## 1

#### The Standard is maximizing well being:

#### [1] Actor spec: util is the best for governments, which is the actor in the rez – multiple warrants – a] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action b] Actor-spec comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action.

#### [2] Extinction first:

#### 1] Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities that makes violent acts inevitable.

#### 2] Objectivity – body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### 3] Moral uncertainty – it’s not regressive nor does it ignore current suffering. It frames that if we win a significant risk of a scenario err neg since arguments about ethics have spanned for centuries.

#### 4] Forecloses value – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible

#### 5] Turns calc indicts – winning the scenario proves significant risk and loss of trillions of future lives outweighs on magnitude

## 2

#### Ukraine war is optimistic, but maintaining outside support and low Russian morale’s key

* Ukraine getting outside help from west
* Kyiv’s history in soviet union and ties to Russia lowers morale
* Low morale destroys new conscriptions which is key for Russia
* Gives example of Ukrainian propaganda dissolving Russian army

Knispel interviewing Goemans 3-9 [Sandra Knispel, (Hein Goemans, a professor of political science at the University of Rochester, is an expert on international conflicts—on how they begin and end.) 3-9-2022, "How to end the war in Ukraine," NewsCenter, https://www.rochester.edu/newscenter/how-to-end-the-ukraine-war-514522/] Jet

Q&A with Hein Goemans One or both sides must change their demands as a precursor to ending the war. What’s likely to happen in the current scenario? Putin made a big mistake by committing himself to total victory in Ukraine. Goemans: It depends on the performance on the battlefield, and a country’s expectations of outside help. Russia should have become more pessimistic in the last few days because Ukraine has shown its ability to inflict far greater costs on Russia than the Kremlin had anticipated. One would expect Russia therefore to lower its demands but we’ve seen very little evidence of that so far—only the demand of denazification seems to have been dropped. Overall, Putin still maintains that everything is going according to plan. If this continues, Ukrainian sovereignty may be at stake, which is dangerous and perhaps even stupid of Putin, who seems to be committing himself to total victory. If he can’t get it, he’ll be responsible and that makes a coup against him more likely. How has the situation changed for Ukraine and its demands for ending the war? Ukraine right now is not likely to accept anything less than full independence as a nation. Goemans: Ukraine must have gotten a lot more optimistic in recent days. Not just because its army has been doing reasonably well but because of the demonstrated incompetence of the Russian army. Yes, the Russians are still much stronger and much bigger, but there are problems with morale in the Russian army, and you see the remarkable level of Ukrainian support from the West. Ukrainians are still fighting for independence of their homeland and may maintain their claims to Luhansk and Donetsk in the Donbas region in south-eastern Ukraine. I don’t know whether they’d willing to give up Crimea at this point. One avenue worth exploring in peace negotiations might be true plebiscites, overseen by international observers. Can Putin credibly commit not to go beyond the invasion of Ukraine? In his February 21 speech, he expressed his aim to reconstitute the Russian Empire. Goemans: No, he cannot. Nobody would believe him if he said he’d stop at Ukraine. People are pointing to the failed attempt to appease Hitler with the Munich Agreement in 1938. So that’s a non-starter, especially with Putin’s February 21st speech in which he said he wants to reconstitute greater Russia or the Russian Empire. Western nations can no longer say, ‘Oh, he doesn’t mean that. We can still do business there and we can have gas if we give him just a little bit, maybe two Ukrainian towns or so.’ He made that impossible. Yes, the analogy is overused, but it really is like Hitler in 1938. People heard the speech and the appeasement alarm bells went off. Global view of Russia and former Soviet satellite countries labeled. (University of Rochester illustration / Michael Osadciw) A deciding factor in this war is going to happen in the next couple of weeks. Can you explain the role of Russian conscripts in this context? The question is how many new conscripts will actually show up because it’ll determine the strength of the Russian army on the ground in Ukraine. Goemans: There are two things to keep in mind: First, the new Russian conscription class is going to be drafted in April. It’ll be very informative to see how many people do not show up. Secondly, are the Russians really going to bomb Kyiv, a so-called “hero city of the Soviet Union,” into rubble like they did with Chechnya’s capital Grosny? Are they willing to kill tens of thousands of people? Those two benchmarks will happen in the next few weeks. How precarious is the situation for Putin’s own survival? He may keep fighting, even if he knows he’s losing, because the alternative may mean signing his own death warrant. Goemans: Putin may count on the fact that Ukrainians will give in if Kyiv is bombed. But if they don’t, that should make him more pessimistic. One would think that he’d have to lower his demands, and that at that point, some kind of deal would be possible. But Putin must come home with some kind of victory because otherwise he’s literally dead. That means he may keep fighting, even if he knows he’s losing, because the alternative is signing his own death warrant. That’s what happened in the First World War. Germany kept fighting for years, even though the leadership knew that they were losing within the first weeks of the war. You’re not hyperbolic when you say Putin is signing his own death warrant with a defeat? History has plenty of examples here. Goemans: No, I’m not. In a regime like Russia—which is clearly not a democracy, but also not quite a dictatorship—if you win a war, you’re the great hero; if you lose a war, you have shown your incompetence and you’ll be removed, which I have explored in my own research. You’ll be held as what’s known as a “culpable leader”—culpable for the fact that the gains of the war do not outweigh the losses. Historically such leaders have been removed from office, and they either have gone into exile, or have been jailed or killed. A recent example is the former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. What’s frightening, and there are already signs of this, is that Putin is moving towards a dictatorship because only full repression will prevent a coup against him. In that case, both the Russian and the Ukrainian people will suffer horribly. What do you think would happen with the war if Putin’s regime were to be overthrown? “Most likely, Ukraine would strengthen its demands and now want Crimea back.” Goemans: It’s possible that the entire Russian superstructure would be wiped out—not just Putin, but all his cronies, his security advisers, the oligarchs. That whole top layer could be removed. So the question is, if there’s a coup against Putin, what would the new Russian government insist on? They’re not necessarily all going to say, “Okay, sorry Ukraine, we made a mistake. Please excuse us.” And Ukrainians would not necessarily accept that anyway. Most likely, Ukraine would strengthen its demands and want Crimea back. Putin has said he wants to effect regime change in Ukraine—would a new government even have any credibility with Ukrainians? Ukrainians have become unified against Russia. Goemans: I don’t think so. There’s a new serious form of unity among the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian identity, and it’s in direct opposition to the Russians. It would be very dangerous for any Ukrainian government to be seen as colluding with Russia. Any such attempt would likely result in the formation of independent fighting units that would keep going to get the Russians out of Ukraine. What are the minimum terms the West can accept? The West cannot accept Putin’s winning in Ukraine, but they might we willing to accept concessions on the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, if Ukraine is willing to entertain that. Goemans: That’s an important question. The West—that is Western Democracies—cannot, in my opinion, accept a victorious Putin. The West is genuinely and correctly afraid of “salami tactics”—if he takes Ukraine, he will next take Georgia, and then he will go to the Baltics. Annexation wouldn’t end, so it has to stop now. Particularly because Putin so unmistakably declared his intentions in that speech on February 21st. Would the West accept Crimea as being Russian? I don’t know. Would the West accept Luhansk along the provincial administrative borders (which is not the same as the current line of control, which is currently roughly half of the of the provinces)? I doubt that. I think the West may demand a return to the status quo ante. I don’t know if they can get that. Maybe Ukraine would have to give up the entire administrative region of Luhansk and Donetsk. But the West will want to go back to the status quo. When do you think the war will end? Either in the next month and a half, or it’ll be years. Goemans: Either in the next month and a half, or it’ll be years. Months, if the new class of Russian conscripts in April fails to turn up. Otherwise I’m not optimistic. It’ll be ongoing bloodshed, pulverizing of Ukrainian cities, coupled with insurgencies, and Russia will never have full control of Ukraine. But going back to the video of the captured Russian soldier who was ashamed of taking part in the invasion of Ukraine: If he returns to Russia, he’ll most likely be killed. Yet, he’s speaking up and he’s hoping that he affects another guy, and then maybe two other guys, and it spreads like that. That’s how an army dissolves. On the other hand, that’s also how a Ukrainian army becomes more determined.

#### Ukrainian propaganda is key to defeating Russia.

Stuart A. Thompson 22 (reporter in the technology department covering misinformation and disinformation.) and Davey Alba (technology reporter covering disinformation. In 2019, she won a Livingston Award for excellence in international reporting and a Mirror Award) 3/3/2022, nytimes, Fact and Mythmaking Blend in Ukraine’s Information War, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/technology/ukraine-war-misinfo.html

Just days into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a pilot with a mysterious nickname was quickly becoming the conflict’s first wartime hero. Named the Ghost of Kyiv, the ace fighter had apparently single-handedly shot down several Russian fighter jets. The story was shared by the official Ukraine Twitter account on Sunday in a thrilling montage video set to thumping music, showing the fighter swooping through the Ukrainian skies as enemy planes exploded around him. The Security Service of Ukraine, the country’s main security agency, also relayed the tale on its official Telegram channel, which has over 700,000 subscribers. The story of a single pilot’s beating the superior Russian air force found wide appeal online, thanks to the official Ukraine accounts and many others. Videos of the so-called Ghost of Kyiv had more than 9.3 million views on Twitter, and the flier was mentioned in thousands of Facebook groups reaching up to 717 million followers. On YouTube, videos promoting the Ukrainian fighter collected 6.5 million views, while TikTok videos with the hashtag #ghostofkyiv reached 200 million views. There was just one problem: The Ghost of Kyiv may be a myth. While there are reports of some Russian planes that were destroyed in combat, there is no information linking them to a single Ukrainian pilot. One of the first videos that went viral, which was included in the montage shared by the official Ukraine Twitter account, was a computer rendering from a combat flight simulator originally uploaded by a YouTube user with just 3,000 subscribers. And a photo supposedly confirming the fighter’s existence, shared by a former president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, was from a 2019 Twitter post by the Ukrainian defense ministry. When the fact-checking website Snopes published an article debunking the video, some social media users pushed back. “Why can’t we just let people believe some things?” one Twitter user replied. “If the Russians believe it, it brings fear. If the Ukrainians believe it, it gives them hope.” **In the information war over the invasion of Ukraine, some of the country’s official accounts have pushed stories with questionable veracity, spreading anecdotes, gripping on-the-ground accounts and even some unverified information that was later proved false, in a rapid jumble of fact and myth.** The claims by Ukraine do not compare to the falsehoods being spread by Russia, which laid the groundwork for a “false flag” operation in the lead-up to the invasion, which the Biden administration sought to derail. As the invasion neared, Russia falsely claimed that it was responding to Ukrainian aggression and liberating citizens from fascists and neo-Nazis. And since the assault began, Russia made baseless claims that Ukrainians had indiscriminately bombed hospitals and killed civilians. **Instead, Ukraine’s online propaganda is largely focused on its heroes and martyrs, characters who help dramatize tales of Ukrainian fortitude and Russian aggression.** But the Ukrainian claims on social media have also raised thorny questions about how false and unproven content should be handled during war — when lives are at stake and a Western ally is fighting for its survival against a powerful invading force. **“Ukraine is involved in pretty classic propaganda,” said Laura Edelson, a computer scientist studying misinformation at New York University. “They are telling stories that support their narrative. Sometimes false information is making its way in there, too, and more of it is getting through because of the overall environment.” Anecdotes detailing Ukrainian bravery or Russian brutality are crucial to the country’s war plan, according to experts, and they are part of established war doctrine that values winning not just individual skirmishes but also the hearts and minds of citizens and international observers. That is especially important during this conflict, as Ukrainians try to keep morale high among the fighters and marshal global support for their cause. “If Ukraine had no messages of the righteousness of its cause, the popularity of its cause, the valor of its heroes, the suffering of its populace, then it would lose,” said Peter W. Singer, a strategist and senior fellow at New America, a think tank in Washington. “Not just the information war, but it would lose the overall war.”** In previous wars, combatants would try to sabotage enemy communication and limit the spread of wartime propaganda, even cutting physical communication lines like telegraph cables. **But there are fewer such cables in the internet age, so in addition to downing communication towers and disrupting pockets of internet access, the modern strategy involves flooding the internet with viral messages that drown out opposing narratives. That digital battle moved at startling speed, experts noted, using an array of social media accounts, official websites and news conferences streamed online to spread Ukraine’s message. “You have to have the message that goes the most viral,” Mr. Singer said.** That was the case with another report from Ukraine involving a remarkable confrontation on Snake Island, an outpost in the Black Sea. According to an audio recording released by Pravda, a Ukrainian newspaper, and later verified by Ukraine officials, 13 border guards were offered a frightening ultimatum by an advancing Russian military unit: Surrender or face an attack. The Ukrainians responded instead with an expletive, before apparently being killed. Audio of the exchange went viral on social media, and the clip posted on Feb. 24 by Pravda received more than 3.5 million views on YouTube. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine personally announced the deaths in a video, saying each guard would be awarded the title Hero of Ukraine. But just days later, Ukrainian officials confirmed in a Facebook post that the men were still alive, taken prisoner by Russian forces. Social media has become the main conduit for pushing the information, verified or not, giving tech companies a role in the information war, too. The fake Ghost of Kyiv video, for instance, was flagged as “out of context” by Twitter, but the montage posted to Ukraine’s official Twitter account received no such flag. The false photo posted by Mr. Poroshenko, the former Ukrainian president, also had no flag. While Twitter monitors its service for harmful content, including manipulated or mislabeled videos, it said tweets simply mentioning the Ghost of Kyiv did not violate its rules. “When we identify content and accounts that violate the Twitter Rules, we’ll take enforcement action,” the company said. In exercising discretion over how unverified or false content is moderated, social media companies have decided to “pick a side,” said Alex Stamos, the director of the Stanford Internet Observatory and a former head of security at Facebook. **“I think this demonstrates the limits of ‘fact-checking’ in a fast-moving battle with real lives at stake,” Mr. Stamos said. He added that technology platforms never created rules against misinformation overall, instead targeting specific behaviors, actors and content. That leaves the truth behind some wartime narratives, like an apparent assassination plot against Mr. Zelensky or simply the number of troops killed in battle, fairly elusive, even as official accounts and news media share the information.** Those narratives have continued as the war marches on, revealing the contours of an information war aimed not just at Western audiences but also at Russian citizens. At the United Nations on Monday, the Ukrainian ambassador, Sergiy Kyslytsya, shared a series of text messages that he said had been retrieved from the phone of a dead Russian soldier. **“Mama, I’m in Ukraine. There is a real war raging here. I’m afraid,” the Russian soldier apparently wrote, according to Mr. Kyslytsya’s account, which he read in Russian. The tale seemed to evoke a narrative advanced by officials and shared extensively on social media that Russian soldiers are poorly trained and too young, and don’t want to be fighting their Ukrainian neighbors. “We are bombing all of the cities together, even targeting civilians.” The story, whether true or not, appears tailor-made for Russian civilians — particularly parents fretting over the fate of their enlisted children, experts said. “This is an age-old tactic that the Ukrainians are trying to use, and that is to draw the attention of the mothers and the families in Russia away from the more grandiose aims for war onto, instead, the human costs of war,” said Ian Garner, a historian focusing on Russia who has followed Russian-language propaganda during the conflict. “We know that this is really effective.”** Official Ukrainian accounts have also uploaded dozens of videos purportedly showing Russian prisoners of war, some with bloody bandages covering their arms or face. In the videos, the prisoners are heard denouncing the invasion. The videos may raise questions about whether Ukraine is violating the Geneva Conventions, which has rules about sharing images of war prisoners. Russia has also engaged in its own form of mythmaking, but experts say it has been far less effective. Rather than targeting international observers with emotional appeals, Russia has focused on swaying its own population to build support for the battle, Dr. Garner said. Since Russian state media is still calling the conflict a “special military operation” and not a war — in line with the description used by President Vladimir V. Putin — state broadcasters are left “trying to talk about a war that is apparently not happening,” Dr. Garner said. **The Russian government “can’t play to its strongest narratives of individual sacrifice,” he added, instead relying on stories of Ukrainians bombing hospitals and civilians, providing no evidence. Ukraine’s efforts to amplify its own messages also leave little room for Russia to dominate the conversation, said Mr. Singer, the strategist from New America.** “A key to information warfare in the age of social media is to recognize that the audience is both target of and participant in it,” he said. He added that social media users were “hopefully sharing out those messages, which makes them combatants of a sort as well.”

#### Ukraine’s info war is key to defeating Russia.

Sinan Aral 22 (director of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy and author of "The Hype Machine) 3/1/2022, Ukraine is winning the information war, Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/01/information-war-zelensky-ukraine-putin-russia/>

**Today, the information war in Ukraine is more intense, more tightly contested and arguably more important than ever because motivating volunteer fighters at home and encouraging foreign support abroad are critical to success. And this time, it seems, Russia is losing. Reports abound on social media of more than 4,000 Russian casualties, images of crippled Russian helicopters and armored vehicles and cellphone videos of savage Russian missile attacks on civilian targets. This mix of official Ukrainian war statistics combined with videos (both verified and unverified), posted by Ukrainian citizens and sympathizers from the front lines, is painting a vivid picture of a homegrown resistance successfully slowing the advance of a much larger and ostensibly better organized military machine. Facebook posts showing Ukrainians kneeling in front of tanks to stop their progress and Twitter images of women and children sheltering in subways and basements set the emotional backdrop of senseless aggression against a peaceful nation. Viral videos and audio clips evoke a defiant optimism impossible to ignore: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appearing via his cellphone walking the streets of Kyiv, unharmed, in a “proof of life” demonstration emphasizing his willingness to stay and fight for his country, despite a U.S. offer to evacuate him, for example, or the recording of soldiers in an isolated Ukrainian outpost on Snake Island, in the Black Sea, cursing and telling off the Russian Black Sea Fleet. These stories are spreading rapidly on social media and subsequently echoing through official news channels in a media feedback loop that amplifies the information war and broadcasts it on television sets all over the world.** Zelensky, in particular, is deftly outmaneuvering Putin in this information war. He rallied Ukrainian men to defend their homeland, used the encrypted messaging platform [Telegram to speak directly to the Russian people](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMTeSsnNCw0) to counter Putin’s narrative, urged the West to step up its assistance in defense of law, order and peace, and even [pleaded with foreigners](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/russia-ukraine-live-updates-n1290057/ncrd1290087#liveBlogCards) to cross the border into Ukraine to defend Western democracy. While misinformation exists on both sides, Zelensky gives the impression that he’s more committed to truth and transparency. In contrast, Russia has been secretive, obfuscating the true extent of its incursion into Ukraine, and out of touch, airing the rambling addresses of its leader. It’s as if Putin has forgotten that social media transitioned from text to real-time video around the time of the Crimean annexation. In today’s information war, Russian news claiming Zelensky had turned tail and fled was swiftly countered by a video selfie of the Ukrainian president in Kyiv, vowing to defend his homeland. The symbolic contrast between Zelensky striding through war-torn streets, confident even under fire, and Putin, seated, hunched over a large wooden desk in the safety of a secure office hundreds of miles away from the fighting, is stark. This time, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Google are also proactively engaged in the information war. During the Crimean annexation, they were reactive and struggled to keep up with misinformation and false abuse reports. Today, in Ukraine, they have [banned Russian state-owned media from advertising on their platforms](https://www.axios.com/youtube-meta-twitter-restrict-russian-state-media-323d966f-531e-40f5-aa06-3b82998589df.html) and [defiantly fact-checked](https://www.theverge.com/2022/2/25/22950874/russia-facebook-blocked-roskomnadzor-media-censorship) Putin’s propaganda despite Russia’s protests and a full ban of Twitter and a partial ban of Facebook in Russia. Facebook has spun up a special operations center, staffed with native Russian and Ukrainian speakers, to monitor misinformation posted about the war, added warning labels to war-related images that its software detects are more than a year old, and restricted access to content from the state-affiliated Russian media outlets RT and Sputnik. YouTube is restricting access to Russian state-owned media outlets for users in Ukraine, removing Russian state-owned channels from recommendations, and limiting their content’s reach across the platform. Twitter has temporarily banned all ads in Ukraine and Russia, added labels to tweets with links to Russian state-affiliated media and downranked their content in algorithmic timelines. While numerous fake videos are circulating on TikTok about Ukraine, the Chinese-owned platform has no comprehensive policy on policing information about the conflict. Despite blocking state-owned Russian media in the European Union, this information flows freely in Ukraine and Russia on the platform, now dubbed “WarTok” by some observers, in part because it is organizing such videos into a convenient discover playlist by the same name. **The information war is critical to what happens next in Ukraine for several reasons. It motivates the resistance by inspiring Ukrainian citizens to take up arms in defense of their country and motivating them with social proof that they are united and not fighting alone. It encourages foreign assistance, pressuring Europe and the United States to step up their efforts to end the conflict. It fans the flames of protest in Russia, mobilizing the antiwar movement in Moscow and elsewhere in defiance of Putin’s aggression. And it may even eventually demoralize Russian troops, who must be wondering what on earth they are doing in Ukraine if the motivation for the intervention has been a lie all along. When Russia struck a Ukrainian television tower on Tuesday, it seemed to confirm Moscow’s keen awareness of the need to counter Ukraine’s information war and to highlight the importance of information in modern conflicts. Information campaigns are difficult to quantify during the fog of war. But while it is hard to pinpoint the extent to which the information war is contributing to the overwhelming international unity against Putin’s aggression, one thing is clear: Social media, mainstream media and the narrative framing of the invasion of Ukraine undoubtedly will play an important role in how this conflict ends. Now, vigilance and fortitude are not only needed on the battlefield, where lives and territory will be won and lost, but also will be essential online, where the hearts and minds of the world will be won or lost.**

#### Russian win would lead to escalation in multiple forums – goes global.

LIANA FIX 22 (Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, in Washington, D.C). MICHAEL KIMMAGE (Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. )2/18/22, What If Russia Wins? A Kremlin-Controlled Ukraine Would Transform Europe, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins>

If Russia gains control of Ukraine or manages to destabilize it on a major scale, a new era for the United States and for Europe will begin. U.S. and European leaders would face the dual challenge of rethinking European security and of not being drawn into a larger war with Russia. All sides would have to consider the potential of nuclear-armed adversaries in direct confrontation. These two responsibilities—robustly defending European peace and prudently avoiding military escalation with Russia—will not necessarily be compatible. The United States and its allies could find themselves deeply unprepared for the task of having to create a new European security order as a result of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine.

MANY WAYS TO WIN

For Russia, victory in Ukraine could take various forms. As in [Syria](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-03-20/russias-pyrrhic-victory-syria), victory does not have to result in a sustainable settlement. It could involve the installation of a compliant government in Kyiv or the partition of the country. Alternatively, the defeat of the Ukrainian military and the negotiation of a Ukrainian surrender could effectively transform Ukraine into a failed state. Russia could also employ devastating cyberattacks and disinformation tools, backed by the threat of force, to cripple the country and induce regime change. With any of these outcomes, Ukraine will have been effectively detached from the West.

If Russia achieves its political aims in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not be what it was before the war. Not only will U.S. primacy in Europe have been qualified; any sense that the European Union or NATO can ensure peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost age. Instead, security in Europe will have to be reduced to defending the core members of the EU and NATO. Everyone outside the clubs will stand alone, with the exception of Finland and Sweden. This may not necessarily be a conscious decision to end enlargement or association policies; but it will be de facto policy. Under a perceived siege by Russia, the EU and NATO will no longer have the capacity for ambitious policies beyond their own borders.

The United States and Europe will also be in a state of permanent economic war with Russia. The West will seek to enforce sweeping sanctions, which Russia is likely to parry with cyber-measures and energy blackmailing, given the economic asymmetries. China might well stand on Russia’s side in this economic tit for tat. Meanwhile, domestic politics in European countries will resemble a twenty-first-century great game, in which Russia will be studying Europe for any breakdown in the commitment to NATO and to the transatlantic relationship. Through methods fair and foul, Russia will take whatever opportunity comes its way to influence public opinion and elections in European countries. Russia will be an anarchic presence—sometimes real, sometimes imagined—in every instance of European political instability.

Cold War analogies will not be helpful in a world with a Russianized Ukraine. The Cold War border in Europe had its flash points, but it was stabilized in a mutually acceptable fashion in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. By contrast, Russian suzerainty over Ukraine would open a vast zone of destabilization and insecurity from Estonia to Poland to Romania to Turkey. For as long as it lasts, Russia’s presence in Ukraine will be perceived by Ukraine’s neighbors as provocative and unacceptable and, for some, as a threat to their own security. Amid this shifting dynamic, order in Europe will have to be conceived of in primarily military terms—which, since Russia has a stronger hand in the military than in the economic realm, will be in the Kremlin’s interest—sidelining nonmilitary institutions such as the European Union.

Russia has Europe’s largest conventional military, which it is more than ready to use. The EU’s defense policy—in contrast to NATO’s—is far from being able to provide security for its members. Thus will military reassurance, especially of the EU’s eastern members, be key. Responding to a revanchist Russia with sanctions and with the rhetorical proclamation of a rules-based international order will not be sufficient.

IMPERILING EUROPE'S EAST

In the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, Germany‘s position in Europe will be severely challenged. Germany is a marginal military power that has based its postwar political identity on the rejection of war. The ring of friends it has surrounded itself with, especially in the east with Poland and the Baltic states, risks being destabilized by Russia. France and the United Kingdom will assume leading roles in European affairs by virtue of their comparatively strong militaries and long tradition of military interventions. The key factor in Europe, however, will remain the United States. NATO will depend on U.S. support as will the anxious and imperiled countries of Europe’s east, the frontline nations arrayed along a now very large, expanded, and uncertain line of contact with Russia, including Belarus and the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine.

Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, will likely have substantial numbers of NATO troops permanently stationed on their soil. A request from Finland and Sweden to gain an Article 5 commitment and to join NATO would be impossible to reject. In Ukraine, EU and NATO countries will never recognize a new Russian-backed regime created by Moscow. But they will face the same challenge they do with Belarus: wielding sanctions without punishing the population and supporting those in need without having access to them. Some NATO members will bolster a Ukrainian insurgency, to which Russia will respond by threatening NATO members.

Ukraine’s predicament will be very great. Refugees will flee in multiple directions, quite possibly in the millions. And those parts of the Ukrainian military that are not directly defeated will continue fighting, echoing the partisan warfare that tore apart this whole region of Europe during and after World War II.

The permanent state of escalation between Russia and Europe may stay cold from a military perspective. It is likely, though, to be economically hot. The sanctions put on Russia in 2014, which were connected to formal diplomacy (often referred to as the “Minsk” process, after the city in which the negotiations were held), were not draconian. They were reversible as well as conditional. Following a Russian invasion of Ukraine, new sanctions on banking and on technology transfer would be significant and permanent. They would come in the wake of failed diplomacy and would start at “the top of the ladder,” according to the U.S. administration. In response, Russia will retaliate, quite possibly in the cyber-domain as well as in the energy sector. Moscow will limit access to critical goods such as titanium, of which Russia has been the world’s second-largest exporter. This war of attrition will test both sides. Russia will be ruthless in trying to get one or several European states to back away from economic conflict by linking a relaxation in tension to these countries’ self-interest, thus undermining consensus in the EU and NATO.

Europe’s strong suit is its economic leverage. Russia’s asset will be any source of domestic division or disruption in Europe or in Europe’s transatlantic partners. Here Russia will be proactive and opportunistic. If a pro-Russian movement or candidate shows up, that candidate can be encouraged directly or indirectly. If an economic or political sore point diminishes the foreign policy efficacy of the United States and its allies, it will be a weapon for Russian propaganda efforts and for Russian espionage.

Much of this is already happening. But a war in Ukraine will up the ante. Russia will use more resources and be unchained in its choice of instruments. The massive refugee flows arriving in Europe will exacerbate the EU’s unresolved refugee policy and provide fertile ground for populists. The holy grail of these informational, political, and cyberbattles will be the 2024 presidential election in the United States. Europe’s future will depend on this election. The election of Donald Trump or of a Trumpian candidate might destroy the transatlantic relationship at Europe’s hour of maximum peril, putting into question NATO’s position and its security guarantees for Europe.

TURNING NATO INWARD

For the United States, a Russian victory would have profound effects on its grand strategy in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. First, Russian success in Ukraine would require Washington to pivot to Europe. No ambiguity about NATO’s Article 5 (of the kind experienced under Trump) will be permissible. Only a strong U.S. commitment to European security will prevent Russia from dividing European countries from one another. This will be difficult in light of competing priorities, especially those that confront the United States in a deteriorating relationship with China. But the interests at stake are fundamental. The United States has very large commercial equities in Europe. The European Union and the United States are each other’s largest trade and investment partners, with trade in goods and services totaling $1.1 trillion in 2019. A well-functioning, peaceful Europe augments American foreign policy—on climate change, on nonproliferation, on global public health, and on the management of tensions with China or Russia. If Europe is destabilized, then the United States will be much more alone in the world.

NATO is the logical means by which the United States can provide security reassurance to Europe and deter Russia. A war in Ukraine would revive NATO not as a democracy-building enterprise or as a tool for out-of-area expeditions like the war in Afghanistan but as the unsurpassed defensive military alliance that it was designed to be. Although Europeans will be demanding a greater military commitment to Europe from the United States, a broader Russian invasion of Ukraine should drive every NATO member to increase its defense spending. For Europeans, this would be the final call to improve Europe’s defensive capabilities—in tandem with the United States—in order to help the United States manage the Russian-Chinese dilemma.

For a Moscow now in permanent confrontation with the West, Beijing could serve as an economic backstop and a partner in opposing U.S. hegemony. In the worst case for U.S. grand strategy, China might be emboldened by Russia’s assertiveness and threaten confrontation over Taiwan. But there is no guarantee that an escalation in Ukraine will benefit the Sino-Russian relationship. China’s ambition to become the central node of the Eurasian economy will be damaged by war in Europe, because of the brutal uncertainties war brings. Chinese irritation with a Russia on the march will not enable a rapprochement between Washington and [Beijing](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe), but it may initiate new conversations.

## 3

#### CP Text: Democracies ought to–

#### - Eliminate the use of fossil fuels.

#### - Eliminate their production subsidies for fossil fuels

#### - Establish an incentive program for artificial tree carbon capture

#### That reduces foreign energy dependence and kickstarts a renewable revolution.

**Monasterolo 19** Irene Monasterolo [Irene Monasterolo is a development economist with experience in policy monitoring and evaluation; institutional capacity building; governance of evidence-based sustainability policies; complex system thinking for modelling the resource-climate nexus; green fiscal and monetary policies for financing the green economy; and adaptation tools for building agricultural resilience to climate change, focusing on food risk and climate adaptation. She has worked as a scientist in academia, as an economist for consulting companies, as a consultant for the World Bank. She is currently Assistant Professor of Climate Economics and Finance at the Vienna University of Economics and Business and a Visiting Scholar with Stanford Energy's Sustainable Finance Initiative. She holds a PhD in Agri-food economics and statistics from the University of Bologna (IT) and held a post-doc at the Global Sustainability Institute in Cambridge (UK) focused on modelling the impact of resource constraints on global growth and political instability.] & Marco Raberto [Associate Professor of Business and Management Engineering, University of Genoa, Italy] (2019). The impact of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies on the low-carbon transition. Energy Policy, 124, 355–370. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2018.08.051 // ash

The phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies contributes to improve the performance of the production factors, represented by unemployment (top panel) and firms’ capital (bottom panel). In the case of full fossil fuel subsidies (black line), the economy experiences the highest unemployment and the lowest firm's capital accumulation because the subsidies are fully financed via general taxation, thus depressing other investments (bottom panel) and consumption. In addition, since the country needs to import raw materials and fossil fuels from ROW, a carbon-intense economy means an outflow of liquidity to the foreign country. In contrast, the phasing in of green subsidies contributes to increase capital accumulation and employment (see Fig. 8 for details).

Fig. 7a: Production factors conditioned to green subsidies. Fig. 7a shows the effects on the production factors (y axis) of increasing levels of green fiscal policy and green sovereign bonds issuance (x axis). Higher levels of green subsidies lead to positive economic outcomes in terms of lower unemployment (top panel) and higher speed of capital accumulation in the production sectors (bottom panel), thus supporting the development of the green economy. Nevertheless, the trend in the fiscal and green bonds’ policy scenarios is slightly different. Our explanation is that the higher share of renewable energy production in the green subsidies scenarios implies lower fossil fuels extraction, thus lower revenues and profits for the mining company, and consequently lower money outflow to the ROW. In this way, the domestic economy displays higher purchasing power and domestic demand, with positive effects on unemployment rate and capital accumulation. This positive effect also emerges in BA's balance sheet (Fig. 3).

The interest rate set by the central bank could explain why the scenarios characterized by green subsidies financed with the issuance of green sovereign bonds are slightly less performing in terms of capital investments than the ones characterized by green fiscal policies. Indeed, the central bank's interest rate increases the most in the green bonds’ scenarios, thus counteracting the inflationary trend created by the green bonds’ issuance on the real economy. These results provide useful insights in the current discussion on what role, if any, central banks could play in the low-carbon transition by greening monetary policies.

7. Conclusion and policy implications

By applying an expanded version of the EIRIN SFC behavioral model, we find that reforming fossil fuel subsidies in high-income countries could create the conditions to foster a stable low-carbon energy transition, with positive socio-economic effects. Indeed, a gradual phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies contributes to shift investments to low-carbon energy production. In addition, it contributes to improve the real economy performance through higher capital accumulation in the domestic economy and the creation of green jobs and capital investments, supported by a dynamic credit market. Table 3 shows the impact of each policy and scenario to the real economy, green capital investments and the credit market.

#### Super trees are sufficient to solve international warming.

Vince 12 [Gaia Vince, BBC News, 4 October 2012, Sucking CO2 from the Skies With Artificial Trees, <http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20121004-fake-trees-to-clean-the-skies>] TR

Scientists are looking at ways to modulate the global temperature by removing some of this greenhouse gas from the air. If it works, it would be one of the few ways of geoengineering the planet with multiple benefits, beyond simply cooling the atmosphere. Every time we breathe out, we emit carbon dioxide just like all other metabolic life forms. Meanwhile, photosynthetic organisms like plants and algae take in carbon dioxide and emit oxygen. This balance has kept the planet at a comfortably warm average temperature of 14C (57F), compared with a chilly -18C (0F) if there were [no carbon dioxide in the atmosphere](http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/cmb-faq/globalwarming.html). In the [Anthropocene](http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120209-welcome-to-the-age-of-modern-man) (the Age of Man), we have shifted this balance by releasing more carbon dioxide than plants can absorb. Since the industrial revolution, humans have been burning increasing amounts of fossil fuels, releasing stored carbon from millions of years ago. Eventually the atmosphere will reach a new balance at a hotter temperature as a result of the additional carbon dioxide, but getting there is going to be difficult. The carbon dioxide we are releasing is changing the climate, the wind and precipitation patterns, acidifying the oceans, warming the habitats for plants and animals, melting glaciers and ice sheets, increasing the frequency of wildfires and raising sea levels. And we are doing this at such a rapid pace that animals and plants may not have time to evolve to the new conditions. Humans won't have to rely on evolution, but we will have to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on adapting or moving our cities and other infrastructure, and finding ways to grow our food crops under these unfamiliar conditions. Even if we stopped burning fossil fuels today, there is enough carbon dioxide in the atmosphere - and it is such [a persistent, lasting gas](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jan/16/greenhouse-gases-remain-air) – that temperatures will continue to rise for a few hundred years. We won't stop emitting carbon dioxide today, of course, and it is now very likely that within the lifetime of people born today we will increase the temperature of the planet [by at least 3C more](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-17488450) than the average temperature before the industrial revolution. Seek and capture Hence, the idea of finding ways of removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. One way to do this is to grow plants that absorb a lot of carbon dioxide and store it. But although we can certainly improve tree-planting, we also need [land to grow food](http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120828-enriching-the-soil) for an [increasing global population](http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120725-population-overload), so there's a limit to how much forestry we can fit on the planet. In recent years there have been attempts to remove the carbon dioxide from its source in power plants. [Scrubber devices](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scrubber)have been fitted to the chimneys in different pilot projects around the world so that the greenhouse gas produced during fossil fuel burning can be removed from the exhaust emissions. The carbon dioxide can then be cooled and pumped for storage in deep underground rock chambers, for example, replacing the fluid in saline aquifers. Another storage option is to use the collected gas to replace crude oil deposits, helping drilling companies to pump out oil from hard to reach places, in a process known as advanced oil recovery. Removing this pollution from power plants – called [carbon capture and storage](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/interactive/2008/jun/12/carbon.capture) – is a useful way of preventing additional carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere as we continue to burn fossil fuels. But what about the gas that is already out there? The problem with removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is that it’s present at such a low concentration. In a power plant chimney, for instance, carbon dioxide is present at concentrations of 4-12% within a relatively small amount of exhaust air. Removing the gas takes a lot of energy, so it is expensive, but it’s feasible. To extract the 0.04% of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would require enormous volumes of air to be processed. As a result, most scientists have baulked at the idea. Fake plastic trees [Klaus Lackner](http://www.columbia.edu/~kl2010/members_lackner.htm), director of the Lenfest Center for Sustainable Energy at Columbia University, has come up with a technique that he thinks could solve the problem. Lackner has designed an artificial tree that passively soaks up carbon dioxide from the air using “leaves” that are 1,000 times more efficient than true leaves that use photosynthesis. "We don't need to expose the leaves to sunlight for photosynthesis like a real tree does," Lackner explains. "So our leaves can be much more closely spaced and overlapped – even configured in a honeycomb formation to make them more efficient." The leaves look like sheets of papery plastic and are coated in a resin that contains sodium carbonate, which pulls carbon dioxide out of the air and stores it as a bicarbonate (baking soda) on the leaf. To remove the carbon dioxide, the leaves are rinsed in water vapour and can dry naturally in the wind, soaking up more carbon dioxide. Lackner calculates that his tree can remove one tonne of carbon dioxide a day. Ten million of these trees could remove 3.6 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide a year – equivalent to about 10% of our global annual carbon dioxide emissions. "Our total emissions could be removed with 100 million trees," he says, "whereas we would need 1,000 times that in real trees to have the same effect." If the trees were mass produced they would each initially cost around $20,000 (then falling as production takes over), just below the price of the average family car in the United States, he says, pointing out that 70 million cars are produced each year. And each would fit on a truck to be positioned at sites around the world. "The great thing about the atmosphere is it's a good mixer, so carbon dioxide produced in an American city can be removed in Oman," he says.

## 4

#### CP Text – In a Democracy, a Free Press ought to prioritize Objectivity over Advocacy, except for instances of Investigative Journalism.

#### The CP competes – the tension between Objectivity and Advocacy lies in Objective Journalisms separation of opinion and personal bias from discussions.

Reavy 13, Matthew. "Objectivity and advocacy in journalism." Media Ethics 25.1 (2013). (Communication Department Chairperson at University of Scranton)//Elmer

Advocacy Journalism Public journalism and, for the most part, citizen journalism can be viewed as examples of advocacy journalism, a form of journalism that endeavors to be fact-based, but does not separate editorial opinion from news coverage and often approaches the news from a specific viewpoint. Advocacy journalists distinguish the “good guys” from the “bad guys” and “actively participate in the debate, becoming more activists than observers of the events” (Ruigrok, 2010). Thus, they can be said to exhibit the same kind of “interventionist impulse” that scholars such as Hanitzsch (2007, p. 373) see at work in public journalism. Advocacy journalism has been at times credited with everything from combating “the moral failings of Western governments” (Hammond, 2002, p. 178) to offering "a more progressive notion of experts and expertise by citing community members while critiquing or pointedly ignoring dominant discourses from government and academic ‘experts’” (Heitner, 2009, p. 405). It has been tied to peace journalism (Kempf, 2007), “alternative” publications (Waisbord, 2009) and environmental journalism (Waisbord & Peruzzotti, 2009) among others. Some scholars contend that advocacy journalists can be assumed to write from a “leftist” point of view (Craig, 2004, p. 240), often as a counterweight to the “inherently conservative” notion of objectivity (Glasser, 1984, para. 3), which some argue serves as a tool to “help the powerful maintain order” (Ryan, 2009. p. 8). Many other scholars contend that any liberal bias on the part of journalists is more than offset by a conservative bias among owners. For example, Parry (2003) notes that “media owners historically have enforced their political views and other preferences by installing senior editors whose careers depend on delivering a news product that fits with the owner’s prejudices.”

#### Investigative Journalism is a form of Advocacy Journalism – it doesn’t violate the Truth BUT attaches it to a partial cause.

Givens 20 Dana Givens 10-14-2020 "Opinion: When It Comes to Advocacy Journalism, the Truth Should Come Before Emotion" <https://theclick.news/essay-when-it-comes-to-advocacy-journalism-the-truth-should-come-before-emotion/> (Sacred Heart University with a Bachelor's of Science in Marketing and Global Studies)//Elmer

(NEW YORK) — Advocacy journalists take a different kind of stance than other journalists when it comes to crafting a story. This type of writing has a different belief system attached — it is dedicated to a certain cause, where the journalist takes a direct and intentional stance. It’s a step above simply an opinion essay because the goal is to create a call to action, to call out injustice. An example of this type of journalism was a recent report from the nonprofit Human Rights Watch, regarding new evidence showing the members of the New York City police department staged a mass arrest and assault on a group of peaceful protesters in the Bronx. The organization released a report and video showing new evidence that the police department did create a plan to stage a mass arrest in Mott Haven, a part of the Bronx, after tracking down peaceful protesters in early June. This is a great example of advocacy journalism because it was tied to human rights and police brutality and demonstrates detailed investigative reporting. They were able to back up their arguments with evidence on the event in addition to getting testimonies from the people involved. We have discussed how objectivity is one of the foundations of journalism and while the organization has taken a stance in their advocacy, they presented an argument backed up by verified facts and sources. The video was able to give even more context to the details leading up to the event and what happened outside of what had previously been reported.

#### Investigative Journalism solves Corruption that hurts democracy.

Hrvolova and Katz 21 Martina Hrvolova and Jonathan D. Katz 11-29-2021 "The Anti-Corruption Role of Free Media and Investigative Journalism" <https://www.gmfus.org/news/anti-corruption-role-free-media-and-investigative-journalism> (Resident Fellow WASHINGTON, DC OFFICE)//Elmer

Summary Global democracy is under growing threat from illiberal actors. In response to challenges including backsliding, the United States and its partners are ramping up efforts to reinvigorate and renew democracy at the U.S.-organized Summit for Democracy in December and its follow-up in 2022. Participants will focus on defending against authoritarianism, fighting corruption, and promoting respect for human rights. Media freedom and investigative journalism—vital for democracy, transparency, and accountability—have been targeted by illiberal forces worldwide, including autocrats in China and Russia. The United States, Europe, and democracy actors internationally need to prioritize media support or face consequences at home and abroad as disinformation deepens polarization, enables corruption, and advantages malign actors. Journalists and independent media are outspent and face violence and even death. They need greater support, legal assistance, training, and protection on the part of donors, governments, and multilateral bodies. The summit can be a launchpad for collaboration and coordination on this front, ensuring that freedom of media and expression serve as bulwarks against rising authoritarianism and corruption. Introduction Democratic governance, civil society, and media are increasingly undermined and threatened across the globe, including in the Western democracies. The rise of authoritarian-led countries, including China and Russia, has severely eroded democratic gains. The impact of illiberal forces and democratic backsliding has been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic, climate change, and growing economic inequality. Corruption, impacting billions globally, helps fuel the democratic spiral, and the trends in this regard point in the wrong direction.1 Corruption in plain sight—but often hidden from scrutiny—has too often been a common and a successful tactic used by authoritarians and their enablers on every continent to gain and maintain power, to repress populations, and to undermine democracy. Authoritarians have increasingly deployed corruption to rot democratic institutions, liberal economies, and citizens’ trust from the inside as well as to create a favorable environment for lawlessness and graft. Free media, including investigative journalists acting as watchdogs, have been at the forefront in addressing the corruption epidemic and in seeking to provide accountability—in closing- space countries as in Western democracies. In Russia, publicity around President Vladimir Putin’s seaside estate highlighted how media can work together across international boundaries to expose serious, long-term corruption in a country.2 The recent release of the Pandora Papers has reaffirmed the indispensable role of media in protecting democracy and addressing the challenges posed by corruption.3 The continuing release of investigative reports based on the Pandora Papers also shows how international collaboration protects journalists and improves their ability to report more completely on the vast international networks of corruption and their enablers across the globe.4 The world is at a historic tipping point for democracy, media, and journalism. Free media will remain an essential institution to preserve and protect democracy. Investigative journalism is playing a leading role in detecting and exposing corruption. It is critical in the current global environment that media remain free and independent. When media is undermined, threatened or weaponized, this creates an environment for autocrats and their enablers to prosper. The U.S.-organized Summit for Democracy in December 2021, the subsequent “year of action,” and the second summit in late 2022 provide a critical opportunity for democracies to commit to protect, promote, and support free, independent media and investigative journalism. The Role of Free Media and Investigative Journalism While many corrupt individuals, corporations, and governments undermine the rule of law and fund media to create propaganda, hate, and divisions among people, independent journalism is in a threatened state operationally and economically. Solutions can be found at many different levels, but the first step is to understand the context and importance of free and independent media, including investigative reporting, as a crucial actor promoting oversight and accountability. According to the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, the following four pillars are essential for addressing the nexus between authoritarianism and corruption: Introducing, adopting, and implementing impactful regulations to address corruption at home and abroad as well as to defend and enhance media freedom. Exposing corruption and its patterns by media. Acting on media findings by civil society and activists Prosecuting corruption based on leads from media, civil society, and activists and enforcing anti-corruption laws.5 Exposing corruption and its patterns by media, civil society, and activists serves as a catalyst that arms others with the information needed to drive positive change and advance democracy, transparency, and accountability. Using media revelations, civil society and activists can push law-enforcement bodies to act and advocates can press for necessary policy reform. At the same time, policymakers can point to media investigations and data releases to gather support for passing legislation and advancing reforms.6 The four pillars have not traditionally been interconnected, which must change if there is to be more impactful efforts at strengthening democracy by fighting corruption and the authoritarianism it supports. Investigative journalists, civil society, and activists have critical roles to play in documenting corruption and enforcing actions against it, but they often work in silos. By contrast, tycoons, corrupt officials, and organized criminal networks are highly coordinated across borders. Corruption is a transnational issue and must be addressed through transnational cooperation. Even a handful of people can make a significant difference if they work together and amplify each other’s voices, as shown by the recent reporting on corruption that have taken center stage at the global level following the release of the Pandora Papers and previous similar leaks. International groups of investigative journalists such as the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, and the Global Anti-Corruption Consortium are some of the prime examples of an international cooperation that leads to tangible results in bringing corruption to the attention of the public and law-enforcement bodies. While sensational stories, investigations, and leaked information exposing high-level corruption have been front-page news worldwide, follow-up action to ensure accountability and to push for lasting change, including by implementing and enforcing laws and regulations have often lagged. In democratic systems, prosecuting corruption based on leads from media, activist watchdogs, and oversight mechanisms begins with training investigators, prosecutors, judges, and other governmental actors to pursue and correctly handle complex corruption cases as well as to work with journalists, civil society, and activists on efforts in promoting transparency and public accountability. For example, the Central and Eastern European Law Institute in the Czech Republic educates legal professionals across multiple geographies through innovative training programs with a focus on providing participants with tools to promote human rights, strengthen democratic institutions, fight corruption, and support free-market economies. This includes making available lectures about how investigative journalists interact with law-enforcement bodies. The changes needed at the regulatory level are equally significant, starting with legislators and governments providing consistent resources and taking actions that advance and enforce policies preventing and addressing corruption as well as promoting media freedom. Activists and journalists often cite transparency and accountability as essential principles for building trust in democracy and shaping the information space to the advantage of democratic actors. They encourage officials, leaders, and employees in the public and private sectors to act not only in their institutions’ interest but also for the common good. Without public access to some of their essential records and information, holding them accountable is nearly impossible. And, while a lot has been done in democracies to bolster transparency and accountability, continued efforts are needed to address gaps where corruption flourishes. The extent to which journalists can assist in addressing corruption also depends on whether the media is free and independent. In addition to strengthening domestic transparency and accountability systems in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption, there is also a need for governments to participate in various international anticorruption initiatives, to harmonize their anticorruption laws and mechanisms, and to increase enforcement activities. In particular, harmonization can remove the knowledge and resources barriers that journalists and activists encounter when engaging in preventing corruption and taking corrective actions. For example, while the establishment of registers of ultimate beneficial ownership in some jurisdictions has increased transparency about the ownership of companies, critics note the lack of their uniform adoption by more countries. The extent to which journalists can assist in addressing corruption also depends on whether the media is free and independent. Therefore, legislative frameworks must be in place more widely to protect journalists and their sources from physical attacks, unfounded lawsuits, recrimination, and victimization.7 However, there is a critical difference between the “law on the books” and the “law in action.” For example, while Europe and the Americas continue to be the most favorable continents for press freedom, they have also seen increased violence against journalists in 2021. And, throughout the world, journalists (and activists) have been killed for their role in exposing corruption.8 In President Joe Biden’s words, “freedom of expression and access to factual and accurate information provided by independent media are foundational to prosperous and secure democratic societies. But the outlook for the rights of journalists today is harrowing.”9 In addition to seeking accountability for all crimes against journalists and media workers, expanding existing efforts and introducing new measures that provide for their legal and physical security must be urgently accelerated. This includes leveraging sanction regimes and launching “wraparound” measures like relocation and placement programs. For example, strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) are increasingly used to silence media critics in all jurisdictions. Greater access to insurance or other resources to help defend journalists against baseless defamation suits and legal intimidation is essential for outlets that in the past have been considered uninsurable or have been unable to afford insurance and defend themselves legally due to high costs. Legislative and other policy actions can also be leveraged to help stem the tide of lawsuits following an effective journalistic investigation. The recent commitment by the U.S. Agency for International Development to launch a global Defamation Defense Fund for Journalists represents a much-needed innovative approach to these challenges. The fund is intended to design an insurance system to help media address the increased number of lawsuits burdening reporters with the cost of a legal defense until they abandon their stories. Defending media in its global role in the fight against corruption starts with investing in it. Another key area for modernizing media assistance is digital security. While the promotion of a free and open Internet and the infusion of democratic values into the adoption of major new technologies, such as 5G, are already underway, the efforts to promote responsible, equitable, and safe use of artificial intelligence must be enhanced to boost the ability of democratic institutions and media to better respond and adapt to changing needs and circumstances in the digital age. What is also missing is a comprehensive mapping and strategy to address the power of new technologies as a source of autocratic wealth and investment in undemocratic media. While many journalists invest in their digital security through best practices in encryption and other types of basic information management, there is always an “arms race” between users, governments, and the developers of technologies that can be used to break even the most secure implementations of data-security protocols. Although such protocols have been developed with law enforcement in mind, policies and other controls necessary to prevent their more nefarious use have not been put in place. The introduction, harmonization, and consistent application of such rules as well as of export controls on digital weapons are necessary to protect journalists and the public more generally. Finally, defending media in its global role in the fight against corruption starts with investing in it. Russia and China alone spend billions on their internal and external propaganda media outlets. For example, Russian media outlets had declared spending over $16 million on propaganda targeting the United States alone this year up to October.10 Meanwhile, with the rise of digital media, artificial intelligence, and distorted media markets, free journalism is in a weak state economically and overall. However, official donors spent only an average $80–90 million each year on support for laws and policies that promote media freedom in 2010–2015. And international support to the media remains a tiny fraction of official development assistance, averaging just 0.3 percent in recent years.11 Besides, this funding often does not meet the requirements of the Paris agreement on aid

## Case