## 1

#### The subject is alienated when it articulates its desires – incomplete signifiers structure the emergence of subjectivity and produce repetitive drives to fill the lack that justify coercive violence. Thus, the ROB is to traverse the fantasy – that means exposing drives.

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The Real Jacques Lacan’s notion of the Real is notoriously difficult to define. In his book on the subject, Tom Eyers calls it the “most elusive” of Lacan’s concepts, but one that is also one that is “central” and “determining” for psychoanalysis (1). There are common elements of the various definitions. First, an agreement that both the economy of tropes that allows the conditions for meaning to emerge (the Symbolic) and the meanings and values invested in these tropes, including the subject itself (the Imaginary), do not and cannot perfectly capture all of existence or experience. Second, this unassimilable remainder structures the Symbolic and Imaginary, just as they structure each other, and thus all three registers are knitted together as demonstrated in Lacan’s famous “Borromean Knot.” The Real is what escapes mediation, what disrupts language itself. To explain its significance and relationship to desire requires examining its foundational role in the formation of the subject. The Real can be understood as the constitutive lack of the subject, its separation from the rest of existence by the self-definition necessary for it to come into being in the first place. This is made clear in the mirror stage, where the subject moves from a fragmented, disorganized concept of the body to the “finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his [sic] entire mental development with its rigid structure” (Lacan, “Mirror Stage” 78). The formation of a discrete subject (a function in the Imaginary register) is a compromise. Its formation allows for participation in the Symbolic because to participate in that economy of exchange requires a “social I” (Lacan, “Mirror stage,” 79). This participation comes at the cost of alienation because the subject trades in a world of symbols which by their nature stand in for what is not present, and thus inescapably mediate the (Real) world outside of the subject, rather than making it present. This lack built in to the subject is the engine of desire: the subject’s divide from an object is a prerequisite for the desire of such an object, but the condition of mediation makes it impossible to ever incorporate it in a perfectly satisfying way. Thus desire remains unfulfilled and each chase for a symbol leads to another in loop which the very constitution of the subject dictates must be endless. This is the basic operation of the death drive which is not distinct from Eros. Were the impossible to occur and the drive of Eros to be fulfilled, it would be extinguished, as there would be nothing left to desire. Thus all drives aim, in a sense, at their own extinction, and therefore there is in a sense only one—the drive that aims towards the extinction of desire through its complete fulfillment in continuity with the world that was lost when the subject became distinct from it in the mirror stage. Although the death drive might stand in for the singular character of the drive, it should not be understood as a desire for the actual biological death of the subject’s body, or even the desire to inflict death on others. The self-destruction of the death drive is a desire to break the limits of the self as the alienating armor of the subject by experiencing unmediated contact with the Real. Death still defines its operation in other ways. The last portion of Lacan’s “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” explains the metaphorical centrality of death as the center of a torus formed by incessant symbolization. The fort-da game is most significant not because it shows that the child wishes to destroy its mother or even inoculate itself against that possibility, but because it assimilates the child into the Symbolic order through the repetition of the signifiers fort and da, which stand in for presence and absence. Death is central to language because the symbol itself invokes the absence and loss of nonexistence since its function is to stand in for something that is gone. Language swirls around this absent center of death, a primordial absence encased in the inner ring of the torus, while the outer surfaces of language hold all else that cannot be symbolized at bay on the outside (Lacan, “Function and Field” 260-264). Paradoxically, death is necessarily evoked by the symbol as that which is absent and also made possible in the first place by that same symbol. The separation of the subject into its alienating identity as a social object makes a meaningful concept of death possible because without it there is no dasein, no individual, no singular human to die. George Bataille explains this with an entomological example. If a scientist picks one fly from a swarm, that fly is subject to death, because its end means the end of the discontinuous being selected by the entomologist. Without differentiation of its members, however, the swarm lives on; the selection of the fly is for the entomologist, not the animal (Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” 14-16). Thus it is with human beings. The subject is founded by a rejection of its sole animal nature by participating in a world of work and accumulation, mediated by language—essentially Lacan’s Symbolic. Thus individuals are made discontinuous with the general economy of matter and energy from which all things are formed by a conceptual separation inextricably bound up in death. Our existences are thus defined by discontinuity from a world of continuity, and for Bataille as for Lacan, our drives are singular in the sense that sex is a coupling that unifies with another and momentarily overcomes discontinuity just as death is the end of the subject’s brief separation from a universe differentiated only by the dismembering violence of our imposition of symbols upon it (Bataille, Erotism 13-17). The experience of death may still be unique because it suggests the absence implied by the sign and because it can be experienced only once by the subject—and for obvious reasons, cannot be symbolized by anyone with first-hand experience. As Freud argues in “Thoughts For The Times On War and Death,” we cannot even hope to imagine our own deaths because to do so demands that we imagine them from some perspective which would be destroyed in the experience itself. Death and the Real are therefore not identical, but are closely linked. The most important characteristic of the Real is not just that it suggests existence beyond language, but that this world-for-itself (to borrow from Eugene Thacker) intrudes on human reality and reveals it to be incomplete. Encompassing Max Picard’s concept of silence, the Real is not the absence of human reality so much as the traumatic revelation that that reality was always incomplete, always feigned in the face of existence so much more than human mediation has already covered. Chris Lundberg uses Lacan’s distinction between reality, being the social world of human construction, and the Real, being the occasional but inevitable failure of that reality, to develop his own distinction between failed unicity and feigned unicity. The Symbolic operates as an economy of interconnected and mutually-referential tropes weaving a kind of fabric that is the precondition for meaning, an environment in which social relationships can be understood in context. When the unified illusion of the social fails, we are compelled to stitch the tears in that fabric to maintain the world that gives us meaning (Lacan in Public 2-3). An account by Bill Laurence, the only journalist allowed to witness the Trinity test, provides evidence for this rupture and repair. While “not a sound could be heard” for the period after the flash and before the thunder, Laurence saw civilization itself collapse in an instant: The big boom came about one hundred seconds after the great flash—the first cry of a newborn world. It brought the silent, motionless silhouettes to life, gave them a voice. A loud cry filled the air. The little groups that had hitherto stood rooted to the earth like desert plants broke into a dance—the rhythm of primitive man dancing at one of his fire festivals at the coming of spring. They clapped their hands as they leaped from the ground…The dance of the primitive man lasted but a few seconds, during which an evolutionary period of about 10,000 years telescoped. Primitive man was metamorphosed into modern man—shaking hands, slapping his fellow on the back, all laughing like happy children. (12)

#### The 1AC is an ideological fantasy constructed by relentless planning at the expense of scapegoated identities, all for recognition from the Other in an attempt to fill the lack.

Gunder 05 Michael Gunder, 2005, “The Production of Desirous Space: Mere Fantasies of the Utopian City?” Planning Theory 2005 4: 173, DOI: 10.1177/1473095205054604, all brackets were in the original text, SJBE

Jouissance is one of the four structuring elements of social discourse,4 or social interactions, links and relationships, where synchronic language meets diachronic speech to evoke an effect on the Other (Lacan, 2004: 3). Zupancic (2004) associates Lacan’s (2004) theory of the Four Discourses (see Gunder, 2003a, 2004; Hillier and Gunder, 2005) with the Marxian theory of commodification and surplus-value via Lacan’s concept of surplus-enjoyment (plus-de-jouir). Lacan (2004: 111) contends that surplusvalue and surplus-enjoyment are historically equivalent, especially in the situation of the Master’s injunction of ‘No!’ in the emerging early phase of Calvinistic repressive capitalism. In contrast to the historical authority and rationality of the Master’s repressive command, late capitalism is structured under a rationality of the university or bureaucracy. Now knowledge and technology, not the Master’s injunction, become ‘agency expressing a logic of governmentality and expertise (including that of planning) that does not prohibit enjoyment, but rather channels jouissance in ways that produces a “bio-politics” (after Foucault) of an alienated subject that has no option, but to enjoy and be satisfied’ (Hillier and Gunder, 2005; McGowan, 2004; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b; Zupancic, 2004). In this regard, ‘a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialised in a set of social practices and submitted through national myths [or fantasies] that structure these practices’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1993: 202). This is taken further by the barely challenged international hegemonic discourse of global capitalization and the fantasies it induces in externally structuring the nation state’s very enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 63; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 61). Even the ruling British Labour government, with its ‘Third Way’, in contrast to its tradition of socialism, has placed ‘economic globalisation’ as ‘the most significant factor in shaping Labour Party thinking since the early 1990s’ (Allmendinger, 2003: 326). As McGowan (2004) observes: we trust fully in the staying power of global capitalism. The alternatives, which once seemed to be just around the corner, have become unimaginable today. The universe of global capitalism is, or so we think, here to stay, and we best not do anything to risk our status within it. Hence, we pledge our allegiance to it, and we put our trust in it. This is the fundamental mode of contemporary obedience to authority. Only by coming to understand this obedience to the dictates of global capitalism as obedience can we hope to break out of it. Global capitalism seems an unsurpassable horizon simply because we have not properly recognized our own investment in sustaining it. We see it as unsurpassable because we don’t want to lose it – and the imaginary satisfaction that it provides. (McGowan, 2004: 193) Illusion resides under this global fantasy of capital where ‘the basic feature of’ this dominant cultural imperative ‘no longer operates on the level of ideals and identifications, but directly on the level of regulating jouissance’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 113). Even in Lefebvre’s day, this was a capitalism where surplus-value was synonymous with surplus-enjoyment supporting the injunction: ‘you must enjoy!’. In this light, the role of planning is to facilitate enjoyment by sustainably providing the correct space – healthy, competitive, fit and attractive – where enjoyment can be effectively materialized and maximized under the imperative of global capitalism. Consequently: urbanism is nothing more than an ideology that claims to be either ‘art’ or ‘technology’ or ‘science’, depending on the context. This ideology pretends to be straightforward, yet it obfuscates, harbours things unsaid: which it covers, which it contains, as a form of will tending towards efficiency. Urbanism is doubly fetishistic. First, it implies the fetishism of satisfaction. What about vested interests? They must be satisfied, and therefore their needs must be understood and catered to, unchanged . . . Second, it implies the fetishism of space. Space is creation. Whoever creates space creates whatever it is that fills space. The place engenders the thing and the good place engenders good things. (Lefebvre, 2003: 159) This is exacerbated further in the current milieu of consumerist post-democracy personified by the master signifier: global capitalism. ‘Post-democracy is founded on an attempt to exclude the political awareness of lack and negativity from the political domain, leading to a political order which retains the token institutions of liberal democracy but neutralizes the centrality of political antagonism’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 59). In response to the dominant ‘logic’ of global competitiveness, the technocrats and experts including planners, shape, contextualize and implement public policy in the interest of the dominant hegemonic bloc. This is constructed under the logics and knowledges of university discourses (see Gunder, 2004), with an objective to remove existing or potential urban blight,‘dis-ease’ and dysfunction detracting from local enjoyment and global competitiveness (Gunder, 2005; McGuirk, 2004). Of course, the hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debate as to what constitutes desired enjoyment and what is lacking in urban competitiveness. In turn, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of planning remedy. This is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness, is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Planners, programmers, and users want solutions. For what? To make people happy. To order them to be happy. It is a strange way of interpreting happiness. The science of the urban phenomenon cannot respond to these demands without the risk of validating external restrictions imposed by ideology and power. (Lefebvre, 2003: 141) Yet this lack and its resolution are more often technical in nature, rather than political. As a consequence, the technocrats in partnership with their ‘dominant stakeholders’ can ensure the impression of happiness for the many, while, not to mention, achieving the stakeholders’ specific interests. Material happiness for all but that evil other Lacanian theory suggests that a subject’s jouissance is given freest rein when an act of desire contains a dimension of transgression. It is the ‘little sin’ that gives the most pleasure; it is the prohibition as such which elevates a common everyday object into an object of desire (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 177). The bio-politics of contemporary planning are predicated on enjoyment – you will enjoy! – not the prior duality of repression/freedom of the Weberian capitalist master’s injunction: ‘No you cannot do that!’. The achievements of traditional utopian goals were ones of freedom to act against the repression of the negative injunction. Contemporary injunctions are to enjoy – or at least to sustain our happiness – regardless of what we actually desire. Happiness is not a class of truth, but one of an ontological class of being where: ‘happiness’ relies on the subject’s inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desires. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we ‘officially’ desire. Happiness is thus hypocritical: it is the happiness dreaming about things we do not really want. (Zˇ izˇek, 2002a: 59–60) Planning continues to succeed because it underpins the primal desire of most subjects in society for a conflict-free, safe and assured happy future, even if it can only deliver this as a fantasy-scenario of material happiness, rather than as an impossible reality that actually sates all desires (Gunder, 2003a, 2003b). This is a fantasy predicated on an obedience to a shallow consumptive quantitative imperative to be materially happy, which often occurs at the expense of our actual qualitative psychic desires. In our contemporary global society the ‘moral law’ is no longer the imperative that acts as a limitation, stopping us from enjoying too much. Instead, the cultural imperative, the now dominant moral Law itself, in its injunction for us to enjoy becomes ‘the ultimate “transgression”’ should one wish to pursue a life of moderation (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 174). Further, ‘the fantasy of a utopian harmonious social world can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder . . . a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated, but instead must be eliminated’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 108). This is the stranger, the Other that is not us that can act as the ‘“scapegoat” to be stigmatised as the one who is blamed for our lack, the Evil force that stole our precious jouissance’ and stopped the fantasy from achieving its utopian vision (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 58). Even our ‘“complex” contemporary societies rely on the basic divide between included and excluded’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 86). Zˇ izˇek (2004b: 86) continues: in any society ‘there is a multitude within the system and a multitude of those excluded, and simply to encompass them both within the scope of the same notion amounts to the same obscenity as equating starvation with dieting.’ It is continually this Other that permits the delusion of harmony in our identity defining groups and for this to transpire we require an Other, external to the group for the group to define itself. We require a disparity, or gap, to allocate a degree of difference to an Other to conceptualize the group identification as who we are not and on this Other we can attribute all the signs of disharmony that jeopardize our shared fantasy (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 5). Difference is essential to complete our fantasy of harmony, but only by providing the sacrificial Other on which we can blame the disappointment of the fantasy to deliver (Zˇ izˇek, 2004a: 158–9). In this light, planning,‘as part of the apparatus of the modern state, makes its own imprint, has its own powers for good and evil’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). This is especially so as planning identifies, or at least names and legitimizes, what constitutes an urban pathology that detracts from what is desirous of the globally competitive city. Planning then sets out to remedy this lack or deficiency. Civil society, i.e. the public stage, and media of information dissemination are central to this process. Of course, our media are not ideologically neutral. As a consequence, media access for putting forth particular tropes of desire constitutes a central component of social, as well as economic, capital. This is well documented by Flyvbjerg (1998a) where the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce controlled the editorial content of the local newspaper. This argument is central to that of Chomsky’s (2003) multinational corporate steering of mass media content in the, so-called, ‘free’ press. This is where the mass media are free to publish almost anything, provided, of course, they do not alienate their corporate clients who provide their majority of income and profits via their advertising payments. Gunder (2003b) documented how planning actors and their affiliated partners gained public agreement via the rhetorical use of culturally shared ‘master signifiers’ and their related metonymies and metaphors. Here each signifier was linked to associations in the public’s unconscious that induced a conscious expression of desire for a particular set of values or specific consequential actions. Effective deployment of rhetorical tropes can seduce subjects ‘to relinquish previous desires (including identifications and embrace new ones) – or alternatively, to invest all the more completely in old ones’ (Bracher, 1993: 51–2). For example, does anyone wish to live in a city that is losing enjoyment to other locations because it lacks the fitness to compete? In Lacan, the construction of reality is continuous with the field of desire. Desire and reality are intimately connected . . . The nature of their link can only be revealed in fantasy . . . when harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent. It has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction. (Stavrakakis, 1999: 62–3) This is where, from a Lacanian outlook, by accepting rationalization as the means to fulfil a desire for completeness – via the utilization of falsifying words – ‘man does not adapt himself to reality; he adapts reality to himself’ (Roudinesco, 1997: 114). Ideological fantasies as to what constitutes an enjoyable and satisfying city are deployed to hide the dysfunctions and unpredictabilities that are ubiquitous throughout all social spheres, particularly for those lacking in sufficient capital to offset adversity. Social reality ‘is sustained by the “as if”, the fantasy of what things are like’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Rationalization, or realrationalität as Flyvbjerg (1998a) calls it, exists between the everyday activities of social life and the held universal ideals or values of what ought to be, even if it is not so, in social reality. The belief that planning is not political, but technical ‘allows the myths of objectivity, value neutrality, and technical reason to persist, and thereby fosters a certain delusion about planning practice’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). Sandercock (2004: 134) continues: planning ‘helps to redefine political debate, producing new sources of power and legitimacy, changing the force field in which we operate’. Lefebvre suggests that planning is based on a strategy of mixing scientificity and rationality with ideology. ‘Here, as elsewhere, scientificity is an ideology, an excrescence grafted onto real, but fragmentary, knowledge’ (Lefebvre, 2003: 166). In particular, Lefebvre argues that quantitative expertise including the technology of urban planning is largely a myth. This is because planning administrators: and bad administrators at that, rarely use much actual technology. However, they have the ability to persuade the people as a whole that because these are technological decisions they should be accepted. In other words, a large part of Lefebvre’s criticism [of planners] is not that technocrats are technocrats, but that they are precisely the opposite. Technology should be put to the service of everyday life, of social life rather than being precisely the condition of its suppression and control. Urbanism, for example, is an ideology that operates under the cover of this myth of technology. (Elden, 2004: 145) Social reality can only exist in the symbolic and imaginary registries as it is composed, that is constructed, as a ‘result of a certain historically specific set of discursive practices and power mechanisms’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 66). Flyvbjerg (1998a) illustrates this well in his exposé of the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce’s intervention in that city’s planning process. Here this grouping of dominant business people is given hegemonic voice to determine what constitutes acceptable transportation modes and spatial development in Aalborg’s town centre. In this example the planner’s technical facts, by themselves, produced the weaker argument. This was perhaps because the dissemination of these facts and their implications for planning action were ineffectively articulated to the public, if at all, via the local information media controlled by the Chamber of Commerce. In contrast, in Sydney, McGuirk (2004) documented how planners actively participated in and facilitated the dominant network of actors successfully pushing for a series of local, regional and national policies supporting Sydney’s global competitiveness. It appeared to be of little consequence that these policies induced adverse effects on the rest of the country, not to mention many of Sydney’s residents. Not dissimilarly, the Auckland case cited in the introduction illustrates how the planners actively consulted the dominant commercial stakeholders in developing their growth strategy, yet failed to have direct consultation with the Region’s actual residents (ARGF, 1999; Gunder, 2003a). Planners and their governance forum of dominant stakeholders appeared to inherently know what is in the best interests of their region’s residents. Planning as agonistic ethics Notwithstanding the ‘full rendering of the antagonisms which traverse our society, we indulge in the notion of society as an organic whole, kept together by forces of solidarity and co-operation’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 6). Planning is one such instrument that shapes and justifies the governing ideals of utopian desire and in this ‘sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is dominant’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 110). The subtle and not so subtle application of power defines truth, reason and rationality and this particularly comprises the deployment of power in our planning and related practices (Flyvbjerg, 1998a). Moreover, a Lacanian line of reasoning about knowledge and truth indicates that the constituting components of these induced fantasies of truth and rationality are mediated on the wants and needs of actors with the capacity to inflict their desires and wants on the Other and, as if, these desires belong to those who have been imposed on. This is via assertions of unquestionable ‘truth’, which are often supported and empowered by selected ‘distorted’ knowledge, practices and language put forward by their ideological supporters, employed professional experts and controlled media. Further, in this light traditional Kantian and related enlightenment ‘ethics is nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology that tries to pass off its own commandments as authentic, spontaneous, and “honorable” inclinations of the subject’ (Zupancic, 1998: 41). In contrast to traditional ethics, Lacan’s (1992) theorizing may provide an alternative way to develop new values beyond those already constituted by society as traditional morals of good or evil shaping acceptable behaviours. Traditional ethics is predicated on a reality principle as to what is possible without transgression in social reality. As Zupancic (2003: 77) observes, this ‘reality principle itself is ideologically mediated; one could even claim that it constitutes the highest form of ideology, the ideology that presents itself as empirical factor or (biological, economic . . .) necessity.’ This ‘beyond good or evil’ does not have to lead to postmodern nihilism, rather Lacan lays a groundwork for an ethics of the Real, where through acknowledgement of this Real that we cannot know or articulate we can establish new ‘truths’ in relationship to the ‘good’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b; Zupancic, 2000, 2003). This is through a mechanism of ethical sublimation where we create ‘a certain space, scene, or “stage” that enables us to value something that is situated beyond the reality principle, as well as beyond the principle of common good’ (Zupancic, 2003: 78). It is the space, or stage, created when the planner, or other actor, makes the ethical decision to recommend an action or permission that is contrary to existing regulations, precedence, professional expectations, or cultural imperatives. This is perhaps because somehow for the planner, perhaps simply driven by strong feelings, the ‘correct’ and expected action is perceived as not being the right thing to do. From the Lacanian perspective of the ethics of the Real, to make the sensed wrong into a rightness is the ethically correct task, even if this requires the agent to act against what he/she thinks society expects of that actor. This act of transcending the reality principle, and being true to the actor’s desires,5 makes possible a new good, a new potential, it changes the rules as to what is possible (Gunder and Hillier, 2004: 230). ‘The ethical, then, is the constellation of events in which the subject frees herself from the symbolic law (“freedom”), commits herself to an act (“agency”), and thereby makes it possible for the law to be rethought’ (Kay, 2003: 109). The ethical ‘act is an “excessive”, trans-strategic intervention which redefines the rules and contours of the existing order’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 81). Viewed from this perspective, Kant’s categorical imperative must be rethought itself as purely transgressive: the ethical act proper is a transgression of the legal norm – a transgression which, in contrast to a simple criminal violation, does not simply violate the legal norm, but redefines what is a legal norm. The moral law does not follow the Good – it generates a new shape of what counts as ‘Good’. (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 170) This is a transgression that introduces new spaces for what can be considered ‘good’ and hence a wider space for jouissance, beyond that of mere technically produced materialist satisfaction. Of course, a key question becomes: how can a credible planner, or other actor, transcend the accepted norms and expectations of a society to create a new space for a new concept of ‘good’? Further, how can one effectively and reasonably mobilize such an ethics of the Real in everyday life when it is so contrary to the consensual instrumental rationality of the modern project and its ready-made solutions, that are, arguably planning’s purpose and foundations? Planning theorists (e.g. Gunder and Hillier, 2004; Pløger, 2004) and researchers in other disciplines (e.g. Mouffe, 1999, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2003a; Thrift, 2004a, 2004b) are currently attempting to address these complex issues that essentially require new insight and perhaps even profound change in our very relationships towards social reality, itself. Further, they are attempting to do so in a manner that does not simply impose a new intransigent set of ideals to replace our late-modern cultural imperatives, but rather to encourage diverse opportunities for multiple opening in which imminence may continually occur (after Deleuze). Coherent and implementable means to achieve this desired state are yet to emerge as new knowledges and practices, if they can ever do so. Yet, this author suggests that mere awareness and articulation of the impossible implications that the Lacanian Real has on traditional rationality are perhaps one of many points of commencement. Of course, this discourse also may fall into the trap leading to transcendental idealism, i.e. a process of identifying a lack, or void, in our knowledge and practices and then presenting a hegemonic solution that must be implemented, regardless of effect and affect! This author suggests that to change social reality, to begin to question and where necessary traverse our norms and laws, while avoiding the imperative of idealism, calls for a return to agonism that reawakens the political awareness of lack and negativity in place of the technical injunction: you will enjoy! This permits a space for an inclusive acceptance of strife or agonism that does not exclude the Others’ voice attempting to articulate their desires and wants in response to the ‘irreducibility of the Real’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b: 331). Rather this re-politicization of the planning problematic from that of the technical, quantified, solution is one that values Lacan’s Real and Lefebvre’s lived space by making the ‘key “jump from quantity to quality”, from antagonisms subordinated to differences to the predominant role of antagonism’ as pure agonism (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 92). In Lefebvre’s city ‘unconscious desires and passions lay dormant, dormant beneath the surface of the real, within the surreal . . . waiting for . . . the day they can be realized in actual conscious life’ (Merrifield, 2000: 178). In this regard, rather than continuing to fill the lack generating the urban problematic and produce a largely phallic enjoyment, Stavrakakis (2003b: 332) reminds us that in Lacan’s later teachings he spoke of another form ‘of jouissance – female or feminine jouissance – which values this lack per se as something that entails a different kind of enjoyment.’ Perhaps this feminine jouissance may be more appropriate to politicize the needs and wants of lived space. Yet, to do so would require a politics that acknowledges the impossibility of the Lacanian Real. In contrast to the notion that what is meant by an utopia is an imagined ‘ideal society; what characterizes utopia is literally the construction of a u-topic space, a social space outside the existing parameters, the parameters of what appears to be “possible” in the existing social universe’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 123). This proposed utopia is one that may permit, at least aspects of Lefebvre’s ‘lived space’ of the qualitative to be both visible and articulated in conscious life. Rather than contestant cities and regions competing globally under one cultural imperative to attract and retain finite capital and resources via one ‘logic’ and vision, this article calls for a planning ethos that encourages diverse groups within cities and regions to actively contest their perspectives and desires without threat of exclusion. To achieve such a state requires planning ‘to find ways of working with agonism without automatically recurring to procedures, voting, representativity, forced consensus or compromises’ that inherently exclude (Pløger, 2004: 87). This requires a planning ethos predicated on a central awareness of the irreducible Real. This is an understanding that any forced resolution always excludes a remainder, what cannot be articulated or perceived. Further, this remainder will continue to have unconscious effect in terms of what drives our materialized actions. This suggests an overt democratic planning process, representative of a society that is explicitly and overtly hegemonic for all participants, not tacitly hegemonic in its privileging of specific groups with access to power and technocratic justification that is constituted under a logic implicitly desiring social order (Critchley, cited in Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 95). This is in contrast to the existing social reality, where political processes, such as planning, appear to strive for public participation culminating in an harmonious public consensus, when of course this is but an ideological foil that excludes in the name of a ‘general interest’ defined by a privileged few and legitimized by technocratic ‘reason’. In contrast, a strong society ‘places conflict and power at its centre’ by guaranteeing the very ‘existence of conflict’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998b: 229). Our current dominating fantasy of harmony is sustained by the illusion of continued consumer abundance produced and brought by the cornucopia of global capitalism, at least for the first world. This enjoyment of global capitalism ‘constitutes a (partial) reality with hegemonic appeal, a horizon sustained by the hegemony of an administration of desire with seemingly unlimited resources’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 61). Of course, resources and global carrying capacities are axiomatically finite. So perhaps must be our desires, for they can never be sated. Traversing our fundamental fantasy for harmony: a start, not a conclusion! Lacan and his followers, such as Stavrakakis, Zˇ izˇek or Zupancic, produce valid arguments for a psychoanalytically derived philosophy of reality and ideology ‘capable of theorizing the ways our deepest commitments bind us to practices of domination’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Revealing and transversing the ideological constructs that shape and structure our social reality is inadequate in itself as a mere academic critical exercise of knowledge production. This author argues that we must radically challenge our underlying beliefs for ourselves, and, in particular, not externalize them to ‘larger cultural practices and technologies’ so that hegemonic networks, or partnerships, of dominant actors, including intellectuals and bureaucratic professionals, can do our believing and desiring for us through planning and related diverse agencies of social guidance (Dean, 2001: 628). To do so we must traverse our fundamental fantasies that seek harmony and security. This article’s application of Lacan, augmented with some of Lefebvre’s urban insights, gives us a combination of Freudian and Marxist thought that is considerably at odds to that conjured up by the Frankfurt School’s vision of society as ‘a liberated collective culture’ with little space for the individual histories of unique subjects (Jameson, 2003: 8). The latter is the School, or project, drawing on Marx and Freud, which eventually created the Habermasian product of communicative rationality. This is a rationality that sought as its seldom if ever achieved ideal, to produce undistorted (ideologically free) speech acts ‘based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensiveness, truth, truthfulness, and rightness’ constituting a basis for consensually agreement as to how we should act (Habermas, 1979: 3). Yet, as Hillier (2003) illustrates, this is an ideal of undistorted speech that is an impossibility because of the Lacanian Real and the incompleteness it always induces in language, not to mention the impossibility of absolute truth. Yet, this author would agree with Habermas’ call for the supremacy of discourse over mere technical reason. Habermas’ last two validity claims of truthfulness to our desires and the need to act in regard of what our unconscious feeling says is rightness, even if this sense is perhaps not readily justifiable with symbolic knowledge and reasoned argument, should be given due regard through our discourses. In contrast to Habermas’ validity claims of truth and comprehensiveness, Lacan’s theorizing suggests a much more fundamental contextualization of urban ideology based on the fantasies we construct to paper over the lack induced by the Real. This is a perspective that situates our very social reality, including space and social interaction, as principally constituted and composed of ideological fantasy constructs, misrecognitions and misunderstandings (see Hillier, 2003). As Jameson (2003: 37–8) observes, we owe to Lacan ‘the first new and as yet insufficiently developed concept of the nature of ideology since Marx’. Drawing on Althusser, Jameson (2003: 37–8) continues that ideology is ‘the “representation” of the Imaginary relationships of individuals to their Real conditions of existence’, so that ‘the individual subject invents a “lived” relationship with collective systems.’ This is a symbolic, materialized, relationship of practices and rituals (Krips, 2003: 149). Here, it is the desire of this Other that we fundamentally seek and wish to please as we constantly strive to return to our idealized primordial desire for infant maternal security and contentment (Hillier and Gunder, 2005). So we construct and share illusions and fantasies – ideologies – that we are somehow achieving this impossible task. It is the aggregate of these Others, and the illusions we generate about them and ourselves, that constitutes the social reality that is our lived space.

#### **The 1AC’s development discourse is the projection of repetitive desires of a capitalist system- the scapegoat is created to obscure the Real- necessitating the destruction of the third world.**

Kapoor 14 [Ilan; 10/2/14; Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, Toronto, Canada; “*Psychoanalysis and development: contributions, examples, limits*,” Third World Quarterly, 35:7, 1120-1143, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2014.926101] Justin recut SJKS

The blind spot on which I would like to dwell a little, however, is the continuing neglect of colonialism in mainstream development discourse. This neglect coincides with the very ‘invention’ of international development in the post-Second World War period: aid to ‘underdeveloped’ areas became vital to containing what the USA and other Western powers saw as Soviet expansionism. No wonder that modernisation theory – which pioneered development as an academic field and has anchored Western foreign policy and development institutions ever since – bears the strong imprint of such cold war politics. As several analysts have argued,26 modernisation tends to take a decidedly postSecond World War view of history, thus avoiding the history of Western colonialism. For instance, Walt Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth – so influential in economic and foreign policy circles – fails to deal with colonial rule in any meaningful way. It’s not that Rostow doesn’t mention colonialism at all; he does, but its significance is notably downplayed. In a short section on ‘Colonialism’, he goes so far as to state that colonies were founded for ‘oblique reasons’ and colonial subjects ‘looked kindly’ on the colonizer’s efforts to organise ‘suitable political frameworks’. 27 But such disavowal continues in various guises even today. It is visible in World Bank and International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programmes, 1126 I. Kapoor Downloaded by [York University Libraries] at 10:45 02 October 2014 which make no mention of, or allowances for, the fact that the West’s colonial plunder might have something to do with the recipient’s current socioeconomic conditions. And it is evident in World Trade Organization trade deals, which so often assume a global economic level playing field in their pursuit of ‘free’ trade, amounting to trade ‘freed’ of any past colonial entanglements. Robert Fletcher calls such persistent sanitisation of colonialism ‘imperialist amnesia’. He analyses the work of several development and globalisation pundits to drive home the point: New York Times columnist Thomas Freidman, former World Bank economist Paul Collier and economist and UN advisor Jeffrey Sachs, all of whom treat wealth accumulation in the global North or poverty in the global South by omitting consideration of the imperialist extraction of Third World resources.28 In The End of Poverty, for example, Sachs claims that ‘the combination of Africa’s adverse geography and its extreme poverty creates the worst poverty trap in the world’. 29 Vandana Shiva, struck by the glaring blind spot, takes Sachs to task, declaring: This is a totally false history of poverty...The wealth accumulated by Europe and North America is largely based on riches taken from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Without the destruction of India’s rich textile industry, without the takeover of the spice trade, without the genocide of the Native American tribes [sic], without African slavery, the Industrial Revolution would not have resulted in new riches for Europe or North America. It was this violent takeover of Third World resources and markets that created wealth in the North and poverty in the South.30 What this recurring blind spot reveals is the tendency to deny the West’s complicity (and one’s own complicity as Westerner) in the plight of the Third World. It is a tendency that, as many postcolonial critics have suggested,31 is rife within the history of Western thought, which so often represses the barbarism (colonialism, racism, violence against the subaltern and women) that founds modernity. And it is a tendency, as underlined above, which equally inaugurates the field of Development Studies, since cold war politics demanded the construction of a strong and irreproachable West, cleansed of any suggestion of complicity in Third World ‘underdevelopment’. Thus, the discourse of modernisation (in its postwar and contemporary forms) can be seen as receiving back its own message to the Third World in inverted form: it is as if it is saying ‘you need to be backward, irrational, poor, terroristic, weak, exotic, fundamentalist, passive, etc since that is my way of reassuring myself that I am civilised, rational, scientific, rich, strong, secular, active, etc’. What psychoanalysis adds to the postmodern understanding of binary construction is the dimension of the Real, which shows up here in the form of the blind spot – the element of selflimitation that one cannot really come to terms with, so one averts [selflimitation] by (unconsciously) projecting it onto the Other. To conclude this section, let me underline again how psychoanalysis can help uncover the unconscious of development discourse, pointing to the latter’s desires and traumas, which so often ‘speak’ when things go wrong (eg in the form of slips and blind spots). Thus, in the examples discussed above, the mastery, credibility and neutrality of the World Bank are tripped up by the ‘Summers memo’, revealing the Bank’s desire for free market economics, even if this means First World domination of the Third World, while the traumatic Third World Quarterly 1127 Downloaded by [York University Libraries] at 10:45 02 October 2014 inability of modernisation to face its limitations and complicities shows up in its disavowal of Western colonialism. Note that both these illustrations exemplify what is known in psychoanalysis as the ‘return of the repressed’: mainstream development’s construction of itself as rational, scientific and authoritative implies precisely the evacuation of certain desires and traumas, which ‘speak’ nonetheless, sometimes at the most inopportune moments. Note as well that, even though development’s slips and stumbles may appear ‘irrational’ (eg the ‘irrational’ implications of free market economic logic), such irrationality is the product of the excess of reason (eg development’s prioritisation of positivist economics and science), that is, its inability to come to terms with its conflicting desires (eg its desire to appear pure, yet its past yearnings for colonial plunder). Irrationality, in this sense, is integral to the very construction of a rational and scientific development discourse (in the same way that, for Lacan, the unconscious is integral to the very construction of language). Finally, note the emphasis on surface rather than depth when it comes to the unconscious: Lacanian psychoanalysis is not a ‘depth psychology’ meant to excavate unconscious desires from the recesses of the individual mind; rather than going below the surface, the point is to glean the unconscious hidden in plain view. The unconscious is thus immanent to language/discourse, visible topologically. This is why the way the Summers memo is presented (its secretive form) is more important, psychoanalytically speaking, than what is uttered in it. This is also why the slips contained in ‘population control’ and ‘sustainable development’ are outwardly visible from the start, although, as pointed out earlier, they are only gleaned retroactively, in light of the institutional machinations that stem from each. Enjoying development: understanding why development discourse endures The Lacanian concept of jouissance (enjoyment) refers not to the pleasure we derive from things but, rather, to the excessive satisfaction or kick we get from doing something transgressive, irrational or even wrong. It has been called ‘the thrill of the [R]eal’, 32 and helps explain, for example, such self-destructive pursuits as smoking and binge drinking, or such ‘extreme sports’ as bungee jumping and free diving: people do them not despite the fact that they are dangerous, but because they are. Jouissance thus involves the intense pleasure taken from pain, a kind of idiotic stupor that often makes us ask for more even though we well know the risks. According to Lacan, jouissance is the outcome of the child’s separation from the primordial (m)Other and entry into the symbolic order. This is a traumatic separation that results in deep loss (of enjoyment), a loss that we are never able to forget. The tragedy is that the loss is actually a fiction (no real primordial fullness ever existed in the first place), yet it always remains with us. We repeatedly assume fullness exists but constantly remain dissatisfied, thus turning ‘nothing into something’. 33 The promise of enjoyment is always deferred, with the result that we continuously miss our goal, yet keep coming back for more. One of Žižek’s significant contributions to political theory has been to make the notion of jouissance a political factor, showing how it is a crucial ingredient 1128 I. Kapoor Downloaded by [York University Libraries] at 10:45 02 October 2014 in the formation of political community and identity.34 For example, the deep comfort people may get from following rituals (bureaucratic or religious), or the enjoyment and thrill that may binds us together against an external enemy, help explain why institutions, nations, or groups often do ‘irrational’ things – in this case, obstinately defending bureaucratic red tape or religious identity, or engaging in aggressive racism or nationalism. Jouissance elucidates why people become so attached to cultural values and socio-political systems, and why power can turn out to be so intractable, persistent and enduring. One has trouble giving up such things as racism, materialism, sexism or religious fundamentalism because one enjoys them; they give one a certain sense of stability and fulfilment, despite the fact that (and sometimes because) one may well know they can be pernicious and cruel. As Stavrakakis points out, ‘by taking into account emotion, affect [and enjoyment]...one may be able to reach a more thorough understanding of “what sticks”: both what fuels identification processes and what creates fixity’. 35 Let me provide the following three illustrations. The first concerns the emphatically capitalist orientation of development: despite the fact that capitalism has been severely criticised – it results in socioeconomic inequality, global unevenness and ecological destruction – it is very much in the ascendancy; arguably, it constitutes the only available economic horizon today, whether in the global North or the South. From a Žižekian perspective, one of the key reasons for such tremendous success is jouissance. That is to say, people enjoy capitalism. We are libidinally bound to it because we get so much from it – cars TVs, houses, nice clothes, cheap fast-food, iPhones, etc. And capitalism, especially in its latest neoliberal phase, has been very effective in appealing to our passions. It is able to exploit what Lacanians see as our deep-seated sense of lack/loss, enabling us to fill such lack through consumerism and materialism. This means that we cannot easily postpone capitalism, since it promises to heal our ontological wound. Late capitalism’s productive engine thus depends on enjoyment-as-excess; its strength and success hinge on the extent to which it can elevate jouissance ‘into the very principle of social life’. 36 This is why late capitalist societies (whether in the West or Third World) are characterised by the normalisation of excess – the desire for the best, biggest, tallest, richest, most original; the pervasiveness of ‘super-sized’ everything, from dams and buildings to coffee and art; the orgiastic show of wealth; the rise of sexual promiscuity and ‘extreme’ sports; or the over-abundance of ‘choice’, whether in TV channels, music, restaurants or university programmes. The problem, however, is that, although capitalist development promises enjoyment, it never quite delivers: a Coke doesn’t quite quench, more wealth is still never enough and super-sized fast-food sickens rather than satisfies. But such failure is written into the very logic of capitalism. For, if an end to dissatisfaction were possible, that would spell the end of the global capitalist system. Instead, the aim of the system is always to solicit and activate desire, but never to allow it to be satiated; this is what enables ever-increasing growth, profit or market share. Capitalist development, in this sense, is driven by insatiable lack, so that, try as we may to satisfy our enjoyment, we always miss our mark. As Todd McGowan states, ‘the problem with the society of enjoyment is not that we suffer from too much enjoyment, but that we don’t have enough’. 37 Third World Quarterly 1129 Downloaded by [York University Libraries] at 10:45 02 October 2014 A second illustration of jouissance involves nationalism. Indeed, little else has been more enduring than national identifications in the development context. Appeals to national bonds were of course crucial during independence struggles across the former colonies, but they have also been a key ingredient in postindependence national politics to help unify the nation on key political issues (land reform, industrialisation or liberalisation strategies, pet or prestige development projects, emergencies, humanitarian disasters, wars, etc). What is notable is that these appeals have invariably relied, not so much on rational arguments as social passions. Nationalism operates at the libidinal level (ie at the level of our ‘guts’, hearts, affect), engaging our sense of belonging, community and pride. It relies on the (fantasmatic) promise of full enjoyment, which once again helps to explain the secret of its persistence. The problem is that, while nationalism may be able to deliver on a few of its development goals, it often leads to irrationalities and excesses. We are all too aware of stories about excessive government spending on the military or costly prestige projects (mega-dams, space programmes, state-of-the-art hospitals, etc), at the expense of, say, basic health care and education. It is precisely this that Frantz Fanon warned about in his scathing critique of the national bourgeoisie, which he famously accused of pandering to nationalist sentiment as a pretext for continuing elite wealth accumulation and ‘racket’. 38 But there is also a more sinister dimension to nationalism: its tendency to scapegoat. This is a tendency that arises as part of the very formation of national identity. To construct the nation is to appeal to what makes ‘us’ unique (our customs, culture, landscapes, food, dress, festivals, etc). It is this uniqueness that provides people with an ecstatic sense of unity and togetherness (ie jouissance). Yet, as Lacanians are quick to point out, such togetherness is a fiction, masking the lack and instability at the heart of any identity. And so, usually when things go wrong and this sense of national togetherness is threatened (eg by economic crises, recessions or internal political instability), a scapegoat is constructed – fundamentalists who terrorise us, the poor who threaten our security or environment, immigrants who steal our jobs or menace our women, the Jews/Indians/Chinese who plot to rule the world. Žižek underlines how such scapegoating allows the nation to avoid confronting its own inadequacies or contradictions by projecting them onto a stereotypical Other.39 My third, related example is about racism. Since colonial times not only has Western domination of the Third World been exercised in the socioeconomic and political spheres, but also when it comes to race. As Fanon claims, the ‘White man’ has become the universal subject or master signifier, so that being Black (or a person of colour) is only meaningful in relation to whiteness.40 From the Lacanian standpoint this implies that whiteness has been constructed as the promise of being less lacking, that is, more human and more whole.41 There is thus, as Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks argues, a kernel of jouissance in the construction of race and racism, with people of colour (and white people themselves) desiring whiteness,42 something which, it must be noted, fits neatly with the preponderant idealisation of the West in development discourse. No wonder once again that, despite the fact that people decry racism, it so obstinately remains with us. Skin bleaching (‘lactification’), the denigration of local culture in favour of all things Euro-North American, racial profiling (in policing, 1130 I. Kapoor Downloaded by [York University Libraries] at 10:45 02 October 2014 immigration), the resurgence of white supremacist movements – all speak to the jouissance inherent in racism and to persistent forms of ‘internalized whiteness’, whether in the global South or North. Žižek often associates racist enjoyment with envy, claiming that our enjoyment is always imbricated with the Other’s enjoyment, so that we can never enjoy on our own; we most often enjoy by envying the Other’s enjoyment, too.43 The creation of a scapegoat, according to him, is accompanied by anxiety about the ‘theft of enjoyment’: we cannot enjoy because the Other – terrorists who are threatening our security, foreigners who are taking our jobs – has stolen our enjoyment or is enjoying more than us. Hence, only by eliminating the Other can we recover our lost enjoyment and really enjoy (of course, no such real enjoyment exists). Such a perspective would help explain why extreme forms of racism result in the Other’s extermination (eg in the Rwandan and Armenian genocides, Bosnian ethnic cleansing, the massacre of indigenous peoples in Guatemala, Nazi concentration camps, etc). But it also helps explain more subtle or everyday forms of racism. For example, the neighbour declaring she likes family X living next door, but there’s something about them that bothers her (their noisy music, their entrepreneurialism, their body odour, their cooking smells, etc). What bothers her is (her construction of) their excess, their particular mode of enjoyment. An illustration of this in the development context is the recent discourse on HIV/AIDS. As Kalpana Wilson contends, despite the fact that the AIDS pandemic has much to do with political economy, the crisis is most often explained or rationalised (eg by Western aid agencies) in terms of ‘risk behaviours’ among ‘Africans’. 44 Wilson shows that weakened immune systems are the result not merely of the spread of a virus, but of people living in poverty, and the lack of access to cheap generic retroviral drugs (blocked by the big pharmaceuticals with the support of Western governments). That people live in poverty is the product of neoliberal structural adjustment policies across sub-Saharan Africa, which has seen reduced access to educational and health services for the poorest (especially women), and high unemployment, particularly among the ranks of former civil servants, teachers and health workers (several of whom live with HIV/AIDS). Yet the HIV/AIDS discourse tends towards a racialised stereotype on sexual behaviour: Africans lack sexual control, or African men and women are promiscuous. The consequence, according to Wilson, is a tendency on the part of Western aid agencies to target not the socioeconomic causes of the pandemic, but ‘African culture’ (behavioural modification, changes in values, etc). The stereotype of the hypersexual African is an old colonial one that Fanon famously seized upon.45 He claimed, from a psychoanalytic point of view, that it displayed a certain paranoid anxiety on the part of the coloniser about ‘African’ sexual prowess. That is, white racist repulsion was accompanied by its opposite – desire for, or sexual attraction to, Black people. And the same applies to the contemporary AIDS-related stereotype about the over-sexed African. To put it in Lacanian terms, it betrays a Western racist envy of the Other’s excess or enjoyment. The ‘African’ is constructed as possessing something we lack, which is what bothers us. But of course, what such racist constructions do is blind us to our own contradictions and deficiencies, which in this case have to do, as Wilson underlines, with Western complicities in the HIV/AIDS pandemic (support Third World Quarterly 1131 Downloaded by [York University Libraries] at 10:45 02 October 2014 for the big pharmaceuticals on restricting cheaper generic drugs, imposition of structural adjustment programmes, etc). Consequently Lacanian psychoanalysis helps us glean how such an unconscious social passion as enjoyment is so intertwined with development. Enjoyment provides for a (false) sense of satisfaction, stability and togetherness (as illustrated in the examples of neoliberal capitalism, nationalism and racism), but the excess it represents can also give way to irrational conduct (overindulgent materialism, scapegoating, and so on). Yet, whether in its positive or negative form (and often in both forms simultaneously), the notion of jouissance helps explain why things stick, why people hold on to sociocultural identifications, why such social ills as racism or rabid nationalism so obdurately persist. One last important argument: I want to suggest that it is the neglect of the passions, particularly jouissance, that bedevils the likes of post-development (hence it is not just mainstream development that has tended to disavow its psychoanalytic underpinnings, but even such non-mainstream thinking as postdevelopment). Indeed, Foucault, on whose work post-development relies, is quite critical of psychoanalysis (at least in his later work), seeing desire not as some extra-discursive passion that is repressed, but as something positively produced by discourse.46 Psychoanalysis, for him, is thus a normalising technology in the service of our disciplinary modern societies. Lacanian psychoanalysis is quite consistent with Foucault’s conception of power and discourse and how these discipline bodies, produce subjects, and shape such modern institutions as asylums, prisons, hospitals, schools, and indeed psychoanalysis.47 The problem, however, is that Foucault assumes that power produces the body without any mediation, that is, without any process of interiorisation. As Copjec argues, in ‘Foucault’s work the techniques of disciplinary power (of the construction of the subject) are conceived as capable of “materially penetrat[ing] the body in depth without depending even on the mediation of the subject’s own representations. If power takes hold on the body, this isn’t through its having first to be interiorized into people’s consciousness”.’ 48 For Lacanians it is precisely desire (growing out of enjoyment) that fixes the subject (however precariously and contingently), explaining how we both (mis) perceive power and become libidinally invested in it. And such desire/enjoyment is not discursively produced, as Foucault would have it, but as noted above is an inherent excess or an extimate core (the Real) to any discourse; it is the result of the insubstantial loss that arises the moment we enter language. Thus, the problem with Foucault, according to Copjec, is his refusal of any type of transcendence (not even the internally external transcendence envisaged by Lacan): his historicist discursivism ends up reducing society to power–knowledge relationships. But because power is always immanent for Foucault, his is a historicism which can neither account for itself (how does one apprehend power/discourse if one is always within it?) nor explain how social orders persist (or can be changed).49 Post-development shares several of the same problems. Drawing primarily on Foucault, post-development analysts such as Arturo Escobar and James Ferguson have focused on the construction of discourses about the Third World and their attendant disciplinary mechanisms. Escobar, for example, examines how development discourse is produced through the problematisation of issues 1132 I. Kapoor Downloaded by [York University Libraries] at 10:45 02 October 2014 (eg ‘poverty’) and the consequent professionalisation and institutionalisation of knowledge, which end up controlling and regulating people and communities.50 Ferguson, for his part, underlines how knowledge is simplified and depoliticised as a way of aggrandising institutional authority, so much so that, even when development projects fail, they can help expand bureaucratic power.51 But the problem with such analyses is that they inadequately grapple with human/social passions, failing to confront the psychic inclinations that support development discourses. In Escobar’s case there is no explanation of how power is mediated at the level of the subject, or why people so often acquiesce in, say, neoliberal discourse (as highlighted earlier). In fact, Escobar has been criticised precisely for a facile anti-development stance, with critics pointing out that many communities (including opposition groups) often fight for development (eg more jobs, even if they are low-paid, and better access to health, education, etc).52 Jonathan Rigg contends, for example, that in Southeast Asia many groups have ‘climbed aboard the modernization bandwagon, whether they be for or against it’. 53 Similarly, while Ferguson’s is a fascinating analysis of institutional power, he reduces the bureaucratic space to the power–knowledge relationships within it. There is no consideration of institutional desire – the ways in which, for instance, development administrators may obtain a certain reassurance and stability from following bureaucratic procedures and rules, or enjoy the prestige (and in the development context, benevolence) of their bureaucratic position and the discretionary power that comes with it. This would certainly explain more adequately why institutional power is able to sustain itself: it is not only produced discursively in an almost impersonal and anonymous way (ie an anti-politics machine), but is able to take hold and expand through libidinal attachments.54 Development as fantasy: doing ideology critique It is Žižek who has almost single-handedly renewed current interest in ideology. Given the Lacanian position that reality is always ruptured by gaps and contradictions (ie the Real), ideology, according to Žižek, is that which attempts to cover up these contradictions, to obscure the Real.55 In this sense reality is thoroughly ideological, with ideology serving as a way for it to escape its traumatic core and ideology critique constantly trying to focus attention back on this escape/trauma. Thus, in the case of (the ideology of) nationalist racism discussed above, we saw how a scapegoat was produced to cover up, and divert attention away from, the nation’s internal troubles (the Real). Here, the underlying ideological fantasy is that, once the scapegoat is removed or eliminated, the nation will recover its (impossible) harmony. Note that Žižek’s position on ideology differs from the Marxist one, which implies a privileged, neutral point from which one can distinguish between ‘objective reality’ and ‘false consciousness’. For Žižek we are all ideologically produced, so there is no question of being outside ideology. Rather, what we can do in terms of ideology critique is to try and detect, in the manner of the psychoanalyst, the gaps in ideologically constructed reality, gaps which, as we have seen, show up as slips, blind spots, symptoms, irrationalities. Ideology critique is therefore possible only from within the belly of the beast, so to speak. Third World Quarterly 1133 Downloaded by [York University Libraries] at 10:45 02 October 2014 Note as well that ideological fantasies secure our consent and compliance through desire (and enjoyment).56 In fact, as Žižek points out, fantasy is the mise-en-scène for desire: it helps make reality smooth, coherent and harmonious, protecting us from trauma or lack, gentrifying turbulence or negativity, and promising a world that is more bearable, attractive and enjoyable. Fantasy thus animates and manages desire; it teaches us how to desire.57 But just as fantasy can never live up to its promises (because no fullness exists), so desire is never satiated; it is condemned to repetition and failure in search of the missing object. Let me illustrate by examining a couple of development’s ideological fantasies. To begin, the very discourse of ‘poverty’, upon which development centres, is ideological. Indeed, poverty discourse typically constructs the Third World as underdeveloped and backward, as though such ‘underdevelopment’ is a fait accompli. By so isolating underdevelopment and poverty, the discourse mystifies the close relationship between surplus extraction and impoverishment, wherein wealth in some parts of the world (ie the affluent centres of the global North and South) is the historical result of the pauperisation of others.58 Hence poverty discourse simplifies and de-historicises inequality by privileging the ‘now’ of poverty, thus eliding the Real – in this case, continuing forms of elite domination, particularly the West’s (neo)colonial immiseration of the Third World. (Note that this is the same traumatic Real that, as pointed out earlier, modernisation tries to escape by disavowing Western colonial history.) It is worth reflecting on the desires elicited by such an ideological fantasy. A typical response to the mis-en-scène of (Third World) poverty is to blame this ‘backwardness’ on individuals and values – rogue civil servants, corrupt leaders, uneducated or irresponsible mothers, ‘ethnic’ or ‘traditional’ practices – so that the solution becomes the need/desire for better (ie modern, Western-style) leadership, norms and codes of conduct. A distinct moral righteousness pervades such a discourse, with experts and elites standing as arbiters of the ‘right’ values and ‘good’ governance. Ideologies and moralising discourses such as that of poverty are most successful when they are able to depoliticise desires, precisely in order to avoid coming too close to the Real. It would be much too risky – and traumatic – for the discourse of poverty to be staged in terms of inequality, for this would doutbless animate the desire to problematise (if not eliminate) the relationship between wealth accumulation and pauperisation. This is no doubt why it is the discourse of poverty, not inequality, that is so hegemonic in development, reflecting elites’ desires to maintain the status quo. A second prevalent ideological fantasy is neoliberalism, with which, for all intents and purposes, mainstream capitalist development is closely associated these days. Neoliberalism proposes that market mechanisms maximise human well-being and are ideal for addressing social and political problems. It promises that everyone wins, and anyone can ‘make it’. 59 We have already seen how such an ideological system binds people to it by seducing them (through jouissance); it creates a series of lacks, and through a cycle of satisfaction–disappointment (and hence postponement) is able to endlessly stimulate and redirect our desires (for consumption, wealth, jobs, etc). But in pledging to eliminate our ontological loss, in vowing to make us whole, the neoliberal fantasy conceals a lot. It hides the rapaciousness of 1134 I. Kapoor Downloaded by [York University Libraries] at 10:45 02 October 2014 markets, which have led to global ecological crisis and growing inequalities and unevenness.60 It disavows the large reserve army of (sweatshop) labour upon which the smooth functioning of global capital depends. And it ignores how the neoliberal gutting of state social programmes has hit hardest those most in need (women, the unemployed, migrants, racialised minorities). Neoliberal capitalism is founded on the gentrification of, and inability to acknowledge, its contradictions and deficiencies. What can be gleaned from the above is that Žižekian ideology critique involves two complementary steps.61 The first is about examining how an ideological fantasy is constructed and what it is trying to hide or disavow. Often this means identifying the fantasy’s master signifiers, taken-for-granteds or ‘sublime objects’ (in the above two examples: ‘poverty’, ‘corruption’, ‘free market’, ‘growth’). Moreover, this means locating the ideology’s Real, that is, what it is trying to render invisible or unutterable (eg inequality, the relationship between poverty and wealth accumulation, sweatshop labour). But detecting the holes and traumas within our knowledge systems is not nearly enough. This is because of what Žižek calls the ‘fetishistic disavowal’, according to which we can know, but still continue to do.62 The problem is evident in, say, global hedge fund managers guiltily regretting the industrial layoffs caused by their own financial speculation, yet continuing their business as usual; or critical TV audience members decrying product advertising but still engaging in consumerism and shopping. The strength of ideology, according to Žižek, lies in allowing us a certain ironic distance, which makes us think we know better and can rise above ideology. In contrast to those who maintain that having the information and ‘exposing the facts’ are sufficient to undermine power, Žižek argues emphatically that, most often, it is not a lack of knowledge that is the problem, but our unconscious commands and passions that bind us to ideology despite critical distance. Acknowledging and tracking the desires and enjoyment we invest in ideology, then, is a crucial second procedure for ideology critique. It means ‘articulating the way in which...an ideology implies, manipulates, produces a pre-ideological enjoyment structured in fantasy’. 63 This is precisely why I have been arguing for the importance of psychoanalysis in development: to better identify and come to terms with our libidinal attachments and the lure of development’s many sublime objects and fantasies. Psychoanalysis tells those of us who work in this field that we do not necessarily know our interests. Our libidinal attachments so often circumscribe our thinking and actions. This is why, despite the fact that we may be critical of or despondent about development, we buy into such development fantasies as ‘doing good’ or ‘free markets’, which often screen our lacks and anxieties (about social injustice, inequality, or our own complicities as Westernised elites) and set off our desires (eg to help, to save the Other, to donate money to charity, or to call for the privatisation of public services).

#### Vote negative to embrace the lack – this requires being open to the anxiety that occurs from an encounter with the other and breaks down fantasy and drives.

McGowan 13 Todd McGowan, 2013, “Enjoying What We Don’t Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” University of Nebraska Press/Lincoln and London, SJBE

The alternative — the ethical path that psychoanalysis identifies — demands an embrace of the anxiety that stems from the encounter with the enjoying other. If there is a certain ethical dimension to anxiety, it lies in the rela- tionship that exists between anxiety and enjoyment. Contra Heidegger, the ethics of anxiety does not stem from anxiety’s relation to absence but from its relation to presence — to the overwhelming presence of the other’s enjoyment. In some sense, the encounter with absence or nothing is easier than the encounter with presence. Even though it traumatizes us, absence allows us to constitute ourselves as desiring subjects. Rather than producing anxiety, absence leads the subject out of anxiety into desire. Confronted with the lost object as a structuring absence, the subject is able to embark on the pursuit of the enjoyment embodied by this object, and this pursuit provides the subject with a clear sense of direction and even meaning. This is precisely what the subject lacks when it does not encounter a lack in the symbolic structure. When the subject encounters enjoyment at the point where it should encounter the absence of enjoyment, anxiety overwhelms the subject. In this situation, the subject cannot constitute itself along the path of desire. It lacks the lack — the absence — that would provide the space through which desire could develop. Consequently, this subject confronts the enjoying other and experiences anxiety. Unlike the subject of desire — or the subject of Heideggerean anxiety — the subject who suffers this sort of anxiety actually experiences the other in its real dimension.¶ The real other is the other caught up in its obscene enjoyment, caught up in this enjoyment in a way that intrudes on the subject. There is no safe distance from this enjoyment, and one cannot simply avoid it. There is nowhere in the contemporary world to hide from it. As a result, the contem- porary subject is necessarily a subject haunted by anxiety triggered by the omnipresent enjoyment of the other. And yet, this enjoyment offers us an ethical possibility. As Slavoj Žižek puts it, “It is this excessive and intrusive jouissance that we should learn to tolerate.”27 When we tolerate the other’s “excessive and intrusive jouissance” and when we endure the anxiety that it produces, we acknowledge and sustain the other in its real dimension.¶ Tolerance is the ethical watchword of our epoch. However, the problem with contemporary tolerance is its insistence on tolerating the other only insofar as the other cedes its enjoyment and accepts the prevailing symbolic structure. That is to say, we readily tolerate the other in its symbolic dimen- sion, the other that plays by the rules of our game. This type of tolerance allows the subject to feel good about itself and to sustain its symbolic identity. The problem is that, at the same time, it destroys what is in the other more than the other — the particular way that the other enjoys.¶ It is only the encounter with the other in its real dimension — the encounter that produces anxiety in the subject — that sustains that which defines the other as such. Authentic tolerance tolerates the real other, not simply the other as mediated through a symbolic structure. In this sense, it involves the experience of anxiety on the part of the subject. This is a difficult posi- tion to sustain, as it involves enduring the “whole opaque weight of alien enjoyment on your chest.”The obscene enjoyment of the other bombards the authentically tolerant subject, but this subject does not retreat from the anxiety that this enjoyment produces. If the embrace of the anxiety that accompanies the other’s proximate enjoyment represents the ethical position today, this does not necessarily provide us with an incentive for occupying it. Who wants to be ethical when it involves enduring anxiety rather than finding a way — a drug, a new authority, or something — to alleviate it? What good does it do to sustain oneself in anxiety? In fact, anxiety does the subject no good at all, which is why it offers the subject the possibility of enjoyment. When the subject encounters the other’s enjoyment, this is the form that its own enjoyment takes as well. To endure the anxiety caused by the other’s enjoyment is to experience one’s own simultaneously. As Lacan points out, when it comes to the enjoyment of the other and my own enjoyment, “nothing indicates they are distinct.” Thus, not only is anxiety an ethical position, it is also the key to embracing the experience of enjoyment. To reject the experience of anxiety is to flee one’s own enjoyment.¶ The notion that the other’s enjoyment is also our own enjoyment seems at first glance difficult to accept. Few people enjoy themselves when they hear someone else screaming profanities in the workplace or when they see a couple passionately kissing in public, to take just two examples. In these instances, we tend to recoil at the inappropriateness of the activity rather than enjoy it, and this reaction seems completely justified. The public display of enjoyment violates the social pact with its intrusiveness; it doesn’t let us alone but assaults our senses. It violates the implicit agreement of the public sphere constituted as an enjoyment-free zone. And yet, recoiling from the other’s enjoyment deprives us of our own.¶ How we comport ourselves in relation to the other’s enjoyment indi- cates our relationship to our own. What bothers us about the other — the disturbance that the other’s enjoyment creates in our existence — is our own mode of enjoying. If we did not derive enjoyment from the other’s enjoyment, witnessing it would not bother us psychically. We would sim- ply be indifferent to it and focused on our own concerns. Of course, we might ask an offending car radio listener to turn the radio down so that we wouldn’t have to hear the unwanted music, but we would not experience the mere exhibition of alien enjoyment through the playing of that music as an affront. The very fact that the other’s enjoyment captures our attention demonstrates our intimate — or extimate — relation to it. This relation becomes even clearer when we consider the epistemo- logical status of the enjoying other. Because the real or enjoying other is irreducible to any observable identity, we have no way of knowing whether or not the other really is enjoying. A stream of profanity may be the result of someone hurting a toe. The person playing the car radio too loud while sitting at the traffic light may have simply forgotten to turn down the radio after driving on the highway. Or the person may have difficulty hearing. The couple’s amorous behavior in public may reflect an absence of enjoyment in their relationship that they are trying to hide from both themselves and the public.¶ Considering the enjoyment of the other, we never know whether it is there or not. If we experience it, we do so through the lens of our own fantasy. We fantasize that the person blasting the radio is caught up in the enjoyment of the music to the exclusion of everything else; we fantasize that the public kisses of the couple suggest an enjoyment that has no concern for the outside world. Without the fantasy frame, the enjoying other would never appear within our experience.¶ The role of the fantasy frame for accessing the enjoying other becomes apparent within Fascist ideology. Fascism posits an internal enemy — the figure of the Jew or some analogue — that enjoys illicitly at the expense of the social body as a whole. By attempting to eliminate the enjoying other, Fascism hopes to create a pure social body bereft of any stain of enjoy- ment. This purity would allow for the ultimate enjoyment, but it would be completely licit. This hope for a future society free of any stain is not where Fascism’s true enjoyment lies, however. Fascists experience their own enjoyment through the enjoying other that they persecute. The enjoy- ment that the figure of the Jew embodies is the Fascists’ own enjoyment, though they cannot avow it as their own. More than any other social form, Fascism is founded on the disavowal of enjoyment — the attempt to enjoy while keeping enjoyment at arm’s length. But this effort is not confined to Fascism; it predominates everywhere, because no subjects anywhere can simply feel comfortable with their own mode of enjoying.¶ The very structure of enjoyment is such that we cannot experience it directly: when we experience enjoyment, we don’t have it; it has us. We experience our own enjoyment as an assault coming from the outside that dominates our conscious intentions. This is why we must fantasize our own enjoyment through the enjoying other. Compelled by our enjoyment, we can’t do otherwise; we act against our self-interest and against our own good. Enjoyment overwhelms the subject, even though the subject’s mode of enjoying marks what is most singular about the subject.¶ Even though the encounter with the enjoying other apprehends the real other through the apparatus of fantasy, this encounter is nonetheless genuine and has an ethical status. Unlike the experience of the nonexistent symbolic identity, which closes down the space in which the real other might appear, the fantasized encounter with the enjoying other leaves this space open. By allowing itself to be disturbed by the other on the level of fantasy, the subject acknowledges the singularity of the real other — its mode of enjoying — without confining this singularity to a prescribed identity.¶ The implications of privileging the encounter with the disturbing enjoy- ment of the real other over the assimilable symbolic identity are themselves disturbing. The tolerant attitude that never allows itself to be jarred by the enjoying other becomes, according to this way of seeing things, further from really encountering the real other than the attitude of hate and mis- trust. The liberal subject who welcomes illegal immigrants as fellow citizens completely shuts down the space for the other in the real. The immigrant as fellow citizen is not the real other. The xenophobic conservative, on the other hand, constructs a fantasy that envisions the illegal immigrant awash in a linguistic and cultural enjoyment that excludes natives. This fantasy, paradoxically, permits an encounter with the real other that liberal tolerance forecloses. Of course, xenophobes retreat from this encounter and from their own enjoyment, but they do have an experience of it that liberals do not. The tolerant liberal is open to the other but eliminates the otherness, while the xenophobic conservative is closed to the other but allows for the otherness. The ethical position thus involves sustaining the liberal’s toler- ance within the conservative’s encounter with the real other.

## 2

**Interpretation: The Affirmitive debater must not read \_\_\_\_.**

**Violation:**

**Standards:**

#### [1] Reciprocity – I have to \_\_\_ before I can even get access to case but still lose case to the \_\_\_, whereas you can collapse to any layer as a no-risk issue so there’s an inherent \_:1 skew for the neg which kills reciprocity – key to fairness because it’s definitionally equal access to the ballot which means it outweighs.

#### [2] Clash – doing this kills clash since there’s no quality engagement on any specific layer because there’s a skew in routes to the ballot which means I’m blitzing superficial responses to everything in the 1AR which means we won’t have in depth clash on either layer. Key to fairness because ensures we don’t hide behind args and education since it ensures we test the validity of arguments.

**Fairness-debate is a game that needs rules to be evaluated**

#### DTD to set norms

#### No rvi-you don’t win for being fair

#### CI cuz brightlines are self serving and arbitrary

## Im done with your tricks-this ends now

#### Their strategy of quick, blippy arguments excludes people with learning disabilities which not only deters them from the activity but also makes debate uneducational.

Thompson 15 Terrence Lonam April 21, 2015 “Miscellaneous Thoughts from the Disorganized Mind of Marshall Thompson” http://nsdupdate.com/2015/04/21/miscellaneous-thoughts-from-the-disorganized-mind-of-marshall-thompson/

First, I think that evaluating who is the better debater via who dropped spikes excludes lots of specific individuals, especially those with learning disabilities. I have both moderate dyslexia and extreme dysgraphia. Despite debating for four years with a lot of success I was never able to deal with spikes. I could not ‘mind-sweep’ because my flow was not clear enough to find the arguments I needed, and I was simply too slow a reader to be able to reread through the relevant parts of a case during prep-time. I was very lucky, my junior year (which was the first year I really competed on the national circuit) spikes were remarkably uncommon. Looking back it was in many ways the low-point for spike. They started to be used some my senior year but not anything like the extent they are used today. I am entirely confident, however, in saying that if spikes had had anywhere near the same prevalence when I started doing ‘circuit’ debate as they do now, I—with the specific ways that dyslexia/dysgraphia has affected me—would never have bothered to try to debate national circuit LD (I don’t intend to imply this is the same for anyone who has dyslexia or dysgraphia, the particular ways that learning disabilities manifest is often difficult to track). Now, the mere fact that I would have been prevented from succeeding in the activity and possibly from being able to enjoyably compete is not an argument. I never would have been able to succeed at calligraphy, but I would hardly claim we should therefore not make the calligraphy club about handwriting. Instead, what I am suggesting is that the values that debate cares about and should be assessing are not questions of handwriting or notation. We expect notation instrumentally to avoid intervention, but it is not one of the ends of debate in itself. Thus, if there is a viable principle upon which we can decrease this strategic dimension of spikes but maintain non-intervention I think we should do so. I was ‘good’ at philosophy, ‘good’ at argument generation, ‘good’ at research, ‘good’ at casing, ‘great’ at framework comparison etc. It seems to me that as long as I can flow well enough to easily follow a non-tricky aff it was proper that my learning disabilities not be an obstacle to my success. (One other thing to note, while I was a ‘framework debater’ who could never have been good at spikes because of my learning disability I have never met a ‘tricky debater’ who could not have succeeded in debate without tricks simply in virtue of their intelligence and technical proficiency; that is perhaps another reason to favor my account.)

#### Vote them down – inclusion is a tangible out-of-round impact distinct from the procedural aspects of debate – it’s key to minority participation.