## 1

#### zzInterpretation and Violation: The affirmative must defend the desirability of the hypothetical implementation of member nations of the WTO reducing IPP for medicines. This doesn’t entail a specific method of engaging in the topic, just that the affirmative must derive offense from a legal reduction of it. They don’t.

**Resolved denotes a proposal to be enacted by law**

Words and Phrases 1964Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “**to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;**” It is of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is **defined** by Bouvier **as** meaning “**to establish by law**”.

**Vote Neg –**

#### Limits – aff gets to choose literally anything they want, which justifies infinite variations of affirmatives that are impossible for the neg to prep against, ensuring they’ll always be ahead and use competition standards like perms to erase neg ground. Key to fairness since we need to predict arguments to be able to make viable responses. Additionally, cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters – kills inclusion which is a prerequisite to engaging in your method and turns case.

#### Testing – topical debate allows in depth analysis of tangible solutions for real world problems. Abstracting to arbitrary advocacies deteriorates from those skills, making debate meaningless. They turn the debate into a monologue where the negative debater is robbed of opportunities to learn which turns aff solvency to their method since I can’t engage. Advocacy skills controls the internal link to education and outweighs on portability since it is applicable to the real world.

#### Private Actor Fiat –its unpredictable – u can choose a billion actors, organizations, and creates cruel optimism because it’s literally impossible for that kind of action to happen because they don’t have the infrastructure to succeed

#### Fairness is an impact –

#### 1] probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews in this round

#### 2] internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### 3] Jurisdicton – every arg assumes that the judge will eval it fairly conceding authority of fairness – if they contest this hack against them

#### 4] comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. Proves they dont get to weigh case and you should be epistemically suspect of their truth claims.

#### No impact turns or RVIs

#### [1] Perfcon – if T’s bad and you vote for them on that arg, you’re voting on T.

#### [2] Substance – if T’s bad then we should try debating on substance – impact turns force me to go for T since I need to defend my position.

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and so is any brightline they set, and causes a race to the top for the best norm

#### Drop the debater on T –

#### a) indicts the aff advocacy so drop the argument would be dropping the aff anyways,

#### b) deter future abuse and set good norms.

## 2

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all previously read positions before the debate on their NDCA wiki page under their own name with full citations, tags, and first three/last three words 1 hour after the round

#### B. Violation: You disclosed a day later

A screen shot of a computer

Description automatically generated with low confidence

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Tournament rules – Disclosure is required for this tournament, AND in a timely manner – this does not mean disclosing a day later. Tournament rules is a voter – they actively chose to participate in a tournament that they knew had these rules. As a judge, you’re constrained to follow tournament rules.

#### Text, letter Description automatically generated

#### 2. Quality engagement --- Disclosure allows for in-depth prep b4 round which checks back against unpredictable positions and effectively write 1ncs to engage. Not just in context of this round but for all rounds. OW because it’s constitiuve to debate to be able to engage and clash – k2 fairness cuz I need to have prep to have a chance. Also k2 inclusion for novice debaters to have a chance to engage w better debaters and levels the playing field. Disclosing all your affs 45 minutes ago don’t solve because I lost a whole day to prep.

#### Framing: You can’t coopt any of the reasons why procedurals are bad in the context of the affirmative since I don’t constrain your ability to read it– the contention is that this aff should’ve been read, just disclosed.

#### Also, your prep outs argument is nonsense

#### a) prep outs are a 2 way street

#### b) they’re good as per the shell

#### c) being a good debater solves back.

## 3

#### The subject emerges through alienation from the attempt to articulate one’s desires through language, which always has a communicability gap that restricts expression. This creates a constant desire for the lost object and leads to a relation of suffocation that justifies infinite violence – deconstructing this constitutive lack explains and comes before anything else in the round. Thus, the ROB is to traverse the fantasy – that means exposing drives.

McGowan 13 Todd McGowan, 2013, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London, SJBE

The subject as such emerges through the experience of loss. It is the loss of a part of the subject — an initial act of sacrifice — that creates both subject and object, the object emerging through this act as what the subject has lost of itself. The subject takes an interest in the object world because it forms this world around its lost object. As Jacques Lacan notes, “Never, in our concrete experience of analytic theory, do we do without the notion of Obviously, no one literally creates objects through an initial act of sacrifice of an actual body part. This would be too much to ask. But the psychical act of sacrifice allows for a distinction to develop where none existed before and simultaneously directs the subject’s desire toward the object world. In his breakthrough essay “Negation,” Freud describes this process as follows: “The antithesis between subjective and objective does not exist from the first. It only comes into being from the fact that thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there. The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not to find an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to refind such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there.”6 Though Freud doesn’t use terms from linguistics, it is clear that he is making refer- ence to the subject’s alienation in language and that he sees this alienation as the key to the emergence of both the subject and the object. When the subject submits to the imperatives of language, it enters into an indirect relation with the object world. The speaking being does not relate to books, pencils, and paper but to “books,” “pencils,” and “paper.” The signifier intervenes between the subject and the object that the subject perceives. The subject’s alienation into language deprives it of immediate contact with the object world. And yet, in the above passage from “Negation,” Freud conceives of the subject’s entrance into language — its “capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there” — as the event that produces the very distinction between subject and object. This means that the indirectness or mediation introduced by language deprives the subject of a direct relation to the object world that it never had. Prior to its immersion in the mediation of language, the subject had no object at all — not a privileged relation to objects but a complete absence of relationality as such due to its autoeroticism. In this sense, the subject’s willingness to accede to its alienation in language is the first creative act, a sacrifice that produces the objects that the subject cannot directly access. Language is important not for its own sake but because it is the site of our founding sacrifice. We know that the subject has performed this act of sacrifice when we witness the subject functioning as a being of language, but the sacrifice is not an act that the subject takes up on its own. Others always impose the entry into language on the subject. Their exhortations and incentives to speak prompt the emergence of the speaking subject. But the subject’s openness to alienation in language, its willingness to sacrifice a part of itself in order to become a speaking subject, suggests a lack in being itself prior to the entry into language. That is, the act through which the subject cedes the privileged object and becomes a subject coin- cides with language but is irreducible to it. The subject engages in the act of sacrifice because it does not find its initial autoeroticism perfectly sat- isfying — the unity of the autoerotic being is not perfect — and this lack of complete satisfaction produces the opening through which language and society grab onto the subject through its alienating process. If the initial autoerotic state of the human animal were perfectly satisfying, no one would begin to speak, and subjectivity would never form. Speaking as such testifies to an initial wound in our animal being and in being itself. But subjectivity emerges only out of a self-wounding. Even though others encourage the infant to abandon its autoerotic state through a multitude of inducements, the initial loss that constitutes subjectivity is always and neces- sarily self-inflicted. Subjectivity has a fundamentally masochistic form, and it continually repeats the masochistic act that founds it. The act of sacrifice opens the door to the promise of a satisfaction that autoerotic isolation forecloses, which is why the incipient subject abandons the autoerotic state and accedes to the call of sociality. But the term “sacrifice” is misleading insofar as it suggests that the subject has given up a wholeness (with itself or with its parent) that exists prior to being lost. In the act of sacrifice, the incipient subject gives up something that it doesn’t have. The initial loss that founds subjectivity is not at all substan- tial; it is the ceding of nothing. Through this defining gesture, the subject sacrifices its lost object into being. But if the subject cedes nothing, this initial act of sacrifice seems profoundly unnecessary. Why can’t the subject emerge without it? Why is the experience of loss necessary for the subject to constitute itself qua subject? The answer lies in the difference between need and desire. While the needs of the human animal are not dependent on the experience of loss, the subject’s desires are. It is the initial act of sacrifice that gives birth to desire: the subject sacri- fices nothing in order to create a lost object around which it can organize its desire. As Richard Boothby puts it in his unequaled explanation of the psychoanalytic conception of the emergence of desire, “The destruction and loss of the object . . . opens up a symbolic dimension in which what was lost might be recovered in a new form.”7 He adds: “Sacrifice serves to constitute the very matrix of desire. The essential function of sacrifice is less do ut des, I give so that you might give, than do ut desidero: I give in order that I might desire.”8 The subject’s desire is oriented around this lost object, but the object is nothing as a positive entity and only exists insofar as it is lost. This is why one can never attain the lost object or the object that causes one to desire.9 The coming-into-being of this object originates the subject of desire, but, having no substance, the object can never become an empirical object of desire. We may see an object of desire as embodying the lost object, but whenever we obtain this object, we discover its emptiness. The lost object is constitutively rather than empirically lost. Eating Nothing In this light, we can see the anorexic as the model for all desiring subjectivity. Most cultural critics justifiably see anorexia as the product of oppressive definitions of femininity that abound in contemporary society and force women to starve themselves in order to fit the ideals of feminine beauty. According to Naomi Wolf ’s classic popular account in The Beauty Myth, the ideal of thinness became a way of controlling women — disciplining their bodies — after the idea of natural female inferiority began to evanesce.10 The anorexic embodies female victimization: she has internalized a patriarchal ideal and does violence to her own body in order to live up to this ideal. But the problem with this analysis is that the anorexic doesn’t just try to embody the ideal of feminine beauty.11 She goes too far in her pursuit of thinness and comes to inhabit a body far from the ideal. Even when everyone tells her that she no longer looks good, that she is too thin, the anorexic continues to lose weight. It is for this reason that many feminists have seen her as a subversive figure. As Elizabeth Grosz puts it, “Neither a ‘disorder’ of the ego nor, as popular opinion has it, a ‘dieting disease’ gone out of control, anorexia can, like the phantom limb, be a kind of mourning for a pre-Oedipal (i.e., pre-castrated) body and a corporeal connection to the mother that women in patriarchy are required to abandon. Anorexia is a form of protest at the social meaning of the female body.”12 Grosz accounts for the excessiveness of anorexia by aligning it with feminist resistance to patriarchy rather than obsequious submission to it. But she aligns the anorexic with wholeness and the maternal bond rather than with the lost object. In this sense, she misses the true radicality of the anorexic, a radical- ity that stems from the power of the anorexic’s desire. The anorexic doesn’t simply refuse to eat but eats nothing, the nothing that is the lost object. While all positive forms of food fail to address the subject’s lack, nothing does speak to the subject’s desire and allows that desire to sustain itself. The anorexic starves not because she can’t find, in the mode of Kafka’s hunger artist, any food that would satisfy her but because she has found a satisfying food, a food that nourishes the desiring subject rather than the living being. The logic of anorexia lays bare the hidden work- ings of desire that operate within every subject. Subjects believe that they pursue various objects of desire (a new car, a new house, a new romantic partner, and so on) and that these objects have an intrinsic attraction, but the real engine for their desire resides in the nothing that the subject has given up and that every object tries and fails to represent. Objects of desire are desirable only insofar as they attempt to represent the impossible lost object, which is what the anorexic reveals. Still, the anorexic is exceptional; most nonanorexic subjects imagine that their lost object can be found in something rather than nothing. Despite its resonances with the structure of desire, anorexia cannot be dissociated from the imposition of the ideal of thinness as a mode of control- ling female subjectivity. Though this ideal distorts the anorexic’s relationship to her own body, it also renders the nature of desire itself apparent. The impossible ideal of perfect thinness allows the anorexic subject to avow, albeit unconsciously, the structural impossibility of desire itself. Unlike male subjects (or other female subjects who manage to distance themselves from the ideal), the anorexic cannot avoid confronting the impossibility of her object. The oppressive ideal of perfect thinness allows the anorexic to bear witness with her body to the truth of desire.13 Understanding the impossible nature of the lost object — what the anorexic makes clear — allows us to rethink the nature of the political act. Rather than being the successful achievement of some object, the accomplishment of some social good, the political act involves insisting on one’s desire in the face of its impossibility, which is precisely what occurs in the death drive. The key to a politics of the death drive is grasping, in the fashion of the anorexic, the nothingness of the object and thereby finding satisfaction in the drive itself. But the subject’s relationship to its object inherently creates an illusion that makes this possibility almost impossible. Though the lost object that initiates subjectivity has no substance, its status for the subject belies its nothingness. For the subject, the originary lost object is the object that seems to hold the key to the subject’s very ability to enjoy. Subjects invest the lost object with the idea of their own completion: the loss of the object retroactively causes a prior state of comple- tion to arise — a state of completion that never actually existed — and the object itself bears the promise of inaugurating a return to this imaginary prior state.14 In short, it promises to fill in the subject’s lack and answer its desire. As a result of this investment on the part of the subject, the initial lost object becomes the engine for all the subject’s subsequent desiring. Without the initial act of sacrifice, the would-be subject neither desires nor enjoys but instead suffocates in a world of self-presence, a self-presence in which one has no freedom whatsoever. Through the loss of the privileged object, one frees oneself from the complete domination of (parental or social) authority by creating a lack that no authority can fill. Ceding the object is thus the founding act of subjectivity and the first free act. Every subsequent effort by authority to give the subject what it lacks will come up short — or, more correctly, will go too far, because only nothing can fill the gap within the subject. For this reason, dissatisfaction and disappointment are correlative with freedom: when we experience the authority’s failure to give us what we want, at that moment we also experience our distance from the authority and our radical freedom as subjects.

#### Debate is structured by agential fantasy – the affirmative is an investment into subjectivity as a teleological entity dependent on external recognition to satisfy its goals, this investment is ultimately addicting and causes passivity - only saying NO to the affirmative can solve

Lundberg 12 Dr. Christian Lundberg, 2012, “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric,” The University of Alabama Press, Dr. Lundberg is an associate professor and co-director of the University Program in Cultural Studies at UNC, he has a B.A. from the University of Redlands, a Master of Divinity from Emory University, and a Ph.D. in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, sjbe

“Ego,” then,names the economy of compensatory subjectivization driven by the repetition and refusal of demands. The nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfillment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the meta- phor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of develop- ment, must not be fulfilled. Thus, pop psychology observations that the in- cessant demands of children for impermissible objects (“may i have a fourth helping of dessert”) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authori- tative pronouncements (the game of asking never ending “whys”) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity-producing effects of the pa- rental “no.” in “The Question of Lay Analysis,” freud argues that “if . . . demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise . . . [and] . . . the ego begins to function. . . . [T]he driving force that sets the vehicle in mo- tion is derived from the id, the ego . . . undertakes the steering. . . . The task of the ego [is] . . . to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world.”31 Later, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and Civilization and Its Discontents, freud relocates the site of the ego’s genesis beyond the parent/child relationship and in the broader social relationships that animate it. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the indi- vidual’s attempts to fulfill certain desires, since some demands for the fulfill- ment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. The frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes and, by ex- tension, civilization writ large, although it does so at the cost of imposing a contested relationship between desire and social mores.32 Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” under- standing the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan’s theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and constraining political subject position. Lacan’s theory of the demand picks up at freud’s movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the parent/ child and individual/civilization toward a more general account of the sub- ject, sociality, and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoreti- cal movement transposes freud’s comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject’s entry into signification. As already noted, the Lacanian aphorism that “the signifier represents a subject for another signifier inverts the conventional wisdom that a pre-given subject uses language as an instrument to communicate its subjective inten- tions.”33 The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is si- multaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. An Es assumes an identity as a subject as a way of ac- commodating to the Symbolic’s demands and as a node for producing de- mands on its others or of being recognized as a subject.34 As i have already argued, the demand demonstrates that the enjoyment of one’s own subjec- tivity is useless surplus produced in the gap between the Es (or it) and the ideal i. As a result, there is excess jouissance that remains even after its reduc- tion to hegemony. This remainder may even be logically prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the subject and therefore conditions possibility for investment in an identitarian configuration. The site of this excess, where the subject negotiates the terms of a non- relationship with the Symbolic, is also the primary site differentiating need, demand, and desire. need approximates the position of the freudian id, in that it is a precursor to demand. Demand is the filtering of the need through signification, but as Sheridan notes, “there is no adequation between need and demand.”35 The same type of split that inheres in the freudian demand inheres in the Lacanian demand, although in Lacan’s case it is crucial to no- tice that the split does not derive from the empirical impossibility of ful- filling demands as much as it stems from the impossibility of articulating needs to or receiving a satisfactory response from the other. Thus, the speci- ficity of the demand becomes less relevant than the structural fact that de- mand presupposes the ability of the addressee to fulfill the demand.This im- possibility points to the paradoxical nature of demand: the demand is less a way of addressing need to the other than a call for love and recognition by it. “in this way,” writes Lacan, “demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very sat- isfactions that it obtains for need are reduced to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.”36 The other cannot, by definition, ever give this gift: the starting presupposition of the mirror stage is the con- stitutive impossibility of comfortably inhabiting the Symbolic. The struc- tural impossibility of fulfilling demands resonates with the freudian de- mand in that the frustration of demand produces the articulation of desire. Thus, Lacan argues that “desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second.”37 This sentiment animates the crucial Lacanian claim for the impossibility of the other giving a gift that it does not have, namely the gift of love: “all demand implies . . . a request for love. . . . Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need: this margin being that which is opened up by demand, the appeal of which can be unconditional only in regards to the other . . . having no universal satisfaction. . . . it is this whim that introduces the phantom of omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the other in which his demand is installed.”38 This framing of demand reverses the classically liberal presupposition regarding demand and agency. Contemporary and classical liberal democratic theories presume that the demand is a way of exerting agency and, further, that the more firmly the demand is lodged, the greater the production of an agential effect. The Lacanian framing of the demand sees the relationship as exactly the opposite: the more firmly one lodges a demand, the more desperately one clings to the legitimate ability of an institution to fulfill it. Hypothetically, demands ought reach a kind of breaking point where the inability of an in- stitution or order to proffer a response should produce a reevaluation of the economy of demand and desire. in analytic terms, this is the moment of sub- traction, where the manifest content of the demand is stripped away and the desire that underwrites it is laid bare. The result of this “subtraction” is that the subject is in a position to relate to its desire, not as a set of deferrals, avoid- ances, or transposition but rather as an owned political disposition. As Lacan frames it, demanding subjects are either learning to reassert the centrality of their demand or coming to terms with the impotence of the other as a satisfier of demands: “But it is in the dialectic of the demand for love and the test of desire that development is ordered. . . . [T]his test of the desire of the other is decisive not in the sense that the subject learns by it whether or not he has a phallus, but in the sense that he learns that the mother does not have it.”39 The point of this disposition is to bring the subject to a point where they might “recognize and name” their own desire and, as a re- sult, become a political subject in the sense of being able to truly argue for something without being dependent on the other as a support for or orga- nizing principle for political identity. Thus, desire has both a general status and a specific status for each subject. it is not just the mirror that produces the subject and its investments but the desire and sets of proxy objects that cover over this original gap. As Easthope puts it: “Lacan is sure that everyone’s de- sire is somehow different and their own—lack is nevertheless my lack. How can this be if each of us is just lost in language . . . passing through demand into desire, something from the Real, from the individual’s being before lan- guage, is retained as a trace enough to determine that i desire here and there, not anywhere and everywhere. Lacan terms this objet petit a . . . petit a is dif- ferent for everyone; and it can never be in substitutes for it in which i try to refind it.”40 Though individuated, this naming is not about discovering a latently held but hidden interiority, rather it is about naming a practice of thinking the uniqueness of individual subjects as a product of discourses that produce them. Thus, this is an account of political subjectivization that is not solely oriented toward or determined by the locus of the demand but that is also determined by the contingent sets of coping strategies that orient a sub- ject toward others and a political order and serve as the condition of possi- bility for demands.As Lacan argues,this is the point where a subject becomes a kind of new presence or a new political possibility:“That the subject should come to recognize and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognizing something which would be en- tirely given. . . . in naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world.”41 Alternatively, subjects can stay fixated on the demand, but in doing so they forfeit their desire, or as fink argues, “an analysis . . . that . . . does not go far enough in constituting the subject as desire leaves him or her stranded at the level of demand . . . unable to truly desire.”42 A politics defined by and exhausted in demands is by definition a hysterical politics. The hysteric is defined by incessant demands on the other at the ex- pense of ever articulating a desire that is theirs. in the Ethics of Psychoanaly- sis, Lacan argues that the hysteric’s demand that the other produce an object is the support of an aversion toward one’s desire: “the behavior of the hys- teric, for example, has as its aim to recreate a state centered on the object, in- sofar as this object . . . is . . . the support of an aversion.”43 This economy of aversion explains the ambivalent relationship between hysterics and their de- mands. on one hand, the hysteric asserts their agency, even authority, over the other.yet, what appears as unfettered agency from the perspective of a discourse of authority is also simultaneously a surrender of desire by enjoy- ing the act of figuring the other as the one with the exclusive capability to satisfy the demand. Thus, “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the reg- ister of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a relation of address the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an os- tensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the stu- dents’ call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire. Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. if not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impos- sibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straight- forward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hy- pothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoy- ment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria rep- resents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization.

#### They destroy the possibility for politics, ethics, and the value of life, and their defense will prove my point— controls the internal link to all other impacts

Ruti ‘14 (mari, English, Toronto, Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society (2014) 19, 297–314) SJBE, recut from Harvard BoSu

On the other hand, Lacan – again like Marcuse – recognizes that the symbolic order is repressive beyond the demands of subject formation, that it includes forms of violence that exceed the ubiquitous violence of the signifier. Indeed, even the violence of the signifier is not equally distributed, so that some of us are much more vulnerable to its injurious effects than others (consider, for instance, hate speech). Lacan does not necessarily talk about the unequal distribution of resources in the manner Marcuse does, but there is no doubt that his analysis of symbolic law as the Law of the Father elucidates a historically specific, deeply heteropatriarchal and hierarchical organization of social life. In point of fact, one reason I have taken a detour through Marcuse is to illustrate the obvious ways in which Lacan’s portraiture of the symbolic mirrors that of Marcuse’s explicitly historical account: what Marcuse calls “the performance principle,” Lacan calls the “service of goods.” Both thinkers identify the underpinnings of a social order dominated by the ideal of productivity – an ideal that is, moreover, placed in direct opposition to the pleasure principle. Both emphasize that the dominant morality of this symbolic – what Lacan calls “the morality of the master” – measures the merit of lives based on largely pragmatic criteria. And both acknowledge that the model citizen of this symbolic is a subject who shows up at work reliably every morning, performs its duties with a degree of diligence, does not let its desires get the better of its productivity, and seeks satisfaction (“enjoys”) in moderate, socially sanctioned ways. “Part of the world has resolutely turned in the directions of the service of goods,” Lacan writes, “thereby rejecting everything that has to do with the relationship of man to desire” (318). This, he adds, “is what is known as the postrevolutionary perspective” (318). In other words, the service of goods reflects the mindset of the levelheaded utilitarian subject who has deemed revolutionary change to be unrealistic. Lacan is here referring to the kind of depoliticization that is arguably the hallmark of Western subjectivity under capitalism. Lacan’s point is by no means, as critics such as Butler have suggested, that a different kind of symbolic is intrinsically impossible but rather that the configuration of subjectivity that Western modernity has produced – a subjectivity that has been subjected to a particular form of surplus-repression (the performance principle, the service of goods) – makes it virtually impossible for us to entertain the idea that the symbolic could be organized differently, that it could be centered around a different version of the reality principle. As Marcuse remarks, one reason the performance principle is so powerful is that it has managed to convince us that all alternatives to it are either utopian or otherwise unpalatable. Yet, for Marcuse, the fact that this principle has been so successful also points to the possibility of transcending it. As he states, “The very progress of civilization under the performance principle has attained a level of productivity at which the social demands upon instinctual energy to be spent in alienated labor could be considerably reduced. Consequently, the continued repressive organization of the instincts seems to be necessitated less by the ‘struggle for existence’ than by the interest in prolonging this struggle – by the interest in domination” (pp. 129–130). This is to say that there is really nothing besides social power that keeps us invested in the notion that our welfare demands relentless toil. The performance principle has outlived its usefulness in the sense that our collective productivity these days surpasses what is necessary for the provision of food, clothing, housing, and other basic amenities. The fact that these amenities have not yet reached all corners of the world, or even all corners of our own society (the homeless, innercity dwellers, etc.), is a function of domination (the unequal distribution of resources) rather than of any deficiencies of productivity. As a result, in Marcuse’s view, all we would need to do to bring about a more “non-repressive civilization” (p. 134) would be to refuse the parameters of the current symbolic; even something as simple as reducing the length of the working day would immediately realign our priorities, perhaps even impacting the very organization of our psychic lives. Our standard of living might drop somewhat, but we might also learn to assess the value of our lives according to other, less performance-oriented, measurements. Psychoanalysis, particularly Lacanian analysis, does not have a normative goal; it does not seek to tell us how we should desire but merely to explore the idiosyncratic contours of our desire. But this does not change the fact that Lacan, at least as a theorist, was exasperated by people’s inability to make their way out of the maze of the master’s morality, including its performance principle; he was frustrated by individuals who were so out of touch with the truth of their desire that they were willing to sacrifice this desire for the sake of social conformity and that they were, furthermore, willing to do so to the point of self-betrayal. As he explains, “What I call ‘giving ground relative to one’s desire’ is always accompanied in the destiny of the subject by some betrayal – you will observe it in every case and should note its importance. Either the subject betrays his own way, betrays himself, and the result is significant for him, or, more simply, he tolerates the fact that someone with whom he has more or less vowed to do something betrays his hope and doesn’t do for him what their pact entailed” (p. 321). Such a betrayal invariably results in the reassertion of the status quo, sending the subject back to the service of goods, what Lacan in this context calls “the common path” (p. 321). And given that desire, for Lacan, is “the metonymy of our being” (p. 321), betraying it in this way leads to the kind of psychic death that extinguishes the subject’s sense of agency. To use Lacan’s wording, “Doing things in the name of the good, and even more in the name of the good of the other, is something that is far from protecting us not only from guilt but also from all kinds of inner catastrophes” (p. 319). It is precisely such inner catastrophes that Lacanian clinical practice was designed to counter, though it may be Julia Kristeva – rather than Lacan himself – who has most clearly developed this interpretation of analytic work. Kristeva depicts psychoanalysis as a means of restoring the subject’s psychic aliveness, as an explicit revolt against the numbing impact of what she calls “the society of the spectacle” (2002, p. 4). This society of the spectacle – of technology, image, and speed – shares many parallels with Adorno’s “culture industry”: a flattened surface of the life world, a constriction of psychic space, a death of critical thought, the worship of efficiency over intellectual curiosity, and the incapacity to revolt. Against this backdrop, psychoanalysis – along with art, writing, and some forms of religious experience – offers, for Kristeva, a gateway to revolt, a way of resurrecting “the life of the mind” (a phrase Kristeva borrows from Hannah Arendt) through ongoing questioning, interrogation, and psychic recreation. “Freud founded psychoanalysis as an invitation to anamnesis in the goal of a rebirth, that is, a psychical restructuring,” Kristeva writes: “Through a narrative of free association and in the regenerative revolt against the old law (familial taboos, superego, ideals, oedipal or narcissistic limits, etc.) comes the singular autonomy of each, as well as a renewed link with the other” (2002, p. 8). In the context of my overall argument in this essay, it is worth stressing that it is “the desire of the subject” that, in Kristeva’s view, reserves a place “for initiative, autonomy” (2002, p. 11). This is in part because the “Freudian journey into the night of desire was followed by attention to the capacity to think: never one without the other” (2010, p. 41). In other words, the exploration of desire, in psychoanalysis, is akin to the critical (or at least curious) movement of thought – the very movement that Arendt also saw as vital to the life of the mind. This is why psychoanalysis has, Kristeva asserts, “the (unique?) privilege today of accompanying the emergence of new capacities of thinking/representing/thinking, beyond the frequent and increasingly noticeable disasters of psychosomatic space – capacities that are so many new bodies and new lives” (2010, pp. 41–42). Kristeva therefore draws the same link between desire and autonomy (in this instance, the capacity for critical thought) as Lacan does. Furthermore, to translate Kristeva’s point into Marcuse’s terminology, one might say that psychoanalysis, at least the kind of analysis that refuses to uphold social adaptation as a therapeutic goal, presents the possibility of sidestepping, or at the very least diminishing, the effects of surplus-repression. This, in turn, creates space for the truth of the subject’s desire in the Lacanian sense. This does not mean that repression as such is defeated. Quite the contrary, as we will see shortly, the truth of the subject’s desire is inextricable from the primary (constitutive) repression that accompanies subject formation. But as I have already suggested, the lifting of surplus-repression renders the imprint of primary repression more clearly discernable, for when surplus-repression is removed, what remains are the always highly singular outlines of primary repression. And if Lacan – like Marcuse – sought to remove surplus-repression, it was because he understood that it was on the level of primary repression (fundamental fantasies) that one could find the most basic building blocks of the subject’s psychic destiny; primary repression was the layer of psychic life that expressed something essential about the distinctive ways in which the pleasure principle, in the subject’s life, had become bound up with the repetition compulsion. This is why Lacan states, “If analysis has a meaning, desire is nothing other than that which supports an unconscious theme, the very articulation of that which roots us in a particular destiny, and that destiny demands insistently that the debt be paid, and desire keeps coming back, keeps returning, and situates us once again in a given track, the track of something that is specifically our business” (p. 319).According to Lacan, analysis aims to enable us to understand something about the eccentric specificity (or truth) of our most fundamental desire as well as about the track of destiny that this desire carves out for us (and that is therefore “specifically our business”). If it is indeed the case, as I have conceded, that most of us tend to be alienated from our desire, Lacanian analysis strives to undo this alienation by familiarizing us with the truth of this desire. This process entails, among other things, recognizing that the destiny we owe to this desire can never be definitively overcome, that the debt of desire can never be fully redeemed (for how are we to compensate the signifier for having brought us into being as subjects of desire?). Our destiny – which might initially coincide quite seamlessly with our repetition compulsion – consists of recurring efforts to pay off this debt, which is why it keeps ushering us to the same track of desire, the same nexus of psychic conundrums, our unconscious hope being that if we wear out the track of our desire by incessant reiteration, one day we might be able to absolve ourselves of our debt. But since we cannot, the only thing to be done is to “own” our destiny even as we might seek to mitigate its more painful dimensions. That is, the only way to arrive at the kind of psychic rebirth Kristeva is talking about is to take full responsibility for our (unconsciously generated) destiny. In the ethical act, our impulse is to embrace this destiny wholesale regardless of consequences (this is one way to understand what it means to plunge into the jouissance of the real). In analysis, the exploration of our destiny is more gradual, more self-reflexive. But in both cases, the point is not to obliterate our foundational destiny (or fundamental fantasies) but merely to elaborate it in more satisfying directions, away from the incapacitating effects of the repetition compulsion and toward the rewards of subjective autonomy. And, if we are to achieve this goal, nothing is more important than staying faithful to the truth of desire that, on the most elementary level, determines our destiny.

#### Vote negative to embrace the lack – this requires being open to the anxiety that occurs from an encounter with the real of the other and breaks down fantasy and drives.

McGowan 3 Todd McGowan, 2013, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London, SJBE

The alternative — the ethical path that psychoanalysis identifies — demands an embrace of the anxiety that stems from the encounter with the enjoying other. If there is a certain ethical dimension to anxiety, it lies in the rela- tionship that exists between anxiety and enjoyment. Contra Heidegger, the ethics of anxiety does not stem from anxiety’s relation to absence but from its relation to presence — to the overwhelming presence of the other’s enjoyment. In some sense, the encounter with absence or nothing is easier than the encounter with presence. Even though it traumatizes us, absence allows us to constitute ourselves as desiring subjects. Rather than producing anxiety, absence leads the subject out of anxiety into desire. Confronted with the lost object as a structuring absence, the subject is able to embark on the pursuit of the enjoyment embodied by this object, and this pursuit provides the subject with a clear sense of direction and even meaning. This is precisely what the subject lacks when it does not encounter a lack in the symbolic structure. When the subject encounters enjoyment at the point where it should encounter the absence of enjoyment, anxiety overwhelms the subject. In this situation, the subject cannot constitute itself along the path of desire. It lacks the lack — the absence — that would provide the space through which desire could develop. Consequently, this subject confronts the enjoying other and experiences anxiety. Unlike the subject of desire — or the subject of Heideggerean anxiety — the subject who suffers this sort of anxiety actually experiences the other in its real dimension.¶ The real other is the other caught up in its obscene enjoyment, caught up in this enjoyment in a way that intrudes on the subject. There is no safe distance from this enjoyment, and one cannot simply avoid it. There is nowhere in the contemporary world to hide from it. As a result, the contem- porary subject is necessarily a subject haunted by anxiety triggered by the omnipresent enjoyment of the other. And yet, this enjoyment offers us an ethical possibility. As Slavoj Žižek puts it, “It is this excessive and intrusive jouissance that we should learn to tolerate.”27 When we tolerate the other’s “excessive and intrusive jouissance” and when we endure the anxiety that it produces, we acknowledge and sustain the other in its real dimension.¶ Tolerance is the ethical watchword of our epoch. However, the problem with contemporary tolerance is its insistence on tolerating the other only insofar as the other cedes its enjoyment and accepts the prevailing symbolic structure. That is to say, we readily tolerate the other in its symbolic dimen- sion, the other that plays by the rules of our game. This type of tolerance allows the subject to feel good about itself and to sustain its symbolic identity. The problem is that, at the same time, it destroys what is in the other more than the other — the particular way that the other enjoys.¶ It is only the encounter with the other in its real dimension — the encounter that produces anxiety in the subject — that sustains that which defines the other as such. Authentic tolerance tolerates the real other, not simply the other as mediated through a symbolic structure. In this sense, it involves the experience of anxiety on the part of the subject. This is a difficult posi- tion to sustain, as it involves enduring the “whole opaque weight of alien enjoyment on your chest.”The obscene enjoyment of the other bombards the authentically tolerant subject, but this subject does not retreat from the anxiety that this enjoyment produces. If the embrace of the anxiety that accompanies the other’s proximate enjoyment represents the ethical position today, this does not necessarily provide us with an incentive for occupying it. Who wants to be ethical when it involves enduring anxiety rather than finding a way — a drug, a new authority, or something — to alleviate it? What good does it do to sustain oneself in anxiety? In fact, anxiety does the subject no good at all, which is why it offers the subject the possibility of enjoyment. When the subject encounters the other’s enjoyment, this is the form that its own enjoyment takes as well. To endure the anxiety caused by the other’s enjoyment is to experience one’s own simultaneously. As Lacan points out, when it comes to the enjoyment of the other and my own enjoyment, “nothing indicates they are distinct.” Thus, not only is anxiety an ethical position, it is also the key to embracing the experience of enjoyment. To reject the experience of anxiety is to flee one’s own enjoyment.¶ The notion that the other’s enjoyment is also our own enjoyment seems at first glance difficult to accept. Few people enjoy themselves when they hear someone else screaming profanities in the workplace or when they see a couple passionately kissing in public, to take just two examples. In these instances, we tend to recoil at the inappropriateness of the activity rather than enjoy it, and this reaction seems completely justified. The public display of enjoyment violates the social pact with its intrusiveness; it doesn’t let us alone but assaults our senses. It violates the implicit agreement of the public sphere constituted as an enjoyment-free zone. And yet, recoiling from the other’s enjoyment deprives us of our own.¶ How we comport ourselves in relation to the other’s enjoyment indi- cates our relationship to our own. What bothers us about the other — the disturbance that the other’s enjoyment creates in our existence — is our own mode of enjoying. If we did not derive enjoyment from the other’s enjoyment, witnessing it would not bother us psychically. We would sim- ply be indifferent to it and focused on our own concerns. Of course, we might ask an offending car radio listener to turn the radio down so that we wouldn’t have to hear the unwanted music, but we would not experience the mere exhibition of alien enjoyment through the playing of that music as an affront. The very fact that the other’s enjoyment captures our attention demonstrates our intimate — or extimate — relation to it. This relation becomes even clearer when we consider the epistemo- logical status of the enjoying other. Because the real or enjoying other is irreducible to any observable identity, we have no way of knowing whether or not the other really is enjoying. A stream of profanity may be the result of someone hurting a toe. The person playing the car radio too loud while sitting at the traffic light may have simply forgotten to turn down the radio after driving on the highway. Or the person may have difficulty hearing. The couple’s amorous behavior in public may reflect an absence of enjoyment in their relationship that they are trying to hide from both themselves and the public.¶ Considering the enjoyment of the other, we never know whether it is there or not. If we experience it, we do so through the lens of our own fantasy. We fantasize that the person blasting the radio is caught up in the enjoyment of the music to the exclusion of everything else; we fantasize that the public kisses of the couple suggest an enjoyment that has no concern for the outside world. Without the fantasy frame, the enjoying other would never appear within our experience.¶ The role of the fantasy frame for accessing the enjoying other becomes apparent within Fascist ideology. Fascism posits an internal enemy — the figure of the Jew or some analogue — that enjoys illicitly at the expense of the social body as a whole. By attempting to eliminate the enjoying other, Fascism hopes to create a pure social body bereft of any stain of enjoy- ment. This purity would allow for the ultimate enjoyment, but it would be completely licit. This hope for a future society free of any stain is not where Fascism’s true enjoyment lies, however. Fascists experience their own enjoyment through the enjoying other that they persecute. The enjoy- ment that the figure of the Jew embodies is the Fascists’ own enjoyment, though they cannot avow it as their own. More than any other social form, Fascism is founded on the disavowal of enjoyment — the attempt to enjoy while keeping enjoyment at arm’s length. But this effort is not confined to Fascism; it predominates everywhere, because no subjects anywhere can simply feel comfortable with their own mode of enjoying.¶ The very structure of enjoyment is such that we cannot experience it directly: when we experience enjoyment, we don’t have it; it has us. We experience our own enjoyment as an assault coming from the outside that dominates our conscious intentions. This is why we must fantasize our own enjoyment through the enjoying other. Compelled by our enjoyment, we can’t do otherwise; we act against our self-interest and against our own good. Enjoyment overwhelms the subject, even though the subject’s mode of enjoying marks what is most singular about the subject.¶ Even though the encounter with the enjoying other apprehends the real other through the apparatus of fantasy, this encounter is nonetheless genuine and has an ethical status. Unlike the experience of the nonexistent symbolic identity, which closes down the space in which the real other might appear, the fantasized encounter with the enjoying other leaves this space open. By allowing itself to be disturbed by the other on the level of fantasy

## Case

### TL

#### The ROTB & J is to determine whether the post-fiat impacts of the Aff policy are good – otherwise it moots 7 mins of NC offense killing fairness – which o/w – determines engagement for real world solutions and comparing their theory of power to the real world is the only way to pedagogically measure if it is a good idea since our reps are tied to our consequences.

### 1NC- Turns

#### Disasters Turn - Algorithmic data is key to natural disaster response - the alternative is global atrocities

John Karlsrud 14, Senior Research Fellow and Manager of the Training for Peace programme at NUPI, Peacekeeping 4.0: Harnessing the Potential of Big Data, Social Media, and Cyber Technologies, in “Cyberspace and International Relations: Theory, Prospects and Challenges,” https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Hakan\_Mehmetcik/publication/285282612\_A\_New\_Way\_of\_Conducting\_War\_Cyberwar\_Is\_That\_Real/links/5c63f67d45851582c3e47db7/A-New-Way-of-Conducting-War-Cyberwar-Is-That-Real.pdf

Brought together, the data can enable international organizations to follow and possibly prevent evolving situations and crises. This potential has been recognized; and, following the financial crisis, the UN Secretary-General created UN Global Pulse to explore opportunities for using real-time data to gain a more accurate understanding of population wellbeing, especially related to the impacts of global crises. The availability of real-time data holds great promise for helping us detect the early signs of stress on vulnerable populations. It represents an unprecedented opportunity to track the human impacts of crises as they unfold, and to get real-time feedback on how well policy responses are working (UN Global Pulse 2012b). As such, research undertaken by UN Global Pulse, notably though its networks of country-level “Pulse Labs,” may give the UN a better ability to follow, respond to and mitigate the impact of natural disasters and complex crises. However, more than 90 % of the information will be unstructured, potentially rich in useful information. Turning structured and unstructured information into actionable data requires efficient ways of structuring and analyzing the information in real time in a data ecosystem (WEF 2010, p. 4). This process is often called “reality mining” (UN Global Pulse 2012a, p. 18; Eagle and Pentland 2006) or “data mining”—discovering patterns in large data sets (Cheshire 2011; Helbing and Balietti 2012). So, how can the UN and other multilateral actors make use of this data? Cooperation has been initiated with Google and other large corporations that are at the forefront in harvesting actionable data from the “data deluge” (The Economist 2010b). Concurrently with this development, the digital divide is closing at an increasing speed. According to the World Bank, 44.9 out of every 100 people in subSaharan Africa had a mobile subscription in 2010 (World Bank 2012a), and by 2016 this figure will reach 91.3 (Portio Research 2012), although the high number may mask persons have more than one subscription. The percentage of population with access to internet is also increasing (World Bank 2012b). This means that the amount of both structured and unstructured data that can be analyzed and can inform multilateral efforts for conflict prevention and international security is increasing rapidly and can give a more even and realistic picture of the situation in question. However, there is a need to be realistic. There is great variance in the access to data between countries such as Syria and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and many have more than one mobile subscription to strengthen their resilience against patchy networks. Other co-influencing factors are the rapid spread of 3G networks in developing countries and affordable smart phones at prices down to $50 or less (Jidenma 2011). There is also a current global mega-trend of access to the internet through mobile devices: “in a world where there are 6.3 bn mobile users and 2.3 bn internet users, the default access mode to broadband services is mobile” (Ulf Ewaldsson, Ericsson, quoted in ITU 2012a). According to the International Telecommunication Union, “the ubiquitous mobile phone provides an important foundation for the uptake of mobilebased Internet [in the developing world]. With the majority of countries worldwide having launched 3G mobile-broadband services, the prospects are promising” (ITU 2012b, p. 39, Evans 2012). In the areas of conflict prevention, humanitarian action, and development, the UN has made some initial steps. But what then is the situation in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding? Unfortunately, little progress has been made so far. Notwithstanding the inclusion of surveillance drones in one peacekeeping mission, the development of Joint Mission Analysis Cells and Joint Operations Centres (which I will return to in the next section), the use of mobile phones in community alert networks in eastern Congo, and the heightened focus on the strategic planning and coordination capacity of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, much work remains before peacekeeping operations can be said to be tapping the potential of big data, social media, and cyber-technology effectively, entering the age of “Peacekeeping 4.0.” The good part of this story is that much work already has been undertaken in the similar and parallel fields of conflict prevention, humanitarian action and development. Many lessons from these fields could easily be imported, while other innovative approaches can be accessed through increased cooperation and coordination. Accomplishing this will require overcoming various bureaucratic hurdles and turfism, driven by support from engaged member states and the Secretary-General. Finally, the uptake of digital information in the planning of UN peace operations may also have implications for how the interaction between the UN, member states and civil society is theorized. IR theorists have increasingly underscored the importance of civil society actors as potential norm entrepreneurs (Keck and Sikkink 1998), and more recent research looking at the relationship between media and international organizations emphasize the potential role civil society and new technology can play in democratizing the access to information, but also the potential for groups spreading disinformation and incite hatred. This chapter will seek to explore what chances the availability of Big Data and new technologies offer for peacekeeping and as well as inherent challenges. The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I narrow in on some key initiatives in the areas of conflict prevention, humanitarian action, and development that can be relevant to peacekeeping. The following section provides a short background on peacekeeping and its evolution from the end of the Cold War until present, noting some of the steps taken to date. Thirdly, I discuss some of the challenges and opportunities facing policymakers, and relate these to the area of peacekeeping in particular. Finally, the chapter sums up and offers some recommendations for policymakers among member states, in the UN, and among civil society, as well as pointing out areas in need of further research, to enable the UN to enter the era of fourth generation peacekeeping—“Peacekeeping 4.0.” 2 Cyberization of Conflict Prevention, Humanitarian Action, and Development The age of Big Data and social media has dawned on the fields of humanitarian activity, social activism, and development. Here the application of big data and social media has advanced a great deal further than in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, particularly among civil society organizations (CSOs) and other independent actors. One of these initiatives is Ushahidi. Ushahidi is a “web based reporting system that utilizes crowdsourced data to formulate visual map information of a crisis on a real-time basis” (Ushahidi 2012a). Ushahidi, which means “testimony” in Swahili, was originally a website established after the election violence in Kenya in 2008 to map incidents of violence (Ushahidi 2012b). Using crowdsourcing as a method means that everyone with access to common digital communication channels can contribute data.1 The data can be provided via text messages, email, twitter and web-forms. One recent example is Syria Tracker—a website set up to monitor violent incidents involving civilians in Syria: “Syria Tracker is a crowdsourced effort developed by individuals concerned about the harm inflicted upon civilians in Syria” (Syria Tracker 2012). Ushahidi and Syria Tracker are part of a tendency of “how non-state actors are increasingly collaborating online to tackle issues traditionally managed by governments” (Leson 2012). Also in the area of monitoring and evaluation, internet platforms are being established to ease the sharing and coordination of information. One example is the ActivityInfo website established by UNICEF, OCHA, and bedatadriven; it “that helps humanitarian organizations to collect, manage, map and analyze indicators…and allow for real time monitoring of the humanitarian situation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo” (ActivityInfo 2012). Analyzing the use of Google searches or Twitter messages can give strong indications of evolving situations, or whether an epidemic is spreading. Paul and Dredze (2011) found a very strong correlation coefficient (0.958) between tweets and official flu statistics, where the tweets were in real time and the statistics available only afterwards. Analyzing trending topics in Google searches or Facebook and blog posts can also yield significant data (Ginsberg et al. 2009). Google Dengue Trends uses aggregated Google search data to estimate dengue activity (Google 2012a); there is a similar service for influenza (Google 2012b). Following the earthquake in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, researchers from Sweden’s Karolinska Institutet and Columbia University in New York used mobile phone data, tracking 1.9 million SIM cards (Bengtsson et al. 2011, p. 2). They were able to follow the population flows and destinations of 648,717 people who had been displaced (ibid.:3). Later that year, the same team followed population movement after a cholera outbreak (Bengtsson et al. 2010, p. 2). Multilateral actors have started to catch on. The UN Secretary-General has created UN Global Pulse; the World Bank has begun discussing how big data can be used for development (World Bank 2012c), and has established “Mapping for Results” to visualize and track its programs and projects on the ground (World Bank 2012d). However, much remains to be done. In 2009, the UN Global Pulse Initiative launched the Rapid Impact and Vulnerability Analysis Fund (RIVAF). However, a recent report published by the initiative reveals a focus on the use of traditional indicators, and a lack of focus on conflict and post-conflict countries, even though many of the UN agencies, funds, and programs involved in the RIVAF initiative operate in precisely such locations (UN Global Pulse 2011). Further work is necessary in this area, also to focus the energies of developmentoriented organizations to conflict and post-conflict countries and utilize the potential offered by big data, social media, and cyber-technology. The UN has engaged with the Crisis Mappers community since 2010 (UN 2012a, p. 4, Crisis Mappers 2012); among other things, the Standby Task Force has supported OCHA crowdsourcing data for South Sudan, collecting “a total of 1,767 unique rows of data and 15,271 unique pieces of information records” in a mere 3 days (Standby Task Force 2012). At a recent meeting in New York to discuss the status of implementation of the UN’s Crisis Information Strategy, it was agreed that there is a need for Crisis Information Managers, and that the efforts towards convergence in crisis information management could support the “endeavours of ‘One UN’ and better coordination within the UN and the international community in general” (Swiss Mission to the United Nations 2012). A Crisis Management Training Course has since been established, with the first course being given in February 2013 at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya. The course will train civilians, military and police “working in multidimensional peace and humanitarian operations … to integrate new information technology into an information management system [and] demonstrate the opportunities and challenges of new ICTs [Information and Communication Technology] and social media tools…” (ICT4Peace 2012a). The challenge now will be to get the UN onboard and send staff to these courses, providing the organization with staff trained personnel that can enable it to make use of Big Data, ICTs and social media in its operations. The UN in Sudan has taken one step in this direction. With support of the United Kingdom, UNDP has run a Crisis Recovery and Mapping Analysis project since 2007 (UNDP 2012a), aimed at supporting both the UN country team (UNCT) and national authorities in making their activities more evidence-based and conflict-responsive (see also Bott and Young 2012).2 In Georgia, the Caucasus Research Resource Centers and Saferworld have joined forces with developers to produce Elva, combining “the data-rich mapping of Ushahidi with the meticulous requirements of human-rights researchers” (Sifry 2012). The platform is used to create a community safety network where a community representative, using SMS, can report violent or security incidents on a weekly basis. A similar initiative was developed by Columbia University in connection with the Voix des Kivus program in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to “overcome the problems associated with the collection of conflict data” (van der Wind and Humphreys 2012). It involved distributing prepaid cellphones, solar chargers, and code sheets to community representatives in 18 villages in Eastern Congo (ibid.). For both projects, protecting the identity of those reporting against possible reprisals became an important concern (ibid., p. 24; see also Puig 2012). Together with the crisis mapping community, OCHA is experimenting with developing twitter dashboards for humanitarian crises. These use “Machine Learning (ML) techniques and social computing methods… to extract relevant information from twitter and aggregate this information according to Cluster for analytical purposes” (Meier 2012). A similar dashboard for peacekeeping operations “that looks across social media content and perhaps uses corporate data” could be envisaged (Interview with Meier 2012).

#### [Hegemony Turn - The globe is transitioning toward an American-led noosphere now – the aff’s technodiversity creates cultural fragmentation

David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla 18. Independent Analyst, retired analyst for the RAND Corporation. PhD in political science from Stanford University, Faculty at US Naval Postgraduate School, coined the concept of “netwar.” “The Continuing Promise of the Noösphere and Noöpolitik — Twenty Years After.” May 2018. p 20. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259425 or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3259425>

What would a full-fledged noosphere encompass? What ideas, values, and norms — what principles, practices, and rules — should it embody? We presume these would include much that America stands for: openness, freedom, democracy, the rule of law, humane behavior, respect for human rights, a preference for peaceful conflict resolution, etc. — all that the noosphere’s original proponents said should and would be embedded. In addition, a fullfledged noosphere would require an interactive organizational and technological foundation to uphold its ideational essences. However, the world is not yet in the age of the noosphere, but rather in an era of transition that is far from smooth or peaceful. When we first started writing about the noosphere and noopolitik, we figured we were witnessing halting steps forward. Yet it’s the steps backwards that are most evident today, especially in the behavior of some of the world’s most powerful states, as discussed above. No methodology exists for assessing the status of the noosphere from strategic standpoints; nobody has yet seen to that potentially valuable task. But what we can observe is that the noosphere is in terribly fragmented disarray in the very country, the United States, that should be taking the most initiative to uphold and foster it. Much of America’s evolving noosphere has become highly compartmented — broken up into what are called information silos, filter bubbles, and echo chambers, tantamount to volatile micro-climates. Many of these “compartments” and “cultural units” (Teilhard’s terms) are engaged in “ruthless struggle” (Vernadsky’s words), far from being ready for the “fusion” that Teilhard forecast, or to “open up and finally link up their spouts, spreading a layer that covers the Earth” as Le Roy depicted. Indeed, America’s noosphere is presently so fragmented, and many of its “units” are so polarized and tribalized, that it could be said that a war — a culture war — is underway for control of the noosphere. And it reflects the essence of noopolitk, for it is a war that will be decided by whose story wins.

#### [Fragmenting the noosphere cedes noopolitik to Russia

David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla 18. Independent Analyst, retired analyst for the RAND Corporation. PhD in political science from Stanford University, Faculty at US Naval Postgraduate School, coined the concept of “netwar.” “The Continuing Promise of the Noösphere and Noöpolitik — Twenty Years After.” May 2018. p 20. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259425 or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3259425>

Our earlier work warned that, while some state and non-state actors might find noöpolitik attractive, they might care less about the emergence and construction of the noosphere. In the hands of a democratic leader, noöpolitik might then amount to little more than airy, idealistic rhetoric with little or no structural basis; whereas in the hands of a dictator or demagogue, noopolitik could be reduced to manipulative propaganda and perception-management. Narrower versions of noöpolitik might be also attempted for private gain — in the commercial worlds of advertising and public relations, this already occurs when companies field media blitzes and plant testimonials to “spin” public opinion. These were among the risks that may have to be faced, we warned long ago.

Unfortunately, that warning has been borne out, for noopolitik has been largely co-opted by dark actors. Today, despite its promise, noopolitik is not alive and well in the environment in which it should be most thriving: the United States, where now even “soft power” is ailing as a strategic concept. Instead, America’s state and non-state adversaries — notably Russia, and until lately, al Qaeda and ISIS — have developed their own versions of noopolitik, albeit by other names, and they’ve applied it effectively against the United States and its allies and friends. As noted earlier, these new circumstances mean we are now living not only in the worst of times for noopolitik, but also in the most pertinent — and urgent — of times for revisiting the promise of the noosphere and the prospects for noospolitik.

#### [Ensures Russian hybrid war

David Ronfeldt & John Arquilla 18. Independent Analyst, retired analyst for the RAND Corporation. PhD in political science from Stanford University, Faculty at US Naval Postgraduate School, coined the concept of “netwar.” “The Continuing Promise of the Noösphere and Noöpolitik — Twenty Years After.” May 2018. p 20. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259425 or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3259425>

What are these darker forms? They go by many names: cognitive warfare, information warfare, information operations, political warfare, memetic warfare, epistemic warfare, neocortical warfare, perception management, strategic deception, along with such older terms as the war of ideas and the battle for hearts and minds, and newer expressions about weaponized social networks and weaponized narratives. What these terms have in common is that they all represent ways to work on the mind — sometimes for good, other times for ill. By way of contrast, we view noopolitik as a way to work with the mind.

For a while, our non-state adversaries — notably Al Qaeda and ISIS — seemed to have the lead in mastering the arts and techniques of cognitive warfare. But they no longer pose the threats of a few years ago. Now our state adversaries have the lead in using dark varieties of noopolitik against us.

In the case of Russia, this means influence operations that go by names like Active Measures, kompromat, dezinformatsiya, reflexive control, and hybrid warfare. These operations also involve Moscow’s deployment of strategic narratives that extol “Eurasianism” and disparage democracy. Actually, Russian use of political warfare is deeply rooted in Russian history — partly in Grigory Potemkin’s use of deception and disinformation in the late 18th C. to make people think things were better (or different) than they really were, as in the creation of “Potemkin villages”; and also in Ivan Pavlov’s work on reflexive conditioning in the late 19th C., resulting in “Pavlovian conditioning”. To say that Russian strategy has Potemkin-ed and Pavlov-ed many American minds may sound odd, but may well be accurate. (See Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014; Walker & Ludwig, 2017)

#### [That causes Extinction

Farquhar 17, Sebastian, et al. "Existential risk: Diplomacy and governance." Global Priorities Project (2017). (PhD in Computer Science and Machine Learning at University of Oxford)//Elmer

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even **in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia**, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale **is only possible between the US and Russia** who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to **threaten civilisation**. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, **the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia.** Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

, the subject acknowledges the singularity of the real other — its mode of enjoying — without confining this singularity to a prescribed identity.¶ The implications of privileging the encounter with the disturbing enjoy- ment of the real other over the assimilable symbolic identity are themselves disturbing. The tolerant attitude that never allows itself to be jarred by the enjoying other becomes, according to this way of seeing things, further from really encountering the real other than the attitude of hate and mis- trust. The liberal subject who welcomes illegal immigrants as fellow citizens completely shuts down the space for the other in the real. The immigrant as fellow citizen is not the real other. The xenophobic conservative, on the other hand, constructs a fantasy that envisions the illegal immigrant awash in a linguistic and cultural enjoyment that excludes natives. This fantasy, paradoxically, permits an encounter with the real other that liberal tolerance forecloses. Of course, xenophobes retreat from this encounter and from their own enjoyment, but they do have an experience of it that liberals do not. The tolerant liberal is open to the other but eliminates the otherness, while the xenophobic conservative is closed to the other but allows for the otherness. The ethical position thus involves sustaining the liberal’s toler- ance within the conservative’s encounter with the real other.

#### \*\*Tech thought is inevitable – at worst neg on presumption

Kateb, professor of politics – Princeton, ’97 (George, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2267/is_/ai_19952031>)

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity--and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives--would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence. As for our generation and the indefinite future, many of us are prepared to say that there are many things we wish that modern science did not know or is likely to find out and many things we wish that modern technology did not know how to do. When referring in 1955 to the new sciences of life, Heidegger says We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us (1966, p. 52). The implication is that it is less bad for the human status or stature and for the human relation to reality that there be nuclear destruction than that (what we today call) genetic engineering should go from success to success. To such lengths can a mind push itself when it marvels first at the passions, drives, and motives that are implicated in modern technology, and then marvels at the feats of technological prowess. The sense of wonder is entangled with a feeling of horror. We are past even the sublime, as conceptualized under the influence of Milton's imagination of Satan and Hell. It is plain that so much of the spirit of the West is invested in modern technology. We have referred to anger, alienation, resentment. But that cannot be the whole story. Other considerations we can mention include the following: a taste for virtuosity, skill for its own sake, an enlarged fascination with technique in itself, and, along with these, an aesthetic craving to make matter or nature beautiful or more beautiful; and then, too, sheer exhilaration, a questing, adventurous spirit that is reckless, heedless of danger, finding in obstacles opportunities for self-overcoming, for daring, for the very sort of daring that Heidegger praises so eloquently when in 1935 he discusses the Greek world in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1961, esp. pp. 123-39). All these considerations move away from anger, anxiety, resentment, and so on. The truth of the matter, I think, is that the project of modern technology, just like that of modern science, must attract a turbulence of response. The very passions and drives and motives that look almost villainous or hypermasculine simultaneously look like marks of the highest human aspiration, or, at the least, are not to be cut loose from the highest human aspiration.

#### \*\*Tech is good and inevitable – you’re biased toward pessimism which disproves their thesis. Rejecting engagement makes it worse

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Many are understandably pessimistic about platforms and technology. This year has been a tough one, from Cambridge Analytica and Russian trolls to the implementation of GDPR and data breaches galore.

Those who think about the world, about the problems that we see every day, and about their own place in it, will quickly realize the immense frailty of humankind. Fear and worry makes sense. We are flawed, each one of us. And technology only seems to exacerbate those problems.

But life is getting better. Poverty continues nose-diving; adult literacy is at an all-time high; people around the world are living longer, living in democracies, and are better educated than at any other time in history. Meanwhile, the digital revolution has resulted in a glut of informational abundance, helping to correct the informational asymmetries that have long plagued humankind. The problem we now face is not how to address informational constraints, but how to provide the means for people to sort through and make sense of this abundant trove of data. These macro trends don’t make headlines. Psychologists know that people love to read negative articles. Our brains are wired for pessimism.