## 1

#### Liquidity stays robust in 2021 despite challenges – status-quo ensures declines are controlled.

Lokeshwarri 21 [SK; Chief of Research Bureau; “3 reasons why market liquidity will stay robust in 2021,” BusinessLine; 1/3/21; <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/data-stories/deep-dive/3-reasons-why-market-liquidity-will-stay-robust-in-2021/article33487346.ece>] Justin

As we step into 2021, investors in Indian equity market have much to be thankful for. While the deep cut in March 2020 — that made the Nifty50 and the Sensex lose almost 40 per cent from the January peak — had everyone losing their head in worry, all the losses were recouped in the following months. The benchmark indices have gained a whopping 79 per cent from the March lows and ended the year with gains of over 15 per cent.

It’s clear that investors are chasing growth, making valuation pricey in select pockets, even as value continues to exist in cyclical stocks. The question that begs an answer now is: will this rally continue in 2021? That depends, to a large extent, on the demand for stocks, also called market liquidity. There are three main reasons why liquidity will remain robust in 2021 as well. While market corrections and sporadic volatility cannot be ruled out, these factors will ensure that the declines do not get too serious.

Interest rates at rock bottom

One of the principal reasons why investors flocked to equity markets after March 2020 was due to the large interest rate cuts by all central banks including the RBI to stimulate the economy. The RBI slashed the repo rate from 5.15 per cent towards the beginning of 2020 to 4 per cent by May; the lowest level in two decades. This made banks lower their deposit rates making fixed income investments unattractive. It needs to be noted the Indian central bank has been consistently lowering rates since 2012, when the repo rate was 8.5 per cent, in a bid to boost growth. This has been one of the drivers of the structural bull-run since 2013.

Other central banks including the US Federal Reserve also similarly slashed rates in March and April. As the accompanying table shows, policy rates of countries such as the US, UK, Canada, Australia, Norway, etc are close to zero; while countries such as Switzerland, Denmark, Japan and the Euro zone have negative policy rates. Maximum global wealth lies in the US and Europe with most FPIs originating from these regions. It is, therefore, not surprising that the hunt for higher returns attracted these investors to Indian stocks.

With global monetary policy expected to be dovish through 2021, the FPI flows in to India equity is likely to be supportive this year.

Dollar movement and global central bank stimulus

Another factor that needs to be tracked closely to gauge liquidity in stock market is the movement of the US dollar. Dollar along with gold is a safe haven with value increasing in times of extreme risk-off sentiments, due to money flowing in to US treasury instruments.

If we track the long-term movement of the dollar index, it can be noted that the index consistently moved lower from 116 in 2002 to 73 in 2008. This was the period of an unbridled bull-run in most equity markets. The period from 2014 to 2016, when the dollar index rallied was accompanied by volatility in global stocks.

The dollar index is once again weak. The weakness is partly on account of the Federal Reserve’s next tranche of stimulus announced recently and the unlimited dollar printing. But it also signifies that there is certain degree of complacency in financial markets regarding the ability of the central banks to keep economies afloat. This is making money move out of the haven of dollar-denominated securities. Continued dollar weakness in 2021 will keep the bias of FPIs tilted towards equities in emerging markets such as India.

The other factor that is supplying liquidity to markets is the stimulus funding being unleashed by Advanced Economies. Some of this money tends to move in to risky assets as the flood of money coupled with lows interest rates in these economies boosts currency carry trades.

Vaccine roll-out, normalisation of economic activity

As far as domestic liquidity goes, there isn’t much to worry about. Though equity oriented mutual funds have witnessed outflows over the last five months, there are other indications that domestic investors have enough liquidity on their hands. One, turnover on domestic stock exchanges has been booming with cash volumes almost doubling since April 2020. Two, the massive over-subscription in IPOs shows that people have surplus on their hands which they are willing to deploy in to stocks.

Also, the Covid-led job losses has not really affected the upper and upper-middle class much. A survey by UBS of 1,508 consumers aged between 18 and 54 found that while 47 per cent of the respondents saw a decline in income in 2020, 49 per cent witnessed stable income or an increase. Also, close to two-thirds of respondents expect income to increase in 2021.

While economic growth is largely expected to contract in the 8-10 per cent range in FY21, most research houses think that growth in FY22 in India will be the fastest globally, around 8 per cent. Revival in activity, of course, hinges on the vaccine roll-out and people getting the confidence to resume activities at pre-Covid levels. With over 56 per cent of the country’s GDP being derived by consumption, success of the vaccine and elimination of the Covid virus would be the key to sustained earnings growth in companies.

One negative fall-out of easing of movement restriction and end of work-from-home would be the inability of the people to trade from offices due to the restrictions in office Wi-Fi and other protocols. This could dampen trading turnover to some extent, though it won’t have a material affect on investing behaviour.

#### The plan collapses market liquidity – our evidence is super recent and really good.

* DiD- Difference in Difference

Dass et al 21 [Nishant Dass, Vikram Nanda, Steven Xiao; Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology Rutgers Business School; “Intellectual Property Protection and Financial Markets: Patenting versus Secrecy,” 4/22/21 (**The download site says 4/22/21 but the pdf says 11/20/20 so I just put the former – correct if wrong**); <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2648770&download=yes>] Justin

5.2.1 TRIPS and Patents

First, we test Hypothesis H1 for the effect of TRIPS on patenting. Our prediction is that stronger international patent protection will encourage firms in patent–reliant industries to use patents over trade secrecy to protect their IPs. We formally test the effect of TRIPS on patenting and stock liquidity (H1) using the following DiD model:

Patentsi,t = α1 + β1Post–TRIPSi,t × Treatedj + γ 0 1CONT ROLi,t−1 + φi + ψt + i,t. (4)

We estimate Model (4) over a five–year window, [t−2, t+ 2], around the implementation of TRIPS. Patents are counted based on the timing of either applications or issuances. Since the implementation of TRIPS in the United States was enforced by the passage of URAA on December 8, 1994, and it became effective on January 1, 1995, we define 1995 as the event year and test the DiD model in a five–year window centered on 1995.20 Post–TRIPSi,t is a binary variable that equals one if the observation is in or after 1995, and equals zero otherwise. We consider industries that are reliant on patents as the treated group. Following Delgado, Kyle, and McGahan (2013), we categorize four–digit NAICS industries as patent–reliant or not based on a 2012 report by the Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA) and the USPTO. Our prediction based on H1 is that the estimate of β1 on the interaction term should be significantly positive.

Since our analysis focuses on firms’ patenting decisions and stock liquidity, we follow the literature and control for a set of firm and industry characteristics that are likely related to firms’ patenting activities and/or stock liquidity. We include firm size and age because older and larger firms tend to generate more patents (Atanassov, 2015). We include asset characteristics for cash holding and tangibility, because asset liquidity is correlated with stock liquidity (Gopalan, Kadan, and Pevzner, 2012). We include firm performance using Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) because firms with better performance tend to be more innovative and have higher stock liquidity. We include industry concentration using the Herfindahl–Hirschman index at four–digit NAICS industry level because corporate innovation is related to the level of product market competition (Aghion et al., 2005). We include the number of analysts following the stock, which is related to higher stock liquidity (Balakrishnan et al., 2014). Standard errors are estimated with clustering at the four–digit NAICS industry level to account for within–industry correlation in patenting activity.21

We estimate this model in four different forms to account for the fact that the number of patent applications and the number of patent grants are count variables with high skewness (see Table 1). The first one is a linear regression with log one plus the number of patent applications or patent grants as the dependent variable. The second one is a negative binomial regression with the number of patent applications or patent grants as the dependent variable. The third one is a Poisson regression with the number of patent applications or patent grants as the dependent variable. The fourth one is a logit regression in which the dependent variable is a binary variable that equals one if a firm has any patent applications or patent grants in a year. Across all forms of regressions, we control for firm fixed effects and year fixed effects, and, thus, the stand–alone variables Post–TRIPS and Treated are absorbed by the fixed effects and cannot be estimated.22

Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates of Model (4). The estimates in columns 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 show that the number of both patent applications and patent grants for firms in patent– reliant industries significantly increased after the implementation of TRIPS. These increases are also economically significant. For example, the linear regression estimates in column 1 (5) suggest that the number of patent applications (patent grants) increased by 10.2% (7.7%) in the post–TRIPS period. Based on Lemley’s (1994) estimate that the average patentee received 253 additional days of protection with the new term conferred by the URAA, our estimates suggest that firms in patent– reliant industries increase the number of patent applications (patent grants) by 0.04% (0.03%) for every additional day of patent protection. In columns 2, 3, 6, and 7, where we present estimates of negative binomial regressions and Poisson regressions, the sample size falls by more than half. This is because firms with zero patents throughout the sample period are dropped from the regression as the outcome variables are perfectly explained by firm fixed effects. Nevertheless, the DiD estimates remain robustly positive in these regressions.23

In columns 4 and 8, where we present estimates of logit regressions, the sample size is even smaller because firms that have non–zero patents every year in the sample period are also dropped from the regression. In the logit regressions, the DiD estimates are insignificant. These results suggest that the increase in the number of patents is not driven by the extensive margin, which would be the case if firms that did not patents prior to TRIPS started patenting afterward. Instead, the results are driven by the intensive margin, whereby firms that patented prior to TRIPS increased their patenting activity after TRIPS. A plausible explanation is that the marginal benefits of a longer patent term and the international enforcement of patent protection conferred by TRIPS may not be sufficient to offset the fixed costs of starting to patent, such as the cost of hiring legal experts and developing the institutional knowledge about the patenting procedure. In our sample, 69% of firms in patent–reliant industries (i.e., the treated group) had at least one patent application in the pre–TRIPS period, whereas only 21% of firms in the control group did so. Hence, the treated group is more likely to increase patenting along the intensive margin. This is consistent with our assumption that firms in patent–reliant industries benefit more from a marginal improvement in the strength of patent protection.

We test the parallel–trend assumption for Model (4) by estimating a dynamic version of the model. We estimate the dynamic DiD model using the quarterly number of patents so that we have more data points when observing the pre–trends. Figure 4 reports the estimates of the dynamic DiD model. The sample includes 20 quarters for the same five–year period used in Table 3, with 1993Q1 as the base level (and hence not estimated) and 1995Q1 as quarter 0. The figure shows that the pre–trends appear parallel until quarter 0, after which the number of patent applications by the treated group sharply spikes in quarter 1 (1995Q2). As Abrams (2008) points out, the enforcement of the patent term extension of the URAA likely drives this spike. The new patent term, which is 20 years from the application date, applies to patents that are filed on and after June 8, 1995. However, subsection (c)(1) of URAA (1994) implicitly allows patents that were filed before June 8, 1995, to receive the longer of the old term and the new term. This provision incentivizes firms to rush their patent applications before June 8 to maximize the patent term. After the spike in patent filings in quarter 1, the number of patent applications by the treated group gradually but significantly increase. Overall, the parallel trend in patenting activity appears to hold in the pre–TRIPS period, supporting the validity of our DiD design.

5.2.2 TRIPS and Stock Liquidity

Given the results that firms in patent–reliant industries increase patenting more than other firms after the implementation of TRIPS, we expect these firms to also experience a greater improvement in stock liquidity post–TRIPS. We test our prediction using the following model:

Stock Illiquidityi,t = α1 + β1Post-TRIPSi,t × Treatedj + γ 0 1CONT ROLi,t−1 + φi + ψt + i,t. (5)

We measure stock illiquidity using Amihud’s measure and the annual average of daily closing bid– ask spread, because the high–frequency data used for relative effective spread are not available before 1993 and have limited coverage for the first few years. We control for the same set of control variables used in Model (4) and include firm and year fixed effects to account for time–invariant unobservable firm characteristics and the macroeconomic conditions, respectively. Standard errors are estimated with clustering at the four–digit NAICS industry level to account for within–industry correlation in stock liquidity. Based on H1, we predict the estimated β1 on the interaction term to be significantly negative, since we expect firms in patent–reliant industries to experience a greater reduction in stock illiquidity after the implementation of TRIPS relative to other firms.

Table 4 presents the estimates of Model (5). The results show that the DiD estimator is significantly negative for both measures of stock illiquidity. The effect is also economically significant: in the five–year period surrounding the implementation of TRIPS in the United States, the bid– ask spread (Amihud’s illiquidity) of treated firms decreased by 14.0% (27.1%) more than that of the control firms. Based on Lemley’s (1994) estimate of the average number of additional days of patent protection with the new term conferred by the URAA, our estimates suggest that the bid– ask spread (Amihud’s illiquidity) of firms in patent–reliant industries decreases by 0.06% (0.11%) for every additional day of patent protection. This is consistent with our prediction that the stock liquidity of firms in patent–reliant industries significantly improved more than that of other firms after the implementation of TRIPS.

Similar to Figure 4, here we also examine the pre–trends in stock illiquidity by estimating a dynamic version of Model (5) using quarterly data. Figures 5 and 6 present the estimates of the dynamic DiD models for the two measures of stock illiquidity. The figures show that the stock illiquidity of the treated firms does not exhibit a significant downward trend relative to the control firms until quarter 0, when TRIPS became effective. These results again support the parallel trends assumption of our DiD models.

#### Statistics prove liquidity is key to long-term growth.

Abdul-Khaliq 13 [Shatha; Assistant Professor, AlBlqa Applied University, Jordan; “The Impact of Stock Market Liquidity on Economic Growth in Jordan,” European Journal of Business and Management [www.iiste.org](http://www.iiste.org); 2013; <https://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/EJBM/article/viewFile/9456/9661#:~:text=Focusing%20on%20liquidity%2C%20Bencivenga%2C%20et,key%20role%20in%20economic%20growth.&text=By%20facilitating%20longer%20term%2C%20more,for%20long%20term%20economic%20growth>.] Justin

5. Data and Methodology

Generally, previous research using cross-country data supports the hypothesis that financial development leads to economic growth. Levine and Zervos (1996), use the regression equation: where X is a set of control variables, GROWTH is the real GDP growth rate and STOCK represents measurements of the stock market. So relationship of the form is :

GROWTH = β0 + β1 MC + β2MTR + e3

Where

MC = market capitalization as percentage of GDP

MTR = market turnover ratio as measure of stock market liquidity

The 20-year time-series (1991-2011) data used for this study was collected from Amman Stock Exchange Annual Reports and Accounts, Central Bank of Jordan Statistical Bulletin, various issues.

The summary descriptive statistics of the variables used (Table 1) show the mean, standard deviation and minimum and maximum value of the data. It is obvious from the table that GDP growth in Jordan ranges from 2% to 14% with an average of 5%. The average market capitalization as percentage of GDP has remained on 1.47 and its ranking continuously rise from 0.49 to 3.6 in the year 2005. The market turnover ratio is averaged at 51.9 starting from its minimum value of 11.59 in year 2000 to 102.1 in 2010.

5.1 Stationary Test: table 2 shows the unit root test using the augmented Dickey - Fuller (ADF). The objective of the unit root test is to empirically examine whether series contains a unit root or not. If the series contains a unit root, this means that the series is non-stationary. Otherwise, the series will be categorized as stationary. The unit root tests show that Economic growth, market capitalization as percentage of GDP and market turnover ratio are not stationary at the zero order both with constant and constant and trend terms. Hence, we move ahead to conduct the ADF test at first difference to further ascertain the stationary of the series. The unit root results at first difference rejects the null hypothesis of non-stationary at both 1 and 5 percent levels for Economic growth, market capitalization as percentage of GDP and market turnover ratio.

6.Results and discussions:

The methodology of the series of the regression using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model to prove a significant correlation between market liquidity and economic growth. The Table 3 shows the regression results for the impact of Stock Market Liquidity on Economic Growth in Jordan. It shows that over 28 percent of the total changes in economic growth rate are explained by the included exogenous variables. The adjusted R-square result explains over 20 systemic changes in the model. The Durbin Watson Statistics indicates insignificant autocorrelation in the model represented above. The F-statistics is statistically significant at the 5 percent level The coefficient of market capitalization as percentage of GDP (MC) is negative but it is statistically insignificant. The coefficient of market turnover ratio (MTR) is significant at the 5% level and the sign is positive indicating that 1% increase in market turnover ratio will increase the growth rate of GDP by 0.06%. This means that market turnover ratio has more positive influence on economic growth in Jordan.

7. Conclusion

This study investigates the relationship of stock market liquidity and economic growth by taking market capitalization to GDP and turnover ratio as independent variables. The impact of these variables is empirically tested on economic growth as a dependant variable for the period of 1991 to 2011 using ADF unit root testing methodology and OLS regression. We find that the market turnover ratio has a stronger influence on economic growth than the of market capitalization to GDP

Finally,, governments should promote stock market liquidity by for instance propagating knowledge to the public of the benefits of investing in stock markets and to ensure higher liquidity on stock markets. These incentives would promote both domestic and foreign investments to penetrate the domestic economies, and thus help to increase economic growth.

#### Growth solves extinction.

Aschenbrenner 20 [Leopold Aschenbrenner; Student in economics at Columbia University and research affiliate at the University of Oxford’s Global Priorities Institute; "Securing posterity," Works in Progress; 10/19/20; <https://worksinprogress.co/issue/securing-posterity/>] julian // Re-Cut Justin

I argue that the opposite is the case. It is not safe stagnation and risky growth that we must choose between; rather, it is stagnation that is risky and it is growth that leads to safety. We might indeed be in “time of perils”: we might be advanced enough to have developed the means for our destruction, but not advanced enough to care sufficiently about safety. But stagnation does not solve the problem: we would simply stagnate at this high level of risk. Eventually, a nuclear war or environmental catastrophe would doom humanity regardless. Faster economic growth could initially increase risk, as feared. But it will also help us get past this time of perils more quickly. When people are poor, they can’t focus on much beyond ensuring their own livelihoods. But as people grow richer, they start caring more about things like the environment and protecting against risks to life. And so, as economic growth makes people richer, they will invest more in safety, protecting against existential catastrophes. As technological innovation and our growing wealth has allowed us to conquer past threats to human life like smallpox, so can faster economic growth, in the long run, increase the overall chances of humanity’s survival. This argument is based on a recent paper of mine, in which I use the tools of economic theory—in particular, the standard models economists use to analyze economic growth—to examine the interaction between economic growth and the risks engendered by human activity. In this model, society must choose how much of its resources to allocate to consumption and how much to safety efforts. Consumption makes us happy, but also creates risks of catastrophe. Investing in safety can in turn help mitigate that risk. For example, consuming fossil fuels can engender great prosperity, but also increases the risk of tail-end climate change. We can spend money on carbon abatement to reduce this risk. Or consider air travel. It’s very useful as well, but also facilitates the spread of infectious diseases, including potentially a pandemic that could wipe out the human race. We can spend money on pandemic preparedness to mitigate that risk. Crucially, society is impatient; it discounts the future. People generally care most about their more immediate well-being. Although they may care about their kids and grandkids, they are certainly not particularly concerned about the trillions of potential lives billions of years in the future that the aforementioned philosophers appeal to. However, an impatient society does care about not getting wiped out. Therefore, what fraction of its resources this impatient society will allocate to safety depends on how much the people in this society value their own lives. As it turns out, under the standard preferences used in economic theory, people value life more and more as they grow richer. This is because of the diminishing marginal returns of consumption. As you grow richer, using an extra dollar to purchase more consumption goods gives you less and less additional utility; meanwhile, as your life becomes better and better, you stand to lose more and more if you die. As a result, the richer people are, the greater the fraction of their income they are willing to sacrifice to protect their lives. Comparing the current pandemic to the 1918 pandemic illustrates this phenomenon. Today, we are putting much of life on hold to minimize deaths. By contrast, in 1918, nonpharmaceutical interventions were milder and went on only for a month on average in the U.S., even though the Spanish Flu was arguably deadlier and claimed younger victims. We are willing to sacrifice much more today than a hundred years ago to prevent deaths because we are richer and thus value life much more. What does this mean for our model? Initially, a poor society will start out by allocating nearly all of its resources to consumption. And so as the economy grows, so does risk. However, as people grow richer, they start valuing life more. They start investing in safety to mitigate risk, shifting more and more resources from consumption to safety. At this point, as the economy grows, risk begins to fall. The risk of a existential catastrophe then looks like an inverted U-shape over time: The dot represents where we might be right now. Over the past centuries, as we have grown out of poverty, we have overwhelmingly focused on consumption. As a result, risk is growing. But as we are growing richer, we are beginning to value life more, and are slowly investing more in safety. Eventually, we will have shifted enough resources to safety such that risk begins to fall—fall exponentially to zero, in fact, such that there is a positive probability of humanity surviving to reach a grand future. And all of this occurs despite our society’s impatience. There is an analog to this in environmental economics, called the “environmental Kuznets curve.” It was theorized that pollution initially rises as countries develop, but, as people grow richer and begin to value a clean environment more, they will work to reduce pollution again. That theory has arguably been vindicated by the path that Western countries have taken with regard to water and air pollution, for example, over the past century. The idea that we are in a unique time in history in which we are facing an elevated risk of existential catastrophe is not new either. Carl Sagan was the one who coined the term “time of perils.” Derek Parfit called it the “hinge of history.” They argue that the discoveries of the last centuries have granted humanity immense power, and so we are in a most “dangerous and decisive” period. But if we manage to survive, our descendants will be able to spread throughout the galaxy, making us much less vulnerable. They will have mastered new technologies that make us immune to bioengineered pathogens, neutralize the threat from atomic bombs, provide plentiful energy without destroying the environment, and keep artificial intelligence in check so it faithfully serves human needs. With their technology and wisdom, our descendants will be able to secure a long and safe future. Our challenge, then, is to make it through this unique perilous period. Seeing the rising levels of existential risk over the past centuries, some might call for an end to economic growth. They might argue, rightfully so, that economic growth has only led to rising risk in the past. Indeed, a period of accelerated economic growth would initially also accelerate the rise in risk. The level of risk might look something like this, where the lighter line is the path with accelerated growth: Even a few hundred years later, the critics of growth would seem to be vindicated! Faster growth just increased the risk! Except that they are missing the whole picture: The accelerated economic growth also accelerated our path along the inverted-U shape of risk. Faster growth means people are richer sooner, so they value life more sooner, so society shifts resources to safety sooner—and ultimately we will begin the decline in risk sooner. As a result, the overall probability of an existential catastrophe—the area under the risk curve—declines! Faster growth means we get through the “time of perils” more quickly. Indeed, stagnation would be the most dangerous choice of all: we would be stuck at an elevated level of risk, meaning an eventual existential catastrophe would be inevitable.

## 2

#### Interp:Precluding a future increase is not a reduction

Melinda **Harmon 12**, Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, 3/6/12, Zieche v. Burlington Res., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30134, p. lexis

Zieche contends that the Court erred when it concluded that "there was no reduction in Zieche's salary or bonus percentage" that would constitute "good reason" for his resignation. Doc. 70 at 8, 9. The Court relied on the fact that Zieche received "his full 2006 performance bonus" after he began working at ConocoPhillips and that the bonus percentage increased from 30% in 2005 to 40% in 2006 as proof that Zieche did not suffer a reduction in salary.

Zieche contends that an increase in his bonus is irrelevant to a determination of whether his salary was reduced because a "bonus is not part of the salary," but is instead [\*12] "something in addition to what is expected or strictly due." Doc. 72 at 4. Additionally, Zieche alleges that "the [C]ourt's analysis ignores the specific provisions of the retention agreement," which defines "good reason" to include "any reduction from your annual rate of base salary." Id.

Initially, although Zieche alleges that ConocoPhillips reduced his salary, he introduced no summary judgment **ev**idence to support this contention. In his Response to ConocoPhillip's Motion for Summary Judgment, Zeiche repeatedly asserts that, in his new position at ConocoPhillips, he would "**not be eligible for annual merit salary *increases***" as he had previously received at Burlington. Doc. 54 at 4 (emph. added). The summary judgment evidence before the Court included Zieche's deposition, in which he admitted that his salary "remained the same . . . up to the time [he] resigned from ConocoPhillips." Doc. 48-1 at 50 (emph. added). Nevertheless, Zieche argues that the Court unnaturally should read the word "reduce" in the retention agreement to mean "**not increase**," rather than interpreting the word according to its plain meaning. **The Court does not agree with this reasoning**, and Zieche has introduced [\*13] no evidence to convince the Court otherwise.

#### Violation: they defend limiting future patents

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Limits and ground– their model allows affs to defend anything from pandemics to Biden’s presidency— there's no universal DA since it’s impossible to know the timeframe when there won’t be IP— that explodes neg prep and leads to random timeframe of the week affs which makes cutting stable neg links impossible — limits key to reciprocal engagement since they create a caselist for neg prep (innovation, collaboration, econ, ptx: all core neg literature thrown away)

#### 2] Precision o/w – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### 3] TVA – defend the advantage to a whole rez timeframe. We don’t prevent new FWs, mechanisms, or advantages. PICs don’t solve – our model allows you to specify countries and medicines.

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because it’s the only intrinsic part of debate – all other rules can be debated over but rely on some conception of fairness to be justified.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

#### NC Theory first abusive NC strat is justified by abusive 1AC

## 3

#### Counterplan: The member nations of the WTO should:

#### Impose restrictions on number of patents

#### Limit secondary patents

#### Reform generic exclusivity

Erin Jones et. al. 9-24 [Erin received her bachelor’s degree with honors in economics from the University of Maryland, College Park. Legislative intern for Congressman James R. Langevin at the U.S. House of Representatives, where she provided support to teams and drafted health policy-related constituent correspondences.], Mark E. Miller [Mark holds a Ph.D. in public policy analysis from the State University of New York at Binghamton and an M.A. and B.A. in political science from Old Dominion University.], Andrea Noda [Andrea holds a master's of public policy from Georgetown University and a bachelor’s in social policy from Northwestern University.], Kirk Williamson [Kirk received his master's of public health in health policy and law from the George Washington University and holds a bachelor’s in global health with a minor in chemistry from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.], Sep 24, 2020. “Evergreening” Stunts Competition, Costs Consumers and Taxpayers," Arnold Foundation, https://www.arnoldventures.org/stories/evergreening-stunts-competition-costs-consumers-and-taxpayers/

What Can Be Done

As the Evergreen Drug Patent Search makes clear, the positive impact of Hatch-Waxman has been steadily and severely eroded by a regulatory system vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated forms of manipulation.

“You might say that the patent and regulatory system has been weaponized,” Feldman said. “When billions of dollars are at stake, there’s a lot of money available to look for ways to exploit the legal system. And companies have become adept at this, as our work has found.”

There are several key steps that Congress could take to restore the balance between innovation and competition that is the key to a successful prescription drug regulatory process. These may include:

Imposing restrictions on the number of patents that prescription drug manufacturers can defend in court to discourage the use of anticompetitive patent thickets.

Limiting the patentability of so-called secondary patents — which don’t improve the safety or efficacy of a drug — through patent and exclusivity reform.

Reforming the 180-day generic exclusivity, which can currently be abused to block other competitive therapies.

“The Evergreen Drug Patent Search provides the publicly available, evidence-based foundation that defines the extent of the problem, and it can be used to develop policies that solve the problem of anti-competitive patent abuses,” said Kristi Martin, VP of Drug Pricing at Arnold Ventures.

“Our incentives have gotten out of whack,” Martin said. “The luxury of monopoly protection should only be provided to innovations that provide meaningful benefits in saving lives, curing illnesses, or improving the quality of people’s lives. It should not be provided to those gaming the system. If we can change that, we can save consumers, employers, and taxpayers many billions of dollars while increasing the incentives for pharmaceutical companies to achieve breakthroughs."

## 4

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being. Prefer it:

#### [1] Actor specificity: util is the best for governments, which is the actor in the rez – multiple warrants:

#### [a] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions lose their bindingness and are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### [5] Util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework-threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose – so, util comes first and my offense outweighs theirs under their own framework.

#### [7] Extinction outweighs

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)