## 1

**Heidegger’s critique of technology and instrumental reason are inextricable from his personal anti-Semitism.**

**Wolin, 17**—Distinguished Professor of History, Political Science, and Comparative Literature at the CUNY Graduate Center (Richard, “On Heidegger's Antisemitism: The Peter Trawny Affair,” Antisemitism Studies

Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 2017), pp. 245-279, dml)

Trawny’s hesitations and equivocations notwithstanding, with the publication of GA 97 (Anmerkungen I-V of The Black Notebooks), we finally have **first-hand knowledge** of Heidegger’s views on the Holocaust. As one might expect, those views are characterized by **repression** and **denial**: wholesale mauvaise foi. Heidegger characterizes the Holocaust as an act of judische Selbstvernichtung (Jewish self-annihilation)—which is merely his way of claiming, meretriciously and perversely, that Auschwitz was a fate that the Jews ultimately **brought upon themselves**.

His reasoning? Relying on a **time-honored antisemitic prejudice**, Heidegger alleges that, historically, the Jews have been the main carriers of “**instrumental reason**” or Machenschaft, whose predominance has led, inexorably, to the “uprooting of all beings from Being.” As he declaims in Überlegungen XII–XV: “The question of the role of world Jewry is not a racial question but a metaphysical one—a question about what sort of human being can take up the uprooting of all beings from Being as a world-historical task.”41 Hence, as victims of industrialized mass murder at Auschwitz and the other Vernichtungslager, “world Jewry” merely succumbed to a fate that it had itself initiated.

By remaining attentive to this rather transparent attempt at “blaming the victim,” we stand to learn a **valuable lesson** about the **obfuscatory character** of Heidegger’s critique of technology—a paradigm for which, paradoxically, he has often been **lauded**. Thus, according to the framework of the “history of Being,” the reason that National Socialism failed had **nothing** to do with the **intrinsically murderous** and **imperious** nature of the Nazi project. Instead, in the end, Nazism failed because it succumbed to forces and tendencies that were **beyond its control**. Above all, its aspirations to historical “greatness” were **undermined by nefarious** “Western” and “**Jewish**” **influences**—influences that abetted the **technological manipulation** of Being in its totality, as Heidegger adverted on many occasions. According to this schema, National Socialism’s shortcomings were entirely the fault of the West. Consequently, in Heidegger’s view, ultimately, National Socialism’s “**inner truth** and **greatness**” remained **unsullied**.

**Heidegger’s philosophical project is intrinsically anti-Semitic—the search for “worlding” requires poisonous hostility towards “rootless”, liberal subjects.**

Gregory **FRIED**, Professor of Philosophy at Suffolk University, **14** [“What Heidegger was hiding: unearthing the philosopher's anti-semitism,” *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2014, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

It is hard to exaggerate just how ambitious Heidegger was in publishing his breakout work, Being and Time, in 1927. In that book, he sought nothing less than a redefinition of what it meant to be human, which amounted to declaring war on the entire philosophical tradition that preceded him. Western thought, Heidegger argued, had taken a wrong turn beginning with Plato, who had located the meaning of being in the timeless, unchanging realm of ideas. In Plato's view, the world as humans knew it was like a cave; its human inhabitants could perceive only the shadows of true ideals that lay beyond. Plato was thus responsible for liberalism in the broadest sense: the notion that transcendent, eternal norms gave meaning to the mutable realm of human affairs. Today, modern liberals call those rules universal values, natural laws, or human rights.

But for Heidegger, there was no transcendence and no Platonic God--no escape, in effect, from the cave. Meaning lay not in serving abstract ideals but in confronting one's place within the cave itself: in how individuals and peoples inhabited their finite existence through time. Heidegger's conception of human being **required** belonging to a specific, shared historical context or national identity. Platonic universalism undermined such collective forms of contingent, historical identity. In the eyes of a transcendent God or natural law, all people--whether Germans, Russians, or Jews--were essentially the same. As Heidegger put it in a 1933 lecture at Freiburg: "If one interprets [Plato's] ideas as representations and thoughts that contain a value, a norm, a law, a rule, such that ideas then become conceived of as norms, then the one subject to these norms is the human being--not the historical human being, but rather the human being in general."

It was against this **rootless, "general"** conception of humanity, Heidegger told his students, that "we must struggle."

By "we," Heidegger meant Germany under Hitler's National Socialist regime, which he hoped would play a central role in such an effort. Heidegger followed in a long line of German intellectuals, going as far back as the eighteenth century, who believed that the country was destined to play a transformative role in human history--a kind of modern rejoinder to the creative glory of ancient Greece. For Heidegger, this meant **replacing** the old, Platonic order with one grounded in his vision of historical being. In the early 1930s, he came to see Hitler's National Socialist movement, with its emphasis on German identity, as the best chance of bringing about such a revolutionary change. And in the Jews, he saw a **shared enemy**.

FOLLOWING PROTOCOL

As Trawny's title suggests, both Hitler's and Heidegger's view of the Jews grew out of a particular form of German anti-Semitism that was rampant after World War I. This strain of thinking, which saw Jews as part of a monolithic, transnational conspiracy, was crystallized in "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion," a forged document that first appeared in Russia in 1903 and made its way to Germany in 1920. Originally published by Russian monarchists to scapegoat the Jews for the tsar's military defeats and the subsequent upheaval, the protocols purported to be minutes from a series of meetings held by Jewish leaders bent on world domination. According to the alleged transcript, the plotters sought to manipulate international finance, culture, and media; promote extreme ideas and radical political movements; and foment war to destabilize existing powers. Hitler devoured the tract, which he swiftly employed as Nazi propaganda. It hit a nerve in Germany, still traumatized by World War I, beset by economic chaos, and subject to extreme political instability--all of which could now be attributed to the Jews.

Trawny does not argue that Heidegger read the protocols or agreed with all their contentions. Rather, he suggests that like so many other Germans, Heidegger accepted their basic premise, which Hitler hammered home in his speeches and in Nazi propaganda. As evidence, Trawny cites the German philosopher and Heidegger colleague Karl Jaspers, who recalled in his memoir a conversation he had with Heidegger in 1933. When Jaspers brought up "the vicious nonsense about the Elders of Zion," Heidegger reportedly expressed his genuine concern: "But there is a dangerous international alliance of the Jews," he replied.

Yet Hitler and Heidegger embraced anti-Semitic conspiracy theories for different reasons. Whereas the former argued that the Jews posed a racial threat (a fear for which the protocols offered evidence), the latter saw them as a philosophical one. The Jews, as uprooted nomads serving a transcendent God--albeit sometimes through their secular activities--**embodied** the very tradition that Heidegger wanted to overturn. Moreover, as Trawny points out, Heidegger found race deeply problematic. He did not dismiss the concept altogether; if understood as a biological feature of a particular people, race might well inform that people's historical trajectory. But he rejected using race as the primary determinant of identity. For Heidegger, racism was itself a function of misguided metaphysical thinking, because it presumed a biological, rather than historical, interpretation of what it meant to be human. By "fastening" people into "equally divided arrangement," he wrote in the notebooks, racism went "hand in hand with a self-alienation of peoples--the loss of history." Instead of obsessing over racial distinctions, Germans needed to confront their identity as an ongoing philosophical question. Heidegger overtly criticized the Nazis for their fixation on biological identity, but he also lambasted the Jews for the same sin. "The Jews," he wrote in the notebooks, "have already been 'living' for the longest time according to the principle of race."

Heidegger's anti-Semitism differed from that of the typical Nazi in other important ways. To many of Hitler's supporters, for example, the protocols reinforced the view that the Jews were essentially un-German, incapable of properly integrating with Germany's way of life or even understanding its spirit. But Heidegger took this notion further, arguing that the Jews belonged **truly nowhere**. "For a Slavic people, the nature of our German space would definitely be revealed differently from the way it is revealed to us," Heidegger told his students in a 1934 seminar. "To Semitic nomads, it will perhaps never be revealed at all." Moreover, Heidegger said, history had shown that "nomads have also often left wastelands behind them where they found fruitful and cultivated land." By this logic, the Jews were rootless; lacking a proper home, all they had was allegiance to one another.

Another anxiety reflected in the protocols and in Hitler's propaganda concerned the perceived power of this stateless, conspiratorial Jewry--be it in banking, finance, or academia. But for Heidegger, the success of Europe's Jews was a symptom of a broader philosophical problem. Playing on the tired cliche of Jews as clever with abstractions and calculation, the notebooks make a more general critique of modern society: "The temporary increase in the power of Jewry has its basis in the fact that the metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development, served as the hub for the spread of an otherwise empty rationality and calculative skill, which in this way **lodged itself in the 'spirit.'**"

In forgetting what it meant to be finite and historical, in other words, the West had become obsessed with mastering and controlling beings--a tendency Heidegger called "machination," or the will to dominate nature in all its forms, ranging from raw materials to human beings themselves. And with their **"calculative skill,"** the Jews had thrived in this distorted "spirit" of the modern age.

At the same time, the Jews were not, in Heidegger's view, merely passive beneficiaries of Western society's "empty rationality" and liberal ideology; they were active proponents of them. "The role of world Jewry," Heidegger wrote in the notebooks, was a "**metaphysical question** about the kind of humanity that, without any restraints, can take over the uprooting of all beings from Being as its world-historical 'task.'" Even if the Jews could not be blamed for the introduction of Platonism or for its hold over Western society, they were the chief carriers of its "task." By asserting liberal rights to demand inclusion in such nations as Germany, the Jews were estranging those countries' citizens from their humanity--the shared historical identity that made them distinct from other peoples. This reasoning formed the **basis for a truly poisonous hostility** toward the Jews, and it was perhaps Heidegger's most damning judgment of them. Now that the notebooks have come into the light, however, such passages constitute the most damning evidence against the philosopher himself.

So what did Heidegger think should be done about the Jews? Did he agree with the Nazi policies? The notebooks give readers little to go on; Heidegger seems to have had no taste for detailed policy discussions. Nevertheless, the philosopher spoke through his silence. Despite his criticism of the Nazis and their crude biological racism, he wrote nothing against Hitler's laws targeting the Jews. Although Heidegger resigned as rector of Freiburg before Hitler passed the Nuremberg Laws, which classified German citizens according to race, he had assumed the role in 1933, just after the Nazis enacted their first anti-Jewish codes, which excluded Jews from civil service and university posts (and which Heidegger helped implement). During a lecture in the winter of 1933-34, he warned a hall full of students that "the enemy can have attached itself to the innermost roots" of the people and that they, the German students, must be prepared to attack such an enemy "with the goal of total annihilation." Heidegger did not specify "the enemy," but for the Nazis, they included Germany's communists; its Roma, or Gypsies; and, above all, its Jews. This chilling **prefiguration of Hitler's Final Solution is unmistakable**, and Heidegger never explained, let alone apologized for, such horrendous statements.

#### Yes they link- their authors cite source Heidegger, and use his thoughts of technology and the world being-their research is intrinsically tied to antisemitism

#### Vote them down

#### [1] Reversibility: once oppressive rhetoric is used it cannot be taken back – you cannot sever out of your reps, the same way someone who says the n-word must be held accountable.

#### [2] Norm setting: we are part of a larger debate community with extensive norms – letting bad discourse be rampant kills the community and recreates forms of oppression – the K holds students accountable.

**[3] Competition: debate is an educational competition with no place for offensive rhetoric – that kills access to the lasting benefit debate provides and encourages students to quit.**

## 2

#### Xi is tightening control over the PLA but completing goals are critical.

Krishnan 21 – Ananth, 11/18/21, [‘Xi tightened control over the PLA’, TheHindu, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/xi-tightened-control-over-the-pla/article37549460.ece>] Justin

The new resolution on history passed last week by China’s ruling Communist Party has said that President Xi Jinping had tightened control over the military to address the party’s “obviously lacking” leadership of the armed forces under his predecessors.

The full text of the resolution, released on Tuesday evening, listed some of the actions taken by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under Mr. Xi, who is also the chairman of the Central Military Commission. These included what the document described as “major operations related to border defence”.

No specifics

It did not specify what those major operations were. China has unresolved land borders with India and Bhutan. In April 2020, the PLA mobilised two divisions and carried out multiple transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, sparking the worst crisis along the border in many years. Talks to resolve the tensions are still on-going.

“The armed forces have remained committed to carrying out military struggles in a flexible manner to counter military provocations by external forces, and they have created a strong deterrent against separatist activities seeking ‘Taiwan independence,’” the resolution said.

“They have conducted major operations related to border defence, protecting China’s maritime rights, countering terrorism and maintaining stability, disaster rescue and relief, fighting COVID-19, peacekeeping and escort services, humanitarian assistance, and international military cooperation.”

Last week’s resolution on history was only third such document putting forth the official view on party history, following resolutions passed by Mao Zedong in 1945 and Deng Xiaoping in 1981.

The new resolution dealt more with the future than the past. It essentially reaffirmed the official view on history, saying that the “basic points and conclusions” of past resolutions “remain valid to this day.”

It repeated the conclusion reached in 1981 on Mao’s errors noting that “mistakes were made” and that “Mao Zedong’s theoretical and practical errors concerning class struggle in a socialist society became increasingly serious” leading to the disasters of the Cultural Revolution.

Criticism of predecessors

Much of the new resolution focuses on emphasising Mr. Xi’s leadership and calling for the party to support his “core” status. It only briefly mentioned Mr. Xi’s predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and implicitly critcised some aspects of their leadership including on military matters.

“For a period of time, the party’s leadership over the military was obviously lacking,” it noted. “If this problem had not been completely solved, it would not only have diminished the military’s combat capacity, but also undermined the key political principle that the party commands the gun.”

The document said Mr. Xi’s leadership had tightened supervision on the military including boosting “troop training and battle preparedness”, and it repeated China’s stated goals of completing the modernisation of its armed forces by 2035 and building a “world class” military by 2050, which observers see as meaning on par with the U.S.

‘Working vigorously’

“To build strong people’s armed forces, it is of paramount importance to uphold the fundamental principle and system of absolute party leadership over the military, to ensure that supreme leadership and command authority rest with the party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC), and to fully enforce the system of the CMC chairman assuming overall responsibility,” the resolution said, adding that “setting their sights on this problem, the Central Committee and the CMC have worked vigorously to govern the military with strict discipline in every respect.”

#### The commercial space sector is one of the PLAs central goals – the plan is a 180.

Bartholomew & Cleveland 19 – Carolyn and Robin, 4/25/19, Chairmen and Vice Chairmen. Section is written from Michael A. McDevitt, US Congressperson, [“HEARING ON CHINA IN SPACE: A STRATEGIC COMPETITION?,” <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/April%2025%2C%202019%20Hearing%20Transcript%20%282%29.pdf>] Justin

As the Chairman said, China is determined to become a leading space power, which requires continuing to boost its innovation capabilities, both in its civilian and military sectors. The People’s Liberation Army is closely involved in most if not every aspect of China’s space program, from helping formulate and execute national space goals to overseeing China’s human spaceflight program. Coverage of China’s space program must treat seriously the implications of the reality that in many cases the boundaries between the military and civil silos of China’s program are thin, if they exist at all.

Our second panel today will address the application of what China calls its “military-civil fusion” strategy to its space sector. Military-civil fusion, a strategic concept designed to harness civilian sector innovation to power China’s military and technological modernization with the goal of leapfrogging the United States and becoming a technological powerhouse. Space has been designated as an especially important sector for military-civil fusion, and the impacts of this campaign on China’s burgeoning commercial space sector—itself a recipient of generous government support and protection—will be crucial as Chinese companies increasingly seek to compete in the international marketplace. Military-civil fusion is especially worthy of attention due to its continued reliance on technology transfer, by hook or by crook, to fuel China’s industrial and military growth.

Our third and final panel today will examine China’s military space and counterspace activities. Since its direct-ascent kinetic antisatellite test in 2007, which was responsible for a large amount of all space debris currently in Earth’s orbit, China has continued to invest in a variety of offensive antisatellite capabilities. Indeed, China’s counterspace arsenal contains many options: earlier this month, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan said China “has exercised and continues to develop” jamming capabilities; is deploying directed-energy counterspace weapons; has deployed an operational ground-based antisatellite missile system; and is prepared to use cyberattacks against U.S. space systems.

#### That triggers backlash – they don’t support restrictions on the space sector and will do everything to convince leaders not to do the plan.

Cheng 14 [Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow in the Asia Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, Former Senior Analyst at the China Studies Division of the Center for Naval Analyses, Former Senior Analyst with Science Applications International Corporation, “Prospects for U.S.-China Space Cooperation”, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 4/9/2014, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/prospects-us-china-space-cooperation]

At the same time, space is now a sector that enjoys significant political support within the Chinese political system. Based on their writings, the PLA is clearly intent upon developing the ability to establish “space dominance,” in order to fight and win “local wars under informationized conditions.”[8] The two SOEs are seen as key parts of the larger military-industrial complex, providing the opportunities to expose a large workforce to such areas as systems engineering and systems integration. It is no accident that China’s commercial airliner development effort tapped the top leadership of China’s aerospace corporations for managerial and design talent.[9] From a bureaucratic perspective, this is a powerful lobby, intent on preserving its interests. China’s space efforts should therefore be seen as political, as much as military or economic, statements, directed at both domestic and foreign audiences. Insofar as the PRC has scored major achievements in space, these reflect positively on both China’s growing power and respect (internationally) and the CCP’s legitimacy (internally). Efforts at inducing Chinese cooperation in space, then, are likely to be viewed in terms of whether they promote one or both objectives. As China has progressed to the point of being the world’s second-largest economy (in gross domestic product terms), it becomes less clear as to why China would necessarily want to cooperate with other countries on anything other than its own terms. Prospects for Cooperation Within this context, then, the prospects for meaningful cooperation with the PRC in the area of space would seem to be extremely limited. China’s past experience of major high-technology cooperative ventures (Sino–Soviet cooperation in the 1950s, U.S.–China cooperation in the 1980s until Tiananmen, and Sino–European space cooperation on the Galileo satellite program) is an unhappy one, at best. The failure of the joint Russian–Chinese Phobos–Grunt mission is likely seen in Beijing as further evidence that a “go-it-alone” approach is preferable. Nor is it clear that, bureaucratically, there is significant interest from key players such as the PLA or the military industrial complex in expanding cooperation.[10] Moreover, as long as China’s economy continues to expand, and the top political leadership values space efforts, there is little prospect of a reduction in space expenditures—making international cooperation far less urgent for the PRC than most other spacefaring states. [FOOTNOTE] [10]It is worth noting here that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not a part of the CCP Politburo, a key power center in China. Thus, the voice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is muted, at best, in any internal debate on policy. [END FOOTNOTE] If there is likely to be limited enthusiasm for cooperation in Chinese circles, there should also be skepticism in American ones. China’s space program is arguably one of the most opaque in the world. Even such basic data as China’s annual space expenditures is lacking—with little prospect of Beijing being forthcoming. As important, China’s decision-making processes are little understood, especially in the context of space. Seven years after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, exactly which organizations were party to that decision, and why it was undertaken, remains unclear. Consequently, any effort at cooperation would raise questions about the identity of the partners and ultimate beneficiaries—with a real likelihood that the PLA would be one of them.

#### An unhinged PLA triggers Himalayan war – goes global

Chellaney 17 [Dr. Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy, PhD in International Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, “Why the Chinese Military’s Rising Clout Troubles Xi Jinping”, The National, 9/9/2017, https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/why-the-chinese-military-s-rising-clout-troubles-xi-jinping-1.626815?videoId=5754807360001]

China’s president Xi Jinping has stepped up his domestic political moves in the run-up to the critical 19th national congress of the Chinese Communist Party next month, but he is still struggling to keep the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in line. China’s political system makes it hard to get a clear picture, yet Mr Xi’s actions underscore the troublesome civil-military relations in the country. Take the recent standoff with India that raised the spectre of a Himalayan war, with China threatening reprisals if New Delhi did not unconditionally withdraw its forces from a small Bhutanese plateau, which Beijing claims is Chinese territory. After 10 weeks, the face-off on the Doklam Plateau ended with both sides pulling back troops and equipment from the site on the same day, signalling that Beijing, not New Delhi, had blinked. The mutual-withdrawal deal was struck just after Mr Xi replaced the chief of the PLA’s joint staff department. This key position, equivalent to the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, was created only last year as part of Mr Xi’s military reforms to turn the PLA into a force “able to fight and win wars”. The Doklam pullback suggests that the removed chief, Gen Fang Fenghui, who has since been detained for alleged corruption, was an obstacle to clinching a deal with India. To be sure, this was not the first time that the PLA’s belligerent actions in the Himalayas imposed diplomatic costs on China. A classic case happened when Mr Xi reached India on a state visit in September 2014. He arrived on Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s birthday with a strange gift for his host, a predawn Chinese military encroachment deep into India’s northern region of Ladakh. The encroachment, the worst in many years in terms of the number of intruding troops, overshadowed Mr Xi’s visit. It appeared bizarre that the military of an important power would seek to mar the visit of its own head of state to a key neighbouring country. Yet Chinese premier Li Keqiang’s earlier visit to New Delhi in 2013 was similarly preceded by a PLA incursion into another part of Ladakh that lasted three weeks. Such provocations might suggest that they are intentional, with the Chinese government in the know, thus reflecting a preference for blending soft and hard tactics. But it is also possible that these actions underscore the continuing “disconnect between the military and the civilian leadership” in China that then US defence secretary Robert Gates warned about in 2011. During his 2014 India trip, Mr Xi appeared embarrassed by the accompanying PLA encroachment and assured Mr Modi that he would sort it out upon his return. Soon after he returned, the Chinese defence ministry quoted Mr Xi as telling a closed-door meeting with PLA commanders that “all PLA forces should follow the president’s instructions” and that the military must display “absolute loyalty and firm faith in the party”. Recently Xi conveyed that same message yet again when he addressed a parade marking the 90th anniversary of the PLA’s creation on August 1, 1927. Donning military fatigues, Mr Xi exhorted members of his 2.3-million-strong armed forces to “unswervingly follow the absolute leadership of the party.” Had civilian control of the PLA been working well, would Mr Xi repeatedly be demanding “absolute loyalty” from the military or asking it to “follow his instructions”? China does not have a national army; rather the party has an army. So the PLA has traditionally sworn fealty to the party, not the nation. Under Mr Xi’s two immediate predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, the PLA gradually became stronger at the expense of the party. The military’s rising clout has troubled Mr Xi because it hampers his larger ambition. As part of his effort to reassert party control over the military, Mr Xi has used his anti-corruption campaign to ensnare a number of top PLA officers. He has also cut the size of the ground force and established a new command-and-control structure. But just as a dog’s tail cannot be straightened, asserting full civil control over a politically ascendant PLA is proving unachievable. After all, the party depends on the PLA to ensure domestic order and sustain its own political monopoly. The regime’s legitimacy increasingly relies on an appeal to nationalism. But the PLA, with its soaring budgets and expanding role to safeguard China’s overseas interests, sees itself as the ultimate arbiter of nationalism. To make matters worse, Mr Xi has made many enemies at home in his effort to concentrate power in himself, including through corruption purges. It is not known whether the PLA’s upper echelon respects him to the extent to be fully guided by his instructions. In the past decade, the PLA’s increasing clout has led China to stake out a more muscular role. This includes resurrecting territorial and maritime disputes, asserting new sovereignty claims, and using construction activity to change the status quo. China’s cut-throat internal politics and troubled civil-military relations clearly have a bearing on its external policy. The risks of China’s rise as a praetorian state are real and carry major implications for international security.

#### Extinction.

Caldicott 17 – Helen, 2017, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility [“The new nuclear danger: George W. Bush's military-industrial complex,” The New Press]//Elmer

The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reac­tion. **Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy, could respond** in kind. China, India's hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear [war] ~~holocaust~~ on the subcontinent. If any of either **Russia** or **America**'s 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either **accidentally** or **purposefully** in response, **nuclear winter** would ensue, meaning the **end of most life on earth**.

## Case

### Presumption

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1] Systems- the 1AC says institutions create social realities that replicate violence but in-round discourse does nothing to alter conditions. All you do is encourage teams to write better framework blocks.

#### 2] Spillover- they are missing an internal link as to why they need the ballot or why the reading of the aff forwards change. Empirically denied – judges vote on heidigger all the time and nothing happens.

#### 3] Competition- debate is the wrong forum for change and competition moots any ethical value of the aff. Winning rounds just makes it seem like you want to win and a loss is internalized as a technical mistake.

### Framing

#### Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Objectivity- body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### Mathematical equations confirm our impacts outweigh.

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### It's the only static category – even if life is bad now.

Tännsjö 11 (Torbjörn, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” <http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf>) //BS 1-27-2018

\*\*Bracketed to avoid triggers

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all [die] commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not [die] commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I [die] kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

**Their sweeping criticism is useless for confronting the practical dangers of technology—their detached attitude creates the worst forms of calculation. Our focus on solving specific environmental harms avoids these turns.**

Aidan **DAVISON**, Geography and Environmental Studies @ Tasmania, **‘1** [*Technology and the Contested Meanings of Sustainability*, p. 132-136]

Heidegger says that the question that can free us from technology is this: How must we think? To ask What shall we do? is, apparently, to be prey to instrumentalism. It is to seek solutions, rather than to understand ever more deeply our plight and the saving power that grows within it. According to Hubert Dreyfus, an influential interpreter of Heidcgger and one who defends much that I find disturbing in Heidegger’s account, the supreme danger Heidegger describes is one beyond all practical concerns. But, because "Heidegger has not always been clear about what distinguishes his approach from a romantic reaction to the domination of narure,' and because his approach confounds our instrumentalist epistemology,, Dreyfus contends that "we are tempted to translate it into conventional platitudes. Thus. Heidegger ontological concerns are mistakenly assimilated to ecologically minded worries about the devastation of nature Dreyfus emphatically rebukes those who would get caught up in everyday problems: Heidegger’s concern is the human distress caused by the technological under­standing of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific technologies. Consequently, he distinguishes the current problem caused by technology­--ecological destruction, nuclear danger, consumerism, and so on‑-from the destruction that would result should technology solve all of our problems.' What I find **unacceptable** here is the **absolute disjunction** Dreyfus identifies in Heidegger's account **between our ontological distress** in adopting a technological understanding of being and our **embodied distress at the degradation of our eco­logical and social relationships**. By defining our distress at the destruction of nature as "worry" and further labelling this worry a "conventional platitude:' we see clearly the lurking danger of intellectual elitism within the philosopher's elevated gaze on the essential issues, The line between opposing our calculative orientation to thinking and disregarding Dreyfus's conclusion that concerns about the devastation of nature verge on platitudinous is drawn all too easily from **within the comfort of secure professorial life amidst technological affluence**. Just as the ancient Greek thinkers were insulated (sum practical everyday matters by the **normalized tyranny of slavery**, so too are many modern thinkers insulated from **the submerged tyranny** perpetrated **through** modern technosystems' Take. for instance, Drevfus’ assessment of *the* role of technology in contemporary Japanese life: "The television set and the household gods share the same shelf‑the styro­foam cup coexists with the porcelain teacup. We thus see that the Japanese, at least, can enjoy technology without taking over the technological understand­ing of being"" In a more recent paper, he takes this point further. I cannot accept this proposition. Technological ontology is so rapidly becoming ubiquitous in most societies precisely because of modern technol­ogy's surface of plurality adaptability and cultural flexibility. We live in the midst of the hyper real illusion of having gained television sets while not having lost our gods as, all the while, our world is em more flattened towards the one‑dimension of technological cornmodification. No doubt many Japanese visitors to Caucasian technological society arc as impressed by exotic medieval cathedrals Looming alongside the gleaming arches of McDonalds, as was Dreyfus amidst the exotic a of Japanese living rooms. Yet behind these surfaces, the tech­nosystems of hegemonic oppression thrive. In turning on their light switches to better see their altar to divinity and TV Japanese citizens activate, as surely as do those of France, the technosystems of nuclear energy. The shelf itself is likely, as it is in Australia, to be an unacknowledged memorial to the ancient rainforests of Borneo. In eating their traditional sushi, this culture now stimu­lates the technosysterns of drift‑netting. chemical‑intensive aquaculture, and genetic engineering‑ In importing rice, they encourage cash crops rather than self‑sufficiency in Africa. In prudently saving to purchase a new Buddhist statue, they contribute, through their gigantic banks, to the technosysterns of finance that power global capitalism. In the face of the neo‑Heideggerian **appeal to higher concerns**, I think it important to emphasize that the destruction of nature is for **vast numbers of people not an abstract worry but an immediate and direct threat to livelihoods**. Cultural practices and routinely to human and nonhuman life itself The sug­gestion that deep thinking lies in the turn away from the technological world toward the study of ancient Creek philosophy or meditation on eighteenth­century poetry seems pretentious and politically fraught. We are cautioned by Heidegger not to rush headlong into action aimed at solving an evident but. he assures us, nonetheless inessential problem such as the destruction of a river valley through the construction of a hydroelectric dam. Heidegger insists that in our urgent hurry we will miss the real threat, which is not to the valley or even its displaced human residents, but to the pos­sibilities for human thinking itself. Yet there can be no doubt that **our decision to sit quietly meditating on our breath or poetry involves many difficult practi­cal choices. To sit still** *in the* midst of the restlessness of the technological world is as much‑indeed, is more‑ deliberate action than rushing out the door brandishing a placard. Simply sitting and reading Hcidcger implies a host of practical judgments. To put aside books on integrated business management and be bothered with Heideggers ontological questions at all runs counter to the self‑assuredness and instrumentalism of the latemodern world. And remain­ing open to these questions, if we choose to be so bothered, is difficult amid the burly burly of technological life?r Contrary to Dreyfus. I consider that "ecological destruction, inextricably **ontological and corporeal**.The literature of radical ecophilosophy attests to this being so. My concern about the accumulation of carcino­genic *pesticides* and heavy metals in the tissues of my children is at once a concern with the technological diminishment of human pocsibilities and a concern with the practical task of living in more sane, more careful ways. Certainly my preoccupation with the well‑being of my children could be nar­rowly construed as a mere instrumentalizing concern with the survival of my genes Similarly ambivalent are alternatives to harmful, unsustainable practices offered via the ecomodernist drive for ecoefficiency. If I can afford them. I can choose from alternatives such as genetically engineered pest resistance, the sub­stitution of timber in my house, and of lead in petrol and paints, by more sophisticated synthetic products of industrial laboratories. However, history has shown the propensity of such solutions to create new sets of problems, for which new *sets* of technological solutions are soon required. This is, after all, the dynamic of technological profligacy that *defines* modernity There is thus much weight to Dreyfus' argument that to attempt to solve our problems in this way is to move another step further clown the path to fully technologized forms of life that obliterate the possibility of our encountering our relational selfhood. But where does this leave us as we negotiate the ambiguities of daily life? If I choose to reduce toxicity in my family's diet by the collection of rain water, by turning my backyard and local public land over to organic forms of food production, by adopting simple passive design methods to reduce the risk of termite damage, by cycling to avoid the combustion of fuel, or by bartering for the vegetable‑based paints made by a neighbor, am I necessarily falling prey to a death‑defying desire for control? Conversely, are philosophers who spend **long hours** meditating on Hólderlin or the *term in* their everyday practices, thereby released from the oppressive ontological grasp of technology! I think not.

GENUINE PRACTICE AND OUR INNER AND REAL CORE

The problematic distinction that Dreyfus makes between our primary **ontological distress and its** secondary material symptoms derives, in my view, from the distinction that Heidegger drew, after the war, between our essential nature, our “inner and real core' and our everyday latemodern lives: We can use technical devices, and yet with proper use keep ounelves free of them, so that e can let go of them any time. We can use technical devices as they ought to be used, and also let them alone as something which does not affect our inner and real core. We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confine, and lay ware our nature." This remarkable passage from his 1955 Memorial Address effectively draws Heidegger's explanation of technology full circle. Beginning with his critique of instrumentalism, through his description of technological ontology and the destining of being, this passage returns us to the instrumentalist promise of technology in the form of the comportment of releasetnent and openness. Of course, Heidegger would present this movement as a spiralling upwards towards the heights of essential questioning. And I do not seek to deny that there is considerable merit in seeing reflection as a spiral movement that returns in to places t have not been before. Nonetheless, his argument is that by adopting our place as artful and meditative dwellers, technologies become instruments once again: we can set them aside at any point This is nothing less than a restate­ment of the instrumentalist assertion that although technologies define the material form of our lives. Our minds are free to define the moral and ontolog­ical form of our lives. In asserting that, provided we preserve our core, the receptiveness of our thinking., we can live in the world of technology yet stay always beyond it, Heidegger elides the simple fact that modem technosystems are designed precisely so that we cannot put them aside at any point. Just how do we "let go at any time" of the technosystems of money? Just how do academics refuse to let computers dominate and lay waste the practices of educa‑tion now that students born in the computer age are unable to conceive sentences without keyboards and university bureaucrats have restructured campus life along digital lines in an effort to maximize the production of competitive educational product?

### Tech good – impact turns their entire aff

#### 1] COVID – allows sustainability.

Patrick Schröder et al 20, Senior research fellow in the Energy, Environment and Resources department at Chatham House. With: Paul Dewick, Honorary Research Fellow at the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research in Alliance Manchester Business School; Maurie J. Cohen, Director Program in Science, Technology, and Society New Jersey Institute of Technology University Heights Newark; Joseph Sarkis, teaches operations and environmental management in the Graduate School of Management at at Clark University, “A brave new world: Lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic for transitioning to sustainable supply and production,” NIH, 4/17/2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7164912/, kyujin recut Justin

3. Sustainable supply and production in response to the COVID-19 pandemic Mandates imposed by governments and other responses to the COVID-19 pandemic provide some initial indications of longer-term actions on the part of policy makers, business managers, and others interested in sustainable supply and production as well as the prospects of sustainability transitions more generally. We initially discuss several behavioral changes that have been implemented such as sheltering in place, social distancing, and reductions in work-related travel in terms of both commuting and other forms of transportation. We also identify issues related to supply chains, social innovations, and technology resulting from the coronavirus outbreak. 3.1. Behavioral changes Current practices due to the COVID-19 pandemic such as sheltering in place and social distancing have profound implications. Public health directives have discouraged large groups from congregating and self-quarantines have been recommended to help “flatten the curve.” Workplaces have implemented new practices that reinforce this need for isolation and separation and some job tasks are being performed on a distributed—often at home–basis. At the same time, we have been seeing in recent weeks the emergence of opportunities for people to build new skills and to shift away from energy-intensive forms of transportation and to instead adopt telecommuting, virtual meetings, and online education. In the United States, on a typical (pre-COVID-19) workday over 200 million people commuted to work and thus released millions of metric tons of nitrous oxides, carbon dioxide, and particulate matter. If a modest number, let us say ten percent, find these new alternatives preferable from a cost and convenience perspective over the longer term, especially individuals who are new to this mode of work, the likely environmental benefits would be quite substantial. Such practices are likely to become more common over time as users develop higher levels of comfort with the relevant technologies and the communications platforms themselves become more proficient in simulating face-to-face interactions. As we write this perspective article, Zoom is ranked as the number one and number two videoconferencing app in the United States and UK, respectively. Service providers are learning a great deal about the operational features of their systems as they are put under stress due to the increasing traffic generated by simultaneous users. As quality and ease of use improves, we are apt to see less physical travel – especially by airplane – after teleconferencing becomes further normalized. Another crisis-motivated shift is likely to be modification in the number of working hours per week. Prior research has demonstrated that there may be advantages from fewer work days in terms of reduced demand for commuting and increased productivity (Knight et al., 2013; Kallis, 2013). However, the net benefit of these changes will ultimately be determined by how additional non-work time is allocated and whether new forms of recreational travel are induced by the change. General public gatherings may be less appealing in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Societal concern and sensitivity to airborne contagions are likely to persist into the indefinite future and this is especially likely to be the case with respect to public venues that encourage close interpersonal interactions involving sizeable groups. For instance, large-scale entertainment and sports activities will probably be less agreeable places for people to congregate. There is apt to be a steep decline in public forms of assembly as erstwhile attendees of such events eschew mass consumption activities and the travel associated with them. During the current public health emergency, various consumer goods are not as easily available as was previously the case. At the present time, indications are that most people have sufficient supplies of food and other essential products to survive, but demand at food banks is rapidly rising due to increasingly dire financial circumstances. Shortages appear to be the result of supply-chain inefficiencies and disruptions. Thus far, the indications are that individuals – similar to the Great Depression or during major wars of the last century – are learning to live simply and to adapt themselves to extended periods of quarantine. 3.2. Localization We can expect that the COVID-19 pandemic will prompt business managers and policy makers to re-examine prevailing globalized systems of production based on complex value chains and the international shipment of billions of components and likely prompt establishment of new relationships and supply configurations. The coronavirus outbreak exposes the vulnerability of overreliance on just-in-time (JIT) and lean delivery systems. Separate from current travails, there has been a long-running debate about whether JIT systems – which can be efficient in terms of resources and waste – are also environmentally sound (Baumer-Cardoso et al, 2020). We will likely see in their place implementation of smarter logistics systems, including reverse logistics for secondary materials and waste products and enabled by Internet-of-Things (IoT) technologies. For example, knowing the location of electronics and appliances and their components through such means makes local sourcing easier. Furthermore, replacement of extensive transportation of processed goods over long distances with intermediate storage, depots, and material reserves is prone to gain renewed attention as inventory-buffering strategies. In response to the need to build local resilience, supply and production systems (as well as associated consumption systems) will likely in the future need to become more localized. Trends toward “glocalization”–localization of the global network and consideration of both global and local aspects jointly– can be supported through additive manufacturing technologies (3D printing) and online sharing platforms and these processes can be further enabled and amplified by embracing current calls to establish a “right to repair” which has become an increasingly prominent feature in debates on the future of European consumer law (Terryn, 2019). Such legal guidelines would mean that users would not suffer adverse legal consequences when trying to repair products by, for example, fashioning replacement parts using 3D printing technologies. This shift would help to alleviate durability problems caused by the tendency of manufacturers to design products for premature obsolesce while encouraging greater reuse, recycling, and reclamation of products and components (Slade, 2006; Hernandez et al., 2020). With broader implementation of the right to repair there can be increases in the circular economy concept (Schröder et al., 2019). A circular economy can provide localized resources from materials and products at the end of life – no matter the sources of these supplies. Knowing what kinds of second-hand resources are available and where they are stored, especially those that are locally rare, can be beneficial for planning purposes. One popular example in the United States derives from the hoarding of toilet paper during the period of social distancing and lockdowns. Toilet paper is treated in local sewer systems and water-treatment plants. What if we had a technology that could separate materials such as cellulose from other parts of the waste stream? There are microorganisms such as bacteria that can be deployed to gather cellulose for recycling purposes (Römling, 2002). Related challenges are not unknown. For instance, two decades ago, the city of Santa Clarita in California launched a diaper-recycling program. Motivated by a desire to reduce this source of solid waste, the community over a six-month period established a collection system for soiled diapers and turned the discarded materials into useful products like shoe insoles, roof shingles, and wallpaper (The Economist, 2002). Such circular economy solutions can further reinforce localization capabilities. Not only is additive manufacturing advantageous in expanding opportunities for repair, but materials from local supplies will also result (Garmulewicz et al., 2018). For instance, recovered plastics and metals can be used as feedstocks for 3D printing and these applications can provide opportunities for locally recycled materials and other byproducts derived from local waste exchanges or eco-industrial parks (Jensen, 2016; Julianelli et al., 2020; Dev et al., 2020).

Tech is inevitable – we all use it to avoid COVID, so rejection reentranches disease and leads to net MORE exclusion, but it’s good for activists to connect and create resistance to governments. Their own participation proves it’s inevitable AND their use of it for competitive merit proves their argument is a moral hazard- space tech is invetiable they don’t resolve public sectors drive foor space- nasa will still have missions- outweighs because governmetns are instruments of collective violence

#### Extinction.

---AT: Cooperation Thesis

RECNA et al. 21 [Research Center for Nuclear Weapon Abolition; Nagasaki, Japan; “Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks: The Nagasaki 75th Anniversary pandemic-nuclear nexus scenarios final report,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament; 5/28/21; <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2021.1890867>] Justin

The Challenge: Multiple Existential Threats The relationship between pandemics and war is as long as human history. Past pandemics have set the scene for wars by weakening societies, undermining resilience, and exacerbating civil and inter-state conflict. Other disease outbreaks have erupted during wars, in part due to the appalling public health and battlefield conditions resulting from war, in turn sowing the seeds for new conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, pandemics have spread with unprecedented speed due to increased mobility created by globalization, especially between urbanized areas. Although there are positive signs that scientific advances and rapid innovation can help us manage pandemics, it is likely that deadly infectious viruses will be a challenge for years to come. The COVID-19 is the most demonic pandemic threat in modern history. It has erupted at a juncture of other existential global threats, most importantly, accelerating climate change and resurgent nuclear threat-making. The most important issue, therefore, is how the coronavirus (and future pandemics) will increase or decrease the risks associated with these twin threats, climate change effects, and the next use of nuclear weapons in war.5 Today, the nine nuclear weapons arsenals not only can annihilate hundreds of cities, but also cause nuclear winter and mass starvation of a billion or more people, if not the entire human species. Concurrently, climate change is enveloping the planet with more frequent and intense storms, accelerating sea level rise, and advancing rapid ecological change, expressed in unprecedented forest fires across the world. Already stretched to a breaking point in many countries, the current pandemic may overcome resilience to the point of near or actual collapse of social, economic, and political order. In this extraordinary moment, it is timely to reflect on the existence and possible uses of weapons of mass destruction under pandemic conditions – most importantly, nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons. Moments of extreme crisis and vulnerability can prompt aggressive and counterintuitive actions that in turn may destabilize already precariously balanced threat systems, underpinned by conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of weaponized chemical and biological technologies. Consequently, the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, increases at such times, possibly sharply. The COVID-19 pandemic is clearly driving massive, rapid, and unpredictable changes that will redefine every aspect of the human condition, including WMD – just as the world wars of the first half of the 20th century led to a revolution in international affairs and entirely new ways of organizing societies, economies, and international relations, in part based on nuclear weapons and their threatened use. In a world reshaped by pandemics, nuclear weapons – as well as correlated non-nuclear WMD, nuclear alliances, “deterrence” doctrines, operational and declaratory policies, nuclear extended deterrence, organizational practices, and the **existential risks** posed by retaining these capabilities – are all up for redefinition. A pandemic has potential to destabilize a nuclear-prone conflict by incapacitating the supreme nuclear commander or commanders who have to issue nuclear strike orders, creating uncertainty as to who is in charge, how to handle nuclear mistakes (such as errors, accidents, technological failures, and entanglement with conventional operations gone awry), and opening a brief opportunity for a first strike at a time when the COVID-infected state may not be able to retaliate efficiently – or at all – due to leadership confusion. In some nuclear-laden conflicts, a state might use a pandemic as a cover for political or military provocations in the belief that the adversary is distracted and partly disabled by the pandemic, increasing the risk of war in a nuclear-prone conflict. At the same time, a pandemic may lead nuclear armed states to increase the isolation and sanctions against a nuclear adversary, making it even harder to stop the spread of the disease, in turn creating a pandemic reservoir and transmission risk back to the nuclear armed state or its allies. In principle, the common threat of the pandemic might induce nuclear-armed states to reduce the tension in a nuclear-prone conflict and thereby the risk of nuclear war. It may cause nuclear adversaries or their umbrella states to seek to resolve conflicts in a cooperative and collaborative manner by creating habits of communication, engagement, and mutual learning that come into play in the nuclear-military sphere. For example, militaries may cooperate to control pandemic transmission, including by working together against criminal-terrorist non-state actors that are trafficking people or by joining forces to ensure that a new pathogen is not developed as a bioweapon. To date, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the isolation of some nuclear-armed states and provided a textbook case of the failure of states to cooperate to overcome the pandemic. Borders have slammed shut, trade shut down, and budgets blown out, creating enormous pressure to focus on immediate domestic priorities. Foreign policies have become markedly more nationalistic. Dependence on nuclear weapons may increase as states seek to buttress a global re-spatialization6 of all dimensions of human interaction at all levels to manage pandemics. The effect of nuclear threats on leaders may make it less likely – or even impossible – to achieve the kind of concert at a global level needed to respond to and administer an effective vaccine, making it harder and even impossible to revert to pre-pandemic international relations. The result is that some states may proliferate their own nuclear weapons, further reinforcing the spiral of conflicts contained by nuclear threat, with cascading effects on the risk of nuclear war.

#### 2] Warming – globalization is good.

Sylvanus Kwaku Afesorgbor and Binyam Afewerk Demena 18. Assistant Professor, Agri-Food Trade and Policy, University of Guelph; Teaching and research fellow, International Institute of Social Studies. “Globalization may actually be better for the environment.” https://theconversation.com/globalization-may-actually-be-better-for-the-environment-95406

The increasing pace of globalization and how it affects the environment has been a major global concern. Although the research has been fraught with contrasting results, there are many who strongly believe that increased globalization has been harmful to the environment. A large number of environmentalists who support this view base their arguments on the premise that globalization leads to an increase in global demand, resulting in increased production. This indirectly contributes to the exploitation of the environment and the depletion of natural resources. Amid rising environmental concerns, an important question is whether deglobalization would have the opposite impact on the environment. Put differently, if globalization is harmful, then should we expect that the current deglobalization trend will be less harmful for the environment? It’s an important question to ask right now considering the mounting anti-globalization sentiments that have engulfed the Global North. We have not only witnessed Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, the Belgian opposition to the trade agreement between the European Union and Canada in the recent past, but more recently, we have seen anti-globalization sentiments heating up even in the United States, once the strongest architect and proponent of globalization in the world. This is resulting in uncertainty and a near stalemate for NAFTA, steel and aluminium tariff hikes and the potential trade war with China. Is globalization bad for the environment? The adverse effect of globalization on the environment is supported by what’s known as the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis. This school of thought argues that increased gains from globalization are achieved at the expense of the environment because more open economies adopt looser environmental standards. Those who support this bleak view of globalization argue it creates global competition, resulting in a boost in economic activities that deplete the environment and its natural resources. The increased economic activity leads to greater emissions of industrial pollutants and more environmental degradation. The pressure on international firms to remain competitive forces them to adopt cost-saving production techniques that can be environmentally harmful. Deglobalization may worsen emissions But in fact, deglobalization may not necessarily translate into reduced emissions of harmful gases such as CO₂, SO₂, NO₂, but could actually worsen it. Through what’s known as the technique effect, we know globalization can trigger environmentally friendly technological innovations that can be transferred from countries with strict environmental regulations to pollution havens. Globalization doesn’t just entail the movement of manufactured goods, but also the transfer of intermediate, capital goods and technologies. That means multinational corporations with clean state-of-the-art technologies can transfer their green know-how to countries with low environmental standards. It’s widely recognized that multinational firms use cleaner types of energy than local firms, and therefore have more energy-efficient production processes. Deglobalization could mean these environmentally friendly technologies aren’t passed on to countries that are trying to go green. The rise of anti-globalization forces also means less specialization in sectors in which countries have comparative advantages. This can create an inefficient allocation of resources that leads to the dissipation of scarce economic and natural resources. If every country has to produce to meet its domestic demand, in other words, it could result in duplication in production processes and therefore an increase in local emissions. Iran sanctions backfire for the environment Since some countries have weaker environmental standards than others, this could possibly worsen global emissions. A good example of this is Iran, which has been slapped with economic sanctions, making the country less integrated in the world economy. The result has been domestic production that’s wreaked immense havoc on the environment. As result of import bans of crude oil, for example, Iran started refining its own crude oil that contains 10 times the level of pollutants of the oil it used to import. Globalization has another benefit — it’s been at the forefront of creating public awareness about labour and environmental standards through the platforms of international activities such as fair trade and eco labels. The success of this environmental public awareness has resulted in consumer preferences evolving. Producers are therefore able to build their customer base by producing eco-friendly products. Without international trade, consumers would have limited choices, and could be forced to purchase only domestic goods that may have been produced under lax environmental standards.

#### Planet-scale computation is necessary.

Joppa 19, PhD, scientist in the Computational Ecology and Environmental Sciences Group (Lucas, “A Planetary Computer to Avert Environmental Disaster,” Scientific American, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-planetary-computer-to-avert-environmental-disaster/>)

If environmental reports published this year were connected to an alarm system, the sound inside the United Nation's Manhattan headquarters would be deafening—we are facing a five-alarm fire. Myriad reports warned us we must take immediate action to ensure a sustainable supply of clean food, water and air to a human population projected to rapidly grow to 10 billion, all while stemming a globally catastrophic loss of biodiversity and averting the worst economic impacts of a changing climate. The news was devastating, but not unexpected. The specificity around the short window of time to act was, however. The world's leading environmental scientists have spoken, and the message is clear: The best time to act was yesterday, so we better start today. The task is much bigger and time is way shorter than previously thought. While the science says we very likely have no more than 420 gigatons of carbon left to spend, emissions steadily continue to rise every year. Just last year, over 42 gigatons was emitted. That gives us no more than 10 years before we must begin to operate as a carbon neutral planet. Unfortunately, discussions and commitments have yet to translate into measurable change. And change we must. At stake is not only the health of our planet, but the incredible social and economic progress seen across the world for at least the past 150 years. It's not surprising that many found themselves glumly nodding in agreement to Jonathan Franzen's recent article in the New Yorker, titled "What If We Stopped Pretending?" But fatalism never solved a problem. What does is a formula that has been repeated over centuries of human society—when faced with existential challenges, we have successfully and consistently tackled major societal problems through the simple summation of hard work, progressive governance and technological innovation. This ideal is what we must embrace in the era of climate change. While people are mobilizing and governments are meeting, what is missing is the third leg of the stool. Investment in technology solutions aimed at environmental outcomes is sorely needed to accelerate the pace, scale and effectiveness of our response to climate change. The epitome of the innovation we need is best understood as a "planetary computer." A planetary computer will borrow from the approach of today's internet search engines, and extend beyond them in the form of a geospatial decision engine that supports queries about the environmental status of the planet, programmed with algorithms to optimize its health. Think of this less as a giant computer in a stark white room and more of an approach to computing that is planetary in scale and allows us to query every aspect of environmental and nature-based solutions available in real time. We currently lack the data, compute power and scalability to do so. Only when we have a massive amount of planetary data and compute at a similar scale can we begin to answer one of the most complex questions ever posed—how do we manage the earth's natural resources equitably and sustainably to ensure a prosperous and climate-stable future? The game-changing potential of this approach is clear, not only for fighting climate change but building a better future for us all. That is not just the hope of an environmental scientist with a background in computer science but borne out by research. A recent report by PwC United Kingdom found that applying AI in just a few areas could boost global GDP by 4.4 percent while lowering emissions by 4 percent. The Global Commission on Adaptation found that investment in adaptation measures would not only avoid human suffering and economic loss, it would bring benefits that outweigh the costs nearly four to one. The incredible benefits from these nature-based mitigation and adaptation solutions and AI-enabled transformations can only be realized with planetary data and computer power. That will require us to quickly take the three accelerants of the information age—ubiquity of data, advances in algorithms, and access to scalable computing infrastructure—and begin, for the first time in many instances, to apply them to our natural world. The gap in application and deployment becomes clear as we look at a few key nature-based solutions. Consider forests for carbon sequestration. We should be able to answer how many trees there are, where they are, and how fast they are appearing or disappearing. The same goes for species conservation, or healthy freshwater lakes or the rate of sea level rise in a granular sense of space and time. Right now, at best, we have very limited answers at a resolution that is far too broad geographically and for only a few points in time, and far less data for many other nature datasets. The world desperately needs better answers. We cannot create a blueprint of action to give us the world and environmental services we want and need without it. With a planetary computer using planetary data, we can ask—and answer—questions such as, What services can or should we obtain from different places on the earth? en route to a day where we can describe what we want for our future and how to get there. A planetary computer is an ambitious idea. It will require us to build a global network that connects billions, or trillions, of datapoints about our environment with the computing power and machine learning tools to process them into actionable insights that will empower decision makers in every corner of the globe to put sustainability first. And although parts of this plan may seem like science fiction, it could be a reality in the near future.

#### Double bind—either the aff can’t solve because it leaves tech like space appropriation unchallenged OR the aff spills up to challenge tech more broadly—that means it disrupts environmental management via tech and databases.

#### Extinction.

Specktor 19 [Brandon; writes about the science of everyday life for Live Science, and previously for Reader's Digest magazine, where he served as an editor for five years; "Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don't Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims," livescience, 6/4/19; <https://www.livescience.com/65633-climate-change-dooms-humans-by-2050.html>] Justin

The current climate crisis, they say, is larger and more complex than any humans have ever dealt with before. General climate models — like the one that the [United Nations' Panel on Climate Change](https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/) (IPCC) used in 2018 to predict that a global temperature increase of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2 degrees Celsius) could put hundreds of millions of people at risk — fail to account for the **sheer complexity of Earth's many interlinked geological processes**; as such, they fail to adequately predict the scale of the potential consequences. The truth, the authors wrote, is probably far worse than any models can fathom. How the world ends What might an accurate worst-case picture of the planet's climate-addled future actually look like, then? The authors provide one particularly grim scenario that begins with world governments "politely ignoring" the advice of scientists and the will of the public to decarbonize the economy (finding alternative energy sources), resulting in a global temperature increase 5.4 F (3 C) by the year 2050. At this point, the world's ice sheets vanish; brutal droughts kill many of the trees in the [Amazon rainforest](https://www.livescience.com/57266-amazon-river.html) (removing one of the world's largest carbon offsets); and the planet plunges into a feedback loop of ever-hotter, ever-deadlier conditions. "Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and **55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of** [lethal heat conditions](https://www.livescience.com/55129-how-heat-waves-kill-so-quickly.html), beyond the threshold of human survivability," the authors hypothesized. Meanwhile, droughts, floods and wildfires regularly ravage the land. Nearly **one-third of the world's land surface turns to desert**. Entire **ecosystems collapse**, beginning with the **planet's coral reefs**, the **rainforest and the Arctic ice sheets.** The world's tropics are hit hardest by these new climate extremes, destroying the region's agriculture and turning more than 1 billion people into refugees. This mass movement of refugees — coupled with [shrinking coastlines](https://www.livescience.com/51990-sea-level-rise-unknowns.html) and severe drops in food and water availability — begin to **stress the fabric of the world's largest nations**, including the United States. Armed conflicts over resources, perhaps culminating in **nuclear war, are likely**. The result, according to the new paper, is "outright chaos" and perhaps "the end of human global civilization as we know it."