#### 1] Aff resolves the net benefit and advocacy turns it - peace journalism needs objectivity to maintain credibility and avoid becoming propaganda

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In conclusion, it can be maintained that there are definite chances for the practical implementation of the peace journalistic program, and it can make an urgently needed contribution to assuring the quality of conflict and crisis journalism. That in the foreseeable future peace journalism will remain in a minority position need not represent an obstacle. Even from this position it can contribute to structuring media discourse on conflicts in a more transparent and balanced way and to protecting conflict coverage from the fateful propaganda traps into which traditional war reporting seems to be continually falling (Jaeger, 2002). As preconditions for this I see only two things: First, there is a need for a further intensification of basic peace journalistic research and the critical examination of so many myths which journalism shares with media studies. News factors and public preferences are, for one thing, two different things which must be kept separate; good journalism is not a description of the current state of conflict coverage, but is, in contrast, only practiced by relatively few journalists, and the professional norms and tools of journalism are, of course, indispensable, but not sufficient to ensure good journalism. Second, however, **caution is imperative, so that the critique of the journalistic mainstream does not throw the baby out with the bath-water. Thus it is not only appropriate, but also urgently necessary to question the conventional journalistic understanding of objectivity (see McGoldrick, 2006), to free it of its inadequacies and constructively further develop it. To radically turn away from the call for objectivity, as suggested by Lynch & McGoldrick (2005) or Hackett (2006), not only endangers the acceptance of the peace journalistic project in the journalistic community, however, but also twists peace journalism into a form of advocacy journalism, which leads directly to PR and propaganda and can squander the trust bonus which its recipients grant to peace journalism.**

#### 2] Lack of objectivity in favor of advocacy leads to war reporting – propaganda can increase public support for wars making us more prone to conflict.

Ryan and Switzer, Professors explain in ‘09 [Michael Ryan, educator at the School of Communication at the University of Houston, and Les Switzer, professor in the School of Communication, adjunct professor in the Department of History, and co-director of the Center for Critical Cultural Studies at the University of Houston, 2009, “Propaganda and the subversion of objectivity: media coverage of the war on terrorism in Iraq,” Taylor and Francis, https://sci-hub.se/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539150902752721?journalCode=rter20]/Kankee

More than 2400 terrorist actions against American citizens and interests were recorded from 1983 to 1998. In almost every case, the preferred counterterrorism response was law enforcement. The government used military force in response to only three incidents – the bombings by bin Laden’s followers of two US embassies in East Africa in 1998; the attempt by Iraq to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush in Kuwait in 1993; and the bombing by Libya of a West German discotheque in 1986 (Malvesti 2001). The US news media played a critical role in selling the invasion of Iraq to the American public as an appropriate response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We argue that (1) traditional principles of objectivity are incompatible with the dissemination of propaganda from any source; that (2) the media failed to employ principles of objectivity in covering the build-up to war; and that (3) the media endorsed the Bush administration’s exploitation of propaganda techniques to rally public support for war. The media generally have not acknowledged this failure in professional ethics – even as some isolated, though influential, media now do acknowledge lapses in judgement in covering news about Iraq. We offer a few suggestions about what journalists could have done differently. The framers of the US Constitution singled out the press for special protection under the First Amendment because they believed unfettered information and commentary were integral to a healthy democracy. The American people should reasonably expect nothing less than the press’s best efforts to provide accurate and complete news and commentary in the service of a burgeoning democratic state. Clearly, this means the press must challenge and not legitimise state propaganda. For its part, the press has a moral covenant with the people to do its very best to keep them informed, from stories about Little League baseball games to stories about war and peace. As international communication scholar Majid Tehranian puts it, ‘Without free and vigorous debate among competing views, no nation can achieve the level of integrated unity and determination necessary for democratic societies to act on public issues’ (Tehranian 2002, p. 79). It may seem naïve to suggest that the media have a moral covenant with the people – given the media’s poor coverage of the Bush administration, the war in Iraq and other issues – but we argue that the American people must expect more of the press and we propose a reasonable ethical standard by which the media can be judged. Journalists must decide which of an infinite number of events and issues are important for an audience to know about, and they must describe (or reconstruct) each event or issue as accurately, clearly and completely as possible. Ethical journalists can accomplish these goals when they use a strategy embodied in the principles of objective journalism. Examples of stories by journalists who use an objective approach may be found – in the past and even in contemporary news coverage of the war on terrorism in Iraq – in newspapers like The Christian Science Monitor and The New York Times, and in network television newscasts by people like Tim Russert and Tom Brokaw, but they are rare. Warren Strobel, Jonathan Landay and John Walcott, for instance, wrote a story refuting the Bush administration’s claim that Saddam Hussein had purchased special aluminium tubes for centrifuges to enrich uranium, possibly for nuclear weapons (Strobel et al. 2002). The Knight Ridder trio challenged the administration sources, and much of the media’s coverage, by reporting new evidence from different sources showing the administration’s story was false. Objectivity in news and commentary Many critical scholars believe that objective journalism has been misused and/or abused by journalists to such an extent that it is no longer relevant when discussing how the media might better portray the world to their audiences. We do not agree. An objective approach must be rehabilitated in an ongoing effort to re-establish and re-impose ethical standards for today’s journalists. We recognise that many journalists assume they merely mirror or reflect the news and do not play a major role in representing these realities to their readers, listeners or viewers. We also recognise that objectivity – which often is framed inadequately as merely giving equal time or space to (only) two sides of an issue – is the traditional strategy journalists claim they employ in this quest for truth. We argue for an alternative perspective. First, as journalists we can never be benign or neutral observers, because there is no fixed meaning in the world we are writing about to re-present. Second, as journalists we have essentially abandoned the largely unwritten standards that comprised the foundation of an objective approach to news reporting and writing. A news event or issue cannot be separated from its mediated image. While the media may reflect our world, the act of mediation itself is constitutive of the world that the media reflect. The journalist’s voice is always present in any given news report, and in this way the journalist represents the world of news to the news audience. Even a journalist covering a Little League baseball game may have strong feelings because he or she was a star or a dud or never played. These feelings may colour that journalist’s stories about Little League, just as a religious background may colour a journalist’s stories about the use of foetal stem cells in medical research. We do not argue that individuals can always control these feelings, for they cannot. But we do argue that an objective approach helps journalists and others produce more accurate, complete and impartial representations of reality. The movement toward objectivity began in the Enlightenment and gained momentum as scientists began to unravel the mysteries of the natural world. Galileo and Copernicus, for example, showed that the Earth circled the Sun and was not the centre of the Universe. Georges-Louis Buffon and James Hutton demonstrated that the Earth was considerably older than the few thousand years implied by The Bible, and Charles Darwin, of course, popularised the notion of evolution by natural selection. Journalism – which was jingoistic, mean, partisan and politicised in early America – began to change in the late 1830s as the penny press made news available to the masses, and editors and writers sought new ways to conceive and package news in their quests for new readers and advertisers. As the scientific method became the dominant narrative in communicating knowledge, more and more journalists began to incorporate the scientific perspective, and to emphasise factual information, in their own work (Mindich 1998).Many journalists began seeking increased power and prestige by defining journalism as a profession and by aligning journalism with a less partisan and more objective approach. This approach was seen as a way to increase profits, and an objective strategy helped drive journalistic practices with the emergence of a mass, popular press beginning in the 1880s and the 1890s (Streckfuss 1990, p. 973). Objectivity was not viewed as a way to guarantee neutrality, but as a way to compensate for the human inability to be objective (Ryan 2006). As early as 1867, Haney & Co., Publishers, produced for literary and newspaper writers a book describing principles that were later seen as fundamental to an objective approach. Newspapers that strive to be profitable must not reflect political or other interests; they must report news, not opinions (Haney’s Guide to Authorship 1867, p. 85). Further, when a newspaper writer quotes an authority, he (sources and writers typically were men) must ‘do so fairly, and copiously enough to do him justice’ (p. 44). When reporting public records, a writer ‘should chronicle the facts, but not give opinions’, and when covering meetings, a writer should report ‘fairly and honestly as a matter of news, giving his personal views in another portion of his paper’ (p. 92). A more formal definition of an objective approach to journalism in America was proposed by journalism professor Charles G. Ross: News writing is objective to the last degree. . . . The viewpoint of the news writer must be that of the unprejudiced, but alert, observer. He must approach his story with a mind open to the facts and he must record the facts unvarnished by his own preferences and opinions. (Ross 1911, pp. 17–18, 20) The meaning of objectivity was refined as journalism practice matured and journalism training evolved during much of the 20th century. Journalism ‘played a significant role in the secularisation of American public life’, as sociologist Richard Flory notes, ‘by spreading ideas adopted from other institutional spheres of knowledge-production to the general public [and by offering] a modern, scientific perspective, appropriate to the age’ (Flory 2003, p. 397). This perspective, media ethicist Stephen Ward observes, ‘can be the practices of common sense or the technical methods of scientific research’ (Ward 2004, p. 17). The overarching goal of one who uses an objective approach is to describe those realities deemed to be newsworthy as accurately as possible. The philosophical underpinnings for objectivity are clarity, accuracy and completeness in identifying, gathering and reporting information; willingness to find and consider new evidence and alternative explanations; scepticism toward authority, the powerful and the self-righteous; initiative in finding answers and solutions and ways to expose lies and deception; impartiality, fairness and disinterest in reporting; refusal to serve any political, social, religious, cultural or scientific agenda; imagination, creativity and logical consistency; honesty about personal preferences and idiosyncrasies; communality in sharing findings; and verification of findings in subsequent reports. None of this excludes analysis and interpretation in information collection and writing, as some critics charge. Early admonitions to ‘keep your own opinion out of your stories’ referred to personal opinion unsupported by evidence. They did not refer to evidencebased analysis and interpretation that could be used to guide story selection, information collection, reporting, writing and editing. The standards of an objective approach apply to commentary as well as to news. This does not mean commentary must not contain opinion. It does mean those opinions must be clearly labelled and well supported by evidence gathered using the techniques of an objective approach. The opinions expressed certainly should not be based on faulty or incomplete information that could ultimately lead to poor decision-making (Ryan 2001, 2006). Ethical journalists honour the principles of objectivity – whether they call it pragmatic objectivity, epistemological objectivity, good journalism or something else – because their output will be transparent, rational, coherent, logical and factual. The approach requires a journalist, or anyone else, to follow the evidence to reasonable conclusions. ‘Objectivity is part of our culture’s attempt to say what knowledge is and how to pursue truth in the many domains of inquiry’, Stephen Ward (2004) argues. ‘Objectivity, properly understood, is a bulwark against authoritarianism in belief and practice. It is a defense against an obscurantism that allows the clever to manipulate the naïve or vulnerable’ (p. 318). The focus of media ethics typically has been on the individual journalist, but that focus is too narrow when the individual must function within an organisation buffeted by all kinds of pressures from government, advertisers, peers and the community. In many cases, the interests and concerns of the media corporation itself may place undue burdens on journalists who work in this environment. Nevertheless, these pressures do not abrogate ‘the ethical imperative of journalism to maintain its standards’, as Ward (2004) notes. ‘Awash in media, the public needs a core of objective news reporting. It needs quality news organizations that serve as islands of credible, verified reporting in a sea of bias and opinion’ (p. 325). Propaganda strategies and the run-up to war The use of propaganda techniques is not consistent with a journalism that is defined by an objective approach to news. Journalists who use an objective approach seek to construct reality as accurately as they can, while those who use propaganda – as defined by communication ethicist Elspeth Tilley (Tilley 2005) – typically seek to bend reality to their own purposes. Tilley, who refined a propaganda index through analysis of the Australian government’s terror information package, defines propaganda as: communication that uses a specific set of rhetorical devices and cognitive heuristics to make claims or assertions, and to generalize (often unstated) broader assumptions from those claims, without providing evidence. [Labelling], particularly once it has become widely accepted as having a certain meaning and connotation, means evidence is not presented and examined on each occasion, but taken as ‘read’. (p. 70) Ethical communicators, especially in times of crisis, use ‘pluralist, evidence-based communication styles that offer data, research, history, context, and point readers to verifiable sources of information’ (Tilley 2005, p. 70). Propagandists typically serve someone’s narrow agenda, make claims that are not evidence-based, spread lies and deception, supply incomplete or misleading information, serve authority figures, and deny or hide their own interests and prejudices. Journalists who are committed to an objective approach do none of these things. We argue that America’s news media **endorsed** propaganda devices used by the Bush administration to generate public approval for invading Iraq. The focus is on propaganda devices that constitute Tilley’s propaganda index. The categories are described as bandwagon, glittering generality, transfer positive (positive qualities of something transfer to something else), transfer negative (negative qualities of something transfer to something else), name-calling, manifest destiny and plain folks. We report the results of several studies of media coverage of the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, but our primary focus is on our own study of editorials published in the ten largest US daily newspapers, which we searched for these propaganda devices:1 The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, Daily News (New York), Chicago Tribune, Newsday, Houston Chronicle and The Dallas Morning News. 2 The focus is on the 27 days preceding the invasion – 22 February–20 March 2003. Ninety-one editorials related to the invasion. Results were broken down into two time periods, 22 February–6 March and 7 March–20 March. The dividing point is 7 March, when Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, reported that Iraq, though increasingly cooperative, was not in full compliance with UN mandates. The question was whether this news was reflected in the editorials and whether more or fewer propaganda devices were used as war approached (Ryan and Switzer 2008). These newspapers and other media used six of Tilley’s seven propaganda devices, according to our research and other studies. Only the plain-folks technique seems to be missing from the propaganda armoury. Propaganda strategy 1: getting on the bandwagon The news media clearly supported the Bush administration’s effort to create a bandwagon effect (Table 1) – defined as an attempt to show that ‘everyone, most people, many people or any large collectivized group of people such as our school, our company, or our neighborhood thinks a particular, singular, and uniform way’ – to make it appear that all patriotic Americans supported the proposed invasion (Tilley 2005, p. 72). Part of this effort was the attempt to create the perception that there were only two options regarding Iraq, ‘use military force’ or ‘do nothing’ (defined as anything short of an invasion). Since few journalists or commentators seemed prepared to argue that the United States should do nothing, the bandwagon favouring a military option rolled freely from the beginning. Editorials in the ten largest US newspapers helped move the war wagon along. Seventy-nine editorials (and all ten newspapers) simply assumed Iraq would be invaded, as shown in Table 1, with more making that assumption in Period 2 (following the Blix report) than in Period 1. Forty-eight editorials (in seven newspapers) supported military intervention. Seven newspapers backed the war editorially: The Wall Street Journal, Newsday, The Dallas Morning News, USA Today, Daily News (New York), Chicago Tribune and The Washington Post. Three did not call for war, but they did not oppose it either: The New York Times, Los Angeles Times and Houston Chronicle. Not a single editorial attempted to slow the bandwagon by opposing military intervention; only five editorials counselled sacrifice by the public and only seven suggested caution. Ten of these twelve editorials were published only after it was clear the United States would invade Iraq. The bandwagon effect was supported by editorial writers who said urgent action was required – even after 7 March 2003. The newspapers frequently posed the question, repeated incessantly by Bush and other war advocates: How much time does this evil man need? Their frustration was captured in the president’s statement, ‘[H]ow much time do we need to see clearly that he’s not disarming? As I said, this looks like a rerun of a bad movie and I’m not interested in watching it’ (International Information Programs 2003). Most agreed with USA Today: Pretending that more time would prompt Hussein’s cooperation or conjure up a strong-willed international community ignores 12 years of history. It also perpetuates the kind of wishful thinking that got the world where it now stands.3 (USA Today 2003, p. 14a) Few in the media seemed to notice that Hussein was complying with UN directives or that Bush kept raising the bar for peace – first that Hussein must allow weapons inspectors, then that he must allow them in his palaces, then that he must list his weapons and ‘be cooperative’ and finally that Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq. A few editorial writers suggested that the embargo against Iraq, weapons inspections and diplomatic efforts were working, but most ultimately agreed with the president that ‘doing nothing’ was not an option. In this binary world, **war was the only option**. The bandwagon effect also was supported in other publications. Photographs of troops and military hardware published in news magazines before the invasion created an image of a determined, powerful nation ready for war: The analysis suggests that newsmagazine photographs primarily serve established narrative themes within official discourse: that published photographs most often offer prompts for prevailing government versions of events and rarely contribute independent, new or unique visual information. (Griffin 2004, p. 381) Photographs of human suffering, property damage and American casualties were accessible to viewers of news media like Al Jazeera, the Arab television and Internet network. Al Jazeera did show images of innocent civilian casualties, who were called martyrs, and of American and coalition war prisoners and casualties, who often were called invaders. American media outlets might have used such images – had they not self-censored themselves by stereotyping Al Jazeera and the Arab media in general as a propaganda tool of the terrorists – and framed them as part of a more comprehensive and accurate depiction of war. Military strikes were assumed from the start to be part of the US response. ‘The New York Times,’ for example, ‘constructed and celebrated heroes and bolstered leaders as they responded to the crisis. It **mobilized** for war and warned of a foreboding future, of suffering and sacrifice to come’ (Lule 2002, p. 286). The words ‘war’ and ‘terrorism’ were linked, and they constituted a mantra in network television’s pre-invasion coverage: ABC News broadcast eighty-six stories that contained the terms ‘war’ and ‘terrorism,’ CBS News aired ninety-six such segments, NBC News broadcast 133, CNN televised 316, and National Public Radio aired 166. The US print press available in the Lexis-Nexis archive published a total of 5,814 articles that mentioned the two terms. (Nacos 2002, p. 146) The New York Times, The Washington Post, and other individuals and media outlets – in unprecedented fashion – eventually acknowledged their coverage was flawed. Editors at The New York Times, for instance, ‘found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have been. . . . Looking back, we wish we had been more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence emerged – or failed to emerge’ (From the Editors 2004, p. 10a). The New York Times and The Washington Post acknowledged that reporters relied too heavily on sources who had vested interests in war or who had no knowledge of what was happening in Iraq. ‘Complicating matters for journalists,’ according to The New York Times, ‘the accounts of these exiles were often eagerly confirmed by United States officials convinced of the need to intervene in Iraq.’ Assertions by war advocates were unchallenged – or contradictory information was buried. Official claims got prominent play, ‘while follow-up articles that called the original ones into question were sometimes buried. In some cases, there was no follow-up at all’ (From the Editors 2004). Patrick E. Tyler’s story of 6 February 2003, according to Daniel Okrent, The New York Times’ public editor, ‘all but declared a direct link between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’. The link would never be confirmed because there was no link. ‘Other stories pushed Pentagon assertions so aggressively you could almost sense epaulets sprouting on the shoulders of editors’ (Okrent 2004, Week in Review, 2). The bandwagon rolled on. The Washington Post also gave favoured treatment to pro-war news, according to staff writer Howard Kurtz: ‘Some reporters who were lobbying for greater prominence for stories that questioned the administration’s evidence complained to senior editors who, in the view of those reporters, were unenthusiastic about such pieces.’ Pentagon correspondent Thomas Ricks noted: ‘There was an attitude among editors: Look, we’re going to war, why do we even worry about all this contrary stuff ?’ (Kurtz 2004, p. 20a). Jessica Yellin, former White House correspondent for MSNBC, said in May 2008: ‘The press corps was under enormous pressure from corporate executives, frankly, to make sure that this was a war that was presented in a way that was consistent with the patriotic fever in the nation and the president’s high approval ratings.’ As Bush’s approval ratings went up, so did pressure from news executives to produce positive stories about Bush. Yellin said: ‘They would edit my pieces, they would push me in different directions, they would turn down stories that were more critical and try to put on pieces that were more positive.’4 There were isolated instances in which journalists reported evidence and made arguments that might have slowed the bandwagon. One example was The New York Times’ response to the 7 March report of Blix: ‘[T]he report of the inspectors on Friday was generally devastating to the American position. They not only argued that progress was being made, they also discounted the idea that Iraq was actively attempting to manufacture nuclear weapons’ (The New York Times 2003, p. 12). Most responses were like that of the Daily News (New York), however, which said the report contained ‘even more excuses’ (Daily News (New York) 2003a, p. 24). Propaganda strategy 2: the glittering generality Glittering generalities are words and phrases that support a position without evidence (Table 1). These include: positive-sounding euphemisms (e.g., collateral damage and friendly fire for civilian or owntroop deaths . . .); broadly affirmative unverifiable adjectives (e.g., state-of-the-art, hightech); . . . vagaries (e.g., significantly increasing or highly trained, where the level of increase or training is not defined); subjective adjectives or adverbs (beautiful, stunning) which give positive effect without evidence. (Tilley 2005, p. 72) All were used by the media in the run-up to the war in Iraq. Sixty-three editorials published by the ten largest US newspapers we studied, for example, cited destroying Hussein’s unconventional weapons as a main reason for war, as shown in Table 1. But there was no credible evidence that he had such weapons or that he could deliver them against the United States or its allies. No editorial in any newspaper questioned whether Hussein had weapons of mass destruction – all assumed he did. Other reasons cited in support of the invasion included: to change the regime, 21; Saddam is ‘bad,’ twelve; to bring freedom to the Iraqis, eleven; to make the world safer, ten; to defend the country, eight; and to combat terrorism, six. The two reasons that resonated particularly well with many Americans, especially conservative Christians, were that Saddam is evil and must go and that America must fight to bring freedom to Iraq (Ryan and Switzer 2008). All of these are empty euphemisms that had little empirical support before the invasion, but they ultimately began to appear to be – and to be portrayed in the media as – hard evidence supporting an invasion. In fact, the Bush administration manufactured and cherry-picked evidence supporting the invasion. A glaring example was former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations when he sought approval for a resolution authorising military action against Iraq. Powell promised to show in his UN speech on 5 February 2003 that Hussein was secretly trying to produce weapons of mass destruction: We know that Saddam’s son, Qusay, ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam’s numerous palace complexes. We know that Iraqi government officials, members of the ruling Baath Party and scientists have hidden prohibited items in their homes. Other key files from military and scientific establishments have been placed in cars that are being driven around the countryside by Iraqi intelligence agents to avoid detection. (US Secretary of State Colin Powell addresses the UN Security Council 2003) Powell presented photographs purporting to show that components of weapons of mass destruction were being moved; he maintained Iraq had failed to account for all weapons of mass destruction amassed in the 1990s; he said Iraq had mobile facilities for making biological weapons; he cited the purchase by Iraq of aluminium tubes to construct centrifuges used to enrich uranium; and he claimed Iraq had helped Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda acquire gases and poisons. These were all positive statements supporting an invasion, but they were mostly false or misleading. A compliant media deemed the speech a success. Powell, USA Today asserted in its news columns, ‘forcefully laid out newly declassified evidence of Iraq’s efforts to develop and conceal chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, as well as new signs that an al-Qaeda terrorist cell was set up in Baghdad last year’ (Nichols 2003, p. 1a). The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette claimed in an editorial that Powell’s speech ‘was far more powerful than anyone had predicted’ and that ‘Powell did produce the proverbial “smoking gun”’ (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 2003, p. 1b). Propaganda strategy 3: transferring positive qualities The media clearly used the transfer positive technique (Table 2) – the ‘process of association whereby the “good” of one thing rubs off onto something else’ (Tilley 2005, p. 72). They praised and made heroes of Western leaders, victims, survivors and rescue workers. ‘This shift of focus [in the days immediately following 11 September 2001] from victims to heroes helped to effect a transition from death to life, and it coincided with the rhetorical shift from shock to sorrow to patriotism’ (Kitch 2003, p. 219). Political and military leaders were portrayed as heroes – to their benefit. ‘The construction of political leaders as heroes . . . can legitimize the actions of those leaders and buttress their authority at critical times. The [New York] Times’ portrayal of President Bush as “a leader whom the nation could follow” offered implicit (and politically important) support for the administration’s response to September 11’ (Lule 2002, p. 284). President Bush elevated his own status by: attacking the ‘evil’ of the terrorists, using the word five times in his first statement on the September 11 terror assaults, and repeatedly portraying the conflict as a war between good and evil in which the United States was going to ‘eradicate evil from the world’ and ‘smoke out and pursue . . . evil doers, those barbaric people’. (Kellner 2002, p. 144) The media also used the transfer positive device by relying on spokespersons like former Secretary of State Colin Powell and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as shown in Table 2. In addition, they relied on a host of military analysts who often agreed with the administration’s militaristic worldview and who would benefit financially from a war in Iraq. The paid analysts ‘often got more airtime than network reporters, and they were not merely explaining the capabilities of Apache helicopters. They were framing how viewers ought to interpret events’ (Barstow 2008, p. 1a). Two of the analysts were Barry R. McCaffrey and Wayne A. Downing, who worked for NBC. They were members of an advisory board for the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, ‘an advocacy group created with White House encouragement in 2002 to help make the case for ousting Saddam Hussein. Both men also had their own consulting firms and sat on the boards of major military contractors’ (Barstow 2008, p. 1a). Two problems, however, did arise during the run-up to war. First, Bush’s heroic image had tarnished somewhat by the time it became obvious the United States would invade Iraq (roughly a month before the invasion) and, second, several major religious denominations expressed opposition to the proposed war. These difficulties had to be dealt with if the selling of the invasion were to succeed. Editorials in the ten largest newspapers employed two strategies. First, they seized on former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as the hero in hopes that his ‘positive outlook’ would rub off onto the war effort. Blair, like other members of the coalition of the willing, was lauded for standing his ground in the face of considerable political opposition at home. Second, editorials began to distinguish between Bush’s efforts to get international support for the war, which they said fell short, from the idea of war. Negative descriptors of Bush were far more common after 6 March 2003, when Bush was trying, and largely failing, to rally international support and to secure a new UN resolution, particularly in newspapers that did not call for an invasion: The New York Times, Los Angeles Times and Houston Chronicle. Bush was described in the editorials as confused, unfocused, cavalier, high-handed, disingenuous, reckless, wrongheaded, inflexible and too hasty. The main substantive concerns were that Bush’s diplomatic efforts were clumsy and ineffective, 14; that he did not explain clearly the costs and risks of war, 13; that he did not make the reasons for war clear, nine; that he dismissed critics’ concerns about the war, eight; and that he alienated allies, six. This excerpt from the Los Angeles Times is typical: But Bush and his advisors also bear much responsibility for the impasse that threatens to wreck the system of collective security that emerged out of World War II. Bush’s disregard for international treaties and his heavy-handed diplomacy have infuriated America’s allies, turning friends into foes. (Los Angeles Times 2003a, p. 14b) Most newspaper editorials, because of larger concerns, tended to ignore or to explain away Bush’s mistakes and inconsistencies. Newsday, which supported the war, wrote: ‘Whatever diplomatic mistakes and political missteps he made in getting there, Bush has taken a stand on Iraq from which he cannot back off without damaging his office and the credibility of the nation itself’ (Newsday 2003, pp. 25a, 26a). The opposition to the invasion expressed by many Christian denominations and individuals was more problematic. Many moderate and progressive Christians, as well as many conservative evangelicals, were uncomfortable with a war of choice, or what Bush and the news media called a ‘preemptive’ war – one in which the United States, acting in self-defence, would respond militarily to a proven threat (weapons of mass destruction). Many Americans, Christians and non-Christians, recognised that Bush was really proposing a ‘preventive’ war in which the United States, acting as an aggressor, would launch military strikes against a sovereign nation that might pose an unspecified threat at some unspecified time in the future (Dean 2004, pp. 132–136). But a preventive war would not satisfy the criteria set by Christians like Saint Augustine as early as the 5th century – it was not a just war.5 Many religious leaders refused to endorse a preventive war in Iraq, even though many members of their congregations did. Bob Edgar, head of the National Council of Churches, noted: ‘While we may have been silent then [before the war in Afghanistan], we certainly don’t think the way to get rid of terrorism is to bomb every government. Even bad governments’ (Gibson 2002, p. 6 opinion). The US Conference of Catholic Bishops sent to Bush on 13 September 2002 a letter stating: We respectfully urge you to step back from the brink of war and help lead the world to act together to fashion an effective global response to Iraq’s threats that conforms with traditional moral limits on the use of military force. (Letter to President Bush from Catholic Bishops 2002) The media dealt with the problem of Christian opposition by embracing Christians like Charles Colson (the Nixon administration’s chief counsel and one of the infamous Watergate Seven), who said: ‘Out of love of neighbor . . . Christians can and should support a preemptive strike, if ordered by the appropriate magistrate to prevent an imminent attack’ (Colson 2002, p. 72).6 Like the Bush administration, they also used another powerful propaganda technique: They essentially ignored the criticism. They gave enough coverage to show they made a good faith effort, but not enough to have an impact on the march to war. None of the editorials in the ten largest newspapers mentioned the calls by the major religious denominations or by Pope John Paul II for a peaceful solution and they ignored, downplayed or denigrated the marches and petitions of ordinary Americans against the impending invasion. Propaganda strategy 4: transferring negative qualities Transfer negative (Table 2) is defined as a process of casting individuals or groups in a bad light by associating them directly or by implication ‘with negative incidents, places, people, or symbols’. The negative qualities ‘rub off’ on ‘the issue being discussed or discredit by implication an opposing viewpoint’ (Tilley 2005, p. 72). France, attacked in 45 editorials, was the prime target, followed by Russia, 19; Germany, 13; and the United Nations, eight. ‘Weapons inspectors’ were criticised in eight editorials, as shown in Table 2. The editorials also attacked individuals like French President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Writers typically associated those who did not support the war wholeheartedly with ‘bad’ people. The Daily News (New York) managed to associate just about everyone with ‘appeasers’ when it wrote of Blix’s 7 March report: France and the other eager appeasers should stop their excuse making and do what comes naturally to them: retreat. Unfortunately, they are being handed even more excuses, courtesy of Hans Blix. The chief UN arms inspector . . . is wrapping everything in such carefully parsed language, he’s playing right into the hands of the cave-in crowd. (Daily News (New York) 2003a) The Wall Street Journal, in a particularly harsh editorial, managed to associate former Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle with the despised French. The last line was, ‘The next time Mr. Daschle says he wants to “work with the President”, at least we’ll know which country’s President he’s referring to’ (The Wall Street Journal 2003, p. 14a). Many of the ten largest newspapers used the transfer negative device in attacking domestic critics of the war. They typically noted that critics had the right to protest, but they clearly wanted to intimidate and silence the protesters, often by casting them as ‘friends’ or ‘dupes’ of the evil terrorists. The Daily News (New York) said that opponents of the war were ‘determinedly blind to the facts’ or were ‘sadly ignorant of them’ and it stereotyped them as ‘peaceniks’ and ‘peacemongers’ (Daily News (New York) 2003b, p. 34). Mackubin Owens denounced in The Providence Journal (RI) ‘the lunatic ravings of those who hide behind the Constitution while trying to destroy it, and whose perspective is not that different from the pathological hatred and fanaticism that motivates Osama bin Laden’ (Owens 2001, p. 7b). Some of the guilt-by-association charges were levelled in clever, backhanded ways. The Dallas Morning News, for instance, chastised Mexican President Vicente Fox for failing to support war against Iraq publicly. The Dallas Morning News noted that Mexico, a member of the UN Security Council, can ‘decide for itself whether to authorize war’. However: Having enlisted to help maintain the world’s security, Mexico should demonstrate it takes that responsibility seriously by supporting the United States. Having thrust itself onto the world stage, it should act with all the courage, wisdom and foresight that its role requires. (The Dallas Morning News 2003, p. 22a) Mexico would not be acting with ‘courage, wisdom and foresight’, presumably, were it to associate itself with ‘them’ by voting against war. The media dutifully reported Bush’s assertion that Iraq had obtained uranium from Africa during his State of the Union speech on 28 January 2003: ‘The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.’ The uranium, yellowcake plutonium from Niger, could be enriched to make a nuclear weapon: Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans – this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known. (President delivers ‘State of the Union’, 2003) The media had to report Bush’s use of this propagandistic statement, but they failed to report that the charge had been discredited months before the president’s address and there was no evidence that Hussein was linked to al-Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks. The FBI later determined that two employees in the Niger Embassy had forged the documents and passed them to an Italian national for sale to contacts in the international intelligence community (Isikoff and Corn 2006, pp. 89–90). A few journalists did use an objective approach in providing credible coverage of antiwar perspectives. Knight-Ridder’s Strobel, Landay and Walcott (Strobel et al. 2002), who have already been mentioned, refuted the story about Iraq’s alleged purchase of aluminium tubes to enrich uranium. Some newspapers also published stories like Kim Campbell’s (2003) in The Christian Science Monitor, Laurie Goodstein’s (2003) in The New York Times and David Gibson’s (2002) in the Sunday Star-Ledger of Newark about religious opposition or indifference to the potential war. And some publications transcended some of the propaganda by showing they were at least aware of the potential impact a preventive attack by the good people (Americans) would have on the demon people (Muslims). The Los Angeles Times wrote, for example, that: Throughout the Middle East, a postwar occupation of Iraq would become part of the myth of an American empire come to wreak havoc on the Muslims. This refueled resentment would not make the world safer. It would not make the streets at home safer. (Los Angeles Times 2003b, p. 14b) Propaganda strategy 5: name calling Name calling (Table 2) seems in this study closely related to transfer negative, but it is treated as a separate category. Name calling is defined as ‘negative or “bad” labels or stereotypes (e.g., terrorists, extremists, fanatics, ferals, “rent-a-crowd”) that encourage a summary negative response without examining history, complexity, or evidence related to an issue’ (Tilley 2005, p. 72). The ultimate insult was to label someone a terrorist, whether the accuser had any evidence or not, and it was the most frequently mentioned pejorative name in the editorials of the ten largest newspapers. The terrorist was defined and described by the Bush administration, the media and war advocates as signifying an individual or group as evil, irrational and without goals – and as someone who, without evidence, could be detained indefinitely by the US government. This use of ‘terrorist’, under the definition that prevailed in the United States after 9/11, essentially stops conversation and makes it difficult to find the causes of terrorist behaviour, which is an important step in developing a responsible response to an attack. Saddam Hussein – whose name was mentioned 84 times, often without rancour, in the editorials we studied – was not often demonised as a terrorist, although his name was associated with terrorism. The writers of editorials published in the ten largest newspapers frequently settled for names that carried less emotional baggage than terrorist, the primary one (used 25 times) being dictator. Names that seemed to carry more emotion than dictator, but less than terrorist, were also used, the most favoured being tyrant, murderer and madman, as shown in Table 2. He was also called a monster, bully, thug, megalomaniacal, torturer, aggressive, psychotic, liar, cruel, terror-monger, beastly, deceptive, dirty and dastardly. Propaganda strategy 6: manifest destiny Manifest destiny – especially as used by American politicians since the beginning of the 19th Century – is the ‘deterministic invocation of God (of any kind or faith), destiny, fate, natural processes, or universal design, to lend support to an argument; removal of accountability for an idea or issue from individuals and attribution of responsibility to deterministic “greater forces”’ (Tilley 2005, p. 72). George Bush and Tony Blair tried in 2002 to rally support for the invasion of Iraq by asserting that it was the West’s destiny to protect future generations. They cited a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that predicted in a ‘new’ intelligence study that Hussein could have a nuclear weapon within six months. ‘I don’t know what more evidence we need,’ Bush proclaimed. ‘We owe it to future generations to deal with this problem.’ In fact, the ‘new’ report was published in the 1990s, not in 2002, and the IAEA did not say Iraq could have a nuclear capability within six months of September 2002. It said Iraq could have had a nuclear capability within six months to two years at the time of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Journalists could have discovered from the IAEA that Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was destroyed between 1991 and 1998 (Cirincione et al. 2004, pp. 22–23). The media also alluded to manifest destiny when they portrayed the 9/11 attacks as an assault only against the United States: This portrayal ‘precluded other sorts of framing such as “an attack on the West” which might have appeared had we seen the spontaneous street demonstrations of shocked and saddened people in Berlin, Copenhagen, Paris, London, and other parts of the world’. More than 1000 victims of the World Trade Center attack were not US citizens and many of the businesses were international. ‘But ours was an American story’ (Uricchio 2001). Print and electronic media across the United States used slogans such as ‘War on America’ and ‘America’s New War’, suggesting this was a US problem and that it was America’s destiny to solve it (Kellner 2002, p. 147; Nacos 2002, ch. 5). The media dutifully reported Bush’s incessant invocations of God as he attempted to generate support for war. They reported comments like, ‘the terrorists hate the fact that . . . we can worship Almighty God the way we see fit’, and the United States will ‘eradicate evil from the world’ (Kellner 2002, p. 144). The media typically did not greet such expressions with the scepticism they deserved and they rarely noted that many religious leaders viewed the circumstances much differently. God was invoked directly one time and indirectly five times in editorials published in the ten largest newspapers. None suggested that Bush used the word ‘God’ for propaganda purposes. Bush and the media also invoked manifest destiny in their use of words like ‘freedom’ and ‘liberty’. In their analysis of the Bush administration’s use of freedom and liberty, communication scholars David Domke, Kevin Coe and Robert Tynes found that editorial writers for 20 US newspapers echoed Bush’s rhetoric: ‘“Freedom” and “liberty” language and emphasis on these values as universal norms significantly increased . . . after September 11; these shifts over time paralleled the patterns of the president’s communications’ (Domke et al. 2004, p. 23). About 30% of the editorials they studied referred to freedom and liberty after 9/11, and half of those emphasised freedom and liberty as universal norms. What journalists should have done Journalists would have served the public better in the run-up to the invasion if they had adhered to principles of objectivity that were once a tradition in journalism. Had writers, editors and commentators followed these tenets, they would have challenged the dichotomous choices posed by the war advocates. They would have questioned whether there were only two options regarding Iraq, ‘do nothing’ or ‘use military force’, and whether such options as tightening the embargo or giving weapons inspectors more time were viable. They would have challenged the assertion that those who were not ‘with us’ were ‘with the terrorists’. They would have noted that one could oppose a US policy of violence and not be ‘with’ the terrorists. They would have questioned the use of ‘terrorist’, a term that has no intrinsic meaning, and challenged its use as a substitute for thinking. Terrorists were not defined as the powerless attacking the powerful who may have wronged them, as individuals who committed violent acts because they believed they had no other alternatives, as individuals who were foreigners to the Arab–Muslim communities in which they were embedded or as individuals who had legitimate grievances (Ryan and Switzer 2008, p. 304). The media, the Bush administration and war advocates made sure questions were seldom raised about the individuals who participated in the 9/11 attacks or about those who were called terrorists and held without trial following the attacks. The use of ‘terrorist’ and phrases like ‘death cults’ to describe groups and individuals: conveniently allows us to dismiss their obvious and usually explicit political goals as simply a mask for their irrationality. It encourages us to believe that those who oppose us for our actions are ‘in love with death’ rather than being governed by beliefs as important to them as ours are to us. By doing so it indulges us in waging ‘war’ on the manifestations of terrorism rather than dealing with its causes. (Steel 2004, p. 13) Journalists were shamefully careless about relying on partisan sources. Officials in the Bush administration selected facts that supported war, particularly those suggesting Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and ignored evidence suggesting war was problematic. Journalists were dealing with an administration whose public dishonesty was perhaps unprecedented – a reality that was clear in a report produced in 2004 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which documented a long list of the lies the Bush administration told about the war in Iraq (Cirincione et al. 2004). The report showed the administration lied about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, about its missile program, about its contact with terrorists and about UN inspectors’ findings. Journalists committed to an objective approach could have exposed most of these lies. They certainly would not have disseminated them without caveats attached and without noting the pattern established by war advocates of emphasising facts that supported an invasion and discarding facts that did not. Journalists could have maintained an objective stance by interviewing scholars and consulting easily accessible texts concerned with the methods and goals of international terrorism, including the role of the media in facilitating terrorism. They could have interviewed Muslims, who thought the terrorists’ goals were correct even though their tactics were wrong, and US religious leaders who opposed the war. They could have displayed more prominently the views of those who suggested alternatives to war – such as giving aggressive diplomacy and weapons inspections more time, and tightening the embargo that would have made it impossible for Hussein to ship or to use unconventional weapons – if he had them. ‘Administration assertions were on the front page’ of The Washington Post, says Pentagon reporter Thomas Ricks. ‘Things that challenged the administration were on A18 on Sunday or A24 on Monday’ (Kurtz 2004, p. 20a). Journalists using an objective approach would not have attacked or ignored dissent, as the Daily News (New York) did when it said: ‘the dumb-and-dumber crowd, led by France and Germany, want to give Saddam yet more time. They floated a lily-livered proposal that would extend the futile inspections for at least another five more months’ (Daily News (New York) 2003c, p. 36). Nor would they have written, as syndicated columnist Max Boot did in Newsday, that war protesters are ‘making war more – not less – likely’ (Boot 2003, p. 39a). Journalists committed to an objective approach would have reported that the impending war might trigger a resurgence of Muslim religious fundamentalism in Iraq and elsewhere. They would have noted the potential impact a war might have on the broader struggle over fundamentalism within Islam and its consequences for the war against terrorism. They might have argued that those responsible for the 9/11 attacks would welcome such an invasion in the ongoing effort to rally Muslim support for their crusade against Western culture. One of the ironies in an era of ironies is that Hussein was the truth-teller and that those who were attacked for proposing that the United States ‘do nothing’ were in fact suggesting valid alternatives. Hussein had already dismantled his weapons program and he did not have weapons of mass destruction, a fact that he repeated constantly and that was verified by repeated UN inspections. The problem for Hussein was that he could not prove a negative proposition (just as a defendant at trial cannot, and is not required to, prove innocence). Bush and his cohorts did not feel the need to prove Hussein had the weapons they assumed he did. The mainstream news media accepted the administration’s rationale for going to war without serious question. Indeed, they legitimised and assigned credibility to Bush’s assertions by disseminating them without challenge and by ignoring or attacking contrary information. Whether or not the invasion of Iraq was justified in the war against terrorism is a question that will occupy the nation for decades, for the way in which the United States wages war tells much about the American mindset. The morality of preemptive or preventive wars against non-threatening nations is a legacy this generation of American warriors will leave for future generations to consider. Conclusions The most critical period to date in defining the war against terrorism was 11 September 2001–8 October 2003. The United States faced real choices: to respond to terrorism with military violence and the invasion of sovereign nations or to respond using a myriad of other methods outlined above that excluded state-sanctioned violence. The ethics of the profession demands that journalists – especially during a period of crisis – help identify and evaluate options, encourage an environment of calm determination and help government make the best decisions in the interests of the nation as a whole. This study suggests the US news media between 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq did not fulfil their ethical obligations to the American people or to the international community. Objectivity – the key, we argue, to maintaining an ethical standard in journalism – was almost completely abandoned. Although there were notable exceptions, the news media embraced the techniques of propaganda, consciously or unconsciously, to support an administration that was determined to exploit the fear of terrorism to rally public support for the invasion. News and editorial writers and editors amplified ‘the views of fear-mongering leaders who may stampede populations into approval of war or the removal of civil rights for minorities’ (Ward 2004, p. 327). The media have not, for the most part, acknowledged their responsibility for helping to create and maintain an environment in which no alternative to war was seriously considered. Much has been written about instances of failed media coverage, but individual media have not explained why they abandoned their own ethical standards, and they have done little to reassure readers and viewers they will behave differently the next time a US President tries to use fear to rally the people in a time of real or manufactured crisis (Isikoff and Corn 2006, Rich 2006, Ricks 2006, Ryan 2005). It is not at all clear that many journalists even understand these failures. When Knight Ridder White House correspondent Bill Douglas, a panellist at a 2005 conference, heard someone call the press corps a mouthpiece for the administration, he said: ‘Do not call us mouthpieces because that pisses me off more than anything’. When The Washington Post acknowledged that some of its war coverage was not up to standard, executive editor Leonard Downie, Jr said: People who were opposed to the war from the beginning and have been critical of the media’s coverage in the period before the war have this belief that somehow the media should have crusaded against the war. They have the mistaken impression that somehow if the media’s coverage had been different, there wouldn’t have been a war. (Kurtz 2004, p. 20a) The Washington Post also dismissed as unimportant the revelation from an IAEA official that Hussein had not tried to purchase yellowcake plutonium from Niger. The newspaper said the charge was not ‘central to the case against Saddam Hussein, and it did not even form part of Secretary of State Colin Powell’s recent presentation to the Security Council’ (The Washington Post 2003, p. 22a), a presentation that Powell later said is a blot on his record. Unethical coverage, and a refusal to explain that coverage, can have great impact on the media’s effectiveness as a catalyst for decision-making. Good decisions are based on solid information shared widely within a community. When the media lose credibility because of poor and unethical performance, the body of shared knowledge is suspect, and consensus and ‘right’ answers are harder to achieve. The loss of credibility does not do much for a news organisation’s bottom line, either.

#### 3] The media can still be an invaluable resource – ensuring objectivity can sway the public away from war.

Eilders, Senior Researcher, explains in ‘05 [Christiane Eilders, senior researcher in political communication at the Hans Bredow Institute for Media Research, 12-2005, “Media under fire: Fact and fiction in conditions of war,” International Review of the Red Cross, https://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/a21917.pdf]/Kankee

Strategies of information control Although the media might lack autonomy and tend to follow parliamentary consensus, warring parties cannot rely on an automatically supportive media attitude. It goes without saying that they constantly develop new information control strategies to ensure that the media do not counteract their views. For warring parties the public perception of the objectives of war and the actual warfare, i.e. public opinion on the war itself, is an existential resource of modern warfare. Nowadays wars cannot be waged without public support. The less the United States relied on the compliance of its allies during the Iraq intervention, the more it endeavoured to convince its own public of the need for that war.14 In doing so, media coverage plays a decisive role. Not only is public opinion expressed in the media, it is also produced and regulated through the media. By keeping media coverage under control, it is possible to sway the general public towards affirmation or rejection of the war. The US withdrawal from Vietnam had been attributed to far too lax media coverage by military circles. The images of civilian victims, of the inhumanity of warfare and of US casualties had been blamed for the fact that the American public deprived the government of their backing for the war. This reasoning cannot be verified scientifically,15 but it led to a very creative handling of new forms of censorship by the military.16 Just recently, a major shift could be observed in the US strategy for wartime communication.17 Military-based “information operations” have replaced the better known foreign policy measures of “public diplomacy.” The US army has started to consider information as a discrete military feature, now that various military conflicts have shown that military superiority can no longer be converted outright into political superiority. The so-called information doctrine of 1998 finally made information a foremost priority of all military actions. Under the generic term “information operations” military and media instruments were merged. The high-tech concept of electronic warfare now also includes information security, public relations and perception control as well as instruments of public diplomacy. The idea is to modify perceptions among elites, soldiers and civilians and get them to understand that war is fought in people’s minds rather than on the battleground. Information is now supposed to preserve other military resources. The resulting military management of information is concerned either with domestic or foreign stakeholders in politics or society or with the warring parties involved. The most important objectives are legitimation, deterrence and camouflage. To achieve these objectives various approaches are adopted: besides securing one’s own chain of information and commands, the regulation and selection of flows of information are reckoned to be decisive for military superiority during war and in times of peace. Disruption of the opposing side’s information processes through information overload is considered just as essential as systematic deception and force multiplication through communication. Mass media are utilized for all these strategies: embedded journalists, the planning and implementation of media campaigns on military issues and the building of military TV stations are only a few examples of such use. The new strategies have proved successful, at least in the short run. During the 2003 Iraq war, for example, the US army took only one tenth of the number of prisoners it took in the 1991 Gulf war — as this time many Iraqi soldiers refrained from joining in the hostilities. Szukala also shows, however, that the successful regulation of intensified and systematized media relations gives rise, at least in the long run, to the problem of a “growing credibility gap.”18

#### 4] No internal link – they don’t fiat an increase in peace journalism nor do they explain why prioritization completely eliminates peace journalism

### Framework

#### Ethics must begin a priori:

#### [A] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory.

#### [B] Constitutive Authority – practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask for why we should be reasoners concedes its authority since it uses reason – anything else is nonbinding and arbitrary.

#### [C] Action theory – only evaluating action through reason solves since reason is key to evaluate intent, otherwise we could infinitely divide actions. For example: If I was brewing tea, I could break up that one big action into multiple small actions. Only our intention, to brew tea unifies these actions if we were never able to unify action, we could never classify certain actions as moral or immoral since those actions would be infinitely divisible.

#### That justifies universality –a) a priori principles like reason apply to everyone since they are independent of human experience and – b) any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. Prefer:

#### [1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify a standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### [2] Consequences Fail: a] Yes act/omission distinction – there are infinite events occurring over which you have no control, so you can never be moral b] Every action has infinite stemming consequences so we can’t predict. c] Induction is circular because it assumes nature will hold uniform d] aggregation impossible – impossible to measure pain and pleasure e] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify

#### [3] Contesting offense and the framework is a voting issue. Reciprocity – I have to win my framework and beat the NC before I can access case, whereas you can collapse to either layer or dump on offense for 7 minutes as a no-risk issue so there’s a skew. Key to fairness because it’s definitionally equal access to the ballot.

#### [4] Aspec: JOURNALISTS CAN’T USE UTIL, PREFER DUTY BASED ETHICS

Christians 7 Christians, Clifford (Research Professor of Comunications, Professor of Journalism and Professor of Media Studies Emeritus at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) "Utilitarianism in media ethics and its discontents." Journal of Mass Media Ethics 22.2-3 (2007): 113-131.

Utilitarian ethics has major weaknesses, despite its democratic appeal. It depends on assessing the consequences accurately, when in everyday affairs the results of our choices are often unknown, at least in the long term. Blogging is a revolution in journalism at present, but how can we calculate all the changes even a decade from now? The short-term benefits of exposing corruption in a political campaign may be offset by long-term negative consequences—public hostility to an overly aggressive press. The results are frequently complicated and intertwined so that a theory staking itself on results often does not provide adequate guidelines for morally acceptable action. Among moral philosophers, the most influential critique of utilitarianism has been developed by W. David Ross.9 Ross argued against the utilitarian claim that others are morally significant to us only when our actions impact them pro or con (1930, pp. 17–21).10 We usually find ourselves confronting more than one moral claim at the same time involving different ethical principles. Asking only what produces the most good is too limiting. It does not cover the ordinary range of human relationships and circumstances. People recognize promise keeping, equal distribution, nonviolence, and preventing injury as moral principles. In various situations any of them might be the most stringent. Ordinary moral sensitivities suggest that when someone fulfills a promise because he thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear that he does so with no thought of its total consequences:: : : What makes him think it’s right to act in a certain way is the fact that he has promised to do so—that and, usually, nothing more. (Ross, 1930, p. 17) Utilitarianism as a single-consideration theory does not simply demand that we maximize general happiness, but renders irrelevant other moral imperatives that conflict with it. As Charles Taylor argued, the exactness of this one-factor model is appealing, but represents only ‘‘a semblance of validity’’ by leaving out whatever cannot be calculated (Taylor, 1982, p. 143; cf. Bowers, 2002). In some media situations, consequences are a reliable guide. But in many of the most crucial issues we face at present, utility is not adequate—for understanding distributive justice, diversity in popular culture, violence in television and cinema, truth telling, digital manipulation, conflict of interest, and so forth. We face the anomaly that the ethical system most entrenched in the media industry is not ideally suited for resolving its most persistent headaches. In an ethics of consequences, ‘‘only the future counts with respect to what is morally significant, and not the past’’ (Dyck, 1977, p. 60). Future results, even though they are hypothetical, are determinative. But why should possible benefits in the future count more, for example, than gratitude to parents for their deeds of the past? If I made a promise in the pxast, for instance, this moral duty would be the most urgent in the present. If my previous acts have harmed someone, I have a duty of reparation, that is, making up for earlier wrongs. There are duties of justice that require us to ignore or even upset the balance of happiness (Ross, 1930, p. 21). Thus an ethics of duty is a more compelling model of moral decision making. It covers the entire time frame rather than only anticipating future effects. Duty responds to a broader range of human experiences and relations. Duty recognizes that the human community requires dutiful actions to maintain its humanness. H. Richard Niebuhr, in fact, saw responsibility as inherent in our personhood. Our selfhood is manifest in the action of answering. Our relation to other selves carries moral obligation; we respond to responders; we live in responsive relations (1963, pp. 59–61, 152–160). With a similar understanding of humans as responsible agents, Emmanuel Levinas (1981) insisted that our duties to others are more fundamental to human identity than are individual rights. An ethics of duty provides a critical framework that prevents us from having our ethical theory and democratic practice slide into one another. In terms of the overall task of developing a theoretically credible media ethics, the most promising direction is a deontological one.

#### Thus the advocacy: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

### Offense

#### [1] Under the categorical imperative, objectivity must always be prioritized because anything else is a contradiction in conception of lying, if a lie were universalized then there would no longer be a conception of truth. This makes objectivity the highest layer that always comes first, even if you are advocating.

#### [2] Any claim that advocacy is constitutive to a free press is impermissible because the function of media is to report information—the constitutive purpose of the media is objective presentation of information because citizens have a right to be informed.

Klein 20 [Ian Klein, J.D. Candidate at the Texas A&M University School of Law, 2020, “Enemy of the People: The Ghost of the F.C.C. Fairness Doctrine in the Age of Alternative Facts.” Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal, https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1809&context=hastings\_comm\_ent\_law\_journal]/Kankee

This scarcity and long history of regulation, combined with the legal fiction of broadcast spectrum scarcity explained in the following paragraphs, is likely enough to overcome this Red Lion hurdle. Second, and more importantly, in the context of the Red Lion holding and the history of broadcast regulation, the concept of scarcity serves to underline the duty of the federal government [is] to make sure that the public has access to objective coverage of important issues.152 Red Lion was the culmination of a decades-long administrative, legislative, and judicial adaptation to the evolving nature of mass communication, during which every branch of the federal government emphasized the right of the public to be informed over the right of broadcasters to disseminate information.153 Since the Radio Act of 1927, broadcasting has been regulated because the public has a right to receive information.154 When the Communications Act supplanted the Radio Act, Congress was determined to require that the newly-created FCC had a duty to “serve the public interest.”155 The F.C.C. noted during its infancy that a democratic society should be given maximum opportunity to express diverse viewpoints on controversial issues, and, importantly, maximum opportunity to hear and read the conflicting view of others.156 As Justice White later wrote for the unanimous Red Lion Court, “[i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic [sic], moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here . . . [t]hat right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.”157 That right of access, based on the history and tradition of the decisions of both the Court and the FCC, extends not only to access to that information, but to the objective presentation of this information.158 Furthermore, “access” referred to the ability of broadcasters to broadcast information vis-à-vis the chilling effect and self-censorship that opponents of the Fairness Doctrine feared. However, as the Red Lion Court noted, “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”159 The fact that the notion of the public’s right to information was reiterated so often and so prevalently indicates that courts and lawmakers did not consider it incidental to their decisions, but as the governing principle necessitating the entire body of broadcast regulation. Furthermore, as legal scholars such as Mark Lloyd and John Berresford theorize, Red Lion’s Scarcity Principle was not only secondary to the emphasis on the public’s right to be informed, but was intended as dicta, which subsequent courts misinterpreted as the crux of the opinion.160 Lloyd suggests that the scarcity principle was merely “[d]ictum that suggests the Court was aware of the spectrum [of broadcast frequencies] as a public resource,” and that the Red Lion opinion was only about the constitutionality of FCC authority over broadcast licensees.161 According to Lloyd, the Red Lion Court’s determination that there was a scarcity of broadcast frequencies was not the conclusion of an engineering or economic analysis, but was the result of a purely legal analysis based on precedent and the record that centered on previous challenges to FCC authority.162 This is significant because, as Berresford points out in his 2005 FCC Research Paper, “[t]he Scarcity [Principle] appears to assume that there is a physical thing . . . of which there is a scarce amount . . . ‘the radio frequency spectrum,’ however, has no discrete physical existence . . . [t]he Scarcity [Principle] thus appears to be based on fundamental misunderstandings of physics.”163 Arbitrary rules made up by dead racists are nothing compared to the physical laws governing the reality of the known universe. The question of scarcity was thus “dislodged from the question before the Court” in Red Lion: Whether the FCC could constitutionally enforce the Fairness Doctrine.164 If the Scarcity Principle is a legal fiction (based on a scientific one), then Red Lion’s precedential value in upholding Fairness Doctrine 2.0 must rest solely on the end that the very nature of broadcast regulation sought to further from its inception:165 the right of the public to receive objective information.166 Legal Issues Surrounding Online News and Social Media

#### That affirms: if we all necessarily want our rights enforced and freedoms respected, we all necessarily agree to carry the responsibilities as well as the rights and privileges of citizenship to ensure the government can accurately act as a collective agent

**Korsgaard 18** [The Claims of Animals and the Needs of Strangers: Two Cases of Imperfect Right. The Journal of Practical EthicsVolume 6, No. 1, June 2018. OPEN ACCESS. <http://www.jpe.ox.ac.uk/papers/the-claims-of-animals-and-the-needs-of-strangers-two-cases-of-imperfect-right/>] // SJ AME

Like many philosophers, I think there is no problem in recognizing that groups of people can form collective agents in this way**. Groups can think when their members can think, and when they can also talk and debate, which amounts to thinking together. They can act**—not just individually but as a group—when they have procedures for making and enacting decisions that makes those decisions and actions count as the decisions and actions of the group. **Political states are collective agents in exactly that sense. A political state thinks through the thoughts of its citizens and legislators when they debate public issues, makes its decisions by voting and passing laws, and enacts its decisions by enforcing those laws. The enforcement of the law counts as the action of the state. It also acts as a collective agent when its duly elected representatives, or otherwise legitimate leaders, perform actions in their official roles that the laws entitle them to do**. That’s what happens when one country declares war on another, for instance. That is something that the country, considered as a collective agent, does.

#### [3] Advocacy is premised off of making somebody do something for you which violates the categorical imperative because you’re using someone as a means to an end.

## UV

#### [1] Aff gets 1AR theory since the neg can be infinitely abusive and I can’t check back. Aff theory is drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer since the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance and reasonability bites intervention since it’s up to the judge to determine. No 2NR paradigm issues since they’d dump on it for 6 minutes and my 3-minute 2AR is spread too thin. No RVIs on AC arguments – incentivizes a 7 minute collapse that decks 1AR strategy. Evaluate the theory debate after the 1AR since a) the 6 min 2n can dump on theory making the 3 min 2AR impossible b) we both get 1 speech on theory. Evaluate aff theory prior to neg theory as the neg can win their shell and beat mine back in the long 2NR, whereas it’s impossible for me to win both layers in a 2AR that’s only half as long.

## Advantage

#### The Populist PiS is in control of Poland. EU sanctions are effective, but the PiS continues to rebel

**Moskwa and Jefferson 20** Moskwa, Wojciech, and Rodney Jefferson. “Poland's Populist Turn.” Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, 31 Oct. 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/poland>.//SJEP

PiS- Law and Justice Party

If Poland had a tumultuous 20th century, the 21st started off pretty well. Having just joined NATO, the country entered the European Union and cemented its transition to capitalism with unrivaled economic growth. **Then a 2015 election unleashed a populist backlash, delivering unprecedented power to a party that promised a shakeup in the name of ordinary Poles. They were fed up with uneven wealth and tossed out what they saw as a self-serving elite that had misruled the country. The Law & Justice Party’s drive to control the courts and remove checks on its power sparked sporadic protests and criticism from the EU, which accuses Poland’s leaders of flouting the rule of law.** Former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned in 2017 that the country was moving “backwards and eastwards.” Is eastern Europe’s biggest economy risking the democratic order it has built since escaping communism? In October, there was a national outcry after a Constitutional Court ruling tightened what was already one of Europe’s most restrictive abortion laws. Women staged a strike and protesters flooded the streets in the biggest threat to the government since it came to power. **The Law & Justice Party had won followers by reducing the tax burden on the poor and providing bigger subsidies for raising children. Winning a second term in 2019, it pushed through more judicial reforms after revamping the constitutional court, nearly doubled the minimum wage and exerted more control over the media. The EU, which gives more money to Poland than any other country on a net basis, has pursued a series of disciplinary measures against Poland for failing to adhere to democratic values; it’s talked of tying future funds to rule-of-law standards, though little has been done.** Poland’s ruling party struck a nerve at home and abroad by calling for the country to assert its national identity, uphold Catholic values and control its borders. It’s also sought to rewrite history, turning Solidarity freedom fighter Lech Walesa into a communist collaborator, making it illegal to suggest that the Polish nation had a role in the Holocaust and backing the creation of “LGBT Free” zones. While it re-nationalized banks and power companies, the economy has remained robust, though the coronavirus pandemic created new challenges. **Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the Law & Justice leader and the man who pulls the strings in Poland, says the government upholds the rule of law and that history shows Poland suffers when outsiders interfere in its politics. He says EU leaders in Brussels should focus on their own problems. He has an ally in Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who is also challenging the European mainstream. The Polish government has replaced much of the country’s establishment since it came to power, justifying the moves with the same “drain the swamp” appeal used by U.S. President Donald Trump. Foreign banks and retailers have also been criticized for not sharing enough of their profit. Critics say Poland’s leaders have eroded civil liberties, turned the media into a party mouthpiece and transformed state companies into political machines.**

#### The PiS controlled Polish media is key to guarantee future elections and sway voters to the PiS.

**Kalan 19** Kalan, Dariusz. “Poland's State of the Media.” Foreign Policy, 25 Nov. 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/25/poland-public-television-law-and-justice-pis-mouthpiece/.//SJEP

**WARSAW, Poland—Asked about the difference between Poland’s public television station, TVP, before 2015 and after, a veteran journalist who works at the network was quick to respond. “Ruling politicians,” they said, “had never had that kind of impact on television” before. “They have audacity and courage to approach reporters and say, ‘I want to say something, and you have to record me.’ This is our everyday life,” the journalist, who insisted on anonymity, said in early October. After a long moment of reflection, they added: “You will not find true information in our television.” TVP, whose two flagship channels were among the country’s** [**most popular**](https://businessinsider.com.pl/media/tv-radio/najpopularniejsze-programy-i-kanaly-w-2018-roku/24lx5c1) **in 2018, has for the last several years been squarely under the control of Poland’s right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, which clung to power in elections in mid-October. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, these elections were “administratively prepared well.” But the voters’ “informed choice was undermined by a lack of impartiality in the media, especially the public broadcaster,”** [noted](https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/435941) Jan Petersen, the head of an election observation mission**. It was not the first time TVP’s reporting raised concerns. This fall, 54 members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe** [**called**](https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=28221&lang=en) **TVP “a propaganda channel for the ruling party.” Reporters Without Borders similarly** [**stated**](https://rsf.org/en/poland) **that Poland’s public media outlets “have been transformed into government propaganda mouthpieces.” This fall, in interviews with almost a dozen current and former TVP journalists and executives, most asked to go unnamed. None argued that TVP’s political news has been objective. In fact, many openly admitted that TVP is purposefully keeping quiet about PiS scandals, gives airtime almost exclusively to pro-PiS voices, and has campaigned against the party’s opponents. Those I spoke to who back PiS largely argued that the hard line was both necessary to ensure a second PiS term and a legitimate response to the private media’s alleged support of the opposition. Interlocutors on both sides believe that there is nothing unique in what is happening in Poland. Rather, their country is just one among many suffering the rise of fake news. According to Ryszard Bankowicz, the head of the Polish Council of Media Ethics, a nonpartisan body promoting principles of ethical journalism, readers and viewers around the world have ceased to want real information.** “They chose a given newspaper or TV station not in order to find the truth but to confirm their own beliefs or take a side against or for someone,” Bankowicz said. “And many journalists do not know principles of ethical journalism. This is a worldwide trend, and Poland is its victim.” But not everyone has given up. This year, Bankowicz, took a public stand on one of the [most serious accusations](https://www.rp.pl/Platforma-Obywatelska/190119723-Borusewicz-To-skutek-nagonki-na-Adamowicza.html) against TVP, made by Bogdan Borusewicz, a former democratic opposition activist under the communist regime and a former speaker of the Senate, among others: that it had incited hatred against Pawel Adamowicz, Gdansk’s mayor, who was stabbed to death at a January charity event. Adamowicz, a popular liberal politician, had been a target of numerous TVP reports that had suggested he was corrupt and had close ties with local businessmen. In a [report](http://www.rem.net.pl/data/20190211.pdf) published in February, Bankowicz wrote that “the authors of these publications manipulated the facts … in order to present Adamowicz as an unreliable person.” He concluded that “TVP spews propaganda, which serves to destroy opponents of the ruling party.” However, he refused to comment on whether violations of journalistic ethics contributed to Adamowicz’s death. “TVP is certainly not to blame for this tragic event,” said Maciej Stanecki, who was TVP’s deputy chairman from 2016 to 2019. But he was quick to add: “But for allowing the radicalization of the public opinion, of the crowd … well, I think that every media person must be aware that such responsibility exists.” Stanecki, a film producer, is proud of his achievements at TVP during his leadership, which include the television’s technological development, but he is aware that the network’s reputation has been tarnished.

#### Biased polish media shifts public perception to the PiS and alters election outcomes.

**Gipson 21** Gipson, Abigail. “New Report: Poland's Public Media Serve as Propaganda Tool.” International Press Institute, 17 Dec. 2021, https://ipi.media/new-report-polands-public-media-serve-as-propaganda-tool/.//SJEP

**A** [**recent report**](http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Masz%20Glos/RaportTDEnglFin_June%2010N.pdf) **by Poland’s Society of Journalists and the Batory Foundation finds that public media in Poland do not fulfil their role as a source of independent and balanced news, but rather function as a propaganda tool for the government. “We saw that the government was using public service media, which is under its control, to support its own programme and its own candidates in the election”, Krzysztof Bobiński, who is a board member for the Society of Journalists, explained in an interview with the International Press Institute (IPI). The report observes that Wiadomości, the main news programme on Poland’s public broadcasting station TVP, demonstrates notable bias in favour of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS). The bias manifests in both proportionally higher screen time for members of PiS and overwhelmingly positive coverage of the party and its interests. In addition to favourable coverage of the ruling party, the programme often casts opposition politicians and their supporters in a negative light.** At times it neglects to cover the opposition at all and omits stories that may reflect poorly on PiS. TVP receives about 28 percent of viewing share, the highest among Polish broadcasters, and Wiadomości averages 2.4 million viewers daily. However, according to a poll conducted earlier this year, Wiadomości ranked very low in public trust, Andrzej Krajewski, the author of the report, said in an interview. Public broadcasters should be independent, giving fair and balanced coverage to all political parties. But according to the report, Wiadomości has neglected to live up to that standard. The report concludes that Wiadomości has “failed to observe the conditions of [article 21.1 of Poland’s law](http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU19930070034/O/D19930034.pdf) on radio and TV, which requires public service television to be ‘pluralistic, unbiased and independent’.” “This is public media we are all paying for, it’s our public media, and they’re breaking the law”, Bobiński commented. “They’re not only breaking the law because they’re biased, but also they’re breaking the law because they’re [PiS] using this media as part of their election campaign, and that should be in their election campaign expenses. Really, they are using our money to bamboozle us.” In a statement accompanying the report, the Society of Journalists, an independent group affiliated with the European Federation of Journalists, noted that in 2019 TVP received a one billion złoty (250 million euro) subsidy from the government on top of its advertising and license fee income. From 2016 TVP budget subsidies were more than two billion złoty (500 million euro). Poland’s media regulator, the National Council for Radio and Television (KRRiT), is legally obligated to monitor media activity and ensure Poland’s public broadcast laws are implemented. However, when the Council was approached with complaints about TVP’s failure to comply with impartiality laws, it failed to take action, Bobiński said. This inaction by the KRRiT is part of what spurred the media monitoring behind the report. “At that point, what does a citizen do? You either don’t do anything or you try to fill the gap that’s been left by a state institution, which is mandated by the constitution to do this work”, Bobiński said. **The report examined Wiadomości coverage from May 10 to 23, the period leading up to the 2019 European Union parliamentary elections. During this time, two-thirds of the news items reported by Wiadomości were election-related. All but one of the stories covering PiS were positive, and the outlier was neutral. The opposition European Coalition was covered negatively in all 33 news items in which it appeared. Liberal and left-wing parties contesting the election were not mentioned at all. The report also notes that Wiadomości “did not mention climate change, a key issue in many other member states.” Shortly after coming to power in the fall of 2015, PiS made moves to disrupt and reform Polish public media.** Parliament passed a law that terminated the contracts of the heads of Poland’s public television and radio broadcasters. The treasury minister was given the power to hire and fire broadcasting directors, a matter that was previously decided by a media supervisory committee. In early 2016, Jacek Kurski, a former PiS member of the European Parliament, was appointed director of TVP, and he remains in this role today. **TVP has not been PiS’s only target. Recently PiS officials** [**announced plans**](https://www.ft.com/content/1a4f9232-9358-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271) **to “re-polonize” media in Poland if they maintain the majority in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Bringing private media in Poland under Polish ownership has been part of PiS’s agenda for several years, though legally it would be difficult to force out non-Polish media companies that are from within the EU, Krajewski explained. However, these companies could be bought out by Polish enterprises.** Foreign-owned broadcasters are some of the most critical in the Polish media landscape, and the threat of their capture by the government presents a serious risk to plurality in Polish news PiS’s [capture of Polish public media](http://ipi.media/polish-public-broadcaster-veers-from-impartial-mission/) poses ominous repercussions not only for Poland but for the European Union as well. **In its statement, the Society of Journalists expressed concern that the “transformation of the public service media into a propaganda tool violates the right […] to a fair election”, and that this transformation “poses the question of whether the election of the Polish members of the European Parliament in May 2019 was conducted in an honest and fair manner”. Wiadomości’s election coverage will continue, as Poland will hold parliamentary elections this fall. Wiadomości and TVP have the potential to significantly affect voters’ perceptions of both PiS and the opposition. “Watching Wiadomości every day, they are doing exactly what they did during the previous election period”, Krajewski said. “It’s propaganda. For instance, almost every day they denigrate [President of the European Council and former Polish Prime Minister] Donald Tusk because possibly he will be a candidate for Polish president, so they want to lower his chances in the local elections.” Without fair, balanced, and transparent coverage of all political parties, Polish citizens cannot make informed decisions at the polling booths. “With such strong propaganda by public media, which is illegal, the results of the elections are questionable”, Krajewski said.**

#### Poland will never leave the EU, but PiS power ensures packed courts and decisions that deck legitimacy-that spills over and causes a massive crisis

**Economist 21** Economist, Oct 21 2021, "Poland is a problem for the EU precisely because it will not leave," https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/10/14/poland-is-a-problem-for-the-eu-precisely-because-it-will-not-leave//SJJK

Brexit, before it happened, was imagined in many forms. Hard, soft, Norwegian, Swiss or Turkish. Briefly, an Albanian option was discussed. Often it was just “clean”. A “clean Brexit” would free Britain from the eu’s single market, customs union and its courts, advocates said. Just as there are many ways of leaving the eu, there are many ways of remaining. There is the clean version, in which countries quietly accept the eu’s strictures. Then there is the messy version, where governments foul up the club. Think of it as “dirty remain”. **To see dirty remain in action, look at Poland. Its Constitutional Tribunal challenged the legal order of the club in a ruling on October 7th. In a case brought by the Polish prime minister, the court, which is stuffed with allies of the government**, **ruled that fundamental parts of eu law do not trump Poland’s constitution. The judgment, which was exactly what the government wanted, has punctured six decades of European case law. In short, the eu’s supreme court is no longer supreme, as far as Poland is concerned. Poles protested in droves, claiming that the government was attempting to drag the country out of the bloc against their will. But anyone expecting a British-style “Polexit” will be disappointed**. S**upport for the eu within the country is among the highest in the union. Standing for an election in Poland on a platform of quitting the eu would be akin to a manifesto promising to drown puppies.** **The problem is not that Poland is trying to leave the eu; the problem is that it intends to stay.** Dirty remain is more pernicious than Polexit. **The risk is that the eu’s legal order in Poland slowly fades,** argues Daniel Sarmiento of the Complutense University of Madrid**. A domino effect takes over**. **If courts across the eu cannot trust their Polish peers, then the eu’s legal system starts to gum up**. An arrest warrant here is not honoured there; a banking licence granted in one country may not be honoured in another. **Over time, an area over which people, goods, capital and services can flow freely turns into one where they can move only with trouble. Bad behaviour can spread**. Eurosceptics have mostly given up on leaving the eu. It is, as Britain has shown, rather stressful. **Eric Zemmour, the nationalist radical mulling a run in the French presidential election, has pledged to restore the primacy of French law over eu law**. Even more mild-mannered figures, such as Michel Barnier, the eu’s Brexit negotiator, toy with the same idea. **If one government can avoid abiding by unpopular rulings by the eu’s top court with little fear of sanction, it becomes a tempting option for all**. As an idea, “dirty remain” has a veneer of respectability. Its Polish proponents argue that everyone else does it, but only Poland is attacked. Polish judges are fond of citing their German counterparts, who have accused the European Court of Justice (ecj) of overstepping the mark in recent years. In such rulings, the medium counts as much as the message. No one doubts the independence of Germany’s constitutional court. No one believes in the independence of Poland’s. The messages are different, too. The German court accused the ecj of exceeding its mandate in approving a programme of bond-buying by the European Central Bank. **The Polish court said the country’s constitution trumped fundamental parts of eu law, such as “ever closer union”, a much more sweeping ruling**. The German court was playing with matches; **its Polish counterpart doused the eu’s legal system in petrol and deliberately started a fire. On paper, the solution to such a disagreement is simple: leave the eu**. Britain made things easy for the club when it departed. Rather than hanging around blocking things and generally causing a fuss, it followed the procedures as laid down in Article 50 of the treaties it was so keen to leave. Doing this without a clear plan was “like putting a gun in your mouth and pulling the trigger” according to Dominic Cummings, the man who led the Vote Leave campaign. Yet to the surprise of eu diplomats this is exactly what the British government did. **Instead, Poland is following a strategy that played out in Watchmen, a comic**. **In it, Rorschach, a vigilante, is sent to jail, where he greets a fellow inmate in the canteen by tipping the contents of a deep-fat fryer over his head**. “None of you seem to understand,” he says to his now-crispy foe. **“I’m not locked in here with you. You’re locked in here with me.”** **In the eu, destinies are linked. If one person starts hurling a fryer, everyone must duck**. David Cameron, Britain’s prime minister at the time, begged for concessions from the eu ahead of Britain’s referendum on leaving it, including an opt-out from “ever closer union”. **Poland threw its fryer without warning.** Such dirty **tricks are difficult to deal with inside the club**. **A nation-state can enforce its will internally, sending in the police or even, in extremis, the army to quell insurrection. The eu has no such tools.** The European Commission could refuse to sign off on Poland’s share of its covid-19 recovery fund, depriving the country of €57bn ($66bn), for instance. **The danger is that this will prompt Poland to bring the eu’s workings to a halt in protest.** Amicable divorce or poisonous marriage Bad behaviour outside the club is less of a problem. After doing things by the book as a member, Britain has discovered a rebellious streak, trying to renege on the terms of its deal with the eu. This causes little trouble for the eu. Rather than an existential problem, Brexit is a tedious one involving the movement of sausages across the Irish sea. Britain has been cauterised. By contrast, **the rule of law in Poland is an open wound**. **It is a long-term threat, which needs to be solved if the eu is to thrive**. **Just as a financial crisis in one country can spread to another, so can a constitutional crisis.** Dealing with a departure is relatively easy for the eu. Handling dirty remain is much harder.

#### And the EU is already weak and Poland is at the front of their issues-further legitimacy crisis destroys global democracy and emboldens further russian invasions

**Tisdall 21** Simon Tisdall Guardian, 11-21-2021, "Instability grips a weakened Europe as global predators smell blood," https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/21/instability-grips-a-weakened-europe-as-global-predators-smell-blood//SJJK

**Threats from Russia and China, a weaker US security alliance and internal discord expose fundamental strategic weaknesses** Is [Europe](https://www.theguardian.com/world/europe-news) entering a dangerous new age of instability? **Not since the height of the cold war with the Soviet Union has it looked so vulnerable to hostile forces.** Accumulating external threats and internal divisions, coupled with a weakening US security alliance, relentless Russian subversion, and power-hungry China’s war on western values are exposing fundamental strategic weaknesses. Europe increasingly resembles a beleaguered democratic island in an anarchic world, where a rising tide of authoritarianism, impunity and international rule-breaking threatens to inundate it. Some European leaders understand this, notably French president [Emmanuel Macron](https://www.theguardian.com/world/emmanuel-macron), yet long-term policy remedies elude them. For example, Belarus dictator Alexander Lukashenko’s use of migrants to pressure the EU is plainly outrageous. Yet it worked, in the sense that Germany’s caretaker chancellor, Angela Merkel, phoned him for a chat, ending his post-coup isolation. [Her unilateral demarche](https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20211117-merkel-and-lukashenko-agree-to-talks-about-belarusian-border-crisi) understandably infuriated Baltic states. It was a concession to a thug, not a lasting solution. Talking of thugs, Russian president Vladimir Putin’s ongoing intimidation of Ukraine risks widening conflagration. The latest border build-up of 90,000 Russian troops may be [sabre-rattling,](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/nov/14/uk-must-be-ready-for-war-with-russia-says-armed-forces-chief) similar to provocations in the Donbas and Black Sea last spring. If not, Europe will only have itself to blame. Putin’s importunities stem directly from its de facto acquiescence in his illegal 2014 annexation of Crimea. Instability on Europe’s periphery extends to the Balkans amid well-founded fears that Bosnia-Herzegovina is slipping back into conflict 26 years after the [Dayton peace accords.](https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-blog/2020/nov/18/the-dayton-accords-a-peace-agreement-for-bosnia-archive-1995) Resurgent ethnic nationalism, embodied by the separatist Bosnian Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, is fuelled by Belgrade and Moscow. **A larger, strategic problem is the EU’s inability** [**to fulfil promises**](https://ecfr.eu/article/western-balkans-in-trouble-why-the-eu-should-make-a-new-offer-to-the-region/) **of closer integration with the region**. Europe’s relationship with Turkey, a key gatekeeper, is dysfunctional, too, thanks partly to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, its deeply unpleasant president. When he menaced EU members Greece and Cyprus last year, Macron [sent naval forces](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/29/greece-turkey-standoff-france-send-warships-east-mediterranean) to the eastern Mediterranean. The rest of Europe sat on its hands. Erdoğan is also meddling in Ukraine and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, which [flared up again](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tensions-high-after-deadly-clashes-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-gwmpfqgdd) last week. Yet Brussels pays him to keep out Middle Eastern refugees, so it **hardly dares challenge him. The vice-like circle of instability squeezing Europe is about more than actual or potential armed conflict.** One of its bigger dilemmas is migration. Despite the searing 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, **the EU still lacks an agreed, humane policy**. **That guarantees more trouble down the road.** **One of the main objectors, ironically,** [**is Poland,**](https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/11/10/eu-council-president-visits-poland-to-express-solidarity-in-face-of-hybrid-attack-by-belarus/) **which rejects migrant quotas.** **Yet faced by border mayhem, its hypocritical rightwing leaders who, like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, are in a bitter fight with Brussels over rule of law and democracy issues, appealed for EU solidarity.** Disturbing, too, is the way **much European opinion appears to have accepted illegal pushbacks and routine mistreatment of asylum-seekers**, whether in camps in Libya or on the beaches of Greece, in breach of EU law. This reflects another self-inflicted wound: the increased influence of xenophobic, rightwing populists and the re-normalisation of circa 1914 ultra-nationalist politics across Europe. **If Europeans will not stand up for western democratic values in a world overrun by Donald Trump clones and copycats, who will?** Sadly, they cannot look to Britain. No longer a trusted friend, the UK under Boris Johnson, sniping and sneering from the sidelines, has become another peripheral conflict zone for the EU. Britain is more irritant than ally. Defence minister Ben Wallace used the linked Belarus-Ukraine crises last week to advance the Brexit agenda and seal arms deals with Warsaw and Kiev. Tellingly, the [UK sent troops,](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/18/british-soldiers-to-give-more-support-to-poland-amid-belarus-border-crisis) not humanitarian aid, to the Polish border. Europe’s age of instability also owes much to events beyond its control. Few forecast Trump would try to blow up what Franklin D Roosevelt called the “arsenal of democracy”, and the western alliance with it. [He may yet try again](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/us/politics/republicans-2022-redistricting-maps.html). Likewise, few predicted, as [Merkel now admits,](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-germany-may-have-been-naive-china-first-merkel-says-2021-11-17/) that China would emerge as such a domineering, economically aggressive, anti-democratic global competitor. **US president Joe Biden reassures Europeans that Nato, even after Afghanistan, is as vital as ever. But his** [**edgy video summit**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/16/biden-xi-summit-highlights-tensions-and-desire-for-cooperation) **with China’s Xi Jinping last week showed where his true focus lies. Putin sees this, and smells blood. Europe’s gas supply is one pressure point. Covert cyber-attacks are another. Russia’s reckless anti-satellite missile test, scorning European safety concerns, was the first recorded act of** [**hooliganism in outer space.**](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/nov/16/a-wild-west-out-there-russian-satellite-debris-worsens-space-junk-problem) **Europe’s inability to make Putin pay a serious price for aggression in Georgia and Crimea, his decimation of Russian democracy, his foreign election meddling, and his murderous attacks on Alexei Navalny – and other opponents on European soil – heightens a sense of decline. On China, there is nothing close to a united front. Such weakness encourages other predators. So what is to be done?** Europe, as ever, is a house divided. East Europeans continue to place their faith in Washington rather than Brussels, despite clear portents of another transatlantic rupture if the Democrats lose the White House in 2024. **The EU bureaucracy is feebly led, its parliament toothless. Germany lacks a proven leader. In France, Macron faces** [**a vicious spring election**](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/eric-zemmour-macrons-far-right-rival-wins-backing-from-russia-t25c086kc) **scrap against the Russian-backed far right.** Yet it is Macron’s ideas about enhanced European political, security and military “strategic autonomy”, and a stronger, more fiscally and economically integrated EU, that offer the most hopeful path forward. EU defence ministers last week discussed [a “Strategic Compass” plan](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-policy-document-against-russia-china/) to boost joint capabilities. But agreement on proposed “rapid-deployment forces” and the like seems a long way off. As [France](https://www.theguardian.com/world/france) prepares to assume the EU presidency, will other leaders recognise this critical moment and back Macron? In a world of sharks, snakes and scary monsters, Europe’s independence, cohesion and values are on the line like never before.

#### Independently Global Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts---economic growth, public goods, alliances, and war

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However, reducing the United States’ emphasis on a values-driven foreign policy is wrong, and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States. **Democracy promotion** in particular serves a **key role in safeguarding U.S. interests** and promoting global, long-term growth in ways fundamentally compatible with U.S. strategic interests. After all, **democracies protect private property** in important ways, **invest in public goods**, are more politically stable, make for **more dependable allies**, and empirically **do not go to war with one another**. Ultimately, a world full of democratic governments is safer, more prosperous, and more stable — all states of being that the United States has an interest in promoting. Democracy guarantees that the public has a stake in its own institutions and government, which leads to **investor confidence and growth**. Since elected politicians are accountable to property owners and are held in check by an independent judiciary, democracies tend to have better mechanisms for **protecting private property** than their autocratic counterparts. This makes democracies a **particularly attractive type of country for investors** — both public and private — because checks and balances make it difficult for the state to nationalize industries. Further, private property rights protected by the legal system **encourage entrepreneurship and small business development**, both of which are **key to a growing and modernizing economy**. As a result, democracies tend to be wealthier and more economically stable than their autocratic counterparts. This is fundamentally in the interest of the United States in that both private and public investors have an interest in seeing returns on their investments, thereby potentially making **countries less willing to go to war if that would require severing economic ties**. Democratic institutions ensure that citizens with both economic and political power are heard. Democracies also **invest in public goods at much higher rates than autocratic governments**. Because politicians must cater to the median voter, they **approve policies that invest in public education and healthcare**, both of which promote long-term growth and development. Public education invests in a country’s human capital, setting the stage for long-term innovation, adaptability, and advancement. Public healthcare, meanwhile, has been shown to **increase overall societal productivity** and well-being as people take fewer sick days, citizens are able to afford their healthcare without going bankrupt, and ultimately, the overall **costs of healthcare are driven down** as citizens become healthier. Productive, innovative societies are also better for the United States — innovation around the world improves global quality of life, results in more educational and vocational opportunities for Americans (both because other universities and jobs become more attractive to Americans who want to go abroad and because potential immigrants are more likely to want to stay in their own country, opening up opportunities for U.S. citizens at home), and may reduce friction between countries over resources and labor. Democracies are also generally more politically stable because regular election cycles ensure an established process for the habitual and peaceful removal of leaders from power. Elections ensure the non-violent transition of power and reduce the need for mass protest, rioting, and revolution — which **makes countries more politically stable**. Further, when citizens are granted rights and protections from government abuse, enforced by an independent judiciary, they have fewer grievances against the government and are thus less able to mobilize large numbers of people to violently overthrow the regime. Revolution, while not always violent, often leads to political instability, challenges to growth, **increased incentives for diversionary war and conflict**, and oftentimes civil war. The externalities of civil war and international conflict then put pressure on the United States to intervene, protect human rights, and otherwise expend resources on other countries’ issues. Further, civil wars are highly destructive to institutions, human capital, and resources, and can have significant security spillover effects, increasing global risk of political instability and **violent extremism**. This political stability, in addition to institutional checks and balances, makes **democracies better international partners and allies in the long-term**. Treaties ratified by multiple branches of government are more durable than executive agreements signed by a single leader who may be replaced within a short period of time. While democracies may be more reluctant to commit to alliances and formal security pacts, once a party to them, they are more dependable than other states with concentrated power at the executive level. **These kind of durable commitments are of interest to the United States as it seeks to preserve the liberal world order**; it is far more effective to ally with partners whose institutions make withdrawal from the alliance costly. Finally, it has been empirically observed that **democracies do not go to war with one another**. While there is a robust debate around the exact nature of the so-called “democratic peace,” it appears that there are qualities particular to democracies that make war between them particularly unlikely: a **dovish public constrains leaders’ ability to wage war**, competitive elections and a free press make it **easier to credibly communicate resolve to potential adversaries**, consolidated democracies tend to be **more wealthy and economically interdependent**, like-minded people are more hesitant to wage war against one another, and so on. Regardless of the precise mechanisms, however, a world of democracies is inherently safer, more prosperous, and less likely to initiate a war against the United States — a key factor in protecting American security and interests.