## 1

#### Interpretation and Violation: The affirmative must defend the desirability of a government policy action of member nations of the WTO reducing IPP for medicines. This doesn’t entail a specific method of engaging in the topic, just that the affirmative must derive offense from a legal reduction of it. They don’t.

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

**Vote Neg –**

#### Limits – aff gets to choose literally anything they want, which justifies infinite variations of affirmatives that are impossible for the neg to prep against, ensuring they’ll always be ahead and use competition standards like perms to erase neg ground. Key to fairness since we need to predict arguments to be able to make viable responses. Additionally, cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters – kills inclusion which is a prerequisite to engaging in your method and turns case.

#### Testing – topical debate allows in depth analysis of tangible solutions for real world problems. Abstracting to arbitrary advocacies deteriorates from those skills, making debate meaningless. They turn the debate into a monologue where the negative debater is robbed of opportunities to learn which turns aff solvency to their method since I can’t engage. Advocacy skills controls the internal link to education and outweighs on portability since it is applicable to the real world.

#### Fairness is an impact –

#### 1] probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews in this round

#### 2] internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### 3] Jurisdicton – every arg assumes that the judge will eval it fairly conceding authority of fairness – if they contest this hack against them

#### 4] comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. Proves they dont get to weigh case and you should be epistemically suspect of their truth claims.

#### No impact turns or RVIs

#### [1] Perfcon – if T’s bad and you vote for them on that arg, you’re voting on T.

#### [2] Substance – if T’s bad then we should try debating on substance – impact turns force me to go for T since I need to defend my position.

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and so is any brightline they set, and causes a race to the top for the best norm

#### Drop the debater on T –

#### a) indicts the aff advocacy so drop the argument would be dropping the aff anyways,

#### b) deter future abuse and set good norms.

## 2

#### **The left melancholic orientation of the 1AC is one that is self-defeating– their politics is revolutionarily empty and projects bourgeoise tactics in disguise.**

Dean 13 Jodi Dean, 2013, “Communist Desire,” from “The Ends of History” SJCP//JG

In a widely cited essay published in 1 999, Wendy Brown uses Walter Benjamin's term, 'left melancholy', to diagnose a melancholia of the contemporary left. 1 Her concern in the essay, which closely tracks Stuart Hall's discussion of the rise of Thatcherism, is to analyze the fears and anxieties of a left in decline, a left that is backwards-looking, self-punishing, attached to its own failure, and seemingly incapable of envisioning an emancipatory, egalitarian future. Timely and evocative, Brown's essay, for many, seemed to capture a truth about the end of a certain sequence of the North American, British and European left. Attuned to the ends and loss occasioned by the disintegration of the 'we' previously held in common by the discourse of communism - in her words, to the 'unaccountable loss' and 'unavowedly crushed ideal, contemporarily signified by the terms Left, dociaLi.:Jm, l11arx, or mOJJement' - Brown provided an opportunity to reflect on the failures and continuities in left projects in terms of the desires that sustain them.2 Her treatment of a ' lost h istorical movement' thus suggested a kind of left 'coming to grips' with or facing of reality: the reality of neoliberal capitalism and the defeat of the welfare state. Read from the vantage point afforded by more than a decade, however, Brown's essay is less convincing, for now it appe�rs to err in its basic account of what was lost and why. Her discussion of Benjamin is misleading. Her treatment of Freud is one-sided. Nonetheless, by analyzing the left in terms of a general structure of desire establishing the contours of a key mode of left theorizing, Brown opens up possibilities for re-conceiving communist desire, possibilities I try to extend in this essay. 'Left-Wing Melancholy' is the title of Benjamin's 1 931 review of the poetry of Erich Kastner.3 Kastner was a well-regarded poet, novelist and journalist during the Weimar period. Kastner's sobering satire appealed to middle-brow readers attracted by its seemingly unadorned and honest portrayal of a stark reality. Benjamin himself disparages Kastner's poetry. He describes it as giving way to the complacency and fatalism of 'those who are most remote from the processes of production and whose obscure courting of the state of the market is comparable to the attitude of a man who yields himself up entirely to the inscrutable accidents of his digestion'.4 In a further essay, 'The Author as Producer', Benjamin uses Kastner as the exemplar of the 'new objectivity' - a literary movement that Benjamin argues 'has made the dtrugg/e againJt poveri:IJ an object of consumption'.5 Citing 'a perceptive critic' - in fact himself, writing in 'Left-Wing Melancholy' - Benjamin quotes his earlier piece: With the workers movement, this left-wing radical intelligentsia has nothing in common. It is, rather, a phenomenon of bourgeois decomposition ... The radical-left publicists of the stamp of Kastner, Mehring, or Tucholsky are the proletarian mimicry of decayed bourgeois strata. Their function is to produce, from the political standpoint, not parties but cliques; from the economic standpoint, not producers but agents ­ agents or hacks who make a great display of their poverty, and a banquet out of yawning emptiness.6 As far as Benjamin is concerned, left-wing writers such as Kastner have no social function other than rendering the political situation into amusing content for public consumption. They transmit the apparatus of production rather than transform it, assimilating revolutionary themes into the bourgeois apparatus of production and publication while in no way placing in question the existence of the bourgeois class. Benjamin writes, 'I define a hack as a writer who abstains in principle from alienating the productive apparatus from the ruling class by improving it in ways serving the interests of socialism? Most generally put, Benjamin's critique in both 'Left-Wing Melancholy' and 'The Author as Producer' targets intellectual compromise, adaptation to the market, and the betrayal of the workers' movement, particularly insofar as this compromise, adaptation, and betrayal banks on and cans authentic revolutionary impulses already part of everyday proletarian life. Brown claims that 'left melancholy is Benjamin's unambivalent epithet for the revolutionary hack who is, finally, attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal - even to the failure of that ideal - than to seizing possibilities for radical change in the present'.8 I disagree. Nowhere in his review of Kastner does Benjamin fault him for a lingering attachment to political ideals. Benjamin in fact makes the opposite point, condemning Kastner for writing poems that are blind to action because 'their beat very precisely follows the notes according to which poor rich folks play the blues'. Benjamin describes Kastner's lyricism as protecting 'above all the status interests of the middle stratum - agents, journalists, heads of departments . . . it noticeably abandons any strilcing powetr against the big bourgeoisie, and betrays its yearning for patronage with a heartfelt sigh: "If only there were a dozen wise men with a great deal of money'".9 Kastner's melancholy is a pose, a fashion trend, a commodity. He is not attached to an ideal; he has compromised revolutionary ideals by reducing them to consumer products. Perhaps because her preoccupation is more with the inadequacies of the contemporary left than with Benjamin's discussion of what the service intellectuals do to the bourgeoisie when they turn revolutionary themes into consumer contents, Brown does not emphasize the compromise of the left melancholic. Instead she reads Benjamin's critique of Kastner as suggesting that 'sentiments themselves become things for the left melancholic who "takes as much pride in the traces of former spiritual goods as the bourgeois do in their material goods'". Brown locates in this reified loss a point of contact with the contemporary left: 'We come to love our � left passions and reasons, our left analyses and convictions, more than we love the existing world that we presumably seek to alter with these terms or the future that would be aligned with them.'10 It is important to note that Brown's continuation differs from Benjamin's. Benjamin is not criticizing a left for its attachment to left passions, reasons, analyses and convictions. Rather, he is calling out Kastner and the 'new objectivity' trend for their compromise and the resulting 'metamorphosis of political struggle from a compulsory decision into an object of pleasure, from a means of production into an article of consumption'. 1 1 He derides Kastner and other 'left-radical publicists' as compromised intellectuals who turn revolutionary reflexes into 'objects of distraction, of amusement, which can be supplied for consumption' and readily purchased at the 'intelligentsia's department store'. 12 Unlike Brown's, Benjamin's left melancholic sublimates left commitment to revolution and the proletariat. A new objectivist, he fatalistically gives way to the bourgeois vision of the existing world instead of holding fast to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat to reorganize and transform production. Brown argues: If the contemporary Left often clings to the formations and formulations of another epoch, one in which the notion of unified movements, social totalities, and class-based politics appeared to be viable categories of political and theoretical analysis, this means that it literally renders itself a conservative force in history- one that not only misreads the present but installs traditionalism in the very heart of its praxis, in the place where commitment to risk and upheaval belongs.13 In our present of undeniable inequality, class war and ongoing capitalist crisis, the relevance, indeed the necessity, of unified movements and classbased analysis is undeniable in a way that it perhaps was not when Br��n was writing at the end of the nineties. This clarity helps illuminate Benjamin's own position as opposite to the one Brown takes. That is, his concern is not with a traditionalism at the heart of praxis but rather with the sublimation of left ideals in market-oriented writing and publishing. In ' Left-Wing Melancholy', the author Benjamin admires is Brecht ­ the Brecht fully committed to communist revolution, the Brecht Badiou describes as making 'Marxism or communism into a condition for the question of the being of art'.14 In contrast to Brecht's poems, Kastner's, Benjamin writes, are removed from the process of production, detached from the labour movement, and at a distance from unemployment. They are for 'people in the higher income bracket, those mournful, melancholic dummies who trample anything and anyone in their path'. 15 Kastner's poems, and similar such writings, participate in the transmission and production of the class power of the bourgeoisie. They are ultimately a conservative social force. Commitment to Marxist ideals, to unified movements and class-based politics, is not. Benjamin sees Kastner as complicit with the sublimation of revolutionary desire in intellectual booms; his poems have 'more to do with flatulence than with subversion'. Unlike Brown's, Benjamin's left melancholic is the one who gives way to 'complacency and fatalism', ceding desire like the 'satiated man who can no longer devote all his money to his stomach'. 16

#### The ego conflates the lost and loved object with itself which breeds melancholy in the face of this loss – this results in ressentiment and inability to pursue in political organization, dooming the project of the aff.

Dean 2 Jodi Dean, 2013, “Communist Desire,” from “The Ends of History” SJCP//JG

What, then, of melancholia? The most valuable aspect of Brown's analysis comes from her turn to Freud's 1917 paper on melancholia to provide an account of a particularly left structure of desire. As is well known, Freud distinguishes melancholia from mourning. Mourning responds to the loss of an object of love, whether that object is a person, a country, freedom or an ideal. 17 Over the time of mourning, the subject painfully and piecemeal confronts the reality of her loss. Slowly she withdraws her attachment from the lost object. The work of mourning is complete when the subject is again free, uninhibited and capable of love. As in mourning, the melancholic subject presents an absence of interest in the outside world and a general inhibition of activity. The crucial difference is that the melancholic's lowering of self-regard is manifest in a self-reproach and self-reviling that exceeds self-punish­ment and extends to the very 'overcoming of the instinct which compels every living thing to cling to life'. The death drive, the force of loss, reformats the structure of drive itself: The melancholic displays something else besid(js which is lacking in mourning - an extraordinary diminution in his self-regard, an impov­ erishmen� ofhis ego on a grand scale. In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself. The patient represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achieve­ment and morally despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and punished. He abases himself before everyone and commiserates with his own relatives for being connected with anyone so unworthy. 18 To account for this difference in self-regard, Freud distinguishes between mourning's consciousness of loss and the unknown and unconscious dimension of object loss in melancholia. Something about the melanchol­ic's loss remains unconscious. Even when the melancholic knows that he lost, he does not know what he has lost, in what his loss consists for him. Psychoanalysis addresses this unconscious element of melancholic loss. Freud accepts the melancholic subject's self-accusation - the subject really is weak, dishonest, petty, egoistic. Yet he notes that most of us, with our reasonably healthy neuroses, don't acknowledge these limita­ tions. We actually are at pains to hide these weaknesses from ourselves and others. The accuracy of the melancholic's self-description, then, isn't at issue. It's basically correct, and Freud accepts it: 'He [the subject] has lost his self-respect and he must have good reason for this.'19 The real question is why the subject has lost his self-respect, what the 'good reason' for this loss is. Answering, Freud notes how, in melancholia, a critical agency splits off from the ego, a voice of conscience that criticizes the poor ego for all its moral failings. He explains that clinical experience reveals that the specific criticisms the melancholic levels against himself correspond most fully not to the melancholic subject, but to one whom the subject loves or should love: 'the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient's own ego.'20 What the patient seems to be saying about himself is really about someone else. The melancholic subject thus is one who has narcissistically identified himself with and attached himself to someone else, his loved object, now lost. Rather than acknowledging the loss, narcissistic identification protects the subject from it, bringing the object into the subject and enabling him to keep it as part of himself. This identification is fraught insofar as there is much about the loved object that the subject does not love, that the subject hates. To deal with this unavowable hatred, a 'special agency' of the ego splits off to judge and condemn the loved object, now part of the subject himself. Freud explains: 'In this way an object loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification.'21 The answer to the question of the subject's loss ofself-respect turns on the object: it is the internalized object who is judged, criticized and condemned, not the subject at all. I return to this point below. Brown uses Freud's account of melancholia to understand the fears and anxieties preventing the left from revising its anachronistic habits of thought. She highlights the persistence of melancholic attachment to a lost object, a persistence that, in superseding conscious desires to recover, to move on, renders 'melancholia a structure of desire, rather than a tran­ sient response'. She also emphasizes the unconscious, 'unavowed and unavowable' nature of melancholic loss. And she notes the shift of the 'reproach of the loved object' onto the left subject, a shift that preserves 'the love or idealization of the object even as the loss of this love is expe­ rienced in the suffering ofthe melancholic'. Recounting some ofthe many losses on the left - of local and international community, of a moral and political vision capable of sustaining political work, of a historical moment - Brown asks whether there might also be a still unconscious, unavowed loss, namely, of 'the promise that left analysis and left commitment would supply its adherents a clear and certain path toward the good, the right, and the true'.22 She suggests that this promise formed the basis for left self-love and fellow feeling. So long as it remains foundational, unavowed and untransformed, it will doom the left to self-destruction. Freud's study of melancholia enables Brown to bring to light the disa­ vowed attachment underlying the fierce debates over poststructuralism and the status of the subject characteristic of a particular mode of left theory. She asks: 'What do we hate that we might preserve the idealiza­ tion of that romantic left promise? What do we punish that we might save the old guarantees of the Left from our wrathful disappointment?'23 The answer, she suggests, is that hatred and punishment are symptoms, strikes we wage upon ourselves so as to preserve the promises and guarantees of left analysis itself. Scorn for identity politics and disparagement of discourse analysis, postmodernism and 'trendy literary theory' is the displaced form of narcissistic attachment to Marxist orthodoxy. It is an attack aimed at an interiorized object, the loved and lost object that prom­ ised unity, certainty, clarity and political relevance.

#### They don't create a space of resistance - they instead carve out a pseudo-radical space in an activity that remains funded by white elites and sustained through labor exploitation. Capitalism thrives on exactly this sort of politics - the simulation of agency allows people to pretend there's an outside to the system.

Bluhdorn 07 – (May 2007, Ingolfur, PhD, Reader in Politics/Political Sociology, University of Bath, “Self-description, Self-deception, Simulation: A Systems-theoretical Perspective on Contemporary Discourses of Radical Change,” Social Movement Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1–20, May 2007, google scholar)

Yet the **established patterns of self-construction, which** thus **have to be defended and** further **developed** at any price, **have fundamental problems** attached to them: ﬁrstly, **the attempt to constitute, on the basis of** product choices and acts of **consumption, a Self and identity** that are **distinct from and autonomous vis-a`-vis the market is a contradiction in terms**. Secondly, **late-modern society’s established patterns of consumption are known to be socially exclusive and environmentally destructive**. Despite all hopes for ecological modernization and revolutionary improvements in resource efﬁciency (e.g. Weizsa¨cker et al., 1998; Hawkenet al., 1999; Lomborg, 2001), **physical environmental limits imply that the lifestyles and established patterns of consumption** cherished by advanced modern societies **cannot even be extended to all residents of the richest countries**, let alone to the populations of the developing world. For the sake of the (re)construction of an ever elusive Self, **in their struggle against self-referentiality** and in pursuit of the regeneration of difference, **late-modern societies are** thus **locked into the imperative of maintaining** and further developing the principle of **exclusion** (Blu¨hdorn, 2002, 2003). At any price they have to, and indeed do, defend **a lifestyle that requires ever increasing social inequality,** environmental degradation, predatory resource wars, and the tight policing of potential internal and external enemies.14 For this effort, **military and surveillance technology provide ever more sophisticated and efﬁcient means**. Nevertheless, the principle of **exclusion is ultimately still unsustainable, not only because of spiralling ‘security’ expenses but also because it** directly **contradicts the** modernist **notion of the free and autonomous individual** that late-modern society desperately aims to sustain. For this reason, late-modern society is confronted with the task of having to sustain both the late-modern principle of exclusion as well as its opposite, i.e. the modernist principle of inclusion. Very importantly, the conﬂict between the principles of exclusion and inclusion is not simply one between different individuals, political actors or sections of society. Instead, it is a politically irresolvable conﬂict that resides right within the late-modern individual, the late-modern economy and late-modern politics. And if, as Touraine notes, late-modern society no longer believes in nor even desires political transcendence, the particular challenge is that the two principles can also no longer be attributed to different dimensions of time, i.e. the former to the present, and the latter to some future society. Instead, late-modern society needs to represent and reproduce itself and its opposite at the same time. If considered **within this framework** of this analysis, the function of Luhmann’s system of protest communication, or in the terms of this article, **the signiﬁcance of** late-modern societies’ **discourses of radical change becomes immediately evident**. **At a stage when the possibility** and desirability **of transcending** the principle of **exclusion has been pulled into** radical **doubt but when**, at the same time, the principle of **inclusion is vitally important**, **these discourses simulate the validity of the latter as a social ideal**. In other words, **latemodern society reconciles the tension between the** cherished but exclusive **status quo** – for which there is no alternative – **and the non-existent** inclusive **alternative** – on whose existence it depends – by means of simulation. The analysis of Luhmann’s work has demonstrated how the societal self-descriptions produced by the system of protest communication, or late-modern society’s discourses of radical change, fulﬁl this function exactly. **They are** an **indispensable** function system not so much because they help to resolve late-modern society’s problems of mal-coordination, but because by performing the possibility of the alternative they help to cope with the fundamental problem of self-referentiality. In this sense, late-modern society’s discourses of sustainability, democratic renewal, social inclusion or global justice, to name but a few, suggest that advanced modern society is working towards an environmentally and socially inclusive alternative – genuinely modern – society, but they do not deny the fact that the big utopia and project of late-modern society is the reproduction and further enhancement of the status quo, i.e. the sustainability of the principle of exclusion. Protest movements as networks of physical actors and actions complement the purely communicative **discourses of radical change** in that they bring their narrative and societal selfdescription to life. Whilst the declarations of institutionalized mainstream politics cannot escape the generalized suspicion that they are purely rhetorical, social movements **provide an arena for** the physical expression and **experience of the authenticity and reality of the alternative**

#### Vote negative to affirm institutionalized party politics – a method of building collectivity that organizes around material actions against capitalism.

Dean 16 Jodi Dean, 2016, “Ch. 5: The Passional Dynamics of the Communist Party,” by “Crowds and Party,” Verso, SJBE

The actuality of the Communist Party exceeds its errors and betrayals. It encompasses the hopes for justice and aspirations for equality invested in it. To reduce the Party to its excesses fails to recognize its indispensable capacity to generate practical optimism and collective strength. Such a reduction likewise reduces the world, contracting possibility into what can be done instead of forcing the impossibility of what must be done. The Communist Party enlarged the world. Expanding the crowd’s egalitarian discharge so that it can endure as the emancipatory push of the people, the party increases the crowd’s effects. It gives the crowd its meaning and takes this meaning as its own. The party continues the moment of belonging, intensifying and expanding it in solidary purpose. “For justice thunders condemnation” How do and can we imagine political change under the conditions of communicative capitalism? Is political change just aggregated personal transformation, communism as viral outbreak or meme-effect, #fullcommunism? Do we think that autonomous zones of freedom and equality will emerge like so many mushrooms out of the dregs left behind in capital flight and the shrinking of state social provisioning? Or do we optimistically look to democracy, expecting (all evidence to the contrary) that communism, or even upgraded social democracy, will arise out of electoral politics? All these fantasies imagine that political change can come about without political struggle. Each pushes away the fact of antagonism, division, and class struggle as if late neoliberalism were not already characterized by extreme inequality, violence, and exploitation, as if the ruling class did not already use military force, police force, legal force, and illegal force to maintain its position. Politics is a struggle over power. Capital uses every resource—state, non-state, interstate—to advance its position. A Left that refuses to organize itself in recognition of this fact will never be able to combat it. In communicative capitalism, individual acts of resistance, subversion, cultural production, and opinion expression, no matter how courageous, are easily absorbed into the circulatory content of global personal media networks. Alone, they don’t amplify; they can’t endure. They are easily forgotten as new content rushes into and through our feeds. We indulge in fantasies of the freedom of our expression, our critical edge and wit, disavowing the way such individuated freedom is the form of collective incapacity. Against states and alliances wielded in the service of capital as a class, diverse and separate struggles are so many isolated resistances, refusals to undertake the political work of pulling together in organized, strategic, long-term struggle. The constant churn of demands on our awareness disperses our efforts and attention. What the Left should be doing is coordinating, consolidating, and linking its efforts so that they can amplify each other. We don’t need multiple, different campaigns. We need an organized struggle against capitalism capable of operating along multiple issues in diverse locations. Crowds push back. From the perspective of the party, we see them as the insistent people. Fidelity to the insistence of the egalitarian discharge demands that we build the infrastructure capable of maintaining the gap of their desire. The more powerful the affective infrastructure we create, the more we will feel its force, interiorizing the perspective of the many into the ego-ideal that affirms our practices and activities and pushes us to do more than we think we can. Radical pluralists and participatory democrats sometimes imply that there can be a left politics without judgment, condemnation, exclusion, and discipline. Denying the way that collective power works back on those who generate it, they suggest we can have the benefits of collectivity without its effects. But “working back” is an inextricable dimension of collectivity’s capacity to cut through the self-interest of individual needs and produce enduring bonds of solidarity. Collective activities always have effects in excess of their immediate goals. Rather than fearing these effects, rather than remaining stuck in the fantasy that an individual can change the world, and rather than remaining so gripped by fears of power that we fantasize a politics that can abolish it, we should confront the force of collectivity directly and take responsibility for generating it and using it. The party capable of building an affective infrastructure that can cut through the barriers of capitalist expectation will err. It is not, cannot be, and should not be believed to be infallible. Sometimes it may turn its immense energies on itself. If we can’t bear it, we aren’t the Left, the communists, we need. Anyone who is unwilling to talk about the party should not talk about political transformation.

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater who best engages in the politics of the comrade – a collective resistance based in one’s subject position against oppression is key to understand how marginalization functions.

Malott et al 16 Zane C. Wubbena, Curry Malott, Derek Ford, 2016, “Becoming Through Revolutionary Pedagogy: An Interview with Curry Malott and Derek R. Ford,” <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ1100237> SJBE

CM: Indeed, our chapter on Ferguson deals explicitly with the ontology or the nature of reality within the social universe of capital by situating the police killings of Michael Brown, Freddie Gray, and countless others, within the terrorist energy of capital itself. That is, the state- sanctioned murder of Black lives is best understood within the tendency of capital to work labour to death unless regulated or slowed down by proletarian resistance. Marx’s detailed study of capital’s general law of accumulation allows the communist pedagogue to create the knowledge needed to enact a revolutionary practice. The critical pedagogue, especially the more privileged white critical pedagogue is an ally of the super-oppressed, the excluded, and the gentrified. The ally assumes the more privileged worker represents the height of possibility. The communist pedagogue, on the other hand, understands their place within the nature of capitalist reality as a comrade. The notion of a comrade is important to a communist pedagogy because a comrade cannot exist outside of organized resistance—resistance against capitalism and its ideological apparatuses such as white supremacy. The comrade and the communist party from which her and his existence depends, is an ontological necessity of the communist pedagogy of becoming advanced throughout our book. It is Marx’s critique of political economy that allows us to understand the role of white supremacy, and its consequence of creating monumental differences in the life experiences and expectations of white versus Black workers, as central to capital’s ability to continue to function as such—as the exploiter of labour power. Marx, in other words, is fundamental for developing a thorough understanding of capital’s cynical recklessness and the routine murder of Black lives. Our pedagogy of becoming draws on Marx providing us with a way out. That is, a way to see a communist future immanent within the contradictions of the capitalist present. DF: The move from ally to comrade is an important one for us. A comrade is a co-conspirator, one who organizes and shares in the same fate as others while understanding their particular subject position within the totality and acting from that particular position. But comradeship doesn’t glorify difference over unity, which often results in inaction and provides all sorts of excuses for not getting involved in the work of organizing and agitating. Now, it’s absolutely crucial that we be conscious of our social positionality and that we take this into consideration in theorizing and acting. For example, both Curry and I are white, and that is relevant in the work that we do in relationship to movements against police brutality, which are always racialized. It’s not our role to be in the leadership of those movements, but as critical educators we can offer contributions to the movement. Importantly, however, those contributions are made through our consultation with that movement, which is mediated through the multi-national and mule- national Party. Our thinking here comes from Harry Haywood, and if you haven’t read his autobiography, Black Bolshevik, you should definitely check it out. ZW: I think that last point is an important point—that the glorifying of difference over unity can become quite stagnating for praxis, for reflection and action, especially in relation to the cultural or discursive. It reminds me of an early 1990s BBC documentary, “Los Angeles: City of the Future?” Edward Soja provides a descriptive-analysis of the Bonaventure Hotel located in downtown Los Angeles, where the internal architecture is that of a postmodern space. At both an ontological and epistemological level, the postmodern glorifying of difference usually takes the form of a claim to multiple realities, multiply knowledge without consideration for the consequences, as if multiple absolves consequence. But, by drawing on Fredric Jameson’s labour, Soja critiques this space of glorified difference, in that, in difference there is no direction with the consequences becoming quite pointed—we end up submitting ourselves to authority, even if no authority can be located. In this sense, and I think this is, for example, the problem with fields like multicultural education and diversity studies, is that they end up submitting themselves to authority, the internal logic of capital made observable by its effects, its consequences. This takes me to another point you both mention, and I’ll ask my question here. Derek you mentioned that “we currently have a limited and limiting understanding” of how capitalism operates, and this point was followed up with something you said, Curry, that “Marx’s detailed study of capital’s general law of accumulation allows the communist pedagogue to create the knowledge needed to enact a revolutionary practice.” What do you think is the most important thing to understand about Marx’s critique of political economy—that is, at its most basic level, the law of accumulation, or how capitalism actually works, or functions, according to its internal logic? DF: I like how you framed it as Marx’s critique of political economy, because in my understanding that is what births Marx’s thought, including—if I may use Althusser’s distinction—the philosophy of dialectical materialism and the science of historical materialism. For me, it is always a question of what is the most glaring or heightened contradiction of a moment; what contradiction can we harness and organize around and against right now? So the question of what is most important to understand depends on historical conditions. I would say that right now the contradiction of the realization of value. Surplus value, as we all know, results from the worker producing more value than represented by their wage, which generally corresponds to socially-necessary labour. Yet this is only the production of surplus value. And if the worker is paid less than the amount they produce, how can all of the products that they produce be realized? Of course, capitalists, landlords, and other classes help realize some of this. But if capitalists realized all of their surplus value, then they would stop accumulating surplus value, and they would cease to be capitalists. This is one of the main contradictions that has given shape to our world, and it occupied the thought of Rosa Luxemburg, Nikolai Bukharin, and V.I. Lenin—the great theorists of imperialism. In the Grunrisse notebooks Marx wrote how the world market is given in the very concept of capital itself, and this is an expression of that tendency. The need for markets to realize surpluses drove processes of colonialism and imperialism. Today imperialism is still salivating over certain territories. Because today the global order is dominated by capital—as opposed to much of the 20th century when there was a strong socialist alternative—imperialist countries like the U.S. are trying to pry open not only socialist states but independent states as well. And even within the U.S. we can see this contradiction heightening social antagonism. With wages depressed and depressing further, the precaritisation of work, and so on, there is a serious gap between wages available and values that need to be realized. This gap is one of the things that Keynesianism, or social democracy, sought to address, and it is an important way to understand the contemporary economic and social crisis within the United States and how that relates to U.S. imperial projects. CM: Toward these ends we spend a great deal of energy unpacking many of the intricacies and counter-intuitive tendencies of how surplus value is accumulated as not a static system, but is an ever-evolving and extending process marked by cyclical crisis and constant disruptions. The tendency toward proletarian immiseration and degradation, of course, is both propelled and justified by xenophobia, racialization and sexist discrimination. In this context the insights of ethnic studies are invaluable, the Black Radical Tradition, for example, represents a tradition of militancy no serious communist party could fathom ignoring or discounting. The theoretical work of Huey P. Newton, co-founder of the Black Panther Party established in 1966, for example, offers key insights building on the Soviet Union’s conceptions of national oppression and the ways capitalist states not only colonize external states, but how they engage in a colonialist relationship with internal oppressed nations, such as the Black Nation. The Black Panther Party could therefore be conceptualized as a communist party engaged in an anti- colonialist struggle against the occupying state (i.e. the United States). The uprisings and rebellions within Black working class communities in the present era, from Ferguson to Baltimore, can therefore be conceptualized as spontaneous anti-colonialist beginnings of a potentially anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist revolution. Rather than viewing them as happening in Black neighbourhoods, a more communist pedagogical approach would be to say these spontaneous riots are emerging within an internally oppressed nation.

## Case

#### 1] No 1AR Impact Turns, Independent Voters, or Perfcons – a] Resolvability: Either you auto accept all responses to 2NR standards and they auto win since I can't respond, or you intervene to give 2AR credence b] No infinite abuse: 1NC is 7 minutes and 1AC spikes check

#### 2] Reject arguments premised solely on identity and performative offense – a] they distract from discussion to target groups and justifies things like vote against Disabled people, Jews, Natives b] Discussion should center around how we act as our identity since I can’t control my identity nor negate yours.

#### 3] They can’t solve anything – a] If material institutions create the realities of violence, ceding the state fails and is much worse than specific engagement b] They assume any advocacy is sufficient to result in liberation BUT they are missing a robust internal link to solving violence in or outside the round c] Voting Aff does nothing, this Aff has been read before and nothing has happened to capitalism -the ballot is only to determine who won or lost on tab

Here's the frmaing issue:

Communities of care sounds like an amazing idea but in order for that to work they need professional and research and development ofmedicines to actually work which they don’t

#### Strong IP protection are the only incentive for drug innovation.

Stevens and Ezell 20 Philip Stevens and Stephen Ezell 2-3-2020 "Delinkage Debunked: Why Replacing Patents With Prizes for Drug Development Won’t Work" <https://itif.org/publications/2020/02/03/delinkage-debunked-why-replacing-patents-prizes-drug-development-wont-work> (Philip founded Geneva Network in 2015. His main research interests are the intersection of intellectual property, trade, and health policy. Formerly he was an official at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva, where he worked in its Global Challenges Division on a range of IP and health issues. Prior to his time with WIPO, Philip worked as director of policy for International Policy Network, a UK-based think tank, as well as holding research positions with the Adam Smith Institute and Reform, both in London. He has also worked as a political risk consultant and a management consultant. He is a regular columnist in a wide range of international newspapers and has published a number of academic studies. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and Durham University (UK).)//Elmer

The **Current System** Has **Produced a Tremendous Amount of Life-Sciences Innovation** The frontier for biomedical innovation is seemingly limitless, and the challenges remain numerous—whether it comes to diseases that afflict millions, such as cancer or malaria, or the estimated 7,000 rare diseases that afflict fewer than 200,000 patients.24 And while certainly citizens in developed and developing nations confront differing health challenges, those challenges are increasingly converging. For instance, as of this year, analysts expect that **noncommunicable** diseases such as cardiovascular disease and diabetes will account for 70 percent of natural fatalities **in developing countries**.25 Citizens of low- and middle-income countries bear 80 percent of the world’s death burden from cardiovascular disease.26 Forty-six percent of Africans over 25 suffer from hypertension, more than anywhere else in the world. Similarly, 85 percent of the disease burden of cervical cancer is borne by individuals living in low- and middle-income countries.27 To develop treatments or cures for these conditions, novel biomedical innovation **will be needed from everywhere**. Yet tremendous progress has been made in recent decades. To tackle these challenges, the global pharmaceutical industry invested over **$1.36 trillion in R&D** in the decade from 2007 to 2016—and it’s expected that annual R&D investment by the global pharmaceutical industry will reach $181 billion by 2022.28 In no small part due to that investment, **943 new active substances have been introduced** globally over the prior 25 years.29 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved more than **500 new medicines since 2000** alone. And these medicines are getting to more individuals: Global medicine use **in 2020 will reach 4.5 trillion doses**, up 24 percent from 2015.30 Moreover, there are an estimated 7,000 new medicines under development globally (about half of them in the United States), with 74 percent being potentially first in class, meaning they use a new and unique mechanism of action for treating a medical condition.31 In the United States, over 85 percent of all drugs sold are generics (only 10 percent of U.S. prescriptions are filled by brand-name drugs).32 And while some assert that biotechnology companies focus too often on “me-too” drugs that compete with other treatments already on the market, the reality is many drugs currently under development are meant to tackle some of the **world’s most intractable diseases**, **including cancer and Alzheimer’s**.33 Moreover, such arguments miss that many of the drugs developed in recent years have in fact been first of their kind. For instance, in 2014, the FDA approved **41 new medicines** (at that point, the most since 1996) many of which were first-in-class medicines.34 In that year, 28 of the 41 drugs approved were considered biologic or specialty agents, and 41 percent of medicines approved were intended to treat rare diseases.35 Yet even when a new drug isn’t first of its kind, it can still produce benefits for patients, both through **enhanced clinical efficacy** (for instance, taking the treatment as a pill rather than an injection, with a superior dosing regimen, **or better treatment** for some individuals who don’t respond well to the original drug) and by generating competition that exerts downward price pressures. For example, a patient needing a cholesterol drug has a host of statins from which to choose, which is important because some statins produce harmful side effects for some patients. Similarly, patients with osteoporosis can choose from Actonel, Boniva, or Fosomax. Or take for example Hepatitis C, which until recently was an incurable disease eventually requiring a liver transplant for many patients. In 2013, a revolutionary new treatment called Solvadi was released that boosted cure rates to 90 percent. This was followed in 2014 by an improved treatment called Harvoni, which cures the Hepatitis C variant left untouched by Solvadi. Since then, an astonishing six new treatments for the disease have received FDA approval, opening up a wide range of treatment options that take into account patients’ liver and kidney status, co-infections, potential drug interactions, previous treatment failures, and the genotype of HCV virus.36 “If you have to have Hepatitis C, now is the time to have it,” as Douglas Dieterich, a liver specialist at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York, told the Financial Times. “We have these marvellous drugs we can treat you with right now, without side effects,” he added. “And this time next year, we’ll have another round of drugs available.”37 Moreover, the financial potential of this new product category has led to multiple competing products entering the market in quick succession, in turn placing downward pressure on prices.38 As Geoffrey Dusheiko and Charles Gore write in The Lancet, “The market has done its work for HCV treatments: after competing antiviral regimens entered the market, competition and innovative price negotiations have driven costs down from the initially high list prices in developed countries.”39 As noted previously, opponents of the current market- and IP-based system contend patents enable their holders to exploit a (temporary) market monopoly by inflating prices many multiples beyond the marginal cost of production. But rather than a conventional neoclassical analysis, an analysis based on “innovation economics” finds it is exactly this “distortion” that is required for innovation to progress. As William Baumol has pointed out, “Prices above marginal costs and price discrimination become the norm rather than the exception because … without such deviations from behaviour in the perfectly competitive model, innovation outlays and other unavoidable and repeated sunk outlays cannot be recouped.”40 Or, as the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment found, “Pharmaceutical R&D is a risky investment; therefore, high financial returns are necessary **to induce companies to invest** in researching new chemical entities.”41 This is also why, in 2018, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office estimated that because of high failure rates, biopharmaceutical **companies would need to earn a 61.8 percent rate of return**

#### Embedding hope for liberation to an object like a ballot enacts cruel optimism

Berlant 06 Lauren, professor of Literature at the University of Chicago. “Cruel Optimism” in Differences, 17.3. 2006.

When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea—whatever. To phrase “the object of desire” as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what is incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality, but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as prox- imity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean that they all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent’s typi- cal misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form (see Ghent). “Cruel optimism” names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility. What is cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being, because whatever the content of the attachment, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject’s desire to temporize an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in advance of its loss.¶ One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are prob- lematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about the cluster of desires and affects we manage to keep magnetized to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad. But some scenes of optimism are crueler than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalizing or ani- mating potency of an object/scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, patriotism, a career, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one’s attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition.¶ To understand cruel optimism as an aesthetic of attachment requires embarking on an analysis of the modes of rhetorical indirection that manage the strange activity of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson’s work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indi- rection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of phantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because the dynamics of this scene are something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I will describe the shape of my transference with her thought

#### This turns the case, is an independent solvency takeout, and serves as a trauma DA—your frame trys to posit hope in the system that encourages that violence in the first place

Berlant 2 Lauren, professor of Literature at the University of Chicago. “Cruel Optimism” in Differences, 17.3. 2006.

It is striking that these moments of optimism, which mark a possibility that the habits of a history might not be reproduced, release an overwhelmingly negative force: one predicts such effects in traumatic scenes, but it is not usual to think about an optimistic event as having the same potential consequences. The conventional fantasy that a revolutionary lifting of being might happen in proximity to a new object/scene would predict otherwise than that a person or a group might prefer, after all, to surf from episode to episode while leaning toward a cluster of vaguely phrased prospects. And yet: at a certain degree of abstraction both from trauma and optimism, the experience of self-dissolution, radically reshaped consciousness, new sensoria, and narrative rupture can look similar; the emotional flooding in proximity to a new object can also produce a similar grasping toward stabilizing form, a reanchoring in the symptom’s predictability.¶ I have suggested that the particular ways in which identity and desire are articulated and lived sensually within capitalist culture produce such counterintuitive overlaps. But it would be reductive to read the preceding as a claim that anyone’s subjective transaction with the optimistic structure of value in capital produces the knotty entailments of cruel optimism as such. This essay focuses on artworks that explicitly remediate singularities into cases of nonuniversal but general abstraction, providing narrative scenarios of how people learn to identify, manage, and maintain the hazy luminosity of their attachment to being x and having x, given that their attachments were promises and not possessions after all. Geoff Ryman’s historical novel Was provides a different kind of limit case of cruel optimism. Linking agrarian labor, the culture industries, and therapy culture through four encounters with The Wizard of Oz, its pursuit of the affective continuity of trauma and optimism in self-unfold- ing excitement is neither comic, tragic, nor melodramatic, but metaformal: it absorbs all of these into a literary mode that validates fantasy (from absorption in pretty things to crazy delusion) as a life-affirming defense against the attritions of ordinary history.

[Continues]

In Was, Baum goes on to write The Wizard of Oz as a gift of alternativity to the person who can’t say or do anything to change her life materially and who has taken in so much that one moment of relief from herself produces a permanent crack in the available genres of her survival. In “What Is a Minor Literature?” Deleuze and Guattari exhort people to become minor in exactly that way, to deterritorialize from the normal by digging a hole in sense, like a dog or a mole. Creating an impasse, a space of internal displacement, in this view, shatters the normal hierar- chies, clarities, tyrannies, and confusions of compliance with autonomous individuality. This strategy looks promising in the Ashbery poem. But in “Exchange Value,” a moment of relief produces a psychotic defense against the risk of loss in optimism. For Dorothy Gael, in Was, the optimism of attachment to another living being is itself the cruelest slap of all.¶ From this cluster we can understand a bit more of the magnetic attraction to cruel optimism, with its suppression of the risks of attach- ment. A change of heart, a sensorial shift, intersubjectivity, or transference with a promising object cannot generate on its own the better good life: nor can the collaboration of a couple, brothers, or pedagogy. The vague futurities of normative optimism produce small self-interruptions as the utopias of structural inequality. The texts we have looked at here stage moments when it could become otherwise, but shifts in affective atmosphere are not equal to changing the world. They are, here, only pieces of an argument about the centrality of optimistic fantasy to reproducing and surviving in zones of compromised ordinariness. And that is one way to take the measure of the impasse of living in the overwhelmingly present moment.