### 1

#### Ethics must begin a priori:

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [2] Bindingness – I can keep asking “why should I follow this” which results in skep since obligations are predicated on ignorantly accepting rules. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason which concedes its authority and equally proves agency as constitutive

#### That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer the standard: [a] freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify the neg arguments/standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others [b] Frameworks are topicality interps of the word ought so they should be theoretically justified. Prefer on resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since huge evidence files aren’t required.

#### [c] Only universalizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

#### Offence:

#### 1] Intellectual property is an inalienable personal right of economic use

**Pozzo 6** Pozzo, Riccardo. “Immanuel Kant on Intellectual Property.” Trans/Form/Ação, vol. 29, no. 2, 2006, pp. 11–18., doi:10.1590/s0101-31732006000200002. SJ//DA recut SJKS recut Cookie JX

Corpus mysticum, opus mysticum, propriété incorporelle, proprietà letteraria, geistiges Eigentum. All these terms mean **intellectual property, the existence of which is intuitively clear because of the unbreakable bond that ties the work to its creator.** The book belongs to whomever has written it, the picture to whomever has painted it, the sculpture to whomever has sculpted it; and this independently from the number of exemplars of the book or of the work of art in their passages from owner to owner. The initial bond cannot change and it ensures the author authority on the work. Kant writes in section 31/II of the Metaphysics of Morals: “Why does unauthorized publishing, which strikes one even at first glance as unjust, still have an appearance of being rightful? Because on the one hand a book is a corporeal artifact (opus mechanicum) that can be reproduced (by someone in legitimate possession of a copy of it), so that there is a right to a thing with regard to it. On the other hand a book is also a mere discourse of the publisher to the public, which the publisher may not repeat publicly without having a mandate from the author to do so (praestatio operae), and this is a right against a person. The error consists in mistaking one of these rights for the other” (Kant, 1902, t.6, p.290). The corpus mysticum, **the work considered as an immaterial good, remains property of the author on behalf of the original right of its creation. The corpus mechanicum consists of the exemplars of the book or of the work of art. It becomes the property of whoever has bought the material object in which the work has been reproduced or expressed.** Seneca points out in De beneficiis (VII, 6) the difference between owning a thing and owning its use. He tells us that the bookseller Dorus had the habit of calling Cicero’s books his own, while there are people who claim books their own because they have written them and other people that do the same because they have bought them. Seneca concludes that the books can be correctly said to belong to both, for it is true they belong to both, but in a different way **The peculiarity of intellectual property consists thus first in being indeed a property, but property of an action; and second in being indeed inalienable, but also transferable in commission and license to a publisher. The bond the author has on his work confers him a moral right that is indeed a personal right. It is also a right to exploit economically his work in all possible ways, a right of economic use, which is a patrimonial right. Kant and Fichte argued that moral right and the right of economic use are strictly connected, and that the offense to one implies inevitably offense to the other.** In eighteenth-century Germany, the free use came into discussion among the presuppositions of a democratic renewal of state and society. In his Supplement to the Consideration of Publishing and Its Rights, Reimarus asked writers “instead of writing for the aristocracy, to write for the tiers état of the reader’s world.” (Reimarus, 1791b, p.595). **He saluted with enthusiasm the claim of disenfranchising from the monopoly of English publishers expressed in the American Act for the Encouragement of Learning of May 31, 1790. Kant, however, was firm in embracing intellectual property. Referring himself to Roman Law, he asked for its legislative formulation not only as patrimonial right, but also as a personal right.** In Of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing, he considered the moral faculties related to **intellectual property as an “inalienable right (ius personalissimum) always himself to speak through anyone else, the right, that is, that no one may deliver the same speech to the public other than in his (the author’s) name”** (Kant, 1902, t.8, p.85). Fichte went farther in the Demonstration of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing. **He saw intellectual property as a part of his metaphysical construction of intellectual activity, which was based on the principle that thoughts “are not transmitted hand to hand, they are not paid with shining cash, neither are they transmitted to us if we take home the book that contains them and put it into our library.** In order to make those thoughts our own an action is still missing: we must read the book, meditate – provided it is not completely trivial – on its content, consider it under different aspects and eventually accept it within our connections of ideas” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). At the center of the discussion was the practice of reprinting books in a pirate edition after having them reset word after words after an exemplar of the original edition. Given Germany’s division in a myriad of small states, the imperial privilege was ineffective against pirate publishing. Kant and Fichte spoke for the acceptance of the right to defend the work of an author by the usurpations of others so that he may receive a patrimonial advantage from those who utilize the work acquiring new knowledge and/or an aesthetic experience. In particular, Fichte declared the absolute primacy of the moral faculties within the corpus mysticum. He divided the latter into a formal and a material part. “This intellectual element must be divided anew into what is material, the content of the book, the thoughts it presents; and the form of these thoughts, the manner in which, the connection in which, the formulations and the words by means of which the book presents them” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). Fichte’s underlining the author’s exclusive right to the intellectual content of his book – “the appropriation of which through another is physically impossible” (ibid.) – brought him to the extreme of prohibiting any form of copy that is not meant for personal use. In Publishing Considered anew, Reimarus considered on the contrary copyright in its patrimonial aspects as a limitation to free trade: “What would not happen were a universal protection against pirate publishing guaranteed? Monopoly and safer sales certainly do not procure convenient price; on the contrary, they are at the origin of great abuses. The only condition for convenient price is free-trade, and one cannot help noticing that upon the appearance of a private edition, publishers are forced to substantially lower the price of a book” (Reimarus, 1791a, pp.402-3). Reimarus admitted of being unable to argue in terms of justice. Justice was of no bearing, he said, for whom, like himself, considered undemonstrated the author’s permanent property of his work (herein supported by the legislative vacuum of those years). What mattered, he said, was equity. In sum, Reimarus anticipated today’s stance on free use by referring to the principle that public interest on knowledge ought to prevail on the author’s interest and to balance the copyright. Moreover, Reimarus extended his argument beyond the realm of literary production to embrace, among others, the today vital issue of pharmaceutical production on patented receipts. “Let us suppose that at some place a detailed description for the preparation of a good medicine or of any other useful thing be published, why may not somebody who lives in places that are far away from that one copy it to use it for his own profit and but must instead ask the original publisher for the issue of each exemplar?” (Reimarus, 1791b, t.2, pp.584). To sum up, Reimarus’s stance does not seem respondent to rule of law. For in all dubious case the general rule ought to prevail, fighting intellectual property with anti-monopolistic arguments in favor of free trade brings with itself consequences that are not tranquilizing also for the ones that are expected to apply the law. **By resetting literary texts, one could obviously expurgate some errors. More frequently, however, some were added, given the exclusively commercial objectives of the reprints. The valid principle was, thus, that reprints were less precise than original editions, but they were much cheaper for the simple reason that the pirate publisher had a merely moral obligation against the author and the original publisher. In fact, he was not held to pay any honorarium to the author upon handling over the manuscript, nor to paying him royalties, nor to pay anything to the original publisher. The** only expense in charge of the pirate publisher was buying the exemplar of the original edition out of which he was to make, as we say today, a free use.

#### 2]The aff violates the categorical imperative and is non-universalizable- governments have a binding obligation to protect creations

**Van Dyke 18** Raymond Van Dyke, 7-17-2018, "The Categorical Imperative for Innovation and Patenting," IPWatchdog, <https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/17/categorical-imperative-innovation-patenting/id=99178/> SJ//DA recut SJKS

As we shall see, applying **Kantian logic entails first acknowledging some basic principles; that the people have a right to express themselves, that that expression (the fruits of their labor) has value and is theirs (unless consent is given otherwise), and that government is obligated to protect people and their property. Thus, an inventor or creator has a right in their own creation, which cannot be taken from them without their consent.** So, employing this canon, **a proposed Categorical Imperative (CI) is the following Statement: creators should be protected against the unlawful taking of their creation by others. Applying this Statement to everyone, i.e., does the Statement hold water if everyone does this, leads to a yes determination. Whether a child, a book or a prototype, creations of all sorts should be protected, and this CI stands.** This result also dovetails with the purpose of government: to protect the people and their possessions by providing laws to that effect, whether for the protection of tangible or intangible things. **However, a contrary proposal can be postulated: everyone should be able to use the creations of another without charge. Can this Statement rise to the level of a CI? This proposal, upon analysis would also lead to chaos. Hollywood, for example, unable to protect their films, television shows or any content, would either be out of business or have robust encryption and other trade secret protections, which would seriously undermine content distribution and consumer enjoyment.** Likewise, inventors, unable to license or sell their innovations or make any money to cover R&D, would not bother to invent or also resort to strong trade secret. Why even create? This approach thus undermines and greatly hinders the distribution of ideas in a free society, which is contrary to the paradigm of the U.S. patent and copyright systems, which promotes dissemination. By allowing freeriding, innovation and creativity would be thwarted (or at least not encouraged) and trade secret protection would become the mainstay for society with the heightened distrust.

#### IPs are a necessary check on companies free-riding off associations of quality. that treats people as ­means to an end and takes advantage of their efforts which violates the principle of humanity

Wong et al 20 [Liana, Ian, and Shayerah; Analyst in International Trade and Finance; Specialist in International Trade and Finance; Specialist in International Trade and Finance; “Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade,” \*Updated\* 5/12/20; CRS; <https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20200512_RL34292_2023354cc06b0a4425a2c5e02c0b13024426d206.pdf>] Justin

Trademark protection in the United States is governed jointly by state and federal law. The main federal statute is the Lanham Act of 1946 (Title 15 of the United States Code). Trademarks permit the seller to use a distinctive word, name, symbol, or device to identify and market a product or company. Marks can also be used to denote services from a particularly company. The trademark allows quick identification of the source of a product, and for good or ill, can become an indicator of a product's quality. If for good, the trademark can be valuable by conveying an instant assurance of quality to consumers. Trademark law serves to prevent other companies with similar merchandise from free-riding on the association of quality with the trademarked item. Thus, a trademarked good may command a premium in the marketplace because of its reputation. To be eligible for a trademark, the words or symbol used by the business must be sufficiently distinctive; generic names of commodities, for example, cannot be trademarked. Trademark rights are acquired through use or through registration with the PTO.

A related concept to trademarks is geographical indications (GIs), which are also protected by the Lanham Act. The GI acts to protect the quality and reputation of a distinctive product originating in a certain region; however, the benefit does not accrue to a sole producer, but rather the producers of a product originating from a particular region. GIs are generally sought for agricultural products, or wines and spirits. Protection for GIs is acquired in the United States by registration with the PTO, through a process similar to trademark registration.

### 2

#### A] Interpretation: The affirmative debater must read either a standard or role of the ballot

#### B] Violation: they don’t

#### C] Standards:

#### 1] Advocacy Shift – I don’t know what matters under your framing – our ideas of what exactly matters may vary – means I can’t engage substantively. You just have a bunch of random cards which could be reinterpreted in the 1AR depending on the 1NC. For example, your JanFeb 2018 aff read rights first and util, which leaves 2 options for 1AR clarifications to evade neg offense.

#### 2] Resolvability - no engagement or clear way to weigh between args makes it impossible to evaluate the round – invites arbitrary judge intervention.

**You can’t use your aff to exclude my shell. My shell indicts the fact that there is no stable metric to be evaluated against . If they go for K first that proves the abuse of my shell since they should have specified in the AC.**

**CX Doesn’t Check**

#### [a] kills 1nc construction pre round

**[b] Infinitely regressive – this justifies the aff just saying “if you don’t understand the Plan – ask me about it in cross-x”**

#### And, saying I can ask them does not solve –

#### [1] Stalling – they can take long and make prep irreciprocal because they prep the aff while we have less to prep the neg

#### [2] Norms – we shouldn’t have to ask you – if you’re racist, you should not be independent of me asking

#### [3] Defense – no reason why your norm is better – you can’t win in competing interps model

#### Paradigms:

#### [1] Theory is competing interps – norming – competing interps causes a race to the top where we find the best possible norm for debate instead of setting a brightline and testing how abusive we can be without violating.

#### [2] Drop the debater on T – deter future abuse and set good norms.

#### [3] No RVI’s – illogical – you don’t reward them for meeting the burden for being fair. Logic is a meta-constraint on all your arguments – every other argument presumes it’s logical to evaluate. Impact turns aren’t a voter – Paradoxical – if T is bad and you vote for this argument, you’re voting on T.

#### Fairness is a voter- debate is a competitive activity that requires objective evaluation

### 3

#### Permissibility and presumption negate – a. the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation b. Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false so negate because the aff is probably false

#### The aff burden is to prove that the resolutional statement is logical, and the reciprocal neg burden is to prove that the resolutional statement is illogical.

#### Prefer:

#### 1. Text – Oxford Dictionary defines ought as “used to indicate something that is probable.”

[https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ought //](https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ought%20//)Massa

#### Ought is “used to express logical consequence” as defined by Merriam-Webster

(<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought>) //Massa

#### 2. Debatability – a) my interp means debates focus on empirics about squo trends rather than irresolvable abstract principles that’ve been argued for years b) Moral oughts cannot guide action.

**Gray,** Grey, JW. "The Is/Ought Gap: How Do We Get "Ought" from "Is?"" *Ethical Realism*. N.p., 19 July 2011. Web. 28 Oct. 2015. //Massa

**The is/ought gap is a problem in moral philosophy where what is the case and what ought to be the case seem quite different, and it presents itself as the following question** to David Hume: **How do we *know* what morally ought to be the case from what is the case?** Hume posed the question in A Treatise of Human Nature Book III Part I Section I: In **every system of morality**, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs, when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change **is imperceptible**; but is, however, of the last consequence. **For as this ought**, or ought not, **expresses some new relation** or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason shou’d be given, **for what seems altogether inconceivable**, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. It is here that Hume points out that **philosophers argue about** various **nonmoral facts, then somehow conclude what ought to be the case** (or what people ought to do) **based on** those facts (about **what is the case**). **For example, we might find out that arsenic is poisonous and conclude that we ought not consume it. But we need to know how nonmoral facts can lead to moral conclusions. These two things seem unrelated. The is/ought gap [isn’t]** doesn’t seem like **a problem for nonmoral oughts**—what we ought to do to accomplish our goals, fulfill our desires, or maintain our commitments. For example, we could say, “If you want to be healthy, you ought not consume arsenic.” However, it might be morally wrong to consume arsenic. If it is, we have some more explaining to do.

#### 4. Neg definition choice – The aff should have defined ought in the 1ac as their value, by not doing so they have forfeited their right to read a new definition – kills 1NC strategy since I premised my engagement on a lack of your definition.

#### [1] Inherency – either a) the aff is non-inherent and you vote neg on presumption or b) it is and it isn’t logically going to happen.

#### [2] In order to say I want to fix x problem, you must say that you want x problem to exist, since it requires the problem exist to solve, which makes any moral attempt inherently immoral.

#### [3] member means “a body part or organ” (Marriam Webster) but a nation cannot have bodily organs so the resolutions incoherent

#### [4] To go anywhere, you must go halfway first, and then you must go half of the remaining distance ad infinitum – thus, motion is impossible because it necessitates traversing an infinite number of spaces in finite time.

#### [5] Property means “a building” (Oxford Languages) so reducing intellectual buildings is incoherent

### Case

#### Consequences Fail: a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict. b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. c] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify because we commit the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral d] Yes act/omission distinction – there are infinite events occurring over which you have no control, so you can never be moral

#### Real shit is still real – take into account the people whose lives are actually affected by images. Even if images are obscured – we know the difference between real shit and fake shit

Blackburn 07 Simon Blackburn, professor of philosophy at Cambridge University, 4-29-07, “Au revoir Baudrillard,” Prospect, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/04/aurevoirbaudrillard/---- {hors texte = outside the text}

Baudrillard was not concerned with the artist’s touch but with what happens when television and other media purport to take us to the field of action. The 1990 Gulf war was modelled by planners using simulations; it was won, if we call a massacre a victory, largely by pilots looking at computer screens; and it was relayed to the public by television. Most consumers of these images get no reality check; the image is all we have to go on. And the image does not come to us innocently. What happened in 1990 may, indeed, have been something more than a war: an episode in America’s cultural narcissism, a hallucinatory projection of its fears and fantasies, a Faustian pact between developed capitalism and virtual reality, a promotional video, or a simulacrum indistinguishable from Disneyland. So Baudrillard’s hyperbole had a serious point. He often provoked outrage by it, but when, for instance, he tactlessly suggested that the iconic place of Nazi atrocities as a symbol of evil makes it “logical” to ask whether they even existed, his point was not to ally himself with the David Irvings of this world, but to suggest that for many political and cultural purposes, the answer is irrelevant. As with God, it is our investment that matters, not whether it is invested in a fiction. Baudrillard’s ideas about simulated reality seem to have touched on an old philosophical panic. Perhaps our senses are no better than our televisions. Perhaps nature has varnished and spun the pictures we receive. They too are commodities, bought in to provide sustenance. Perhaps, at the limit, we live in a virtual reality, unable to comprehend our real position, sentenced to a woeful life of dreams, myth, fiction and illusion. Baudrillard, the inspiration for the Matrix films, tried to distance himself from the trite opposition of one moment seeing through the glass darkly and then coming face to face with reality, yet he enjoyed playing with its ingredients. I do not think this was wise, since generalised scepticism implies that there is nothing especially wrong about America or late capitalism or consumer society—and would any self-respecting culture critic want to draw that conclusion. In any event, it is not all simulacra. We are participants in a public world, not hermits trapped in our own private cinemas. The cure for the sceptical nightmare is action. Nobody stays sceptical while crossing the street, or choosing dinner. Nor while dodging bombs and shells, even if they are sent by people watching computer screens. In the hurly-burly of survival, there is a lot that is hors texte—although this is more true for the artisan driving nails or baking bread than for the politician (or academic) whose work is confined to the production of signs and messages.

#### Companies will just obtain a patent in a different sector.

Thomas 15 [John R; Visiting Scholar, CRS; “Tailoring the Patent System for Specific Industries, Congressional Research Service,” CRS; 2015; <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43264/7>] Justin

In view of the concerns noted above, commentators have gone so far to say that “it has become increasingly difficult to believe that a one-size-fits-all approach to patent law can survive.”75 To the extent the current patent system creates a blanket set of rules that apply comparably to distinct industries, it likely over-encourages innovation in some contexts and under-incentivizes it in others.76 Further, some observers have asserted that the need of firms to identify and access the patented inventions of others may differ among industries.77 As a result, the case can be made that distinct industrial, technological, and market characteristics that exist across the breadth of the U.S. economy compel industry-specific patent statutes. However, others have questioned the wisdom and practicality of such line-drawing.78 The following concerns, among others, have been identified:

• Over its long history, the U.S. patent system has flexibly adapted to new technologies such as biotechnology and computer software. Legislative adoption of technology-specific categories may leave unanticipated, cutting-edge technologies outside the patent system.79

• Defining a specific industry or category of technologies may prove to be a contested proposition.

80 • Over time, new industries may emerge and old industries may consolidate. The dynamic nature of the U.S. economy suggests greater need for legislative oversight within a differentiated patent regime.

81 • Even if an industry or technology remains relatively stable, the innovation environment within it might change. For example, technological or scientific advances might open new possibilities for research and development within hidebound industries—but also increase expense and risk for those firms.

82 • Distinct patent rights among industries or technologies may lead to strategic behavior on behalf of patent applicants. For example, a computer program that controls a fuel injector within an automobile could possibly be identified as either an automobile-related or a computer-related invention.

83 •The legislative effort to enact sector-specific patent laws may provide an opportunity for politically savvy firms to exert more lobbying and political power, at the possible expense of less sophisticated firms.

#### Collaboration between companies high now and key to solving covid – the aff destroys it.

Zilber 21 [Einav; Owner of Zilber IP; “The proposed TRIPs covid waiver is a bad idea that could do a lot of good,” IAM-Media; 6/23/21; <https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/the-proposed-trips-covid-waiver-bad-idea-could-do-lot-of-good>] Justin + Diego

**Uncertainties over trade secret protection could undermine collaboration Collaboration has been critical to addressing the pandemic. This is perhaps best exemplified by the scramble for personal protective equipment and ventilator manufacturing in the earliest days of the crisis. The corporate sector responded rapidly, with companies collaborating in development, supply-chain facilitation and manufacturing, while novel partnerships sprang up between organisations around the globe**.For example, Israeli defence company and manufacturer of the world-famous Iron Dome air-defence system Rafael harnessed its R&D and manufacturing capabilities to solve various issues raised by covid-19. Among other projects, Rafael worked with hospital doctors to develop a system that enables two patients to be treated by a single ventilator, with separate pressure controls in the lungs of each individual. Rafael freely distributed this design and the accompanying manufacturing information, as well as the blueprints for a specialised mask for patients receiving non-invasive ventilation treatment, to medical organisations around the world**. The covid-19 masks were adapted from anti-gas mask homeland security technology. In the United States, medical device giant Medtronic shared its Puritan Bennett 560 ventilator technology, a product sold in 35 countries. Among the materials publicly shared were hardware-design specifications and manufacturing instructions, design documents (including manufacturing tools, printed circuit-board drawings, multiple bills of materials and 3D CAD files) and software source-code files.** The materials were provided under a permissive licence, allowing others to use the technology broadly during the pandemic. The private sector’s success in effectively speeding up the development and delivery of equipment and products can be attributed to many factors, including bold leadership, a sense of urgency and responsibility, engineer dedication and creativity, a collaborative mindset and digital communication. **However, having a global and trustworthy IP system also significantly facilitated companies’ willingness to collaborate and share. The IP system enables companies to precisely control the scope of sharing while keeping selected technologies tightly shuttered. By releasing technologies, companies inevitably erode their own competitive edge. The material that is shared reveals solutions that might otherwise have been patented; engineers are educated with a range of methodologies and know-how, and this cannot be unlearned. This is critical, especially when core technology is migrated to covid-19 applications. Should the TRIPs waiver be enacted, companies could lose that level of control and thus be discouraged from collaborating at all.** Further, the success stories of private sector collaboration clearly demonstrate that it is not enough merely to share patents**. Rapid deployment of new, unfamiliar technologies by companies requires access to know-how that is typically protected as trade secrets. While patents are concrete, published and easily managed, trade secrets – and other forms of know-how – are not. It is the sharing company that is in the best position to compile and prepare the materials reflecting its technology. Any effort to apply an external judicial or government review over the scope of shared material could turn out to be futile.** Another troubling uncertainty concerns the vast amount of confidential information that companies already share externally. For example, they already share information with governments in the case of regulatory approvals. Will the IP waiver enable governments to use regulatory company information for local production? Similarly, companies share their technologies with suppliers, customers and partners. A significant amount of valuable information is already illegally available as a result of industrial espionage and the technology black market. How will