## 1AC

A cat lying on a mat

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

### FW

#### *Ethics must begin a priori*

#### [A] Empirical Uncertainty – evil demon could deceive us and inability to know others experience make empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### [B] Constitutive Authority – The meta-ethic is bindingness. Practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask why I should be a reasoner concedes it’s authority since you’re actively reasoning.

#### [C] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory.

#### That justifies universality – a] a priori principles like reason apply to everyone since they are independent of human experience and b] any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end.

#### Additionally:

#### [A] Ethical frameworks are topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must be theoretically justified. Prefer on resource disparities—focusing on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep excluding lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debater under my framework can easily be won without any prep since minimal evidence is required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

#### [B] Only universalizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

#### [C] Practical identities – we find our lives worth living under practical identities such as student but that presupposes agency.

**Korsgaard 92** CHRISTINE M. Korsgaard 92 [I am a Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, where I have taught since 1991. From July 1996 through June 2002, I was Chair of the Department of Philosophy. (The current chair is Sean Kelly.) From 2004-2012, I was Director of Graduate Studies in Philosophy. (The current DGS is Mark Richard.) Before coming here, I held positions at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago, as well as visiting positions at Berkeley and UCLA. I served as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2008-2009, and held a Mellon Distinguished Achievement Award from 2006-2009. I work on moral philosophy and its history, practical reason, the nature of agency, personal identity, normativity, and the ethical relations between human beings and the other animals], “The Sources of Normativity”, THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University 16-17 Nov 1992, BE

The Solution: Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### [1] Presumption and Permissibility affirm: a] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me. b] If anything is permissible, then so is the aff since there is nothing prohibiting us.

#### [2] Consequences Fail: a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict. b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. c] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify because we commit the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral d] Yes act/omission distinction – there are infinite events occurring over which you have no control, so you can never be moral

#### [3] Contesting offense under the Aff framework is a voting issue. Reciprocity – I have to win my framework and beat the NC before I can access case, whereas you can collapse to either layer or dump on offense for 7 minutes as a no-risk issue so there’s a skew. Key to fairness because it’s definitionally equal access to the ballot.

#### [4] Aspec: JOURNALISTS CAN’T USE UTIL, PREFER DUTY BASED ETHICS

Christians 7 Christians, Clifford (Research Professor of Comunications, Professor of Journalism and Professor of Media Studies Emeritus at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) "Utilitarianism in media ethics and its discontents." Journal of Mass Media Ethics 22.2-3 (2007): 113-131.

Utilitarian ethics has major weaknesses, despite its democratic appeal. It depends on assessing the consequences accurately, when in everyday affairs the results of our choices are often unknown, at least in the long term. Blogging is a revolution in journalism at present, but how can we calculate all the changes even a decade from now? The short-term benefits of exposing corruption in a political campaign may be offset by long-term negative consequences—public hostility to an overly aggressive press. The results are frequently complicated and intertwined so that a theory staking itself on results often does not provide adequate guidelines for morally acceptable action. Among moral philosophers, the most influential critique of utilitarianism has been developed by W. David Ross.9 Ross argued against the utilitarian claim that others are morally significant to us only when our actions impact them pro or con (1930, pp. 17–21).10 We usually find ourselves confronting more than one moral claim at the same time involving different ethical principles. Asking only what produces the most good is too limiting. It does not cover the ordinary range of human relationships and circumstances. People recognize promise keeping, equal distribution, nonviolence, and preventing injury as moral principles. In various situations any of them might be the most stringent. Ordinary moral sensitivities suggest that when someone fulfills a promise because he thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear that he does so with no thought of its total consequences:: : : What makes him think it’s right to act in a certain way is the fact that he has promised to do so—that and, usually, nothing more. (Ross, 1930, p. 17) Utilitarianism as a single-consideration theory does not simply demand that we maximize general happiness, but renders irrelevant other moral imperatives that conflict with it. As Charles Taylor argued, the exactness of this one-factor model is appealing, but represents only ‘‘a semblance of validity’’ by leaving out whatever cannot be calculated (Taylor, 1982, p. 143; cf. Bowers, 2002). In some media situations, consequences are a reliable guide. But in many of the most crucial issues we face at present, utility is not adequate—for understanding distributive justice, diversity in popular culture, violence in television and cinema, truth telling, digital manipulation, conflict of interest, and so forth. We face the anomaly that the ethical system most entrenched in the media industry is not ideally suited for resolving its most persistent headaches. In an ethics of consequences, ‘‘only the future counts with respect to what is morally significant, and not the past’’ (Dyck, 1977, p. 60). Future results, even though they are hypothetical, are determinative. But why should possible benefits in the future count more, for example, than gratitude to parents for their deeds of the past? If I made a promise in the pxast, for instance, this moral duty would be the most urgent in the present. If my previous acts have harmed someone, I have a duty of reparation, that is, making up for earlier wrongs. There are duties of justice that require us to ignore or even upset the balance of happiness (Ross, 1930, p. 21). Thus an ethics of duty is a more compelling model of moral decision making. It covers the entire time frame rather than only anticipating future effects. Duty responds to a broader range of human experiences and relations. Duty recognizes that the human community requires dutiful actions to maintain its humanness. H. Richard Niebuhr, in fact, saw responsibility as inherent in our personhood. Our selfhood is manifest in the action of answering. Our relation to other selves carries moral obligation; we respond to responders; we live in responsive relations (1963, pp. 59–61, 152–160). With a similar understanding of humans as responsible agents, Emmanuel Levinas (1981) insisted that our duties to others are more fundamental to human identity than are individual rights. An ethics of duty provides a critical framework that prevents us from having our ethical theory and democratic practice slide into one another. In terms of the overall task of developing a theoretically credible media ethics, the most promising direction is a deontological one.

#### Thus the advocacy: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

#### That’s the most effective and historically grounded interpretation of objectivity – it isn’t bias free but rather demands a transparent methodology.

Dean and Rosenstiel n.d. [Walter Dean was a CCJ training director and API Executive Director Tom Rosenstiel formerly co-chaired the committee. “The lost meaning of ‘objectivity’.” API. <https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/journalism-essentials/bias-objectivity/lost-meaning-objectivity/>] Justin **\*\*We do not endorse any gendered language**

One of the great confusions about journalism, write Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel in The Elements of Journalism, is the concept of objectivity. When the concept originally evolved, it was not meant to imply that journalists were free of bias. Quite the contrary. The term began to appear as part of journalism after the turn of the 20th century, particularly in the 1920s, out of a growing recognition that journalists were full of bias, often unconsciously. Objectivity called for journalists to develop a consistent method of testing information – a transparent approach to evidence – precisely so that personal and cultural biases would not undermine the accuracy of their work. In the latter part of the 19th century, journalists talked about something called “realism” rather than objectivity. This was the idea that if reporters simply dug out the facts and ordered them together, truth would reveal itself rather naturally. Objectivity called for journalists to develop a consistent method of testing information – a transparent approach to evidence Realism emerged at a time when journalism was separating from political party affiliations and becoming more accurate. It coincided with the invention of what journalists call the inverted pyramid, in which a journalist lines the facts up from the most important to the least important, thinking it helps audiences understand things naturally. At the beginning of the 20th century, however, some journalists began to worry about the naïveté of realism. In part, reporters and editors were becoming more aware of the rise of propaganda and the role of press agents. At a time when Freud was developing his theories of the unconscious and painters like Picasso were experimenting with Cubism, journalists were also developing a greater recognition of human subjectivity. The method is objective, not the journalist. In 1919, Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, an associate editor for the New York World, wrote an influential and scathing account of how cultural blinders had distorted the New York Times coverage of the Russian Revolution. “In the large, the news about Russia is a case of seeing not what was, but what men wished to see,” they wrote. Lippmann and others began to look for ways for the individual journalist “to remain clear and free of his irrational, his unexamined, his unacknowledged prejudgments in observing, understanding and presenting the news.” Journalism, Lippmann declared, was being practiced by “untrained accidental witnesses.” Good intentions, or what some might call “honest efforts” by journalists, were not enough. Faith in the rugged individualism of the tough reporter, what Lippmann called the “cynicism of the trade,” was also not enough. Nor were some of the new innovations of the times, like bylines, or columnists. The solution, Lippmann argued, was for journalists to acquire more of “the scientific spirit … There is but one kind of unity possible in a world as diverse as ours. It is unity of method, rather than aim; the unity of disciplined experiment.” Lippmann meant by this that journalism should aspire to “a common intellectual method and a common area of valid fact.” To begin, Lippmann thought, the fledgling field of journalist education should be transformed from “trade schools designed to fit men for higher salaries in the existing structure.” Instead, the field should make its cornerstone the study of evidence and verification. Although this was an era of faith in science, Lippmann had few illusions. “It does not matter that the news is not susceptible to mathematical statement. In fact, just because news is complex and slippery, good reporting requires the exercise of the highest scientific virtues.” In the original concept, in other words, the method is objective, not the journalist. The key was in the discipline of the craft, not the aim. This point has some important implications. One is that the impartial voice employed by many news organizations – that familiar, supposedly neutral style of newswriting – is not a fundamental principle of journalism. Rather, it is an often helpful device news organizations use to highlight that they are trying to produce something obtained by objective methods. The second implication is that this neutral voice, without a discipline of verification, creates a veneer covering something hollow. Journalists who select sources to express what is really their own point of view, and then use the neutral voice to make it seem objective, are engaged in a form of deception. This damages the credibility of the craft by making it seem unprincipled, dishonest, and biased. The impartial voice employed by many news organizations – that familiar, supposedly neutral style of newswriting – is not a fundamental principle of journalism. Reporters have gone on to refine the concept Lippmann had in mind, but usually only privately, and in the name of technique or reporting routines rather than journalism’s larger purpose. The notion of an objective method of reporting exists in pieces, handed down by word of mouth from reporter to reporter. Developmental psychologist William Damon at Stanford, for instance, has identified various “strategies” journalists have developed to verify reporting. Damon asked his interviewees where they learned these concepts. Overwhelmingly the answer was: by trial and error and on my own or from a friend. Rarely did journalists report learning them in journalism school or from their editors. Many useful books have been written. IRE (Investigative Reporters and Editors) for instance, has tried to develop a methodology for how to use public records, read documents, and produce Freedom of Information Act requests. By and large, however, these informal strategies have not been pulled together into the widely understood discipline that Lippmann and others imagined. There is nothing approaching standard rules of evidence, as in the law, or an agreed-upon method of observation, as in the conduct of scientific experiments. Nor have older conventions of verification been expanded to match the new forms of journalism. Although journalism may have developed various techniques and conventions for determining facts, it has done less to develop a system for testing the reliability of journalistic interpretation.

### Offense

#### [1] Under the categorical imperative, objectivity must always be prioritized because anything else is a contradiction in conception of lying, if a lie were universalized then there would no longer be a conception of truth. This makes objectivity the highest layer that always comes first, even if you are advocating.

#### [2] Any claim that advocacy is constitutive to a free press is impermissible because the function of media is to report information.

Klein 20 [Ian Klein, J.D. Candidate at the Texas A&M University School of Law, 2020, “Enemy of the People: The Ghost of the F.C.C. Fairness Doctrine in the Age of Alternative Facts.” Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1809&context=hastings\_comm\_ent\_law\_journal]/Kankee

This scarcity and long history of regulation, combined with the legal fiction of broadcast spectrum scarcity explained in the following paragraphs, is likely enough to overcome this Red Lion hurdle. Second, and more importantly, in the context of the Red Lion holding and the history of broadcast regulation, the concept of scarcity serves to underline the duty of the federal government [is] to make sure that the public has access to objective coverage of important issues.152 Red Lion was the culmination of a decades-long administrative, legislative, and judicial adaptation to the evolving nature of mass communication, during which every branch of the federal government emphasized the right of the public to be informed over the right of broadcasters to disseminate information.153 Since the Radio Act of 1927, broadcasting has been regulated because the public has a right to receive information.154 When the Communications Act supplanted the Radio Act, Congress was determined to require that the newly-created FCC had a duty to “serve the public interest.”155 The F.C.C. noted during its infancy that a democratic society should be given maximum opportunity to express diverse viewpoints on controversial issues, and, importantly, maximum opportunity to hear and read the conflicting view of others.156 As Justice White later wrote for the unanimous Red Lion Court, “[i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic [sic], moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here . . . [t]hat right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.”157 That right of access, based on the history and tradition of the decisions of both the Court and the FCC, extends not only to access to that information, but to the objective presentation of this information.158 Furthermore, “access” referred to the ability of broadcasters to broadcast information vis-à-vis the chilling effect and self-censorship that opponents of the Fairness Doctrine feared. However, as the Red Lion Court noted, “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”159 The fact that the notion of the public’s right to information was reiterated so often and so prevalently indicates that courts and lawmakers did not consider it incidental to their decisions, but as the governing principle necessitating the entire body of broadcast regulation. Furthermore, as legal scholars such as Mark Lloyd and John Berresford theorize, Red Lion’s Scarcity Principle was not only secondary to the emphasis on the public’s right to be informed, but was intended as dicta, which subsequent courts misinterpreted as the crux of the opinion.160 Lloyd suggests that the scarcity principle was merely “[d]ictum that suggests the Court was aware of the spectrum [of broadcast frequencies] as a public resource,” and that the Red Lion opinion was only about the constitutionality of FCC authority over broadcast licensees.161 According to Lloyd, the Red Lion Court’s determination that there was a scarcity of broadcast frequencies was not the conclusion of an engineering or economic analysis, but was the result of a purely legal analysis based on precedent and the record that centered on previous challenges to FCC authority.162 This is significant because, as Berresford points out in his 2005 FCC Research Paper, “[t]he Scarcity [Principle] appears to assume that there is a physical thing . . . of which there is a scarce amount . . . ‘the radio frequency spectrum,’ however, has no discrete physical existence . . . [t]he Scarcity [Principle] thus appears to be based on fundamental misunderstandings of physics.”163 Arbitrary rules made up by dead racists are nothing compared to the physical laws governing the reality of the known universe. The question of scarcity was thus “dislodged from the question before the Court” in Red Lion: Whether the FCC could constitutionally enforce the Fairness Doctrine.164 If the Scarcity Principle is a legal fiction (based on a scientific one), then Red Lion’s precedential value in upholding Fairness Doctrine 2.0 must rest solely on the end that the very nature of broadcast regulation sought to further from its inception:165 the right of the public to receive objective information.166 Legal Issues Surrounding Online News and Social Media

#### That affirms: if we all necessarily want our rights enforced and freedoms respected, we all necessarily agree to carry the responsibilities as well as the rights and privileges of citizenship to ensure the government can accurately act as a collective agent

**Korsgaard 18** [The Claims of Animals and the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right. The Journal of Practical EthicsVolume 6, No. 1, June 2018. OPEN ACCESS. <http://www.jpe.ox.ac.uk/papers/the-claims-of-animals-and-the-needs-of-strangers-two-cases-of-imperfect-right/>] // SJ AME

Like many philosophers, I think there is no problem in recognizing that groups of people can form collective agents in this way**. Groups can think when their members can think, and when they can also talk and debate, which amounts to thinking together. They can act**—not just individually but as a group—when they have procedures for making and enacting decisions that makes those decisions and actions count as the decisions and actions of the group. **Political states are collective agents in exactly that sense. A political state thinks through the thoughts of its citizens and legislators when they debate public issues, makes its decisions by voting and passing laws, and enacts its decisions by enforcing those laws. The enforcement of the law counts as the action of the state. It also acts as a collective agent when its duly elected representatives, or otherwise legitimate leaders, perform actions in their official roles that the laws entitle them to do**. That’s what happens when one country declares war on another, for instance. That is something that the country, considered as a collective agent, does.

#### [3] A condition of reason is to be able to formulate ideas and ends based on both your private and public use of reason. This can only happen through public information exchange that is not connected to personal or subjective ties.

**Donald 03** [James Donald, February 3, 2003; KANT, THE PRESS, AND THE PUBLIC USE OF REASON JAMES DONALD James Donald is Professor of Film Studies at the University of New South Wales, email: [J.Donald@curtin.edu.au](mailto:J.Donald@curtin.edu.au). https://javnost-thepublic.org/article/pdf/2003/2/3/]

This, according to Pinkard at least, was the receptive cultural milieu which Kant addressed with this dramatic opening answer to Biester’s question: E**nlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity**. The motto of enlightenment must be, Sapere Aude! Dare to know. Have the courage to use your own reason (Kant 1991, 54, translation modified). What, though, did using your own reason mean in this context and at that time? And, more broadly, in what circumstances is the use of reason possible? Here it is necessary to read what Kant has to say both historically and philosophically. The Berlinische Monatsschrift was not just in the business of publishing news and views. It had a political and social agenda. The journal represented the public face of a secret society of senior officials in the administration of Frederick II who were committed to embedding Enlightenment principles in the institutions of the Prussian state. The inference must therefore be that Kant knew exactly whom he was talking to, and that his emphasis on daring and courage in the somewhat hesitant and cryptic opening of the essay is a nod towards the risks these men would have seen themselves as taking in the attempt to create social conditions in which their fellow-citizens might be (more) free to think (Caygill 2001, 31). At the time Kant’s essay was published in 1784, they were especially concerned that their achievements should not be reversed when Frederick II, then in the 44th year of his reign, died  as he did two years later  and was replaced by his more reactionary heir. It helps to know this, as it explains the strategic nature of the essay. It is designed to make use of the press and its public access in order to help a political cause as well as to establish philosophical principles. The philosophical basis for the argument **about the public use of reason is Kant’s axiomatic belief that thinking well must be based on three maxims: Think for your- self; think from the standpoint of everyone else; and think consistently. Respecting all or any of these maxims is possible only in community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts, and who communicate their thoughts to us.** Thinking is of its nature a social activity, then, and reason is a product of society (Wood 1999, 301). For thinking to demonstrate reason, it must be critical, testing what is thought from different possible perspectives in order to achieve understanding and coherence. To a degree, and perhaps quite a considerable degree, such critical self-reflection is possible through the inner exercise of imagination. To be most effective, however, imagination needs at least some external stimulus from actual dialogue with people in relation to whose viewpoints one is trying to think. This is why, in What Is Enlightenment?, Kant insists that citizens have a philosophical responsibility to do their thinking in front of the entire reading public  even if his historical under- standing of who should make up the public was much more discriminating (Kant 1991, 55). **Kant’s is thus an inherently pluralistic conception of reason: that is, it requires the disposition of not being occupied with oneself as the entire world, but regarding and conducting oneself as a cosmopolitan** [or citizen of the world] (Wood 1999, 302). This is how he puts it in his discussion of census communis in The Critique of Judgment: **The idea of a public sense, i.e., a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgment with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence upon its judgment. This is accomplished by weighing the judgment, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else, as the result of mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently affect our own estimate** (cited in Splichal 2002, 101). Without that worldly regard for the thoughts, feelings, and wishes of others, thought and judgment fall prey to the opposite of pluralism, which is egoism. And egoism, whether in terms of one’s understanding, one’s tastes or one’s interests, in turn produces traits that are obstacles to moral self-development: passion, self- conceit, fear, and intellectual indolence (Wood 1999, 283).1 It is the very nature of thinking that requires its public use and an initiating act of resolution and courage if reason is to be developed in individuals and in humanity as a whole. The immaturity (Unmündigkeit), or intellectual and moral de- pendency, that is the opposite of enlightenment is not a developmental stage be- fore maturity, but is self-incurred (selbstverschuldet) (Kant 1991, 54). **Thinking adults have a choice. They have to decide between the challenging demands of reason and the comfort zone of conformity and deference to authority: people who do not need to submit to tutelage often do so because they find it convenient to have others guide them.** Being unaccustomed to think for themselves, they are often frightened by the prospect of having to do so (Wood 1999, 305). This is why some of the most intransigent barriers to the development of rea- son are to be found in ourselves. Mündigkeit adulthood ,majority, or maturity brings with it not just the freedom and assurance of autonomy, but also its attendant anxieties, risks and responsibilities. As Kant strategically acknowledges, however, the roadblocks to enlightenment are external as well as internal. **It is in the interests of tyrants, priests, and other often more benevolent powers to tell people what to think, to tell them what will make them safe and happy, and so to perpetuate their deference and dependency. Their most effective weapon is, of course, the ability to play on spiritual, social and economic fears.** Having carefully prevented the docile creatures from daring to take single step without the leading- strings to which they are tied, such authorities will attempt to show them the danger which threatens them if they try to walk unaided (Wood 1999, 305-306). **Kant does not deny the existence of such dangers and discontents, but sees them simply as part and parcel of the human condition, as obstacles that need to be overcome**: they would certainly learn to walk eventually after a few falls (Kant 1991, 54). And learning to walk means taking on those social impediments as well as well as one’s own fears. Kant sees it as our duty to opt for maturity: a duty to ourselves, because to opt for tutelage and dependency is personally degrading, but also a kind of species- duty, in the sense that reason can exist and fulfil its vocation in human history only through free rational communication between independent thinkers (Wood 1999, 306). Kant’s philosophy was radical in its emphasis on the spontaneity and autonomy of human beings, and it was this that found an affinity with an emerging cultural sense of people’s potential  and desire  for subjective development and collective progress. As Pinkard (2002, 19) puts it, he captured a deep, almost sub- terranean shift in what his audience was coming to experience as necessary for themselves: from now on, we were called to lead our own lives, to think for ourselves. Historically, the question is whether, how and to what extent the dissemination of Kant’s philosophical ideas helped to articulate that ethos as a social force. From that point of view, what is electric in Kant’s account of that now are his comments about the social circumstances that are necessary if such courage is to lead to autonomy. When Kant observes that for enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom, he is not just talking about overcoming the psychological comforts of immaturity and the inner tyranny of superstition and timidity, but also about all too real and familiar ideological pressures and political-legal obstacles to free communication, to the operation of reason, and so to human progress (Kant 1991, 55; Wood 1999, 283).2 Hence the need for courage, but also the need for the existence of social circumstances that made daring to use one’s reason a possibility**. Because we can develop our reason only by communicating with others, and as the development of reason in human society depends on its public use, therefore Kant de- fends freedom of public communication as an absolute precondition for the collective development of people’s rational powers and so for human progress** (Wood 1999, 306). The freedom to communicate, asserts Kant, is the one treasure which remains to us amidst all the burdens of civil life, and which alone offers us a means of overcoming all the evils of this condition (in Reiss 1991, 247). To prohibit the use of public reason, however, is not only to injure and trample on the rights of mankind. In a subtle argument  or a piece of opportunist flattery, depending on how you look at it  Kant makes the case that such restriction is also against the interests of an enlightened ruler who is not afraid of shadows [or phantoms]. It is, after all, the public use of critical reason alone that can foster enlightenment, and so create a population that is likely to be peaceful and virtuous. A prince who does not regard it as beneath him to say that he considers it his duty, in religious matters, not to prescribe anything to his people, but to allow them complete freedom, a prince who thus even declines to accept the presumptuous title of tolerant, is himself enlightened. This spirit of freedom is also spreading abroad, even where it has to struggle with outward obstacles imposed by governments which misunderstand their own function. For such governments can now witness a shining example of how freedom may exist without in the least jeopardizing public concord and the unity of the commonwealth. Men will of their own accord gradually work their way out of barbarism so long as artificial measures are not deliberately adopted to keep them in it (Kant 1991, 58-59). Just as individuals need to think their way out of tutelage and towards maturity, so the general development from an age of enlightenment to an enlightened age requires a polity that not only allows, but encourages criticism of existing political institutions as part of the development and expansion of reason.

#### [4] Advocacy is premised off of making somebody do something for you which violates the categorical imperative because you’re using someone as a means to an end.

### UV

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory since the neg can be infinitely abusive and I can’t check back. Aff theory is drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer since the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance and reasonability bites intervention since it’s up to the judge to determine. No 2NR RVI, paradigm issues, theory, evidence, or new responses to AC arguments since they’d dump on it for 6 minutes and my 3-minute 2AR is spread too thin. No RVIs on AC arguments – incentivizes a 7 minute collapse that decks 1AR strategy.