## 1

#### The subject is alienated when it articulates its desires – incomplete signifiers structure the emergence of subjectivity and produce repetitive drives to fill the lack that justify coercive violence. Thus, the ROB is to traverse the fantasy – that means exposing drives.

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The Real Jacques Lacan’s notion of the Real is notoriously difficult to define. In his book on the subject, Tom Eyers calls it the “most elusive” of Lacan’s concepts, but one that is also one that is “central” and “determining” for psychoanalysis (1). There are common elements of the various definitions. First, an agreement that both the economy of tropes that allows the conditions for meaning to emerge (the Symbolic) and the meanings and values invested in these tropes, including the subject itself (the Imaginary), do not and cannot perfectly capture all of existence or experience. Second, this unassimilable remainder structures the Symbolic and Imaginary, just as they structure each other, and thus all three registers are knitted together as demonstrated in Lacan’s famous “Borromean Knot.” The Real is what escapes mediation, what disrupts language itself. To explain its significance and relationship to desire requires examining its foundational role in the formation of the subject. The Real can be understood as the constitutive lack of the subject, its separation from the rest of existence by the self-definition necessary for it to come into being in the first place. This is made clear in the mirror stage, where the subject moves from a fragmented, disorganized concept of the body to the “finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his [sic] entire mental development with its rigid structure” (Lacan, “Mirror Stage” 78). The formation of a discrete subject (a function in the Imaginary register) is a compromise. Its formation allows for participation in the Symbolic because to participate in that economy of exchange requires a “social I” (Lacan, “Mirror stage,” 79). This participation comes at the cost of alienation because the subject trades in a world of symbols which by their nature stand in for what is not present, and thus inescapably mediate the (Real) world outside of the subject, rather than making it present. This lack built in to the subject is the engine of desire: the subject’s divide from an object is a prerequisite for the desire of such an object, but the condition of mediation makes it impossible to ever incorporate it in a perfectly satisfying way. Thus desire remains unfulfilled and each chase for a symbol leads to another in loop which the very constitution of the subject dictates must be endless. This is the basic operation of the death drive which is not distinct from Eros. Were the impossible to occur and the drive of Eros to be fulfilled, it would be extinguished, as there would be nothing left to desire. Thus all drives aim, in a sense, at their own extinction, and therefore there is in a sense only one—the drive that aims towards the extinction of desire through its complete fulfillment in continuity with the world that was lost when the subject became distinct from it in the mirror stage. Although the death drive might stand in for the singular character of the drive, it should not be understood as a desire for the actual biological death of the subject’s body, or even the desire to inflict death on others. The self-destruction of the death drive is a desire to break the limits of the self as the alienating armor of the subject by experiencing unmediated contact with the Real. Death still defines its operation in other ways. The last portion of Lacan’s “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” explains the metaphorical centrality of death as the center of a torus formed by incessant symbolization. The fort-da game is most significant not because it shows that the child wishes to destroy its mother or even inoculate itself against that possibility, but because it assimilates the child into the Symbolic order through the repetition of the signifiers fort and da, which stand in for presence and absence. Death is central to language because the symbol itself invokes the absence and loss of nonexistence since its function is to stand in for something that is gone. Language swirls around this absent center of death, a primordial absence encased in the inner ring of the torus, while the outer surfaces of language hold all else that cannot be symbolized at bay on the outside (Lacan, “Function and Field” 260-264). Paradoxically, death is necessarily evoked by the symbol as that which is absent and also made possible in the first place by that same symbol. The separation of the subject into its alienating identity as a social object makes a meaningful concept of death possible because without it there is no dasein, no individual, no singular human to die. George Bataille explains this with an entomological example. If a scientist picks one fly from a swarm, that fly is subject to death, because its end means the end of the discontinuous being selected by the entomologist. Without differentiation of its members, however, the swarm lives on; the selection of the fly is for the entomologist, not the animal (Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” 14-16). Thus it is with human beings. The subject is founded by a rejection of its sole animal nature by participating in a world of work and accumulation, mediated by language—essentially Lacan’s Symbolic. Thus individuals are made discontinuous with the general economy of matter and energy from which all things are formed by a conceptual separation inextricably bound up in death. Our existences are thus defined by discontinuity from a world of continuity, and for Bataille as for Lacan, our drives are singular in the sense that sex is a coupling that unifies with another and momentarily overcomes discontinuity just as death is the end of the subject’s brief separation from a universe differentiated only by the dismembering violence of our imposition of symbols upon it (Bataille, Erotism 13-17). The experience of death may still be unique because it suggests the absence implied by the sign and because it can be experienced only once by the subject—and for obvious reasons, cannot be symbolized by anyone with first-hand experience. As Freud argues in “Thoughts For The Times On War and Death,” we cannot even hope to imagine our own deaths because to do so demands that we imagine them from some perspective which would be destroyed in the experience itself. Death and the Real are therefore not identical, but are closely linked. The most important characteristic of the Real is not just that it suggests existence beyond language, but that this world-for-itself (to borrow from Eugene Thacker) intrudes on human reality and reveals it to be incomplete. Encompassing Max Picard’s concept of silence, the Real is not the absence of human reality so much as the traumatic revelation that that reality was always incomplete, always feigned in the face of existence so much more than human mediation has already covered. Chris Lundberg uses Lacan’s distinction between reality, being the social world of human construction, and the Real, being the occasional but inevitable failure of that reality, to develop his own distinction between failed unicity and feigned unicity. The Symbolic operates as an economy of interconnected and mutually-referential tropes weaving a kind of fabric that is the precondition for meaning, an environment in which social relationships can be understood in context. When the unified illusion of the social fails, we are compelled to stitch the tears in that fabric to maintain the world that gives us meaning (Lacan in Public 2-3). An account by Bill Laurence, the only journalist allowed to witness the Trinity test, provides evidence for this rupture and repair. While “not a sound could be heard” for the period after the flash and before the thunder, Laurence saw civilization itself collapse in an instant: The big boom came about one hundred seconds after the great flash—the first cry of a newborn world. It brought the silent, motionless silhouettes to life, gave them a voice. A loud cry filled the air. The little groups that had hitherto stood rooted to the earth like desert plants broke into a dance—the rhythm of primitive man dancing at one of his fire festivals at the coming of spring. They clapped their hands as they leaped from the ground…The dance of the primitive man lasted but a few seconds, during which an evolutionary period of about 10,000 years telescoped. Primitive man was metamorphosed into modern man—shaking hands, slapping his fellow on the back, all laughing like happy children. (12)

#### The 1AC is an ideological fantasy constructed by relentless planning at the expense of scapegoated identities, all for recognition from the Other in an attempt to fill the lack.

Gunder 05 Michael Gunder, 2005, “The Production of Desirous Space: Mere Fantasies of the Utopian City?” Planning Theory 2005 4: 173, DOI: 10.1177/1473095205054604, all brackets were in the original text, SJBE

Jouissance is one of the four structuring elements of social discourse,4 or social interactions, links and relationships, where synchronic language meets diachronic speech to evoke an effect on the Other (Lacan, 2004: 3). Zupancic (2004) associates Lacan’s (2004) theory of the Four Discourses (see Gunder, 2003a, 2004; Hillier and Gunder, 2005) with the Marxian theory of commodification and surplus-value via Lacan’s concept of surplus-enjoyment (plus-de-jouir). Lacan (2004: 111) contends that surplusvalue and surplus-enjoyment are historically equivalent, especially in the situation of the Master’s injunction of ‘No!’ in the emerging early phase of Calvinistic repressive capitalism. In contrast to the historical authority and rationality of the Master’s repressive command, late capitalism is structured under a rationality of the university or bureaucracy. Now knowledge and technology, not the Master’s injunction, become ‘agency expressing a logic of governmentality and expertise (including that of planning) that does not prohibit enjoyment, but rather channels jouissance in ways that produces a “bio-politics” (after Foucault) of an alienated subject that has no option, but to enjoy and be satisfied’ (Hillier and Gunder, 2005; McGowan, 2004; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b; Zupancic, 2004). In this regard, ‘a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialised in a set of social practices and submitted through national myths [or fantasies] that structure these practices’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1993: 202). This is taken further by the barely challenged international hegemonic discourse of global capitalization and the fantasies it induces in externally structuring the nation state’s very enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 63; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 61). Even the ruling British Labour government, with its ‘Third Way’, in contrast to its tradition of socialism, has placed ‘economic globalisation’ as ‘the most significant factor in shaping Labour Party thinking since the early 1990s’ (Allmendinger, 2003: 326). As McGowan (2004) observes: we trust fully in the staying power of global capitalism. The alternatives, which once seemed to be just around the corner, have become unimaginable today. The universe of global capitalism is, or so we think, here to stay, and we best not do anything to risk our status within it. Hence, we pledge our allegiance to it, and we put our trust in it. This is the fundamental mode of contemporary obedience to authority. Only by coming to understand this obedience to the dictates of global capitalism as obedience can we hope to break out of it. Global capitalism seems an unsurpassable horizon simply because we have not properly recognized our own investment in sustaining it. We see it as unsurpassable because we don’t want to lose it – and the imaginary satisfaction that it provides. (McGowan, 2004: 193) Illusion resides under this global fantasy of capital where ‘the basic feature of’ this dominant cultural imperative ‘no longer operates on the level of ideals and identifications, but directly on the level of regulating jouissance’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 113). Even in Lefebvre’s day, this was a capitalism where surplus-value was synonymous with surplus-enjoyment supporting the injunction: ‘you must enjoy!’. In this light, the role of planning is to facilitate enjoyment by sustainably providing the correct space – healthy, competitive, fit and attractive – where enjoyment can be effectively materialized and maximized under the imperative of global capitalism. Consequently: urbanism is nothing more than an ideology that claims to be either ‘art’ or ‘technology’ or ‘science’, depending on the context. This ideology pretends to be straightforward, yet it obfuscates, harbours things unsaid: which it covers, which it contains, as a form of will tending towards efficiency. Urbanism is doubly fetishistic. First, it implies the fetishism of satisfaction. What about vested interests? They must be satisfied, and therefore their needs must be understood and catered to, unchanged . . . Second, it implies the fetishism of space. Space is creation. Whoever creates space creates whatever it is that fills space. The place engenders the thing and the good place engenders good things. (Lefebvre, 2003: 159) This is exacerbated further in the current milieu of consumerist post-democracy personified by the master signifier: global capitalism. ‘Post-democracy is founded on an attempt to exclude the political awareness of lack and negativity from the political domain, leading to a political order which retains the token institutions of liberal democracy but neutralizes the centrality of political antagonism’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 59). In response to the dominant ‘logic’ of global competitiveness, the technocrats and experts including planners, shape, contextualize and implement public policy in the interest of the dominant hegemonic bloc. This is constructed under the logics and knowledges of university discourses (see Gunder, 2004), with an objective to remove existing or potential urban blight,‘dis-ease’ and dysfunction detracting from local enjoyment and global competitiveness (Gunder, 2005; McGuirk, 2004). Of course, the hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debate as to what constitutes desired enjoyment and what is lacking in urban competitiveness. In turn, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of planning remedy. This is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness, is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Planners, programmers, and users want solutions. For what? To make people happy. To order them to be happy. It is a strange way of interpreting happiness. The science of the urban phenomenon cannot respond to these demands without the risk of validating external restrictions imposed by ideology and power. (Lefebvre, 2003: 141) Yet this lack and its resolution are more often technical in nature, rather than political. As a consequence, the technocrats in partnership with their ‘dominant stakeholders’ can ensure the impression of happiness for the many, while, not to mention, achieving the stakeholders’ specific interests. Material happiness for all but that evil other Lacanian theory suggests that a subject’s jouissance is given freest rein when an act of desire contains a dimension of transgression. It is the ‘little sin’ that gives the most pleasure; it is the prohibition as such which elevates a common everyday object into an object of desire (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 177). The bio-politics of contemporary planning are predicated on enjoyment – you will enjoy! – not the prior duality of repression/freedom of the Weberian capitalist master’s injunction: ‘No you cannot do that!’. The achievements of traditional utopian goals were ones of freedom to act against the repression of the negative injunction. Contemporary injunctions are to enjoy – or at least to sustain our happiness – regardless of what we actually desire. Happiness is not a class of truth, but one of an ontological class of being where: ‘happiness’ relies on the subject’s inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desires. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we ‘officially’ desire. Happiness is thus hypocritical: it is the happiness dreaming about things we do not really want. (Zˇ izˇek, 2002a: 59–60) Planning continues to succeed because it underpins the primal desire of most subjects in society for a conflict-free, safe and assured happy future, even if it can only deliver this as a fantasy-scenario of material happiness, rather than as an impossible reality that actually sates all desires (Gunder, 2003a, 2003b). This is a fantasy predicated on an obedience to a shallow consumptive quantitative imperative to be materially happy, which often occurs at the expense of our actual qualitative psychic desires. In our contemporary global society the ‘moral law’ is no longer the imperative that acts as a limitation, stopping us from enjoying too much. Instead, the cultural imperative, the now dominant moral Law itself, in its injunction for us to enjoy becomes ‘the ultimate “transgression”’ should one wish to pursue a life of moderation (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 174). Further, ‘the fantasy of a utopian harmonious social world can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder . . . a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated, but instead must be eliminated’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 108). This is the stranger, the Other that is not us that can act as the ‘“scapegoat” to be stigmatised as the one who is blamed for our lack, the Evil force that stole our precious jouissance’ and stopped the fantasy from achieving its utopian vision (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 58). Even our ‘“complex” contemporary societies rely on the basic divide between included and excluded’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 86). Zˇ izˇek (2004b: 86) continues: in any society ‘there is a multitude within the system and a multitude of those excluded, and simply to encompass them both within the scope of the same notion amounts to the same obscenity as equating starvation with dieting.’ It is continually this Other that permits the delusion of harmony in our identity defining groups and for this to transpire we require an Other, external to the group for the group to define itself. We require a disparity, or gap, to allocate a degree of difference to an Other to conceptualize the group identification as who we are not and on this Other we can attribute all the signs of disharmony that jeopardize our shared fantasy (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 5). Difference is essential to complete our fantasy of harmony, but only by providing the sacrificial Other on which we can blame the disappointment of the fantasy to deliver (Zˇ izˇek, 2004a: 158–9). In this light, planning,‘as part of the apparatus of the modern state, makes its own imprint, has its own powers for good and evil’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). This is especially so as planning identifies, or at least names and legitimizes, what constitutes an urban pathology that detracts from what is desirous of the globally competitive city. Planning then sets out to remedy this lack or deficiency. Civil society, i.e. the public stage, and media of information dissemination are central to this process. Of course, our media are not ideologically neutral. As a consequence, media access for putting forth particular tropes of desire constitutes a central component of social, as well as economic, capital. This is well documented by Flyvbjerg (1998a) where the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce controlled the editorial content of the local newspaper. This argument is central to that of Chomsky’s (2003) multinational corporate steering of mass media content in the, so-called, ‘free’ press. This is where the mass media are free to publish almost anything, provided, of course, they do not alienate their corporate clients who provide their majority of income and profits via their advertising payments. Gunder (2003b) documented how planning actors and their affiliated partners gained public agreement via the rhetorical use of culturally shared ‘master signifiers’ and their related metonymies and metaphors. Here each signifier was linked to associations in the public’s unconscious that induced a conscious expression of desire for a particular set of values or specific consequential actions. Effective deployment of rhetorical tropes can seduce subjects ‘to relinquish previous desires (including identifications and embrace new ones) – or alternatively, to invest all the more completely in old ones’ (Bracher, 1993: 51–2). For example, does anyone wish to live in a city that is losing enjoyment to other locations because it lacks the fitness to compete? In Lacan, the construction of reality is continuous with the field of desire. Desire and reality are intimately connected . . . The nature of their link can only be revealed in fantasy . . . when harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent. It has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction. (Stavrakakis, 1999: 62–3) This is where, from a Lacanian outlook, by accepting rationalization as the means to fulfil a desire for completeness – via the utilization of falsifying words – ‘man does not adapt himself to reality; he adapts reality to himself’ (Roudinesco, 1997: 114). Ideological fantasies as to what constitutes an enjoyable and satisfying city are deployed to hide the dysfunctions and unpredictabilities that are ubiquitous throughout all social spheres, particularly for those lacking in sufficient capital to offset adversity. Social reality ‘is sustained by the “as if”, the fantasy of what things are like’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Rationalization, or realrationalität as Flyvbjerg (1998a) calls it, exists between the everyday activities of social life and the held universal ideals or values of what ought to be, even if it is not so, in social reality. The belief that planning is not political, but technical ‘allows the myths of objectivity, value neutrality, and technical reason to persist, and thereby fosters a certain delusion about planning practice’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). Sandercock (2004: 134) continues: planning ‘helps to redefine political debate, producing new sources of power and legitimacy, changing the force field in which we operate’. Lefebvre suggests that planning is based on a strategy of mixing scientificity and rationality with ideology. ‘Here, as elsewhere, scientificity is an ideology, an excrescence grafted onto real, but fragmentary, knowledge’ (Lefebvre, 2003: 166). In particular, Lefebvre argues that quantitative expertise including the technology of urban planning is largely a myth. This is because planning administrators: and bad administrators at that, rarely use much actual technology. However, they have the ability to persuade the people as a whole that because these are technological decisions they should be accepted. In other words, a large part of Lefebvre’s criticism [of planners] is not that technocrats are technocrats, but that they are precisely the opposite. Technology should be put to the service of everyday life, of social life rather than being precisely the condition of its suppression and control. Urbanism, for example, is an ideology that operates under the cover of this myth of technology. (Elden, 2004: 145) Social reality can only exist in the symbolic and imaginary registries as it is composed, that is constructed, as a ‘result of a certain historically specific set of discursive practices and power mechanisms’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 66). Flyvbjerg (1998a) illustrates this well in his exposé of the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce’s intervention in that city’s planning process. Here this grouping of dominant business people is given hegemonic voice to determine what constitutes acceptable transportation modes and spatial development in Aalborg’s town centre. In this example the planner’s technical facts, by themselves, produced the weaker argument. This was perhaps because the dissemination of these facts and their implications for planning action were ineffectively articulated to the public, if at all, via the local information media controlled by the Chamber of Commerce. In contrast, in Sydney, McGuirk (2004) documented how planners actively participated in and facilitated the dominant network of actors successfully pushing for a series of local, regional and national policies supporting Sydney’s global competitiveness. It appeared to be of little consequence that these policies induced adverse effects on the rest of the country, not to mention many of Sydney’s residents. Not dissimilarly, the Auckland case cited in the introduction illustrates how the planners actively consulted the dominant commercial stakeholders in developing their growth strategy, yet failed to have direct consultation with the Region’s actual residents (ARGF, 1999; Gunder, 2003a). Planners and their governance forum of dominant stakeholders appeared to inherently know what is in the best interests of their region’s residents. Planning as agonistic ethics Notwithstanding the ‘full rendering of the antagonisms which traverse our society, we indulge in the notion of society as an organic whole, kept together by forces of solidarity and co-operation’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 6). Planning is one such instrument that shapes and justifies the governing ideals of utopian desire and in this ‘sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is dominant’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 110). The subtle and not so subtle application of power defines truth, reason and rationality and this particularly comprises the deployment of power in our planning and related practices (Flyvbjerg, 1998a). Moreover, a Lacanian line of reasoning about knowledge and truth indicates that the constituting components of these induced fantasies of truth and rationality are mediated on the wants and needs of actors with the capacity to inflict their desires and wants on the Other and, as if, these desires belong to those who have been imposed on. This is via assertions of unquestionable ‘truth’, which are often supported and empowered by selected ‘distorted’ knowledge, practices and language put forward by their ideological supporters, employed professional experts and controlled media. Further, in this light traditional Kantian and related enlightenment ‘ethics is nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology that tries to pass off its own commandments as authentic, spontaneous, and “honorable” inclinations of the subject’ (Zupancic, 1998: 41). In contrast to traditional ethics, Lacan’s (1992) theorizing may provide an alternative way to develop new values beyond those already constituted by society as traditional morals of good or evil shaping acceptable behaviours. Traditional ethics is predicated on a reality principle as to what is possible without transgression in social reality. As Zupancic (2003: 77) observes, this ‘reality principle itself is ideologically mediated; one could even claim that it constitutes the highest form of ideology, the ideology that presents itself as empirical factor or (biological, economic . . .) necessity.’ This ‘beyond good or evil’ does not have to lead to postmodern nihilism, rather Lacan lays a groundwork for an ethics of the Real, where through acknowledgement of this Real that we cannot know or articulate we can establish new ‘truths’ in relationship to the ‘good’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b; Zupancic, 2000, 2003). This is through a mechanism of ethical sublimation where we create ‘a certain space, scene, or “stage” that enables us to value something that is situated beyond the reality principle, as well as beyond the principle of common good’ (Zupancic, 2003: 78). It is the space, or stage, created when the planner, or other actor, makes the ethical decision to recommend an action or permission that is contrary to existing regulations, precedence, professional expectations, or cultural imperatives. This is perhaps because somehow for the planner, perhaps simply driven by strong feelings, the ‘correct’ and expected action is perceived as not being the right thing to do. From the Lacanian perspective of the ethics of the Real, to make the sensed wrong into a rightness is the ethically correct task, even if this requires the agent to act against what he/she thinks society expects of that actor. This act of transcending the reality principle, and being true to the actor’s desires,5 makes possible a new good, a new potential, it changes the rules as to what is possible (Gunder and Hillier, 2004: 230). ‘The ethical, then, is the constellation of events in which the subject frees herself from the symbolic law (“freedom”), commits herself to an act (“agency”), and thereby makes it possible for the law to be rethought’ (Kay, 2003: 109). The ethical ‘act is an “excessive”, trans-strategic intervention which redefines the rules and contours of the existing order’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 81). Viewed from this perspective, Kant’s categorical imperative must be rethought itself as purely transgressive: the ethical act proper is a transgression of the legal norm – a transgression which, in contrast to a simple criminal violation, does not simply violate the legal norm, but redefines what is a legal norm. The moral law does not follow the Good – it generates a new shape of what counts as ‘Good’. (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 170) This is a transgression that introduces new spaces for what can be considered ‘good’ and hence a wider space for jouissance, beyond that of mere technically produced materialist satisfaction. Of course, a key question becomes: how can a credible planner, or other actor, transcend the accepted norms and expectations of a society to create a new space for a new concept of ‘good’? Further, how can one effectively and reasonably mobilize such an ethics of the Real in everyday life when it is so contrary to the consensual instrumental rationality of the modern project and its ready-made solutions, that are, arguably planning’s purpose and foundations? Planning theorists (e.g. Gunder and Hillier, 2004; Pløger, 2004) and researchers in other disciplines (e.g. Mouffe, 1999, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2003a; Thrift, 2004a, 2004b) are currently attempting to address these complex issues that essentially require new insight and perhaps even profound change in our very relationships towards social reality, itself. Further, they are attempting to do so in a manner that does not simply impose a new intransigent set of ideals to replace our late-modern cultural imperatives, but rather to encourage diverse opportunities for multiple opening in which imminence may continually occur (after Deleuze). Coherent and implementable means to achieve this desired state are yet to emerge as new knowledges and practices, if they can ever do so. Yet, this author suggests that mere awareness and articulation of the impossible implications that the Lacanian Real has on traditional rationality are perhaps one of many points of commencement. Of course, this discourse also may fall into the trap leading to transcendental idealism, i.e. a process of identifying a lack, or void, in our knowledge and practices and then presenting a hegemonic solution that must be implemented, regardless of effect and affect! This author suggests that to change social reality, to begin to question and where necessary traverse our norms and laws, while avoiding the imperative of idealism, calls for a return to agonism that reawakens the political awareness of lack and negativity in place of the technical injunction: you will enjoy! This permits a space for an inclusive acceptance of strife or agonism that does not exclude the Others’ voice attempting to articulate their desires and wants in response to the ‘irreducibility of the Real’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b: 331). Rather this re-politicization of the planning problematic from that of the technical, quantified, solution is one that values Lacan’s Real and Lefebvre’s lived space by making the ‘key “jump from quantity to quality”, from antagonisms subordinated to differences to the predominant role of antagonism’ as pure agonism (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 92). In Lefebvre’s city ‘unconscious desires and passions lay dormant, dormant beneath the surface of the real, within the surreal . . . waiting for . . . the day they can be realized in actual conscious life’ (Merrifield, 2000: 178). In this regard, rather than continuing to fill the lack generating the urban problematic and produce a largely phallic enjoyment, Stavrakakis (2003b: 332) reminds us that in Lacan’s later teachings he spoke of another form ‘of jouissance – female or feminine jouissance – which values this lack per se as something that entails a different kind of enjoyment.’ Perhaps this feminine jouissance may be more appropriate to politicize the needs and wants of lived space. Yet, to do so would require a politics that acknowledges the impossibility of the Lacanian Real. In contrast to the notion that what is meant by an utopia is an imagined ‘ideal society; what characterizes utopia is literally the construction of a u-topic space, a social space outside the existing parameters, the parameters of what appears to be “possible” in the existing social universe’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 123). This proposed utopia is one that may permit, at least aspects of Lefebvre’s ‘lived space’ of the qualitative to be both visible and articulated in conscious life. Rather than contestant cities and regions competing globally under one cultural imperative to attract and retain finite capital and resources via one ‘logic’ and vision, this article calls for a planning ethos that encourages diverse groups within cities and regions to actively contest their perspectives and desires without threat of exclusion. To achieve such a state requires planning ‘to find ways of working with agonism without automatically recurring to procedures, voting, representativity, forced consensus or compromises’ that inherently exclude (Pløger, 2004: 87). This requires a planning ethos predicated on a central awareness of the irreducible Real. This is an understanding that any forced resolution always excludes a remainder, what cannot be articulated or perceived. Further, this remainder will continue to have unconscious effect in terms of what drives our materialized actions. This suggests an overt democratic planning process, representative of a society that is explicitly and overtly hegemonic for all participants, not tacitly hegemonic in its privileging of specific groups with access to power and technocratic justification that is constituted under a logic implicitly desiring social order (Critchley, cited in Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 95). This is in contrast to the existing social reality, where political processes, such as planning, appear to strive for public participation culminating in an harmonious public consensus, when of course this is but an ideological foil that excludes in the name of a ‘general interest’ defined by a privileged few and legitimized by technocratic ‘reason’. In contrast, a strong society ‘places conflict and power at its centre’ by guaranteeing the very ‘existence of conflict’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998b: 229). Our current dominating fantasy of harmony is sustained by the illusion of continued consumer abundance produced and brought by the cornucopia of global capitalism, at least for the first world. This enjoyment of global capitalism ‘constitutes a (partial) reality with hegemonic appeal, a horizon sustained by the hegemony of an administration of desire with seemingly unlimited resources’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 61). Of course, resources and global carrying capacities are axiomatically finite. So perhaps must be our desires, for they can never be sated. Traversing our fundamental fantasy for harmony: a start, not a conclusion! Lacan and his followers, such as Stavrakakis, Zˇ izˇek or Zupancic, produce valid arguments for a psychoanalytically derived philosophy of reality and ideology ‘capable of theorizing the ways our deepest commitments bind us to practices of domination’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Revealing and transversing the ideological constructs that shape and structure our social reality is inadequate in itself as a mere academic critical exercise of knowledge production. This author argues that we must radically challenge our underlying beliefs for ourselves, and, in particular, not externalize them to ‘larger cultural practices and technologies’ so that hegemonic networks, or partnerships, of dominant actors, including intellectuals and bureaucratic professionals, can do our believing and desiring for us through planning and related diverse agencies of social guidance (Dean, 2001: 628). To do so we must traverse our fundamental fantasies that seek harmony and security. This article’s application of Lacan, augmented with some of Lefebvre’s urban insights, gives us a combination of Freudian and Marxist thought that is considerably at odds to that conjured up by the Frankfurt School’s vision of society as ‘a liberated collective culture’ with little space for the individual histories of unique subjects (Jameson, 2003: 8). The latter is the School, or project, drawing on Marx and Freud, which eventually created the Habermasian product of communicative rationality. This is a rationality that sought as its seldom if ever achieved ideal, to produce undistorted (ideologically free) speech acts ‘based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensiveness, truth, truthfulness, and rightness’ constituting a basis for consensually agreement as to how we should act (Habermas, 1979: 3). Yet, as Hillier (2003) illustrates, this is an ideal of undistorted speech that is an impossibility because of the Lacanian Real and the incompleteness it always induces in language, not to mention the impossibility of absolute truth. Yet, this author would agree with Habermas’ call for the supremacy of discourse over mere technical reason. Habermas’ last two validity claims of truthfulness to our desires and the need to act in regard of what our unconscious feeling says is rightness, even if this sense is perhaps not readily justifiable with symbolic knowledge and reasoned argument, should be given due regard through our discourses. In contrast to Habermas’ validity claims of truth and comprehensiveness, Lacan’s theorizing suggests a much more fundamental contextualization of urban ideology based on the fantasies we construct to paper over the lack induced by the Real. This is a perspective that situates our very social reality, including space and social interaction, as principally constituted and composed of ideological fantasy constructs, misrecognitions and misunderstandings (see Hillier, 2003). As Jameson (2003: 37–8) observes, we owe to Lacan ‘the first new and as yet insufficiently developed concept of the nature of ideology since Marx’. Drawing on Althusser, Jameson (2003: 37–8) continues that ideology is ‘the “representation” of the Imaginary relationships of individuals to their Real conditions of existence’, so that ‘the individual subject invents a “lived” relationship with collective systems.’ This is a symbolic, materialized, relationship of practices and rituals (Krips, 2003: 149). Here, it is the desire of this Other that we fundamentally seek and wish to please as we constantly strive to return to our idealized primordial desire for infant maternal security and contentment (Hillier and Gunder, 2005). So we construct and share illusions and fantasies – ideologies – that we are somehow achieving this impossible task. It is the aggregate of these Others, and the illusions we generate about them and ourselves, that constitutes the social reality that is our lived space.

#### Narratives of sustainable space exploration are constructed fantasies of risk analysis that desire an impossible knowledge and recreate power hierarchies through controlled risk politics

**Ormord, 12** – James, School of Applied Social Science, University of Brighton, (“Beyond world risk society? A critique of Ulrich Beck’s world risk society thesis as a framework for understanding risk associated with human activity in outer space.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2013, volume 31, pages 727 – 744)

Beck has been criticised for his ‘confusion’ about whether or not exposure to risk is unevenly distributed according to social and geographic divisions (Lupton, 1999, page 68). He has argued that “pollution follows the poor” (Beck, 1999, page 5) and has accepted that the rich can sometimes buy themselves safety, but he has also stated that nuclear contamination, for example, “is egalitarian, and in that sense ‘democratic’” (page 61), and he hopes for our unification into a global “civilizational community of fate” (2006, page 7; also 1992, page 47). In elaborating what he calls a “political economy of risk”, however, he appears to accept that the economic consequences of risk are unevenly socially distributed (1999, page 61). It is therefore surprising that he refers to the subpolitics of risk as an ‘enemyless’ politics. For even if it is accepted that risks themselves unite us in principle, there are clearly, as in the instances discussed above, those who benefit from the proliferation of risk. I have argued throughout the paper that there are serious problems with Beck’s account of how a cosmopolitan public sphere will emerge. The contradictions of risk themselves are portrayed as the most powerful force in undermining the risk makers, whilst it is merely for social movements to make risk scandalous, and various “moralizing groups” to put risk on the social agenda (1999, page 67). **Beck sees progress as** occurring “not through class struggle or revolution as in Marx, but as an unintended consequence of modernity itself” (Lupton, 1999, page 67). Politics “nestles down” in everyday life as risk decisions become impossible to ignore (Beck, 1997, page 152). His hope for cosmopolitan ecological democracy revolves around consumer boycotts and buycotts, and in **balloting over ecological issues**. In his assertion that “in sorting through the trash for recycling, everyone is compelled to cooperate as a minor activist in the overall rescue mission for the earth and humankind” (1997, page 91, emphasis added), activism is dissolved into individualised consumer behaviour administered by the state (see Smith, 2009, page 17). The theoretical problem posed by the relative failure to politicise the public about the risks involved in space activity is precisely that it does not impose itself on the everyday lives of those who stand to suffer. Nor are the risks concentrated in any socially or geographically determined sector of the population, with the exception of localised risks around manufacture and launch facilities such as the Baikonur Cosmodrome. The decision by **SNAP-9A** scientists to design the plutonium capsule to break up in the event of a disaster was in this sense a perfect tactic to avoid politicising any particular group. Issues concerning risk associated with human activity in space may find greater symbolic anchoring in areas immediately surrounding manufacture and launch sites, accounting for the geographic concentration of activism within those areas, but there is no necessary reason why people should engage with them. Accounting for why some people are mobilised to contest these risks whilst others are not, even when they share the same interests, values and knowledge, is difficult using Beck’s theoretical framework. As Lupton (1999, page 62) argues, “a usual response to grave dangers is to deny their existence as a kind of psychological self-protective mechanism, an attempt to maintain a sense of normality”. As she says, Beck accepts this (see Beck, 1995, pages 42–57). He argues that in the most “hopelessly hazardous situations … there is a growing tendency not merely to accept the hazard, but to deny it by every means at one’s disposal” (pages 48–49). He even makes the point that the imperceptibility of danger could in principle make this easy, but comes back again to the idea that we confront unavoidable risk decisions in day-to-day scenarios: “The lake one was about to leap into is revealed as a sewer, the superb, crispy lettuce in one’s mouth turns out to be contaminated and foul” (page 55). The “tolerance of despoliation and hazards”, says Beck, “wears thin only where people see their way of life jeopardized, in a manner they can both know and interpret, within the horizon of their expectations and valuations” (page 46). I have highlighted throughout that, where risks are not directly confronted and are uncertain, the operation of economic power becomes more important. One dimension to how power operates under these circumstances has recurred throughout the paper: the ability to **create and manage fantasies about catastrophe**. The more sophisticated the **technologies** used to **rationalise risk** become, the more significant what it **cannot model** becomes. Various approaches to psychoanalysis have examined how **fantasy creates both** **what is feared** (its ‘horrific’ dimension) **and the pacifying solution that relieves this fear** (its ‘beautific’ dimension). This is true of Kleinian psychoanalysis (eg, Klein, 1946, page 6), but particularly of contemporary Lacanian psychoanalysis, which has dealt with images of catastrophe specifically. This provides tools to explore in more depth Beck’s category of ‘things we are unwilling to know’. The Lacanian social theorist Slavoj Žižek (2008, page xii), for example, adds another category—‘unknown knowns’—to Donald Rumsfeld’s typology of knowledge. Žižek argues that when gaps appear in the symbolic order (in this case rationalising risk discourses) fantasy operates to conceal the true horror of the Lacanian Real; that which cannot be articulated. Žižek (2008, pages 5–6) provides the **example** of **safety demonstrations on aeroplanes**. These demonstrations do not serve to pacify our true fears about a crash landing, but to construct the horrific scenario. The true horror remains our inability to know how the crash scenario will play out. Precisely **the same is true of NASA’s Environmental Impact Statements, which are known to be fabrications but are still preferred to uncertainty** (the UN demands an impossible risk assessment that is probabilistic and geographically limited). The image of a **collision** **cascade** in orbit taking out global communications is also a **fantasy**, as are Haynes’s and McKay’s mutant bacteria. These fantasies each allow us to contemplate uncertainty. But each has a different effect, engineered and selected to function in the interests of those in power. Environmental Impact Assessments provide scenarios that legitimate State acquiescence to capital. They cover over not only science’s failings, but also those of the State and capital in turn. **They function to draw activists into** what Beck (1995, page 42) describes as “**orgies of mathematics and science” that work to prevent a truly reflexive discussion of risk**. Whilst informed activists engage with these scenarios as though they were rationalities (and, for example, demand to see more of the information on which they are based), less informed members of the public leave them to it. **Collision cascade fantasies and solutions for them in the form of fantastic technologies also sustain a relationship between capital and the State in which disaster and solution must be conceived within the existing regime governing space activities**. Not many people have direct economic interests in planetary engineering as yet, bar a marginal group of scientists. Desiring an impossible knowledge, these fantasies give scientists recourse to seek further funding (though more advanced modelling will make the unknown more, not less, terrifying), whilst at the same time making any politicisation of their work seem absurd. Meanwhile, the notion of **planetary engineering itself functions as a fantasy sustaining our unsustainable relationship with the Earthly environment**. Such fantasies are especially effective in **immobilising** public concern because of their remote setting in outer space. Space colonisation advocate Kraaft Ehricke (1972) referred to the development of outer space as the ‘benign industrial revolution’ precisely because it removed the negative consequences of industrial activity to a place where they no longer mattered. The same principle underpinned proposals to dump nuclear waste in outer space. Such a manoeuvre is a form of Beck’s “**symbolic detoxification**”, and the relationship between purity, exclusion, and avoidance has been tackled in the literature on risk (eg, Douglas, 1992; Joffe, 1999). Conclusion I have argued that, whilst many of the descriptive concepts established in Beck’s world risk society thesis can capture the existing state of risk beyond the globe, these risks reveal some of the problems with Beck’s theoretical understanding of risk politics. Contrary to Beck’s understanding, I have argued that there is nothing inevitable about these issues entering into a cosmopolitan public sphere. I have argued that this is especially true given the economic interests that keep uncertainty about these risks away from the public. I recommend that **we should remain sceptical about apparently cosmopolitan international cooperation regarding risk in outer space**, arguing that **this exists only where the interests of states and capital coincide**. I have also outlined some of the ways in which **space activity is** set to increase in order to resolve Earthly problems. These necessarily entail new and **increased risk**s, and are not the result simply of overspecialised science, but are **driven by the need for new capital fixes**. Because of the existence of these mechanisms, it cannot be trusted that progress will be made through the inevitable functional realignment of risk politics. The influence of power on risk politics beyond the global level must instead be recognised and collectively challenged, and **especially the function of fantasy** within this. An equal and open discussion of both the ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ (to use Beck’s terms) produced by space activity can only proceed on this basis.

#### The repetition of drives makes life the enemy and causes extinction

Themi 08 (Tim, Prof @ Deakin U, “How Lacan’s Ethics Might Improve Our Understanding of Nietzsche’s Critique of Platonism: The Neurosis & Nihilism of a ‘Life’ Against Life,” *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy* 4.1-2, 2008) SJBE, recut from Harvard BoSu

For to circle in too close to the Thing which is ethically forbidden by our reality principles––yet too the real truth of much desire––does hardly give us pleasure at all but anguish of the heaviest kind. Even if done so only as a thought experiment; as a free-association. So go there we generally don’t, and our ‘realities’ reflect as much. But henceforth when desire builds up, damns and flares return of the Thing: this is how Lacan specifically characterises the move we might make that goes beyond the pleasure principle, whose other name for Freud is ‘death-drive’. There where there is no, not pleasure yet jouissance in the transgression that the Thing would bring, a jouissance of transgression which Lacan suggests is the most direct satisfaction of a drive humanly possible[48]. But it’s also one perhaps unconsciously masochistic, that which Freud writes up as being only preliminarily sadistic, in eventually expressing itself as an “unconscious need for punishment”[49]. And if indeed we are feeling guilty, then we may yet still seek to pay the price. Why? For unknowingly possessing and inadvertently re-accessing this Thing in our real, beyond the pleasure-reality principle, our moral transgressions casting shadow long into the unconscious we know next to nothing about, and refuse even to acknowledge.¶ Could it not be thusly then that our time is behind now a sadomasochistic, wilfully ignorant drive towards death for nigh the entire species? Such punishment would too overly suffice, to be sure, for even a two-millennium length in repression…¶ But with our advancements in technological power outmatching by far any correlative advance in the awareness gained as a whole of our prehistoric Thing within: the great 21st century ecological disaster that too many academics and activists now increasingly predict, seems more than just a little possible. But to this increasingly macabre scenario, we must also add the renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons which occurs, no less, amidst a world where vital resources for energy and democracy are wearing thin[50]. For just such reasons, wilful ignorance of the Thing now bares results which Lacan’s Ethics reveals as far too terrifyingly possible to rationally accept; given that we have the Thing armed to the teeth now from that primitive id-like part of the brain, with no Sovereign Good, and all the way into a nuclear age.¶ CONCLUSION: THE NEUROSIS & NIHILISM OF A ‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE.¶ This is why Lacan proposes that his enquiry into ethics must be one to go “more deeply into the notion of the real”(LE:11). Further into what he would rather call the real, given that previous notions of ‘nature’ have been too far ‘different’––from being far too Platonic––than his own; and because it’s the very exclusions in these previous notions which upon return, as return of excess, are yielding our most tragic problems.¶ Today when faced with problems of the magnitude of global warming––a special but by no means solo case of adverse environment change at present due to our physical treatment of the planet––we often think the answer is to be more moral, more good, and we are thankful when exponents of the Good in some way bring attention to the problem. However, the idea of the Good as introduced by Plato, and nigh all of its descendants whether secular, rationalist, religious or not, continue to predicate themselves on a radically false picture of the human-condition: if not still of the entire cosmos––which only then lines itself up aside of an age-old repression, a repression of das Ding, that Freudian Thing in our inner real which, when it returns after being disavowed and denied in the name of the Good too long, is even more devastating.¶ Presently we are accelerating along the path of what Lacan discloses as our civilisation’s “race towards destruction”, a “massive destruction”, “a resurgence of savagery”, snaking the paths traced out before us by the centuries long dominion of Western morality [51]; and the nihilism detected by Nietzsche before the turn of the 20th has never threatened to reach such the grand finale. But what I would have us take from this enquiry here is that this is not because we aren’t in accordance enough with a moral ideal of the Sovereign good, but rather, it’s because we aren’t in accordance enough with a proper understanding of the real. It’s because we still at some level think that being more moral, in accordance with the Good’s inherited repressive structures towards our drives, desire, and truthfulness about the real, is actually the answer to––rather than the source of––our most tragic problems.¶ The goal here is by no means then to encourage all to let their Things run wild––which would probably be nothing short of an instant conflagration––but this is why and precisely why we must desist from deluding ourselves under the tightening grip of a Sovereign Good, for this is precisely the move which cuts the Thing loose after pressing down for far too long, a slippery hand’s palming on the coils of a spring, forever readying the subsequent explosion. For when that which is really real––as opposed to what Christian-Platonism falsely called the ‘real’––is forced from mind, it can’t really disappear because it is real, and it tends to end up only in our gun-sights as an imaginary overlaying of an external other, when the signifier ‘enmity’ appears. The earth itself can even seem like the enemy after while, one which like Plato in his Phaedo, we might think then to escape from “as if from a prison”, and especially from “the bonds of the body”, in the hope that we may live one day without the earthly altogether[52]. Following such negations to their logical conclusion, life itself becomes enemy too, for as being made up of the earthly and organic, life could never be free of what it is in essence. And what is the death-drive Freud tells from the start, if not to return us sundry to that dust-bowl of the inorganic; as per that “second death”[53] fantasm Lacan salvages from the Monstre de Sade, which wills to go beyond the destruction of mere beings, by destroying too the principle from which fresh sets could emerge. Such negative devaluations of our earthly, organic life though are really of our own construction: as de Sade, like any pervert, is only the mirror which shows expressed what Platonic-neurotics are but hide inside––a cess-pit of loathing contempt for life, built up from the unconscious and disowned, distorted and damned up, built up, instinctual-ideational elements of their own subjective psyches, phobically ferocious of that Thingly real lying not so dormant, and readying within…¶ But is it now still possible as Nietzsche teaches to say ‘Yes’ to the real of nature both without and within––to return to it!––even though it is more frightful and we are less guaranteed protection of it than the Platonic history of metaphysicians taught? For with the further disclosures of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis––Lacan’s following up and extension of the meta-ethical implications of Freud: perhaps even Nietzsche, our great intellectual übermensch, may too have bitten off more snake-head than he could chew? From certain moments in Nietzsche’s texts we can perhaps interpret that he may have had this Thing in his sights, but saw nothing much to come of it, so instead, elected to turn away, though not without some perhaps hinted at self-amusement.[54]¶ But with psychoanalysis, rightly or wrongly, such truths are out. It doesn’t seem all positive at first, and perhaps it never entirely will. But we must not let this deeper disclosure desist us now from the core Nietzschean project of locating and overcoming the nihilism which begs us to take cover in idealising fictions, as if life as life is not worth living. Not because nihilism and the annihilation of the species is wrong in the sense of being immoral, but rather because it is bad art, mediocre art, and the ‘knowledge’ claims it trumpets on should only make us flare. If we are at our full intellectual and creative will to power, we can only consider such cultural-civil regressions as we saw on display with that whole propaganda comedy that surrounded the war for more oil in Iraq as infantile; the hapless results of sibling rivalries gone too far astray. But we must also resist being caught up in the imaginary of those who would only re-preach to us now of a return to the Good, who would only redeploy such versions of nihilism’s precursory defensive fictions, the pernicious ones, which would only then re-falsify our data, and leave us disappointed when the truth then re-emerges. Doing more harm than good does Platonism in the end by leaving us untrained for the real, with the habit instead to take some truth as ‘error’, and error as ‘truth’––as ‘real’––to the point even of epistemic dysfunction. Take the grotesque intellectual poverty of that whole Christian middle-ages for example, whence put into relation with the heights of Aristotle and his fellow Greeks, as Augustine and Aquinas amplified some of the worst bits of Platonism, and threw the rest into abyss.¶ The overcoming of the moralising good of Christian-Platonism though does by no means imply then a subsequent affirmation of all that brutal Roman like greed, slavery, decadence, circus-bread corruption and mindless colonial expansion that we’ve heard all about, and are hardly so free of with our corporate today––just ask a Latin-American for instance![55] For it is possible within the perspectives opened up by Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, as Silvia Ons puts it, to view a social-historical or individual neurosis of any kind: including the expressed acted-out, perverse-sadistic form that escapes when the Good is temporarily loosed of its repressive grip––and say to the would be Platonist: ‘No, not that, that’s not a cure, that’s a mirage; that’s sheer fantasy, resentment, spite; that’s not a cure it will only make things worse; worse in a different way, but worse nonetheless!’¶ By greater mindfulness then, with guided affirmation towards even that fearsome Freudian Thing that The Ethics of Psychoanalysis has us find now in our inner natures: we can eventually again say ‘Yes’-to-life in such the way that it overcomes the nihilism of not caring too much whether we as individuals or species live or die, whether we as culture or civilisation advance or decline. But we can only do this with fullest efficacy by freeing ourselves of all that wasted neurosis sickness that feels it must deny our Thing like aspect of the real: because from all those Christian-Platonic prejudices of the Good, it has been taught that such ‘things’ are too far beneath it. We must continue instead to train ourselves to stare the real directly in the face, without flinching, and that’s all we can do at least to start. For unless we can continue to utilise, sublimate, enjoy and get a positive, well-guided jouissance out of all aspects of life––including that Freudian Ding in our real––then the chances are we’re going to be at least in part, happy enough in no longer living it: offering not even a puff of genuine political praxis! We either face up to the death-drive snaking long beneath the dank, hidden history of the un-real, anti-real Good of Platonism––or let the disowned, un-understood drive resurge of its own volition until it accidentally finishes us!

#### Vote negative to embrace the lack – this requires being open to the anxiety that occurs from an encounter with the other and breaks down fantasy and drives.

McGowan 13 Todd McGowan, 2013, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London, SJBE

The alternative — the ethical path that psychoanalysis identifies — demands an embrace of the anxiety that stems from the encounter with the enjoying other. If there is a certain ethical dimension to anxiety, it lies in the rela- tionship that exists between anxiety and enjoyment. Contra Heidegger, the ethics of anxiety does not stem from anxiety’s relation to absence but from its relation to presence — to the overwhelming presence of the other’s enjoyment. In some sense, the encounter with absence or nothing is easier than the encounter with presence. Even though it traumatizes us, absence allows us to constitute ourselves as desiring subjects. Rather than producing anxiety, absence leads the subject out of anxiety into desire. Confronted with the lost object as a structuring absence, the subject is able to embark on the pursuit of the enjoyment embodied by this object, and this pursuit provides the subject with a clear sense of direction and even meaning. This is precisely what the subject lacks when it does not encounter a lack in the symbolic structure. When the subject encounters enjoyment at the point where it should encounter the absence of enjoyment, anxiety overwhelms the subject. In this situation, the subject cannot constitute itself along the path of desire. It lacks the lack — the absence — that would provide the space through which desire could develop. Consequently, this subject confronts the enjoying other and experiences anxiety. Unlike the subject of desire — or the subject of Heideggerean anxiety — the subject who suffers this sort of anxiety actually experiences the other in its real dimension.¶ The real other is the other caught up in its obscene enjoyment, caught up in this enjoyment in a way that intrudes on the subject. There is no safe distance from this enjoyment, and one cannot simply avoid it. There is nowhere in the contemporary world to hide from it. As a result, the contem- porary subject is necessarily a subject haunted by anxiety triggered by the omnipresent enjoyment of the other. And yet, this enjoyment offers us an ethical possibility. As Slavoj Žižek puts it, “It is this excessive and intrusive jouissance that we should learn to tolerate.”27 When we tolerate the other’s “excessive and intrusive jouissance” and when we endure the anxiety that it produces, we acknowledge and sustain the other in its real dimension.¶ Tolerance is the ethical watchword of our epoch. However, the problem with contemporary tolerance is its insistence on tolerating the other only insofar as the other cedes its enjoyment and accepts the prevailing symbolic structure. That is to say, we readily tolerate the other in its symbolic dimen- sion, the other that plays by the rules of our game. This type of tolerance allows the subject to feel good about itself and to sustain its symbolic identity. The problem is that, at the same time, it destroys what is in the other more than the other — the particular way that the other enjoys.¶ It is only the encounter with the other in its real dimension — the encounter that produces anxiety in the subject — that sustains that which defines the other as such. Authentic tolerance tolerates the real other, not simply the other as mediated through a symbolic structure. In this sense, it involves the experience of anxiety on the part of the subject. This is a difficult posi- tion to sustain, as it involves enduring the “whole opaque weight of alien enjoyment on your chest.”The obscene enjoyment of the other bombards the authentically tolerant subject, but this subject does not retreat from the anxiety that this enjoyment produces. If the embrace of the anxiety that accompanies the other’s proximate enjoyment represents the ethical position today, this does not necessarily provide us with an incentive for occupying it. Who wants to be ethical when it involves enduring anxiety rather than finding a way — a drug, a new authority, or something — to alleviate it? What good does it do to sustain oneself in anxiety? In fact, anxiety does the subject no good at all, which is why it offers the subject the possibility of enjoyment. When the subject encounters the other’s enjoyment, this is the form that its own enjoyment takes as well. To endure the anxiety caused by the other’s enjoyment is to experience one’s own simultaneously. As Lacan points out, when it comes to the enjoyment of the other and my own enjoyment, “nothing indicates they are distinct.” Thus, not only is anxiety an ethical position, it is also the key to embracing the experience of enjoyment. To reject the experience of anxiety is to flee one’s own enjoyment.¶ The notion that the other’s enjoyment is also our own enjoyment seems at first glance difficult to accept. Few people enjoy themselves when they hear someone else screaming profanities in the workplace or when they see a couple passionately kissing in public, to take just two examples. In these instances, we tend to recoil at the inappropriateness of the activity rather than enjoy it, and this reaction seems completely justified. The public display of enjoyment violates the social pact with its intrusiveness; it doesn’t let us alone but assaults our senses. It violates the implicit agreement of the public sphere constituted as an enjoyment-free zone. And yet, recoiling from the other’s enjoyment deprives us of our own.¶ How we comport ourselves in relation to the other’s enjoyment indi- cates our relationship to our own. What bothers us about the other — the disturbance that the other’s enjoyment creates in our existence — is our own mode of enjoying. If we did not derive enjoyment from the other’s enjoyment, witnessing it would not bother us psychically. We would sim- ply be indifferent to it and focused on our own concerns. Of course, we might ask an offending car radio listener to turn the radio down so that we wouldn’t have to hear the unwanted music, but we would not experience the mere exhibition of alien enjoyment through the playing of that music as an affront. The very fact that the other’s enjoyment captures our attention demonstrates our intimate — or extimate — relation to it. This relation becomes even clearer when we consider the epistemo- logical status of the enjoying other. Because the real or enjoying other is irreducible to any observable identity, we have no way of knowing whether or not the other really is enjoying. A stream of profanity may be the result of someone hurting a toe. The person playing the car radio too loud while sitting at the traffic light may have simply forgotten to turn down the radio after driving on the highway. Or the person may have difficulty hearing. The couple’s amorous behavior in public may reflect an absence of enjoyment in their relationship that they are trying to hide from both themselves and the public.¶ Considering the enjoyment of the other, we never know whether it is there or not. If we experience it, we do so through the lens of our own fantasy. We fantasize that the person blasting the radio is caught up in the enjoyment of the music to the exclusion of everything else; we fantasize that the public kisses of the couple suggest an enjoyment that has no concern for the outside world. Without the fantasy frame, the enjoying other would never appear within our experience.¶ The role of the fantasy frame for accessing the enjoying other becomes apparent within Fascist ideology. Fascism posits an internal enemy — the figure of the Jew or some analogue — that enjoys illicitly at the expense of the social body as a whole. By attempting to eliminate the enjoying other, Fascism hopes to create a pure social body bereft of any stain of enjoy- ment. This purity would allow for the ultimate enjoyment, but it would be completely licit. This hope for a future society free of any stain is not where Fascism’s true enjoyment lies, however. Fascists experience their own enjoyment through the enjoying other that they persecute. The enjoy- ment that the figure of the Jew embodies is the Fascists’ own enjoyment, though they cannot avow it as their own. More than any other social form, Fascism is founded on the disavowal of enjoyment — the attempt to enjoy while keeping enjoyment at arm’s length. But this effort is not confined to Fascism; it predominates everywhere, because no subjects anywhere can simply feel comfortable with their own mode of enjoying.¶ The very structure of enjoyment is such that we cannot experience it directly: when we experience enjoyment, we don’t have it; it has us. We experience our own enjoyment as an assault coming from the outside that dominates our conscious intentions. This is why we must fantasize our own enjoyment through the enjoying other. Compelled by our enjoyment, we can’t do otherwise; we act against our self-interest and against our own good. Enjoyment overwhelms the subject, even though the subject’s mode of enjoying marks what is most singular about the subject.¶ Even though the encounter with the enjoying other apprehends the real other through the apparatus of fantasy, this encounter is nonetheless genuine and has an ethical status. Unlike the experience of the nonexistent symbolic identity, which closes down the space in which the real other might appear, the fantasized encounter with the enjoying other leaves this space open. By allowing itself to be disturbed by the other on the level of fantasy, the subject acknowledges the singularity of the real other — its mode of enjoying — without confining this singularity to a prescribed identity.¶ The implications of privileging the encounter with the disturbing enjoy- ment of the real other over the assimilable symbolic identity are themselves disturbing. The tolerant attitude that never allows itself to be jarred by the enjoying other becomes, according to this way of seeing things, further from really encountering the real other than the attitude of hate and mis- trust. The liberal subject who welcomes illegal immigrants as fellow citizens completely shuts down the space for the other in the real. The immigrant as fellow citizen is not the real other. The xenophobic conservative, on the other hand, constructs a fantasy that envisions the illegal immigrant awash in a linguistic and cultural enjoyment that excludes natives. This fantasy, paradoxically, permits an encounter with the real other that liberal tolerance forecloses. Of course, xenophobes retreat from this encounter and from their own enjoyment, but they do have an experience of it that liberals do not. The tolerant liberal is open to the other but eliminates the otherness, while the xenophobic conservative is closed to the other but allows for the otherness. The ethical position thus involves sustaining the liberal’s toler- ance within the conservative’s encounter with the real other.

## Case

### ASATS GOOD

#### This is the thesis of their advantage – Indian ASAT weaponization and space militarization will happen in SPACE now to protect PRIVATE assets; they have said this is casual; without these commerical and private objects in space, India will demilitarize and remove ASATs, thereby resolving tensions with China. We’ll impact turn that:

#### ASATs are key to deterrence and asymmetric escalation capabilities---that caps conflicts from going nuclear---independently, solves Chinese DEWs.

Kartik Bommakanti 19. Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Program. 11-15-2019. “‘Soft Kill’ or ‘Hard Kill’? The requirements for India’s space and counter-space capabilities.” ORF Occasional Paper. https://www.orfonline.org/research/soft-kill-or-hard-kill-the-requirements-for-indias-space-and-counter-space-capabilities-57832/

II. KEWs: India’s Space Weapons and Balance of Power

A key justification for the development of space weapons is preserving the balance of power, which requires a state’s active effort to enhance its power and secure its interests against the dominant or near-dominant states in the international system. “Balancing” involves engineering a shift in the existing distribution of power, away from the dominant state in the system or region.[3]

India currently faces two adversarial states—China and Pakistan—both of them with active space military capabilities and having a history of strategic cooperation. To achieve a balance of power, India must improve its hard-kill and soft-kill capabilities in the space domain and work towards “internal balancing,” i.e. accumulating capabilities through domestic effort, instead of “external balancing,” i.e. relying on the power of other states.[4] Internal balancing gives a state the power to prevent the escalation of conflict and war. American realist scholar John J. Mearsheimer observed, “…the balance of power is largely synonymous with military power.”[5]

The success of India’s ASAT test of March 2019 demonstrated the country’s ground-launched KEW capability. However, the country’s kinetic capabilities are not without limitations vis-à-vis its situation with Pakistan and China. The challenge is summarised by Vipin Narang: “If Pakistan starts hitting Indian satellites, India can knock out Pakistan’s very few satellites whereas India cannot do the same to China. So it’s kind of a weird balance for India if it’s interested in getting into the anti-satellite deterrence game [because] it doesn’t really have an advantage in either of its dyads.”[6]

While Pakistan, too, does not have a confirmed kinetic capability, it could develop one with China’s assistance, which is consistent with Narang’s observation. According to another scholar, “…the number of countries able to undertake such intercepts is much larger…”[7] and Pakistan is one of them. While its space programme is not as expansive as India’s, Pakistan has an extensive missile programme and is in a position to undertake a KEW test in the not-so-distant future. (The barriers to entry in KEW-related space technology for states such as Pakistan, which is otherwise not a leading spacefaring nation, are not too high.)

Another legitimate concern is that a conventional war can escalate to a nuclear war, involving space as a domain and a medium. A potential two-front attack is one of the major reasons that India must develop triadic KEWs, since it gives the country asymmetric escalation capabilities, allowing it to put at considerable and direct risk both Chinese and Pakistani space assets. According to a 2015 Indian study, which ties partially into Narang’s reference to the two-front military challenge facing India, “There is also little doubt that space, nuclear weapons, conventional weapons and strategies of war and deterrence are now inextricably connected with each other.”[8] However, this statement is not entirely accurate, and in the context of India’s conflictual relationships with China and Pakistan, alternative scenarios are equally plausible. For example, in the event of a China–India war or an India–Pakistan war, traditional weapons and space weapons could be used without the involvement of nuclear arms. The Kargil conflict is an example of a “limited-aims conventional war,” fought under the cover of nuclear weapons.[9] Similar conflicts in the future, however, are likely to involve the space segment, especially in the case of a Sino-Indian military conflagration. On the other hand, a joint attack by China and Pakistan could potentially escalate to the nuclear level, as the 2015 study suggests. However, it is equally likely to remain confined to conventional and space warfare, for terrestrial territorial gains. The study also ignores the fact that a two-front war against India will be a function of the common objectives pursued by China and Pakistan against India, and vice versa. An inextricable link between space, nuclear and conventional deterrence and warfighting strategies is limited and conditional, if not tenuous.

According to Narang’s assessment, India lacks an “advantage” in the two conflict dyads. However, what India needs primarily is not an advantage but parity (especially if Pakistan tests its own KEW), which will enable it to militarily balance the collaborative space power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Pakistan. Due to the vulnerabilities created by the two-front ASAT challenge and the absence of a robust capability, let alone a distinct advantage, India will need a triadic ground-, air- and sea-launched KEW capability to maintain a credible space deterrent. As one important study observed, “Though its [India’s] space assets are smaller than those of the other major powers they are not insignificant. At the least they may need to be protected against the direct and indirect consequences of actions taken by the other space powers.”[10] Former Indian National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon, alluding to the differential in strength recently, observed, “The basic reason is the power gap between the two [China and India]…”[11] Consequently, creating a triad-based KEW capability assumes considerable importance, since it creates mutual risks and threats. In the event of deterrence breakdown, it gives New Delhi the option to escalate during the course of a military confrontation.

American strategic studies scholar Ashley J. Tellis argues, “India’s ASAT test was perhaps necessary, but it will not suffice to protect India’s space assets during any major conflict with China.”[12] While this is a valid point, Tellis overlooks the fact that India does not have kinetic capabilities that can be launched from diverse platforms, which can boost flexibility and offer redundancy to the extent that adversaries will need to contend with a larger “menu” of targets. Thus, it provides a diverse array of hard-kill capabilities. A kinetic ASAT capability may be a last-resort weapon, as Tellis correctly asserts, but the 27 March 2019 test was only a ground-launched projectile adapted from a missile-defence interceptor and launched from the Interim Test Range (ITR). The test is, therefore, insufficient to sustain the Indian space deterrent posture vis-à-vis China, and additional tests from sea- and air-launched platforms are required. The Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has undertaken a prototype laser weapon test, which is a Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) from presumably surface vessel.[13] Beijing has also invited bids for a nuclear powered ship-breaking vessel,[14] which could potentially enable the PLAN to develop nuclear-powered aircraft carriers serving as future platforms for the employment DEWs such as laser weapons against space targets.[15]

Indeed, Tellis’ claim that India’s ASAT amounted to an “incomplete success” is accurate, but not for the reasons he believes. His prescription specifically requires moving away from “debris-generating kinetic tests” and emulating China in developing non-kinetic capabilities.[16] On the contrary, the March test was incomplete because it did not fully test India’s kinetic capabilities from diverse platforms. KEW tests from diverse platforms will make India’s space deterrent more robust, inject caution into India’s adversaries, and create shared risks essential to sustaining credible deterrence. Tellis also leaves unexplained why Beijing, despite the debris-related risks that accompany any direct ascent KEW tests, pursues the acquisition of KEWs such as the SC-19, DN-1 and DN-3, which are capable of striking Indian space assets in GEO in parallel with its development and deployment of DEWs and other non-kinetic counter space capabilities.

The point to underline here is that India will need standalone kinetic capabilities as well as non-kinetic means to deter China. India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) appears to have foreclosed the option of further kinetic tests, with G. Satish Reddy declaring, “Though we tested the interceptor missile for an altitude below 300 km as a responsible nation after multiple simulations, it has the technical capability to go beyond 1,000 km. That will cover most of the orbiting satellites in LEO. For the same purpose we don’t need more tests.”[17] This misses the point about survivability, redundancy and flexibility, which can only be assured if additional tests are conducted from sea- and air-launched platforms. However, the DRDO chief’s statement is revealing in terms of the altitude of the test, which is important inasmuch as future tests must not be conducted beyond an altitude of 300 km, to prevent the creation of longer-lasting space debris. In 2012, the DRDO declared that simulated electronic tests were sufficient to meet India’s ASAT requirements.[18] However, the Modi government decided to carry out an actual test, rejecting the view that simulated tests were sufficient. For a credible space-deterrent posture, which Reddy conceded was important, a diversified kinetic capability appears not integral to that effort. Moreover, taking into account the two-front ASAT challenge, it would be unwise to forego the additional tests required for establishing a KEW triad.

A 2017 Indian study recommended the creation of a KEW triad, albeit without explaining the military-operational and technical reasons for the same.[19] Another analysis draws attention to the vulnerability of Indian satellites—radar, earth-observation (EO), cartographic and navigation satellites—particularly in low-earth orbit (LEO), where a large number of India’s satellites are concentrated. The study proposes several soft-kill capabilities, including counter-measures such as building a more robust Space Surveillance Network (SSN), hardening satellites and making them stealthier to avoid detection, thus reducing their vulnerability to Chinese KEWs.[20] It further recommends developing resilient satellites against electronic countermeasures and geographically spread static and mobile telemetry, tracking and command (TTC) facilities as critical mitigatory measures against soft-kill attacks. However, the study precludes the development of whole categories of weapons. For instance, hard-kill weapons or KEWs have not been included in the mix of capabilities India should possess. Interestingly, the paper does acknowledge that pure soft-kill capabilities in the form of cyber weapons, electronic-warfare capabilities and DEWs are insufficient.[21] As a solution, however, it recommends policy, normative and legal restraints against space weapons, instead of R&D or the deployment of space weapons.[22]

Distant Indian space targets, such as the Indian Regional Navigation Spacecraft System (IRNSS), in geosynchronous orbit (GEO), are difficult to strike kinetically. However, China does possess the capabilities for doing so.[23] In May 2013, China tested the SC-19 ASAT system that can hit targets in GEO.[24] Its successor missile, the DN-3, too is ASAT capable and is likely a ballistic missile interceptor meant for intercepting targets in LEO.[25] Both these capabilities represent significant and critical advances in hit-to-kill kinetic capabilities to strike space assets well beyond LEO. In 2010, 2013 and 2014, China conducted ASAT non-debris-generating tests using adapted land-based ballistic missile interceptors.[26] Co-orbital ASATs are another arrow in China’s space quiver. In 2008, the BX-1, a miniature imaging satellite was deployed in-orbit close to its mother satellite and passed within 45 km of the International Space Station (ISS). While this is speculative, the BX-1 was likely released from a spring-loaded device, which does not conclusively prove counter-space capability but does establish China’s ability to undertake a co-orbital ASAT.[27] As a follow-up to their BX-1 test in 2008, China launched the SJ-12 satellite, which is believed to possess counter-space capabilities such as jamming.[28] In 2011, the SJ-12 undertook a close manoeuvre to test docking capabilities, possibly as a test run for the actual docking of the Shenzhou capsule with the Tiangong-1 space station. In 2013, China tested a robotic arm, which grabbed one satellite from another. These tests demonstrate China's ability to conduct orbital proximity operations, allowing it to execute microwave attacks against enemy satellite systems. While of the technologies and capabilities tested by China are seemingly for civilian applications, given the dual nature of space technology, they are potentially applicable in the military arena.

Thus, China have developed a whole slew of kinetic capabilities that can target Indian satellites in LEO, sun-synchronous orbit (SSO), medium-earth orbit (MEO) and GEO (See Figure 1). These include cyber weapons to attack space assets, co-orbital attack capabilities, as well as kinetic earth-to-space and air-to-space kinetic capabilities.[29] In light of China’s expertise, India cannot afford to confine itself to passive means of defending against Chinese space assets and infrastructure.

#### AND, solves Chinese A2AD expansion.

Stephen Biddle 16. Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Ivan Oelrich, served as Vice President for the Strategic Security Program at the Federation of American Scientists and is Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University, Summer 2016, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 7-48

The United States must also be able to neutralize any satellite-based sea surveillance systems China may deploy. Neutralization may be possible with cyber or other soft-kill approaches, but it will probably be necessary to maintain a hard-kill ASAT capability for this purpose. If Chinese space-based radars are allowed to function, continued growth of Chinese long-range missile capabilities will eventually enable an A2/AD system that really could threaten targets out to the Second Island Chain. A U.S. capability to deny this is thus critical if Chinese A2/AD range is to be constrained to the limits presented above.

#### Chinese A2AD collapses global FON norms.

Prashanth Parameswaran 15. Visiting Fellow at the ASEAN Studies Center at American University, Ph.D. Candidate and Provost Fellow at the Fletcher School of. Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “US Commander Warns China Against ‘Revising’ International Law in the South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 10-9, http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/us-commander-warns-china-against-revising-international-law-in-the-south-china-sea/

Swift was referring to manifestations of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea over the past few years, including the erection of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea and the construction of artificial islands. If such efforts went uncontested, Swift argued in his speech to the Royal Australian Navy Seapower Conference, seen by The Diplomat, it would be a setback for global norms.

“If even one of these restrictions were successful, it would be a major blow to the international rules-based system with ramifications well beyond the maritime domain,” Swift said.

Restricting freedoms, values and rights that all actors enjoy in the international rules-based system through ‘might makes right’ approaches, Swift argued, would undermine global economic prosperity and return us to a world of mercantilism and protectionism that benefits only a handful of powerful states.

“If we are not willing to commit to resolve these differences peacefully, leveraging the tools of the international rules-based system that has served us so well, for so long, in an multilateral, inclusive way; then are we willing to accept the likelihood that imposed solutions to these national differences at sea, will seek us out in our supposed sanctuaries ashore?” Swift said.

#### Extinction.

Dr. James Kraska 11. Professor in the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S. Naval War College, Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in World Politics, Oxford University Press, Google Books

What do the issues of global politics and grand strategy have to do with oceans policy? Oceans policy should be connected to and serve grand strategy, which should be implemented by national strategy. The United States and its friends and allies face a common set of strategic risks and threats in the global system, and a policy for the legal order of the oceans should be pursued that meets the major challenges of the day. In some respects, U.S. oceans policy has been at the forefront of reducing military risk to the United States. The U.S.-sponsored post- 9/11 counter-terrorism initiatives introduced by the United States and other nations at the International Maritime Organization reflect this strategic purpose. Amendments adopted in the fall of 2005 to the 1988 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation tighten rules to counter maritime terrorism and the transport of weapons of mass destruction on a ship. Similarly, the International Shipping and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which amends the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention, established tougher standards for seaside and vessel security, reducing the vulnerability of the maritime system to terrorist attack. At the same time, however, the United States has been surprisingly lax in maintaining awareness of military risks posed by peer state rivals, and the relationship between grand strategy and oceans policy. What are the greatest military risks in the international system?

First, the greatest military threat to a stable order comes from China, which is rising on a wave of economic, scientific, and military power. Success in these spheres is producing political power for the first time, creating in Beijing a heady atmosphere of arrival. China is a trendsetter in Asia, and is marketing its illiberal perspective on oceans policy, both in the Pacific region and at the IMO. Following behind China, nations such as Brazil and Iran are becoming dominant in their respective geographic and political spheres. Brazil is filling a power vacuum on the continent of South America; Iran is filling a void created by the toppling of Saddam Hussein and subsequent civil war in Iraq. Second, a resurgent autocratic Russia could further destabilize Europe. Moscow’s heavy hand has frightened the states on its western border, and encumbered better relations with NATO and the EU. Empowered with energy wealth to rebuild its military forces, Russia still suffers from a decayed infrastructure and an unhealthy and declining population base. But Moscow aspires to be a naval power once again, so there may be opportunity to engage with Russia more effectively. The United States has more in common with Russia on oceans policy than any other issue, and the two states worked closely to achieve the navigational regimes in UNCLOS. But instead of working in tandem with Moscow at the IMO, the United States and Russia have been more inclined to butt heads. For the United States, the goal is to reassure European allies and curry favor with the EU nations; for Russia, the objective has been to myopically define its foreign policy in terms of opposition to whatever the U.S. is promoting. Both nations share essential interests in a liberal order of the oceans, and should work together closely to maintain and stabilize the system of rules in UNCLOS that they created.

Third, the Middle East is under a grave threat from an aggressive and dedicated assault by an irreconcilable wing of Islam, funded by radical Shiites and Sunnis. The extremists seek to attack the West in order to weaken its resolve and dilute its institutions, destroy Israel, and impose a caliphate dictatorship throughout the Middle East. The states in the region — Syria, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia — are caught in the crosshairs, and any one of them could erupt into chaos, anarchy, or war. Whereas Egypt and Saudi Arabia care so much about stability that they stamp out all dissent, breeding a seething anger that could explode, Syria and Iran are breeding instability by conducting secret, irregular wars through proxy forces throughout the Levant and beyond. Iran’s “split personality” between the more professional Iranian Navy on the one hand and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy (IRGCN) on the other, keeps the Persian Gulf in a constant state of high tension.

Fourth, there are a growing number of rogue regimes eager to acquire weapons of mass destruction, mass murder, and mass disruption. These regimes, including North Korea, are developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in order to limit the flexibility of the democratic states to challenge them, to deter neighborhood policing by the United States and its allies, and to be able to impose their will on their neighbors. Iran is the most unpredictable nation in the Middle East, and Tehran has exported instability into both Gaza and Lebanon.

Fifth, the Pakistan-Afghanistan problem has lit South Asia from the coast of Gwadar to the peaks of the Hindu Kush. Even more so than Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan teeters on anarchy, and it is not implausible to worry about the nation descending into a jihad autocracy. The Pakistani military and intelligence service are both essential partners in the fight against terrorism, as well as collaborators that are not entirely reliable. While Islamabad remains focused inward toward the continent, it also bristles at Delhi’s grip on the Indian Ocean. Pakistan, like its neighbor India, purports to restrict foreign military activities in its EEZ.

Finally — particularly relevant for this study — there is an emerging international governance system of pseudo-legality sustained by bureaucratic international elites and anti-American and anti-Western states, which weakens the democracies, “protects the vicious and the evil, and absorbs the energy of decent countries into endless maneuvers of utter impotence and dishonesty.” 29 In the maritime context, the tribulations of international law are exposed in the application of UNCLOS. The international law of the sea is pulled in so many different, even contradictory directions, by dissimilar domestic and international constituencies that it is becoming unmoored from its roots as a system for international peace and stability. As a global system, the law of the sea is becoming less coherent, not more. By working at cross-purposes to obfuscate international law of the sea in a bureaucratic web of contradictory transnational, foreign, and domestic rules, oceans law risks being an agent of disorder rather than order. 30

These six global threats are evolving in parallel and sometimes in synergistic coordination. American grand strategy should take into account the six threats; democratic states should implement a foreign policy that is designed to overmatch all of these challenges. As an adjunct of grand strategy, oceans policy should be attached to and promote the defeat of these six threats. Freedom of the seas, particularly in the EEZ, is a crucial element for meeting each of these challenges.

#### Indian ASATs solve Pakistani nuke buildup and Chinese preemptive strikes.

Chellaney 19 ― Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy Research, Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy, nonresident affiliate with the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization at King's College London, former Fellow at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, Ph.D. in international studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2019. (“The looming specter of Asian space wars”, *Asian Review*, March 29th, 2019, Available Online at: [https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-looming-specter-of-Asian-space-wars Accessed 8-16-2019](https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-looming-specter-of-Asian-space-wars%20Accessed%208-16-2019))

The linkages between antisatellite, or ASAT, weapon technologies and ballistic missile defense systems, which can shoot down incoming missiles, underscore how innovations favor both offense and defense. Space wars are no longer just Hollywood fiction.

India's ASAT test is a reminder that the Asia-Pacific region is the hub of the growing space-war capabilities. The United States and Russia field extensive missile defense systems and boast a diverse range of ground-launched and directed-energy ASAT capabilities. China's ASAT weaponry is becoming more sophisticated, even as it aggressively seeks theater ballistic missile defenses.

Japan and South Korea are working with the U.S. separately to create missile defense systems. Although aimed at thwarting regional threats, these systems are interoperable with American missile defenses. Australia, for its part, participates in trilateral missile-defense consultations with the U.S. and Japan.

Space-based assets are critical not just for communications but also for imagery, navigation, weather forecasting, surveillance, interception, missile guidance and the delivery of precision munitions. Taking out such assets can ~~blind~~ an enemy.

India's successful "kill" of one of its own satellites with a missile -- confirmed by the U.S. Air Force Space Command -- has made it the fourth power, after the United States, Russia and China, to shoot down an object in space. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, facing a tight reelection race, made a rare televised address to announce India's entry into this exclusive club of nuclear-armed countries that can destroy a moving target in space.

India's technological leap is being seen internationally as a counter to China's growing ASAT capabilities, which include ground-based direct ascent missiles and lasers, which can ~~blind~~ or ~~disable~~ satellites.

The international development of ASAT capabilities mirrors the nuclear-weapons proliferation chain. Like nuclear weapons, the U.S. was the first to develop satellite-kill technologies, followed by the former Soviet Union. China, as in nuclear weapons, stepped into this realm much later, only to provoke India to follow suit.

The Indian test was clearly a warning shot across China's bow, although Modi claimed that it was not aimed against any country.

India finds itself boxed in by the deepening China-Pakistan strategic nexus. China has transferred, according to international evidence, technologies for weapons of mass destruction to Pakistan to help tie down India south of the Himalayas. Beijing currently is seeking to shield Pakistan even from international pressure to root out transnational terrorist groups that operate from its territory.

The Indian ASAT demonstration holds strategic implications also for Pakistan, which values nuclear weapons as an antidote to its conventional military inferiority and thus maintains a nuclear first-use doctrine against stronger India. By shielding it from retaliation, Pakistan's nuclear weapons enable its nurturing of armed jihadists as a force multiplier in its low-intensity proxy war by terror against India.

An ASAT capability, by potentially arming India with the means to shoot down incoming missiles, could erode Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. After all, an ASAT capability serves as a building block of a ballistic missile defense system.

However, China remains at the center of Indian security concerns. Without developing ASAT weaponry to help underpin deterrence, India risked encouraging China to go after Indian space-based assets early in a conflict.

In today's world, one side can impose its demands not necessarily by employing force but by building capabilities that can mount a coercive threat.

China's ASAT capabilities arguably hold the greatest significance for India, which has no security arrangements with another power and thus is on its own. Japan, South Korea and Australia, by contrast, are ensconced under the U.S. security umbrella. The U.S. and Russia, armed to their teeth, can cripple China's space-based assets if it dared to strike any of their satellites.

### Sino-India War

#### No India-China war

Rashme Sehgal and Ramamurti Rajaraman 18, he’s being interviewed, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, "'India-Pakistan nuke war not a realistic possibilty', says leading nuclear expert Ramamurti Rajaraman", Firstpost, https://www.firstpost.com/india/india-pakistan-nuke-war-not-a-realistic-possibilty-says-leading-nuclear-expert-ramamurti-rajaraman-3880145.html

The Chinese do make border incursions periodically and are generally aggressive towards India in a lot of ways. We have also had a war with them in 1962. There are reports that some of their intermediate range missiles are pointed towards India. Despite all this, I don’t think that there is any real danger of a nuclear threat from China, as things stand now. It is unlikely that China would attempt anything remotely like that. After all, we also have nuclear weapons and are improving our ability to deliver them on to China. They are unlikely to go beyond constant pinpricks to a regular war, let alone one involving nuclear weapons.

#### Studies prove – both sides will de-escalate

Max Fisher 14, Foreign Affairs Correspondent – Washington Post, M.A. in Security Studies – Johns Hopkins University, Former International Editor – The Atlantic, “The study that shows why China and India probably won’t clash over border dispute”, The Washington Post, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/05/03/the-study-that-shows-why-china-and-india-probably-wont-clash-over-a-border-dispute/

Either way, we can probably breathe easy on this one, and not just because neither China nor India would be served by a conflict. China, despite its sometimes-bellicose rhetoric and its otherwise deep interest in territorial integrity, has actually shown remarkable flexibility in resolving border disputes, according to a fascinating 2005 study by the scholar M. Taylor Fravel. Fravel, who published his research in the journal International Security, found that China has "frequently used cooperative means to manage its territorial conflicts, revealing a pattern of behavior far more complex than many portray. Since 1949, China has settled seventeen of its twenty-three territorial disputes. Moreover, it has offered substantial compromises in most of these settlements, usually receiving less than 50 percent of the contested land." China has not used its power advantages to bargain hard over contested land, especially with its weaker neighbors. Nor has it become less willing to offer concessions over disputed territory as its power has increased. Instead, China compromised in eight disputes as its power grew rapidly in the 1990s. For constructivists, the legacy of “unequal treaties” that ceded land to foreign powers in the 19th century and the central role of national unification in modern Chinese history suggest that conflicts over territory should be highly salient for China’s leaders and basically nonnegotiable. In its many compromises, however, China has accepted the general boundaries that these treaties created, except in the cases of Hong Kong and Macao. Fravel also found that "China offered many concessions despite clear incentives that its simultaneous involvement in multiple conflicts created to signal toughness and resolve, not conciliation." In other words, just because China might have wanted to project a tough image – something still true today with its island disputes in the Pacific – did not actually make it any more assertive in individual disputes. And he notes that China actually proposed a plan in 1960 to resolve Aksai Chin with India by divvying it up, along with another territory. The proposal "failed spectacularly," but the point is that China was interested in seeking a peaceful, negotiated agreement. Though China's island disputes have been in the news a lot lately, Fravel points out that these have been contested for decades and that China has not made new territorial claims even as the nation has grown in power. This is surprising because you might expect that a stronger China would become more aggressive in pushing for new or disputed territory, it would do so. But it hasn't, suggesting China is a "status quo" rather than a "revisionist" power, meaning it's happy with the current state of territorial affairs, those islands aside. All of which should **calm** any **fears** that a border dispute between India and China could devolve into something worse. Fravel's study concluded that China is more likely to compromise territorial disputes when it's worried about internal stability, and that doesn't seem to be the case right now. That suggests that the latest Aksai Chin dispute isn't likely to achieve a full resolution just yet, even if it also isn't going to lead to a conflict. Here's Fravel: Regime insecurity best explains China’s pattern of cooperation and delay in its territorial disputes. China’s leaders have compromised when faced with internal threats to regime security—the revolt in Tibet, the instability following the Great Leap Forward, the legitimacy crisis after the Tiananmen upheaval, and separatist violence in Xinjiang. The timing of compromise efforts, official documents, and statements by China’s leaders demonstrate that internal threats, not external ones, account for why and when China pursued cooperation.

#### No Sino-India war -- conventional and nuclear deterrence check

Richards 15 (Commodore Katherine, Marine Engineer Officer who has served in the Royal Australian Navy for 26 Years, February, China-India: An analysis of the Himalayan territorial dispute, The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, <http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Richards%20final%20IPSD%20paper.pdf>)

However, Fravel counters this view and states that China has been ‘less belligerent than leading¶ theories of international relations might have predicted for a state with its characteristics’,¶ further noting that:¶ For scholars of offensive realism, China has rarely exploited its military superiority either to¶ bargain hard territory that it claims or to seize it through force. China has likewise not become¶ increasingly aggressive in managing its territorial disputes as its relative military and economic¶ power has grown since 1990.199¶ Moreover, Jonathan Holslag surmises that the overall strategy of both nations is to maintain the¶ balance of power in the border area and that this balance is ‘nourished’ by small-scale incursions¶ and the build-up of military infrastructure.200 He further argues that both sides are not looking¶ for military supremacy along the border, although ‘they are seeking … to develop the capability to¶ react flexibly on a wide range of challenges’.201 For China, such challenges include combating¶ Tibetan separatism, while for India, Pakistan continues to be a constant source of irritation.¶ On balance, ‘an all-out conflict, although possible, appears improbable because it could spiral into¶ nuclear war and would upset the prevailing harmonious development model adopted by both¶ sides’.202 Hence a combination of conventional and nuclear deterrence serves to keep hostilities¶ in check. Furthermore, as China and India are both ‘vulnerable to potential acts of hostility’, a¶ ‘multi-level soft deterrence’ is now a feature of the relationship.203 In the border dispute, China’s¶ key vulnerability is Tibet and India’s is Pakistan, which makes the potential cost of conflict¶ extremely high for both nations.¶ Thus India’s and China’s military modernisations have created a ‘stronger security¶ interdependence’, suggesting the current security dilemma ‘will not bring peace, but it will lead¶ to a precarious form of stability as the costs of war rise significantly on both sides of the¶ Himalayas’.204 In effect, the military power of both nations will assist in perpetuating the¶ stalemate, wherein the dispute will continue to fester, albeit within bounds.¶ In many ways, the Sino-Indian border dispute highlights the limitations of military power. Yet¶ today, China and India are also bound by ‘the challenge of piloting a third of the world’s¶ population into the global economy’.205 So what does this great economic endeavor mean for¶ their relationship and, more specifically, for the prospects of resolution of the dispute? The next¶ part of this paper examines the role of economic forces and whether or not these forces could aid¶ in breaking the deadlock.

### US China War

#### The US would respond to an attack on the homeland or allies with a devastating counterforce attack that would crush China

David J. Lonsdale 19 {David Lonsdale is the Director of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of Hull, UK. 5/17/2019. “The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: A return to nuclear warfighting?” https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/01495933.2019.1573074}//JM

The important question is: what objectives would the U.S. pursue within a nuclear conflict, and how would they be achieved? It appears that the primary objectives sought would be damage limitation (an important component of warfighting) and the reestablishment of deterrence. This fits with the preliminary qualifying statement to this section of the review, in which it is stated that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons in compliance with the law of armed conflict.86 Indeed, the NPR is at pains to note that nuclear forces would only be used for defensive purposes. One assumes that this rules out counter-value targeting (deliberate attacks against enemy population centers). This leaves counterforce operations as the only option. Strikes against enemy nuclear forces and their command and control, in conjunction with active ballistic missile defenses (BMD), would help ensure damage limitation for the U.S. and its allies.87 A focus on counterforce options is reminiscent of later Cold War strategy, when the U.S. increasingly procured weapon systems with increased accuracy and penetrative capability designed for warfighting. Indeed, Lieber and Press argue that increases in accuracy and remote sensing have enhanced the potency of counterforce options, to the point that low-casualty counterforce options are possible for the first time.88 One can reasonably assume, although it is not explicitly noted in the review, that the restoration of deterrence would be achieved through a combination of intra-war deterrence by denial (as noted above in relation to counter-escalation strategies) and punishment for coercive purposes. Inclusion of the latter is premised on references to “unacceptable consequences” resulting from nuclear attack elsewhere in the NPR. 89 However, in the face of no counter-value targeting, it is reasonable to question how these costs would be inflicted. There are three possible answers, although none of them is discussed in the NPR. First, it may be that the enemy values highly their nuclear forces; so that the loss of them would inflict unacceptable costs. Alternatively, there may be an unwritten assumption that counterforce strikes would inevitably produce “bonus” counter-value damage. Much of the nuclear force infrastructure (including command and control, airbases, etc.) is within or near population centers. Thus, even a limited counterforce strike is likely to have a significant detrimental effect on counter-value targets. This assumption, however, is somewhat thrown into question by the stated desire to procure accurate limited-yield weapons and to operate within the norms of the war convention. Low-yield accurate weapons would be ideal for counterforce missions and would minimize damage to counter-value target sets. Thus, bonus damage is likely to be limited. Finally, although again not explicitly noted in the NPR, perhaps there is a return to the notion of attacking targets associated with political control. Yet again, though, concerns over collateral damage would likely restrict a campaign aimed at the means of political control. We are, thus, left with many questions concerning how the coercive effects of nuclear weapons would be administered. This is problematic, for as Thomas C. Schelling eloquently noted, “The power to hurt can be counted among the most impressive attributes of military force.” 90 It has to be concluded that the uncertainties in this area of strategy reflect either a paradox or incomplete strategic thinking in the NPR. Clarity on these matters would be welcome, especially as it would enhance deterrence credibility still further. Although countervailing is back on the agenda in the 2018 NPR, there is no mention of prevailing in a nuclear conflict. Indeed, the review quotes Defense Secretary Mattis, echoing the early thoughts of Brodie, that nuclear war can never be won, and thus must never be fought.91 This is both curious and disappointing from a warfighting perspective, and speaks to the need for the further development of strategic thinking in U.S. nuclear strategy under Trump. Damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence are perfectly admirable goals within the context of nuclear conflict. However, if the U.S. is to achieve its objectives in a post-deterrence environment, it must have a comprehensive theory of victory. Damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence are limited negative objectives. They do not provide a positive driving force for the use of nuclear weapons. To reiterate, victory refers to a policy objective that must be achieved in the face of the enemy. And, as Clausewitz reminds us, the will of the enemy must be broken by destroying his ability to resist, or putting him in such a position as his defeat is inevitable.92 If we consider the conditions under which U.S. nuclear weapons could be used, as stipulated by the 2018 NPR, then we can assume that an enemy power (likely Russia, China, North Korea, or a state-sponsored terror group) has launched a substantial attack on either the U.S. or one of its allies. We can think in terms of a Russian assault on the Baltic States, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or perhaps a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Alternatively, the U.S. may have been subjected to a substantial strategic attack, involving either weapons of mass destruction (including biological or chemical) or a crippling cyberattack. In any of these scenarios, more expansive objectives would be required. As Lieber and Press note, “In some cases, wars may be triggered by events that compel U.S. leaders to pursue decisive victory, conquest, and/or regime change.” 93 Thus, in order to achieve its objectives, the U.S. would variously need to: punish an aggressor to reinstate deterrence; defeat enemy forces for damage limitation or to reclaim lost territory; and, in the North Korean case, presumably overthrow a communist regime. In some of these cases, damage limitation and the reestablishment of deterrence would not be enough. Enemy forces would have to be defeated, removed, destroyed, or coerced (to withdraw from allied territory). Any operations in pursuit of these goals would need a theory of victory built on a detailed understanding of the use of nuclear weapons in the service of military objectives; i.e., nuclear warfighting. This could include defeating enemy nuclear forces for force protection of U.S. and allied conventional forces. Alternatively, U.S. nuclear forces may be required to defeat regionally superior enemy conventional forces. And yet, as previously noted, the NPR rules out a return to nuclear warfighting. This is a significant disjuncture in U.S. nuclear strategy. It is even more curious when one considers the range of modern forces the Trump administration seeks to acquire under the 2018 NPR.

#### wipes out China’s offensive capabilities and second-strike – but waiting makes it survivable AND lets them strike first

--it’s gotta happen now, if it happens during wartime they’ll have deployed TELs (transporter erector launcher)

Caitlin Talmadge 17, professor of political science and international affairs @ George Washington University, International Security, “Would China Go Nuclear?” 41(4), Project Muse

Despite the scope of the U.S. campaign just described, it is not obvious that China would immediately come to fear the impending destruction of its nuclear arsenal. For one thing, the conventional war would not afford the United States significant counterforce advantages over China beyond what the United States already enjoys in peacetime. U.S. satellites and nuclear weapons would do the bulk of the heavy lifting in a true counterforce scenario and would not suddenly become more effective because of a conventional war against China.93 If anything, a first strike against China would probably be easier for the United States in peacetime, when China had not dispersed its TELs as it would during a crisis or war. This situation notably differs from that of the late Cold War. In that era, the Soviets had real reason to fear that a conventional war could have served as the cloak behind which the United States would gain military advantages in executing a nuclear counterforce strike.94 For example, NATO's offensive efforts to gain sea control in a conventional war also would have given NATO a leg up in destroying the Soviet SSBN force before it could reach the locations where it would most threaten the United States. Similarly, NATO conventional [End Page 79] air operations would have involved electronic and kinetic attacks on Soviet ground-based early warning radars, which were critical to the Soviet ability to detect the initial stages of a nuclear attack, especially if that attack began with low-flying bombers or cruise missiles launched from the Soviet periphery. Such degradation would have nullified any Soviet hope of launching on warning, rendering the country's silo-based nuclear forces highly vulnerable. It also could have hampered Soviet nuclear command and control more generally. As a result, the Soviets might have escalated out of a fear that the conventional war was delivering distinct and irreversible counterforce advantages to the United States, and in the belief that going first could limit damage or rapidly halt the components of the conventional campaign that posed the greatest nuclear threats, or both.95 Yet militating against this escalatory danger was the very high baseline survivability of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, which through its sheer size might have provided some insurance against escalatory pressures on Soviet leaders. Today's situation with respect to China is distinct. China does not appear to rely on its SSBN force or on early warning in the same ways the Soviets did, so the implications of conventional attacks that might impinge on those assets may be more benign. China also has virtually no ability to limit damage by going first. Furthermore, China's arsenal is smaller and inherently more vulnerable to counterforce even in peacetime, especially given improved U.S. capabilities since the Cold War. As a result, a conventional war with the United States would not alter the nuclear balance to nearly the degree that was possible in the Cold War case. Indeed, many analysts note that China already recognizes the vulnerability of its sea-based deterrent forces.96 Some go so far as to describe China's Jin-class program as "puzzling" given the platforms' lack of survivability, and note that China seems much more focused on "modernizing and hiding its land-based missiles" as the main bulwark against nuclear attack.97 It is possible, for example, that China's efforts to develop SSBNs are rooted in bureaucratic or domestic political motives rather than in a belief that these platforms [End Page 80] functionally enhance China's nuclear deterrent. If that is true, then China's loss of its SSBNs might not be as threatening, because Chinese leaders may have already calculated their requirements for deterrence on the assumption that they will not be able to rely on SLBMs. If this logic is correct, then the real question is how secure China's leaders assess their land-based nuclear forces to be (see map 3). Here, too, China might remain relatively insulated from nuclear escalatory pressures. For example, even if the United States destroyed all of China's DF-21 missiles, both nuclear and conventional, within range of Taiwan, China would retain other land-based nuclear missiles. These would include other DF-21 launch brigades hundreds of miles farther inland, attached to Base 56 deep in China's interior.98 Although currently positioned to deter India and Russia, these mobile missiles could relocate to areas from which they could threaten U.S. bases or forces in Asia. Under the Taiwan scenario, China also would retain its approximately twenty silo-based, liquid-fueled DF-5A or DF-5B ICBMs, the latter of which the Pentagon now reports as carrying multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles.99 Although vulnerable to counterforce attacks given their immobility and the need for fueling prior to launch, the DF-5A certainly would not be mistaken for a DF-21. Furthermore, the DF-5As have known, fixed locations that the United States could avoid (even though some of these may be decoy silos). As mentioned, China does station two brigades of DF-5A missiles near Base 55, which likely would be involved in a Taiwan campaign. The other DF-5As are attached to Base 54, however, which is farther from Taiwan and also appears to support exclusively nuclear brigades.100 As a result, the United States and China likely could keep this latter base and its related elements fairly clear of the conventional fight. China also likely would retain its single brigade of the older, road-mobile, liquid-fueled DF-4 ICBMs, comprising about ten warheads and believed to be based in caves.101 Most importantly, China's DF-31 and DF-31A missiles—the road-mobile, intercontinental backbone of the country's nuclear deterrent—appear to be spread across a variety of locations, only some of which might be physically touched by the conventional fight. Open sources suggest that China probably [End Page 81] has about eight DF-31 TELs and about the same number of warheads, with a range of about 7,000 kilometers. Estimates of the DF-31A suggest about twenty-five TELs and the same number of warheads, with a range of about 11,000 kilometers.102 The two DF-31 missile brigades appear to be attached to Base 54 and possibly Base 53, while the three DF-31A brigades are likely attached to Bases 51, 55, and 56.103 Two features of this deployment pattern stand out. First, none of these ICBM brigades are attached to Base 52, which is the base with the greatest conventional missile capability and closest proximity to Taiwan. This suggests that the most intense and aggressive U.S. conventional operations are unlikely to pose a direct physical threat to China's core ICBM force. Second, the mobile ICBM brigades are distributed across China's other operational missile bases in a notable effort at dispersion that should afford varying degrees of insulation from conventional warfare.104 This use of strategic depth to improve survivability is a long-standing theme in China's nuclear strategy.105 Some of these bases and associated brigades, such as the DF-31A brigade attached to Base 55, could still be affected by the conventional fight because of the bases' conventional missiles (whose areas of operation might overlap with those of the nuclear brigades) and the bases' and base elements' general proximity to Taiwan. This is also true to a lesser degree of the DF-31 brigade possibly attached to Base 53 in southern China. These bases are farther from Taiwan but also oversee conventional capabilities that could become relevant in a conventional conflict. Even under those circumstances, however, China would still retain another DF-31 brigade attached to Base 54, which is located well inland and whose capabilities appear to be entirely nuclear and are therefore unlikely to be involved in a Taiwan scenario. In addition, China still would have a final DF-31A brigade attached to Base 56, located hundreds of miles away in western China. This brigade could be especially reassuring given that the longer range of the DF-31A as compared to the DF-31 would enable the brigade to hold more U.S. targets at risk. In general, these deployment patterns suggest that China should have reasonable confidence in the survivability of at least some of its mobile nuclear ICBM brigades even in the event of a conventional war over Taiwan. [End Page 82] In addition to the physical separation of some of these bases and nuclear launch brigades from the likely locus of conventional conflict, the PLARF's central warhead storage base is located deep inside China in the Qinling mountain range.106 It is virtually inconceivable that the United States could somehow inadvertently threaten or destroy Base 22 while conducting the conventional campaign described earlier; it would be challenging even to do so deliberately. Although it is at least plausible that in the course of a war over Taiwan the United States might attack conventional targets well inside eastern China, such as elements attached to Bases 52 or 55, U.S. forces would have to travel hundreds of miles still farther into the Chinese interior before reaching Base 22. The physical separation of many of China's nuclear launch brigades from areas likely to see conventional conflict with Taiwan also reduces the possibility that U.S. attacks on Chinese conventional C4ISR would eliminate China's nuclear retaliatory capacity. For example, even if the United States attacked bases or base elements closer to Taiwan, possibly destroying some nuclear-relevant C4ISR in the process, it is highly unlikely that these attacks would prevent China from launching nuclear weapons from brigades attached to bases located elsewhere. Furthermore, China likely has built significant redundancies into its command and control arrangements for nuclear weapons, including by building back-up command and control capability into the extensive, virtually impenetrable complex at Base 22.107 This development is far more important for nuclear stability than whether nuclear and conventional systems are interlinked. Even if interlinkages exist, redundancies could mean that conventional fighting would not necessarily create sudden, catastrophic escala-tory nuclear pressures. This is not to say that Chinese nuclear command and control [C2] is invulnerable. Command and control posed significant challenges for the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, and China appears to recognize it as a serious concern today.108 For example, Charles Glaser and Steve Fetter conclude that although developing truly survivable nuclear C2 is probably within China's reach, China has not yet achieved it.109 Crucially, however, their analysis assesses the survivability of China's nuclear C2 in a nuclear war, not a [End Page 83] conventional war. The question motivating their analysis is whether the United States can achieve or should pursue a damage-limitation capability against China—that is, the ability to preemptively destroy as much of China's nuclear arsenal as possible in a scenario where the United States anticipates a looming Chinese nuclear first strike. Such a scenario presupposes a dedicated effort to systematically destroy China's nuclear-relevant C2, including through the use of U.S. nuclear weapons. Glaser and Fetter are optimistic that China will eventually obtain survivable C2 even though the bar for survivability under the conditions they examine is dramatically higher than it would be in a conventional war of the type analyzed here.

#### Accuracy improvements solve their objections

Lieber and Press 17 – Keir, Professor @ Georgetown, Daryl, Professor @ Dartmouth, “The New Era of Counterforce,” International Security 41(4), Project Muse

Figure 1 illustrates one consequence of the accuracy revolution, as applied to nuclear forces, by comparing the effectiveness of U.S. ballistic missiles in 1985 to those in the current U.S. arsenal.30 We use formulas, employed by nuclear analysts for decades, to estimate the effectiveness of missile strikes against a typical hardened silo.31 The figure distinguishes three potential outcomes of a missile strike: hit, miss, and fail. "Hit" means that the warhead detonates within the lethal radius (LR) of the aimpoint, thus destroying the target. "Miss" means that the warhead detonates outside the LR, leaving the target undamaged. "Fail" means that some element of the attacking missile system malfunctioned, leaving the target undamaged. [End Page 20] Figure 1 shows that the accuracy improvements of the past three decades have led to substantial leaps in counterforce capabilities. In 1985 a U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) had only about a 54 percent chance of destroying a missile silo hardened to withstand 3,000 pounds per square inch (psi) overpressure. In 2017 that figure exceeds 74 percent. The improvement in submarine-launched weapons is starker: from 9 percent to 80 percent (using the larger-yield W88 warhead). Figure 1 also suggests, however, that despite vast improvements in missile accuracy, the weapons still are not effective enough to be employed individually against hardened targets. Even modern ballistic missiles are expected to miss or fail 20–30 percent of the time. The simple solution to that problem, striking each target multiple times, has never been a feasible option because of the problem of fratricide: the danger that incoming weapons might destroy or deflect each other.32 The accuracy revolution, however, also offers a solution to the fratricide problem, opening the door to assigning multiple warheads against a single target, and thus paving the way to disarming counterforce strikes. One type of fratricide occurs when the prompt effects of nuclear detonations—radiation, heat, and overpressure—destroy or deflect nearby warheads. To protect those warheads, targeters must separate the incoming weapons by at least 3–5 seconds.33 A second source of fratricide is harder to overcome. Destroying hard targets typically requires low-altitude detonations (so-called ground bursts), which vaporize material on the ground. When the debris begins to cool, 6–8 seconds after the detonation, it solidifies and forms a dust cloud that envelops the target. Even small dust particles can be lethal to incoming warheads speeding through the cloud to the target. Particles in the debris cloud take approximately 20 minutes to settle back to ground.34 For decades, these two sources of fratricide, acting together, posed a major [End Page 21] problem for nuclear planners.35 Multiple warheads could be aimed at a single target if they were separated by at least 3–5 seconds (to avoid interfering with each other); yet, all inbound warheads had to arrive within 6–8 seconds of the first (before the dust cloud formed). As a result, assigning more than two weapons to each target would produce only marginal gains: if the first one resulted in a miss, the target would likely be shielded when the third or fourth warhead arrived.36 Improvements in accuracy, however, have greatly mitigated the problem of fratricide. As figure 1 shows, the proportion of misses—the main culprit of fratricide—compared to hits is fading. To be clear, some weapons will still fail; that is, they will be prevented from destroying their targets because of malfunctioning missile boosters, faulty guidance systems, or defective warheads. Those kinds of failures, however, do not generally cause fratricide, because the warheads do not detonate near the target. Only those that miss—that is, those that travel to the target area and detonate outside the LR—will create a dust cloud that shields the target from other incoming weapons. In short, leaps in accuracy are essentially reducing the set of three outcomes (hit, fail, or miss) to just two: hit or fail. The "miss" category, the key cause of fratricide, has virtually disappeared.37

### IndoPak War

#### No Indo-Pak war – history proves de-escalation

* History proves:
* Kargil war ended without escalation
* Terror attacks in ’01 and ’02 didn’t cause war
* Pakistan military doesn’t want war, neither does Modi
* Both leaders understand MAD – speeches prove
* Current moves are theatrics and unlikely to escalate

Ganguly 3/5/19 [Sumit Ganguly is Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington. Why the India-Pakistan Crisis Isn’t Likely to Turn Nuclear. March 5, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-03-05/why-india-pakistan-crisis-isnt-likely-turn-nuclear]

Worried analysts now fear that, since India and Pakistan have breached the informal norm against using air power across the border, they will be unable to prevent further escalation. Hawkish publics in both countries are calling for retaliation. Can the politicians exercise restraint?

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

No one can say for sure, but history suggests that there is cause for optimism. During the Kargil War, India worked to contain the fighting to the regions around Pakistan’s original incursions and the war concluded with no real threat of nuclear escalation.

Less than two years later, the two countries plunged into crisis once again. In December 2001, five terrorists from the Pakistan-based groups Lashkar-e-Tabia and Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked the parliament building in New Delhi with AK-47s, grenades, and homemade bombs, killing eight security guards and a gardener. In response, India launched a mass military mobilization designed to induce Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups. As Indian troops deployed to the border, terrorists from Pakistan struck again. In May 2002, three men killed 34 people in the residential area of an Indian army camp in Kaluchak, in Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions spiked. India seemed poised to unleash a military assault on Pakistan. Several embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad withdrew their nonessential personnel and issued travel advisories. The standoff lasted for several months, but dissipated when it became apparent that India lacked viable military options and that the long mobilization was taking a toll on the Indian military’s men and materiel. The United States also helped ease tensions by urging both sides to start talking. India claimed victory, but it was a Pyrrhic one, as Pakistan failed to sever its ties with a range of terrorist organizations.

Other nuclear states have also clashed without resorting to nuclear weapons. In 1969, China, then an incipient nuclear weapons state, and the Soviet Union, a full-fledged nuclear power, came to blows over islands in the Ussuri River, which runs along the border between the two countries. Several hundred Chinese and Soviet soldiers died in the confrontation. Making matters worse, Chinese leader Mao Zedong had a tendency to run risks and dismissed the significance of nuclear weapons, reportedly telling Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that even if half of mankind died in a nuclear war, the other half would survive and imperialism would have been razed to the ground. Yet despite Mao’s views, the crisis ended without going nuclear, thanks in part to the efforts of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, who took the first step by travelling to Beijing for talks.

There’s reason to believe that the current situation is similar. Pakistan’s overweening military establishment undoubtedly harbors an extreme view of India and determines Pakistan’s policy toward its neighbor. The military, however, is not irrational. In India, although Prime Minister Narendra Modi has a jingoistic disposition, he, too, understands the risks of escalation, and he has a firm grip on the Indian military.

Another source of optimism comes from what political scientists call the “nuclear revolution,” the idea that the invention of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the nature of war. Many strategists argue that nuclear weapons’ destructive power is so great that states understand the awful consequences that would result from using them—and avoid doing so at all costs. Indian and Pakistani strategists are no different from their counterparts elsewhere. Even Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, a political neophyte, underscored the dangers of nuclear weapons in his speech addressing the crisis last week. And Modi, for all his chauvinism, has scrupulously avoided referring to India’s nuclear capabilities.

The decision by India and Pakistan to allow their jets to cross the border represents a major break with the past. Yet so far both countries have taken only limited action. Their principal aim, it appears, is what the political scientist Murray Edelman once referred to as “dramaturgy”—theatrical gestures designed to please domestic audiences. Now that both sides have gone through the motions, neither is likely to escalate any further. Peering into the nuclear abyss concentrates the mind remarkably.

#### Current tensions are routine and de-escalating- newest ev

Roblin, 20 -- university instructor for the Peace Corps in China

[Sébastien, "It's Only A Matter Of Time Before The Next India-Pakistan Nuclear Crisis," National Interest, 4-16-20, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/its-only-matter-time-next-india-pakistan-nuclear-crisis-144697, accessed 4-18-20]

Indian and Pakistani ground forces are also exchanging tank and artillery fire across the LOC, injuring and killing civilians and soldiers on both sides. Sadly, such artillery duels have been routine for decades.

Aerial skirmishes might easily have continued. Instead, on February 28 Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan announced he would release Wing Commander Vathraman as a gesture of goodwill. This conciliatory move was carried out the following day, and will hopefully bring an end to the current cycle of escalation.

#### No Indo-Pak War

* Leaders know risks and deescalate
* US, Soviet Union, China, Britain, France are historical examples of deescalating dyads
* South Asia doesn’t fight large scale wars anymore
* Impact is too large so neither side even considers starting war

Shellenberger 2/21/19 [Michael Shellenberger, Time Magazine “Hero of the Environment,” Green Book Award Winner, and President of Environmental Progress, a research and policy organization. His writings have appeared in The New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, Scientific American, Nature Energy, and PLOS Biology. His TED talks have been viewed over 1.5 million times. Stop Letting Your Cartoon Fears Of Nuclear Bombs Kill The Planet. Februrary 21, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/gradsoflife/2019/03/04/to-end-the-ever-growing-skills-gap-employers-must-change-their-outdated-hiring-practices/#7fa29a8f2d16]

But then political leaders in India and Pakistan considered the likely impacts of nuclear war and frightened each other into peace, just as the US, Soviet Union, China, Britain, and France had done before them.

Vox’s Dylan Matthews asked India-Pakistan expert, Sumit Ganguly, a professor of political science at University of Indiana, what the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation on the region was.

“In South Asia,” Ganguly said, “it has, for all practical purposes, done away with the prospect of full scale war. It's just not going to happen. The risks are so great as a consequence of the nuclearization of the subcontinent that neither side can seriously contemplate starting a war.”

#### Space wars don’t cause escalation

James Pavur 19, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science at Oxford University and Ivan Martinovic, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.), <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>

A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### No space war miscalc

Bragg et al, July 2018 - \*Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI’s Chief Analytics Officer (CAO) and Executive Vice President, PhD in IR @ NYU \*\*Dr. Robert Elder, PhD @ Emory, BA @ Clemson, Assistant prof of History @ Baylor \*\*\*Dr. Belinda Bragg, principle research scientist at NSI, Inc. Lecturer in polisci @ Texas A&M.;“Contested Space Operations, Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting: Summary Findings and Integration Report,” NSI, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Space-SMA-Integration-Report-Space-FINAL.pdf

Everyone needs space

While the US may be relatively more dependent on space for national security than are other states, it is far from alone in relying on space. Nuclear armed states are dependent on space for important command and control functions, and major powers are increasingly using space for battlefield situational awareness and communications. China and Russia were identified as having significant (and fairly equal) levels of strategic risk in space (ViTTa Q16), although their regional security priorities and (to date) less spacedependent economies place them at an advantage to the US. They may, therefore, see the strategic risk of conflict is space as lower than does the US. Still, space capabilities remain a source of economic expansion and national pride for both, and their calculations of the cost of conflict involving space may include consideration of these factors. Even now, there is a general consensus that the US and other actors have more to gain from space than they have from the loss of space-based capabilities (ViTTa Q3). This suggests that, although the US is more vulnerable in the space domain than are other states, the likelihood that aggressive action against an adversary’s space assets would be reciprocated may provide a degree of security. It also creates another incentive for actors to use diplomacy and international law to reduce risk and increase transparency in the space domain.

#### No one’s going to war over a downed satellite

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.