# 1AC-Koorsgaard

#### Ethics must begin a priori:

#### [A] Empirical uncertainty – evil demon could deceive us, dreaming, simulation, and inability to know others’ experience make empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### [B] Constitutive Authority – practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary.

#### Next, the relevant feature of reason is universality – any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end and demand the value of my end be recognized by others which also means universalizability acts as a side constraint on all other frameworks. It’s impossible to will a violation of freedom since deciding to do would will incompatible ends since it logically entails willing a violation of your own freedom

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. Prefer:

#### [A] Practical identities – we find our lives worth living under practical identities such as student but that presupposes agency.

**Korsgaard 92** CHRISTINE M. Korsgaard 92 [I am a Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, where I have taught since 1991. From July 1996 through June 2002, I was Chair of the Department of Philosophy. (The current chair is Sean Kelly.) From 2004-2012, I was Director of Graduate Studies in Philosophy. (The current DGS is Mark Richard.) Before coming here, I held positions at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago, as well as visiting positions at Berkeley and UCLA. I served as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2008-2009, and held a Mellon Distinguished Achievement Award from 2006-2009. I work on moral philosophy and its history, practical reason, the nature of agency, personal identity, normativity, and the ethical relations between human beings and the other animals], “The Sources of Normativity”, THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University 16-17 Nov 1992, BE

The Solution: Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

#### That hijacks roles of the ballots since the judge is one such practical identity.

#### [B] Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. All frameworks are functionally topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must be theoretically justified: prefer on resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since only analytical arguments are required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

#### [C] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify a standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### [D] Even if ideal-theory is bad, the alternatives are far worse because they don’t rely on fixed principles and devolve into relativism at a particular space and time—you can’t measure something with a ruler constantly changing length, which means we need a standard to hold people to.

**Consequences fail: [A] They only judge actions after they occur, which fails action guidance [B] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence. Probability doesn’t solve because 1) Probability is improvable, as it relies on inductive knowledge, but induction from past events can’t lead to deduction of future events [C] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify action because we intend the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral or not. [D] If you’re held responsible for things other than an intention ethics aren’t binding because there are infinite events occurring over which you have no control, so you can never be moral as you are permitting just action. [E] There’s no objective arbiter to evaluate consequences [F] You can’t aggregate consequences, happiness and sadness are immutable – ten headaches don’t make a migraine**

### Advocacy

#### I affirm: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right to strike CPS and Pics affirm because they don’t disprove my general thesis. Ill defend neg preferences on specification as long as it doesn’t change the principle of my aff-check spec in CX.

A just government is The word just can be defined as “acting or being in conformity with what is morally upright or good”(Just). By this definition, a just government is a government that acts for the good of the people and is morally upright.(cram)

#### Meaning that by proving the plan is morally good we are defending a just government.

#### Definition of unconditional right to strike:

NLRB 85 [National Labor Relations Board; “Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947: Volume 1,” Jan 1985; <https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA__v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA__v4xwC&rdot=1>] Justin

\*\*Edited for gendered language

As for the so-called absolute or unconditional right to strike—there are no absolute rights that do not have their corresponding responsibilities. Under our American Anglo-Saxon system, each individual is entitled to the maximum of freedom, provided however (and this provision is of first importance), his [their] freedom has due regard for the rights and freedoms of others. The very safeguard of our freedoms is the recognition of this fundamental principle. I take issue very definitely with the suggestion that there is an absolute and unconditional right to concerted action (which after all is what the strike is) which endangers the health and welfare of our people in order to attain a selfish end.

### Offense

#### Workers view their jobs as a means to an end of acquiring wealth. The unconditional right to strike ensures that companies can not coerce workers into lower wages.

Dubin 56 Dubin, Robert. “Industrial Workers' Worlds: A Study of the ‘Central Life Interests’ of Industrial Workers.” *Social Problems*, vol. 3, no. 3, Jan. 1956, pp. 131–142., doi:http://www.jstor.org/stable/799133 .

Our hypothesis can now be stated as follows: a significant proportion of industrial workers will be classified as non-job-oriented when central life interest is measured with the CLI questionnaire. Considering the pattern of responses to all the questions, we found that only 24% of all the workers \* studied could be labelled job-oriented in their life interests. Thus, three out of four of this group of industrial workers did not see their jobs and work places as central life interests for themselves. They found their preferred human associations and preferred areas of behavior outside of employment. If this finding holds generally, the role and significance of work in American society has departed from its presumed historical position. Factory work may now very well be viewed by industrial workers as a means to an end — a way of acquiring income for life in the community. The factory as a locale for living out a lifetime seems clearly secondary to other areas of central life interest. The factory and factory work as sources of personal satisfaction, pride, satisfying human associations, perhaps even of pleasure in expressing what Veblen called the "instinct of workmanship,” seem clearly subordinated in the American scene. The general and specific implications of this finding will be examined in the last section of this paper.

#### Strikes prevent workers from being used as a means

**Lofaso 17** Anne Marie Lofaso, Workers’ Rights as Natural Human Rights, 71 U. Miami L. Rev. 565 (2017) Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol71/iss3/3 [Anne Marie Lofaso is Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development and a professor at the West Virginia University College of Law. In 2010, she was named WVU College of Law Professor of the Year.]

It is the categorical imperative’s second formulation, known as the principle of ends, the principle of dignity, or the humanity principle, where Kant seems to add something more.202 Kant’s humanity principle tells us to treat people as if each person has intrinsic value simply because each person is human: “Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means.”203 The humanity principle forbids us to act in ways that exploit human beings or at least in ways that merely exploit human beings.204 Presumably, hiring workers per se does not violate the CI even though the employer uses its workers in furtherance of its purposes. The moral question inherent in a natural human rights approach to workers’ rights is whether these workers are being used merely as a means. Those interested in workers’ rights must determine whether, as a matter of fact (as opposed to a matter of law), workers are actually being used in an exploitative manner. This is essentially an empirical assessment of the moral claim: Are institutions, which are designed to protect workers, doing their job? It is also a legal strategy for developing positive labor standards, which reflect a particular conception of human dignity and autonomy while minimizing the impact of state and business coercion of workers.205 This particular formulation of the CI further and most clearly shows how the CI is in tension with political (or even economic) utilitarianism, by which majority rule governs and the ends justify the means.206 Morality requires that when people act we consider the humanity of each person and the effect of our actions on others’ humanity.

#### Put away your turns: strikes are an omission of action

**Benjamin 78** Walter Benjamin, On Violence, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings [Walter Bendix Schönflies Benjamin was a German Jewish philosopher, cultural critic and essayist]

This is above all the case in the class struggle, in the form of the workers' guaranteed right to strike. Organized labor is, apart from the state, probably today the only legal subject en­titled to exercise violence. Against this view there is certainly the objection that an omission of actions, a nonaction, which a strike really is, cannot be described as violence. Such a consideration doubtless made it easier for a state power to conceive the right to strike, once this was no longer avoidable. But its truth is not unconditional, and therefore not unrestricted. It is true that the omission of an action, or service, where it amounts simply to a "severing of relations," can be an entirely nonviolent, pure means. And as in the view of the state, or the law, the right to strike conceded to labor is certainly not a right to exercise violence but, rather, to escape from a violence indirectly exercised by the employer, strikes conforming to this may undoubtedly occur from time to time and involve only a "withdrawal" or "estrangement" from the employer. The mo­ment of violence, however, is necessarily introduced, in the form of extortion, into such an omission, if it takes place in the context of a conscious readiness to resume the suspended action under certain circumstances that either have nothing whatever to do with this action or only superficially modify it. Understood in this way, the right to strike constitutes in the view of labor, which is opposed to that of the state, the right to use force in attaining certain ends. The antithesis between the two conceptions emerges in all its bitterness in face of a revolu­tionary general strike. In this, labor will always appeal to its right to strike, and the state will call this appeal an abuse, since the right to strike was not "so intended," and take emer­gency measures.

### UV

#### [1] Only univeralizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

#### [2] Permissibility and presumption affirm. [a] Negating an obligation requires proving a prohibition – means negating prohibits the aff action. [b] Time skew—the negative gets 7 minutes to respond to the 1AC and 6 to respond to the 1AR – this is structural skew, means it outweighs because it controls access to the ballot

**[3] Aff gets 1AR theory and RVIs – otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this – meta theory also precedes the evaluation of initial theory shells because it determines whether or not I could engage in theory in the first place. 1AR theory is drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer of the round – the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance – you must be punished and no 2NR paradigm issues, theory, or RVIs because a) It becomes impossible to check NC abuse if you can dump on reasons the shell doesn't matter in the 2n. There will always be multiple conflicting interpretations of the resolution but the aff has to start somewhere, which means you should accept mine, and b) they have 6 minutes to go for them whereas I only have a 3 minute 2AR to respond so I get crushed on time skew. Reject theory on spikes since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other but prefer mine since they are lexically prior.**

#### [4] Fairness comes before the K: [A] Probability-theory norms are set all the time since arguments go in and out of the meta but nobody ever stops oppression with one position [B] The judge has to indicate who won the round, fairness best coheres with this since if one debater had ten minutes to speak and the other had three there would be incongruence that alters ability to judge the truth value of the K so cross-applications don’t work. [C] Jurisdiction – every argument you make concedes the authority of fairness: i.e. that the judge will evaluate your arguments. Absent some judge-debater reciprocal relationship, they could just hack against or for you. [D] Prior question. My theory argument calls into question the ability to run the argument in the first place. They can’t say the same even if they criticize theory because theory makes rules of the game not just normative statements about what debaters should say [E] Fair testing. Judge their arguments knowing I wasn’t given a fair shot to answer them. Prefer theory takes out K because they could answer my arguments but I couldn’t answer theirs. Without testing their args, we don’t know if they’re valid, so you prefer fairness impacts on strength of link. Impact turns any critical education since a marketplace of ideas where we innovate and test ideas presumes equal access. [F] Fair version of K solves. My interp allows their position but not vice versa. That means I solve 99% of their impacts, but they solve none of mine. [G] Debaters quit – turns their dialogue args and maintains squo oppression of the dominant voices in debate – prereq

#### [6] Strikes have been a form of indigenous resistance and opportunity-Austrailia proves.

Cohen 13 Cohen, Dylan. “Australian Aboriginal Workers Strike for Fair Wages and Equality, 1946-1949.” *Australian Aboriginal Workers Strike for Fair Wages and Equality, 1946-1949 | Global Nonviolent Action Database*, 18 Oct. 2013, nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/australian-aboriginal-workers-strike-fair-wages-and-equality-1946-1949.

In 20th century Australia indigenous workers were treated completely differently from the Caucasian settlers on the continent. Until the 1920s, for example, Aboriginals employed at pastoral stations in Australia received rations of clothing and food instead of cash wages. The 1936 Native Administration Act required employers to provide housing and healthcare to their Aboriginal workers.  Australian law also forced Aboriginal workers to be confined to an employer, and prevented them from leaving a place of employment without consent of an employer.  Further restricting Aboriginal mobility, Australian law did not permit them to work in industries that did any type of overseas trading. They lived in low-quality employer-provided houses, without much compensation and unable to leave. In contrast, Caucasian workers were given far better wages and had complete freedom of movement.In the early 1940s a Caucasian communist named Don McLeod began to question the status quo regarding Aboriginal rights. McLeod’s activism for indigenous rights and dignity, along with the medical help he provided to an injured Aboriginal leader, attracted the attention of other Aboriginal leaders. Dooley Bin Bin, a representative of the Nyangumarta language, and Clancy McKenna, who represented the Nyamal language, approached McLeod proposing a meeting about Aboriginal living conditions.  In 1942, Bin Bin, McKenna, McLeod, and Nyamal Elder Peter Coppin convened a meeting of Aboriginals at Skull Creek.  Over 200 Aboriginal people representing 23 communities convened for six weeks to plan for Aboriginal liberation.  The assembly included twenty-three languages and sixteen different translators. They agreed on the overall goal of ‘positive change’.From that meeting, leaders developed a plan to organize a mass strike, with all indigenous pastoral workers refusing to work. They planned the strike for 1 May 1943, intentionally aligning with the International Day of Workers’ Struggle and the start of the shearing season. However, the strike leaders decided to postpone the strike until after World War II, to maximize publicity and good will.In March 1945 the Aboriginal leader Dooley Bin Bin began travelling to pastoral camps to spread the word about the strike they’d planned in 1943 and then postponed.  He traveled on an old bicycle disguised as a relative of a pastoral worker.  Bin Bin delivered jam tin labels marked with a primitive calendar indicating the strike date, accommodating for the workers’ illiteracy.On 1 May 1946 hundreds of Aboriginal workers walked away from their employers at over 25 pastoral stations, on the specific day that shearing and mustering was to begin.  The strike left 10,000 square kilometers of pasture untended. The goals that the strikers sent to the Department of Native Affairs were clear:1. Raise the minimum wage to 30 shillings per week2. Grant the Aboriginals the right to elect representatives 3. Grant the Aboriginals the right to freedom of movement within AustraliaAt its height more than 800 Aboriginals were on strike. Strikers congregated into camps, developing them into small communities. The two major camps were The Twelve Mile camp outside of Port Hedland and the Moolyella camp outside of Marble Bar.  Here, they set up schools. Food was a major issue, since employers did not provide the striking workers with ration coupons (Australian food-stamps). The workers set up cooperative stores to handle the supplies some white shopkeepers gave them and share what became available. To further sustain themselves, the strikers hunted kangaroo and goats and gathered plants, minerals, and pearl shells.   
Some Aboriginal workers left the strike when offered better wages by their old employers. Other alienated strikers called the police.  The government arrested the leaders of the strike, McKenna, Bin Bin, and McLeod. The arrests did not intimidate the strikers; most workers continued to refuse work. One station simply decided not to elect a new leader after the arrests, forcing the police to arrest every worker or do nothing.  In 1946, the Communist Party of Australia and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union formed “the Committee for the Defence of Native Rights.” They held a public meeting in the Perth Town Hall that over 300 Caucasian allies attended. Attendees demanded the freeing of Dooley and Clancy from jail, committed to gather food and funding for the strikers, and employed a lawyer to defend McLeod. The Communist leader Dr. Alec Jolly led this meeting. Additionally, the University of Western Australia’s Student Guild marched to show support to the strikers. The Student Guild also helped raise funds for the strikers.In November 1946 the Commissioner for Native Affairs sent a medical practitioner to evaluate the safety of the Twelve Mile strike camp. Contrary to public expectations, he found that the Aboriginals were hygienic and well behaved. His report went further to explain that the only way to resolve the conflict would be through a mediated setting where the Aboriginals could fully voice their opinion.In December 1946, police arrested Mcleod when he demanded ration coupons for the striking Aboriginals. In response, over 200 men marched to the jail where he was kept. The pastoral workers demanded the police to set McLeod free.  The police then released McLeod.  Police repression in the form of arrest was common.  Police arrested McLeod a total of seven times.  At one point, police converged upon the Marble Bar camp armed.  They shot the strikers’ dogs until some strikers, including Jacob Oberdoo, disarmed them.  Police jailed Oberdoo three times during the strike.  In mid-1947, the Australian government established the White Springs Mission near the strike camps to recruit workers willing to leave the strike. The missions failed to recruit any Aboriginals to return to pastoral employment. In July 1947, after the shearing season ended, some stations that had begun providing wages in response to the strikers’ demands reduced the wages back to the original amounts. Many of those employed by these employers re-joined the strike. During these two years after World War II Australia experienced a trend of economic expansion affecting almost all inhabitants of the country. However, indigenous Australians in the Pilbara region, whether or not they participated in the strike, failed to benefit from the economic growth and were pushed further into poverty.  Throughout 1947 and 1948, the strikers remained in the strike camps.  Armed police consistently visited the camps and demanded the Aboriginals return to work. The strikers formed the North West Workers’ Association to formally represent them in negotiations.By May 1949, most strikers remained in the strike camps, especially in the Pilbara region which had suffered from the least police repression.  Instead of participating in the shearing season, the workers traveled to the pastures and pressured the remaining workers to join them, in an attempt to escalate pressure on the employers.  Police arrested thirty-two strikers who had converged at Warragine station for this purpose.In August 1949, the strikers requested that the Seamen's Union not transport wool from pasture stations in Pilbara.  The Seamen’s Union agreed.  On the third day of this targeted strike, a representative of the Australian government told McLeod that the pastoral strikers' demands would be met if the Seamen’s Union lifted this ban. The government fined the Seamen’s Union £1 for the first day and £5 for every subsequent day. The Seamen’s Union lifted the ban.  The government, however, did not meet the workers’ demands.  By this time the workers had gained the endorsement of nineteen other labor unions, including the Sheet Metal Workers Union, the Brick Layers Union, the Seamen's Union, two branches of the Australian Education Union, and the South Australian and Queensland Trades and Labour Councils.  The Workers Star, a Communist paper, covered the strike supportively, while most other domestic publications (dominated by farm owners) either ignored or disparaged it.In 1949 the Australian High Court ruled that Aborigines had the right to organize and elect their own recognized representatives. In that same year employers at the Mt. Edgar and Limestone Stations and in Kimberly and the Northern Territory granted wages to Aboriginal workers.The Deputy Commissioner for Native Affairs, Elliot Smith, told McLeod that similar wage standards would be put forth for all stations in the Pilbara region. Some of the strike camps disbanded.  The Agency of Native Affairs did not implement wage standards.Some of the Pilbara strikers refused to return to the pastoral stations. Instead they worked in surface mining, and saved their wages to form cooperatives and buy or lease sheep stations, including some they had formerly worked on.  In 1951, Aboriginals formed the Northern Development and Mining Company Pty Ltd, the first Aboriginal-owned company in Australia.  Inspired by their unity in the three-year Pilbara Strike, Aboriginals finally won equal wages to whites in the 1966 Gurindji strike in Wave Hill in the Northern Territory.