## 1AC

### Framing

#### Ethics must begin a priori:

#### [A] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory.

#### [B] Empirical uncertainty – evil demon could deceive us, dreaming, simulation, and inability to know others’ experience make empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### [C] Constitutive Authority – practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary.

#### [D] Action theory – only evaluating action through reason solves since reason is key to evaluate intent, otherwise we could infinitely divide actions. For example: If I was brewing tea, I could break up that one big action into multiple small actions. Only our intention, to brew tea unifies these actions if we were never able to unify action, we could never classify certain actions as moral or immoral since those actions would be infinitely divisible.

#### Next, the relevant feature of reason is universality – any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end and demand the value of my end be recognized by others which also means universalizability acts as a side constraint on all other frameworks. It’s impossible to will a violation of freedom since deciding to do would will incompatible ends since it logically entails willing a violation of your own freedom

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. Prefer:

#### [1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify a standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

**[2] Consequences fail: [A] They only judge actions after they occur, which fails action guidance [B] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence. Probability doesn’t solve because 1) Probability is improvable, as it relies on inductive knowledge, but induction from past events can’t lead to deduction of future events and 2) Probability assumes causation, we can’t assume every act was actually the cause of tangible outcomes [C] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify action because we intend the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral or not. [D] You can’t aggregate consequences, happiness and sadness are immutable – ten headaches don’t make a migraine**

#### [3] Ethical frameworks are topicality interpretations of the word unjust so they must be theoretically justified. Prefer on resource disparities—focusing on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep excluding lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debater under my framework can easily be won without any prep since minimal evidence is required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

### Advocacy

#### Thus, the plan – Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust. Definitions and enforcement in the doc and I’ll clarify in cross.

To clarify we’ll defend implementation and a revision to the Outer Space Treaty that explicitly bans appropriation of outer space by private entities

### Offense

#### [1] Privatization is bad

#### [a] The OST allows for regions that could be under the exclusive control of corporations, while no government has authority.

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Imagine a colony on [the Moon](https://www.sciencefocus.com/tag/the-moon/) or [Mars](https://www.sciencefocus.com/space/mars-facts-figures-fun-questions-red-planet/) run by a corporation. That one company would control everything the colonists need to survive, from the water to the oxygen to the food. That’s a dangerous amount of power for any company, but it’s a very real scenario. So what stops a major corporation landing on the Moon and setting up a colony? One very old document. [The Outer Space Treaty](http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html) was signed in 1967 by all of the major space-faring nations, and explicitly states nobody can go to another planet or the Moon and claim that territory for their own. It’s a very important document, but it’s flawed. For one thing, the private space sector wasn’t around when the treaty was written so it’s not clear how some of the rules would be applied to private companies. And secondly, given the ambitions of many countries and corporations, there’s no way it’s going to last much longer. Anyone with a plan to land on the Moon or Mars and stay there is going to run into the Outer Space Treaty, and the smart money is on the wealthy and powerful winning out against an old loophole-ridden document. Politicians such as Ted Cruz in the United States have [already called for changes](https://spacenews.com/cruz-interested-in-updating-outer-space-treaty-to-support-commercial-space-activities/) to be made to the treaty, and given the increasing amounts of money private space companies spend on lobbying in the United States, more such attempts will follow. It’s imperative that the space community as a whole takes this issue on to ensure the needs of all, and not just the private sector, are taken into account should any alterations be made. The further we look into the future of humans in space, the more reality resembles science fiction. That’s why it’s difficult to make people take the issues which could potentially arise seriously. But now is the time to consider the problems that could arise from a commercially-led space race, and take the necessary small steps now to avoid potentially disastrous consequences in the future.

#### [b] That’s an instance of a unilateral will governing individuals while universal decision making is absent. This is an unjust state which violates people’s freedoms and violates the categorical imperative.

Cordelli 16 Chiara Cordelli [Chiara Cordelli is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago. Her main areas of research are social and political philosophy, with a particular focus on theories of distributive justice, political legitimacy, normative defenses of the state, and the public/private distinction in liberal theory. She is the author of The Privatized State (Princeton University Press, 2020), which was awarded the 2021 ECPR political theory prize for best first book in political theory. She is also the co-editor of, and a contributor to, Philanthropy in Democratic Societies (University of Chicago Press, 2016). -- [cordelli@uchicago.edu](mailto:cordelli@uchicago.edu)] “WHAT IS WRONG WITH PRIVATIZATION?”, University of Chicago, Political Science & the College, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/What-is-Wrong-With-Privatization\_UCB.pdf

The intrinsic wrong of privatization, I will suggest, rather consists in the creation of an institutional arrangement that, by its very constitution, denies those who are subject to it equal freedom. I understand freedom as an interpersonal relationship of reciprocal independence. To be free is not to be subordinated to another person’s unilateral will. By building on an analytical reconstruction of Kant’s Doctrine of Right, I will argue that current forms of privatization reproduce (to a different degree) within a civil condition the very same defects that Kant attributes to the state of nature, or to a pre-civil condition, thereby making a rightful condition of reciprocal independence impossible. Importantly, this is so even if private actors are publicly authorized through contract and subject to regulations, and even if they are committed to reason in accordance with the public good. The reason for this, as I will explain, derives from the fact that private agents are constitutionally incapable of acting omnilaterally, even if their actions are omnilaterally authorized by government through some delegation mechanism, e.g. a voluntary contract. Omnilateralness, I will suggest, must be understood as a function of 1) rightful judgment and 2) unity. By rightful judgment I mean the capacity to reason publicly and to make universal rules that are valid for everyone, according to a juridical ideal of right, as necessary to solve the problem of the unilateral imposition of private wills on others. By unity I mean the capacity to make rules and decisions that change the normative situation of others, as a part of a unified system of decision-making. The condition of unity is crucial, as I shall later explain, insofar as there might be multiple interpretations compatible with rightful judgment, which would still problematically leave the definition of people’s rightful entitlements indeterminate. Further, the practical realization of the juridical idea of an omnilateral will, I will contend, requires embeddedness within a shared collective practice of decision-making. In practice, rightful judgment can only obtain when certain shared background frameworks that structure practical reasoning and confer unity to that reasoning are in place. The rules of public administration and the authority structure of bureaucracy should be understood as playing this essential function of giving empirical and practical reality to the omnilateral will, as far as the execution of rules and the concrete definition of entitlements are concerned. Together, these two requirements are necessary, (whether they are also sufficient is a different question), to make an action the omnilateral action of a state, which has the moral power to change the normative situation of citizens, by fixing the content of their rights and duties in accordance with the equal freedom of all. The phenomenon of privatization thus raises the fundamental questions of why we need political institutions to begin with, and what makes an action an action of the state. Insofar as private agents make decisions that fundamentally alter the normative situation (the rights and duties) of citizens, and insofar as, by definition, private agents are not public officials embedded in that shared collective practice, their decisions, even if well intentioned and authorized through contract, cannot count as omnilateral acts of the state. They rather and necessarily remain unilateral acts of men. Hence, I will conclude, for the very same reasons that we have, following Kant, a duty to exit the state of nature so as to solve the twofold problems of the unilateral imposition of will on others and the indeterminacy of rights, we also have a duty to limit privatization and to support, on normative grounds, a case for the re-bureaucratization of certain functions. Therefore, my paper provides foundational reasons to agree with Richard Rorty’s nonfoundational defense of bureaucracy as stated in the opening epigraph, since only agents who are appropriately embedded within a bureaucratic structure, properly understood, are, in many cases, capable of acting omnilaterally. The “bosses” I am here concerned with are not primarily those who can unilaterally impose their will on us in their capacity as private employers, but rather any private actor who acts unilaterally while in the garb of the state. This essay is structured as follows. In Section I, I assess and reject what I take to be the most powerful non-instrumental arguments against privatization. In Section II, through an interpretation of Kant, I explain in what sense the state, defined as an omnilateral system of rules, is a constitutive condition of freedom, rather than merely an instrument to promote it. In Section III, through an analytical reconstruction, based on a theory of collective action, of the conditions that make a system of rules an omnilateral system of laws rather than an aggregation of unilateral acts of men, I show that privatization constitutes a regression to the state of nature, understood as a normative condition of unfreedom. I then present some reflections on the broader implications of my argument, as it posits an expansive conception of the juridical order as an appropriate object of analysis for political philosophy. Before moving to the next section, let me first clarify what I mean by privatization. In a general sense, privatization can be defined as the devolution of public responsibilities to private actors. This however entails a baseline against which the idea of public responsibilities must be specified. Here I defend a normative, rather than, as is commonly the case, a historical or economic baseline.11 I will assume that in a just society government ought to bear, on grounds of justice, the primary responsibility to secure not only a fair distribution of general resources, including income and wealth, through tax and transfers, but also an adequate provision of particular in-kind goods, including police protection, defense, criminal justice, education and healthcare.12 This does not per se entail, however, that government should provide these goods directly. Government may fund the production of in-kind goods, while delegating their provision to private actors. I thus define privatization as the implementation of public, justice-based responsibilities through private agents.

#### [2] The categorical imperative rejects states and companies desires to profit off of space for themselves.

Wurth 19Wurth, Nicolas. “SPACE ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: ADVANCEMENT AND ENFORCEABILITY.” *University of Luxembourg* , 2019. SJEP

Hans Jonas, german philosopher, studied the concept of ethics related to Kant’s “Categorical Imperative” under the angle of modern technology allowing humans to surpass their own frontiers.10 By extending the aforementioned Categorical Imperative to modern technologies, (which includes space activities) he wrote: “Act that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life. [...] Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life [...] Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth.”11 The conceptualization of ethics implies to evaluate behavior, actions and activities of space actors.12 Related to space activities, ethical behavior shall therefore be aligned with a sort of conduct that is to be followed, independently of “any natural desires.” Such an understanding does naturally challenge States’ desires to diversify their economy via the adoption of a legal framework on space activities13 or the profit-making goal of a company which has the technical ability to conduct a profitable space activity such as space-mining?

### Underview

#### [1] Permissibility and presumption affirm: [A] Negating an obligation requires proving a prohibition – they prohibit the aff action. [B] If agents had to reflect on every action they take and justify why it was a good one we would never be able to take an action because we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral ie drinking water is not morally right or wrong but if I had to justify my action every time I decided upon a course of action I would never be able to make decisions.

**[2] Aff gets 1AR theory and RVIs – otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this**

**1AR theory is drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer of the round – [A] the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance, [B] they get to go for their shell and beat back mine in the long 2NR but the 2AR is too short to do both**

#### [3] Interpretation: The negative must concede the affirmative framework

#### Violation: It’s preemptive

#### Prefer-

#### 1] Time skew- Winning the negative framework moots 6 minutes of 1AC offense and forces a 1AR restart against a 7 min 1NC – outweighs on quantifiability and reversibility – I can’t get back time lost and it’s the only way to measure abuse.

#### 2] Topic Ed- Every debate would just be a framework debate which crowds out our ability to have core debates about the topic – that outweighs- A] Time Frame- We only have 2 months to debate the topic B] Inclusion- Phil and K literature is incredibly dense and requires a vast amount of prior knowledge and experience which excludes novices while topic literature is less esoteric

#### 3] Prep skew- We can’t predict every single negative framework before round but they know the aff coming into round which makes pre-tournament prep impossible. Especially true since there are millions of K’s and NC’s that could negate. Prep skew outweighs A] Sequencing- It’s a perquisite engaging in-round since you need prep to debate B] Engagement- It ruins the quality and depth of discussions that make debate rounds educational.

Fairness is a voter- intrinsic to the debate; education- terminal impact to debate; DTD and CI- deter futue abuse, and sets the best norms and rzn is arbtrary and invites judge intervention; no rvi- means 7 minute dump on something they chose

### Advantage

#### The advantage is debris:

#### Massive satellite development incoming and cascades debris – lack of regulations raises the risk and turns any reason satellites are good.

Hattenbach 19. Jan Hattenbach sat down with Stijn Lemmens, Senior Space Debris Mitigation Analyst at the European Space Agency (ESA) in Darmstadt, Germany, to talk about how Starlink plays into the space junk problem. 6/3/19. [Sky Telescope, “DOES STARLINK POSE A SPACE DEBRIS THREAT? AN EXPERT ANSWERS,” <https://skyandtelescope.org/astronomy-news/starlink-space-debris/>] Justin

Jan Hattenbach: The recent launch of the first 60 “Starlink” satellites has sparked outrage on social media. Some critics claim the “mega-constellation” of satellites by the U.S. company SpaceX will increase the risk of creating more space junk, even calling it a threat to space flight itself. What is your opinion — is this criticism justified or exaggerated?

Web around the worldWhen up and running Starlink will provide internet access to locations across the planet. SpaceX

Stijn Lemmens: We're talking about a constellation that — if it ever comes to full fruition — would include up to 12,000 members. Several nations have launched almost 9,000 satellites over the past six decades. Of these, about 5,000 are still in orbit. So we are talking about doubling the amount of traffic in space over a couple of years, or over a decade at most, compared to the last 60 years.

However, the space debris issue is mostly caused by the fact that we leave objects behind in orbit, which are then a target for collisions either with fragments of a previous collision event or with big, intact objects. Currently, most space debris comes from explosive break-up events; in the future, we predict collisions will be the driver. It's like a cascade event: Once you have one collision, other satellites are at risk for further collisions.

Over the past two decades, there has been a lot of effort to establish guidelines and codes of conduct. For low-Earth orbit (LEO), there is a well-known guideline to take out your spacecraft, satellite, or launch vehicle upper stage, within 25 years after the end of mission.

To have a reasonable shot at having a stable space environment, the goal is to have at least 90% of the satellites and launch-vehicle upper stages with lifetimes longer than 25 years take themselves out of orbit, or put themselves into orbits with lifetimes less than 25 years.

However, we are not really good at doing this at the moment. We’re talking about success rates of 5% to 15% for satellites (launch vehicle orbital stages do notably better, with success rates of 40-70% in low-Earth orbit). Already with current traffic, we have reasonable concerns that we're creating a real debris issue out there.

If we're now thinking about putting another couple of thousands of satellites up there, with levels of compliance similar to what we've been doing so far, then we're talking about a possible catastrophe.

Operators of any type of large satellite constellation would have to behave far better than most current actors in spaceflight have been doing. And this is the concern: Before you launch, operators can of course say and demonstrate that they are going to comply with all international norms and guidelines. But it's only after launch that we know how responsible their behavior actually was.

JH: Do you have the impression that SpaceX is aware of their responsibility?

SL: They are certainly aware of the problem. For example, to get a license to launch in the U.S. with a mission like theirs, where they are exchanging data between the mainland, space, and other operators, you need to request a license, in this case from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). To obtain this license, they must demonstrate what they will do with respect to space debris mitigation. So they needed to demonstrate a certain adherence to the norms.

But the real question is whether the current norms are actually sufficient for large constellations, or if we are putting the bar too low with respect to future sustainability. We are talking about thousands of new satellites — the risk is that the cumulative effect is not captured in the current level of guidelines. So SpaceX would have to voluntarily demonstrate higher levels of commitment.

JH: When asked about these issues, SpaceX responded that they believe they have the “most advanced system” for space debris mitigation, e.g. that the Starlink satellites are “designed to be capable of fully autonomous collision avoidance – meaning zero humans in the loop.” Are you confident that such a system will work, especially considering the numbers?

SL: I have no technical visibility on how they implement their system, so I cannot make a judgment if it will work with their satellites or not. What I can say is that it will require a certain improvement on the current state-of-the-art. On the other hand, if a pair of Starlink satellites does collide within the operation orbit, SpaceX will be the first one who will be badly affected by the fragmentation cloud the collision generates. It's in their own best interest to make sure their system works.

JH: You mentioned the launch license issued by the FCC, which is a federal commission of the United States. However, space is not the property of the U.S. or any other country. Is there an international body that has a say in these matters?

SL: Five outer space treaties, established in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, do not mention space debris. Instead, there is a lot of coordination, first of all on the agency level. The Inter-agency Space Debris Coordination Committee coordinates 13 of the world's space agencies, including the ESA, NASA, the China National Space Administration, and Russia’s Roscosmos,to come up with debris mitigation guidelines, share best practices, and try to address the problem in a way that makes sense to everyone. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has taken on these guidelines . This committee includes politicians from many countries, including those not currently flying in space. Industries in many countries likewise discuss these issues within the International Organization for Standardization.

So there is a lot of coordination internationally to make sure that we play by the same rules and implement the same set of standards. But right now there is no way to directly interface with any nation's sovereignty over what it launches — the outer space treaties make nation states responsible for the behavior of their individuals or private companies.

#### Democratization of technology spurs rapid development – feedback loops ensures debris cascades

BERNAT 20. Pawel @ Military University of Aviation. 11/4/20. [SAFETY ENGINEERING OF ANTHROPOGENIC OBJECTS, “ORBITAL SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS AND THE GROWING THREAT OF KESSLER SYNDROME IN THE LOWER EARTH ORBIT,” Volume 4, PDF] Justin

The second decade of the 21st century has brought a dynamic and somewhat surprising development of the space industry. Since 1972 – the Apollo 17 crew mission to the Moon, the humankind has not left the safe environment of Earth’s orbit, and for years the global space sector has been progressing in slow but steady pace run by a few largest space agencies like American NASA, European ESA, Japanese JAXA, and Chinese CNSA. The most significant achievement of the “old ways” of managing outer space exploration is the International Space Stations (ISS) that has facilitated more than 20 years of continuous crewed operations.

The situation started to change at the turn of the century when new generations of private entrepreneurs began to invest in and develop space technologies like rocket boosters, spaceships, and what most important for the subject of the paper – satellites and their constellations. This new shift is known among the space industry as “Space 2.0”, and its emergence is dated around 2000-2002 when the companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic were established. (Pyle, 2019). The real change, however, came in 2012 when the first SpaceX commercial mission was successfully launched to the ISS (NASA, 2012).

Since then, the participation of the private sector in the space industry has skyrocketed, especially in the United States. Today, SpaceX is the only entity that provides reusable rockets (first stage and fairings) that is capable of vertical launch and landing. Their current flagship rocket – Falcon 9 has carried out 23 successful missions in 2020 (SpaceX, 2020) and another four are planned for December of that year (Weitering, 2020). Moreover, thanks to Crew Dragon spaceship developed by the company, Americans have regained this year the capacity of sending astronauts from their own soil after nine years of buying the seats on Russian Soyuz capsule. SpaceX is now in the process of building a communication satellites constellation that will be addressed and analyzed in the paper.

Nowadays, in the space industry, we witness a very productive cybernetic feedback look between the development of space technologies, the democratization of those technologies, and a substantial reduction of prices. The latter is even more significant if we compare the cost of launching cargo into orbit now and 20 years ago – Falcon 9 is over ten times cheaper than Space Shuttle (Jones, 2018). This, of course, directly translates into the mass and number of objects that we are able to put in the orbit viably. Once the constellations consisting of thousands of satellites were unthinkable, but in the current environment, they become a reality.

Space 2.0 also has brought new threats and challenges in the sphere of national and international security. The increase in launch capacity, among other factors, has led to progressive militarization and weaponization of space and new arms race (Bernat, 2019), which has also contributed to the growing numbers of orbiting objects.

The goal of the paper is to present the argumentation that the threat posed by the cascading collisions in the Earth’s orbit (Kessler syndrome) is becoming more severe due to the construction of orbital satellite constellations; the threat that presents a real danger for people during their EVAs and orbital infrastructure, which may bare immediate consequences for safety and security systems on Earth. In order to provide the theoretical context for the above claim, the following issues will be presented and discussed: (1) space debris, (2) the Kessler syndrome, (3) orbital debris models, (4) the legal issues related to space debris and mitigation actions against their proliferation, and (5) the planned and being currently developed orbital satellite constellations and how they contribute to the growing threat of the Kessler syndrome.

#### Privatization drive rivalries and exponentially increases debris – lack of regulations spikes it.

BERNAT 20. Pawel @ Military University of Aviation. 11/4/20. [SAFETY ENGINEERING OF ANTHROPOGENIC OBJECTS, “ORBITAL SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS AND THE GROWING THREAT OF KESSLER SYNDROME IN THE LOWER EARTH ORBIT,” Volume 4, PDF] Justin

5. Orbital satellite constellations and the growing threat of the Kessler syndrome

Space 2.0 – the new era of space exploration that we witness now in the 21st century means, in words of Buzz Aldrin, “moving human enterprise into space” (Pyle, 2019, p. xiv). The process of commercialization of outer space has already begun and is not limited to private companies providing technologies and services for national or international space agencies, as it was in the past. On the contrary, private companies from the space sector have now matured to carry out their own independent projects.

As for 2020, SpaceX is a company that serves as the best example – it launches satellites to the orbit, both for state and private contractors, it successfully realized two crew missions to the International Space Station, and is in the process of constructing Starlink satellite constellation that will provide high-speed internet access across the planet.

Each satellite weighs around 260 kg, is equipped with an ion propulsion system, autonomous collision avoidance system, and orbits Earth at approximately 540-560 km altitude (Starlink, 2020). At the beginning of November 2020, more than 860 Starlink satellites were orbiting the Earth (Jewett, 2020). Immediate plans include launching 12,000 satellites, but they assume a potential later extension to 42,000 (Henry, 2019a). Of course, SpaceX has employed, at least declaratively, all necessary measures to keep the space clean – the satellites are equipped with the deorbiting system, and in the event of inoperability of the propulsion system (Starlink, 2020). The orbital collisions are, however, inevitable. As it was shown before, the possibility of collisions grows with the number of orbital objects. Bastida Virgili with the team compared (2016, p. 154-155) orbital debris environment development without and with a large hypothetical constellation consisting of merely 1080 satellites, distributed across 20 orbital planes at 1,100 km altitude (Fig. 5).

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

Figure 5. Comparison of long term evolution of the number of objects in LEO with and without the constellation (Virgili et al., 2016, p. 155)

It has to be noted that although SpaceX’s Starlink is the only constellation that is being built in orbit, it is not the only one planned. There are at least a few initiatives aiming at the same goal – to construct internet infrastructure at the Earth’s orbit. The planned Kuiper Systems LLC, which is a subsidiary of Amazon and intends to place 3,236 broadband satellites in the LEO, is one of Starlink’s biggest competitors (Henry, 2019b). Now, there is even a rivalry between the two companies because Kuiper’s lowest orbital shell is planned to be 590 km, with a tolerance of 9 km either above or below (Cao, 2020), which is the altitude of Starlink satellites. Moreover, the race for space in orbit is now at the beginning.

The outer space is vast. It increasingly becomes more cluttered with both operational satellites and space debris. The threat of collisions increases and no institution or body has enough power to license, coordinate and regulate what is sent to the orbit. The UNOOSA has not such power. National states decide what the companies from the space industry can launch to space. In the United States, which is most advanced in the area of private constellations, it is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that issues the appropriate approvals. The race to put broadband internet satellites bears similarities to the gold rush – there are no rules, at the global level, apart from first-come, first-served.

#### Models are rigorous—inserted below.

Virgili et al. 16. Bastida, J.C. Dolado, H.G. Lewis, J. Radtke, H. Krag, B. Revelin, C. Cazaux b , C. Colombo, R. Crowther, M. Metz. 4/26/16. [Act Astranautica “Risk to space sustainability from large constellations of satellites,” <https://sci-hub.se/10.1016/j.actaastro.2016.03.034>.] Justin

1.3. Simulation approach and result analysis A Monte Carlo (MC) approach was used to simulate the evolution of the object population over a period of 200 years under different post-mission disposal requirements, with four different tools (MEDEE – Modelling the Evolution of Debris on Earth's Environment [9], LUCA – Long Term Utility for Collision Analysis [10], DAMAGE – Debris Analysis and Monitoring Architecture to the Geosynchronous Environment [11] and DELTA – Debris Environment Long Term Analysis [12]). For analysis purposes, the effective number of objects was used where the contribution to the population by each object was weighted by the proportion of the orbital period spent in LEO. In a first step, four different evolutionary models performed an analysis of two reference scenarios. One scenario considered only the evolution of the background population and non-constellation traffic. The second scenario augmented the first with the addition of the representative constellation, with the requirement that 90% of the constellation satellites achieved post-mission disposal to orbits with remaining lifetimes of 25 years. The manoeuvres performed at the mission end to meet the disposal requirement are assumed to be impulsive (i.e. instantaneous) and result in an eccentric orbit with the apogee near the original (constellation) altitude and the perigee at an altitude such that the effects of atmospheric drag would cause the orbit to decay within 25 years. Two of the models considered an apogee remaining at the operational constellation altitude, while the other two reduced the apogee by 50 km. The purpose of these scenarios is to provide a cross-comparison of the models in terms of their predictions of the total object population, which take into account the effects of the constellation. As the distribution of the MC results for the models is of the same nature and the results are independent, a bootstrapping [20] approach is used to derive the mean, the standard deviation and the confidence levels at 95% of the combined results of all the MC runs from the four models (cf. Fig. 1), although not all the models performed the same number of MC runs (see Table 1). The main source of variation inside a particular model's MC runs included the randomness in collision activity, while the different models used their own solar activity forecast.

#### That drives a space arms race which enhances the risk of debris cascades, closes off space exploration, and causes conflict.

Shah 20. Sachin Shah is a write for Cornell Undergraduate Law and Society Review. 8/30/20 [CORNELL UNDERGRADUATE LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW “The International Legal Regulation of Space Debris,” <https://www.culsr.org/articles/the-international-legal-regulation-of-space-debris>] Justin

The body of legal regulations regarding the use of space (space being defined as the area above the jurisdiction of air law) by public and private entities is referred to as space law. Currently, there are only about five such regulations of space, the most significant of those being the United Nations’ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereinafter referred to as the Outer Space Treaty) of 1967. In this article, I would like to specifically describe and analyze the laws and regulations’ handling of the increasingly prevalent issue of space debris in orbit around Earth. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defines space debris as “any man-made object in orbit about the Earth which no longer serves a useful function.” [1] However, a major point of confusion discussed below is that the Outer Space Treaty does not explicitly define what it refers to as “space objects,” nor does it mention whether space debris are space objects. An excessive clustering of space debris is a problem for a few reasons. It may result in a phenomenon known as the Kessler Syndrome, in which there is a “cascade created when debris hits a space object, creating new debris and setting off a chain reaction of collisions that eventually closes off entire orbits.” [2] This endangerment of Earth’s future ability to explore extraterrestrial planets and life must be avoided at all costs. Furthermore, space debris in orbit around Earth limits the amount of available space for satellites to orbit, which may result in the Tragedy of the Commons: multiple actors will aggressively vie, in an arms race, for their right to space as it is a limited resource. [3] Space debris is thus a potentially pressing issue in our increasingly technological world. In this essay, I will analyze the existing regulation of space debris as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty, point out the issues with these regulations of space debris and discuss potential solutions, and, finally, discuss legal considerations for private enterprises as well.

#### Satellites solves the grid and every extinction scenario.

Pellegrino & Stang 16. Massimo Pellegrino, Master’s Degree in Space Studies from ISU, with Gerald Stang, Senior Associate Analyst at the EUISS, holds BSc and MSc degrees in chemical engineering from the University of Saskatchewan and an MA in international affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University (“Space Security for Europe”, *EU Institute for Security Studies*, published July 2016, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/space-security-europe>, accessed 7-10-2019) bm

Modern societies are highly dependent on the continuous operation of critical infrastructure to ensure the provision of basic goods and services. They consist of assets, systems or parts thereof which are so vital, that their disruption would significantly impact the economy, national security, public health, safety, or social well-being. Examples of critical infrastructure include energy, water, food supply, communication, transportation, and waste processing systems. Space assets are so deeply embedded in developed economies that a day without fully functioning space capabilities would severely restrict or even endanger our lives.

Space systems are critical for running energy grids and telecommunication networks, border and maritime surveillance, crisis management and humanitarian operations, environmental and climate monitoring, verification of international treaties and arms control agreements, and the fight against organised crime and terrorism. Space assets also provide the technological backbone for other critical infrastructures. The synchronisation of power grids and telecommunication networks, for example, is heavily dependent on GNSS timing signals and any disruption would create a domino effect on other critical infrastructures (see Figure 5).

Satellites also play a central role in supporting defence systems and military operations. They are force multipliers that provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, as well as communication, navigation, positioning and timing signals. Armed forces do not only use their own space systems, but are also significant consumers of space services provided by private operators. In fact, about 90% of US military communications traffic passes through civilian satellites, many of which privately owned, rather than through dedicated systems designed to withstand attempted interruptions.1 The reliance of both civilian and military users on space systems therefore places them firmly in the area of critical infrastructure. Some critical space systems, such as the American GPS, are under foreign control, and the governments controlling those systems retain the authority to disrupt services, even for allies, in case of a national emergency. While the United States announced that it has no intention of ever intentionally degrading public GPS signals (also known as ‘Selective Availability’) and that the next generation of GPS satellites will not include this feature, other governments might still do so.2

These dependences engender new and growing vulnerabilities. Reliance on space is likely to increase further as space capabilities and services improve in diversity, quality and affordability. Close to 1,500 satellites with a launch mass of over 50 kg are expected to be launched over the next decade; an increase of 50% compared to 2005-2014. This estimate excludes both the expected proliferation of smaller satellites (such as CubeSats), but also the planned OneWeb and Steam mega-constellations for global internet broadband service. Advances in small satellite capabilities and in launch technology (e.g. SpaceX’s Falcon rocket family) have already lowered the cost of access to space. About 45% more CubeSats were launched in 2014 than in 2013 (130 vs. 91), accounting for 63% of all satellites launched3 . However, just as the reliance on space increases, so too do threats and vulnerabilities. Therefore, in order to realise the full potential of investments in space, critical space systems need to be adequately protected and the space environment properly managed.

#### Any nuclear war causes extinction – ice age and famine.

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A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that [ends human history](https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StarrNuclearWinterOct09.pdf). There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on.

But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes.

The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create [a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSAD.pdf). Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making.

The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout, produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to [destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer](https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/just-published/3995/nuclear-war-and-ultraviolet-radiation) and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades.

Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter.

Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.