bernice Johns on Reagon to Chandra Talpede Mohanty have cautioned, the desire for home, for familiarity, often leads to naïve evocations of community.100 Thus, in naming and experiencing this desire, I am likely misreading and misrecognizing the bodies and practices of others. I am, in other words, finding both disability and desire where they don’t necessarily belong—surely a potentially queer and crip move. This desire, these imaginings, cannot be separated from the crip pasts behind us or the crip presents surrounding us; indeed, these very pasts and presents are what make articulating a critical crip futurity so essential. To put it bluntly, I, we, need to imagine crip futures because disabled people are continually being written out of the future, rendered as the sign of the future no one wants. This erasure is not mere metaphor. Disabled people—particularly those with developmental and psychiatric impairments, those who are poor, gender-deviant, and/or people of color, those who need atypical forms of assistance to survive—have faced sterilization, segregation, and institutionalization; denial of equitable education, health care and social services; violence and abuse; and the withholding of the rights of citizenship. Too many of these practices continue, and each of them has greatly limited, and often literally shortened, the futures of disabled people. It is my loss, our loss, not to take care of, embrace, and desire all of us. We must begin to anticipate presents and to imagine futures that include all of us. We must explore disability in time

#### No root cause claims.

Bone 17 (Kirstin Marie Bone, Department of English, University of Alabama. “Trapped behind the glass: crip theory and disability identity”. Disability and Society, April 21, 2017. <http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/09687599.2017.1313722?needAccess=true>)

The purpose of critical theory has long been the focus of debate within the academy. Are we, as theorists, obligated to strive for political and social change, or are we merely resolved to engage in the work of critical thinking? This question becomes particularly contested in the realm of minority theory, because the groups we study are those whose histories are awash in a cycle of oppression and marginalization. Within disability studies, an examination of dominate modes of thought produces an answer: as theorists, we should strive to improve the living conditions of the community we examine. One mode of discourse in particular that has positioned itself as seeking this political and social impact is ~~crip~~ [disability] theory. Based in the rhetoric of queer theory, ‘crip’ seeks to challenge constructions of able-bodiedness and be politically generative through the fracturing of key systems of oppression. Whether or not it actually accomplishes these goals is debatable, particularly because its founding principles allow anyone to colonize the disabled identity as their own. In order to understand the nuances of crip theory and the ways in which this framework fractures the disabled community, I will examine this theory through three different lenses. The first lens is to understand the word ‘crip/crippled’ and its relationship with other historical terms for disability. This framework will demonstrate how ~~crip~~ [disability] theory continues oppressive cycles instead of fulfilling politically generative and empowering goals. Next, I examine crip theory through its relationships with other branches of theory. By placing crip theory within this context, I identify the ways ~~crip~~ [disability] and other dominant branches of thought both succeed and fail in advancing the lives of disabled people. Finally, I conduct a rigorous examination of crip theory as defined by the dominant theorists who subscribe to its ideology. Through this tri-fold reading, I conclude that crip theory’s transformative agenda has not been realized. Instead, ~~crip~~ [disability] theory continues a cycle of silencing and marginalization that widens the divide between disability studies and the lived experiences of the disabled rather than bridging those critical gaps in meaningful ways.

#### Psychoanalysis is infinitely regressive, not falsifiable, and too abstract

Gordon 1 – Paul Gordon, accomplished psychotherapist, “Psychoanalysis and Racism: The Politics of Defeat,” RACE & CLASS v. 42 n. 4, 2001, pp. 17-34.

But in the thirty years since Kovel wrote, that attempt to relate mind and society has been fractured by the advent of postmodernism, with its subsumption of the material/historical, of notions of cause and effect, to what is transitory, contingent, free-¯oating, evanescent. Psychoanalysis, by stepping into the vacuum left by the abandonment of all metanarrative, has tended to put mind over society. This is particularly noticeable in the work of the Centre for New Ethnicities Research at the University of East London, which purports to straddle the worlds of the academy and action by developing projects for the local community and within education generally.28 But**,** in marrying psychoanalysis and postmodernism, on the basis of claiming to be both scholarly and action oriented, it degrades scholarship and undermines action, and ends in discourse **analysis a language** in which metaphor passes for reality**.** Cohen's work unavoidably raises the question of the status of psycho- analysis as a social or political theory, as distinct from a clinical one. Can psychoanalysis, in other words, apply to the social world of groups, institutions, nations, states and cultures in the way that it does, or at least may do, to individuals? Certainly there is now a considerable body of literature and a plethora of academic courses, and so on, claim- ing that psychoanalysis is a social theory. And, of course, in popular discourse, it is now a commonplace to hear of nations and societies spoken of in personalised ways. Thus `truth commissions' and the like, which have become so common in the past decade in countries which have undergone turbulent change, are seen as forms of national therapy or catharsis, even if this is far from being their purpose. Nevertheless, the question remains: does it make sense, as Michael Ignatieff puts it, to speak of nations having psyches the way that individuals do? `Can a nation's past make people ill as we know repressed memories sometimes make individuals ill? . . . Can we speak of nations ``working through'' a civil war or an atrocity as we speak of individuals working through a traumatic memory or event?' 47 The problem withthe application ofpsychoanalysis to social institutionsis thatthere can be no testing of the claims made. If someone says, for instance, that nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, how can this be proved? Thepioneers of psychoanalysis, from Freud onwards, allderivedtheirideas in the context oftheirwork with individual patients and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient**.** Outside of the consulting room, there can be no **such** verification process, and the further one moves from the individual **patient,** the less purchase psychoanalyticideas canhave**.** Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking. Butif everything is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true. An example of Cohen's method is to be found in his 1993 working paper, `Home rules', subtitled `Some re¯ections on racism and nation- alism in everyday life'. Here Cohen talks about taking a `particular line of thought for a walk'. While there is nothing wrong with taking a line of thought for a walk, such an exercise is not necessarily the same as thinking. One of the problems with Cohen's approach is that a kind of free association, mixed with deconstruction, leads not to analysis, not even to psychoanalysis, but to . . . well, just more free association, an endless, indeed one might say pointless, play on words. This approach may well throw up some interesting associations along the way, connections one had never thought of but it is not to be confused with political analysis. In `Home rules', anything and everything to do with `home' can and does ®nd a place here and, as I indicated above, even the popular ®lm Home Alone is pressed into service as a story about `racial' invasion.

#### The 1AC’s static concepts of strikes naturalize a universal able-bodied subject that excludes disabled bodies and causes political rollback.

Desai 17 [Desai, Saima is an activist and an Editor at Briarpatch Magazine https://www.mcgilldaily.com/2017/02/organizing-our-way-through-mental-illness/ “Organizing our way through mental illness: Lots of activists live with mental illness – so why is social justice organizing still so ableist?” “” indicates paragraphs] //Lex VM

Our worth as activists is measured by our ability to throw down in the street, to stand at vigils or strikes for hours in the cold without food, our willingness to risk being arrested or pepper sprayed or kettled. We’re expected to be constantly active on social media, constantly debating and educating our less-political friends and family, constantly up to date on the news, constantly offering emotional support to affected communities. Physical, emotional, and mental exertion are used as yardsticks of commitment to the cause – without taking into account our differing abilities and skills. It ends up replicating structures of capitalism, where our bodies are juiced for labour and then disposed of when they can no longer work – the workers become what Marx, in Capital, calls the “conscious organs of the automaton.” “There’s a hierarchy in mental illness, where the people who are the most productive are at the top, and the people who are the least productive are at the bottom, which is ingrained in us by capitalism,” said Sonia. As a result of all of this, a lot of the discussion around activism and organizing is incredibly ableist. It’s coming from seasoned organizers as well as the recent influx of new activists that perhaps haven’t done the work to interrogate their ableism. The rhetoric of “bodies in the streets” activism most strongly excludes people with physical disabilities and mobility restrictions, as well as many undocumented, racialized, and trans folks who simply cannot risk arrest in the way a white dude can. But ableist activism also affects those of us with mental illness. People with anxiety are excluded from protests. People with PTSD are side-eyed for not shutting down a sexist comment at a dinner party. People with bipolar disorder are judged for not showing up for the vigil, when in reality they couldn’t get out of bed that day. Our bodies are juiced for labour and then disposed of when they can no longer work. “I feel like there’s no room for people who can’t make those protests for various reasons. And even if people say that they don’t have that mentality, I think it’s very ingrained,” Maddie told me. It’s the mentality that creates the idea of the Platonic form of the activist: a young white man who’s necessarily able-bodied and infinitely resilient, who can scream at the cops without risking being beaten or deported. “That’s definitely internalized in many activist communities: that you need to put your body on the street, you need to be out there, and be ready to face violence,” Maddie continued. For those who organize in communities or alongside friends, withdrawing from high-intensity work means not only feeling like a bad activist, but a bad person overall. “We have to keep loving people when they’re not able to organize, and not able to do as much,” CJ told me. “And I think that’s hard because I definitely idolize or deeply respect and admire people who spend their life organizing, and really do a lot – but that’s also just not possible for so many people, for so many reasons.” Part of this ableist rhetoric of activism is the idea of “slacktivism”: posting, sharing, liking, or donating via social media, which is considered ‘lazy’ or ‘shallow’ activism. But creating a hierarchy of activism, where violent protest is at the top, not only excludes those who cannot attend protests or smash windows, but also underestimates social media’s value as a tool for organizing and community-building. “We have to keep loving people when they’re not able to organize.” “During high school I isolated a lot from my physical community because of my depression, but I did a lot of online community stuff; I had this screen and I felt more comfortable behind it, and I didn’t have to move out of my bed, also,” Maddie told me. “I created a community through Twitter and Tumblr – that was my initial introduction into social justice spaces.” Protests and vigils are wonderful and necessary forms of political action. But we also need to value other forms of resistance, and make space for people to resist in whatever ways their bodies and brains allow – lest our work become anti-oppressive in name alone. This has never been more important to understand than now, when mass protests are erupting in Montreal twice a week, when we’re inundated with calls to “step up,” and “show up,” when tapping out of visible, high-intensity, or physical activism is seen as inexcusable. When Trump has a history of mocking disabled reporters, his possible repeal of the Affordable Care Act will strip many disabled people of healthcare, and his federal hiring freeze is going to make it even harder to appeal for Social Security Disability Insurance, activists need to make sure that we’re not excluding the very people whose rights we should be fighting for. Staying sane in the time of Trump I have a lot of friends who have never been politically engaged before who are coming to me and asking how to attend a protest for the first time, or which grassroots organizations to volunteer with. I’m really excited about this wave of popular resistance, but I also know that this intensity of fear and rage amongst activists is not sustainable. I know that this work erodes your sanity. If we don’t start talking about mental illness in activism – and not just as a throwaway acknowledgement, not just as an afterthought – then we’re facing mass burnout in the near future. This chunk of writing is how I’m staying sane in harrowing times. I’m writing to try and open a more honest conversation about mental illness amongst activists, but I’m also writing to help myself untangle my complicated relationship with the politics of mental illness. I’m writing because I feel helpless and sad, and journalism is my activism and my catharsis. This is my act of resistance – against Trump, against ableism, against burnout and desensitization, against my own creeping depression. CJ told me, “it would be good for me to prioritize my own mental and physical health. I should do that for my own sake. But also to actually do the most good, my organizing has to be sustainable, and I have to find ways that it doesn’t kill me.” Four years is a long time to keep up a fight, and it’s imperative that our work survives – but to do so, the activists have to survive too.