#### *Ethics must begin a priori*

#### [A] Empirical Uncertainty – evil demon could deceive us and inability to know others experience make empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### [B] Constitutive Authority – The meta-ethic is bindingness. Practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask why I should be a reasoner concedes it’s authority since you’re actively reasoning.

#### [C] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory.

#### That justifies universality – a] a priori principles like reason apply to everyone since they are independent of human experience and b] any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end.

#### Additionally:

#### [A] Ethical frameworks are topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must be theoretically justified. Prefer on resource disparities—focusing on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep excluding lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debater under my framework can easily be won without any prep since minimal evidence is required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

#### [C] Practical identities – we find our lives worth living under practical identities such as student but that presupposes agency.

**Korsgaard 92** CHRISTINE M. Korsgaard 92 [I am a Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, where I have taught since 1991. From July 1996 through June 2002, I was Chair of the Department of Philosophy. (The current chair is Sean Kelly.) From 2004-2012, I was Director of Graduate Studies in Philosophy. (The current DGS is Mark Richard.) Before coming here, I held positions at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago, as well as visiting positions at Berkeley and UCLA. I served as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2008-2009, and held a Mellon Distinguished Achievement Award from 2006-2009. I work on moral philosophy and its history, practical reason, the nature of agency, personal identity, normativity, and the ethical relations between human beings and the other animals], “The Sources of Normativity”, THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University 16-17 Nov 1992, BE

The Solution: Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### [1] Presumption and Permissibility affirm: a] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me. b] If anything is permissible, then so is the aff since there is nothing prohibiting us.

#### [2] Consequences Fail: a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict. b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. c] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify because we commit the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral d] Yes act/omission distinction – there are infinite events occurring over which you have no control, so you can never be moral

#### [3] Contesting offense under the Aff framework is a voting issue. Reciprocity – I have to win my framework and beat the NC before I can access case, whereas you can collapse to either layer or dump on offense for 7 minutes as a no-risk issue so there’s a skew. Key to fairness because it’s definitionally equal access to the ballot.

## Advocacy

#### Plan text: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. CX checks theory interps to avoid frivolous debates – otherwise I get an I meet.

#### Definition of unconditional right to strike:

NLRB 85 [National Labor Relations Board; “Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947: Volume 1,” Jan 1985; <https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=7o1tA__v4xwC&rdid=book-7o1tA__v4xwC&rdot=1>] Justin

\*\*Edited for gendered language

As for the so-called absolute or unconditional right to strike—there are no absolute rights that do not have their corresponding responsibilities. Under our American Anglo-Saxon system, each individual is entitled to the maximum of freedom, provided however (and this provision is of first importance), his [their] freedom has due regard for the rights and freedoms of others. The very safeguard of our freedoms is the recognition of this fundamental principle. I take issue very definitely with the suggestion that there is an absolute and unconditional right to concerted action (which after all is what the strike is) which endangers the health and welfare of our people in order to attain a selfish end.

#### Enforcement through IFAs is normal means – that solves credibility concerns and legal loopholes which encourages striking.

Neill 12 [Emily CM; “The Right to Strike: How the United States Reduces it to the Freedom to Strike and How International Framework Agreements can Redeem it,” 1/1/12; Labor & Employment Law Forum Volume 2 Issue 2 Article 6; <https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1047&context=lelb>] Justin

IFAs open the door to collective bargaining by creating a space that alters the traditionally antagonistic employer-employee engagement and is more hospitable to the organizing process.83 MNC commitment to respect the core ILO principles of freedom of association and the rights to organize and collectively bargain through IFAs are instrumental to realizing that purpose.84

1. The Creation and Proliferation of International Framework Agreements

An IFA is an agreement negotiated between an MNC and typically85 a global union86 to establish an ongoing relationship between the signatories and ensure adherence to uniform labor standards by the MNC in all countries in which it operates.87 IFAs are the first and only formally-negotiated instruments between unions and corporations at the global level and a significant development in labor relations.88 Since the signing of the first IFA in 1988, they have spread at a steadily increasing rate. 89 Their proliferation since 2000 has been especially dramatic—with the number of IFAs signed in 2003-2006 nearly doubling the number signed in the first fifteen years.90 By 2008, approximately sixty-five agreements had been concluded.91 At the end of 2010, that number had jumped to seventy-six.92

2. Context of Framework Agreements: Corporate Social Responsibility

While both corporate codes of conduct and IFAs can be traced to a consumer driven push for corporate social responsibility, a key difference separates the two: credibility. In the late 1980’s, MNCs in the United States began to respond to campaigns by non-governmental organizations accusing MNCs of international human rights abuses by elaborating internal codes of conduct.93 These codes, unilaterally written and implemented, tend to be vague and provide for no enforcement mechanism.94 The voluntary, self-enforcing nature of these commitments has led critics to conclude that they are mere marketing ploys lacking in credibility or having any real social impact.95

IFAs were developed, in part, as an alternative to corporate codes of conduct to raise labor standards.96 Unlike unilateral codes, IFAs are negotiated between the two principal actors—employers and workers—in the employment relationship.97 Involvement of the very party the agreement is meant to protect attaches greater meaning and significance to the instrument.98

The purpose of IFAs is to promote fundamental labor rights by regulating corporate conduct on a global level.99 This brings us to another key distinction between corporate codes of conduct and IFAs: their concrete normative content.

3. Core ILO Principles as the Substantive Content of IFAs

Whereas codes tend to be vague in their commitments, MNCs commit themselves to concrete international labor norms through framework agreements. The key areas of IFAs are the acceptance of the four core labor standards, as articulated in the 1998 ILO Declaration.100 The Declaration itself is typically not mentioned, but rather the four rights are referred to in IFAs by their convention numbers.101 Thus, apart from a very few exceptions, IFAs refer explicitly to ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on freedom of association and the right to organize and collective bargaining, respectively.102

As previously discussed, ILO standards are the principal source of international labor norms.103 ILO Conventions 87 and 98 are perhaps the most important of ILO principles since the right to organize and bargain collectively is essential to the defense of working conditions like wages, hours, and health and safety through the collective bargaining process.104

4. Scope of IFAs, MNCs and Supply Chains

One of the most important features of IFAs is their goal of addressing behavior not only within the signatory MNC, but along their supply chains as well.105 According to one study, of the IFAs in existence as of 2008, eighty eight percent explicitly indicated that the norms of the agreements applied to their subsidiaries and seventy-three percent contained provisions defining their application to suppliers and subcontractors.106 These provisions contain varying degrees of commitment on behalf of the signatory MNC. Some MNCs agree to place very concrete obligations on supply chain parties, going so far as to detail sanctions to be imposed upon non-compliant suppliers.107 Others contain provisions that are less mandatory, limiting the MNC’s obligation to informing or encouraging its suppliers and subsidiaries to respect the principles of the agreement. For instance, the PSA Peugeot Citroen IFA was amended in 2010, changing its once relatively firm language by which suppliers are “required” to make similar commitments to a much weaker provision in which the MNC agrees to “request” that its suppliers a similar commitment in respect of their own suppliers and sub-contractors.108

III. ANALYSIS

The principal weapon workers have to leverage their bargaining power is the strike.109 The permanent strike replacement policy renders [strikes] this weapon almost meaningless by subjecting workers that employ it to a risk of job loss. This practice deviates from international norms on freedom of association, the right to organize, and bargain collectively, as enunciated in Conventions 87 and 98, and reaffirmed in the ILO 1998 Declaration to the point of rendering the right to strike a mere freedom to strike.110 Fortunately, IFAs have the potential to bring many U.S. operating companies into compliance with international standards on the right to strike, which prohibits the use of permanent replacements.

This Section first addresses the effect of the permanent replacement doctrine on the right to strike in the United States. It next argues that as a member of the ILO, the U.S. is obligated to amend this policy to guarantee workers protection in their right to strike. Finally, it argues that even if the U.S. permits permanent strike replacements, certain U.S. companies are bound to IFAs that prohibit them from taking advantage of the policy.

A. Interference with the Right to Strike is an Abridgement of ILO Principles

Collective bargaining is the mechanism through which workers present their demands to an employer and, through negotiations, determine the working conditions and terms of employment.111 The right to strike arises most often in the context of collective bargaining, though as a weapon of last resort.112 The employment relationship is an economic one—with most workers’ demands encompassing improved pay or other working conditions.113 To bring balance to the employment relationship at the bargaining table, one of the primary weapons available to workers in defending their interests is the threat of withholding labor to inflict costs upon the employer.114 The principle of the strike as a legitimate means of action taken by workers’ organizations is widely recognized in countries throughout the world, almost to the point of universal recognition.115 The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association holds the position that the right to strike is a basic consequence of the right to organize.116

Interference or impairment of the right to strike is inconsistent with Articles 3, 8, and 10 of Convention 87 guaranteeing workers freedom of association and the right to take concerted actions to further their interests. Article 3 recognizes the right of workers’ organizations to organize their activities and to formulate their programs.117 Article 10 states that the term “organization” means any organization for furthering and defending the interests of workers.118 When read together with Article 10, Article 3 protects activities and actions that are designed to further and defend the interests of workers. Recall that strikes are recognized as an essential means through which workers further and defend their interests.119 Article 8 declares that no national law may impair the guarantees of the Convention.120 Because strike action falls under the activities protected by Article 3, which are aimed at furthering and defending workers’ interests, limitations on the right to strike may contravene Conventions 87 and 98.121 This subsection addresses the lawful practice of hiring of permanent replacements for striking workers in the United States as it relates to ILO principles.

1. The Use of Permanent Strike Replacements Reduces the ‘Right’ to Strike to the Unprotected ‘Freedom’ to Strike

In refraining from ratifying ILO Conventions 87 and 98, the United States government has insisted that U.S. law sufficiently guarantees workers protections of the principles of freedom of association, the rights to organize, and bargain collectively.122 While Section 13 of the NLRA addresses the right to strike,123 in reality, enforcement of the NLRA falls short of its goals and departs from international norms, which afford the right to strike fundamental status.124

The Mackay doctrine, permitting permanent replacement of strikers renders the right a mere privilege, or freedom, because it removes meaningful protection of the right by stripping employers of a duty to refrain from interference with striking.125 Wesley Hohfeld’s famous account of legal rights provides a useful analytical framework for distinguishing between the colloquial uses of the “rights” and their implications.126 Under this framework, rights are distinguished from what he calls privileges, or freedoms, by the existence or inexistence of a corresponding duty. All rights have a corresponding duty, or a legal obligation to respect the legal interest of the right-holder and refrain from interfering with it.127 In the example of the right to strike, the correlative is the employer’s duty to not interfere with the employees’ right.128 On the other hand, a ‘freedom’ is the liberty to act, but without the imposition of a duty upon others.129 When one has the freedom to act, others simply do not have a right to prevent her from acting.130 In the strike context, if employees enjoy the freedom to strike, an employer does not have the right to stop the employees from striking, but does not have a duty to not interfere with the act of striking.131

In establishing the Mackay permanent strike replacement Doctrine, the Supreme Court reasoned that the ‘right’ to strike does not destroy an employer’s right to protect and continue business by filling the vacancies of the strikers.132 In so holding, the Court actually transformed the ‘right’ to strike it into the ‘freedom’ to strike by removing a corresponding affirmative duty not to interfere with the exercise of the right from the employer.133 The hire of permanent replacements interferes with strike action by inflicting substantial repercussions upon the employees that undertake the action, loss of employment opportunities.134

The Mackay doctrine forces an employee to choose to strike—at the risk of losing the very job that is the object of the gains and benefits sought— rendering the act virtually useless.135 The threat of being permanently replaced has, in fact, discouraged workers from exercising their ‘right’ to strike.136

Application of the Mackay doctrine produces results that are inconsistent with the NLRA’s provisions regarding protected activity, making the diminution of protection for striking employees even more apparent. In recognizing an employer right to hire permanent replacements, the Mackay Court created a loophole for employers who otherwise are prohibited from firing striking employees under the Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, which proscribes retaliation against employees that engage in protected union activity.137 While the act of permanently replacing strikers is lawful, firing strikers is unlawful, although both acts produce the same result: loss of a job as a consequence of striking.138 The result renders the NLRA’s protections for striking workers a dead letter. Although employers have a duty to refrain from retaliation against workers engaged in union activity in the form of firing, employers do not have a duty to refrain from reaching the same result through a different tactic—permanent replacement.139 Thus, this removal of a duty to refrain from interference renders the ‘right’ to strike, an unprotected ‘freedom’ to strike that yields to an employer’s corresponding freedom to replace strikers.140 In other words, the Mackay doctrine preserves the NLRA Section 13 reference to strike action as a lawful recourse for workers, but not one afforded the status of a protected right.

## Offense

#### Workers view their jobs as a means to an end of acquiring wealth. The unconditional right to strike ensures that companies can not coerce workers into lower wages.

#### Dubin 56 Dubin, Robert. “Industrial Workers' Worlds: A Study of the ‘Central Life Interests’ of Industrial Workers.” Social Problems, vol. 3, no. 3, Jan. 1956, pp. 131–142., doi:http://www.jstor.org/stable/799133 . SJEP

Our hypothesis can now be stated as follows: a significant proportion of industrial workers will be classified as non-job-oriented when central life interest is measured with the CLI questionnaire. Considering the pattern of responses to all the questions, we found that only 24% of all the workers \* studied could be labelled job-oriented in their life interests. Thus, three out of four of this group of industrial workers did not see their jobs and work places as central life interests for themselves. They found their preferred human associations and preferred areas of behavior outside of employment. If this finding holds generally, the role and significance of work in American society has departed from its presumed historical position. Factory work may now very well be viewed by industrial workers as a means to an end — a way of acquiring income for life in the community. The factory as a locale for living out a lifetime seems clearly secondary to other areas of central life interest. The factory and factory work as sources of personal satisfaction, pride, satisfying human associations, perhaps even of pleasure in expressing what Veblen called the "instinct of workmanship,” seem clearly subordinated in the American scene. The general and specific implications of this finding will be examined in the last section of this paper.

#### A right to strike is key to check employer coercion and restricting it limits the freedom of unions

**Muhudia 17** Muhudia, Stephan. Ethico-Legal Inquiry into Strike Action by Doctors in Kenya. Jan. 2017, <https://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/jspui/bitstream/10539/23188/1/Research%20Report%20Stephen%20Muhudhia%20887305%20January,%202017.pdf>. SJ//DA

Chapter 4, section 41 of The Constitution of Kenya provides for the protection of the right of workers to strike. Kenya has ratified ILO Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining (ILO, 1949), but so far, has not ratified ILO Convention No. 87 which provides for the freedom of association of workers and the protection of their right to organise (ILO, 1948). However, by being a member of the ILO, Kenya has an obligation to promote and ultimately realise the principles of Convention No. 87 (ILO, 1998). The ILO recognises the concept of essential workers, and its Committee on Freedom of Association attests to the fact that hospital services are essential services in which workers may be restricted or prohibited from going on strike (ILO, 2008). A number of writers have challenged the principle of legislating against strike action for certain categories of workers (Gernigon, Odero, and Guido, 2003). The ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) stated that **denying workers the right to strike constitutes a significant restriction on the opportunities for trade unions to defend the interests of their members** (ILO, 2006). The ILO Committee of Freedom of Association reaffirmed the right of workers to strike in its publication entitled “Freedom of Association- Digest of Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of ILO”. Paragraph 521 states that: “**The Committee has always recognized the right to strike by workers and their organizations as a legitimate means of defending their economic and social interests”.** While paragraph 522 adds that **“The right to strike is one of the essential means through which workers and organizations may promote and defend their economic and social interests”.** Paragraph 523 reiterates that “The right to strike is an intrinsic corollary to the right to organize protected by Convention No. 87” (ILO, 2006, p109) The International Trade Union Council (ITUC) asserts that “**the right to strike is one of the essential means available to workers and their organisations for the promotion and protection of their economic and social interests”** (ITUC, 2014, p19). Okene (2009) **contended that denying employees the right to strike subjects them to work under conditions akin to enslavement. He claimed that strike action was a fundamental right of workers enabling them to participate in labour negotiations and collective bargaining for their entitlements. Without the right to strike, Okene stated, that workers would be forced to work under any conditions that they are subjected to.** He added that such a situation was both morally and ethically indefensible (Okene, 2009). Strikes are part of the process of advocating for employees‟ demands ranging from economic issues to those related to working conditions and other issues which affect their lives. Loewy (2000) **declared that strikes provided a mechanism for managing deadlocks in negotiations between employees and employers. He further claimed that the right to strike and the ability to do so are necessary for collective bargaining of labour movements to be effective**. Yule Jr. (1982) argued that without the ability to strike, workers would be greatly handicapped and their collective bargaining would merely be collective begging. This sentiment is echoed by other commentators who argue that for democratic societies to function well, the workers‟ fundamental right to strike must be protected (Okene, 2009).

## UV

#### [1] Affirming is harder –

#### [A] Neg is reactive – they tailor the 1NC before the round to exploit the aff’s weakness. Not reciprocal – affs enter the round unaware.

#### [B] Reciprocity – aff defends their framework, method, advantages but neg can contest any of those to win – outweighs since it’s structural. Also means neg only gets one route to the ballot since the aff only gets the 1AC.

#### [C] Aff extends twice – takes valuable time from already most time-pressed speeches.

**[4] Aff gets 1AR theory and RVIs – otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this 1AR theory is drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer of the round – the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance – you must be punished and no 2NR paradigm issues, theory, or RVIs because a) It becomes impossible to check NC abuse if you can dump on reasons the shell doesn't matter in the 2n. There will always be multiple conflicting interpretations of the resolution but the aff has to start somewhere, which means you should accept mine, and b) they have 6 minutes to go for them whereas I only have a 3 minute 2AR to respond so I get crushed on time skew. Reject theory on spikes since it would be a contradiction since they indict each other but prefer mine since they are lexically prior. Evaluate the theory debate after the 1AR since a) the 6 min 2n can dump on theory making the 3 min 2AR impossible b) we both get 1 speech on theory. Evaluate aff theory prior to neg theory as the neg can win their shell and beat mine back in the long 2NR, whereas it’s impossible for me to win both layers in a 2AR that’s only half as long. No new 2N framing issues or responses. a) Destroys aff ability to frame the round, k2 recourse because the neg can uplayer in the 1N unchecked, makes the 4 minute 1AR impossible because either I have to respond to every layer or I have to make a weaker uplayering that is stomped by the 6 min**

#### Global democracy is collapsing now.

Freedom House 3/3 [Freedom House. Freedom House works to defend human rights and promote democratic change, with a focus on political rights and civil liberties. We act as a catalyst for freedom through a combination of analysis, advocacy, and action. Our analysis, focused on 13 central issues, is underpinned by our international program work. “New Report: The global decline in democracy has accelerated”. 3-3-2021. . https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-global-decline-democracy-has-accelerated.] SJ//VM

Washington - March 3, 2021 — Authoritarian actors grew bolder during 2020 as major democracies turned inward, contributing to the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom, according to [***Freedom in the World 2021***](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege), the annual country-by-country assessment of political rights and civil liberties released today by Freedom House. The report found that the share of countries designated Not Free has reached its highest level since the deterioration of democracy began in 2006, and that countries with declines in political rights and civil liberties outnumbered those with gains by the largest margin recorded during the 15-year period. The report downgraded the freedom scores of 73 countries, representing 75 percent of the global population. Those affected include not just authoritarian states like China, Belarus, and Venezuela, but also troubled democracies like the United States and India. In one of the year’s most significant developments, India’s status changed from Free to Partly Free, meaning less than 20 percent of the world’s people now live in a Free country—the smallest proportion since 1995. Indians’ political rights and civil liberties have been eroding since Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014. His Hindu nationalist government has presided over increased pressure on human rights organizations, rising intimidation of academics and journalists, and a spate of bigoted attacks—including lynchings—aimed at Muslims. The decline deepened following Modi’s reelection in 2019, and the government’s response to the coronavirus pandemic in 2020 featured further abuses of fundamental rights. The changes in India formed part of a broader shift in the international balance between democracy and authoritarianism, with authoritarians generally enjoying impunity for their abuses and seizing new opportunities to consolidate power or crush dissent. In many cases, promising democratic movements faced major setbacks as a result. In Belarus and Hong Kong, for example, massive prodemocracy protests met with brutal crackdowns by governments that largely disregarded international criticism. The Azerbaijani regime’s military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh indirectly threatened recent democratic gains in Armenia, while the armed conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region dashed hopes for the tentative political opening in that country since 2018. All four of these cases notably featured some degree of intervention by an autocratic neighbor: Moscow provided a backstop for the regime in Belarus, Beijing propelled the repression in Hong Kong, Turkey’s government aided its Azerbaijani counterpart, and Ethiopia’s leader called in support from Eritrea. The malign influence of the regime in China, the world’s most populous dictatorship, ranged far beyond Hong Kong in 2020. Beijing ramped up its global disinformation and censorship campaign to counter the fallout from its cover-up of the initial coronavirus outbreak, which severely hampered a rapid global response in the pandemic’s early days. Its efforts also featured increased meddling in the domestic political discourse of foreign democracies, as well as transnational extensions of rights abuses common in mainland China. The Chinese regime has gained clout in multilateral institutions such as the UN Human Rights Council, which the United States abandoned in 2018, as Beijing pushed a vision of so-called noninterference that allows abuses of democratic principles and human rights standards to go unpunished while the formation of autocratic alliances is promoted. “This year’s findings make it abundantly clear that we have not yet stemmed the authoritarian tide,” said Sarah Repucci, vice president of research and analysis at Freedom House. “Democratic governments will have to work in solidarity with one another, and with democracy advocates and human rights defenders in more repressive settings, if we are to reverse 15 years of accumulated declines and build a more free and peaceful world.” **A need for reform in the United States** While still considered Free, the United States experienced further democratic decline during the final year of the Trump presidency. The US score in [Freedom in the World](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege) has dropped by 11 points over the past decade, and fell by three points in 2020 alone. The changes have moved the country out of a cohort that included other leading democracies, such as France and Germany, and brought it into the company of states with weaker democratic institutions, such as Romania and Panama. Several developments in 2020 contributed to the United States’ current score. The Trump administration undermined government transparency by dismissing inspectors general, punishing or firing whistleblowers, and attempting to control or manipulate information on COVID-19. The year also featured mass protests that, while mostly peaceful, were accompanied by high-profile cases of violence, police brutality, and deadly confrontations with counterprotesters or armed vigilantes. There was a significant increase in the number of journalists arrested and physically assaulted, most often as they covered demonstrations. Finally, the outgoing president’s shocking attempts to overturn his election loss—culminating in his incitement of rioters who stormed the Capitol as Congress met to confirm the results in January 2021—put electoral institutions under severe pressure. In addition, the crisis further damaged the United States’ credibility abroad and underscored the menace of political polarization and extremism in the country. ”January 6 should be a wake-up call for many Americans about the fragility of American democracy,” said Michael J. Abramowitz, president of Freedom House. “Authoritarian powers, especially China, are advancing their interests around the world, while democracies have been divided and consumed by internal problems. For freedom to prevail on a global scale, the United States and its partners must band together and work harder to strengthen democracy at home and abroad. President Biden has pledged to restore America’s international role as a leading supporter of democracy and human rights, but to rebuild its leadership credentials, the country must simultaneously address the weaknesses within its own political system.” “Americans should feel gratified that the courts and other important institutions held firm during the postelection crisis, and that the country escaped the worst possible outcomes,” said Abramowitz. “But the Biden administration, the new Congress, and American civil society must fortify US democracy by strengthening and expanding political rights and civil liberties for all. People everywhere benefit when the United States serves as a positive model, and the country itself reaps ample returns from a more democratic world.” **The effects of COVID-19** Government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the global democratic decline. Repressive regimes and populist leaders worked to reduce transparency, promote false or misleading information, and crack down on the sharing of unfavorable data or critical views. Many of those who voiced objections to their government’s handling of the pandemic faced harassment or criminal charges. Lockdowns were sometimes excessive, politicized, or brutally enforced by security agencies. And antidemocratic leaders worldwide used the pandemic as cover to weaken the political opposition and consolidate power. In fact, many of the year’s negative developments will likely have lasting effects, meaning the eventual end of the pandemic will not necessarily trigger an immediate revitalization of democracy. In Hungary, for example, the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took on emergency powers during the health crisis and misused them to withdraw financial assistance from municipalities led by opposition parties. In Sri Lanka, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa dissolved Parliament in early March and, with new elections repeatedly delayed due to COVID-19, ruled without a legislature for several months. Later in the year, both Hungary and Sri Lanka passed constitutional amendments that further strengthened executive power. **The resilience of democracy** Despite the many losses for freedom recorded by [Freedom in the World](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege) during 2020, people around the globe remained committed to fighting for their rights, and democracy continued to demonstrate its remarkable resilience. A number of countries held successful elections, independent courts provided checks on executive overreach, journalists in even the most repressive environments investigated government transgressions, and activists persisted in calling out undemocratic practices.

#### The plan solves:

#### 1] Civic engagement – strikes increase democratic participation which reinvigorates democracy.

McElwee 15 [Sean; Research Associate at Demos; “How Unions Boost Democratic Participation,” The American Prospect; 9/16/15; https://prospect.org/labor/unions-boost-democratic-participation/] Justin

Labor organizer Helen Marot once observed, "The labor unions are group efforts in the direction of democracy." What she meant is that more than simply vehicles for the economic interests of workers (which they certainly are), labor unions also foster civic participation for workers. And nowhere is this clearer than in voter turnout, which has suffered in recent years along with union membership. Indeed, new data from the Census Bureau and a new analysis of American National Election Studies data support the case that unions' declining influence has also deeply harmed democracy.

In 2014, voter turnout was abysmal, even for a midterm. Census data suggest that only 41.9 percent of the citizen population over 18 turned out to vote. However, as I note in my new Demos report Why Voting Matters, there are dispiriting gaps in turnout across class, race, and age. To examine how unions might affect policy, I performed a new analysis of both Census Bureau and American National Election Studies data. The data below, from the 2014 election, show the differences in voter turnout between union and non-union workers (the sample only includes individuals who were employed, and does not include self-employed workers). While only 39 percent of non-union workers voted in 2014, fully 52 percent of union workers did.

As part of ongoing research, James Feigenbaum, an economics PhD candidate at Harvard, ran a regression using American National Election Studies data suggesting that union members are about 4 percentage points more likely to vote and 3 points more likely to register (after controlling for demographic factors) and individuals living in a union household are 2.5 points more likely to vote and register. This is largely in line with the earlier estimates of Richard Freeman.

These numbers may appear modest, but in a close national election they could be enough to change the result.

Other research has found an even stronger turnout effect from unions. Daniel Stegmueller and Michael Becher find that after applying numerous demographic controls, union members are 10 points more likely to vote.

What's particularly important is that unions boost turnout among low- and middle-income individuals. In a 2006 study, political scientists Jan Leighley and Jonathan Nagler found that, "the decline in union membership since 1964 has affected the aggregate turnout of both low and middle-income individuals more than the aggregate turnout of high-income individuals." In 2014, the gap between unions and non-union workers shrunk at the highest rung of the income ladder. There was a 15-point gap among those earning less than $25,000 (40 percent turnout for union workers, and 25 percent turnout for non-union workers). Among those earning more than $100,000, the gap was far smaller (49 percent for non-union workers and 52 percent for union workers).

Individuals living in union households are also more progressive than those in non-union households. I examined 2012 ANES data and find that union households aren't largely different from non-union households on many issues regarding government spending, but they are more likely to have voted for Obama, identify as Democratic, and support a robust role for the government in reducing income inequality. When looking at union members specifically, the gaps become slightly larger.

More upscale union members are far more progressive than their non-union counterparts. Non-union households with an income above $60,000 oppose government intervention to reduce inequality by 11 points, with 32.2 percent in favor and 43.4 percent against. But richer union households support government intervention, with 42.5 percent in favor and 29.9 percent opposed. As Richard B. Freeman has pointed out, "union members are more likely to vote for a Democrat for the House or Presidency than demographically comparable nonunion voters." He similarly finds that "unionism moves members to the left of where they would be given their socioeconomic status," in line with the data I examined from 2012.

A 2013 study by Jasmine Kerrissey and Evan Schofer finds that union members are not only more likely to vote, but also more likely to belong to other associations, and to protest. They also find that these effects are strongest among people with lower levels of education, suggesting that unions may help mobilize the least politically active groups. A recent study of European countries finds union members vote more and identifies those aspects of union membership that contribute to the higher turnout.

The strongest factor is that workers who engage in democratic organizations in the workplace (via collective bargaining) are more likely to engage in democracy more broadly by, for instance, voting.

Other studies support the idea that civic participation creates a feedback loop that leads to higher voting rates. Another factor is that union members make more money, and higher income is correlated with voting behavior. Finally, union members are encouraged by peers and the union to engage in politics, which also contributes to higher levels of turnout.

It's not entirely surprising that politicians who savage unions often share a similar contempt for the right to vote. Democracy in the workplace leads to democracy more broadly throughout society. Workers with more democratic workplaces are more likely to democratically engage in in society. Further, when unions and progressives demonstrate that government can benefit them, Americans are more likely to want to participate in decision-making. For all these reasons, unions play a unique and indispensable role in the progressive project. As Larry Summers, certainly not a leftist, recently argued, "the weakness of unions leaves a broad swath of the middle class largely unrepresented in the political process."

#### 2] Corruption reduction – the right to strike fights concentration of power while reducing inequality.

IER 17 [Institute of Employment Rights. The IER exists to inform the debate around trade union rights and labour law by providing information, critical analysis, and policy ideas through our network of academics, researchers and lawyers. “UN Rights Expert: Right to strike is essential to democracy”. 3-10-2017. . https://www.ier.org.uk/news/un-rights-expert-right-strike-essential-democracy/.] SJ//VM

The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, has reminded member states of the International Labour Organization (ILO) – including the UK – that they have a positive obligation to uphold the right to strike. Speaking at an ILO meeting on Monday 06 March 2017 in Geneva, Kiai argued that the right to strike is fundamental to the preservation of democracy. “The concentration of power in one sector – whether in the hands of government or business – inevitably leads to the erosion of democracy, and an increase in inequalities and marginalization with all their attendant consequences. The right to strike is a check on this concentration of power,” he explained. The right to strike has been established in international law as a corollary to the right of freedom of association for decades, and is enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights as Article 11. As a member state of the ILO and of the EU, the UK is legally obliged to uphold the right to strike, although through the Trades Union Act 2016 and the anti-trade union laws that preceded it, the government is making it harder and harder for trade unions to take industrial action. Kiai criticised such actions, saying government’s have a duty not to impede workers’ ability to take industrial action. “I deplore the various attempts made to erode the right to strike at national and multilateral levels,” the expert said, reminding delegates: “Protest action in relation to government social and economic policy, and against negative corporate practices, forms part of the basic civil liberties whose respect is essential for the meaningful exercise of trade union rights. This right enables them to engage with companies and governments on a more equal footing, and Member States have a positive obligation to protect this right, and a negative obligation not to interfere with its exercise.”

#### Democratic backsliding causes extinction.

Kendall-Taylor 16 [Andrea; Deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council, Senior associate in the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington; “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order,” CSIS; 7/15/16; <https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order>/] Justin

It is rare that policymakers, analysts, and academics agree. But there is an emerging consensus in the world of foreign policy: threats to the stability of the current international order are rising. The norms, values, laws, and institutions that have undergirded the international system and governed relationships between nations are being gradually dismantled. The most discussed sources of this pressure are [the ascent of China](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-sees-world-order-15846) and other non-Western countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy, and the diffusion of power from traditional nation-states to nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and technology-empowered individuals. Largely missing from these discussions, however, is the [specter of widespread democratic decline](http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/facing-democratic-recession). Rising challenges to democratic governance across the globe are a major strain on the international system, but they receive [far less attention](http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2016-5e13/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-april-may-2016-eb2d/58-2-03-boyle-6dbd) in discussions of the shifting world order.

In the 70 years since the end of World War II, the United States has fostered a global order dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic. The United States has promoted the spread of democracy to strengthen global norms and rules that constitute the foundation of our current international system. However, despite the steady rise of democracy since the end of the Cold War, over the last 10 years we have seen dramatic reversals in respect for democratic principles across the globe. [A 2015 Freedom House report](https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf) stated that the “acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years.”

Although the number of democracies in the world is at an all-time high, there are a number of [key trends](file:///C:\Users\PMeylan\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\Content.Outlook\5V2CJVRN\160715_KendallTaylor_DemocracysDecline_Commentary.docx#http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/democracy-decline) that are working to undermine democracy. The rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even in a number of less consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes in today’s global order.

Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S. cooperation abroad. [Research demonstrates](file:///C:\Users\PMeylan\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary%20Internet%20Files\Content.Outlook\5V2CJVRN\160715_KendallTaylor_DemocracysDecline_Commentary.docx#http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/18/1/49.abstract) that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of states. In particular, democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other democracies than with autocracies. Similarly, authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian countries, then, would provide a broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests—factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system.

Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of Egypt’s autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic standing.

Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations.

A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the [United Nations](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/christopher-walker-authoritarian-regimes-are-changing-how-the-world-defines-democracy/2014/06/12/d1328e3a-f0ee-11e3-bf76-447a5df6411f_story.html) , the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet. Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests.

Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic governance will become [fragmented and less effective](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2016.1161899?journalCode=tsur20#.V2H3MRbXgdI).

Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. [International relations literature](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/1995-05-01/democratization-and-war) tells us that democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies, suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines. Moreover, within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an “authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability. Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way, democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because rising levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows.

Finally, widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for strongman tactics.

Since 9/11, and particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Western enthusiasm for democracy support has waned. Rising levels of instability, including in Ukraine and the Middle East, fragile governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sustained threats from terrorist groups such as ISIL have increased Western focus on security and stability. U.S. preoccupation with intelligence sharing, basing and overflight rights, along with the perception that autocracy equates with stability, are trumping democracy and human rights considerations.

While rising levels of global instability explain part of Washington’s shift from an historical commitment to democracy, the nature of the policy process itself is a less appreciated factor. Policy discussions tend to occur on a country-by-country basis—leading to choices that weigh the costs and benefits of democracy support within the confines of a single country. From this perspective, the benefits of counterterrorism cooperation or access to natural resources are regularly judged to outweigh the perceived costs of supporting human rights. A serious problem arises, however, when this process is replicated across countries. The bilateral focus rarely incorporates the risks to the U.S.-led global order that arise from widespread democratic decline across multiple countries.

Many of the threats to the current global order, such as China’s rise or the diffusion of power, are driven by factors that the United States and West more generally have little leverage to influence or control. Democracy, however, is an area where Western actions can affect outcomes. Factoring in the risks that arise from a global democratic decline into policy discussions is a vital step to building a comprehensive approach to democracy support. Bringing this perspective to the table may not lead to dramatic shifts in foreign policy, but it would ensure that we are having the right conversation.