## 1

Yo vishal I know Jarvis asked this already but I gotta ask

Pls give 30 speaks or inflate speaks because im a senior and this is my last in person tournament – us seniors have lost almost two year’s worth of tournaments 😊

#### Ukraine war is optimistic, but maintaining outside support and low Russian morale’s key

* Ukraine getting outside help from west
* Kyiv’s history in soviet union and ties to Russia lowers morale
* Low morale destroys new conscriptions which is key for Russia
* Gives example of Ukrainian propaganda dissolving Russian army

Knispel interviewing Goemans 3-9 [Sandra Knispel, (Hein Goemans, a professor of political science at the University of Rochester, is an expert on international conflicts—on how they begin and end.) 3-9-2022, "How to end the war in Ukraine," NewsCenter, https://www.rochester.edu/newscenter/how-to-end-the-ukraine-war-514522/] Jet

Q&A with Hein Goemans One or both sides must change their demands as a precursor to ending the war. What’s likely to happen in the current scenario? Putin made a big mistake by committing himself to total victory in Ukraine. Goemans: It depends on the performance on the battlefield, and a country’s expectations of outside help. Russia should have become more pessimistic in the last few days because Ukraine has shown its ability to inflict far greater costs on Russia than the Kremlin had anticipated. One would expect Russia therefore to lower its demands but we’ve seen very little evidence of that so far—only the demand of denazification seems to have been dropped. Overall, Putin still maintains that everything is going according to plan. If this continues, Ukrainian sovereignty may be at stake, which is dangerous and perhaps even stupid of Putin, who seems to be committing himself to total victory. If he can’t get it, he’ll be responsible and that makes a coup against him more likely. How has the situation changed for Ukraine and its demands for ending the war? Ukraine right now is not likely to accept anything less than full independence as a nation. Goemans: Ukraine must have gotten a lot more optimistic in recent days. Not just because its army has been doing reasonably well but because of the demonstrated incompetence of the Russian army. Yes, the Russians are still much stronger and much bigger, but there are problems with morale in the Russian army, and you see the remarkable level of Ukrainian support from the West. Ukrainians are still fighting for independence of their homeland and may maintain their claims to Luhansk and Donetsk in the Donbas region in south-eastern Ukraine. I don’t know whether they’d willing to give up Crimea at this point. One avenue worth exploring in peace negotiations might be true plebiscites, overseen by international observers. Can Putin credibly commit not to go beyond the invasion of Ukraine? In his February 21 speech, he expressed his aim to reconstitute the Russian Empire. Goemans: No, he cannot. Nobody would believe him if he said he’d stop at Ukraine. People are pointing to the failed attempt to appease Hitler with the Munich Agreement in 1938. So that’s a non-starter, especially with Putin’s February 21st speech in which he said he wants to reconstitute greater Russia or the Russian Empire. Western nations can no longer say, ‘Oh, he doesn’t mean that. We can still do business there and we can have gas if we give him just a little bit, maybe two Ukrainian towns or so.’ He made that impossible. Yes, the analogy is overused, but it really is like Hitler in 1938. People heard the speech and the appeasement alarm bells went off. Global view of Russia and former Soviet satellite countries labeled. (University of Rochester illustration / Michael Osadciw) A deciding factor in this war is going to happen in the next couple of weeks. Can you explain the role of Russian conscripts in this context? The question is how many new conscripts will actually show up because it’ll determine the strength of the Russian army on the ground in Ukraine. Goemans: There are two things to keep in mind: First, the new Russian conscription class is going to be drafted in April. It’ll be very informative to see how many people do not show up. Secondly, are the Russians really going to bomb Kyiv, a so-called “hero city of the Soviet Union,” into rubble like they did with Chechnya’s capital Grosny? Are they willing to kill tens of thousands of people? Those two benchmarks will happen in the next few weeks. How precarious is the situation for Putin’s own survival? He may keep fighting, even if he knows he’s losing, because the alternative may mean signing his own death warrant. Goemans: Putin may count on the fact that Ukrainians will give in if Kyiv is bombed. But if they don’t, that should make him more pessimistic. One would think that he’d have to lower his demands, and that at that point, some kind of deal would be possible. But Putin must come home with some kind of victory because otherwise he’s literally dead. That means he may keep fighting, even if he knows he’s losing, because the alternative is signing his own death warrant. That’s what happened in the First World War. Germany kept fighting for years, even though the leadership knew that they were losing within the first weeks of the war. You’re not hyperbolic when you say Putin is signing his own death warrant with a defeat? History has plenty of examples here. Goemans: No, I’m not. In a regime like Russia—which is clearly not a democracy, but also not quite a dictatorship—if you win a war, you’re the great hero; if you lose a war, you have shown your incompetence and you’ll be removed, which I have explored in my own research. You’ll be held as what’s known as a “culpable leader”—culpable for the fact that the gains of the war do not outweigh the losses. Historically such leaders have been removed from office, and they either have gone into exile, or have been jailed or killed. A recent example is the former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. What’s frightening, and there are already signs of this, is that Putin is moving towards a dictatorship because only full repression will prevent a coup against him. In that case, both the Russian and the Ukrainian people will suffer horribly. What do you think would happen with the war if Putin’s regime were to be overthrown? “Most likely, Ukraine would strengthen its demands and now want Crimea back.” Goemans: It’s possible that the entire Russian superstructure would be wiped out—not just Putin, but all his cronies, his security advisers, the oligarchs. That whole top layer could be removed. So the question is, if there’s a coup against Putin, what would the new Russian government insist on? They’re not necessarily all going to say, “Okay, sorry Ukraine, we made a mistake. Please excuse us.” And Ukrainians would not necessarily accept that anyway. Most likely, Ukraine would strengthen its demands and want Crimea back. Putin has said he wants to effect regime change in Ukraine—would a new government even have any credibility with Ukrainians? Ukrainians have become unified against Russia. Goemans: I don’t think so. There’s a new serious form of unity among the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian identity, and it’s in direct opposition to the Russians. It would be very dangerous for any Ukrainian government to be seen as colluding with Russia. Any such attempt would likely result in the formation of independent fighting units that would keep going to get the Russians out of Ukraine. What are the minimum terms the West can accept? The West cannot accept Putin’s winning in Ukraine, but they might we willing to accept concessions on the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, if Ukraine is willing to entertain that. Goemans: That’s an important question. The West—that is Western Democracies—cannot, in my opinion, accept a victorious Putin. The West is genuinely and correctly afraid of “salami tactics”—if he takes Ukraine, he will next take Georgia, and then he will go to the Baltics. Annexation wouldn’t end, so it has to stop now. Particularly because Putin so unmistakably declared his intentions in that speech on February 21st. Would the West accept Crimea as being Russian? I don’t know. Would the West accept Luhansk along the provincial administrative borders (which is not the same as the current line of control, which is currently roughly half of the of the provinces)? I doubt that. I think the West may demand a return to the status quo ante. I don’t know if they can get that. Maybe Ukraine would have to give up the entire administrative region of Luhansk and Donetsk. But the West will want to go back to the status quo. When do you think the war will end? Either in the next month and a half, or it’ll be years. Goemans: Either in the next month and a half, or it’ll be years. Months, if the new class of Russian conscripts in April fails to turn up. Otherwise I’m not optimistic. It’ll be ongoing bloodshed, pulverizing of Ukrainian cities, coupled with insurgencies, and Russia will never have full control of Ukraine. But going back to the video of the captured Russian soldier who was ashamed of taking part in the invasion of Ukraine: If he returns to Russia, he’ll most likely be killed. Yet, he’s speaking up and he’s hoping that he affects another guy, and then maybe two other guys, and it spreads like that. That’s how an army dissolves. On the other hand, that’s also how a Ukrainian army becomes more determined.

#### Ukrainian propaganda is key to defeating Russia.

Stuart A. Thompson 22 (reporter in the technology department covering misinformation and disinformation.) and Davey Alba (technology reporter covering disinformation. In 2019, she won a Livingston Award for excellence in international reporting and a Mirror Award) 3/3/2022, nytimes, Fact and Mythmaking Blend in Ukraine’s Information War, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/technology/ukraine-war-misinfo.html

Just days into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a pilot with a mysterious nickname was quickly becoming the conflict’s first wartime hero. Named the Ghost of Kyiv, the ace fighter had apparently single-handedly shot down several Russian fighter jets. The story was shared by the official Ukraine Twitter account on Sunday in a thrilling montage video set to thumping music, showing the fighter swooping through the Ukrainian skies as enemy planes exploded around him. The Security Service of Ukraine, the country’s main security agency, also relayed the tale on its official Telegram channel, which has over 700,000 subscribers. The story of a single pilot’s beating the superior Russian air force found wide appeal online, thanks to the official Ukraine accounts and many others. Videos of the so-called Ghost of Kyiv had more than 9.3 million views on Twitter, and the flier was mentioned in thousands of Facebook groups reaching up to 717 million followers. On YouTube, videos promoting the Ukrainian fighter collected 6.5 million views, while TikTok videos with the hashtag #ghostofkyiv reached 200 million views. There was just one problem: The Ghost of Kyiv may be a myth. While there are reports of some Russian planes that were destroyed in combat, there is no information linking them to a single Ukrainian pilot. One of the first videos that went viral, which was included in the montage shared by the official Ukraine Twitter account, was a computer rendering from a combat flight simulator originally uploaded by a YouTube user with just 3,000 subscribers. And a photo supposedly confirming the fighter’s existence, shared by a former president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, was from a 2019 Twitter post by the Ukrainian defense ministry. When the fact-checking website Snopes published an article debunking the video, some social media users pushed back. “Why can’t we just let people believe some things?” one Twitter user replied. “If the Russians believe it, it brings fear. If the Ukrainians believe it, it gives them hope.” **In the information war over the invasion of Ukraine, some of the country’s official accounts have pushed stories with questionable veracity, spreading anecdotes, gripping on-the-ground accounts and even some unverified information that was later proved false, in a rapid jumble of fact and myth.** The claims by Ukraine do not compare to the falsehoods being spread by Russia, which laid the groundwork for a “false flag” operation in the lead-up to the invasion, which the Biden administration sought to derail. As the invasion neared, Russia falsely claimed that it was responding to Ukrainian aggression and liberating citizens from fascists and neo-Nazis. And since the assault began, Russia made baseless claims that Ukrainians had indiscriminately bombed hospitals and killed civilians. **Instead, Ukraine’s online propaganda is largely focused on its heroes and martyrs, characters who help dramatize tales of Ukrainian fortitude and Russian aggression.** But the Ukrainian claims on social media have also raised thorny questions about how false and unproven content should be handled during war — when lives are at stake and a Western ally is fighting for its survival against a powerful invading force. **“Ukraine is involved in pretty classic propaganda,” said Laura Edelson, a computer scientist studying misinformation at New York University. “They are telling stories that support their narrative. Sometimes false information is making its way in there, too, and more of it is getting through because of the overall environment.” Anecdotes detailing Ukrainian bravery or Russian brutality are crucial to the country’s war plan, according to experts, and they are part of established war doctrine that values winning not just individual skirmishes but also the hearts and minds of citizens and international observers. That is especially important during this conflict, as Ukrainians try to keep morale high among the fighters and marshal global support for their cause. “If Ukraine had no messages of the righteousness of its cause, the popularity of its cause, the valor of its heroes, the suffering of its populace, then it would lose,” said Peter W. Singer, a strategist and senior fellow at New America, a think tank in Washington. “Not just the information war, but it would lose the overall war.”** In previous wars, combatants would try to sabotage enemy communication and limit the spread of wartime propaganda, even cutting physical communication lines like telegraph cables. **But there are fewer such cables in the internet age, so in addition to downing communication towers and disrupting pockets of internet access, the modern strategy involves flooding the internet with viral messages that drown out opposing narratives. That digital battle moved at startling speed, experts noted, using an array of social media accounts, official websites and news conferences streamed online to spread Ukraine’s message. “You have to have the message that goes the most viral,” Mr. Singer said.** That was the case with another report from Ukraine involving a remarkable confrontation on Snake Island, an outpost in the Black Sea. According to an audio recording released by Pravda, a Ukrainian newspaper, and later verified by Ukraine officials, 13 border guards were offered a frightening ultimatum by an advancing Russian military unit: Surrender or face an attack. The Ukrainians responded instead with an expletive, before apparently being killed. Audio of the exchange went viral on social media, and the clip posted on Feb. 24 by Pravda received more than 3.5 million views on YouTube. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine personally announced the deaths in a video, saying each guard would be awarded the title Hero of Ukraine. But just days later, Ukrainian officials confirmed in a Facebook post that the men were still alive, taken prisoner by Russian forces. Social media has become the main conduit for pushing the information, verified or not, giving tech companies a role in the information war, too. The fake Ghost of Kyiv video, for instance, was flagged as “out of context” by Twitter, but the montage posted to Ukraine’s official Twitter account received no such flag. The false photo posted by Mr. Poroshenko, the former Ukrainian president, also had no flag. While Twitter monitors its service for harmful content, including manipulated or mislabeled videos, it said tweets simply mentioning the Ghost of Kyiv did not violate its rules. “When we identify content and accounts that violate the Twitter Rules, we’ll take enforcement action,” the company said. In exercising discretion over how unverified or false content is moderated, social media companies have decided to “pick a side,” said Alex Stamos, the director of the Stanford Internet Observatory and a former head of security at Facebook. **“I think this demonstrates the limits of ‘fact-checking’ in a fast-moving battle with real lives at stake,” Mr. Stamos said. He added that technology platforms never created rules against misinformation overall, instead targeting specific behaviors, actors and content. That leaves the truth behind some wartime narratives, like an apparent assassination plot against Mr. Zelensky or simply the number of troops killed in battle, fairly elusive, even as official accounts and news media share the information.** Those narratives have continued as the war marches on, revealing the contours of an information war aimed not just at Western audiences but also at Russian citizens. At the United Nations on Monday, the Ukrainian ambassador, Sergiy Kyslytsya, shared a series of text messages that he said had been retrieved from the phone of a dead Russian soldier. **“Mama, I’m in Ukraine. There is a real war raging here. I’m afraid,” the Russian soldier apparently wrote, according to Mr. Kyslytsya’s account, which he read in Russian. The tale seemed to evoke a narrative advanced by officials and shared extensively on social media that Russian soldiers are poorly trained and too young, and don’t want to be fighting their Ukrainian neighbors. “We are bombing all of the cities together, even targeting civilians.” The story, whether true or not, appears tailor-made for Russian civilians — particularly parents fretting over the fate of their enlisted children, experts said. “This is an age-old tactic that the Ukrainians are trying to use, and that is to draw the attention of the mothers and the families in Russia away from the more grandiose aims for war onto, instead, the human costs of war,” said Ian Garner, a historian focusing on Russia who has followed Russian-language propaganda during the conflict. “We know that this is really effective.”** Official Ukrainian accounts have also uploaded dozens of videos purportedly showing Russian prisoners of war, some with bloody bandages covering their arms or face. In the videos, the prisoners are heard denouncing the invasion. The videos may raise questions about whether Ukraine is violating the Geneva Conventions, which has rules about sharing images of war prisoners. Russia has also engaged in its own form of mythmaking, but experts say it has been far less effective. Rather than targeting international observers with emotional appeals, Russia has focused on swaying its own population to build support for the battle, Dr. Garner said. Since Russian state media is still calling the conflict a “special military operation” and not a war — in line with the description used by President Vladimir V. Putin — state broadcasters are left “trying to talk about a war that is apparently not happening,” Dr. Garner said. **The Russian government “can’t play to its strongest narratives of individual sacrifice,” he added, instead relying on stories of Ukrainians bombing hospitals and civilians, providing no evidence. Ukraine’s efforts to amplify its own messages also leave little room for Russia to dominate the conversation, said Mr. Singer, the strategist from New America.** “A key to information warfare in the age of social media is to recognize that the audience is both target of and participant in it,” he said. He added that social media users were “hopefully sharing out those messages, which makes them combatants of a sort as well.”

#### Ukraine’s info war is key to defeating Russia.

Sinan Aral 22 (director of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy and author of "The Hype Machine) 3/1/2022, Ukraine is winning the information war, Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/01/information-war-zelensky-ukraine-putin-russia/>

**Today, the information war in Ukraine is more intense, more tightly contested and arguably more important than ever because motivating volunteer fighters at home and encouraging foreign support abroad are critical to success. And this time, it seems, Russia is losing. Reports abound on social media of more than 4,000 Russian casualties, images of crippled Russian helicopters and armored vehicles and cellphone videos of savage Russian missile attacks on civilian targets. This mix of official Ukrainian war statistics combined with videos (both verified and unverified), posted by Ukrainian citizens and sympathizers from the front lines, is painting a vivid picture of a homegrown resistance successfully slowing the advance of a much larger and ostensibly better organized military machine. Facebook posts showing Ukrainians kneeling in front of tanks to stop their progress and Twitter images of women and children sheltering in subways and basements set the emotional backdrop of senseless aggression against a peaceful nation. Viral videos and audio clips evoke a defiant optimism impossible to ignore: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appearing via his cellphone walking the streets of Kyiv, unharmed, in a “proof of life” demonstration emphasizing his willingness to stay and fight for his country, despite a U.S. offer to evacuate him, for example, or the recording of soldiers in an isolated Ukrainian outpost on Snake Island, in the Black Sea, cursing and telling off the Russian Black Sea Fleet. These stories are spreading rapidly on social media and subsequently echoing through official news channels in a media feedback loop that amplifies the information war and broadcasts it on television sets all over the world.** Zelensky, in particular, is deftly outmaneuvering Putin in this information war. He rallied Ukrainian men to defend their homeland, used the encrypted messaging platform [Telegram to speak directly to the Russian people](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMTeSsnNCw0) to counter Putin’s narrative, urged the West to step up its assistance in defense of law, order and peace, and even [pleaded with foreigners](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/russia-ukraine-live-updates-n1290057/ncrd1290087#liveBlogCards) to cross the border into Ukraine to defend Western democracy. While misinformation exists on both sides, Zelensky gives the impression that he’s more committed to truth and transparency. In contrast, Russia has been secretive, obfuscating the true extent of its incursion into Ukraine, and out of touch, airing the rambling addresses of its leader. It’s as if Putin has forgotten that social media transitioned from text to real-time video around the time of the Crimean annexation. In today’s information war, Russian news claiming Zelensky had turned tail and fled was swiftly countered by a video selfie of the Ukrainian president in Kyiv, vowing to defend his homeland. The symbolic contrast between Zelensky striding through war-torn streets, confident even under fire, and Putin, seated, hunched over a large wooden desk in the safety of a secure office hundreds of miles away from the fighting, is stark. This time, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Google are also proactively engaged in the information war. During the Crimean annexation, they were reactive and struggled to keep up with misinformation and false abuse reports. Today, in Ukraine, they have [banned Russian state-owned media from advertising on their platforms](https://www.axios.com/youtube-meta-twitter-restrict-russian-state-media-323d966f-531e-40f5-aa06-3b82998589df.html) and [defiantly fact-checked](https://www.theverge.com/2022/2/25/22950874/russia-facebook-blocked-roskomnadzor-media-censorship) Putin’s propaganda despite Russia’s protests and a full ban of Twitter and a partial ban of Facebook in Russia. Facebook has spun up a special operations center, staffed with native Russian and Ukrainian speakers, to monitor misinformation posted about the war, added warning labels to war-related images that its software detects are more than a year old, and restricted access to content from the state-affiliated Russian media outlets RT and Sputnik. YouTube is restricting access to Russian state-owned media outlets for users in Ukraine, removing Russian state-owned channels from recommendations, and limiting their content’s reach across the platform. Twitter has temporarily banned all ads in Ukraine and Russia, added labels to tweets with links to Russian state-affiliated media and downranked their content in algorithmic timelines. While numerous fake videos are circulating on TikTok about Ukraine, the Chinese-owned platform has no comprehensive policy on policing information about the conflict. Despite blocking state-owned Russian media in the European Union, this information flows freely in Ukraine and Russia on the platform, now dubbed “WarTok” by some observers, in part because it is organizing such videos into a convenient discover playlist by the same name. **The information war is critical to what happens next in Ukraine for several reasons. It motivates the resistance by inspiring Ukrainian citizens to take up arms in defense of their country and motivating them with social proof that they are united and not fighting alone. It encourages foreign assistance, pressuring Europe and the United States to step up their efforts to end the conflict. It fans the flames of protest in Russia, mobilizing the antiwar movement in Moscow and elsewhere in defiance of Putin’s aggression. And it may even eventually demoralize Russian troops, who must be wondering what on earth they are doing in Ukraine if the motivation for the intervention has been a lie all along. When Russia struck a Ukrainian television tower on Tuesday, it seemed to confirm Moscow’s keen awareness of the need to counter Ukraine’s information war and to highlight the importance of information in modern conflicts. Information campaigns are difficult to quantify during the fog of war. But while it is hard to pinpoint the extent to which the information war is contributing to the overwhelming international unity against Putin’s aggression, one thing is clear: Social media, mainstream media and the narrative framing of the invasion of Ukraine undoubtedly will play an important role in how this conflict ends. Now, vigilance and fortitude are not only needed on the battlefield, where lives and territory will be won and lost, but also will be essential online, where the hearts and minds of the world will be won or lost.**

#### Russian win would lead to escalation in multiple forums – goes global.

LIANA FIX 22 (Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, in Washington, D.C). MICHAEL KIMMAGE (Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. )2/18/22, What If Russia Wins? A Kremlin-Controlled Ukraine Would Transform Europe, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins>

If Russia gains control of Ukraine or manages to destabilize it on a major scale, a new era for the United States and for Europe will begin. U.S. and European leaders would face the dual challenge of rethinking European security and of not being drawn into a larger war with Russia. All sides would have to consider the potential of nuclear-armed adversaries in direct confrontation. These two responsibilities—robustly defending European peace and prudently avoiding military escalation with Russia—will not necessarily be compatible. The United States and its allies could find themselves deeply unprepared for the task of having to create a new European security order as a result of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine.

MANY WAYS TO WIN

For Russia, victory in Ukraine could take various forms. As in [Syria](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-03-20/russias-pyrrhic-victory-syria), victory does not have to result in a sustainable settlement. It could involve the installation of a compliant government in Kyiv or the partition of the country. Alternatively, the defeat of the Ukrainian military and the negotiation of a Ukrainian surrender could effectively transform Ukraine into a failed state. Russia could also employ devastating cyberattacks and disinformation tools, backed by the threat of force, to cripple the country and induce regime change. With any of these outcomes, Ukraine will have been effectively detached from the West.

If Russia achieves its political aims in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not be what it was before the war. Not only will U.S. primacy in Europe have been qualified; any sense that the European Union or NATO can ensure peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost age. Instead, security in Europe will have to be reduced to defending the core members of the EU and NATO. Everyone outside the clubs will stand alone, with the exception of Finland and Sweden. This may not necessarily be a conscious decision to end enlargement or association policies; but it will be de facto policy. Under a perceived siege by Russia, the EU and NATO will no longer have the capacity for ambitious policies beyond their own borders.

The United States and Europe will also be in a state of permanent economic war with Russia. The West will seek to enforce sweeping sanctions, which Russia is likely to parry with cyber-measures and energy blackmailing, given the economic asymmetries. China might well stand on Russia’s side in this economic tit for tat. Meanwhile, domestic politics in European countries will resemble a twenty-first-century great game, in which Russia will be studying Europe for any breakdown in the commitment to NATO and to the transatlantic relationship. Through methods fair and foul, Russia will take whatever opportunity comes its way to influence public opinion and elections in European countries. Russia will be an anarchic presence—sometimes real, sometimes imagined—in every instance of European political instability.

Cold War analogies will not be helpful in a world with a Russianized Ukraine. The Cold War border in Europe had its flash points, but it was stabilized in a mutually acceptable fashion in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. By contrast, Russian suzerainty over Ukraine would open a vast zone of destabilization and insecurity from Estonia to Poland to Romania to Turkey. For as long as it lasts, Russia’s presence in Ukraine will be perceived by Ukraine’s neighbors as provocative and unacceptable and, for some, as a threat to their own security. Amid this shifting dynamic, order in Europe will have to be conceived of in primarily military terms—which, since Russia has a stronger hand in the military than in the economic realm, will be in the Kremlin’s interest—sidelining nonmilitary institutions such as the European Union.

Russia has Europe’s largest conventional military, which it is more than ready to use. The EU’s defense policy—in contrast to NATO’s—is far from being able to provide security for its members. Thus will military reassurance, especially of the EU’s eastern members, be key. Responding to a revanchist Russia with sanctions and with the rhetorical proclamation of a rules-based international order will not be sufficient.

IMPERILING EUROPE'S EAST

In the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, Germany‘s position in Europe will be severely challenged. Germany is a marginal military power that has based its postwar political identity on the rejection of war. The ring of friends it has surrounded itself with, especially in the east with Poland and the Baltic states, risks being destabilized by Russia. France and the United Kingdom will assume leading roles in European affairs by virtue of their comparatively strong militaries and long tradition of military interventions. The key factor in Europe, however, will remain the United States. NATO will depend on U.S. support as will the anxious and imperiled countries of Europe’s east, the frontline nations arrayed along a now very large, expanded, and uncertain line of contact with Russia, including Belarus and the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine.

Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, will likely have substantial numbers of NATO troops permanently stationed on their soil. A request from Finland and Sweden to gain an Article 5 commitment and to join NATO would be impossible to reject. In Ukraine, EU and NATO countries will never recognize a new Russian-backed regime created by Moscow. But they will face the same challenge they do with Belarus: wielding sanctions without punishing the population and supporting those in need without having access to them. Some NATO members will bolster a Ukrainian insurgency, to which Russia will respond by threatening NATO members.

Ukraine’s predicament will be very great. Refugees will flee in multiple directions, quite possibly in the millions. And those parts of the Ukrainian military that are not directly defeated will continue fighting, echoing the partisan warfare that tore apart this whole region of Europe during and after World War II.

The permanent state of escalation between Russia and Europe may stay cold from a military perspective. It is likely, though, to be economically hot. The sanctions put on Russia in 2014, which were connected to formal diplomacy (often referred to as the “Minsk” process, after the city in which the negotiations were held), were not draconian. They were reversible as well as conditional. Following a Russian invasion of Ukraine, new sanctions on banking and on technology transfer would be significant and permanent. They would come in the wake of failed diplomacy and would start at “the top of the ladder,” according to the U.S. administration. In response, Russia will retaliate, quite possibly in the cyber-domain as well as in the energy sector. Moscow will limit access to critical goods such as titanium, of which Russia has been the world’s second-largest exporter. This war of attrition will test both sides. Russia will be ruthless in trying to get one or several European states to back away from economic conflict by linking a relaxation in tension to these countries’ self-interest, thus undermining consensus in the EU and NATO.

Europe’s strong suit is its economic leverage. Russia’s asset will be any source of domestic division or disruption in Europe or in Europe’s transatlantic partners. Here Russia will be proactive and opportunistic. If a pro-Russian movement or candidate shows up, that candidate can be encouraged directly or indirectly. If an economic or political sore point diminishes the foreign policy efficacy of the United States and its allies, it will be a weapon for Russian propaganda efforts and for Russian espionage.

Much of this is already happening. But a war in Ukraine will up the ante. Russia will use more resources and be unchained in its choice of instruments. The massive refugee flows arriving in Europe will exacerbate the EU’s unresolved refugee policy and provide fertile ground for populists. The holy grail of these informational, political, and cyberbattles will be the 2024 presidential election in the United States. Europe’s future will depend on this election. The election of Donald Trump or of a Trumpian candidate might destroy the transatlantic relationship at Europe’s hour of maximum peril, putting into question NATO’s position and its security guarantees for Europe.

TURNING NATO INWARD

For the United States, a Russian victory would have profound effects on its grand strategy in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. First, Russian success in Ukraine would require Washington to pivot to Europe. No ambiguity about NATO’s Article 5 (of the kind experienced under Trump) will be permissible. Only a strong U.S. commitment to European security will prevent Russia from dividing European countries from one another. This will be difficult in light of competing priorities, especially those that confront the United States in a deteriorating relationship with China. But the interests at stake are fundamental. The United States has very large commercial equities in Europe. The European Union and the United States are each other’s largest trade and investment partners, with trade in goods and services totaling $1.1 trillion in 2019. A well-functioning, peaceful Europe augments American foreign policy—on climate change, on nonproliferation, on global public health, and on the management of tensions with China or Russia. If Europe is destabilized, then the United States will be much more alone in the world.

NATO is the logical means by which the United States can provide security reassurance to Europe and deter Russia. A war in Ukraine would revive NATO not as a democracy-building enterprise or as a tool for out-of-area expeditions like the war in Afghanistan but as the unsurpassed defensive military alliance that it was designed to be. Although Europeans will be demanding a greater military commitment to Europe from the United States, a broader Russian invasion of Ukraine should drive every NATO member to increase its defense spending. For Europeans, this would be the final call to improve Europe’s defensive capabilities—in tandem with the United States—in order to help the United States manage the Russian-Chinese dilemma.

For a Moscow now in permanent confrontation with the West, Beijing could serve as an economic backstop and a partner in opposing U.S. hegemony. In the worst case for U.S. grand strategy, China might be emboldened by Russia’s assertiveness and threaten confrontation over Taiwan. But there is no guarantee that an escalation in Ukraine will benefit the Sino-Russian relationship. China’s ambition to become the central node of the Eurasian economy will be damaged by war in Europe, because of the brutal uncertainties war brings. Chinese irritation with a Russia on the march will not enable a rapprochement between Washington and [Beijing](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe), but it may initiate new conversations.

#### Nuclear detonations cause nuclear winter and extinction.

**Starr 15** Steven Starr, 10-14-2015, "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation Of American Scientists, [Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.], https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/, SJBE

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. **That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs**. **Following the detonation** (in conflict) **of** US and/or Russian launch-ready **strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke** (up to [180 million tons](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/ToonRobockTurcoPhysicsToday.pdf), according to peer-reviewed studies), **which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere.** [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see [Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf).] **The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more**. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. **Once in the stratosphere, the smoke** (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) **would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a** [**dense stratospheric smoke layer**](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/warconsequences/hundredfiftytonessmoke/). **The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere.** Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. **For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia.** [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see [Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockNW2006JD008235.pdf).] Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. **Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer.** Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. **Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed,** resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment? It is, of course, debatable whether or not nuclear winter could cause human extinction. There is essentially no way to truly “know” without fighting a strategic nuclear war. Yet while it is crucial that we all understand the mortal peril that we face, **it is not necessary to engage in an unwinnable academic debate as to whether any humans will survive.**

## 2

#### Settler colonialism is the permeating structure of the nation state – sustained by settler/colonial desire, genocide and erasure become naturalized.

Jafri 13 Beenesh Jafri (PhD candidate in gender, feminist, and women’s studies at York University in Toronto, Canada. Her recent publications can be found in Critical Race and Whiteness Studies and in Alliances: Re/Envisioning Indigenous-Non-Indigenous Relationships), 2013, “Desire, Settler Colonialism, and the Racialized Cowboy,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 37:2, doi:10.17953/aicr.37.2.n758545211525815, SJBE

Much of the scholarship on race, racialization, and settler colonialism has framed the relationship between racialized subjects and settler colonialism in legal or political terms.20 This move makes sense, considering that settler colonialism is, at base, a political project concerned with governance. For example, when Patrick Wolfe critically asserts that settler-colonial invasion is not an event, but a structure, he argues that the “event” of invasion is made permanent through technologies of governance, such as settler laws, policies, and institutions.21 Similarly, Lorenzo Veracini, when distinguishing settlerhood from migration, makes this distinction by suggesting that “settlers are founders of political orders, and carry their sovereignty with them.”22 Like Wolfe, Veracini identifies sovereignty and political governance as the feature that distinguishes settler invasion from migration. Still underexamined in the literature on settler colonialism are the kinds of emotive investments that settler subjects may have in settler coloniality. To be clear, I am not denying that settler colonialism is a political project. However, I do wish to emphasize the significance of desire, which I would argue enables settler-colonial governance and vice versa. This notion that settler colonialism is as much a project of desire as it is a purely political or legal project is certainly clear within the emergent literature on Queer Indigenous studies, which has shown how alternative models of kinship, through figures such as the berdache or two-spirit person, become objects of desire for Queer subjects searching for true or authentic selves and communities.23 For example, in his research on Queer settler subjectivities, Scott Morgensen discusses how Queer Indigenous identities are appropriated by White LGBTQ activists to serve their own goals of building Queer movements without simultaneously challenging the logics of settler colonialism.24 Similarly, in When Did Indians Become Straight? Mark Rifkin underlines how the fetishization of Native social structures by Queer settlers, or liberals more generally, is as complicit with the settler-colonial project as is the repudiation of these social structures by US imperialist politics.25 In each case, argues Rifkin, Native social practices are framed strictly through the lens of cultural difference rather than as integral to processes of governance, and Native sovereignty is undermined.26 The work of both Morgensen and Rifkin points to the ways that relations of desire sustain and reassert colonial power in settler states. For the Queer settlers discussed by Morgensen and Rifkin, it is indigeneity (or a commodified form of indigeneity) which is the object of desire.27 However, I would argue that settlerhood is also an object of desire, and settler-desires also do the work of sustaining colonial power. This is especially true in the case of the racialized subject seeking belonging in settler society or seeking access to the benefits and privileges of the settler society. Moreover, settlerhood is not only an object of desire in and of itself, but desires that are construed as natural or innate—such as “settling down” and starting a family—do the work of constituting settlerhood as natural and happenstance. It is this naturalization in particular which makes settler colonialism so tenacious. More specifically, the political relationship between “Natives” and “settlers” is sustained through the cultivation of settler subjectivities invested not only in asserting settler identity (for example, American, Canadian or Australian), but with seemingly abstract or “universal” aims, objectives, and ideals, such as settling down, heterosexual (heteronormative) love, property ownership, the nuclear family, the separation of public/private spheres, and so on. Incidentally, these are values that dovetail with other political projects. As indicated by Oxford English Dictionary definitions of the word, desire is generally associated with sexual desire, and it is almost always presumed to operate at the level of the individual rather than the collective. As suggested by the literature on critical psychoanalysis, however, the spaces of the psychic and social/cultural/structural are intimately intertwined. The desire I speak of in this paper is a settler/colonial desire, which manifests itself at the collective level even as it expresses itself at the individual level. When settler desire installs itself as individual desire, it makes invisible its structural dimensions. For example, the desire to “settle down” appears to be a neutral, arbitrary, personal desire, delinked from history or politics. In some ways, settler desire is analogous to the construction of race difference that Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks describes in Desiring Whiteness.28 Though she is engaged in a different conceptual task than I am in this paper, there are nonetheless some useful insights to be gleaned from Desiring Whiteness. In it, Seshadri-Crooks draws upon Lacan’s theory of subject constitution to develop a framework for understanding the logic through which race difference is organized. 29 She argues that while the origins of race difference can be historically situated, its effects exceed language.30 However, racial difference assumes the appearance of naturalness and ahistoricity. To do this, racial difference relies upon the order of sexual difference, where sexual difference (via Lacan) is that which cannot be fully articulated by language.31 Racial difference acquires its tenacity and pervasiveness by assuming naturalness and ahistoricity. One could ask a similar question about settler/colonial desire: How do settler desires become naturalized to the point that their violence is erased, their history disappeared? Even as there is recognition that settler colonialism (or its euphemism, “discovery”) has a clear history, and even as there is recognition of First Peoples, the process of settlement itself continues to be construed as benign. Like race, settler coloniality becomes naturalized or made “normal” by relying upon the order of sexual difference, such that the calls to own property or start a (nuclear) family become delinked from their historical contexts and reconfigured as natural, innate, ahistorical desires. At the same time, it should be noted that while settler desires are constructed as innate, settlerhood itself is not marked on the body in the same way as race or sex difference. Rather, the settler/Native distinction is imprinted on the body through race. That is, there is no inherent recognition of settler-ness except through some sense of racial difference, which is often ambiguous. Outside of this, claims to settler status are recognized only through political and legal technologies, such as birth certificates, passports, status cards, and so on. It is perhaps due to this lack of embodied recognition that settler desire is so significant to sustaining colonial power. Indeed, settler/colonial desire is integral to the construction of settler subjectivities, to settler narratives, and to the project of erasure underlying the indigenizing efforts of settler projects. Settler colonialism is able to sustain itself because settler subjects are invested in its project. Because they are framed as belonging to the space of the psychic settler, desires are able to do the work of naturalizing settler imperatives. In other words, they are able to do this work because they are framed as universal human desires. As Scott Morgensen notes in relation to gender difference, “Any naturalisation of Western heteropatriarchy or binary sex/gender also naturalises settler colonialism. . . . Settler colonisation performs the West’s potential universality, by transporting and indigenising Western governance upon territories far from Europe: in settler states that then may appear not to be perpetual colonisers, but rather to be natural sites of Western law.”32 As a key aspect of this naturalization process, desire links settlerhood to the category of the human—with the implication that the binary counterpart to the settler, the “Native,” belongs to the category of the nonhuman. Such was the dilemma that Frantz Fanon described in Black Skin, White Masks. 33 The process of colonization, argued Fanon, institutes the binary of the colonizer/colonized, which seizes the subjectivity of the colonized, denying the ability of the colonized ever to be recognized except through the logic of racial difference.34 For Fanon, only anticolonial struggle held the promise of recapturing the humanity stolen by colonization. Yet, as Denise Ferreira da Silva has argued, the category of the human is always already embedded in the politics of racialization, emerging from historical-material contexts, even as it has the appearance of being natural.35 Claims to humanity rely on the figure of the “Other,” without which humanness cannot be recognized. Da Silva’s analysis thus problematizes the modernist quest for humanity itself. The evocation of humanity, signaled through naturalized desire, is also what facilitates a project of indigenization—wherein it appears natural and inconsequential that settlers belong to, and are legitimate occupants of, land that was acquired through deceptive treaty processes and through policies of genocide and assimilation.36 For example, in Indian Cowboy, love, marriage, and “settling down” are central themes. The film evokes the “American Dream”—the fantasy of marriage, nuclear family, property ownership, and success within a capitalist economy—while simultaneously making invisible the Indigenous histories and claims to land which make the American Dream possible. Because these erasures are enacted through desire—desire constructed as that which is natural, benign, and essentially human—the erasures are neutralized; the effects of their violence are rendered void. The racialized cowboy performs, expresses, and negotiates settler desires, speaking to the inability to occupy particular spaces and subject positions and articulating a demand to do so. In Indian Cowboy, this is suggested by the fantastical representation of this figure—the cowboy is out of grasp in the real world of the racialized subject, relegated to the dream world.

#### Conceptions of objectivity fail into the guise of progress. The truth of Settler Colonialism must be publicly confronted from personal experience which settlers will always encroach upon.

**Brake 7/5** [Justin; Justin Brake is an independent journalist from Ktaqmkuk (Newfoundland) who presently lives and works in unceded Algonquin territory. A settler with Mi’kmaq ancestry, much of Justin’s work focuses on Indigenous rights and liberation. He is a writer and editor with the Breach and a regular contributor to the Independent. “Built on a foundation of white supremacy””. 7-5-2021. https://briarpatchmagazine.com/articles/view/built-on-a-foundation-of-white-supremacy.] SJ//VM

**Objectivity and settler colonialism** “Watch your language.” That was the warning, written into [an op-ed](https://www.saltwire.com/newfoundland-labrador/opinion/pam-frampton-watch-your-language-135558/) title, given by a daily newspaper columnist who took issue with my and other journalists’ use of the term “land protector” in our coverage of the Muskrat Falls resistance. “Reporters should avoid such language, laden as it is with inherent subjectivity,” the columnist went on. “[T]he last thing any journalist wants is to fuel those who are perpetually coiled and ready to yell ‘Media bias!’” The debate over the utility and legitimacy of objectivity in journalism is almost as old as the ideal itself. Objectivity “hinges on a more fundamental belief that there is a knowable world, a way of seeing that, once we set aside our own subjectivities, can be universally achieved or at least universally agreed upon,” journalist Lewis Raven Wallace writes in *The View From Somewhere*. Defenders of objectivity, like The Elements of Journalism authors Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel, argue that “[o]bjectivity was not meant to suggest that journalists were without bias. To the contrary, precisely because journalists could never be objective, their methods had to be. In the recognition that everyone is biased, in other words, the news, like science, should flow from a process for reporting that is defensible, rigorous, and transparent.” **“That the prose may have become less ‘blatant’ however suggests that the audience has become more familiar with the genre conventions of colonial discourse. To put it another way: the nation has been built.”** But too often, objectivity is conflated with the views of those in positions of power. In *Seeing Red: A History of Natives in Canadian Newspapers,* Mark Cronlund Anderson and Carmen L. Robertson detail how, over the course of this country’s short history, Canadian newspapers have supported and advanced settler colonialism. Under the guise of “objective” reporting, journalists have consistently othered and stereotyped Indigenous Peoples, misrepresented them, and outright erased their histories and cultures. “The colonial stereotypes have endured in the press, even flourished,” the authors noted a decade ago. “That the prose may have become less ‘blatant’ however suggests that the audience has become more familiar with the genre conventions of colonial discourse. To put it another way: the nation has been built.” Robert Ballantyne, a Cree-Mohawk grad student at Carleton University and former CBC and *Toronto Star* journalist, is researching anti-colonial reporting methods. He says objectivity “makes it difficult for journalists to confront their own work, as if they are somehow capable of transcending their own backgrounds, biases, and communities.” Armed with what Ballantyne calls a perceived “superpower of fairness,” journalists’ indoctrination in objectivity “can create an almost impossible situation to have difficult conversations and create change if someone believes they are beyond reproach.” Tałtan journalist Candis Callison and her colleague Mary Lynn Young argue in their book *Reckoning: Journalism’s Limits and Possibilities* that “what journalists think happened is deeply related to who they are and where they’re coming from in broad and specific senses – and that there are multiple truths and perspectives that contribute to understanding what ‘really’ happened,” they write. Instead of pretending to be objective, they suggest journalists could be transparent about who they are and where they come from. “Recognizing individual and collective social and historical location needs to become part of the methodology for journalists in order to situate themselves, their knowledge, and expertise within a wider web of relations and entanglements.

#### The alternative is one of decolonization – settlers need to enact an ethic of incommensurability to relinquish settler futurity.

Tuck and Yang 12 Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, 2012, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, // SJ DL

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly.But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It meansremoving the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for who best centers indigenous scholarship and resistance-- Any ethical commitment requires that the aff place themselves in the center of Native scholarship and demands.

Carlson 16 (Elizabeth Carlson, PhD, is an Aamitigoozhi, Wemistigosi, and Wasicu (settler Canadian and American), whose Swedish, Saami, German, Scots-Irish, and English ancestors have settled on lands of the Anishinaabe and Omaha Nations which were unethically obtained by the US government. Elizabeth lives on Treaty 1 territory, the traditional lands of the Anishinaabe, Nehiyawak, Dakota, Nakota, and Red River Metis peoples currently occupied by the city of Winnipeg, the province of Manitoba, (2016): Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1241213) // recut SJ DL

Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.**42** Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies.I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral, and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoplesand take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broade\_r view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigenous resistance’.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.

## Case

#### Facts can’t convince climate skeptics but advocacy can.

Spencer Bokat-Lindell 20 (Writer, NY Times) 1/2/2020, So You Want to Convince a Climate Change Skeptic, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/opinion/climate-change-deniers.html

Lead with values, not facts

If you want to convince someone about climate change, don’t lead with data, [writes Katharine Hayhoe](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/opinion/sunday/climate-change-evangelical-christian.html) in The Times. Dr. Hayhoe is a climate scientist at Texas Tech University, and she’s also an evangelical Christian, two identities she realized after moving from Canada were “supposed to be entirely incompatible” in the United States. Understanding why that’s the case is crucial when attempting to convert climate change skeptics, she writes, explaining:

It turns out, it’s not where we go to church (or don’t) that determines our opinion on climate. It’s not even our religious affiliation. Hispanic Catholics are [significantly more likely](https://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/16/catholics-divided-over-global-warming/) than other Catholics to say the earth is getting warmer, according to a 2015 survey, and they have the same pope. It’s because of the alliance between conservative theology and conservative politics that has been deliberately engineered and fostered over decades of increasingly divisive politics on issues of race, abortion and now climate change, to the point where the best predictor of whether we agree with the science is simply where we fall on the political spectrum.

In her experience, Dr. Hayhoe has found that the best way to neutralize the partisan charge on climate change is not by appealing to science — which some prominent Republicans, such as [Senator Ted Cruz](https://www.cnbc.com/video/2016/04/15/global-warming-a-religion-not-science-ted-cruz.html), have cast as a competitor to religion — but by emphasizing shared values. “For some, this could be the well-being of our community,” she writes. “For others, our children; and for fellow Christians, it’s often our faith.”

In such conversations, it may be important to remember how your interlocutor’s values differ from your own. In Vice, [Maggie Puniewska points to](https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a3d35a/how-to-sway-a-climate-change-skeptic) the [moral foundations theory](https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/25/books/review/the-righteous-mind-by-jonathan-haidt.html), according to which liberals and conservatives prioritize different ethics: the former compassion, fairness and liberty, the latter purity, loyalty and obedience to authority. Ms. Puniewska writes:

If you’re trying to convince someone who leans left, you can stick with the polar bear and keep tugging at their heart strings with talk of how unfair it will be to our children if the world is poisoned, but if you’re with a conservative, it’s wise to change up your approach — science has found that personalized climate-related messages work better.

For example, [research has found](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/295677478_Red_White_and_Blue_Enough_to_Be_Green_Effects_of_Moral_Framing_on_Climate_Change_Attitudes_and_Conservation_Behaviors) that conservatives are more likely to support a pro-environmental agenda when presented with messages containing themes of patriotism and defending the purity of nature.

#### Data proves.

University of Oregon, 5/27/21, Climate skeptics not easily persuaded by available evidence, now or later, <https://phys.org/news/2021-05-climate-skeptics-easily-evidence.html>

Climate skeptics who aren't persuaded by the existing evidence from climate change are unlikely to change their minds for many years, according to a newly published quantitative study by a University of Oregon environmental economist.

The central question posed by the study published in the journal Climate Change was "How much evidence would it take to convince skeptics that they are wrong?" The answer depended on the degree of skepticism. The study modeled two types of hypothetical skeptics—those who were less extreme and believed the change in temperature was slight, as well as more extreme skeptics who believed the change was nonexistent—and exposed them to climate data recorded between 1866 and 2005, as well as future projections until the end of the century.

"If a climate skeptic is unpersuaded by the evidence that is already available to them today, my model implies that they will likely remain a skeptic for many years into future," said author Grant McDermott, an assistant professor in the University of Oregon Department of Economics interested in the interaction between human and natural systems. "Why? Because it suggests their prior beliefs are so strong that even decades of continued warming may not be enough to convince them."

AT Oppressive regimes

#### PROPAGANDA IS STATE SPONSERED

Ferraro 20 (Matthew. Matthew F. Ferraro is an attorney and former U.S. intelligence officer, is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a visiting fellow at the National Security Institute at George Mason Law School) Preston B. Golson, 3/24/2020, The Next Gray Zone Conflict: State-Based Disinformation Attacks on the Private Sector, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/next-gray-zone-conflict-state-based-disinformation-attacks-private-sector>

The story of RT’s attack on 5G is a glimpse of the near-future. Adversaries such as Russia, Iran and China look for ways to harass American interests without triggering all-out conflict. As trade wars proliferate, technological rivalries intensify, and multinational corporations take public positions on hot-button social issues, this form of “[gray zone conflict](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/GrayZone_ExecSummary1_0.pdf)”—coercive actions that lie somewhere between diplomacy and warfare—will likely increase in scale and scope as competitors seek a strategic and economic advantage over the United States. American businesses will increasingly find themselves in the crosshairs of nation-state-sponsored disinformation operations. There are several reasons why. First, more and more countries have disinformation capabilities in their arsenal. According to a recent Oxford University report, [more than 70 countries](https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/09/CyberTroop-Report19.pdf) have state-sponsored disinformation units. There’s no reason to think their targets will remain solely political. After all, economic interests have become further entangled with national interests. Economic espionage, state-sponsored hacks of private firms, and regulatory war over leading-edge technologies are all fixtures of current geopolitics. Disinformation attacks on the private sector are the next frontier in that conflict.

#### FREE PRESS EXCLUDES STATE CONTROL

Policinski 3/16 (Gene. Gene Policinski is a chief operating officer of the Freedom Forum Institute and of the Institute's First Amendment Center), 3/16/21, Opinion: There can be no American democracy without a free press, <https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/solutions/2021/03/16/there-can-no-american-democracy-without-free-press/4703141001/>

So, they provided for three branches of government to balance each other, along with periodic elections and the rights for us to assemble and seek change when we think things have gone astray. All fine, but also relatively long-term solutions. How do we know what our government is doing, how well it is operating or whether our elected officials are up to the job? Enter the only profession mentioned in the Constitution: A free press, to serve as a “watchdog on government.” A free press the government cannot control, to offer an independent, regular update on behalf of the rest of us.

#### Objectivity creates media bubbles and right wing news.

Kelkar 19 (Shreeharsh. Shreeharsh Kelkar is lecturer in the Interdisciplinary Studies Field Major at UC Berkeley), Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 5 (2019), 86-106, Post-truth and the Search for Objectivity: Political Polarization and the Remaking of Knowledge Production

* Brackets included in original text

In an era where both political parties presided over coalitions that spanned the ideological spectrum, newspapers could practice a detached objectivity through which they could be critical of all political persuasions. **Political polarization however raised serious questions about journalistic objectivity as practiced. As polarization increased, partisans on both sides, especially conservatives, started to accuse mainstream media institutions of exhibiting “journalistic bias.” While journalists and academics studiously followed objective norms and cast themselves as experts, they were always more left-of-center in their own politics. Conservatives, not unreasonably, perceived this as “bias,” and therefore sought to create their own information ecosystem of think tanks and media. Aided partly by regulatory changes, this led to the creation of an alternative right-wing media ecosystem (like cable news channels and conservative talk radio) and new audiences who consumed them. A key feature of this alternative ecosystem was its focus on the biases of mainstream media institutions. The success of the alternative right-wing media ecosystem is reflected in its outsized influence on setting the goals of the Republican Party, a truly unprecedented state of affairs. Political scientists Matt Grossman and David Hopkins argue that “the establishment of an explicitly right-of-center media ecosystem as a conscious alternative to ‘mainstream’ journalism allows conservative media personalities to exert an influence over Republican officeholders and voters that has no true counterpart among Democrats**” (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016a). This has led to an information asymmetry in terms of the news and knowledge that circulates amongst publics of different political persuasions. While the right relies on its alternative information system, the left relies on traditional news media and intellectual sources [e.g. university research] that often implicitly flatter the Democratic worldview but do not portray themselves or their consumers as engaged in an ideological conflict. Similarly, left-of-center think tanks have adapted to conservative upstarts by frequently opposing them in policy debates, but still retain broader ties to scholarly researchers and closer adherence to academic norms. (Grossmann and Hopkins 2016a) The rise of the internet and the growth of internet publishing further complicated matters. The internet took classifieds away from newspapers and magazines, thereby taking away a chunk of their revenue; further, it brought forth a new class of proto-journalists: bloggers, citizen-activists, advocates, who utilized it to reach a broader audience. These new voices did not necessarily subscribe to the established model of journalistic objectivity, where the journalist remains invisible and reports all sides of a conflict. Instead, they created a new genre of writing (embodied today in outlets like Vox and Talking Points Memo) embodying a different style of objectivity: their writing style accords a prominent space to facts but proudly spurns the invisible-reporter view-from-nowhere model of the NYT or CNN. The writer’s loyalties are clear, facts and opinions are mixed, and every side does not get equal (or similar) coverage (Farrell and Drezner 2007).

#### Objectivity doesn’t solve misinformation – their evidence is correlative not causative.

**Karić 21** (Tijana. Tijana Karić is an Humboldt Research Fellow at the Philipps-University Marburg | PhD in Social and Political Psychology), and Janko Međedović. "It doesn’t matter what you watch, but how much you watch: social attitudes, media objectivity, and frequency of informing as predictors of conspiracy beliefs." (2021).

Surprisingly, the objectivity of the media sources participants inform themselves through does not play a significant role in predicting either conspiracy mentality, or specific COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs, leading to the rejection of the second hypothesis. However, this finding is in contrast with previous studies (e.g., Kim & Kim, 2021). Possible reasons for the insignificance of source objectivity for conspiracy theories may lie in several psychological mechanisms. First, the lingering effect of misinformation (Ecker et al., 2017) indicates that the original information leaves traces on attitudes even after (repeated) counter-argumentation, because cognitive representations remain in the memory. The second mechanism is the sleeper effect (Hovland et al., 1949), i.e. the dissociation of the message from the source due to discounting cues (unworthy of consideration because it is not credible). The effect of such information will remain significant for recipient's attitudes because the fake information prevails in the memory while the source fades away, despite the person's awareness of the nature of the source (Krekó, 2020). The third potential mechanism is motivated reasoning, i.e. the theory that conspiracy beliefs are rooted in a wider set of beliefs and serve as advantages for the ingroup, such as the external attribution of blame, collective self-esteem etc. (Krekó, 2015). In our study, media objectivity clearly correlates negatively with social attitudes and with beliefs that the virus is harmless. It might be argued that media objectivity itself does not directly predict conspiracy beliefs, but its relationship with conspiracy beliefs takes place entirely through attitudes: more authoritarian, religious and conservative individuals systematically follow less objective media. However, conspiracy beliefs are not related to which media they follow, but only to attitudinal dispositions. These assumptions require further research

#### OBJECTIVITY IS WHAT MAKES FAKE NEWS POSSIBLE, ANY HINT OF BIAS OR FACTUAL ERROR MAKE THE MEDIA LOSE CREDIBILITY. THIS ALLOWS PEOPLE TO REJECT NEWS REPORTS AS FABRICATIONS

**Winston 20** (Brian. Brian Winston is a journalist who is the first holder of the Lincoln Professorship at the University of Lincoln, United Kingdom. He was a Pro Vice Chancellor for 2005-2006 and the former dean of Media and Humanities), and Matthew Winston. The roots of fake news: Objecting to objective journalism. Routledge, 2020.

Populism 101 holds that disagreeing with the leader is never an honest difference of opinions. To disagree with the leader, criticise the leader, be anything less than fanatically supportive of the leader, is always an attack on not just the leader, but the nation, deliberately intending it harm. Whether a private citizen, a judge, or a journalist, why else would you do it? But enough about all that. The part of this that matters the most in the context of our argument is that tackling this type of Trumpian notion of fakery (which never includes his own fabrications) with endless cross-checked rebuttals is to address the wrong issue. All the advice currently being offered in the marketplace of ideas on how to sort the news from the dross is never going to be foolproof. Only skepticism in the context of one’s own prior knowledge, or ‘collateral experience’ (to use a phrase of Charles Peirce)24 of the world, will ‘protect’ you from the fake, and even that is obviously far from infallible. The rhetoric (at least) of a fake news/news dichotomy, however, must be noticed as it serves to re-enforce a vision of good and bad media which comforts ‘good’ (all too often simply meaning ‘mainstream’) media. This carries a significant cost: the current focus on the dichotomy masks the news media’s deepest problems, which, as we suggest above, are located in the ideology and practice of journalism itself, rather than in the credulity of those who consume it. Trumpian attacks gain traction because journalism promises what it conspicuously fails to deliver: the more loudly it insists on its truth, the greater the threat to its credibility. Fake news flourishes not so much because of pure lying as because seeking to provide unassailable accounts capturing reality in its entirety, the impossible ideal of the news (as supposedly produced by objective journalism), proves indeed to be exactly that – impossible – and so every visible failure can seem like further evidence that the news is not to be trusted. What is most concerning, then, is not fiction shot through with fact and then labelled as journalism, but the truths, such as they are, of well-intentioned journalism appearing to be tainted, whether by lies or otherwise, while claiming a high standard of objectivity, honesty, accuracy, etc. The news’s truth can be undermined by mendacities but is, far more often, compromised by accidental errors of one kind or another. Moreover, it is inevitably also contaminated, at the very least, by incompleteness and subjectivity. As we have explained, hopefully persuasively, these ingredients can never be entirely excluded from the recipe. However hard it may strive to avoid such impurities, they are always present, meaning that journalism itself is always doomed to be impure. Noticing this cannot amount to a crisis. Nor is it valuable to postulate a straightforward dichotomy between truth and falsehood in looking for fake news’s roots. Doing this only obscures the real nature of the issue which is grounded, as it has been for half a millennium, in journalism’s essential challenges. Against that fake news may be presented as a matter of truth and lies, just as it is presented as being a recent and suddenly all-pervasive phenomenon, but, as we will endeavour to demonstrate, that’s just wrong. Naive. Foolish. Deceptive. Fake News.