## 1AR

### 1

#### I meet: o/w their interp on credibilit cuz it’s the national oceanic and atmosperic adminstration, and common usage

NESDIS 16 2-22-2016, "Where is space?," NESDIS, https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/news/where-space

A common definition of space is known as the Kármán Line, an imaginary boundary 100 kilometers (62 miles) above mean sea level. In theory, once this 100 km line is crossed, the atmosphere becomes too thin to provide enough lift for conventional aircraft to maintain flight. At this altitude, a conventional plane would need to reach orbital velocity or risk falling back to Earth.

## 1AC

### \*\*\*SPIKES ON BOTTOM\*\*\*

Does this get me +0.2 speaks for effort? I copy pasted

Graphical user interface

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### Disclosure

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions in cite boxes on the 2021-22 NDCA LD wiki. To clarify, they can’t say check open source.

Debatecoaches no date

A screenshot of a cell phone

Description automatically generated

#### Violation: see the screenshot in the doc- just an example of many cites

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

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#### Standards:

#### 1] Pre-round prep: prep becomes atrocious when you make people sift through 20 word docs to figure out which links you’re reading and which impacts to prep. Discourages tricks—you can just hide a bunch of blippy arguments. Also key for inclusion since disadvantaged people have computers more prone to lag and even 3 or 4 can crash the program for them—outweighs accessibility is a multiplier for their impacts. Disclosing in cite boxes solves—people can quickly get a summary of your position and go to open source if they need more information

#### 2] wiki rules—the wiki tells you to disclose like everyone else. Freeloading is bad and o/w—it cultivates passive citizenship and turns any hope of actually solving their impacts which is a voter for education.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

O/w 1NC theory because any reason I was abusive is because you were

#### And, saying I can ask them does not solve –

#### [1] Stalling – they can take long and make prep irreciprocal because they prep the aff while we have less to prep the neg

#### [2] Norms – we shouldn’t have to ask you – if you’re racist, you should not be independent of me asking

#### [3] Defense – no reason why your norm is better – you can’t win in competing interps model

### Plan

#### Plan – The appropriation of outer space through the production of space debris by private entities is unjust.

#### Revising the Outer Space Treaty curbs the impact of space debris – timeframe is crucial.

Shah 20 – Sachin, 8/30/20, [“Aug 30 The International Legal Regulation of Space Debris,” CORNELL UNDERGRADUATE LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, Administrative, Policy, Technology, <https://www.culsr.org/articles/the-international-legal-regulation-of-space-debris>] Justin

In this article, I have demonstrated that the existing laws and regulations pertaining to space debris are best captured in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. While many scholars do believe that Articles VII and IX of the Treaty does provide basic accountability for space debris, many also agree that its vague, non-technical legal language creates problems in mitigating the ever-growing problem of space debris in orbit around Earth. Despite this lack of legal clarity, some scholars have proposed solutions to the space debris issue. Some have simply called for a revised, specific version of the Outer Space Treaty. Others have recommended implementing an entire regulatory regime with the authority to create laws which specifically pertain to holding actors accountable for space debris production. While lawmakers have yet to update the existing regulations regarding space debris, more effective space debris mitigation techniques lie in the private sector. The profit-based incentives of private satellite companies ensure their responsibility in and around Earth's orbit. In the example of SpaceX, the loose legal regulations of satellite use by the FCC and the ITU have allowed the company to send thousands of satellites into orbit. We live in a different world today than we did in 1967. In order to maintain our current safety and our future ability to voyage outer space, stronger legal frameworks must be created to prevent the uncontrollable expansion of space debris around Earth. Used effectively, legal action can accomplish these goals, but lack thereof may result in disaster.

#### Private entities are non-governmental.

Dunk 11 – Frans G. von der Dunk, 2011, [“The Origins of Authorisation: Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and International Space Law,” University of Nebraska] Justin

4. Interpreting Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty One main novel feature of Article VI stood out with reference to the role of private enterprise in this context. Contrary to the version of the concept applicable under general international law, where “direct state responsibility” only pertained to acts somehow directly attributable to a state and states could only be addressed for acts by private actors under “indirect,” “due care”/“due diligence” responsibility,18 Article VI made no difference as to whether the activities at issue were the state’s own (“whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies” . . .) or those of private actors (. . . “or by non-governmental entities”). The interests of the Soviet Union in ensuring that, whomever would actually conduct a certain space activity, some state or other could be held responsible for its compliance with applicable rules of space law to that extent had prevailed. However, the general acceptance of Article VI as cornerstone of the Outer Space Treaty unfortunately was far from the end of the story. Partly, this was the consequence of key principles being left undefined.

#### Exemptions destroy the coercive power of legal regimes – causes circumvention across the board.

Hickman and Dolman 2 – John and Everett, 2002, Associate professor in the Department of Government and International Studies at Berry College in Mt. Berry, [“Resurrecting the Space Age: A State–Centered Commentary on the Outer Space Regime,” Volume 21 Number 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/014959302317350855>] Elmer Recut Justin

Thus a state party need merely announce its intention to withdraw and then wait one year. Withdrawal of a single state party to the treaty, however, would not necessarily terminate the treaty between the other state parties. Yet, the decision of an important state not to be bound by a regime–creating treaty obviously endangers the entire treaty. The decision of the United States or China to withdraw from the OST would have far greater implications for the survival of the international space regime than the same decision by Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, or Papua New Guinea—the equality of states under international law remains nothing more than a useful  ction. For the OST to remain good international law, it must be accepted as such by the major space faring states of the 21st Century: the United States, Russia, the European Union, Japan, and China. One defection from the regime by a member of this group would no doubt lead to its effective collapse, as the remaining space faring states are unlikely to use the kind of coercion necessary to enforce the regime. A more likely response to such a defection is a scramble to make similar claims to sovereignty, based on historical precedent and effective occupation. Similar rushes to stake claims for territory sovereignty in other celestial bodies might follow.

### Advantage

#### The advantage is Debris –

#### Privatization of space leads to unchecked debris.

Muelhaupt et al. 19 – Theodore, Marlon Sorge, Jamie Morin, and Robert Wilson, 6/18/19, Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation, 30 year Space Systems Analyst and Operator, [“Space traffic management in the new space era,” Journal of Space Safety Engineering, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S246889671930045X?via%3Dihub>] Justin

The last decade has seen rapid growth and change in the space industry, and an explosion of commercial and private activity. Terms like NewSpace or democratized space are often used to describe this global trend to develop faster and cheaper access to space, distinct from more traditional government-driven activities focused on security, political, or scientific activities. The easier access to space has opened participation to many more participants than was historically possible. This new activity could profoundly worsen the space debris environment, particularly in low Earth orbit (LEO), but there are also signs of progress and the outlook is encouraging. Many NewSpace operators are actively working to mitigate their impact. Nevertheless, NewSpace represents a significant break with past experience and business as usual will not work in this changed environment. New standards, space policy, and licensing approaches are powerful levers that can shape the future of operations and the debris environment. 2. Characterizing NewSpace: a step change in the space environment In just the last few years, commercial companies have proposed, funded, and in a few cases begun deployment of very large constellations of small to medium-sized satellites. These constellations will add much more complexity to space operations. Table 1 shows some of the constellations that have been announced for launch in the next decade. Two dozen companies, when taken together, have proposed placing well over 20,000 satellites in orbit in the next 10 years. For perspective, fewer than 8100 payloads have been placed in Earth orbit in the entire history of the space age, only 4800 [1] remain in orbit and approximately 1950 [2] of those are still active. And it isn't simply numbers – the mass in orbit will increase substantially, and long-term debris generation is strongly correlated with mass. Table 1. Some announced NewSpace constellations. Operator Number of satellites Altitude (km) Country SpaceX V-band 7518 335–345 US Capella 48 350–650 US Planet Swift 6 350–650 US Black Sky 60 450 US Satellogic NuSat 300 500 Argentina Kepler 140 550 US SpaceX Starlink 1584 550 US Skybox 30 576 US Fleet 100 580 Australia Amazon Kuiper 3236 590–630 US Commsat 800 600 China Kineis 20 600 France Yalini 135 600 Canada Spire 100 651 US Planet Doves 150 675 US Orbcomm 31 750 US Iridium 72 780 US Theia 112 800 US Lucky Star 156 1000 China Telesat LEO 72 1000 Canada Hongyan 300 1100 China Xinwei 32 1100 China SpaceX Starlink 2825 1110–1325 US OneWeb 720 1200 ESA Telesat LEO 45 1248 Canada Astrome Tech 600 1400 India LeoSat 108 1400 US Globalstar 40 1412 US This table is in constant flux. It is based largely on U.S. filings with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and various press releases, but many of the companies here have already altered or abandoned their original plans, and new systems are no doubt in work. Although many of these large constellations may never be launched as listed, the traffic created if just half are successful would be more than double the number of payloads launched in the last 60 years and more than 6 times the number of currently active satellites. Current space safety, space surveillance, collision avoidance (COLA) and debris mitigation processes have been designed for and have evolved with the current population profile, launch rates and density of LEO space. By almost any metric used to measure activity in space, whether it is payloads in orbit, the size of constellations, the rate of launches, the economic stakes, the potential for debris creation, the number of conjunctions, NewSpace represents a fundamental change. 3. Compounding effects of better SSA, more satellites, and new operational concepts The changes in the space environment can be seen on this figurative map of low Earth orbit. Fig. 1 shows the LEO environment as a function of altitude. The number of objects found in each 10 km “bin” is plotted on the horizontal axis, while the altitude is plotted vertically. Objects in elliptical orbits are distributed between bins as partial objects proportional to the time spent in each bin. Some notable resident systems are indicated in blue text on the right to provide an altitude reference. The (dotted) red line shows the number of objects in the current catalog tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN). All the COLA alerts and actions that must be taken by the residents are due to their neighbors in the nearby bins, so the currently visible risk is proportional to the red line.



Fig. 1. Objects in LEO orbit by altitude per 10 km altitude bin. Elliptical orbit objects distributed by portion spent in each bin. Some notable existing resident systems are listed on the right. New residents, including some replacement systems, are on the left. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) The red line of the current catalog does not represent the complete risk; it indicates the risk we can track and perhaps avoid. A rule of thumb is that the current SSN LEO catalog contains objects about 10 cm or larger. It is generally accepted that an impact in LEO with an object 1 cm or larger will cause damage likely to be fatal to a satellite's mission. Therefore, there is a large latent risk from unobserved debris. While we cannot currently track and catalog much smaller than 10 cm, experiments have been performed to detect and sample much smaller objects and statistically model the population at this size [3]. The (solid) blue line represents the model of the 1 cm and larger debris that is likely mission-ending, usually called lethal but not trackable. If LEO operators avoid collisions with all the objects in the red line, they are nonetheless inherently accepting the risk from the blue line. This risk is already present. The (dashed) orange line is an estimate of the population at 5 cm and larger and is thus an estimate of what the catalog might conservatively be a few years after the Space Fence, a new radar system being built by the Air Force, comes on line (currently planned for 2019) [4]. Commercial companies offering space surveillance services, such as LeoLabs, ExoAnalytics, Analytic Graphics Inc., Lockheed, and Boeing, might also add to the number of objects currently tracked. Space Policy Directive 3 (SPD-3) [13] specifically seeks to expand the use of commercial SSA services. Existing operators can expect a sharp increase in the number of warnings and alerts they will receive because of the increase in the cataloged population. Almost all the increase will come from newly detected debris [5]. The pace of safety operations for each satellite on orbit will significantly change because of the increase in the catalog from the Space Fence. This effect is compounded because the NewSpace constellations described in Table 1 will drastically change the profile of satellites in LEO. The green bars in Fig. 1 represent the number of objects that will be added to the catalog (red or orange lines) from only the NewSpace large LEO constellations at their operational altitudes. This does not include the rocket stages that launch them, or satellites in the process of being phased into or removed from the operational orbits. Neighbors of one of these new constellations may face a radically different operations environment than their current practices were designed to address. Satellites in these large LEO constellations typically have planned operational lifetimes of 5–10 years. Some companies have proposed to dispose of their satellites using low thrust electric propulsion systems, which would spiral satellites down over a period of months or years from operating altitudes as high as 1500 km through lower orbits where the Hubble Space Telescope, the International Space Station, and other critical LEO satellites operate [6]. Similar propulsive techniques would raise replacement satellites from lower launch injection orbits to higher operational orbits. These disposal and replenishment activities will add thousands of satellites each year transiting through lower altitudes and posing a risk to all resident satellites in those lower orbits. More importantly, failures will occur both among transiting satellites and operational constellations, potentially leaving hundreds more stranded along the transit path. Aerospace studies [7–9] have shown that failed satellites, whether they fail during operations or fail during disposal, can pose as great or even greater risk than the many thousands of operational satellites (Fig. 2). Given the rapid flux in the proposed large LEO constellations (LLC), we created a Future Constellations Model (FCM) with elements that represented the characteristics of the different systems being proposed. In our models, almost all the collisions and the resulting debris from those collisions occur because of failed systems. Most large constellation operators intend to perform active collision avoidance for active systems, whether operational or in some stage of check-out or disposal, but failed satellites are assumed to be incapable of maneuver. Fig. 2 also shows that satellites in the disposal phase can contribute to collisions similarly to satellites in the operational phase. Fig 2 Download : Download full-size image Fig. 2. Collisions during operations and disposal over 10 years for various NewSpace Future Constellation Models (FCMs). 4. A notional illustration of workload The highest risk to operational satellites comes from the lethal but non-trackable debris that is depicted in the blue line in Fig. 2. However, operators perform collision avoidance only on the objects that can be tracked and cataloged. Advances in tracking and NewSpace launches will both act to increase this workload. A key element of the problem is that an increase in the LEO population will lead to an increase in close approaches to existing satellites [5], and the potential for accidental collisions. Conjunction prediction, collision probability (Pc), and maneuver planning for most existing satellite operators is a time- and personnel-intensive operation. Orbit analysts, and propulsion, navigation, and communications systems personnel are involved in evaluating and planning maneuvers over several days and must do so even if the ultimate decision is to “fly through” a close approach. Since most existing systems have small numbers of vehicles and the number of conjunctions any given operator experiences is relatively small, COLA remains a manual process. For systems not designed with automated maneuver planning, a COLA assessment that progresses all the way to a maneuver plan can consume considerable effort, whether or not the maneuver is executed. If a large constellation is deployed next to an existing resident system, the existing system may experience many conjunctions and alerts due to its close proximity of the dense new constellation. A sufficiently large constellation will, in effect, form a “shell” where frequent opportunities for conjunctions will be created. For example, Fig. 3 depicts a fictional scenario where 1225 “New” satellites are distributed in 35 planes in circular orbits at 1000 km altitude, at 98° inclination. These are placed near a hypothetical “Old” six-satellite constellation operating in a nearly circular orbit at the same altitude and 63° inclination. Following a common operations practice, we assume that the Old satellite operators flag a conjunction at Pc> 10−7, start COLA assessment with additional tracking at Pc> 10−6, and plan a COLA maneuver when the Pc> 10−5. A conjunction with Pc > 10−4 would typically be considered a significant risk leading most operators to maneuver. Fig 3 Download : Download full-size image Fig. 3. “New” large LEO constellation at same average altitude as “Old” existing constellation. Currently, the Old system in this example would typically see a warning (Pc > 10−6) a few times a month at this altitude, and of those, a few per year might cross the maneuver threshold. For the operations center, this would be multiplied by the number of satellites in the constellation. When the New system parks nearby, the number of COLA alerts jumps substantially. But the number of alerts depends entirely on the error bubble, (covariance) used. If the typical errors of the public external tracking data and the orbit propagation methods that are widely available (General Perturbations, or GP) are used for both constellations, over a 30-day period we see 129 conjunctions that cross the threshold for COLA assessment (Pc> 10−6), and 53 that cross the maneuver planning threshold (Pc> 10−5) (Fig. 4). This is nearly 2 per day. This could be an enormous workload for a manual process. If a high accuracy catalog (Special Perturbations, or “SP”) and a high-fidelity propagator with its typical covariances is used, the number of conjunctions goes from 129 to a more manageable 10. SP data is maintained by the Air Force, but it is not widely available. It is interesting to note that nine of those 10 crossed the maneuver-planning threshold, and of those, four crossed the Pc> 10−4 where many operators would choose to execute a maneuver. Compared to GP, the SP-quality data resulted in far fewer warnings and flagged four very close conjunctions. The operations center would have been able to concentrate on fewer “false alarms”. We also computed the case where GPS-quality owner-operator data was used for both systems, in which we assumed near-real-time owner-operator position data of very high quality was provided by both operators and used in the collision analysis. In this case, NONE of the conjunctions resulted in a warning and no COLA alerts were generated. The closest approach was 99 m, with a Pc of 3.7 × 10−7 using SP. But because of the quality of the GPS-based position data, this conjunction did not raise an alert because the fully-informed operators could be confident that a collision would not occur. Fig 4 Download : Download full-size image Fig. 4. Number of COLA alerts in 30 days for various qualities of position knowledge when a fictional new system is deployed near an existing one. In the example, an operations center for the Old constellation of six satellites could go from about one COLA assessment a week to nearly one per day per satellite, if only the published satellite catalog is available. If a new constellation operates too close to an existing system, the operator workload may become unreasonable using existing processes. But high accuracy data makes this manageable, and GPS-quality owner-operator data for both systems makes the problem vanish. Since these constellations are likely to be operated by different companies or governments, sharing high-quality position data would likely require an active space traffic management organization. Existing operators will not necessarily have large constellations parked nearby, but they will nonetheless be affected by the new activity. The new large constellations’ satellites typically will have relatively short lifetimes and will need frequent replenishment. The traffic transiting up and down will be substantial, and failures could leave stranded objects at intermediate altitudes, permanently increasing the collision risk. 5. Conjunction warning overload NewSpace operators will face a different challenge due to the vast increase in numbers of satellites. While there are likely as many operational plans as there are operators, a large constellation must consider close approaches with itself. Even if there are no neighboring systems, self-conjunctions can occur between two members of the same constellation. Depending on the configuration, a given operator could see hundreds to thousands of self-conjunctions that cross typical warning thresholds each day using current practices. This could be an issue for a space traffic management (STM) agency, even if it is not an issue for the operator. Aerospace models show that for one possible NewSpace constellation, more than 500,000 self-conjunctions each year could result that cross the typical Pc > 10−6 warning threshold. If no action were taken, we would expect 2–3 collisions per year. This is clearly unacceptable. Thus, current tracking accuracy and processes might produce millions of warnings per year for NewSpace operators to prevent half a dozen actual collisions. Under current practices operators would need to sort through an enormous haystack to find the needles, and because a handful of actual collisions will occur, the warnings cannot be ignored.

#### Feedback loops of technology cause increasing development and debris.

Bernat 20 – Pawel, 2020, Military University of Aviation, [“ORBITAL SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS AND THE GROWING THREAT OF KESSLER SYNDROME IN THE LOWER EARTH ORBIT,” SAFETY ENGINEERING OF ANTHROPOGENIC OBJECTS, Volume 4, PDF] Justin

The second decade of the 21st century has brought a dynamic and somewhat surprising development of the space industry. Since 1972 – the Apollo 17 crew mission to the Moon, the humankind has not left the safe environment of Earth’s orbit, and for years the global space sector has been progressing in slow but steady pace run by a few largest space agencies like American NASA, European ESA, Japanese JAXA, and Chinese CNSA. The most significant achievement of the “old ways” of managing outer space exploration is the International Space Stations (ISS) that has facilitated more than 20 years of continuous crewed operations. The situation started to change at the turn of the century when new generations of private entrepreneurs began to invest in and develop space technologies like rocket boosters, spaceships, and what most important for the subject of the paper – satellites and their constellations. This new shift is known among the space industry as “Space 2.0”, and its emergence is dated around 2000-2002 when the companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic were established. (Pyle, 2019). The real change, however, came in 2012 when the first SpaceX commercial mission was successfully launched to the ISS (NASA, 2012). Since then, the participation of the private sector in the space industry has skyrocketed, especially in the United States. Today, SpaceX is the only entity that provides reusable rockets (first stage and fairings) that is capable of vertical launch and landing. Their current flagship rocket – Falcon 9 has carried out 23 successful missions in 2020 (SpaceX, 2020) and another four are planned for December of that year (Weitering, 2020). Moreover, thanks to Crew Dragon spaceship developed by the company, Americans have regained this year the capacity of sending astronauts from their own soil after nine years of buying the seats on Russian Soyuz capsule. SpaceX is now in the process of building a communication satellites constellation that will be addressed and analyzed in the paper. Nowadays, in the space industry, we witness a very productive cybernetic feedback look between the development of space technologies, the democratization of those technologies, and a substantial reduction of prices. The latter is even more significant if we compare the cost of launching cargo into orbit now and 20 years ago – Falcon 9 is over ten times cheaper than Space Shuttle (Jones, 2018). This, of course, directly translates into the mass and number of objects that we are able to put in the orbit viably. Once the constellations consisting of thousands of satellites were unthinkable, but in the current environment, they become a reality. Space 2.0 also has brought new threats and challenges in the sphere of national and international security. The increase in launch capacity, among other factors, has led to progressive militarization and weaponization of space and new arms race (Bernat, 2019), which has also contributed to the growing numbers of orbiting objects. The goal of the paper is to present the argumentation that the threat posed by the cascading collisions in the Earth’s orbit (Kessler syndrome) is becoming more severe due to the construction of orbital satellite constellations; the threat that presents a real danger for people during their EVAs and orbital infrastructure, which may bare immediate consequences for safety and security systems on Earth. In order to provide the theoretical context for the above claim, the following issues will be presented and discussed: (1) space debris, (2) the Kessler syndrome, (3) orbital debris models, (4) the legal issues related to space debris and mitigation actions against their proliferation, and (5) the planned and being currently developed orbital satellite constellations and how they contribute to the growing threat of the Kessler syndrome.

#### Invisible tipping points trigger the Kessler Syndrome.

Thompson 21 – Clive, 11/17/21, Clive Thompson is a contributing writer for the New York Times Magazine, a columnist for Wired and Smithsonian magazines, and a regular contributor to Mother Jones. He’s the author of Coders: The Making of a New Tribe and the Remaking of the World, and Smarter Than You Think: How Technology is Changing our Minds for the Better. He’s @pomeranian99 on Twitter and Instagram, [“Get Ready for the “Kessler Syndrome” to Wreck Outer Space,” OneZero, <https://onezero.medium.com/get-ready-for-the-kessler-syndrome-to-wreck-outer-space-7f29cfe62c3e>] Justin

Back in 1978, the astrophysicist Donald Kessler made an alarming prediction: Space junk could wreck our ability to keep satellites aloft. In a fascinating paper, Kessler noted that “low earth orbit” — a region between 99 miles and 1,200 miles up — was getting pretty crowded. In 1978 there were already 3,866 objects being tracked in space. That included satellites used by scientists (say, to monitor weather) or spy agencies. It also included a lot of debris: Every time a rocket launches a satellite into orbit, it tends to leave stray bits of material. The thing is, when objects are zooming through space about 2 km/s, even something as tiny as a chip of paint can smash through glass or steel. Pieces of debris become bullets. What Kessler predicted is that sooner or later, objects in low-earth orbit would start colliding, and produce chain effects, like billiard balls colliding on a crowded pool table. If a piece of debris hit a satellite, it would produce more debris, which would to increase the risk of other collisions … and so on, and so on. At some point, you could reach a tipping point. There’d be so many chunks of debris that collisions would be inevitable, leaving low-earth orbit a junkyard where no satellites could survive. Remember the scene in Wall-E where they blast off Earth, and the planet is utterly ringed with crap? That’s what Kessler worried about. Except in our situation the pieces of junk could be quite small — billions of objects the size of grains of sand, which is actually a lot harder to deal with, because you can’t see it coming. In essence, Kessler predicted we could create an artificial asteroid belt of junk: The result would be an exponential increase in the number of objects with time, creating a belt of debris around the earth. This process of mutual collisions is thought to have been responsible for creating most of the astroids from larger planetlike bodies. Space folks began calling this the “Kessler Syndrome”. It was hard to predict when this might start happening. Kessler worried that conditions could be ripe by as early as 2000. Thankfully, that estimate turned out to be premature. But wow, it looks like it might happen soon. What’s happened recently that makes the “Kessler Syndrome” more likely? A couple of things: Way more satellites are going up The pace at which satellites are going up in the sky is simply exploding. Back when Kessler wrote his paper in 1978, we humans were launching about 53 new satellites a year. Going to space was hard. But now launches are an order of magnitude more common, and they’re increasing in pace rapidly. SpaceX in particular is launching oodles of satellites as it builds its orbital Internet-access service Starlink. In the last two years, it has put 1,740 satellites in low-earth orbit, with plans to eventually shoot 30,000 up there. This is part of a larger trend, which is … The privatization of outer space The private sector is rapidly becoming the dominant actor in space. There’s a huge demand for satellite data — everyone wants better info about weather, crops, traffic patterns, tree coverage, emissions, you name it, on top of the explosive use of satellites for communication and Internet. SpaceX’s remarkable innovations in rocketry (the leading folks, though others are following in their footsteps) have made it cheaper than ever to get a satellite into orbit. It is unlocking a huge pent-up demand for near-earth-orbit tech. More launches mean not only more intentional objects in orbit but unintentional ones — bits of rocket parts and detritus from launches.

#### Privatization exponentially increases the curve but ending dangerous missions stops it.

Bernat 20 – Pawel, 2020, Military University of Aviation, [“ORBITAL SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS AND THE GROWING THREAT OF KESSLER SYNDROME IN THE LOWER EARTH ORBIT,” SAFETY ENGINEERING OF ANTHROPOGENIC OBJECTS, Volume 4, PDF] Justin

5. Orbital satellite constellations and the growing threat of the Kessler syndrome Space 2.0 – the new era of space exploration that we witness now in the 21st century means, in words of Buzz Aldrin, “moving human enterprise into space” (Pyle, 2019, p. xiv). The process of commercialization of outer space has already begun and is not limited to private companies providing technologies and services for national or international space agencies, as it was in the past. On the contrary, private companies from the space sector have now matured to carry out their own independent projects. As for 2020, SpaceX is a company that serves as the best example – it launches satellites to the orbit, both for state and private contractors, it successfully realized two crew missions to the International Space Station, and is in the process of constructing Starlink satellite constellation that will provide high-speed internet access across the planet. Each satellite weighs around 260 kg, is equipped with an ion propulsion system, autonomous collision avoidance system, and orbits Earth at approximately 540-560 km altitude (Starlink, 2020). At the beginning of November 2020, more than 860 Starlink satellites were orbiting the Earth (Jewett, 2020). Immediate plans include launching 12,000 satellites, but they assume a potential later extension to 42,000 (Henry, 2019a). Of course, SpaceX has employed, at least declaratively, all necessary measures to keep the space clean – the satellites are equipped with the deorbiting system, and in the event of inoperability of the propulsion system (Starlink, 2020). The orbital collisions are, however, inevitable. As it was shown before, the possibility of collisions grows with the number of orbital objects. Bastida Virgili with the team compared (2016, p. 154-155) orbital debris environment development without and with a large hypothetical constellation consisting of merely 1080 satellites, distributed across 20 orbital planes at 1,100 km altitude (Fig. 5).

Chart, line chart

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It has to be noted that although SpaceX’s Starlink is the only constellation that is being built in orbit, it is not the only one planned. There are at least a few initiatives aiming at the same goal – to construct internet infrastructure at the Earth’s orbit. The planned Kuiper Systems LLC, which is a subsidiary of Amazon and intends to place 3,236 broadband satellites in the LEO, is one of Starlink’s biggest competitors (Henry, 2019b). Now, there is even a rivalry between the two companies because Kuiper’s lowest orbital shell is planned to be 590 km, with a tolerance of 9 km either above or below (Cao, 2020), which is the altitude of Starlink satellites. Moreover, the race for space in orbit is now at the beginning. The outer space is vast. It increasingly becomes more cluttered with both operational satellites and space debris. The threat of collisions increases and no institution or body has enough power to license, coordinate and regulate what is sent to the orbit. The UNOOSA has not such power. National states decide what the companies from the space industry can launch to space. In the United States, which is most advanced in the area of private constellations, it is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that issues the appropriate approvals. The race to put broadband internet satellites bears similarities to the gold rush – there are no rules, at the global level, apart from first-come, first-served.

#### Debris triggers miscalculated war.

Peter Dockrill 16. Award-winning science & technology journalist. “Space Junk Accidents Could Trigger Armed Conflict, Study Finds.” <https://www.sciencealert.com/space-junk-accidents-could-trigger-armed-conflict-expert-warns>.

The increasingly crowded space in Earth's low orbit could set the stage for an international armed conflict, says a new study. Researchers from the Russian Academy of Sciences warn that accidents stemming from the steady rise in space junk floating around the planet could incite political rows and even warfare, with nations potentially mistaking debris-caused incidents as the results of intentional aggressive acts by others. In a paper published in Acta Astronautica, the team suggests that space debris in the form of spent rocket parts and other fragments of hardware hurtling at high speed pose a "special political danger" that could dangerously escalate tensions between nations. According to the study, destructive impacts caused by random space junk cannot easily be told apart from military attacks. "The owner of the impacted and destroyed satellite can hardly quickly determine the real cause of the accident," the authors write. The risks of such an event occurring are compounded by the sheer volume of debris now orbiting Earth. Recent figures from NASA indicate that there are more than 500,000 pieces of space junk currently being tracked in orbit, travelling at speeds up to 28,160 km/h (17,500 mph). The majority of those objects are small – around the size of a marble – but some 20,000 of them are bigger than a softball. In addition to these 500,000 or so fragments – which are big enough for scientists to know about them – NASA estimates that there are millions of undetectable pieces of debris in orbit that are too small to be monitored. But even extremely small fragments such as these pose a threat – in fact, they're considered a greater risk than trackable debris, as their invisible status means spacecraft and satellites can't do anything to avoid them until it's too late. As NASA observed in 2013: "Even tiny paint flecks can damage a spacecraft when travelling at these velocities. In fact a number of space shuttle windows have been replaced because of damage caused by material that was analysed and shown to be paint flecks… With so much orbital debris, there have been surprisingly few disastrous collisions." While we may have been lucky in the past, we can't rely on that to continue. The study by the Russian team cites the repeated sudden failures of defence satellites in past decades that were never explained. The researchers attribute two possible causes: either unrecorded collisions with space junk, or aggressive actions from adversaries. "This is a politically dangerous dilemma," the authors write.

#### Goes nuclear.

Les Johnson 14. Baen science fiction author, popular science writer, and NASA technologist. “Living without satellites”. <https://www.baen.com/living_without_satellites>.

Satellite imagery is used by the military and our political leaders to maintain the peace. When your potential adversaries can’t hide what they’re doing, where their armies are moving and what they are doing with their civilian and military infrastructure, then the danger of surprise attack is diminished. In our nuclear age with instant death only minutes away by missile attack, the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) only works if both sides know whether or not they are being attacked. The launch of missiles or a bomber fleet can easily be seen from space far in advance of either reaching their potential targets halfway around the globe. The danger of surprise attack is therefore small, making an accidental war far less likely. So what does all this mean? And what do we do about it? First of all, it means that the advocates of space development, exploration and commercialization have succeeded far beyond their initial expectations and dreams. The economies and security of countries in the developed world are now dependent on space satellites. We space advocates should celebrate our success and be terrified of it at the same time. Should we lose these fragile assets in space, our economy would experience a disruption like no other: ship, air and train travel would stop and only restart/operate in a much-reduced capacity for years (GPS loss). Many banking and retail transactions would cease (VSAT loss). Distribution of news and vital national information would be crippled (communications satellite loss). Lives would be put at risk and the productivity of our farming would dramatically decrease (weather satellite loss). The risk of war, including nuclear war, would increase (loss of spy satellites) and our military’s ability to react to crises would be significantly reduced (loss of military logistics and intelligence gathering satellites).

#### Public pressure forces retaliation.

Nancy Gallagher 15. Interim director of the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland, previous Executive Director of the Clinton Administration’s CTBT Treaty Committee, an arms control specialist at the State Dept., and a faculty member at Wesleyan, “Antisatellite warfare without nuclear risk: A mirage,” May 29, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, <http://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges8346>

In recent decades, however, as space-based reconnaissance, communication, and targeting capabilities have become integral elements of modern military operations, strategists and policy makers have explored whether carrying out antisatellite attacks could confer major military advantages without increasing the risk of nuclear war. In theory, the answer might be yes. In practice, it is almost certainly no. Hyping threats. No country has ever deliberately and destructively attacked a satellite belonging to another country (though nations have sometimes interfered with satellites' radio transmissions). But the United States, Russia, and China have all tested advanced kinetic antisatellite weapons, and the United States has demonstrated that it can modify a missile-defense interceptor for use in antisatellite mode. Any nation that can launch nuclear weapons on medium-range ballistic missiles has the latent capability to attack satellites in low Earth orbit. Because the United States depends heavily on space for its terrestrial military superiority, some US strategists have predicted that potential adversaries will try to neutralize US advantages by attacking satellites. They have also recommended that the US military do everything it can to protect its own space assets while maintaining a capability to disable or destroy satellites that adversaries use for intelligence, communication, navigation, or targeting. Analysis of this sort often exaggerates both potential adversaries’ ability to destroy US space assets and the military advantages that either side would gain from antisatellite attacks. Nonetheless, some observers are once again advancing worst-case scenarios to support arguments for offensive counterspace capabilities. In some other countries, interest in space warfare may be increasing because of these arguments. If any nation, for whatever reason, launched an attack on a second nation's satellites, nuclear retaliation against terrestrial targets would be an irrational response. But powerful countries do sometimes respond irrationally when attacked. Moreover, disproportionate retaliation following a deliberate antisatellite attack is not the only way in which antisatellite weapons could contribute to nuclear war. It is not even the likeliest way. As was clearly understood by the countries that negotiated the Outer Space Treaty, crisis management would become more difficult, and the risk of inadvertent deterrence failure would increase, if satellites used for reconnaissance and communication were disabled or destroyed. But even if the norm against attacking another country’s satellites is never broken, developing and testing antisatellite weapons still increase the risk of nuclear war. If, for instance, US military leaders became seriously concerned that China or Russia were preparing an antisatellite attack, pressure could build for a pre-emptive attack against Chinese or Russian strategic forces. Should a satellite be struck by a piece of space debris during a crisis or a low-level terrestrial conflict, leaders might mistakenly assume that a space war had begun and retaliate before they knew what had actually happened. Such scenarios may seem improbable, but they are no more implausible than the scenarios that are used to justify the development and use of antisatellite weapons.

#### Convergence of factors guarantee space escalation.

Thomas González Roberts 17. A space security researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and host of [Moonstruck](https://www.moonstruckpodcast.com/), a podcast about humans in space. "Why We Should Be Worried about a War in Space ," 12-15-2017. Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/12/why-we-should-be-worried-about-a-war-in-space/548507/>

One hundred miles above the Earth’s surface, orbiting the planet at thousands of miles per hour, the six people aboard the International Space Station enjoy a perfect isolation from the chaos of earthly conflict. Outer space has never been a military battleground. But that may not last forever. The [debate in Congress](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1e6zH3AfZHs4hLpGaKwmxAVxR-LfWk0110THq9tIhgOU/edit?ts=5a2f95e8?utm_source=masthead-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=member-newsletter-20171213-20&silverid=%25%25RECIPIENT_ID%25%25) over whether to create a Space Corps comes at a time when governments around the world are engaged in a bigger international struggle over how militaries should operate in space. Fundamental changes are [already underway](https://www.csis.org/analysis/congress-creating-military-space-corps?utm_source=masthead-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=member-newsletter-20171213-20&silverid=%25%25RECIPIENT_ID%25%25). No longer confined to the [fiction shelf](https://best-sci-fi-books.com/23-best-military-science-fiction-books/?utm_source=masthead-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=member-newsletter-20171213-20&silverid=%25%25RECIPIENT_ID%25%25), space warfare is likely on the horizon. While agreements for how to operate in other international domains, like the open sea, airspace, and even cyberspace, have already been established, the major space powers—the United States, Russia, and China—have not agreed upon a rulebook outlining what constitutes bad behavior in space. It’s [presumed](http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/twmzia1cp84kv2c29bi4iz6q4u03in?utm_source=masthead-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=member-newsletter-20171213-20&silverid=%25%25RECIPIENT_ID%25%25) that International Humanitarian Law would apply in outer space—protecting the civilian astronauts aboard the International Space Station—but it’s unclear whether damaging civilian satellites or the space environment itself is covered under the agreement. With only a limited history of dangerous behavior to study, and few, [outdated guidelines](http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html?utm_source=masthead-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=member-newsletter-20171213-20&silverid=%25%25RECIPIENT_ID%25%25) in place, a war in space would be a war with potentially more consequences, but far fewer rules, than one on Earth. Although there has never been a military conflict in space, the history of human activity above our atmosphere is not entirely benign. In 1962, the United States [detonated a 1.4 megaton nuclear weapon](https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/going-nuclear-over-the-pacific-24428997/?utm_source=masthead-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=member-newsletter-20171213-20&silverid=%25%25RECIPIENT_ID%25%25) 250 miles above the Earth’s surface. The blast destroyed approximately one third of satellites in orbit and poisoned the most used region of space with radiation that lasted for years. Although the United States, Russia, and others soon agreed to a treaty to prevent another nuclear test in space, China and North Korea never signed it. In 2007, China [tested an anti-satellite weapon](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/AR2007011801029.html?utm_source=masthead-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=member-newsletter-20171213-20&silverid=%25%25RECIPIENT_ID%25%25), a conventionally-armed missile designed to target and destroy a satellite in orbit. In the process, it annihilated an old Chinese weather satellite and created high-velocity shrapnel that still threatens other satellites. Even though demonstrations like this have consequences for everyone, countries are free to carry them out as they see fit. No treaties address this kind of test, the creation of space debris, or the endangerment of other satellites. The U.S. has the most to lose in a space-based conflict With by far the most satellites in orbit, the U.S. has the most to gain by establishing norms, but also the most to lose. Almost half of all operational satellites are owned and operated by the United States government or American commercial companies. That’s twice as many as Russia and China, combined. Space may seem distant, but what happens there affects our everyday lives on the ground. When we use our phones to plan a trip, we depend on American GPS satellites to guide us. When the U.S. military deploys troops overseas, satellite communications connect forces on the ground to control centers. When North Korea launches an intercontinental ballistic missile, the U.S. and its allies depend on early-warning satellites to detect it. On one hand, if the global space powers agreed to put limits on space-based weapons and other related technologies, it could make space safer for everyone. But because the U.S. may have spent time and resources [developing](https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/why-so-secretive/525969/?utm_source=masthead-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=member-newsletter-20171213-20&silverid=%25%25RECIPIENT_ID%25%25) exactly the type of weapons that a code of conduct would ban**,** it could also curtail the most advanced space-based developments, erasing years of research and progress. There are more players in space—and less consensus In the [first space age](https://www.csis.org/analysis/escalation-and-deterrence-second-space-age?utm_source=masthead-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=member-newsletter-20171213-20&silverid=%25%25RECIPIENT_ID%25%25), from the launch of the first human-made satellite in 1957 through the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States and the USSR were responsible for over 90 percent of all satellites. Their race to perfect space technology, dominated by both national security interests and scientific discovery, far outpaced everyone else. The second space age, from 1990 to today, looks remarkably different. Now, more satellites are operated by private companies than militaries, and more space launches and new satellites come from countries other than the United States and Russia. More players in space—particularly more unpredictable players—means more opportunities for aggressive behavior, like developing anti-satellite technologies or hacking satellite communications. Countries like Iran or North Korea that are newer to space can choose to operate in a way we’ve never seen before. And if their nuclear programs on Earth are [any guide](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/iran-northk-korea-nuclear/542673/?utm_source=masthead-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=member-newsletter-20171213-20&silverid=%25%25RECIPIENT_ID%25%25), they could pose serious threats if left unchecked. Efforts have been made to create a modern-day space rulebook, but so far none have gained traction. In 2008, when Russia and China both proposed norms of behavior, the United States [refused to sign on](https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/04/space-war/521910/?utm_source=masthead-newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=member-newsletter-20171213-20&silverid=%25%25RECIPIENT_ID%25%25). Similarly, when the United States supported a 2014 European Union proposal to govern the use of conventional weapons in orbit, Russia and China didn’t agree with the terms. Since the congressional debate about a Space Corps, people have been taking the prospect of a war in space seriously, in a way we haven’t seen before. Now we should start talking about how to avoid that war. To prevent conflict in the upper atmosphere, all potential adversaries—the United States, China, North Korea, Iran, Russia, the EU—need to align, and agree on norms of behavior. They need rules.

#### No checks on escalation.

MacDonald 18 --- Bruce W. MacDonald, professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), ("Outer Space; Earthly Escalation? Chinese Perspectives on Space Operations and Escalation," August 2018, *NSI* white paper, <https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/SMA-White-Paper_Chinese-Persepectives-on-Space_-Aug-2018.pdf>, accessed 7-14-2019) bm

Challenges across all five phases: Another escalation threat is the inexperience that nations share in the space and cyber domains, unlike in conventional domains of conflict and in the nuclear domain to a lesser extent. This inexperience gives rise to a “sorcerer’s apprentice” problem, placing leaders at risk of making potentially unwise judgment calls without a full grasp of their implications. The space and cyber domains are sufficiently new and dynamic that such decisions are highly likely. Adding to this uncertainty is the ever-growing interdependence of infrastructures within and among advanced countries, making the impact of major attacks against a country’s space and/or cyber infrastructures inherently unknowable. In considering all these factors, it is important to keep in mind that events in space do not happen in isolation. Any space conflict would likely be part of a multidimensional field of play, with space being important because of the effects it has on the earth. Significant instability in space is unlikely to lead to war if there is stability in other domains and in the larger geopolitical relationship between participants, while conflict could easily spread to a stable space domain if war in other domains appeared preferable to the alternative. While any use of nuclear weapons would pose a serious threat of escalation to full-scale nuclear war, any use of space or cyber offense would not pose a comparable escalation threat. That said, a series of reciprocal escalations could easily become unstable. No clear-cut escalation barrier exists in the space and cyber domains, and given the short-term tactical benefits of escalating ahead of an adversary, each additional escalation could create incentives for further escalation that an adversary would not always anticipate. Escalation in space, then, is a slippery slope with few off-ramps.

#### Specifically---China, Iran, and Noko.

Beauchamp 14 – Zack, 4/21/14, Zack Beauchamp is a senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on foreign policy and international relations. His work focuses on the rise of the populist right across the West, the role of identity in American politics, and how fringe ideologies shape the mainstream. Before coming to Vox, he edited TP Ideas, a section of Think Progress devoted to the ideas shaping our political world. He has an MSc from the London School of Economics in International Relations and grew up in Washington, DC, where he currently lives with his wife, daughter, and two (rescue) dogs [“How space trash could start a nuclear war,” Vox, <https://www.vox.com/2014/4/21/5625246/space-war-china-north-korea-iran>] Justin \*Brackets added for ableist language

If debris from a Chinese test destroys a US military satellite, the US could mistake it as a preemptive strike against its space capabilities — some of which are designed to detect nuclear missile launches. If the US thinks China is trying to take out its ability to detect a nuclear launch, things could get very bad, very quickly. Accidents aren't the only concern. Zenko also worries about intentional space attacks, either during peacetime or a crisis. Here, Iran and North Korea are probably bigger threats, though their ASAT capabilities are far from proven. North Korea has a pattern of ~~crazy~~ [irrational] military moves designed to extort concessions from South Korea and the West; it could extend that behavior to space. Iran, according to Zenko, "already views space as a legitimate arena in which to contest US military power." He worries that Iran might fire missiles into space "during a major crisis, especially if it believes war is imminent — an assessment that could have self-fulfilling consequences."

#### Any nuclear war causes extinction – ice age and famine.

Steven Starr 15 [Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the [Physicians for Social Responsibility](http://www.psr.org/). He has worked with the Swiss, Chilean, and Swedish governments in support of their efforts at the United Nations to eliminate thousands of high-alert, launch-ready U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. <https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html>] TG

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that [ends human history](https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StarrNuclearWinterOct09.pdf). There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create [a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSAD.pdf). Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout, produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to [destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer](https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/just-published/3995/nuclear-war-and-ultraviolet-radiation) and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

#### Satellites solves the grid and every extinction threat.

Pellegrino & Stang 16 --- Massimo Pellegrino, Master’s Degree in Space Studies from ISU, with Gerald Stang, Senior Associate Analyst at the EUISS, holds BSc and MSc degrees in chemical engineering from the University of Saskatchewan and an MA in international affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University (“Space Security for Europe”, *EU Institute for Security Studies*, published July 2016, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/space-security-europe>, accessed 7-10-2019) bm

Modern societies are highly dependent on the continuous operation of critical infrastructure to ensure the provision of basic goods and services. They consist of assets, systems or parts thereof which are so vital, that their disruption would significantly impact the economy, national security, public health, safety, or social well-being. Examples of critical infrastructure include energy, water, food supply, communication, transportation, and waste processing systems. Space assets are so deeply embedded in developed economies that a day without fully functioning space capabilities would severely restrict or even endanger our lives. Space systems are critical for running energy grids and telecommunication networks, border and maritime surveillance, crisis management and humanitarian operations, environmental and climate monitoring, verification of international treaties and arms control agreements, and the fight against organised crime and terrorism. Space assets also provide the technological backbone for other critical infrastructures. The synchronisation of power grids and telecommunication networks, for example, is heavily dependent on GNSS timing signals and any disruption would create a domino effect on other critical infrastructures (see Figure 5). Satellites also play a central role in supporting defence systems and military operations. They are force multipliers that provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, as well as communication, navigation, positioning and timing signals. Armed forces do not only use their own space systems, but are also significant consumers of space services provided by private operators. In fact, about 90% of US military communications traffic passes through civilian satellites, many of which privately owned, rather than through dedicated systems designed to withstand attempted interruptions.1 The reliance of both civilian and military users on space systems therefore places them firmly in the area of critical infrastructure. Some critical space systems, such as the American GPS, are under foreign control, and the governments controlling those systems retain the authority to disrupt services, even for allies, in case of a national emergency. While the United States announced that it has no intention of ever intentionally degrading public GPS signals (also known as ‘Selective Availability’) and that the next generation of GPS satellites will not include this feature, other governments might still do so.2 These dependences engender new and growing vulnerabilities. Reliance on space is likely to increase further as space capabilities and services improve in diversity, quality and affordability. Close to 1,500 satellites with a launch mass of over 50 kg are expected to be launched over the next decade; an increase of 50% compared to 2005-2014. This estimate excludes both the expected proliferation of smaller satellites (such as CubeSats), but also the planned OneWeb and Steam mega-constellations for global internet broadband service. Advances in small satellite capabilities and in launch technology (e.g. SpaceX’s Falcon rocket family) have already lowered the cost of access to space. About 45% more CubeSats were launched in 2014 than in 2013 (130 vs. 91), accounting for 63% of all satellites launched3 . However, just as the reliance on space increases, so too do threats and vulnerabilities. Therefore, in order to realise the full potential of investments in space, critical space systems need to be adequately protected and the space environment properly managed.

#### Grid collapse causes extinction.

Friedemann 16 --- Alice, transportation expert, founder of EnergySkeptic.com, citing Dr Peter Vincent Pry, executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, a Congressional advisory board dedicated to achieving protection of the United States from electromagnetic pulse and other threats, (“Electromagnetic pulse threat to infrastructure (U.S. House hearings)”, 1-24-2016, <http://energyskeptic.com/2016/the-scariest-u-s-house-session-ever-electromagnetic-pulse-and-the-fall-of-civilization/>)

Modern civilization cannot exist for a protracted period without electricity. Within days of a blackout across the U.S., a blackout that could encompass the entire planet, emergency generators would run out of fuel, telecommunications would cease as would transportation due to gridlock, and eventually no fuel. Cities would have no running water and soon, within a few days, exhaust their food supplies. Police, Fire, Emergency Services and hospitals cannot long operate in a blackout.Government and Industry also need electricity in order to operate. The EMP Commission warns that a natural or nuclear EMP event, given current unpreparedness, would likely result in societal collapse.

### Framing

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### 1] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### 2] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### 3] Extinction outweighs

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

### UV

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps – 1AR are too short to make up for the time trade-off.

#### 2] Reasonability on 1NC theory with the brightline of link and impact turn ground – there are infinite bidirectional interps that I can never meet – the four minute 1AR doesn’t have enough time to line by line every argument, make offense, and go for substance.

#### 3] Evaluate the debate after the 2AR – otherwise it gives debaters an unfair time skew and is arbitrary.

#### 4] Use comparative worlds – A] topic ed – forces the neg to research the topic instead of low quality rez flaw args – the only benefit to debate is making us better arguers not perfect logicians, B] reciprocity – truth-testing allows the neg to disprove any part of the aff, but the aff has to defend every part, which gives the neg too much ground, C] inclusion – truth testing says rez is only thing that’s relevant which excludes ks – either only the rez matters so we can’t punish slurs, or people should get dropped for making debate unsafe which proves other things matter