## 1AC – Normal

### 1AC – FW

#### Any moral valuation presupposes the unconditional worth of humanity because when agents pursue any end, all value placed upon an object is contingent upon the agent for example a pencil is only valuable to me so long as it can write my paper. Agents have unconditional value because they possess the ability to confer value that stems from their reason. That outweighs.

#### All other frameworks collapse—other theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

#### That justifies universalizable ends – A) a priori principles like reason apply to everyone since they are independent of human experience and B) any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end and demand the value of my end be recognized by others.

#### There are two models of universal freedom—the non-interference model and the non-domination model. The non-interference holds that someone’s freedom is violated if they are actually interfered with, whereas the non-domination model holds that someone’s freedom is violated if someone has the capacity to arbitrarily interfere. For example, a slave with a benevolent master would be free under non-interference b/c the master let’s them set and pursue whatever ends they want, but unfree under freedom as non-domination b/c their freedom is contingent upon the master who has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily.

#### Prefer the non-domination model:

#### Freedom is good but the non-interference model of freedom allows absolute institutional control—non-domination solves.

Pettit 97 Philip Pettit (Laurence Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values at Princeton University). “Freedom with Honor: A Republican Ideal.” Spring 1997. <http://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/papers/FreedomwithHonor_SocialResearch_1997.pdf>

And so to my claim about the constitutional consistency of freedom as noninterference with institutional humiliation. For the lesson of our reflections is that **if the task is to promote negative liberty** overall then **the best constitution**al arrangement for doing that **may involve leaving some** people **with** a certain **power of interfering in** the **lives of others**. But if some people have such a power of interfering with others then, cases of covert manipulation apart, it will generally be salient to relevant parties that they have that power: everyone is going to be interested, after all, in whether some people dominate others in this way and it will usually be evident from the allocation of resources that they do or do not exercise such domination (Pettit, 1997, ch. 2). And **where** it is salient to all that **a dominates b,** then it will equally be salient that **if b does anything in the domain of a’s power,** then **b does that by** the **implicit leave**—by the grace and favor—**of a. There may not be much actual interference** practiced in the relationship **but it will still be** the case, and it will still be saliently the case, **that b acts** and lives **at the mercy of a. With such manifest domination, of course, humiliation routinely follows**. The subordinate party has to look out for the moods and feelings of the dominating person. They have to make sure that they stay on their best side. **They will naturally seek to ingratiate themselves with their superior**, if that is possible, **and** they **may** even find themselves inclined to **bow and scrape**. The subordinate party will live in a position where **their grounds for self-respect are** severely **compromised**; they will be forced to accept a considerable measure of humiliation. I earlier associated the absence of humiliation with enjoying a voice and being given an ear. The connection between domination and humiliation comes out nicely in the loss of voice that domination entails. The dominated person is obliged to watch what they say, having an eye to what will please their dominators; they have to impress their dominators, wherever that is possible, and try to win a higher ranking in their opinion. But **such a person will naturally be presumed to lack an independent voice**, at least in the area where domination is relevant. They will fail to make the most basic claim on the attention of the more powerful, for they will easily be seen as attention-seekers: they will easily be seen in the way that adults often see precocious children. They may happen to receive attention but they will not command attention; **they may happen to receive respect but they will not command respect.**

#### **Non-domination is the only notion of freedom that can apply to state actors. Prefer: State interference promotes freedom if it ensures non-domination.**

Waltman 2 Jerry Waltman (taught political science at the University of Southern Mississippi for 25 years; in 15 of those he participated in the British Studies Program.  He currently holds an endowed professorship in political science at Baylor University, where he teaches British politics and comparative public law.  He received his Ph.D. from Indiana University, and is the author of eight books and numerous articles in academic journals on both British and American politics.  In addition to his years spent on the British Studies Program, he has traveled and taught in the UK on many occasions). “Civic Republicanism, The Basic Income Guarantee, and the Living Wage.” USBIG Discussion Paper. No. 25, March 2002.

Civic republicanism's origins lie in the ancient world, in the political theory undergirding several notable Greek city-states and the Roman republic. (2) Thereafter, it lay dormant until resurrected in the Italian city-states of the Renaissance, and then by the "Commonwealth men" of seventeenth century England. From the latter, it was transported to the American colonies and flowered during the Revolutionary era and immediately afterward. While republican thinkers from these various periods parted company on several matters, their unifying focus was that **the polity is a self-governing community of citizens**. The aim of the civic republican polity is maintaining the liberty of its citizens. **Since liberty cannot be achieved outside a community**-a wild animal can be "free" but it cannot be said to have "liberty"-**the individual** citizen must be intimately connected to the community. He **must believe that** his **[their] interests are inseparable from those of the community**, and that the role of citizen is a natural part of life. The state can rely on its citizens, who after all are the state, to exercise civic virtue and to consider the needs of the community along with their own. The citizenry governs itself by the process of deliberation, a deliberation devoted to finding and pursuing the public interest. To this end, political institutions in a republic should evidence a certain balance and be rather slow acting, at least under ordinary circumstances. Representative democracy, which allows republics to be larger than city-states, is a method for the further protection of liberty. It is not, pointedly, an end in itself. **Unlike liberal individualism, which posits no overriding end for the polity, civic republicanism stands** emphatically **on liberty** as its central value. Liberty is taken to mean being free from domination. More formally, according to Richard Petit, a leading contemporary republican theorist, "One agent dominates another if and only if they have a certain power over that other, in particular a power of interference on an arbitrary basis." (3) Domination can therefore take either of two forms. In the first, one private individual holds power over another (dominium); in the second, it is the state which exercises the domination (imperium). Both are equally odious to republicanism. If I am dominated, I am not free, no matter what the source of the domination. **To be a citizen is to be** at all times and all places **free of domination**, since citizenship is synonymous with the enjoyment of liberty. Prohibiting dominium presupposes that no citizen can be the servant of another, for servanthood brings domination with it by its very nature. If you are my servant and I order you around, you are quite clearly being dominated. Nevertheless, it is important to note that **you are dominated even if I chose not to order you around** (for whatever reason). **You still cannot look me in the eye as an equal**, for we both know that "The Remains of the Day" is more realistic than Wooster and Jeeves. Not only may I alter my reserved role at any time without consulting you, but you will also be ever mindful of my ability to do so, and that cannot help but affect how you think, feel, and act. You and I are both aware that there may come a time when you will have to tread gingerly. Citizens of a republic simply cannot have such a relationship. As Petit said of civic republicans: The heights that they identified held out the prospect of a way of life within which none of them had to bow and scrape to others; they would each be capable of standing on their own two feet; they would each be able to look others squarely in the eye. (4) Or, as Walt Whitman succinctly described a citizen, "Neither a servant nor a master am I." (5) **Governmental power can** of course **be a source of domination also**, for the enormous power of the state is ever pregnant with the potential for domination. **There is, however, a critical difference** here. **Where**as **interference**, real or potential, **by one individual over another**'s choices **is** by its nature **domination, government**al **interference** in one's affairs **may** or may **not be.** This is **because liberty can only be** made **meaningful in a community, and** the **needs of the community will** necessarily at times come into **conflict** with one or more individuals' autonomy, or at least with individuals' autonomy as they would define it. It is the community that makes liberty possible, and a citizen's freedom is inseparable from the interests and health of the community. As Blackstone noted, "**laws, when prudently framed, are** by no means subversive but rather **introductive of liberty**."

#### Additionally Prefer:

#### [A] Ethical frameworks are topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must be theoretically justified. Prefer on resource disparities—focusing on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep excluding lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debater under my framework can easily be won without any prep since minimal evidence is required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

#### [B] Only universalizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

#### [C] Willing to abide by their ethical theory presupposes we have freedom in the first place. Thus, making an argument for another standard concedes the authority to mine.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with universality as non-domination.

#### [1] Presumption and Permissibility affirm: a] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me. b] If anything is permissible, then so is the aff since there is nothing prohibiting us.

#### [2] Consequences Fail: a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict. b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. c] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify because we commit the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral d] Yes act/omission distinction – there are infinite events occurring over which you have no control, so you can never be moral

#### [3] Contesting offense under the Aff framework is a voting issue. Reciprocity – I have to win my framework and beat the NC before I can access case, whereas you can collapse to either layer or dump on offense for 7 minutes as a no-risk issue so there’s a skew. Key to fairness because it’s definitionally equal access to the ballot.

### 1AC – Advocacy

#### Thus, the advocacy – Resolved: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike.

### 1AC – Offense

#### Recognizing the right to strike would transform dominating power structures.

Lazar 20 [Orlando; 10/6/20; St. Edmund Hall & Balliol College, University of Oxford; “Work, Domination, and the False Hope of Universal Basic Income,” <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11158-020-09487-9>] Justin

If workers can simply leave and subsist on an adequate level of basic income, then they can very credibly threaten to do so rather than suffer under the dominating power structures of their workplaces. More than this, employers will know that their workers have this option. In response to some gross overstep of managerial power this might take the form of an actual threat, but in normal circumstances it would function as an implicit threat on the part of the worker. The threat to strike works in the same way: where the right to strike is protected, that threat functions quietly and implicitly, and needs only rarely become explicit. The genuine ability to exit would become more than a tool to contest, after the fact, managerial decisions; it would be an ever-present possibility, raising the bargaining power of individual workers and reshaping their relationship to their employers. Rather than just the ability to exit, an adequate UBI gives workers various abilities—by the reckoning of one supporter, the powers to ‘enter, undominatedly stay, exit, and restart all kinds of social relations, starting with work relations’ (Casassas 2016, p. 9). In this sense the power structures of individual workplaces would be transformed, with managers no longer able to monopolise the residual authority described in the previous section.

#### Striking is a fundamental protection of dignity and the right of the worker to resist a dominant relationship.

Mason 18 [Elinor. Elinor Mason is a senior lecturer in philosophy at Edinburgh University. On striking, and the recognition that ethics are a collective affair. “On striking, and the recognition that ethics are a collective affair”. 4-1-2018. openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/on-striking-and-recognition-that-ethics-are-collective-affair/.] SJ//VM

It is worth situating any remarks about the ethics of strike action in the legal context. In Britain, strike action is not civil disobedience, it is legal, and permitted within the framework of employment law. This situation was hard won, by generations of workers who faced terrible working conditions. At the start of the industrial revolution, workers faced day to day working conditions that were often unsanitary and dangerous, no job security, exploitative wages, no paid time off, arbitrary inequalities, and of course, no pensions. In the years following the Industrial Revolution, workers fought for the right to organize, and formed trade unions in order to use collective power to resist unfair treatment by their employers. The overall justification for a framework that allows workers to unionize, and to pursue strike action under some circumstances, is that the possibility of striking provides a safeguard against exploitation, a protection for workers in a situation of power imbalance. **Ethical Issues** 1. Preconditions Obviously, there are various [preconditions that must be met](https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/kieran-oberman/just-and-unjust-strikes) for a strike to be ethically justified. First, the question of whether what the employers are doing is unfair or not arises. The pensions issue is incredibly complicated, and I do not pretend to understand all the [actuarial details](https://twitter.com/mikeotsuka?lang=en). It seems though, that we have a just cause here, that the offers that have been made are unfair. It is worth pointing out that it is not just a question of how much money there is or will be in the pension fund, there are also ethical questions: a question about how risk should be distributed, and a question about what else the universities are doing with their money. Pensions are a kind of wage, and our wages are not paid out of any particular fund, but out of the universities’ general resources. So we should be wary of accepting frameworks for discussion that attempt to reduce all the issues to financial ones. Relatedly, if a strike is to be justified, the cause must be realistic. There is no point in striking for something that cannot be obtained. But again, we should be careful here. What counts as unrealistic depends on the values people hold. There was a time when votes for women seemed unrealistic. Twenty years ago, marriage equality might have seemed an unrealistic goal. But some people pursued those goals anyway. If we take for granted that vice chancellors will be paid a fortune and that wages will be linked to student enrolment, perhaps fair wages for lecturers is not realistic. But why would we take those things for granted? Finally, of course, less disruptive methods of persuasion should be used first. Striking is a last resort, it is only permissible when negotiation has stalled. We start by trying to persuade the employer on the basis of the reasons: that a policy or proposal is unfair, unnecessary, that there are alternatives. It is only if that fails that we should move to strike action. **2. Harm** The primary aim of a strike is to harm the interests of the employer. Public Sector workers, will, inevitably end up harming the public too. In the public sector, the work we do is a public good, and if we withdraw our labour, we hurt the public. How much harm there is depends on what area, and what sort of public good we are talking about – the potential harm from doctors striking is greater than the potential harm we do here. The harm we do to our students in striking is nonetheless significant, and it needs to be defended. I think that the harm here is justified, and I will try to defend that in what follows, but even if you do not agree with me about this case, I aim to provide a way to think clearly about what might justify this sort of harm. First though, it is worth thinking a bit more about the nature of the harm, and what role it has. We might think of students as innocent bystanders in all this, and we might think that our duty as teachers is to minimize the harm to them. I don’t think that is quite right: students are innocent bystanders in one sense, they are innocent anyway, they are not the ones deciding to cut our pensions. However, harm to students is an essential part of strike action, and we should face that head on. Here is why. Strike action occurs when negotiation has not worked. If the suggested changes are truly unjust, what should we do? Should we simply accept the injustice? The recent history of Conservative government policy in the UK, starting with Thatcher and continued by Cameron, is to weaken the power of the Unions and weaken the right to strike. Their idea is that the way to deal with unjust working condition is through individual employment tribunals. If I am being badly treated by my employer, I should initiate a tribunal. But this deprives us of the power of collective action. The whole point of the union is that we are stronger together. We bargain collectively, and so the employers cannot pit us against each other as individuals. Furthermore, we threaten collectively. Harm to the employer’s interests is a necessary part of what makes collective action effective. It is because a harm is threatened that the employer has reason to change their mind. When the employer is a public body and the work a public good, then harm to the public – the students, in this case – is inevitable. To put it another way, striking is a form of coercion. We want to make it impossible for them to say ‘no’ to us. The preconditions for a justified strike are that the workers offered the reasons that were directly relevant – the reasons relating to justice, and that failed. So now the workers offer a different sort of reason: coercive practical reasons. As I said, the right to strike is a protection against exploitation. We have the right to move on to threat of harm when our reasonable requests are ignored. Compare this situation: imagine that a student plagiarises an essay. We have both a reasons based system to discourage plagiarism (we make clear that it is wrong and unfair) and a practical reason as back up (if you plagiarize, we will take punitive action). The punitive action is essentially harmful, that’s why it is effective, and of course, that is why it is only justified when all else has failed. **3. Justifying harm** First, as I said above, I think that the pensions deal we have been offered is unfair in its own terms. But our goal here is not simply to get our pensions back. Long term, we are trying to protect the University, just as the [junior doctors’ strike](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-34775980) in 2016 was partly about the future of the NHS. If the university mistreats its employees, it will not have as good a pool of staff to draw on, and the quality of the institution will suffer. We impose harms on this generation of students, but we hope that future generations of students will be able to take advantage of a strong university system. More broadly, a strike is usually about more than just the issue at hand. Women factory workers in the early twentieth century went on [strike for equal pay](http://www.unionhistory.info/equalpay/). They were not just striking for equal pay as individuals, they were protesting about gender inequity. The strike has an expressive message. Most of your lecturers striking here are doing more than asking for their pensions back: they are sending an expressive message to University management. For many of us, the message is that we want the University to be a public good, a shared asset, a place of learning and teaching, not a business. Our students are not consumers, and market models are not the best way to run universities. In striking, we are referencing a long history of effective strike action, and we are showing that we are willing to fight for the things we value. This is not to deny that the right to strike could be abused, or could be ineffective. In the end, it is an empirical matter whether the right to strike has done more good than harm, or done more harm than good. It is not an empirical matter that is easy to settle either: labour history is one of the most ideologically polluted areas of human enquiry. On the one hand, there are the supporters of the right to strike, who point out that organization has brought us workers’ rights and tolerable working conditions. On the other hand there are those who argue, with Thatcher, that striking hurts growth; hurts industry; hurts the economy, and should be stopped. It may seem like a far fetched comparison, but think of the right to bear arms, as enshrined in the American constitution. That right has the same basic justification as the right to strike, it is there to protect the ordinary person from tyranny and exploitation by more powerful groups. However, the right to bear arms does not actually function like that. It is not a safeguard against tyranny, but rather causes immense harm. We can imagine that this is how Thatcher saw the right to strike: as a right that does not achieve its aims and causes unnecessary harm. But the opposing view is that the legal right to strike is an effective right, it does protect us, and can be, and is usually, used in a judicious way. But as I say, this is an empirical matter, and we should all know more about labour history. **4. Collective Action** Finally, I will close with a couple of thoughts about collective action. As I said, we stand for more than just this issue. That worries some people: they will not march under a banner that they do not fully endorse. Here is an interesting philosophical/sociological thought about that. As I said, the anti-union movement encourages us away from collective action and towards individual action. One of Margaret Thatcher’s major victories was to [take away the right to strike in solidarity](http://www.unionhistory.info/timeline/1960_2000_Narr_Display.php?Where=NarTitle+contains+%27Anti-Union+Legislation%3A+1980-2000%27) with other workers who have a different employer. Perhaps it is not coincidental that there is also a cultural movement towards thinking of one’s values as a very individual thing, a personal thing. Philosophically, there is one clear mistake there, and a less clear one. The clear mistake is thinking that values are not universalisable. As [Kant](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/) points out, it is part of the definition of values that they are universalisable. Values are not personal in the sense that they apply only to the person who holds them. The less clear point though, and more relevant here, is that integrity does not require that we never sign up for anything we are not fully on board with every detail of. We shouldn’t be too precious about our own values. The mistake here might be characterized as fetishization, or a quest for purity. Think of the voter who says, ‘I can’t vote for X because of something she has done that I don’t agree with, so I will not vote at all’. This is a mistake. We should think of the bigger picture, sometimes be willing to throw our lot in with those we disagree with in pursuit of bigger goals. [Solidarity](https://www.opendemocracy.net/uk/mihaela-mihai/plea-to-my-students) is important, and solidarity requires that we think of our own values as robust enough to bear some minor disagreements. We should value solidarity; we should engage in it. We hugely appreciate the solidarity of our students: thank you.

#### Non-domination requires restriction of the employer’s power to arbitrarily impose their will on employees.

Bogg 17 [Alan. Alan L Bogg is Professor in Law at the [University of Bristol Law School](https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/organisations/university-of-bristol-law-school). 'Republican Non-Domination and Labour Law: New Normativity or Trojan Horse?', (2017), 33, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Issue 3, pp. 391-417, <https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/International+Journal+of+Comparative+Labour+Law+and+Industrial+Relations/33.3/IJCL2017017>] SJ//VM

According to Pettit, this equal civic status requires the effective public resourcing and protection of ‘basic liberties’ in the relations between private citizens.46 These ‘basic liberties’ consist of those freedoms that are capable of being exercised and enjoyed equally by all citizens. This would require the republican state to entrench such freedoms as ‘the freedom to think what you like’ and ‘the freedom to travel within the society’ as ‘basic liberties’.47 The specification and content of these ‘basic liberties’ is determined through Pettit’s ‘free-person heuristic,’ or ‘eyeball test’: ‘people should securely enjoy resources and protections to the point where they … can look others in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that a power of interference might inspire; they can walk tall and assume the public status, objective and subjective, of being equal in this regard with the best.’48 It is a great strength of Pettit’s account of ‘basic liberties’ that it is rooted in a concern to ameliorate private domination between citizens. By contrast, standard liberal accounts of freedom focus on state infringement of freedom, and are sometimes sceptical of the ‘horizontal’ extension of public rights into the private sphere.49 This also marks an important difference with the structure of Lovett’s republican argument, where his discussion of basic liberties is framed as a concern to impose constitutional limits on public democratic processes.50 On Pettit’s republican account, the ‘basic liberties’ demarcate a protected zone of freedoms that must be insulated from arbitrary interference by other private parties.51 In particular, Pettit’s eyeball test leads to the need for ‘special insulation’ of the ‘basic liberties’ within ‘relationships like those of wife and husband, employee and employer, debtor and creditor, where there are often asymmetries of power’.52 Pettit is therefore concerned to elaborate a republican account of labour standards, and the employment relation lies at the centre of Pettit’s democratic theory. This ‘special insulation’ regime of republican labour law requires the state to impose legal duties on the stronger party to restrain the arbitrary exercise of private power. This would include ‘for cause’ dismissal protection, encompassing ‘constraints within workplace relations that deny an employer the right to fire without cause, imposing something like a requirement to defend an appeal against dismissal in an agreed forum.’53 It also includes ‘legalizing the unionization of employees and recourse to strike action’.54 This is because ‘the resort to collective action…may represent the only hope of winning freedom as non-domination for those who are employed.’55 Pettit defends the public provision of unemployment insurance to resource effective ‘exit’ rights for workers, as part of a public republican programme of insurance for citizens. 56 Pettit’s approach to ‘special insulation’ is also attuned to the specific vulnerabilities of precarious workers. For example, in their republican audit of Spanish governmental reforms implemented under Prime Minister Zapatero, Luis Marti and Pettit offer a favourable assessment of specific legal measures to protect illegal migrant-workers and those employed on fixed term contracts.57

### Underview

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory since the neg can be infinitely abusive and I can’t check back. Aff theory is drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer since the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance and reasonability bites intervention since it’s up to the judge to determine. No 2NR RVI, paradigm issues, theory, evidence, or new responses to AC arguments since they’d dump on it for 6 minutes and my 3-minute 2AR is spread too thin. No RVIs on AC arguments – incentivizes a 7 minute collapse that decks 1AR strategy. If I’m wrong I shouldn’t be punished since it breeds more animosity and decks future solutions for violence.

#### **[2] Fairness is a voter – A] Debate’s a competitive game and requires objective evaluation.** B] Fairness best coheres a winner since if one debater had ten minutes to speak and the other had three there would be incongruence that alters ability to judge the better debater. Procedural unfairness doesn’t compensate since it denies access anyone to the space. C] Determines engagement in substance so it outweighs. D] Jurisdiction – every argument you make concedes the authority of fairness: i.e. that the judge will evaluate your arguments. Hack against them if they contest this since that’s the most unfair thing to do E

#### **[3] Weigh the case vs the K: a] Fairness – opposing frameworks moot our offense – there are infinite parts they could problematize which forces a 1ar restart b] Clash – Our scholarship is tied to the goodness of our framework and plan**

### TT

#### The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement.

#### [1] Constitutivism: The ballot says vote aff or neg based on a topic – five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional – that’s a meta constraint on anything else since the judge voting aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary proves that it’s an independent voter means hack against them if they contest it.

#### [2] Fairness: Anything new moots 6 minutes of the AC and exacerbates neg reactivity advantage so I should be able to compensate by choosing. They justify substantive skews since there will always be a more correct side of the issue but we compensate for flaws in the lit.

#### [3] Inclusivity: Other ROBs open the door for personal lives to factor into decisions to compare who is more oppressed causing violence. Only we allow anything as long is it proves the res true or false but the judge can stop if its violent. Also if I’m textual I’m fair since the resolution is the only predictable stasis point.

### Adv

#### Global democracy is collapsing now.

Freedom House 3/3 [Freedom House. Freedom House works to defend human rights and promote democratic change, with a focus on political rights and civil liberties. We act as a catalyst for freedom through a combination of analysis, advocacy, and action. Our analysis, focused on 13 central issues, is underpinned by our international program work. “New Report: The global decline in democracy has accelerated”. 3-3-2021. . https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated.] SJ//VM

Washington - March 3, 2021 — Authoritarian actors grew bolder during 2020 as major democracies turned inward, contributing to the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom, according to [***Freedom in the World 2021***](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege), the annual country-by-country assessment of political rights and civil liberties released today by Freedom House. The report found that the share of countries designated Not Free has reached its highest level since the deterioration of democracy began in 2006, and that countries with declines in political rights and civil liberties outnumbered those with gains by the largest margin recorded during the 15-year period. The report downgraded the freedom scores of 73 countries, representing 75 percent of the global population. Those affected include not just authoritarian states like China, Belarus, and Venezuela, but also troubled democracies like the United States and India. In one of the year’s most significant developments, India’s status changed from Free to Partly Free, meaning less than 20 percent of the world’s people now live in a Free country—the smallest proportion since 1995. Indians’ political rights and civil liberties have been eroding since Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014. His Hindu nationalist government has presided over increased pressure on human rights organizations, rising intimidation of academics and journalists, and a spate of bigoted attacks—including lynchings—aimed at Muslims. The decline deepened following Modi’s reelection in 2019, and the government’s response to the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 featured further abuses of fundamental rights. The changes in India formed part of a broader shift in the international balance between democracy and authoritarianism, with authoritarians generally enjoying impunity for their abuses and seizing new opportunities to consolidate power or crush dissent. In many cases, promising democratic movements faced major setbacks as a result. In Belarus and Hong Kong, for example, massive prodemocracy protests met with brutal crackdowns by governments that largely disregarded international criticism. The Azerbaijani regime’s military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh indirectly threatened recent democratic gains in Armenia, while the armed conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region dashed hopes for the tentative political opening in that country since 2018. All four of these cases notably featured some degree of intervention by an autocratic neighbor: Moscow provided a backstop for the regime in Belarus, Beijing propelled the repression in Hong Kong, Turkey’s government aided its Azerbaijani counterpart, and Ethiopia’s leader called in support from Eritrea. The malign influence of the regime in China, the world’s most populous dictatorship, ranged far beyond Hong Kong in 2020. Beijing ramped up its global disinformation and censorship campaign to counter the fallout from its cover-up of the initial coronavirus outbreak, which severely hampered a rapid global response in the pandemic’s early days. Its efforts also featured increased meddling in the domestic political discourse of foreign democracies, as well as transnational extensions of rights abuses common in mainland China. The Chinese regime has gained clout in multilateral institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council, which the United States abandoned in 2018, as Beijing pushed a vision of so-called noninterference that allows abuses of democratic principles and human rights standards to go unpunished while the formation of autocratic alliances is promoted. “This year’s findings make it abundantly clear that we have not yet stemmed the authoritarian tide,” said Sarah Repucci, vice president of research and analysis at Freedom House. “Democratic governments will have to work in solidarity with one another, and with democracy advocates and human rights defenders in more repressive settings, if we are to reverse 15 years of accumulated declines and build a more free and peaceful world.” **A need for reform in the United States** While still considered Free, the United States experienced further democratic decline during the final year of the Trump presidency. The US score in [Freedom in the World](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege) has dropped by 11 points over the past decade, and fell by three points in 2020 alone. The changes have moved the country out of a cohort that included other leading democracies, such as France and Germany, and brought it into the company of states with weaker democratic institutions, such as Romania and Panama. Several developments in 2020 contributed to the United States’ current score. The Trump administration undermined government transparency by dismissing inspectors general, punishing or firing whistleblowers, and attempting to control or manipulate information on COVID-19. The year also featured mass protests that, while mostly peaceful, were accompanied by high-profile cases of violence, police brutality, and deadly confrontations with counterprotesters or armed vigilantes. There was a significant increase in the number of journalists arrested and physically assaulted, most often as they covered demonstrations. Finally, the outgoing president’s shocking attempts to overturn his election loss—culminating in his incitement of rioters who stormed the Capitol as Congress met to confirm the results in January 2021—put electoral institutions under severe pressure. In addition, the crisis further damaged the United States’ credibility abroad and underscored the menace of political polarization and extremism in the country. ”January 6 should be a wake-up call for many Americans about the fragility of American democracy,” said Michael J. Abramowitz, president of Freedom House. “Authoritarian powers, especially China, are advancing their interests around the world, while democracies have been divided and consumed by internal problems. For freedom to prevail on a global scale, the United States and its partners must band together and work harder to strengthen democracy at home and abroad. President Biden has pledged to restore America’s international role as a leading supporter of democracy and human rights, but to rebuild its leadership credentials, the country must simultaneously address the weaknesses within its own political system.” “Americans should feel gratified that the courts and other important institutions held firm during the postelection crisis, and that the country escaped the worst possible outcomes,” said Abramowitz. “But the Biden administration, the new Congress, and American civil society must fortify US democracy by strengthening and expanding political rights and civil liberties for all. People everywhere benefit when the United States serves as a positive model, and the country itself reaps ample returns from a more democratic world.” **The effects of COVID-19** Government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the global democratic decline. Repressive regimes and populist leaders worked to reduce transparency, promote false or misleading information, and crack down on the sharing of unfavorable data or critical views. Many of those who voiced objections to their government’s handling of the pandemic faced harassment or criminal charges. Lockdowns were sometimes excessive, politicized, or brutally enforced by security agencies. And antidemocratic leaders worldwide used the pandemic as cover to weaken the political opposition and consolidate power. In fact, many of the year’s negative developments will likely have lasting effects, meaning the eventual end of the pandemic will not necessarily trigger an immediate revitalization of democracy. In Hungary, for example, the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took on emergency powers during the health crisis and misused them to withdraw financial assistance from municipalities led by opposition parties. In Sri Lanka, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa dissolved Parliament in early March and, with new elections repeatedly delayed due to COVID-19, ruled without a legislature for several months. Later in the year, both Hungary and Sri Lanka passed constitutional amendments that further strengthened executive power. **The resilience of democracy** Despite the many losses for freedom recorded by [Freedom in the World](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege) during 2020, people around the globe remained committed to fighting for their rights, and democracy continued to demonstrate its remarkable resilience. A number of countries held successful elections, independent courts provided checks on executive overreach, journalists in even the most repressive environments investigated government transgressions, and activists persisted in calling out undemocratic practices.

#### The plan solves:

#### The aff reduces concentrations of power within businesses, strengthens democracy

OHCHR 17 “UN Rights Expert: ‘Fundamental Right to Strike Must Be Preserved.’” OHCHR, 9 Mar. 2017, [www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21328&amp;LangID=E](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21328&amp;LangID=E). SJ//DA

**The right to strike is also an intrinsic corollary of the fundamental right of freedom of association**. **It is crucial for millions of women and men** **around the world to assert collectively their rights in the workplace, including the right to just and favourable conditions of work, and to work in dignity and without fear of intimidation and persecution. Moreover, protest action in relation to government social and economic polic**y, and against negative corporate practices, forms part of the basic civil liberties whose respect is essential for the meaningful exercise of trade union rights. This right enables them to engage with companies and governments on a more equal footing, and Member **States have a positive obligation to protect this right, and a negative obligation not to interfere with its exercise**. Moreover, **protecting the right to strike** is not simply about States fulfilling their legal obligations. **It is also about them creating democratic and equitable societies that are sustainable in the long run. The concentration of power in one sector – whether in the hands of government or business – inevitably leads to the erosion of democracy, and an increase in inequalities and marginalization with all their attendant consequences. The right to strike is a check on this concentration of power**. I deplore the various attempts made to erode the right to strike at national and multilateral levels. In this regard, **I welcome the positive role played by the ILO’s Government Group in upholding workers’ right to strike by recognizing that ‘without protecting a right to strike, freedom of association, in particular the right to organize activities for the purpose of promoting and protecting workers’ interests, cannot be fully realized.’** I urge all stakeholders to ensure that the right to strike be fully preserved and respected across the globe and in all arenas”, the expert concluded.

#### Democratic backsliding causes extinction.

Kendall-Taylor 16 [Andrea; Deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council, Senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington; “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order,” CSIS; 7/15/16; <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order>/] Justin

It is rare that policymakers, analysts, and academics agree. But there is an emerging consensus in the world of foreign policy: threats to the stability of the current international order are rising. The norms, values, laws, and institutions that have undergirded the international system and governed relationships between nations are being gradually dismantled. The most discussed sources of this pressure are [the ascent of China](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-sees-world-order-15846) and other non-Western countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy, and the diffusion of power from traditional nation-states to nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and technology-empowered individuals. Largely missing from these discussions, however, is the [specter of widespread democratic decline](http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/facing-democratic-recession). Rising challenges to democratic governance across the globe are a major strain on the international system, but they receive [far less attention](http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2016-5e13/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-april-may-2016-eb2d/58-2-03-boyle-6dbd) in discussions of the shifting world order.

In the 70 years since the end of World War II, the United States has fostered a global order dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. The United States has promoted the spread of democracy to strengthen global norms and rules that constitute the foundation of our current international system. However, despite the steady rise of democracy since the end of the Cold War, over the last 10 years we have seen dramatic reversals in respect for democratic principles across the globe. [A 2015 Freedom House report](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf) stated that the “acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years.”

Although the number of democracies in the world is at an all-time high, there are a number of [key trends](file:///C:\Users\PMeylan\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\Content.Outlook\5V2CJVRN\160715_KendallTaylor_DemocracysDecline_Commentary.docx#http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/democracy-decline) that are working to undermine democracy. The rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even in a number of less consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes in today’s global order.

Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S. cooperation abroad. [Research demonstrates](file:///C:\Users\PMeylan\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\Content.Outlook\5V2CJVRN\160715_KendallTaylor_DemocracysDecline_Commentary.docx#http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/18/1/49.abstract) that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of states. In particular, democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other democracies than with autocracies. Similarly, authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian countries, then, would provide a broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system.

Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of Egypt’s autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic standing.

Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations.

A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the [United Nations](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/christopher-walker-authoritarian-regimes-are-changing-how-the-world-defines-democracy/2014/06/12/d1328e3a-f0ee-11e3-bf76-447a5df6411f_story.html) , the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests.

Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become [fragmented and less effective](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2016.1161899?journalCode=tsur20#.V2H3MRbXgdI).

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)