## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a just government in which a right to strike ought to be recognized

#### “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just governmnt” in the res – means that you have to prove the resolution true in a VACCUM, not in a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation) LHSLA JC/SJ

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### Violation: they spec [x]

#### Standards:

#### [1] precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### [2] limits – the UN says there are 195 national governments but even that’s not an agreed upon brightline – explodes limits since there are tons of independent affs plus functionally infinite combinations, all with different advantages in different political situations. Kills neg prep and debatability since there are no DAs that apply to every aff – i.e. factors that affect labor shortages or unions in the US are different than in China – means the aff is always more prepared and wins just for speccing. There’s been China, Hungary, EU, Kazakhstan, US, India, UK, Egypt, Germany, Brazil, Japan.

#### [3] tva – just read your aff as an advantage under a whole res advocacy, solves all ur offense- Potential abuse doesn’t permit 1AC abuse – allows you to be infinitely abusive in the 1AC-– if the neg doesn’t have specific prep, they’ll resort to cheaty word PICs which are net worse

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

Evaluate the theory debate after the 2nr- key to reciprocity because we both have 2 speeches on theory

## 2

#### Presumption and permissibility negate – a) more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways which outweighs on probability

#### b) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted which outweighs on empirics

#### c) ought means the aff is proactive if they win that definition which means lack of proactivity negates. these args still negate under comparative worlds since it requires them to prove the statement that “the aff world is more desirable than the neg world” true but we deny their ability to do so which means presume neg. Also, I don’t need to win presumption to win, I just need to win any of the arguments below because the aff is false, not just no offense and if I’m textual I’m fair because the topic is the most predictable, so you could’ve engaged.

#### d] Affirmation theory- Affirming requires unconditionally maintaining an obligation

Affirm [is to]: maintain as true.

That’s Dictionary.com- “affirm” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/affirm

#### The aff burden is to prove that the aff will logically happen in the status quo

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Text – o/w on common usage b/c 2 defs

#### A] Ought is “used to express logical consequence” as defined by Merriam-Webster

(<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought>) //Massa

#### B] Oxford Dictionary defines ought as “used to indicate something that is probable.”

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ought> //Massa

#### c] “Should” means a logical consequence – 2 definitions.

Merriam-Webster. No Date. “Definition of Should.” *Merriam Webster Dictionary Online*. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should>. NM

should auxiliary verb Save Word To save this word, you'll need to log in. \ shəd, ˈshu̇d \ Definition of should **past tense of SHALL** 1—used in auxiliary function to express condition if he should leave his father, his father would die — Genesis 44:22 (Revised Standard Version) 2—used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency 'tis commanded I should do so — William Shakespeare this is as it should be — H. L. Savage you should brush your teeth after each meal 3—**used** in auxiliary function **to express futurity from a point of view in the past** realized that she should have to do most of her farm work before sunrise — Ellen Glasgow 4—**used** in auxiliary function **to express what is probable or expected** with an early start, they should be here by noon 5—used in auxiliary function to express a request in a polite manner or to soften direct statement I should suggest that a guide … is the first essential — L. D. Reddick

#### 2] Debatability – a. it focuses debates on empirics about squo trends rather than irresolvable abstract principles that’ve been argued for years

#### b. the neg forces the most real world debates because it forces us to actually take into consideration things that are possible as opposed to abstract policymaking that’s impossible which means we are more material – the aff’s method just imagines we magically pass something that will never happen whereas we discuss real trends which link turns education claims

#### c. Prediction is impossible. Any action can lead to a domino effect that can have disastrous impacts in the end. For example, if I sneeze, it could lead to a butterfly effect that eventually causes my sneeze to form into a hurricane and kill thousands.

#### 3] Neg definition choice – the aff should have defined ought in the 1ac because it was in the rez so it’s predictable contestation, by not doing so they have forfeited their right to read a new definition – kills 1NC strategy since I premised my engagement on a lack of your definition.

#### 4] Log con isn’t mutually exclusive with comparative worlds a) logic is a side constraint on desirability b) proves why it’s not desirable since taking impossible actions are net bad since they produce no benefits and only opportunity costs c) reinterprets to the more logical world rather than more desireable world.

**Negate:**

#### 1] Inherency – either a) the aff is non-inherent and you vote neg on presumption or b) it is and it isn’t going to happen.

## 3

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement – their framing collapses since you must say it is true that a world is better than another before you adopt it.

#### They justify substantive skews since there will always be a more correct side of the issue but we compensate for flaws in the lit.

#### Most educational since otherwise we wouldn’t use math or logic to approach topics. Scalar methods like comparison increases intervention – the persuasion of certain DA or advantages sway decisions – T/F binary is descriptive and technical.

#### The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional, that outweighs since it’s a procedural question it questions whether the judge should go outside the scope of the game. And I disagree with the aff which denies the truth of it, which meets my burden

#### Most inclusive because other ROBs allow for oppression Olympics allowing personal lives and experiences to factor in decisions.

## 4

#### 2] just[[3]](#footnote-3) describes what is “(of treatment) deserved or appropriate in the circumstances” but the res doesn’t specify circumstances

#### 3] government[[4]](#footnote-4) is “direction; control; management; rule” but a direction can’t perform an action

#### 5] recognize[[5]](#footnote-5) is to “(of a person presiding at a meeting or debate) call on (someone) to speak” but a right can’t speak

#### Paradox of tolerance- to be completely open to the aff we must exclude perspectives that wouldn’t be open to it which makes complete tolerance impossible.

#### 3] Decision Making Paradox- We need a decision-making procedure to enact the aff, but to choose a procedure requires another meta level decision-making procedure and so forth leading to infinite regress.

#### 4] The Place Paradox- if everything exists in a place, that place must have a place that it exists in and so forth. Therefore, identifying ought statements is impossible since it assumes the space-time continuum.

#### 5] Grain Paradox- One grain falling makes no sound, but a thousand grains make a sound. A thousand nothings cannot make something which means the physical world is paradoxical.

#### 6] Arrows Paradox- If time is divided into 0-duration slices, no motion is happening in each of them, so taking them all as a whole, motion is impossible.

#### 7] Bonini’s Paradox- As a model of a complex system becomes more complete, it becomes less understandable and vice versa; therefore, no model can be useful.

#### [8] Rule following fails a) We can infinitely question why to follow that rule, as all rules will terminate at the assertion of some principle with no further justification b) Rule are arbitrary since the agent has the ability to formulate a unique understanding of them. It becomes impossible to say someone is violating a rule, since they can always perceive their actions as a non-violation.

#### [9] you can’t be sure anything besides yourself exists – we could be deceived by a demon, dreaming, or in a simulation so the whole world could be nonexistent which nonunique your offense

## 5

#### NC theory first 1] They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] We have more speeches to norm over it 3] It was introduced first so it’s lexically prior.

#### Neg abuse outweighs aff abuse 1] Infinite prep before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology 3] 1st and last speech 4] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

#### No new 1ar theory paradigm issues 1] New 1ar paradigms moot 1NC offense 2] Introducing them in the aff allows for rigorous testing

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells/IVIs – 1AR theory is aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that don’t get responded to

#### DTA on 1AR shells/IVIs – they can blow up blippy shells in the 2AR but I have to split time and can’t preempt the 2AR which causes intervention and makes it irresolvable so don’t stake the round on it

#### RVIs on 1AR theory/IVIs – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces at least 2:30 on the shell so RVIs check time skew

## Case

#### War stays conventional.

Caitlin 1AC Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, November/December 2018, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 5

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself.

#### Wouldn’t go all out – it would stay conventional.

Natasha Kassam 20, Research Fellow in the Diplomacy and Public Opinion Program at the Lowy Institute, Bachelor of Laws (Hons I) and a Bachelor of International Studies from the University of Sydney, and Richard McGregor, Senior Fellow at the Lowy Institute, Former Fellow at the Wilson Center and Visiting Scholar at the Sigur Center at George Washington University, “Taiwan’s 2020 Elections”, Lowy Institute Report, 1/7/2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/taiwan-s-2020-elections

Regionally, the conventional balance of military power is tipping towards China. The People’s Liberation Army has long equipped itself and planned for a cross-straits conflict. However, a full-frontal Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains unlikely in the near term. There are numerous factors that would deter such an invasion, including Taiwan’s unwelcoming geography and climate, the difficulties of staging an amphibious landing, the unknown appetite in the United States for intervention and Japan’s interests in the Taiwan Strait. Other military options which would be less risky, and potentially less disruptive to trade, include a targeted naval blockade.[36]

#### But, invasion triggers political backlash – induces a democratic transition.

Wang Mouzhou 17 – Pen name of a former NSA intelligence officer, 3-24-2017, (“What Happens After China Invades Taiwan?” The Diplomat, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/what-happens-after-china-invades-taiwan/>) Recut Justin

Let’s assume, hypothetically, that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) successfully conquers Taiwan. Most analyses of an attempted invasion consider only if the PRC could successfully subdue Taiwan. The consequences of an attempted invasion –even a tactically successful one – have received little thought, however. This analysis considers some likely consequences for the PRC if it attempts and/or completes an invasion of Taiwan. Likely consequences include: the direct human and economic expenditures of the invasion itself; the costs of garrisoning Taiwan; the PRC’s post-war diplomatic and economic isolation; and, finally, the significant and potentially destabilizing process of incorporating 23 million individuals into the PRC. It is still too soon to say if Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in Crimea and the Donbass produced a strategic defeat or victory for Russia. However, the elements that advantaged Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine will not avail themselves to the PRC in a cross-straits crisis. Invading Taiwan would prove highly dangerous and costly for Beijing. Incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC would prove to be, at best, a Pyrrhic victory if attempted in the near or medium term. The Invasion of Taiwan While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a highly capable and formidable force, a conventional military invasion of Taiwan would prove highly costly in treasure and blood and could fail to achieve the Communist Party of China’s (CPC’s) objectives. Ship-to-shore and shore-to-shore landings are extremely hazardous for the invasion force. In the first Gulf War, American military planners were rumored to estimate that an amphibious invasion of Saddam Hussein-occupied Kuwait would cost up to 10,000 American lives, despite the considerable relative military superiority of U.S. forces. The Republic of China (ROC) possesses a much more sophisticated military than Hussein did in 1991 and, due to advances in anti-access area denial doctrine and capabilities, can impose asymmetric costs on an invader. Additionally, American forces (and, potentially, other actors) would impose punishing costs on any invasion force. A 2015 RAND study estimated that United States submarines alone could sink 41 percent of Chinese amphibious ships in a theoretical 2017 conflict. A direct invasion attempt by the PRC would likely lead to significant – and potentially massive – casualties for all involved actors, as well as a regional or even global economic depression. In the “best-case” scenario for the PRC, a successful invasion would still suffer substantial casualties and cost tens of billions of dollars. Moreover, the consequences of an invasion would persist, as health expenses and pensions would burden the Chinese state for decades (at a time when Chinese veterans are already protesting about unpaid pensions). An invasion and the one-child policy could exacerbate an already hellish social crisis for the mainland, as wounded and deceased veterans – often only children – would be unable to support their elderly parents and grandparents. Instead of a direct invasion, the PRC could employ a blockade or another form of so-called “asymmetrical warfare.” Russia used the tactics of asymmetric warfare to achieve short-term political objectives in Crimea, the Donbass, and, according to some reports, the 2016 United States presidential election. It may also potentially achieve the dissolution of the European Union and stimulate a worldwide financial crisis through its intervention in European elections. Leaving aside, for now, the wisdom of these actions, it is worth noting that the PRC’s invasion of Taiwan would confront an environment hostile to asymmetric means. Several factors aided Russia’s asymmetric/hybrid invasion of Ukraine: popular support in Crimea and the Donbass for close political ties with Russia; a significant number of former Russian (and Soviet) citizens and even veterans in the invaded territories, especially in Crimea; a largely ineffective opposing military force; and the element of surprise. A PRC invasion of Taiwan would confront much more challenging conditions. Few in Taiwan desire reunification with the CPC-dominated mainland: a 2014 public opinion poll by the ROC’s Mainland Affairs Council found that 84 percent of respondents on the island wanted to “maintain the status quo defined in a broader sense.” The PRC could surely count on some fifth-column support in the event of an invasion or asymmetric campaign but the reality is that most individuals in Taiwan fear PRC rule and would actively resist a reduction in their political freedoms and economic prosperity. Finally, the ROC’s military – and other militaries – are unlikely to be surprised by asymmetric warfare and would respond vigorously. Therefore, in the highly likely event of an asymmetric invasion’s failure, the CPC’s political leadership would have to face a hard choice: accept a massive symbolic defeat, which could jeopardize the Party’s legitimacy, or escalate an asymmetric operation into a full military invasion with all attendant risks. Garrison Island The costs of invading Taiwan could, perhaps surprisingly, pale in comparison to the costs of maintaining control over it. In the best-case scenario for the PRC, the island would fall with minimal damage to its physical (not to mention human) infrastructure. It is perhaps more realistic to expect that a PRC invasion would lead to catastrophic destruction of private property (much of it owned by mainland elites); severe damages to Taiwan’s transportation infrastructure, such as railroads, bridges, ports, airports, and metro systems; ecological devastation from landmines and unexploded ordinance; and, perhaps, an anti-Communist insurgency. As many Chinese officials and scholars like to point out (especially when they are upset at American actions), the United States has spent significant blood and treasure in Iraq and Afghanistan and has achieved relatively few results. An invasion of Taiwan could provide the PRC with an object lesson in the difficulties of counterinsurgency (for an excellent exposition on guerrilla war in the cross-strait context, see the CSBA’s 2014 “Hard ROC 2.0” report). It is extremely difficult to pacify an invaded region. Unlike, say, Crimea, individuals in Taiwan are quite likely to actively resist their occupiers. If the PRC successfully invades Taiwan, it will likely re-learn many of the hard lessons that Washington experienced in the first two decades of the 21st century. PRC planners should perhaps consider some unpleasant questions. Would ROC security forces be disbanded immediately upon conquest of the island? If so, does the PRC have sufficient financial resources to bribe former ROC soldiers and security officials from conducting an insurgency? If the PRC bribed former ROC soldiers and security officials, how would PLA veterans respond to enemy combatants receiving higher pensions? More broadly, given that Taiwan’s per capita PPP GDP is, at $49,400, over three times larger than the mainland’s per capita GDP, who would finance Taiwan’s reconstruction? Would these expenditures provoke or sharpen resentments on either or both sides of the strait? And how would the PRC handle Taiwan’s old political leadership? Would the PRC murder the old leadership, ensuring a massive backlash from the international community and the people on the island? Would the PLA merely imprison them, perhaps creating a sustained, symbolic threat to the Party? Or would the PLA exile the old political leadership, constructing a sophisticated opposition with governing experience, international stature, and, for the CPC, an uncomfortable historical parallel to Sun Yat-sen, founder of the ROC and one of the few individuals revered on both sides of the strait? Subduing Taiwan would require massive investments of time, personnel, and resources. Counterinsurgency experts suggest that counterinsurgents often need to employ several times as many combatants as the insurgents. Therefore, garrisoning Taiwan would require a minimum occupying force numbering in the tens of thousands. Higher manpower requirements are probable. A PLA counterinsurgency force in Taiwan could require hundreds of thousands soldiers and paramilitary forces, tying down PRC military and financial resources for decades. The PRC’s Legitimacy Post-Invasion An invasion of Taiwan would signal the emergence of aggressive, might-makes-right Chinese nationalism. Indo-Pacific countries would likely respond by coalescing into a military and economic alliance aimed at countering PRC aggression. The PRC’s international isolation would constrain its economic potential and, ultimately, likely lead CPC leadership to seek an alternative legitimation model. Under Mao Zedong, the CPC derived political legitimacy from its assertion of Chinese autonomy, Marxist ideology, and, to a lesser degree, rising living standards (the survivors of Mao experienced improvements in life expectancy, literacy, and infant mortality). Under Deng Xiaoping, the CPC increasingly tied its legitimacy to rising living standards, while notionally adhering to Marxist ideology. An invasion of Taiwan would represent the end of the Deng Xiaoping epoch. Under a new political paradigm, the CPC would mainly legitimate itself through nationalism, not economics: the state would seek to maximize China’s international prestige, perhaps even at the expense of domestic welfare. In other words, the CPC would increasingly resemble Russia under President Vladimir Putin. Under the new legitimation model, several features would emerge. First, living standards would likely stall – while remaining relatively high. Second, China would increasingly seek to derive legitimacy from the domination of other sovereign countries. Third, China’s appetite would likely grow larger with eating: Chinese claims to former territories currently occupied by India, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia could grow increasingly strident. This new legitimation model would present several challenges for the CPC. First, Chinese and Russians have different historical experiences and psychological expectations. Russians endured a profoundly scarring economic and financial crisis in the 1990s, increasing their tolerance for economic misery while largely sapping demand for free-market economics (not to mention rules-based government). Chinese, on the other hand, have enjoyed near-continuous economic and social improvements for nearly 40 years. A nationalism-induced recession – or even stagnation – could lead to a political backlash from Chinese accustomed to rising living standards. As Samuel P. Huntington wrote, “Urbanization, increases in literacy, education, and media exposure all give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations which, if unsatisfied, galvanize individuals and groups into politics.” An invasion of Taiwan could trigger an economic crisis and political struggle on the mainland. Second, after invading Taiwan, what would the CPC do to score more nationalist “victories” – particularly if the invasion and/or occupation of Taiwan doesn’t go well? Most countries on China’s land and maritime borders possess nuclear weapons, enjoy an alliance or quasi-alliance with the United States and Japan, or both. Third, Taiwan’s incorporation into the PRC may increase the likelihood of democratic transition. Most individuals in Taiwan possess strong normative commitments to free markets, constitutional law, and open societies. Many mainland Chinese – particularly those from the 1989 generation – support these ideas. Adding 20 million liberals to China’s political discourse could have important implications for its domestic politics.

#### Democratic landing would be peaceful – but public buy-in is key.

Pei 13 – Minxin, Tom and Margot Pritzker ’72 Professor of Government and director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College, (“5 Ways China Could Become a Democracy”, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/5-ways-china-could-become-a-democracy/1/>) Recut Justin

“Happy ending” would be the most preferable mode of democratic transition for China. Typically, a peaceful exit from power managed by the ruling elites of the old regime goes through several stages. It starts with the emergence of a legitimacy crisis, which may be caused by many factors (such as poor economic performance, military defeat, rising popular resistance, unbearable costs of repression, and endemic corruption). Recognition of such a crisis convinces some leaders of the regime that the days of authoritarian rule are numbered and they should start managing a graceful withdrawal from power. If such leaders gain political dominance inside the regime, they start a process of liberalization by freeing the media and loosening control over civil society. Then they negotiate with opposition leaders to set the rules of the post-transition political system. Most critically, such negotiations center on the protection of the ruling elites of the old regime who have committed human rights abuses and the preservation of the privileges of the state institutions that have supported the old regime (such as the military and the secret police). Once such negotiations are concluded, elections are held. In most cases (Taiwan and Spain being the exceptions), parties representing the old regime lose such elections, thus ushering in a new democratic era. At the moment, the transition in Burma is unfolding according to this script. But for China, the probability of such a happy ending hinges on, among other things, whether the ruling elites start reform before the old regime suffers irreparable loss of legitimacy. The historical record of peaceful transition from post-totalitarian regimes is abysmal mainly because such regimes resist reform until it is too late. Successful cases of “happy ending” transitions, such as those in Taiwan, Mexico, and Brazil, took place because the old regime still maintained sufficient political strength and some degree of support from key social groups. So the sooner the ruling elites start this process, the greater their chances of success. The paradox, however, is that regimes that are strong enough are unwilling to reform and regimes that are weak cannot reform. In the Chinese case, the odds of a soft landing are likely to be determined by what China’s new leadership does in the coming five years because the window of opportunity for a political soft landing will not remain open forever.

#### Transition solves aggressive pursuit of domination.

Michael Mandelbaum 19, PhD in political science from Harvard University, Christian A. Herter Professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies., March, "In Praise of Regime Change," Commentary, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/in-praise-of-regime-change/

If revolution, as the word was defined in the last century, has become obsolete, its successor, regime change, has become discredited. The American military engagements in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq not only failed to yield democratic governments; they proved, in the last two cases, costly to the United States, both in lives and treasure. The American public has, consequently, little appetite for more such ventures. Yet there is another type of regime change to consider: the peaceful replacement of dictatorship by democracy through the efforts of local people rather than the American military. That’s occurred with heartening frequency over the past four decades, and, in 2019, it has greater relevance and importance than ever. Such regime change offers the solution to the most dangerous challenge facing the United States and its friends and allies. That challenge comes from the ambitions of three major countries to overturn the existing political arrangements in their regions and to expand their own power and influence at the expense both of their neighbors and of the United States. All have already used force for this purpose. In Europe, Russia has seized Crimea and invaded and occupied eastern Ukraine. In East Asia, China has laid claim, contrary to international law, to virtually the entire western Pacific, where it has built artificial islands on which it has placed military installations. In the Middle East, Iran has funded, trained, equipped, and directed military forces outside the control of the local government in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. At best, these revisionist ambitions portend Cold War–like political and military competition in the three regions. At worst, they will lead to wars involving the United States. These aggressive policies have, in each case, a variety of sources. But they have one major cause in common. Each of these aggressive governments is a dictatorship operating in what is still a predominantly democratic world, and each feels an acute need for domestic support and political legitimacy. To be sure, the rule of the current Russian, Chinese, and Iranian governments rests ultimately on coercion, but Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and the Iranian mullahs are wary of relying on coercion alone to remain in power. The leaders of Russia and China, in particular, are known to monitor public sentiment carefully, if not obsessively. For the purpose of generating the support they believe they need, however, these dictators have few options. None can afford to indulge in the most common source of 21st-century legitimacy: democracy. For genuinely democratic politics would sweep them all away. Ideology was an important basis for autocratic regimes’ claims to rule in the 20th century. But ideology is unavailable to Russia and China, which have renounced, in the first case, and effectively abandoned, in the second, orthodox Marxism-Leninism (and in China, Maoism as well). The Iranian regime retains an ideological foundation—the Persian-Shia version of Islamic fundamentalism—but few Iranians outside the regime believe in it. Authoritarian Russia and China, although not Iran, have relied on economic success to produce support for, or at least acceptance of, their rulers; but their economic performance and future economic prospects have taken a turn for the worse. The Russian economy depends on the sale of energy. The price of oil reached record heights during Vladimir Putin’s first stint as president, which generated income that underpinned the high levels of popularity that he enjoyed. The price has since fallen and is unlikely to return to its peak, which makes Russia’s economic outlook a gloomy one. As for China, the ruling Communist Party presided over three decades of double-digit annual growth based on the large-scale movement of labor from the countryside to the cities, massive investment, and ever-growing exports. That model for growth has run its course: China needs a new one that, even in the best of circumstances, will not deliver the extraordinary advances to which the Chinese people have become accustomed. The Islamic Republic of Iran has seen only economic failure since its establishment in 1979, and unashamedly so. Its founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, said that the regime he installed was “not about the price of watermelons.” Still, the country’s poor economic performance, now aggravated by American sanctions, has increased the public’s already considerable discontent with its clerical rulers. In the face of this common predicament, the three revisionists have turned to the one source of support on which they believe they can rely: aggressive nationalism. This underlies the policies that all three use to threaten their neighbors. In this way, aggression is a form of regime protection. Putin, Xi, and the Iranian clerics tell the people they rule that such policies are designed to achieve regional dominance, which, for reasons of history and culture, they deserve. The Russian, Chinese, and Iranian governments also justify their aggressive foreign policies as necessary to ward off the hostility of their enemies—above all the United States—which, the dictators tell their subjects, are bent on weakening, subverting, and even destroying Russia, China, and Iran. Putin claimed that the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine in 2014, which triggered his invasion of that country, was part of an anti-Russian plot by the West. The Chinese government has repeatedly denounced what it alleges are American efforts to thwart China. The mullahs have, from the outset of the Islamic Republic, made opposition to the United States, “the Great Satan,” a cornerstone of their rule. Such evidence as there is suggests that this political tactic works for all three regimes. Putin’s aggressive policies in Ukraine and Syria, for example, have raised his popularity among Russians. The successful employment of such policies in bolstering each regime’s standing at home increases the temptation to employ it repeatedly, which makes Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East increasingly dangerous places. In sum, the roots of the greatest international problem that the United States and its friends and allies face—the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian challenges to the global order—lie in the nature of the regime that governs each country. The solution to the problem, it follows, is to change those regimes, and to change them not just to any other form of government but specifically to democracy. Democracy here means liberal democracy, a combination of popular sovereignty, whereby the people choose the government through free and fair elections, and liberty—the protection of religious, economic, and political freedom. The historical record shows that, in the modern era at least, liberal democracies seldom if ever go to war with one another. This is so because democracy’s basic features counteract the age-old incentives for armed conflict. Popular sovereignty, for example, imposes a check on the government’s freedom of action, including the freedom to wage war. Democracies resolve domestic differences by peaceful means and so are inclined to act similarly with respect to international disputes. None of this is to say that the spread of democracy guarantees the elimination of war: Nothing can do so. What has come to be called the “democratic peace” theory does not rise to the level of an iron law of politics because there are no such laws. It is to say, however, that were Russia, China, and Iran to become full-fledged democracies, each would surely conduct less belligerent foreign policies toward its neighbors.

#### Democratized China increases cooperation and solves major security hotspots – Sino-Japanese war, Sino-Indo war, etc.

Aaron Friedberg 11, PhD in Government from Harvard, professor of politics and international affairs @ Princeton University, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,” <http://users.clas.ufl.edu/zselden/coursereading2011/friedberg.pdf> Recut Justin

Though not everyone is convinced, it is likely that a more democratic China would ultimately create a more peaceful, less war-prone environment in Asia. In the view of some realists, domestic reforms will only make Beijing richer, stronger and hence a more potent competitor without deflecting it from its desire to dominate East Asia and settle scores with some of its neighbors. It is undoubtedly true that even if, in the long run, China becomes a stable, peaceful democracy, its passage will prove rocky. The opening of the nation’s political system to dissent and debate is likely to introduce an element of instability into its foreign policy as new voices are heard and aspiring leaders vie for popular support. As one observer, economist David Hale, ruefully points out: “An authoritarian China has been highly predictable. A more open and democratic China could produce new uncertainties about both domestic policy and international relations.” Nationalism, perhaps in its most virulent and aggressive form, is one factor likely to play a prominent role in shaping the foreign policy of a liberalizing Middle Kingdom. Thanks to the spread of the Internet and the relaxation of restraints on at least some forms of “patriotic” political expression, the current regime already finds itself subject to criticism whenever it takes what some “netizens” regard as an overly accommodating stance toward Japan, Taiwan or the United States. Beijing has sought at times to stir up patriotic sentiment, but, fearful that anger at foreigners could all too easily be turned against the party, the regime has also gone to great lengths to keep popular passions in check. A democratically elected government might be far less inhibited. U.S.-based political scientist Fei-Ling Wang argues that a post-Communist regime would actually be more forceful in asserting its sovereignty over Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea. As he explains: A “democratic” regime in Beijing, free from the debilitating concerns for its own survival but likely driven by popular emotions, could make the rising Chinese power a much more assertive, impatient, belligerent, even aggressive force, at least during the unstable period of fast ascendance to the ranks of a world-class power. The last proviso is key. Even those who are most confident of the long-term pacifying effects of democratization recognize the possibility of a turbulent transition. In his book China’s Democratic Future, Bruce Gilley acknowledges that democratic revolutions in other countries have often led to bursts of external aggression and he notes that, since the start of the twentieth century, pro-democracy movements in China have also been highly nationalistic. Despite these precedents, Gilley predicts that, after an interval of perhaps a decade, a transformed nation will settle into more stable and cooperative relationships with the United States as well as with its democratic neighbors. Such an outcome is by no means certain, of course, and would be contingent upon events and interactions that are difficult to anticipate and even harder to control. If initial frictions between a fledgling democracy and its better established counterparts are mishandled, resulting in actual armed conflict, history could spin off in very different and far less promising directions than if they are successfully resolved. Assuming the transition can be navigated without disaster, however, there are good reasons to believe that relations will improve with the passage of time. One Chinese advocate of political reform, Liu Junning, summarizes the prospects well. Whereas a “nationalistic and authoritarian China will be an emerging threat,” a liberal, democratic China will ultimately prove “a constructive partner.” This expectation is rooted in more than mere wishful thinking. As the values and institutions of liberal democracy become more firmly entrenched, there will begin to be open and politically meaningful debate and real competition over national goals and the allocation of national resources. Aspiring leaders and opinion makers preoccupied with prestige, honor, power and score settling will have to compete with others who emphasize the virtues of international stability, cooperation, reconciliation and the promotion of social welfare. The demands of the military and its industrial allies will be counterbalanced, at least to some degree, by groups who favor spending more on education, health care and the elderly. The assertive, hypernationalist version of China’s history and its grievances will be challenged by accounts that acknowledge the culpability of the Communist regime in repressing minorities and refusing to seek compromise on questions of sovereignty. A leadership obsessed with its own survival and with countering perceived threats from foreign powers will be replaced by a government secure in its legitimacy and with no cause to fear that the world’s democracies are seeking to encircle and overthrow it. A democratic China would find it easier to get along with Japan, India and South Korea, among others. The trust and mutual respect that eventually grows up between democracies, and the diminished fear that one will use force against another, should increase the odds of attaining negotiated settlements of outstanding disputes over borders, offshore islands and resources. A democratic government in Beijing would also stand a better chance of achieving a mutually acceptable resolution to its sixtyyear standoff with Taiwan. In contrast to today’s ccp rulers, a popularly elected mainland regime would have less to gain from keeping this conflict alive, it would be more likely to show respect for the preferences of another democratic government, and it would be more attractive to the Taiwanese people as a partner in some kind of federated arrangement that would satisfy the desires and ease the fears of both sides. For as long as China continues to be governed as it is today, its growing strength will pose a deepening challenge to American interests. If they want to deter aggression, discourage coercion and preserve a plural, open order, Washington and its friends and allies are going to have to work harder, and to cooperate more closely, in order to maintain a favorable balance of regional power. In the long run, the United States can learn to live with a democratic China as the dominant power in East Asia, much as Great Britain came to accept America as the preponderant power in the Western Hemisphere. Until that day, Washington and Beijing are going to remain locked in an increasingly intense struggle for mastery in Asia.

#### Keeping regional ambitions in check is necessary to avoid *escalatory wars*

Brands & Edel 19. Hal Brands – Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs in the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Charles Edel – senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and previously served on the U.S. Secretary of State's policy planning staff. “The End of Great Power Peace,” 3/6/19. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/end-great-power-peace-46282?page=0%2C1> Recut Justin

China is leading the way. Although Beijing has been a leading beneficiary of a liberal economic order that has allowed it to amass great prosperity, Chinese leaders nonetheless always regarded American primacy as something to be endured for a time rather than suffered forever. America’s preeminent position in the Asia-Pacific represents an affront to the pride and sense of historical destiny of a country that still considers itself “the Middle Kingdom.” And as Aaron Friedberg notes, China’s authoritarian leaders have long seen a dominant, democratic America as “the most serious external threat” to their domestic authority and geopolitical security. As China’s power has increased, Beijing has strived to establish mastery in the Asia- Pacific. A Chinese admiral articulated this ambition in 2007, telling an American counterpart that the two powers should split the Pacific with Hawaii as the dividing line. Yang Jiechi, China’s foreign minister, made the same point in 2010. In a modern-day echo of the Melian Dialogue’s “the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must,” he lectured the nations of Southeast Asia that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.” Policy has followed rhetoric. To undercut America’s position, Beijing has harassed American ships and planes operating in international waters and airspace; People’s Republic of China (PRC) media organs warn U.S. allies that they may be caught in the crossfire of a Sino- American war unless they distance themselves from Washington. China has simultaneously attacked the credibility of U.S. alliance guarantees by using strategies—island-building in the South China Sea, for instance—that are designed to shift the regional status quo in ways even the U.S. Navy finds difficult to counter. Through a mixture of economic aid and diplomatic pressure, Beijing has also divided international bodies, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), through which Washington has sought to rally opposition to Chinese assertiveness. All the while, China has been steadily building formidable military tools designed to keep the United States out of the region and thereby give Beijing a free hand. As America’s sun sets in the Asia-Pacific, Chinese leaders calculate, the shadow China casts will only grow longer. The counterparts to these activities are initiatives meant to bring the neighbors into line. China has islands as staging points to project military power. Military and paramilitary forces have harassed, confronted, and violated the sovereignty of countries from Vietnam to the Philippines to India; China has consistently exerted pressure on Japan in the East China Sea.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.google.com/search?q=just+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=just+defi&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i57j69i60l3.1304j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/government> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. <https://www.google.com/search?q=recognize+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=recognize+definition&aqs=chrome..69i57.4104j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu [↑](#footnote-ref-5)