## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must define “advocacy” in a delineated line in the 1AC

#### 3 different forms of media advocacy all completely different

WVU No AuthorND, "Types of Advocacy," No Publication, https://cedwvu.org/resources/types-of-advocacy//SJJK

Advocacy involves promoting the interests or cause of someone or a group of people. An advocate is a person who argues for, recommends, or supports a cause or policy. Advocacy is also about helping people find their voice. There are three types of advocacy - self-advocacy, individual advocacy and systems advocacy. The CED is involved in all areas of advocacy for people with disabilities and their families. Self-Advocacy Self-advocacy refers to an individual's ability to effectively communicate, convey, negotiate or assert his or her own interests, desires, needs, and rights (VanReusen et al., 1994). Self-advocacy means understanding your strengths and needs, identifying your personal goals, knowing your legal rights and responsibilities, and communicating these to others. Self-Advocacy is speaking up for oneself! Individual Advocacy In individual advocacy a person or group of people concentrate their efforts on just one or two individuals. According to the group Advocacy for Inclusion "Advocacy is having someone to stand beside you if you think something is unfair or that someone is treating you badly and you would like to do something to change it." There are two common forms of individual advocacy - informal and formal advocacy. When people like parents, friends, family members or agencies speak out and advocate for vulnerable people this is termed informal advocacy. Formal advocacy more frequently involves organizations that pay their staff to advocate for someone or for a group of individuals. Systems Advocacy Systems advocacy is about changing policies, laws or rules that impact how someone lives their life. These efforts can be targeted at a local, state, or national agency. The focus can be changing laws, or simply written or unwritten policy. What is targeted depends on the type of problem and who has authority over the problem (Brain Injury Resource Center, 1998).

#### Violation: They didn’t

#### Negate:

#### 1] Shiftiness- they can redefine what type of advocacy the 1ac defends in the 1ar which decks strategy and allows them to wriggle out of negative positions which strips the neg of all our ground. If we don’t know what type of advocacy the aff deprioritizes we cant generate any offense-includes climate disads or social issue advocacy

#### CX can’t resolve this and is bad because A] Not flowed B] Skews 6 min of prep C] They can lie and no way to check D] Debaters can be shady.

#### 2] Real World- policy makers will always specify what they aim to do. That outweighs since debate has no value without portable application.

#### This spec shell isn’t regressive- it literally determines what the affirmative defends

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

#### And its not my burden to define it-the resolution is a comparitive statement you need to define both sides to compare

## 2

#### Ethics must begin a priori and the meta-ethic is bindingness.

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [2] Bindingness – I can keep asking “why should I follow this” which results in skep since obligations are predicated on ignorantly accepting rules. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason which is self-justified.

#### That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer –

#### [1] All other frameworks collapse—non-Kantian theories source obligations in extrinsically good objects, but that presupposes the goodness of the rational will.

#### [2] Aspec: JOURNALISTS CAN’T USE UTIL, PREFER DUTY BASED ETHICS

Christians 7 Christians, Clifford (Research Professor of Comunications, Professor of Journalism and Professor of Media Studies Emeritus at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) "Utilitarianism in media ethics and its discontents." Journal of Mass Media Ethics 22.2-3 (2007): 113-131.

Utilitarian ethics has major weaknesses, despite its democratic appeal. It depends on assessing the consequences accurately, when in everyday affairs the results of our choices are often unknown, at least in the long term. Blogging is a revolution in journalism at present, but how can we calculate all the changes even a decade from now? The short-term benefits of exposing corruption in a political campaign may be offset by long-term negative consequences—public hostility to an overly aggressive press. The results are frequently complicated and intertwined so that a theory staking itself on results often does not provide adequate guidelines for morally acceptable action. Among moral philosophers, the most influential critique of utilitarianism has been developed by W. David Ross.9 Ross argued against the utilitarian claim that others are morally significant to us only when our actions impact them pro or con (1930, pp. 17–21).10 We usually find ourselves confronting more than one moral claim at the same time involving different ethical principles. Asking only what produces the most good is too limiting. It does not cover the ordinary range of human relationships and circumstances. People recognize promise keeping, equal distribution, nonviolence, and preventing injury as moral principles. In various situations any of them might be the most stringent. Ordinary moral sensitivities suggest that when someone fulfills a promise because he thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear that he does so with no thought of its total consequences:: : : What makes him think it’s right to act in a certain way is the fact that he has promised to do so—that and, usually, nothing more. (Ross, 1930, p. 17) Utilitarianism as a single-consideration theory does not simply demand that we maximize general happiness, but renders irrelevant other moral imperatives that conflict with it. As Charles Taylor argued, the exactness of this one-factor model is appealing, but represents only ‘‘a semblance of validity’’ by leaving out whatever cannot be calculated (Taylor, 1982, p. 143; cf. Bowers, 2002). In some media situations, consequences are a reliable guide. But in many of the most crucial issues we face at present, utility is not adequate—for understanding distributive justice, diversity in popular culture, violence in television and cinema, truth telling, digital manipulation, conflict of interest, and so forth. We face the anomaly that the ethical system most entrenched in the media industry is not ideally suited for resolving its most persistent headaches. In an ethics of consequences, ‘‘only the future counts with respect to what is morally significant, and not the past’’ (Dyck, 1977, p. 60). Future results, even though they are hypothetical, are determinative. But why should possible benefits in the future count more, for example, than gratitude to parents for their deeds of the past? If I made a promise in the pxast, for instance, this moral duty would be the most urgent in the present. If my previous acts have harmed someone, I have a duty of reparation, that is, making up for earlier wrongs. There are duties of justice that require us to ignore or even upset the balance of happiness (Ross, 1930, p. 21). Thus an ethics of duty is a more compelling model of moral decision making. It covers the entire time frame rather than only anticipating future effects. Duty responds to a broader range of human experiences and relations. Duty recognizes that the human community requires dutiful actions to maintain its humanness. H. Richard Niebuhr, in fact, saw responsibility as inherent in our personhood. Our selfhood is manifest in the action of answering. Our relation to other selves carries moral obligation; we respond to responders; we live in responsive relations (1963, pp. 59–61, 152–160). With a similar understanding of humans as responsible agents, Emmanuel Levinas (1981) insisted that our duties to others are more fundamental to human identity than are individual rights. An ethics of duty provides a critical framework that prevents us from having our ethical theory and democratic practice slide into one another. In terms of the overall task of developing a theoretically credible media ethics, the most promising direction is a deontological one.

#### Negate:

#### [1] Objectivity censors’ journalists’ personal views and biases- that’s non universalizable

Greven 21 Greven, Alec, "Speech and Sovereignty: A Kantian Defense of Freedom of Expression" (2021). Honors Theses. 1579.  
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses/1579 Karan

I will now outline the value of communication. The capacity to effectively communicate with others is crucial for an agent to realize their distinct ends, projects, and values. All agents need to will a world in which the value of communication is preserved in order to realize their ends. Lying and censorship are two actions that subvert the value of communication. Thus, engaging in lying and censorship is usually a hypocritical action that commits an agent to a practical contradiction. It simultaneously commits an agent to a principle that the value of communication in the world should be preserved while performing actions that subvert the value of communication. If everyone lied and censored at will then the structure of communication that the agent is practically committed to would collapse. Therefore, the liar or censor makes themselves an exception to a rule which is hypocritical and fails to respect the unity of their agency and treat others with equal moral standing.

#### [2] Journalists are required to respect those they report on, thus, advocacy journalism is required to alleviate suffering

Leshilo 18 Thabo Leshilo [A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Applied Ethics for Professionals.] “Morality and Journalists: Objectivity versus Duty of Care” 13 July 2018, Johannesburg https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/26530/Morality%20and%20Journalists%20(markup)\_2.pdf?sequence=1

My view is that Detached Kevin Carter used the Sudanese child as a mere means to fame and (some mini-) fortune by simply photographing her and selling her photo; he did not treat her as a human being worthy of respect when he failed to come to her aid. In another formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant expresses the universal imperative of duty thus: “Act as though the maxim of your action were to become, through your will, a universal law of nature” ([1785] 2005, 24). The word ‘maxim’ refers to the basis on which one acts: what informs one’s action. What, indeed, would become of the world if all of us were to refuse to help people facing great hardship the way (some) journalists claim to be entitled to do? Kant also implores us to act beneficently, and might as well have had the Detached Kevin Carter in mind when he admonishes someone in a position to help, who does not: What concern of mine is it? Let each one be as happy as heaven wills, or as he can make himself; I won’t take anything from him or even envy him; but I have no desire to contribute to his welfare or help him in time of need. (25) According to Kant, although it is possible that a maxim such as the one quoted above should be a universal law of nature “it is impossible to will that it [be] so . . . [f]or a will that brought that about would conflict with itself, since instances can often arise in which the person in question would need the love and sympathy of others, and he would have no hope of getting the help he desires, being robbed of it by this law of nature springing from his own will” (ibid.). Expanding on this, Charles Fried (2007,206) says that we are all required to recognise that human beings have certain basic rights to which they are all entitled as human beings: These rights are subject to qualification only in order to ensure equal protection of the same rights in others. In this sense the view is Kantian; it requires recognition of persons as ends, and forbids the overriding of their most fundamental interests for the purpose of maximizing the happiness or welfare of others. (ibib.) Fried goes on to say that this recognition that all humans have moral entitlements, correlates with the concept of respect – the attitude which is manifested when a person observes the constraints of the principle of morality in his dealings with another person, and thus respects the basic rights of the other. Respect is also an attitude which may be taken in part as defining the concept of a person: persons are those who are obliged to observe the constraints of the principle of morality in their dealings with each other, and thus show respect towards each other. (207) On Kant’s account, a person commands respect by virtue of being a rational being. “I maintain that man – and in general every rational being – exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be used by this or that at its discretion” ([1785] 2005, 28). I argue that Kant’s ‘Formula of the End in Itself’ (or ‘Principle of Humanity’) compels journalists to go the extra mile to help alleviate the suffering of those that they report on, and even take action to save their lives. When they fail to do that and instead simply report on such plight with the clinical detachment displayed by Detached Kevin Carter towards the Sudanese child, they simply use their subjects as mere means to make money and build their careers. By acting this way, journalists act unjustly and wrongfully. That is because a victim of such tragedy would ordinarily expect another human being to help to alleviate his or her suffering.

## 3

#### PIC Text: In a democracy except Ukraine, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy. In Ukraine, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy except in Ukrainian propaganda against Russia’s invasion.

#### Ukraine war is optimistic, but maintaining outside support and low Russian morale’s key

* Ukraine getting outside help from west
* Kyiv’s history in soviet union and ties to Russia lowers morale
* Low morale destroys new conscriptions which is key for Russia
* Gives example of Ukrainian propaganda dissolving Russian army

Knispel interviewing Goemans 3-9 [Sandra Knispel, (Hein Goemans, a professor of political science at the University of Rochester, is an expert on international conflicts—on how they begin and end.) 3-9-2022, "How to end the war in Ukraine," NewsCenter, https://www.rochester.edu/newscenter/how-to-end-the-ukraine-war-514522/] Jet

Q&A with Hein Goemans One or both sides must change their demands as a precursor to ending the war. What’s likely to happen in the current scenario? Putin made a big mistake by committing himself to total victory in Ukraine. Goemans: It depends on the performance on the battlefield, and a country’s expectations of outside help. Russia should have become more pessimistic in the last few days because Ukraine has shown its ability to inflict far greater costs on Russia than the Kremlin had anticipated. One would expect Russia therefore to lower its demands but we’ve seen very little evidence of that so far—only the demand of denazification seems to have been dropped. Overall, Putin still maintains that everything is going according to plan. If this continues, Ukrainian sovereignty may be at stake, which is dangerous and perhaps even stupid of Putin, who seems to be committing himself to total victory. If he can’t get it, he’ll be responsible and that makes a coup against him more likely. How has the situation changed for Ukraine and its demands for ending the war? Ukraine right now is not likely to accept anything less than full independence as a nation. Goemans: Ukraine must have gotten a lot more optimistic in recent days. Not just because its army has been doing reasonably well but because of the demonstrated incompetence of the Russian army. Yes, the Russians are still much stronger and much bigger, but there are problems with morale in the Russian army, and you see the remarkable level of Ukrainian support from the West. Ukrainians are still fighting for independence of their homeland and may maintain their claims to Luhansk and Donetsk in the Donbas region in south-eastern Ukraine. I don’t know whether they’d willing to give up Crimea at this point. One avenue worth exploring in peace negotiations might be true plebiscites, overseen by international observers. Can Putin credibly commit not to go beyond the invasion of Ukraine? In his February 21 speech, he expressed his aim to reconstitute the Russian Empire. Goemans: No, he cannot. Nobody would believe him if he said he’d stop at Ukraine. People are pointing to the failed attempt to appease Hitler with the Munich Agreement in 1938. So that’s a non-starter, especially with Putin’s February 21st speech in which he said he wants to reconstitute greater Russia or the Russian Empire. Western nations can no longer say, ‘Oh, he doesn’t mean that. We can still do business there and we can have gas if we give him just a little bit, maybe two Ukrainian towns or so.’ He made that impossible. Yes, the analogy is overused, but it really is like Hitler in 1938. People heard the speech and the appeasement alarm bells went off. Global view of Russia and former Soviet satellite countries labeled. (University of Rochester illustration / Michael Osadciw) A deciding factor in this war is going to happen in the next couple of weeks. Can you explain the role of Russian conscripts in this context? The question is how many new conscripts will actually show up because it’ll determine the strength of the Russian army on the ground in Ukraine. Goemans: There are two things to keep in mind: First, the new Russian conscription class is going to be drafted in April. It’ll be very informative to see how many people do not show up. Secondly, are the Russians really going to bomb Kyiv, a so-called “hero city of the Soviet Union,” into rubble like they did with Chechnya’s capital Grosny? Are they willing to kill tens of thousands of people? Those two benchmarks will happen in the next few weeks. How precarious is the situation for Putin’s own survival? He may keep fighting, even if he knows he’s losing, because the alternative may mean signing his own death warrant. Goemans: Putin may count on the fact that Ukrainians will give in if Kyiv is bombed. But if they don’t, that should make him more pessimistic. One would think that he’d have to lower his demands, and that at that point, some kind of deal would be possible. But Putin must come home with some kind of victory because otherwise he’s literally dead. That means he may keep fighting, even if he knows he’s losing, because the alternative is signing his own death warrant. That’s what happened in the First World War. Germany kept fighting for years, even though the leadership knew that they were losing within the first weeks of the war. You’re not hyperbolic when you say Putin is signing his own death warrant with a defeat? History has plenty of examples here. Goemans: No, I’m not. In a regime like Russia—which is clearly not a democracy, but also not quite a dictatorship—if you win a war, you’re the great hero; if you lose a war, you have shown your incompetence and you’ll be removed, which I have explored in my own research. You’ll be held as what’s known as a “culpable leader”—culpable for the fact that the gains of the war do not outweigh the losses. Historically such leaders have been removed from office, and they either have gone into exile, or have been jailed or killed. A recent example is the former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. What’s frightening, and there are already signs of this, is that Putin is moving towards a dictatorship because only full repression will prevent a coup against him. In that case, both the Russian and the Ukrainian people will suffer horribly. What do you think would happen with the war if Putin’s regime were to be overthrown? “Most likely, Ukraine would strengthen its demands and now want Crimea back.” Goemans: It’s possible that the entire Russian superstructure would be wiped out—not just Putin, but all his cronies, his security advisers, the oligarchs. That whole top layer could be removed. So the question is, if there’s a coup against Putin, what would the new Russian government insist on? They’re not necessarily all going to say, “Okay, sorry Ukraine, we made a mistake. Please excuse us.” And Ukrainians would not necessarily accept that anyway. Most likely, Ukraine would strengthen its demands and want Crimea back. Putin has said he wants to effect regime change in Ukraine—would a new government even have any credibility with Ukrainians? Ukrainians have become unified against Russia. Goemans: I don’t think so. There’s a new serious form of unity among the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian identity, and it’s in direct opposition to the Russians. It would be very dangerous for any Ukrainian government to be seen as colluding with Russia. Any such attempt would likely result in the formation of independent fighting units that would keep going to get the Russians out of Ukraine. What are the minimum terms the West can accept? The West cannot accept Putin’s winning in Ukraine, but they might we willing to accept concessions on the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, if Ukraine is willing to entertain that. Goemans: That’s an important question. The West—that is Western Democracies—cannot, in my opinion, accept a victorious Putin. The West is genuinely and correctly afraid of “salami tactics”—if he takes Ukraine, he will next take Georgia, and then he will go to the Baltics. Annexation wouldn’t end, so it has to stop now. Particularly because Putin so unmistakably declared his intentions in that speech on February 21st. Would the West accept Crimea as being Russian? I don’t know. Would the West accept Luhansk along the provincial administrative borders (which is not the same as the current line of control, which is currently roughly half of the of the provinces)? I doubt that. I think the West may demand a return to the status quo ante. I don’t know if they can get that. Maybe Ukraine would have to give up the entire administrative region of Luhansk and Donetsk. But the West will want to go back to the status quo. When do you think the war will end? Either in the next month and a half, or it’ll be years. Goemans: Either in the next month and a half, or it’ll be years. Months, if the new class of Russian conscripts in April fails to turn up. Otherwise I’m not optimistic. It’ll be ongoing bloodshed, pulverizing of Ukrainian cities, coupled with insurgencies, and Russia will never have full control of Ukraine. But going back to the video of the captured Russian soldier who was ashamed of taking part in the invasion of Ukraine: If he returns to Russia, he’ll most likely be killed. Yet, he’s speaking up and he’s hoping that he affects another guy, and then maybe two other guys, and it spreads like that. That’s how an army dissolves. On the other hand, that’s also how a Ukrainian army becomes more determined.

#### Ukrainian propaganda is key to defeating Russia.

Stuart A. Thompson 22 (reporter in the technology department covering misinformation and disinformation.) and Davey Alba (technology reporter covering disinformation. In 2019, she won a Livingston Award for excellence in international reporting and a Mirror Award) 3/3/2022, nytimes, Fact and Mythmaking Blend in Ukraine’s Information War, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/technology/ukraine-war-misinfo.html

Just days into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a pilot with a mysterious nickname was quickly becoming the conflict’s first wartime hero. Named the Ghost of Kyiv, the ace fighter had apparently single-handedly shot down several Russian fighter jets. The story was shared by the official Ukraine Twitter account on Sunday in a thrilling montage video set to thumping music, showing the fighter swooping through the Ukrainian skies as enemy planes exploded around him. The Security Service of Ukraine, the country’s main security agency, also relayed the tale on its official Telegram channel, which has over 700,000 subscribers. The story of a single pilot’s beating the superior Russian air force found wide appeal online, thanks to the official Ukraine accounts and many others. Videos of the so-called Ghost of Kyiv had more than 9.3 million views on Twitter, and the flier was mentioned in thousands of Facebook groups reaching up to 717 million followers. On YouTube, videos promoting the Ukrainian fighter collected 6.5 million views, while TikTok videos with the hashtag #ghostofkyiv reached 200 million views. There was just one problem: The Ghost of Kyiv may be a myth. While there are reports of some Russian planes that were destroyed in combat, there is no information linking them to a single Ukrainian pilot. One of the first videos that went viral, which was included in the montage shared by the official Ukraine Twitter account, was a computer rendering from a combat flight simulator originally uploaded by a YouTube user with just 3,000 subscribers. And a photo supposedly confirming the fighter’s existence, shared by a former president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, was from a 2019 Twitter post by the Ukrainian defense ministry. When the fact-checking website Snopes published an article debunking the video, some social media users pushed back. “Why can’t we just let people believe some things?” one Twitter user replied. “If the Russians believe it, it brings fear. If the Ukrainians believe it, it gives them hope.” **In the information war over the invasion of Ukraine, some of the country’s official accounts have pushed stories with questionable veracity, spreading anecdotes, gripping on-the-ground accounts and even some unverified information that was later proved false, in a rapid jumble of fact and myth.** The claims by Ukraine do not compare to the falsehoods being spread by Russia, which laid the groundwork for a “false flag” operation in the lead-up to the invasion, which the Biden administration sought to derail. As the invasion neared, Russia falsely claimed that it was responding to Ukrainian aggression and liberating citizens from fascists and neo-Nazis. And since the assault began, Russia made baseless claims that Ukrainians had indiscriminately bombed hospitals and killed civilians. **Instead, Ukraine’s online propaganda is largely focused on its heroes and martyrs, characters who help dramatize tales of Ukrainian fortitude and Russian aggression.** But the Ukrainian claims on social media have also raised thorny questions about how false and unproven content should be handled during war — when lives are at stake and a Western ally is fighting for its survival against a powerful invading force. **“Ukraine is involved in pretty classic propaganda,” said Laura Edelson, a computer scientist studying misinformation at New York University. “They are telling stories that support their narrative. Sometimes false information is making its way in there, too, and more of it is getting through because of the overall environment.” Anecdotes detailing Ukrainian bravery or Russian brutality are crucial to the country’s war plan, according to experts, and they are part of established war doctrine that values winning not just individual skirmishes but also the hearts and minds of citizens and international observers. That is especially important during this conflict, as Ukrainians try to keep morale high among the fighters and marshal global support for their cause. “If Ukraine had no messages of the righteousness of its cause, the popularity of its cause, the valor of its heroes, the suffering of its populace, then it would lose,” said Peter W. Singer, a strategist and senior fellow at New America, a think tank in Washington. “Not just the information war, but it would lose the overall war.”** In previous wars, combatants would try to sabotage enemy communication and limit the spread of wartime propaganda, even cutting physical communication lines like telegraph cables. **But there are fewer such cables in the internet age, so in addition to downing communication towers and disrupting pockets of internet access, the modern strategy involves flooding the internet with viral messages that drown out opposing narratives. That digital battle moved at startling speed, experts noted, using an array of social media accounts, official websites and news conferences streamed online to spread Ukraine’s message. “You have to have the message that goes the most viral,” Mr. Singer said.** That was the case with another report from Ukraine involving a remarkable confrontation on Snake Island, an outpost in the Black Sea. According to an audio recording released by Pravda, a Ukrainian newspaper, and later verified by Ukraine officials, 13 border guards were offered a frightening ultimatum by an advancing Russian military unit: Surrender or face an attack. The Ukrainians responded instead with an expletive, before apparently being killed. Audio of the exchange went viral on social media, and the clip posted on Feb. 24 by Pravda received more than 3.5 million views on YouTube. President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine personally announced the deaths in a video, saying each guard would be awarded the title Hero of Ukraine. But just days later, Ukrainian officials confirmed in a Facebook post that the men were still alive, taken prisoner by Russian forces. Social media has become the main conduit for pushing the information, verified or not, giving tech companies a role in the information war, too. The fake Ghost of Kyiv video, for instance, was flagged as “out of context” by Twitter, but the montage posted to Ukraine’s official Twitter account received no such flag. The false photo posted by Mr. Poroshenko, the former Ukrainian president, also had no flag. While Twitter monitors its service for harmful content, including manipulated or mislabeled videos, it said tweets simply mentioning the Ghost of Kyiv did not violate its rules. “When we identify content and accounts that violate the Twitter Rules, we’ll take enforcement action,” the company said. In exercising discretion over how unverified or false content is moderated, social media companies have decided to “pick a side,” said Alex Stamos, the director of the Stanford Internet Observatory and a former head of security at Facebook. **“I think this demonstrates the limits of ‘fact-checking’ in a fast-moving battle with real lives at stake,” Mr. Stamos said. He added that technology platforms never created rules against misinformation overall, instead targeting specific behaviors, actors and content. That leaves the truth behind some wartime narratives, like an apparent assassination plot against Mr. Zelensky or simply the number of troops killed in battle, fairly elusive, even as official accounts and news media share the information.** Those narratives have continued as the war marches on, revealing the contours of an information war aimed not just at Western audiences but also at Russian citizens. At the United Nations on Monday, the Ukrainian ambassador, Sergiy Kyslytsya, shared a series of text messages that he said had been retrieved from the phone of a dead Russian soldier. **“Mama, I’m in Ukraine. There is a real war raging here. I’m afraid,” the Russian soldier apparently wrote, according to Mr. Kyslytsya’s account, which he read in Russian. The tale seemed to evoke a narrative advanced by officials and shared extensively on social media that Russian soldiers are poorly trained and too young, and don’t want to be fighting their Ukrainian neighbors. “We are bombing all of the cities together, even targeting civilians.” The story, whether true or not, appears tailor-made for Russian civilians — particularly parents fretting over the fate of their enlisted children, experts said. “This is an age-old tactic that the Ukrainians are trying to use, and that is to draw the attention of the mothers and the families in Russia away from the more grandiose aims for war onto, instead, the human costs of war,” said Ian Garner, a historian focusing on Russia who has followed Russian-language propaganda during the conflict. “We know that this is really effective.”** Official Ukrainian accounts have also uploaded dozens of videos purportedly showing Russian prisoners of war, some with bloody bandages covering their arms or face. In the videos, the prisoners are heard denouncing the invasion. The videos may raise questions about whether Ukraine is violating the Geneva Conventions, which has rules about sharing images of war prisoners. Russia has also engaged in its own form of mythmaking, but experts say it has been far less effective. Rather than targeting international observers with emotional appeals, Russia has focused on swaying its own population to build support for the battle, Dr. Garner said. Since Russian state media is still calling the conflict a “special military operation” and not a war — in line with the description used by President Vladimir V. Putin — state broadcasters are left “trying to talk about a war that is apparently not happening,” Dr. Garner said. **The Russian government “can’t play to its strongest narratives of individual sacrifice,” he added, instead relying on stories of Ukrainians bombing hospitals and civilians, providing no evidence. Ukraine’s efforts to amplify its own messages also leave little room for Russia to dominate the conversation, said Mr. Singer, the strategist from New America.** “A key to information warfare in the age of social media is to recognize that the audience is both target of and participant in it,” he said. He added that social media users were “hopefully sharing out those messages, which makes them combatants of a sort as well.”

#### Ukraine’s info war is key to defeating Russia.

Sinan Aral 22 (director of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy and author of "The Hype Machine) 3/1/2022, Ukraine is winning the information war, Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/01/information-war-zelensky-ukraine-putin-russia/>

**Today, the information war in Ukraine is more intense, more tightly contested and arguably more important than ever because motivating volunteer fighters at home and encouraging foreign support abroad are critical to success. And this time, it seems, Russia is losing. Reports abound on social media of more than 4,000 Russian casualties, images of crippled Russian helicopters and armored vehicles and cellphone videos of savage Russian missile attacks on civilian targets. This mix of official Ukrainian war statistics combined with videos (both verified and unverified), posted by Ukrainian citizens and sympathizers from the front lines, is painting a vivid picture of a homegrown resistance successfully slowing the advance of a much larger and ostensibly better organized military machine. Facebook posts showing Ukrainians kneeling in front of tanks to stop their progress and Twitter images of women and children sheltering in subways and basements set the emotional backdrop of senseless aggression against a peaceful nation. Viral videos and audio clips evoke a defiant optimism impossible to ignore: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appearing via his cellphone walking the streets of Kyiv, unharmed, in a “proof of life” demonstration emphasizing his willingness to stay and fight for his country, despite a U.S. offer to evacuate him, for example, or the recording of soldiers in an isolated Ukrainian outpost on Snake Island, in the Black Sea, cursing and telling off the Russian Black Sea Fleet. These stories are spreading rapidly on social media and subsequently echoing through official news channels in a media feedback loop that amplifies the information war and broadcasts it on television sets all over the world.** Zelensky, in particular, is deftly outmaneuvering Putin in this information war. He rallied Ukrainian men to defend their homeland, used the encrypted messaging platform [Telegram to speak directly to the Russian people](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMTeSsnNCw0) to counter Putin’s narrative, urged the West to step up its assistance in defense of law, order and peace, and even [pleaded with foreigners](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/russia-ukraine-live-updates-n1290057/ncrd1290087#liveBlogCards) to cross the border into Ukraine to defend Western democracy. While misinformation exists on both sides, Zelensky gives the impression that he’s more committed to truth and transparency. In contrast, Russia has been secretive, obfuscating the true extent of its incursion into Ukraine, and out of touch, airing the rambling addresses of its leader. It’s as if Putin has forgotten that social media transitioned from text to real-time video around the time of the Crimean annexation. In today’s information war, Russian news claiming Zelensky had turned tail and fled was swiftly countered by a video selfie of the Ukrainian president in Kyiv, vowing to defend his homeland. The symbolic contrast between Zelensky striding through war-torn streets, confident even under fire, and Putin, seated, hunched over a large wooden desk in the safety of a secure office hundreds of miles away from the fighting, is stark. This time, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Google are also proactively engaged in the information war. During the Crimean annexation, they were reactive and struggled to keep up with misinformation and false abuse reports. Today, in Ukraine, they have [banned Russian state-owned media from advertising on their platforms](https://www.axios.com/youtube-meta-twitter-restrict-russian-state-media-323d966f-531e-40f5-aa06-3b82998589df.html) and [defiantly fact-checked](https://www.theverge.com/2022/2/25/22950874/russia-facebook-blocked-roskomnadzor-media-censorship) Putin’s propaganda despite Russia’s protests and a full ban of Twitter and a partial ban of Facebook in Russia. Facebook has spun up a special operations center, staffed with native Russian and Ukrainian speakers, to monitor misinformation posted about the war, added warning labels to war-related images that its software detects are more than a year old, and restricted access to content from the state-affiliated Russian media outlets RT and Sputnik. YouTube is restricting access to Russian state-owned media outlets for users in Ukraine, removing Russian state-owned channels from recommendations, and limiting their content’s reach across the platform. Twitter has temporarily banned all ads in Ukraine and Russia, added labels to tweets with links to Russian state-affiliated media and downranked their content in algorithmic timelines. While numerous fake videos are circulating on TikTok about Ukraine, the Chinese-owned platform has no comprehensive policy on policing information about the conflict. Despite blocking state-owned Russian media in the European Union, this information flows freely in Ukraine and Russia on the platform, now dubbed “WarTok” by some observers, in part because it is organizing such videos into a convenient discover playlist by the same name. **The information war is critical to what happens next in Ukraine for several reasons. It motivates the resistance by inspiring Ukrainian citizens to take up arms in defense of their country and motivating them with social proof that they are united and not fighting alone. It encourages foreign assistance, pressuring Europe and the United States to step up their efforts to end the conflict. It fans the flames of protest in Russia, mobilizing the antiwar movement in Moscow and elsewhere in defiance of Putin’s aggression. And it may even eventually demoralize Russian troops, who must be wondering what on earth they are doing in Ukraine if the motivation for the intervention has been a lie all along. When Russia struck a Ukrainian television tower on Tuesday, it seemed to confirm Moscow’s keen awareness of the need to counter Ukraine’s information war and to highlight the importance of information in modern conflicts. Information campaigns are difficult to quantify during the fog of war. But while it is hard to pinpoint the extent to which the information war is contributing to the overwhelming international unity against Putin’s aggression, one thing is clear: Social media, mainstream media and the narrative framing of the invasion of Ukraine undoubtedly will play an important role in how this conflict ends. Now, vigilance and fortitude are not only needed on the battlefield, where lives and territory will be won and lost, but also will be essential online, where the hearts and minds of the world will be won or lost.**

#### Russian win would lead to nuclear escalation in multiple forums – goes global.

LIANA FIX 22 (Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, in Washington, D.C). MICHAEL KIMMAGE (Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. )2/18/22, What If Russia Wins? A Kremlin-Controlled Ukraine Would Transform Europe, Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins>

If Russia gains control of Ukraine or manages to destabilize it on a major scale, a new era for the United States and for Europe will begin. U.S. and European leaders would face the dual challenge of rethinking European security and of not being drawn into a larger war with Russia. All sides would have to consider the potential of nuclear-armed adversaries in direct confrontation. These two responsibilities—robustly defending European peace and prudently avoiding military escalation with Russia—will not necessarily be compatible. The United States and its allies could find themselves deeply unprepared for the task of having to create a new European security order as a result of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine.

MANY WAYS TO WIN

For Russia, victory in Ukraine could take various forms. As in [Syria](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2016-03-20/russias-pyrrhic-victory-syria), victory does not have to result in a sustainable settlement. It could involve the installation of a compliant government in Kyiv or the partition of the country. Alternatively, the defeat of the Ukrainian military and the negotiation of a Ukrainian surrender could effectively transform Ukraine into a failed state. Russia could also employ devastating cyberattacks and disinformation tools, backed by the threat of force, to cripple the country and induce regime change. With any of these outcomes, Ukraine will have been effectively detached from the West.

If Russia achieves its political aims in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not be what it was before the war. Not only will U.S. primacy in Europe have been qualified; any sense that the European Union or NATO can ensure peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost age. Instead, security in Europe will have to be reduced to defending the core members of the EU and NATO. Everyone outside the clubs will stand alone, with the exception of Finland and Sweden. This may not necessarily be a conscious decision to end enlargement or association policies; but it will be de facto policy. Under a perceived siege by Russia, the EU and NATO will no longer have the capacity for ambitious policies beyond their own borders.

The United States and Europe will also be in a state of permanent economic war with Russia. The West will seek to enforce sweeping sanctions, which Russia is likely to parry with cyber-measures and energy blackmailing, given the economic asymmetries. China might well stand on Russia’s side in this economic tit for tat. Meanwhile, domestic politics in European countries will resemble a twenty-first-century great game, in which Russia will be studying Europe for any breakdown in the commitment to NATO and to the transatlantic relationship. Through methods fair and foul, Russia will take whatever opportunity comes its way to influence public opinion and elections in European countries. Russia will be an anarchic presence—sometimes real, sometimes imagined—in every instance of European political instability.

Cold War analogies will not be helpful in a world with a Russianized Ukraine. The Cold War border in Europe had its flash points, but it was stabilized in a mutually acceptable fashion in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. By contrast, Russian suzerainty over Ukraine would open a vast zone of destabilization and insecurity from Estonia to Poland to Romania to Turkey. For as long as it lasts, Russia’s presence in Ukraine will be perceived by Ukraine’s neighbors as provocative and unacceptable and, for some, as a threat to their own security. Amid this shifting dynamic, order in Europe will have to be conceived of in primarily military terms—which, since Russia has a stronger hand in the military than in the economic realm, will be in the Kremlin’s interest—sidelining nonmilitary institutions such as the European Union.

Russia has Europe’s largest conventional military, which it is more than ready to use. The EU’s defense policy—in contrast to NATO’s—is far from being able to provide security for its members. Thus will military reassurance, especially of the EU’s eastern members, be key. Responding to a revanchist Russia with sanctions and with the rhetorical proclamation of a rules-based international order will not be sufficient.

IMPERILING EUROPE'S EAST

In the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, Germany‘s position in Europe will be severely challenged. Germany is a marginal military power that has based its postwar political identity on the rejection of war. The ring of friends it has surrounded itself with, especially in the east with Poland and the Baltic states, risks being destabilized by Russia. France and the United Kingdom will assume leading roles in European affairs by virtue of their comparatively strong militaries and long tradition of military interventions. The key factor in Europe, however, will remain the United States. NATO will depend on U.S. support as will the anxious and imperiled countries of Europe’s east, the frontline nations arrayed along a now very large, expanded, and uncertain line of contact with Russia, including Belarus and the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine.

Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, will likely have substantial numbers of NATO troops permanently stationed on their soil. A request from Finland and Sweden to gain an Article 5 commitment and to join NATO would be impossible to reject. In Ukraine, EU and NATO countries will never recognize a new Russian-backed regime created by Moscow. But they will face the same challenge they do with Belarus: wielding sanctions without punishing the population and supporting those in need without having access to them. Some NATO members will bolster a Ukrainian insurgency, to which Russia will respond by threatening NATO members.

Ukraine’s predicament will be very great. Refugees will flee in multiple directions, quite possibly in the millions. And those parts of the Ukrainian military that are not directly defeated will continue fighting, echoing the partisan warfare that tore apart this whole region of Europe during and after World War II.

The permanent state of escalation between Russia and Europe may stay cold from a military perspective. It is likely, though, to be economically hot. The sanctions put on Russia in 2014, which were connected to formal diplomacy (often referred to as the “Minsk” process, after the city in which the negotiations were held), were not draconian. They were reversible as well as conditional. Following a Russian invasion of Ukraine, new sanctions on banking and on technology transfer would be significant and permanent. They would come in the wake of failed diplomacy and would start at “the top of the ladder,” according to the U.S. administration. In response, Russia will retaliate, quite possibly in the cyber-domain as well as in the energy sector. Moscow will limit access to critical goods such as titanium, of which Russia has been the world’s second-largest exporter. This war of attrition will test both sides. Russia will be ruthless in trying to get one or several European states to back away from economic conflict by linking a relaxation in tension to these countries’ self-interest, thus undermining consensus in the EU and NATO.

Europe’s strong suit is its economic leverage. Russia’s asset will be any source of domestic division or disruption in Europe or in Europe’s transatlantic partners. Here Russia will be proactive and opportunistic. If a pro-Russian movement or candidate shows up, that candidate can be encouraged directly or indirectly. If an economic or political sore point diminishes the foreign policy efficacy of the United States and its allies, it will be a weapon for Russian propaganda efforts and for Russian espionage.

Much of this is already happening. But a war in Ukraine will up the ante. Russia will use more resources and be unchained in its choice of instruments. The massive refugee flows arriving in Europe will exacerbate the EU’s unresolved refugee policy and provide fertile ground for populists. The holy grail of these informational, political, and cyberbattles will be the 2024 presidential election in the United States. Europe’s future will depend on this election. The election of Donald Trump or of a Trumpian candidate might destroy the transatlantic relationship at Europe’s hour of maximum peril, putting into question NATO’s position and its security guarantees for Europe.

TURNING NATO INWARD

For the United States, a Russian victory would have profound effects on its grand strategy in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. First, Russian success in Ukraine would require Washington to pivot to Europe. No ambiguity about NATO’s Article 5 (of the kind experienced under Trump) will be permissible. Only a strong U.S. commitment to European security will prevent Russia from dividing European countries from one another. This will be difficult in light of competing priorities, especially those that confront the United States in a deteriorating relationship with China. But the interests at stake are fundamental. The United States has very large commercial equities in Europe. The European Union and the United States are each other’s largest trade and investment partners, with trade in goods and services totaling $1.1 trillion in 2019. A well-functioning, peaceful Europe augments American foreign policy—on climate change, on nonproliferation, on global public health, and on the management of tensions with China or Russia. If Europe is destabilized, then the United States will be much more alone in the world.

NATO is the logical means by which the United States can provide security reassurance to Europe and deter Russia. A war in Ukraine would revive NATO not as a democracy-building enterprise or as a tool for out-of-area expeditions like the war in Afghanistan but as the unsurpassed defensive military alliance that it was designed to be. Although Europeans will be demanding a greater military commitment to Europe from the United States, a broader Russian invasion of Ukraine should drive every NATO member to increase its defense spending. For Europeans, this would be the final call to improve Europe’s defensive capabilities—in tandem with the United States—in order to help the United States manage the Russian-Chinese dilemma.

For a Moscow now in permanent confrontation with the West, Beijing could serve as an economic backstop and a partner in opposing U.S. hegemony. In the worst case for U.S. grand strategy, China might be emboldened by Russia’s assertiveness and threaten confrontation over Taiwan. But there is no guarantee that an escalation in Ukraine will benefit the Sino-Russian relationship. China’s ambition to become the central node of the Eurasian economy will be damaged by war in Europe, because of the brutal uncertainties war brings. Chinese irritation with a Russia on the march will not enable a rapprochement between Washington and [Beijing](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/competition-with-china-without-catastrophe), but it may initiate new conversations.