## Framing

#### *Ethics must begin a priori*

#### [A] Empirical Uncertainty – evil demon could deceive us and inability to know others experience make empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### [B] Constitutive Authority – The meta-ethic is bindingness. Practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask why I should be a reasoner concedes it’s authority since you’re actively reasoning.

#### [C] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory.

#### That justifies universality – a] a priori principles like reason apply to everyone since they are inÞpendent of human experience and b] any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end.

#### Additionally:

#### [A] Ethical frameworks are topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must be theoretically justified. Prefer on resource disparities—focusing on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep excluding lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debater under my framework can easily be won without any prep since minimal evidence is required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

#### [B] Only universalizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

#### Consistent action through egalitarian recognition of humanity solves all violence and oppression – viewing others through equal personhood along with adoption of principles of universality are key to racial recognition and equality.

**Mills 18** Charles W. Mills. “Black Radical Kantianism.” Res Philosophica, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 1–33 https:// doi.org/ 10.11612/ resphil.1622 SJCP//JG

So the common theme is the demand for equal recognition, equal dignity, equal respect, equal personhood, in a white-supremacist world where disrespect rather than respect is the norm, the default mode, for blacks. A racesensitive Kantianism not merely purged of Kant’s own racism but attuned (in a way nominally color-blind Kantianism is not) to these racially demarcated particularities for the different sub-sections of the human population— a black radical Kantianism—will thus understand the need to “universalize” the categorical imperative in a very different way to register the crucial differences between those socially recognized as persons and those socially recognized as sub-persons. I suggest that we divide the different moral relations involved into two categories based on whether one is a member of the privileged race, the R1s, or the subordinated race, the R2s. That gives us the following six-way breakdown: (1) one’s duty as an R1 to give respect to oneself, (2) one’s duty as an R1 to give respect to one’s fellow-R1s, (3) one’s duty as an R1 to give respect to R2s, (4) one’s duty as an R2 to give respect to oneself, (5) one’s duty as an R2 to give respect to one’s fellow-R2s, and (6) one’s duty as an R2 to give respect to R1s. Historically, each of these will have been affected by race (as racism), leaving an ideological and psychological legacy, habits of disrespect, that will shape the “inclinations” most likely to be determinative and most imperatively to be resisted. Instead of (what could be graphically thought of as) “horizontal” relations of reciprocal and symmetrical race-indifferent respect among equal raceless persons, the R1s will have historically respected themselves and each other as R1s, while “vertically” looking down on, disrespecting, R2s as inferiors. In turn, the R2s will have been required to show racial deference to the R1s, looking up to them as R2s, and—having most probably internalized their lower ontological status—will have been prone to regard both themselves and their fellows with racial contempt.

#### [C] Practical identities – we find our lives worth living under practical identities such as student but that presupposes agency.

**Korsgaard 92** CHRISTINE M. Korsgaard 92 [I am a Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, where I have taught since 1991. From July 1996 through June 2002, I was Chair of the Department of Philosophy. (The current chair is Sean Kelly.) From 2004-2012, I was Director of Graduate Studies in Philosophy. (The current DGS is Mark Richard.) Before coming here, I held positions at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago, as well as visiting positions at Berkeley and UCLA. I served as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2008-2009, and held a Mellon Distinguished Achievement Award from 2006-2009. I work on moral philosophy and its history, practical reason, the nature of agency, personal identity, normativity, and the ethical relations between human beings and the other animals], “The Sources of Normativity”, THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University 16-17 Nov 1992, BE

The Solution: Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### [1] Presumption and Permissibility affirm: a] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me. b] If anything is permissible, then so is the aff since there is nothing prohibiting us.

#### [2] Consequences Fail: a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict. b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. c] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify because we commit the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral d] Yes act/omission distinction – there are infinite events occurring over which you have no control, so you can never be moral

#### [3] Aspec: JOURNALISTS CAN’T USE UTIL, PREFER DUTY BASED ETHICS

Christians 7 Christians, Clifford (Research Professor of Comunications, Professor of Journalism and Professor of Media Studies Emeritus at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) "Utilitarianism in media ethics and its discontents." Journal of Mass Media Ethics 22.2-3 (2007): 113-131.

Utilitarian ethics has major weaknesses, despite its democratic appeal. It depends on assessing the consequences accurately, when in everyday affairs the results of our choices are often unknown, at least in the long term. Blogging is a revolution in journalism at present, but how can we calculate all the changes even a decade from now? The short-term benefits of exposing corruption in a political campaign may be offset by long-term negative consequences—public hostility to an overly aggressive press. The results are frequently complicated and intertwined so that a theory staking itself on results often does not provide adequate guidelines for morally acceptable action. Among moral philosophers, the most influential critique of utilitarianism has been developed by W. David Ross.9 Ross argued against the utilitarian claim that others are morally significant to us only when our actions impact them pro or con (1930, pp. 17–21).10 We usually find ourselves confronting more than one moral claim at the same time involving different ethical principles. Asking only what produces the most good is too limiting. It does not cover the ordinary range of human relationships and circumstances. People recognize promise keeping, equal distribution, nonviolence, and preventing injury as moral principles. In various situations any of them might be the most stringent. Ordinary moral sensitivities suggest that when someone fulfills a promise because he thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear that he does so with no thought of its total consequences:: : : What makes him think it’s right to act in a certain way is the fact that he has promised to do so—that and, usually, nothing more. (Ross, 1930, p. 17) Utilitarianism as a single-consideration theory does not simply demand that we maximize general happiness, but renders irrelevant other moral imperatives that conflict with it. As Charles Taylor argued, the exactness of this one-factor model is appealing, but represents only ‘‘a semblance of validity’’ by leaving out whatever cannot be calculated (Taylor, 1982, p. 143; cf. Bowers, 2002). In some media situations, consequences are a reliable guide. But in many of the most crucial issues we face at present, utility is not adequate—for understanding distributive justice, diversity in popular culture, violence in television and cinema, truth telling, digital manipulation, conflict of interest, and so forth. We face the anomaly that the ethical system most entrenched in the media industry is not ideally suited for resolving its most persistent headaches. In an ethics of consequences, ‘‘only the future counts with respect to what is morally significant, and not the past’’ (Dyck, 1977, p. 60). Future results, even though they are hypothetical, are determinative. But why should possible benefits in the future count more, for example, than gratitude to parents for their deeds of the past? If I made a promise in the pxast, for instance, this moral duty would be the most urgent in the present. If my previous acts have harmed someone, I have a duty of reparation, that is, making up for earlier wrongs. There are duties of justice that require us to ignore or even upset the balance of happiness (Ross, 1930, p. 21). Thus an ethics of duty is a more compelling model of moral decision making. It covers the entire time frame rather than only anticipating future effects. Duty responds to a broader range of human experiences and relations. Duty recognizes that the human community requires dutiful actions to maintain its humanness. H. Richard Niebuhr, in fact, saw responsibility as inherent in our personhood. Our selfhood is manifest in the action of answering. Our relation to other selves carries moral obligation; we respond to responders; we live in responsive relations (1963, pp. 59–61, 152–160). With a similar understanding of humans as responsible agents, Emmanuel Levinas (1981) insisted that our duties to others are more fundamental to human identity than are individual rights. An ethics of duty provides a critical framework that prevents us from having our ethical theory and democratic practice slide into one another. In terms of the overall task of developing a theoretically credible media ethics, the most promising direction is a deontological one.

#### Thus the advocacy: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

### Offense

#### [1] Under the categorical imperative, objectivity must always be prioritized because anything else is a contradiction in conception of lying, if a lie were universalized then there would no longer be a conception of truth. This makes objectivity the highest layer that always comes first, even if you are advocating.

#### [2] Any claim that advocacy is constitutive to a free press is impermissible because the function of media is to report information—the constitutive purpose of the media is objective presentation of information because citizens have a right to be informed.

Klein 20 [Ian Klein, J.D. Candidate at the Texas A&M University School of Law, 2020, “Enemy of the People: The Ghost of the F.C.C. Fairness Doctrine in the Age of Alternative Facts.” Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1809&context=hastings\_comm\_ent\_law\_journal]/Kankee

This scarcity and long history of regulation, combined with the legal fiction of broadcast spectrum scarcity explained in the following paragraphs, is likely enough to overcome this Red Lion hurdle. Second, and more importantly, in the context of the Red Lion holding and the history of broadcast regulation, the concept of scarcity serves to underline the duty of the federal government [is] to make sure that the public has access to objective coverage of important issues.152 Red Lion was the culmination of a decades-long administrative, legislative, and judicial adaptation to the evolving nature of mass communication, during which every branch of the federal government emphasized the right of the public to be informed over the right of broadcasters to disseminate information.153 Since the Radio Act of 1927, broadcasting has been regulated because the public has a right to receive information.154 When the Communications Act supplanted the Radio Act, Congress was determined to require that the newly-created FCC had a duty to “serve the public interest.”155 The F.C.C. noted during its infancy that a democratic society should be given maximum opportunity to express diverse viewpoints on controversial issues, and, importantly, maximum opportunity to hear and read the conflicting view of others.156 As Justice White later wrote for the unanimous Red Lion Court, “[i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic [sic], moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here . . . [t]hat right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.”157 That right of access, based on the history and tradition of the decisions of both the Court and the FCC, extends not only to access to that information, but to the objective presentation of this information.158 Furthermore, “access” referred to the ability of broadcasters to broadcast information vis-à-vis the chilling effect and self-censorship that opponents of the Fairness Doctrine feared. However, as the Red Lion Court noted, “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”159 The fact that the notion of the public’s right to information was reiterated so often and so prevalently indicates that courts and lawmakers did not consider it incidental to their decisions, but as the governing principle necessitating the entire body of broadcast regulation. Furthermore, as legal scholars such as Mark Lloyd and John Berresford theorize, Red Lion’s Scarcity Principle was not only secondary to the emphasis on the public’s right to be informed, but was intended as dicta, which subsequent courts misinterpreted as the crux of the opinion.160 Lloyd suggests that the scarcity principle was merely “[d]ictum that suggests the Court was aware of the spectrum [of broadcast frequencies] as a public resource,” and that the Red Lion opinion was only about the constitutionality of FCC authority over broadcast licensees.161 According to Lloyd, the Red Lion Court’s determination that there was a scarcity of broadcast frequencies was not the conclusion of an engineering or economic analysis, but was the result of a purely legal analysis based on precedent and the record that centered on previous challenges to FCC authority.162 This is significant because, as Berresford points out in his 2005 FCC Research Paper, “[t]he Scarcity [Principle] appears to assume that there is a physical thing . . . of which there is a scarce amount . . . ‘the radio frequency spectrum,’ however, has no discrete physical existence . . . [t]he Scarcity [Principle] thus appears to be based on fundamental misunderstandings of physics.”163 Arbitrary rules made up by dead racists are nothing compared to the physical laws governing the reality of the known universe. The question of scarcity was thus “dislodged from the question before the Court” in Red Lion: Whether the FCC could constitutionally enforce the Fairness Doctrine.164 If the Scarcity Principle is a legal fiction (based on a scientific one), then Red Lion’s precedential value in upholding Fairness Doctrine 2.0 must rest solely on the end that the very nature of broadcast regulation sought to further from its inception:165 the right of the public to receive objective information.166 Legal Issues Surrounding Online News and Social Media

#### That affirms: if we all necessarily want our rights enforced and freedoms respected, we all necessarily agree to carry the responsibilities as well as the rights and privileges of citizenship to ensure the government can accurately act as a collective agent

**Korsgaard 18** [The Claims of Animals and the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right. The Journal of Practical EthicsVolume 6, No. 1, June 2018. OPEN ACCESS. <http://www.jpe.ox.ac.uk/papers/the-claims-of-animals-and-the-needs-of-strangers-two-cases-of-imperfect-right/>] // SJ AME

Like many philosophers, I think there is no problem in recognizing that groups of people can form collective agents in this way**. Groups can think when their members can think, and when they can also talk and debate, which amounts to thinking together. They can act**—not just individually but as a group—when they have procedures for making and enacting decisions that makes those decisions and actions count as the decisions and actions of the group. **Political states are collective agents in exactly that sense. A political state thinks through the thoughts of its citizens and legislators when they debate public issues, makes its decisions by voting and passing laws, and enacts its decisions by enforcing those laws. The enforcement of the law counts as the action of the state. It also acts as a collective agent when its duly elected representatives, or otherwise legitimate leaders, perform actions in their official roles that the laws entitle them to do**. That’s what happens when one country declares war on another, for instance. That is something that the country, considered as a collective agent, does.

#### [3] A condition of reason is to be able to formulate ideas and ends based on both your private and public use of reason. This can only happen through public information exchange that is not connected to personal or subjective ties.

**Donald 03** [James Donald, February 3, 2003; KANT, THE PRESS, AND THE PUBLIC USE OF REASON JAMES DONALD James Donald is Professor of Film Studies at the University of New South Wales, email: [J.Donald@curtin.edu.au](mailto:J.Donald@curtin.edu.au). https://javnost-thepublic.org/article/pdf/2003/2/3/]

This, according to Pinkard at least, was the receptive cultural milieu which Kant addressed with this dramatic opening answer to Biester’s question: E**nlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity**. The motto of enlightenment must be, Sapere Aude! Dare to know. Have the courage to use your own reason (Kant 1991, 54, translation modified). What, though, did using your own reason mean in this context and at that time? And, more broadly, in what circumstances is the use of reason possible? Here it is necessary to read what Kant has to say both historically and philosophically. The Berlinische Monatsschrift was not just in the business of publishing news and views. It had a political and social agenda. The journal represented the public face of a secret society of senior officials in the administration of Frederick II who were committed to embedding Enlightenment principles in the institutions of the Prussian state. The inference must therefore be that Kant knew exactly whom he was talking to, and that his emphasis on daring and courage in the somewhat hesitant and cryptic opening of the essay is a nod towards the risks these men would have seen themselves as taking in the attempt to create social conditions in which their fellow-citizens might be (more) free to think (Caygill 2001, 31). At the time Kant’s essay was published in 1784, they were especially concerned that their achievements should not be reversed when Frederick II, then in the 44th year of his reign, died  as he did two years later  and was replaced by his more reactionary heir. It helps to know this, as it explains the strategic nature of the essay. It is designed to make use of the press and its public access in order to help a political cause as well as to establish philosophical principles. The philosophical basis for the argument **about the public use of reason is Kant’s axiomatic belief that thinking well must be based on three maxims: Think for your- self; think from the standpoint of everyone else; and think consistently. Respecting all or any of these maxims is possible only in community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts, and who communicate their thoughts to us.** Thinking is of its nature a social activity, then, and reason is a product of society (Wood 1999, 301). For thinking to demonstrate reason, it must be critical, testing what is thought from different possible perspectives in order to achieve understanding and coherence. To a degree, and perhaps quite a considerable degree, such critical self-reflection is possible through the inner exercise of imagination. To be most effective, however, imagination needs at least some external stimulus from actual dialogue with people in relation to whose viewpoints one is trying to think. This is why, in What Is Enlightenment?, Kant insists that citizens have a philosophical responsibility to do their thinking in front of the entire reading public  even if his historical under- standing of who should make up the public was much more discriminating (Kant 1991, 55). **Kant’s is thus an inherently pluralistic conception of reason: that is, it requires the disposition of not being occupied with oneself as the entire world, but regarding and conducting oneself as a cosmopolitan** [or citizen of the world] (Wood 1999, 302). This is how he puts it in his discussion of census communis in The Critique of Judgment: **The idea of a public sense, i.e., a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgment with the collective reason of mankind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions which could readily be taken for objective, an illusion that would exert a prejudicial influence upon its judgment. This is accomplished by weighing the judgment, not so much with actual, as rather with the merely possible, judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else, as the result of mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently affect our own estimate** (cited in Splichal 2002, 101). Without that worldly regard for the thoughts, feelings, and wishes of others, thought and judgment fall prey to the opposite of pluralism, which is egoism. And egoism, whether in terms of one’s understanding, one’s tastes or one’s interests, in turn produces traits that are obstacles to moral self-development: passion, self- conceit, fear, and intellectual indolence (Wood 1999, 283).1 It is the very nature of thinking that requires its public use and an initiating act of resolution and courage if reason is to be developed in individuals and in humanity as a whole. The immaturity (Unmündigkeit), or intellectual and moral de- pendency, that is the opposite of enlightenment is not a developmental stage be- fore maturity, but is self-incurred (selbstverschuldet) (Kant 1991, 54). **Thinking adults have a choice. They have to decide between the challenging demands of reason and the comfort zone of conformity and deference to authority: people who do not need to submit to tutelage often do so because they find it convenient to have others guide them.** Being unaccustomed to think for themselves, they are often frightened by the prospect of having to do so (Wood 1999, 305). This is why some of the most intransigent barriers to the development of rea- son are to be found in ourselves. Mündigkeit adulthood ,majority, or maturity brings with it not just the freedom and assurance of autonomy, but also its attendant anxieties, risks and responsibilities. As Kant strategically acknowledges, however, the roadblocks to enlightenment are external as well as internal. **It is in the interests of tyrants, priests, and other often more benevolent powers to tell people what to think, to tell them what will make them safe and happy, and so to perpetuate their deference and dependency. Their most effective weapon is, of course, the ability to play on spiritual, social and economic fears.** Having carefully prevented the docile creatures from daring to take single step without the leading- strings to which they are tied, such authorities will attempt to show them the danger which threatens them if they try to walk unaided (Wood 1999, 305-306). **Kant does not deny the existence of such dangers and discontents, but sees them simply as part and parcel of the human condition, as obstacles that need to be overcome**: they would certainly learn to walk eventually after a few falls (Kant 1991, 54). And learning to walk means taking on those social impediments as well as well as one’s own fears. Kant sees it as our duty to opt for maturity: a duty to ourselves, because to opt for tutelage and dependency is personally degrading, but also a kind of species- duty, in the sense that reason can exist and fulfil its vocation in human history only through free rational communication between independent thinkers (Wood 1999, 306). Kant’s philosophy was radical in its emphasis on the spontaneity and autonomy of human beings, and it was this that found an affinity with an emerging cultural sense of people’s potential  and desire  for subjective development and collective progress. As Pinkard (2002, 19) puts it, he captured a deep, almost sub- terranean shift in what his audience was coming to experience as necessary for themselves: from now on, we were called to lead our own lives, to think for ourselves. Historically, the question is whether, how and to what extent the dissemination of Kant’s philosophical ideas helped to articulate that ethos as a social force. From that point of view, what is electric in Kant’s account of that now are his comments about the social circumstances that are necessary if such courage is to lead to autonomy. When Kant observes that for enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom, he is not just talking about overcoming the psychological comforts of immaturity and the inner tyranny of superstition and timidity, but also about all too real and familiar ideological pressures and political-legal obstacles to free communication, to the operation of reason, and so to human progress (Kant 1991, 55; Wood 1999, 283).2 Hence the need for courage, but also the need for the existence of social circumstances that made daring to use one’s reason a possibility**. Because we can develop our reason only by communicating with others, and as the development of reason in human society depends on its public use, therefore Kant de- fends freedom of public communication as an absolute precondition for the collective development of people’s rational powers and so for human progress** (Wood 1999, 306). The freedom to communicate, asserts Kant, is the one treasure which remains to us amidst all the burdens of civil life, and which alone offers us a means of overcoming all the evils of this condition (in Reiss 1991, 247). To prohibit the use of public reason, however, is not only to injure and trample on the rights of mankind. In a subtle argument  or a piece of opportunist flattery, depending on how you look at it  Kant makes the case that such restriction is also against the interests of an enlightened ruler who is not afraid of shadows [or phantoms]. It is, after all, the public use of critical reason alone that can foster enlightenment, and so create a population that is likely to be peaceful and virtuous. A prince who does not regard it as beneath him to say that he considers it his duty, in religious matters, not to prescribe anything to his people, but to allow them complete freedom, a prince who thus even declines to accept the presumptuous title of tolerant, is himself enlightened. This spirit of freedom is also spreading abroad, even where it has to struggle with outward obstacles imposed by governments which misunderstand their own function. For such governments can now witness a shining example of how freedom may exist without in the least jeopardizing public concord and the unity of the commonwealth. Men will of their own accord gradually work their way out of barbarism so long as artificial measures are not deliberately adopted to keep them in it (Kant 1991, 58-59). Just as individuals need to think their way out of tutelage and towards maturity, so the general development from an age of enlightenment to an enlightened age requires a polity that not only allows, but encourages criticism of existing political institutions as part of the development and expansion of reason.

#### [4] Advocacy is premised off of making somebody do something for you which violates the categorical imperative because you’re using someone as a means to an end.

### UV

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory since the neg can be infinitely abusive and I can’t check back. Aff theory is drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer since the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance and reasonability bites intervention since it’s up to the judge to determine. No 2NR RVI, paradigm issues, theory, evidence, or new responses to AC arguments since they’d dump on it for 6 minutes and my 3-minute 2AR is spread too thin. No RVIs on AC arguments – incentivizes a 7 minute collapse that decks 1AR strategy. If I’m wrong I shouldn’t be punished since it breeds more animosity and decks future solutions for violence.

#### **[2] Fairness is a voter – A] Debate’s a competitive game and requires objective evaluation.** B] Fairness best coheres a winner since if one debater had ten minutes to speak and the other had three there would be incongruence that alters ability to judge the better debater. Procedural unfairness doesn’t compensate since it denies access anyone to the space. C] Determines engagement in substance so it outweighs. D] Jurisdiction – every argument you make concedes the authority of fairness: i.e. that the judge will evaluate your arguments. Hack against them if they contest this since that’s the most unfair thing to do

#### **[3] Weigh the case vs the K: a] Fairness – opposing frameworks moot our offense – there are infinite parts they could problematize which forces a 1ar restart b] Clash – Our scholarship is tied to the goodness of our framework and plan c]** Role playing is key to better tackle problems of oppression and create tangible solutions.

Nixon 2KMakani Themba-Nixon, Executive Director of The Praxis Project. “Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing.” Colorlines 3.2, 2000. Organic Intellectual

Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decision maker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decision makers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, stories that are designed to affect the public conversation [and]. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

## Advantage

#### The Populist PiS is in control of Poland. EU sanctions are effective, but the PiS continues to rebel

**Moskwa and Jefferson 20**Moskwa, Wojciech, and Rodney Jefferson. “Poland's Populist Turn.” Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, 31 Oct. 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/poland>.//SJEP

PiS- Law and Justice Party

If Poland had a tumultuous 20th century, the 21st started off pretty well. Having just joined NATO, the country entered the European Union and cemented its transition to capitalism with unrivaled economic growth. **Then a 2015 election unleashed a populist backlash, delivering unprecedented power to a party that promised a shakeup in the name of ordinary Poles. They were fed up with uneven wealth and tossed out what they saw as a self-serving elite that had misruled the country. The Law & Justice Party’s drive to control the courts and remove checks on its power sparked sporadic protests and criticism from the EU, which accuses Poland’s leaders of flouting the rule of law.** Former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned in 2017 that the country was moving “backwards and eastwards.” Is eastern Europe’s biggest economy risking the democratic order it has built since escaping communism? In October, there was a national outcry after a Constitutional Court ruling tightened what was already one of Europe’s most restrictive abortion laws. Women staged a strike and protesters flooded the streets in the biggest threat to the government since it came to power. **The Law & Justice Party had won followers by reducing the tax burden on the poor and providing bigger subsidies for raising children. Winning a second term in 2019, it pushed through more judicial reforms after revamping the constitutional court, nearly doubled the minimum wage and exerted more control over the media. The EU, which gives more money to Poland than any other country on a net basis, has pursued a series of disciplinary measures against Poland for failing to adhere to democratic values; it’s talked of tying future funds to rule-of-law standards, though little has been done.** Poland’s ruling party struck a nerve at home and abroad by calling for the country to assert its national identity, uphold Catholic values and control its borders. It’s also sought to rewrite history, turning Solidarity freedom fighter Lech Walesa into a communist collaborator, making it illegal to suggest that the Polish nation had a role in the Holocaust and backing the creation of “LGBT Free” zones. While it re-nationalized banks and power companies, the economy has remained robust, though the coronavirus pandemic created new challenges. **Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the Law & Justice leader and the man who pulls the strings in Poland, says the government upholds the rule of law and that history shows Poland suffers when outsiders interfere in its politics. He says EU leaders in Brussels should focus on their own problems. He has an ally in Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who is also challenging the European mainstream. The Polish government has replaced much of the country’s establishment since it came to power, justifying the moves with the same “drain the swamp” appeal used by U.S. President Donald Trump. Foreign banks and retailers have also been criticized for not sharing enough of their profit. Critics say Poland’s leaders have eroded civil liberties, turned the media into a party mouthpiece and transformed state companies into political machines.**

#### The PiS controlled Polish media is key to guarantee future elections and sway voters to the PiS.

**Kalan 19** Kalan, Dariusz. “Poland's State of the Media.” Foreign Policy, 25 Nov. 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/25/poland-public-television-law-and-justice-pis-mouthpiece/.//SJEP

**WARSAW, Poland—Asked about the difference between Poland’s public television station, TVP, before 2015 and after, a veteran journalist who works at the network was quick to respond. “Ruling politicians,” they said, “had never had that kind of impact on television” before. “They have audacity and courage to approach reporters and say, ‘I want to say something, and you have to record me.’ This is our everyday life,” the journalist, who insisted on anonymity, said in early October. After a long moment of reflection, they added: “You will not find true information in our television.” TVP, whose two flagship channels were among the country’s** [**most popular**](https://businessinsider.com.pl/media/tv-radio/najpopularniejsze-programy-i-kanaly-w-2018-roku/24lx5c1) **in 2018, has for the last several years been squarely under the control of Poland’s right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, which clung to power in elections in mid-October. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, these elections were “administratively prepared well.” But the voters’ “informed choice was undermined by a lack of impartiality in the media, especially the public broadcaster,”** [noted](https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/435941) Jan Petersen, the head of an election observation mission**. It was not the first time TVP’s reporting raised concerns. This fall, 54 members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe** [**called**](https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=28221&lang=en) **TVP “a propaganda channel for the ruling party.” Reporters Without Borders similarly** [**stated**](https://rsf.org/en/poland) **that Poland’s public media outlets “have been transformed into government propaganda mouthpieces.” This fall, in interviews with almost a dozen current and former TVP journalists and executives, most asked to go unnamed. None argued that TVP’s political news has been objective. In fact, many openly admitted that TVP is purposefully keeping quiet about PiS scandals, gives airtime almost exclusively to pro-PiS voices, and has campaigned against the party’s opponents. Those I spoke to who back PiS largely argued that the hard line was both necessary to ensure a second PiS term and a legitimate response to the private media’s alleged support of the opposition. Interlocutors on both sides believe that there is nothing unique in what is happening in Poland. Rather, their country is just one among many suffering the rise of fake news. According to Ryszard Bankowicz, the head of the Polish Council of Media Ethics, a nonpartisan body promoting principles of ethical journalism, readers and viewers around the world have ceased to want real information.** “They chose a given newspaper or TV station not in order to find the truth but to confirm their own beliefs or take a side against or for someone,” Bankowicz said. “And many journalists do not know principles of ethical journalism. This is a worldwide trend, and Poland is its victim.” But not everyone has given up. This year, Bankowicz, took a public stand on one of the [most serious accusations](https://www.rp.pl/Platforma-Obywatelska/190119723-Borusewicz-To-skutek-nagonki-na-Adamowicza.html) against TVP, made by Bogdan Borusewicz, a former democratic opposition activist under the communist regime and a former speaker of the Senate, among others: that it had incited hatred against Pawel Adamowicz, Gdansk’s mayor, who was stabbed to death at a January charity event. Adamowicz, a popular liberal politician, had been a target of numerous TVP reports that had suggested he was corrupt and had close ties with local businessmen. In a [report](http://www.rem.net.pl/data/20190211.pdf) published in February, Bankowicz wrote that “the authors of these publications manipulated the facts … in order to present Adamowicz as an unreliable person.” He concluded that “TVP spews propaganda, which serves to destroy opponents of the ruling party.” However, he refused to comment on whether violations of journalistic ethics contributed to Adamowicz’s death. “TVP is certainly not to blame for this tragic event,” said Maciej Stanecki, who was TVP’s deputy chairman from 2016 to 2019. But he was quick to add: “But for allowing the radicalization of the public opinion, of the crowd … well, I think that every media person must be aware that such responsibility exists.” Stanecki, a film producer, is proud of his achievements at TVP during his leadership, which include the television’s technological development, but he is aware that the network’s reputation has been tarnished.

#### The EU is weak and a PiS controlled Poland is at the front of their issues-further legitimacy crisis destroys global democracy and emboldens Russian invasions

**Tisdall 21** Simon Tisdall Guardian, 11-21-2021, "Instability grips a weakened Europe as global predators smell blood," https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/21/instability-grips-a-weakened-europe-as-global-predators-smell-blood//SJJK

**Threats from Russia and China, a weaker US security alliance and internal discord expose fundamental strategic weaknesses** Is [Europe](https://www.theguardian.com/world/europe-news) entering a dangerous new age of instability? **Not since the height of the cold war with the Soviet Union has it looked so vulnerable to hostile forces.** Accumulating external threats and internal divisions, coupled with a weakening US security alliance, relentless Russian subversion, and power-hungry China’s war on western values are exposing fundamental strategic weaknesses. Europe increasingly resembles a beleaguered democratic island in an anarchic world, where a rising tide of authoritarianism, impunity and international rule-breaking threatens to inundate it. Some European leaders understand this, notably French president [Emmanuel Macron](https://www.theguardian.com/world/emmanuel-macron), yet long-term policy remedies elude them. For example, Belarus dictator Alexander Lukashenko’s use of migrants to pressure the EU is plainly outrageous. Yet it worked, in the sense that Germany’s caretaker chancellor, Angela Merkel, phoned him for a chat, ending his post-coup isolation. [Her unilateral demarche](https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20211117-merkel-and-lukashenko-agree-to-talks-about-belarusian-border-crisi) understandably infuriated Baltic states. It was a concession to a thug, not a lasting solution. Talking of thugs, Russian president Vladimir Putin’s ongoing intimidation of Ukraine risks widening conflagration. The latest border build-up of 90,000 Russian troops may be [sabre-rattling,](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/nov/14/uk-must-be-ready-for-war-with-russia-says-armed-forces-chief) similar to provocations in the Donbas and Black Sea last spring. If not, Europe will only have itself to blame. Putin’s importunities stem directly from its de facto acquiescence in his illegal 2014 annexation of Crimea. Instability on Europe’s periphery extends to the Balkans amid well-founded fears that Bosnia-Herzegovina is slipping back into conflict 26 years after the [Dayton peace accords.](https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-blog/2020/nov/18/the-dayton-accords-a-peace-agreement-for-bosnia-archive-1995) Resurgent ethnic nationalism, embodied by the separatist Bosnian Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, is fuelled by Belgrade and Moscow. **A larger, strategic problem is the EU’s inability** [**to fulfil promises**](https://ecfr.eu/article/western-balkans-in-trouble-why-the-eu-should-make-a-new-offer-to-the-region/) **of closer integration with the region**. Europe’s relationship with Turkey, a key gatekeeper, is dysfunctional, too, thanks partly to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, its deeply unpleasant president. When he menaced EU members Greece and Cyprus last year, Macron [sent naval forces](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/29/greece-turkey-standoff-france-send-warships-east-mediterranean) to the eastern Mediterranean. The rest of Europe sat on its hands. Erdoğan is also meddling in Ukraine and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, which [flared up again](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tensions-high-after-deadly-clashes-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-gwmpfqgdd) last week. Yet Brussels pays him to keep out Middle Eastern refugees, so it **hardly dares challenge him. The vice-like circle of instability squeezing Europe is about more than actual or potential armed conflict.** One of its bigger dilemmas is migration. Despite the searing 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, **the EU still lacks an agreed, humane policy**. **That guarantees more trouble down the road.** **One of the main objectors, ironically,** [**is Poland,**](https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/11/10/eu-council-president-visits-poland-to-express-solidarity-in-face-of-hybrid-attack-by-belarus/) **which rejects migrant quotas.** **Yet faced by border mayhem, its hypocritical rightwing leaders who, like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, are in a bitter fight with Brussels over rule of law and democracy issues, appealed for EU solidarity.** Disturbing, too, is the way **much European opinion appears to have accepted illegal pushbacks and routine mistreatment of asylum-seekers**, whether in camps in Libya or on the beaches of Greece, in breach of EU law. This reflects another self-inflicted wound: the increased influence of xenophobic, rightwing populists and the re-normalisation of circa 1914 ultra-nationalist politics across Europe. **If Europeans will not stand up for western democratic values in a world overrun by Donald Trump clones and copycats, who will?** Sadly, they cannot look to Britain. No longer a trusted friend, the UK under Boris Johnson, sniping and sneering from the sidelines, has become another peripheral conflict zone for the EU. Britain is more irritant than ally. Defence minister Ben Wallace used the linked Belarus-Ukraine crises last week to advance the Brexit agenda and seal arms deals with Warsaw and Kiev. Tellingly, the [UK sent troops,](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/18/british-soldiers-to-give-more-support-to-poland-amid-belarus-border-crisis) not humanitarian aid, to the Polish border. Europe’s age of instability also owes much to events beyond its control. Few forecast Trump would try to blow up what Franklin D Roosevelt called the “arsenal of democracy”, and the western alliance with it. [He may yet try again](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/us/politics/republicans-2022-redistricting-maps.html). Likewise, few predicted, as [Merkel now admits,](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-germany-may-have-been-naive-china-first-merkel-says-2021-11-17/) that China would emerge as such a domineering, economically aggressive, anti-democratic global competitor. **US president Joe Biden reassures Europeans that Nato, even after Afghanistan, is as vital as ever. But his** [**edgy video summit**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/16/biden-xi-summit-highlights-tensions-and-desire-for-cooperation) **with China’s Xi Jinping last week showed where his true focus lies. Putin sees this, and smells blood. Europe’s gas supply is one pressure point. Covert cyber-attacks are another. Russia’s reckless anti-satellite missile test, scorning European safety concerns, was the first recorded act of** [**hooliganism in outer space.**](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/nov/16/a-wild-west-out-there-russian-satellite-debris-worsens-space-junk-problem) **Europe’s inability to make Putin pay a serious price for aggression in Georgia and Crimea, his decimation of Russian democracy, his foreign election meddling, and his murderous attacks on Alexei Navalny – and other opponents on European soil – heightens a sense of decline. On China, there is nothing close to a united front. Such weakness encourages other predators. So what is to be done?** Europe, as ever, is a house divided. East Europeans continue to place their faith in Washington rather than Brussels, despite clear portents of another transatlantic rupture if the Democrats lose the White House in 2024. **The EU bureaucracy is feebly led, its parliament toothless. Germany lacks a proven leader. In France, Macron faces** [**a vicious spring election**](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/eric-zemmour-macrons-far-right-rival-wins-backing-from-russia-t25c086kc) **scrap against the Russian-backed far right.** Yet it is Macron’s ideas about enhanced European political, security and military “strategic autonomy”, and a stronger, more fiscally and economically integrated EU, that offer the most hopeful path forward. EU defence ministers last week discussed [a “Strategic Compass” plan](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-policy-document-against-russia-china/) to boost joint capabilities. But agreement on proposed “rapid-deployment forces” and the like seems a long way off. As [France](https://www.theguardian.com/world/france) prepares to assume the EU presidency, will other leaders recognise this critical moment and back Macron? In a world of sharks, snakes and scary monsters, Europe’s independence, cohesion and values are on the line like never before.

#### Independently Global Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts---economic growth, public goods, alliances, and war

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However, reducing the United States’ emphasis on a values-driven foreign policy is wrong, and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States. **Democracy promotion** in particular serves a **key role in safeguarding U.S. interests** and promoting global, long-term growth in ways fundamentally compatible with U.S. strategic interests. After all, **democracies protect private property** in important ways, **invest in public goods**, are more politically stable, make for **more dependable allies**, and empirically **do not go to war with one another**. Ultimately, a world full of democratic governments is safer, more prosperous, and more stable — all states of being that the United States has an interest in promoting. Democracy guarantees that the public has a stake in its own institutions and government, which leads to **investor confidence and growth**. Since elected politicians are accountable to property owners and are held in check by an independent judiciary, democracies tend to have better mechanisms for **protecting private property** than their autocratic counterparts. This makes democracies a **particularly attractive type of country for investors** — both public and private — because checks and balances make it difficult for the state to nationalize industries. Further, private property rights protected by the legal system **encourage entrepreneurship and small business development**, both of which are **key to a growing and modernizing economy**. As a result, democracies tend to be wealthier and more economically stable than their autocratic counterparts. This is fundamentally in the interest of the United States in that both private and public investors have an interest in seeing returns on their investments, thereby potentially making **countries less willing to go to war if that would require severing economic ties**. Democratic institutions ensure that citizens with both economic and political power are heard. Democracies also **invest in public goods at much higher rates than autocratic governments**. Because politicians must cater to the median voter, they **approve policies that invest in public education and healthcare**, both of which promote long-term growth and development. Public education invests in a country’s human capital, setting the stage for long-term innovation, adaptability, and advancement. Public healthcare, meanwhile, has been shown to **increase overall societal productivity** and well-being as people take fewer sick days, citizens are able to afford their healthcare without going bankrupt, and ultimately, the overall **costs of healthcare are driven down** as citizens become healthier. Productive, innovative societies are also better for the United States — innovation around the world improves global quality of life, results in more educational and vocational opportunities for Americans (both because other universities and jobs become more attractive to Americans who want to go abroad and because potential immigrants are more likely to want to stay in their own country, opening up opportunities for U.S. citizens at home), and may reduce friction between countries over resources and labor. Democracies are also generally more politically stable because regular election cycles ensure an established process for the habitual and peaceful removal of leaders from power. Elections ensure the non-violent transition of power and reduce the need for mass protest, rioting, and revolution — which **makes countries more politically stable**. Further, when citizens are granted rights and protections from government abuse, enforced by an independent judiciary, they have fewer grievances against the government and are thus less able to mobilize large numbers of people to violently overthrow the regime. Revolution, while not always violent, often leads to political instability, challenges to growth, **increased incentives for diversionary war and conflict**, and oftentimes civil war. The externalities of civil war and international conflict then put pressure on the United States to intervene, protect human rights, and otherwise expend resources on other countries’ issues. Further, civil wars are highly destructive to institutions, human capital, and resources, and can have significant security spillover effects, increasing global risk of political instability and **violent extremism**. This political stability, in addition to institutional checks and balances, makes **democracies better international partners and allies in the long-term**. Treaties ratified by multiple branches of government are more durable than executive agreements signed by a single leader who may be replaced within a short period of time. While democracies may be more reluctant to commit to alliances and formal security pacts, once a party to them, they are more dependable than other states with concentrated power at the executive level. **These kind of durable commitments are of interest to the United States as it seeks to preserve the liberal world order**; it is far more effective to ally with partners whose institutions make withdrawal from the alliance costly. Finally, it has been empirically observed that **democracies do not go to war with one another**. While there is a robust debate around the exact nature of the so-called “democratic peace,” it appears that there are qualities particular to democracies that make war between them particularly unlikely: a **dovish public constrains leaders’ ability to wage war**, competitive elections and a free press make it **easier to credibly communicate resolve to potential adversaries**, consolidated democracies tend to be **more wealthy and economically interdependent**, like-minded people are more hesitant to wage war against one another, and so on. Regardless of the precise mechanisms, however, a world of democracies is inherently safer, more prosperous, and less likely to initiate a war against the United States — a key factor in protecting American security and interests.