### 1

#### Interpretation and Violation: The affirmative must defend the desirability of a to advocacy in which Just governments implement an unconditional right to strike this doesn’t entail a specific method of engaging in the topic, just that the affirmative must derive offense from it.

**Resolved denotes a proposal to be enacted by law**

**Words and Phrases 1964** Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “**to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;**” It is of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is **defined** by Bouvier **as** meaning “**to establish by law**”.

#### Four types of IP.

Ackerman 17 [Peter; Founder & CEO, Innovation Asset Group, Inc; “The 4 Main Types of Intellectual Property and Related Costs,” Decipher; 1/6/17; <https://www.innovation-asset.com/blog/the-4-main-types-of-intellectual-property-and-related-costs>] Justin

Intellectual property protection isn’t as simple as declaring ownership of a particular product or asset. In most countries, there are four primary types of intellectual property (IP) that can be legally protected: patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets. Each has their own attributes, requirements and costs.

Before narrowing your focus on which form of protection to use, know that these forms of protection are not mutually exclusive. Depending on what you’re doing, you might be able to use a “belt & suspenders” approach and apply multiple forms of protection, or one approach might be the most sensible. Read the descriptions below to get some of the basics.

Used to protect inventive ideas or processes – things that are new, useful and nonobvious - patents are what most often come to mind when thinking of IP protection. **Patents** are also used to protect newly engineered plant species or strains, as well.

Procedure For most companies, patents result from the following stages: Conceptualization Typically, innovation teams work to address a common problem facing their organization, industry, or the world at large when developing their idea. When they’ve arrived at a solution or concept, they’ll draw up plans and gather the resources necessary to make it a reality. Prototypes or drawings can be created to provide a more accurate description of the end product or process. Invention Disclosure An internal review process often occurs with every invention. The innovation team consists of internal counsel and an invention review panel of varying disciplines. The reviewers assess, rate, rank, score, and highlight potential flaws in the supporting documents and descriptions for the invention, which are then addressed by the inventor. These reviews can and often do take place multiple times for a single invention. Patent Application If the invention is deemed meritorious enough for the pursuit of patent protection, some organizations prepare their own provisional or nonprovisional patent applications. Others will farm this stage out. There may be more tweaks as an application is prepared, and then submission to the appropriate patent office and the prosecution stage begins (the back & forth with the government patent office). Typically it is outside counsel that manages this process and related docketing activities. Docketing is the overarching name for activities that include management of paperwork and meeting filing deadlines specified by the government patent office. Because the application process is often very complicated, patent offices highly recommend working with experienced patent attorneys to handle this process. Maintenance Once a patent is approved, it has a finite lifetime. Patent holders are responsible for maintaining and tracking the usage of their patents and paying the appropriate periodic government renewal fees. If a given technology or other patented asset is collecting dust, you might not want to renew it. Instead, you can try and sell, license or donate it. Conversely, if a patented asset is performing well through product sales or licensing activities and its life is getting shorter, you might think about innovating ahead and maintaining competitive momentum. Costs Costs will vary depending on the country or countries where you file an application, and can run into tens of thousands of dollars depending on the invention’s complexity, plus attorney fees. Maintenance fees over the lifetime of the patent can run into thousands more per patent, per country where patent rights have been granted. You have to keep your eyes on these costs.

Trademark

A trademark is unlike a patent in that it protects words, phrases, symbols, sounds, smells and color schemes. Trademarks are often considered assets that describe or otherwise identify the source of underlying products or services that a company provides, such as the MGM lion roar, the Home Depot orange color scheme, the Intel Inside logo, and so on.

Procedure Trademarks do not necessarily require government approval to be in effect; they can apply through abundant use in interstate commerce. Still, registration of a trademark affords far superior protection and is gained by filing an application with the proper government office. A trademark application requires the company or user to provide a clear description and representation of the mark and its uses in conjunction with associated products or services. As with patents, it’s a good idea to partner with outside counsel that specializes in trademark applications and/or search services so they can help ensure there is a clear path for your desired mark. Costs Trademarks are generally quite less expensive to obtain. According to the US Patent and Trademark Office, trademark registration currently costs between $225 and $325 for each class code you use per mark. Attorney and search fees are extra. There are also periodic (and relatively inexpensive) government maintenance fees for trademarks.

Copyrights do not protect ideas, but rather the manner in which ideas are expressed (“original works of authorship”) - written works, art, music, architectural drawings, or even programming code for software (most evident nowadays in video game entertainment). With certain exceptions, copyrights allow the owner of the protected materials to control reproduction, performance, new versioning or adaptations, public performance and distribution of the works. Procedure Copyrights in general attach when the original works become fixed in a tangible medium, but should be registered with the government copyright office for optimal protection in the form of damages, injunctions and confiscation. Copyright registration applications are much simpler than patents or trademarks, and typically can be obtained by the author alone. The US Copyright Office encourages use of their online application system, and requires a sample of the work to be protected and some background information about the author. Costs Depending on the type of work being protected, currently fees vary between $25-$100 in the US. The most frequent copyright registration sought is for one work by one author, and costs about $35.

Trade Secret

Trade secrets are proprietary procedures, systems, devices, formulas, strategies or other information that is confidential and exclusive to the company using them. They act as competitive advantages for the business. Procedure There actually isn’t a federally-regulated registration process for trade secrets. Instead, the onus is on the company in possession of the secret to take necessary precautions to maintain it as such. This is an ongoing, proactive process and can include clearly marking relevant documents as “Confidential,” implementing physical and data security measures, keeping logs of visitors and restricting access. The issuance of nondisclosure agreements or other documented assurances of secrecy can also be employed. One of the first defenses typically put up when you assert that someone misappropriated your trade secret is that you failed to adequately treat it as a trade secret. Costs Though there are no official registration costs, there are costs associated with taking appropriate precautions and security measures. You must weigh the competitive significance of your secrets against the cost of protecting them.

#### First is limits – aff gets to choose anything they want, which justifies infinite variations of affirmatives that are impossible to prep against, ensuring they’ll be ahead and use competition standards like perms to erase neg ground. Key to fairness since predictability is needed to make viable responses.

#### In round competitive equity first:

#### [1] Evaluation – their arguments only seem true because they have an advantage – equity is a meta constraint on your ability to determine who’s better under the aff method, if one debater had 10 minutes to speak and the other had 1 it alters the ability to judge the affs truth value so they don’t get to weigh their aff and presume their arguments false since we couldn’t engage with it to start

#### [2] Ballot proximity – the ballot can’t solve their offense since the arguments we read have no effect on our subjectivity, but the judge can determine the direction of equitable practices so a risk our interp is good means you negate

#### [3] exclusion’s inevitable since you can exclude my offense with your ROB so I shouldn’t be punished for excluding the way your advocacy’s presented

#### [4] Quality of discussion – Debate’s unique value is that it forces contestation of issues – but this is impossible if I don’t even know what to prepare for which turns the tangible benefit of their method, so even if the scholarship they bring is good there’s no point if I couldn’t engage

#### TVA solves- Fourth, TVA:

#### 1] Read an aff about how strikes disrupt workplaces that assume that able body employeees are needed

2] use strikes as a method of rupturing which your method says is good

#### Drop the debater. Drop the arg is severance since you jump ship from your advocacy which perpetuates abuse since it allows you to restart the round.

#### Competing interps: 1. Competing interps leads to a race to the top to set the best possible norms 2. Collapses- reasonability collapses to competing interps since it becomes a battle between two competing Brightlines

#### No RVIs: 1. Illogical- being topical doesn’t mean you should win, it’s just a burden. 2. Baiting- debaters will just bait theory and prep it out leading to maximally abusive practices

### 2

#### Their analysis of race focusing on single instances of racism as opposed to a machine of faciality traps race in a dialectic which recreates oppression

**Saldanha 1** (Saldanha, Arun. Arun Saldanha Department of Geography, University of Minnesota, Reontologising Race: the Machinic Geography of Phenotype. Vol. 24, Society and Space, 2006. P. 9-12) SJ//DA

Abstract. In contradistinction to the treatment of race as a problem of epistomology—how is phenotype represented in racial discourse—the author seeks to defend a materialist ontology of race. The creative materiality of race is asserted following the 'material turn' in feminism, anthro-pology, complexity theory, and Deleuze. Race is shown to be an embodied and material event, a `machine assmblage' with a different spatiality than the self/other scheme of Hegel. Taking issue with the calls for the transcendence of race amongst cultural studies scholars such as Paul Gilroy, the author ends the paper by suggesting that the political battle against racial subordination includes a serious engagement with its biological dimensions. Race should not be eliminated, but its energies harnessed through a cosmopolitan ethics which is sensitive to its heterogeneous and dynamic nature. Introduction In contemporary theory, **race tends to be conceived as a problem of language, We read that race is an ideology, a narrative, a discourse. Race then refers to the cultural representation of people, not to people themselves. It could be said that race tends to be approached as an epistemological problem: how is race known? Why was it invented? Some argue that we should simply stop thinking in terms of race.** In this paper I would like to argue this might not be a good idea. **Race will be approached ontologically, as a real process demanding particular concepts and commitments. Not so much representations, but bodies and physical events will be foregrounded. For instance, the phenotype of humans can be shown to play an active part in the event called race. When understood as immanent process, it becomes clear that, though contingent, race cannot be transcended, only understood and rearranged**. Whether there is any physical basis for the concept of race has of course been hotly contested for many decades. In cultural studies, postcolonial theory, cultural anthropology, and most human geography, **it is common to treat race as a discursive construct. Many in American critical race theory**, such as Howard Winant and Naomi Zack, opt instead for a more realist approach, granting that there are phenotypical differences but that their social force depends on culture, economics, and the law. In this paper I chiefly follow poststructuralist philosophy not American left-wing prag-matism, but I do so in order to take issue with the epistemological bias in much of the humanities inspired by poststructuralism. Despite coming from a different intellectual trajectory, therefore, I would locate this intervention closer to the realist approach. The paper presents a number of entries into the argument. This theoretical eclecti-cism \_ cism demonstrates that the materiality of race can be conceptualised from a number of perspectives, making the reconceptualisation very much due. First, Frantz Fanon's phenomenology of race is revisited, and I argue against Judith Butler's linguistic take on embodiment. Then the deontologisation of race in authors such as Paul Gilroy is scrutinised. Not asking properly what race is, Gilroy believes too easily in the possibility of its transcendence. In the fourth section. the refusal to engage with phenotype is with Bruno Latour shown to follow from a wider anxiety in the social sciences about matter. Nevertheless, in many places, as in the feminism of Elizabeth Grosz, materiality is again treated positively, As discussed in the fifth section. the openness of the human organism is also affirmed in anthropology—as well as in biology, from Darwin onwards. In particular. biology influenced by complexity theory and its philosophical under-pinning by Gilles Deleuze and Michel Serres can help in imagining the biocultural emergence and evolution of race relations. **The last two sections follow Deleuze and Guattari and use their term machine assemblage to capture race's reality of unmediated connections. Far from being an arbitrary classification system imposed upon bodies, race is a nonnecessary and irre-ducible effect of the ways those bodies themselves interact with each other and their physical environment. The spatiality of race is not one of grids or self/other dialectics, but one of viscosity, bodies gradually becoming sticky and clustering into aggregates. Battling against racism is then not a question of denying race, but of cultivating its energies against the stickiness of racial segregation. Crucial in this process is that social scientists critically engage with race's biological aspect. For if they insist that race is but a 'social construction'.** they might leave the discursive arena open for (closet) racists to reinstate biological justifications for white privilege. Phenotypical encounter "'Look, a Negro!' It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I passed by. I made a tight smile. `Look, a Negro!' It was true. It amused me. `Look, a Negro!' The circle was drawing a bit tighter. I made no secret of my amusement. `Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened!' Frightened! Frightened! Now they were beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh myself to tears, but laughter had become impossible. I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were legends, and above all historicity, which I had learned about from Jaspers. Then, assailed at various points**, the corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema.** ... I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my ancestors. I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slave-ships, and above else, above all: `Sho' good eatin'." Fanon ([1952] 1986, pages III – 112) Fanon's 'train passage' is widely cited as a particularly painful and recognisable example of what it 'means' to be black in a white society—to discover one's blackness through white eyes, as negatively, as what is not proper, clean, trustworthy. Reading Maurice Merleau-Ponty through Georg Hegel. Fanon's work argues that under colo-nialism a black body is inevitably imbricated in a binary classification regime, defined by the White Man's stereotypes and exploitation. Blackness exists only by virtue of what it is not; to reclaim humanity and a rightful place in universal hi, black need to break out of the binary classification imposed by whites and to assert the arbitrary nature of racial division. Thinking about difference as self versus other is a legacy of Hegelian dialectics, which inspires practically all commentary on Fanon and postcolonial theory, as can be seen in a recent collection, Philosophies of Race and Ethnicity (Osborne and Sandford, 2002). But let us ask what happens in the train passage. There is a differentiation of human bodies. Within a racialised visual regime, it is the concentration of melanin in Fanon's skin that attracts the attention to the white boy—not his suitcase, or coat, or smell, or even posture. \*\*The evidence was there, unalterable. My blackness was there, dark and unarguable. And it tormented me, pursued me, disturbed me, angered me" (Fanon, [1952] 1986, page 117). A "racial epidermal schema" can suddenly be activated wherever Fanon moves in French society [or elsewhere (compare Pile, 2000)]. **His phenotype is capable of conjuring up a whole series of fears, desires, clichés, and antagonisms; it can bar him from places and practices, or raise suspicion about his medical skills, or it can be taken as evidence of the superiority of French imperialism; such is the varie-gated force of phenotype. Not that Fanon's phenotype mechanically invokes histories and geographies of race. but within a racialised regime of vision always matter somehow—to experience, imagination, and the allocation of bodies. Linda Martin Alcoff argue' denomenological descriptions of racial identity can reveal a differentiation or stribution of felt connectedness to others**. Kerouac's sadness is prompted by his ck of felt connection, a connection he may have antic' d when initiating ut one that does not present itself. However, felt connection is a complex issue, undetermined solely by phenotype. The felt connectedness to visibly similar others may produce either flight or empathic identification or other possible dispositions" (1999, page 21). The embodiment of race therefore encompasses certain ethical stances and political choices. It informs what one can do, what one should do, in certain spaces and situations**. Though I will later question whether the Hegelian framework of Fanon can account for the gradual and multidimensional differences that emerge in social space, his phenomenological insistence on situated embodiment can certainly support a materialist conception of race**. Bodies and language The relationality between blackness and whiteness in Fanon will to many readers be reminiscent of the relationalities of language. **Signifiers, in the legacy of Ferdinand de Saussure, can only mean by way of a formal system or arbitrary differences. After the 'linguistic turn' associated with the poststructuralists Roland Barflies, Jacques Derrida Julia Kristeva Jacques Lacan, and the 'archaeological' Foucault, society has been widely considered to operate in the same way that Saussurian signs do**. In a social system of differences. dominance is achieved through the fearful discursive excEINFR `the Other'. **But since identity is never given, the future of the system is inherently, political. Politics is then about the formation of heterogeneous coalitions amongst the disenfranchised to wrestle signifiers from the dominantAtis conception of the social as structured through negativity and floating signifiers is very influentia**l1 mo less informing important theorists of the left such as Butler, Gilroy, Hvgitabha, Stuart Hall. Ernesto Laclau. Chantal Moutie„ Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak. and Slavoj Zikk. These theorists might retort to the phenomenologist of race that it isn't phenotype at all, but the white boy's reiterated interjection "Look!" that determines the cliff" entiation of bodies. Fanon is Interpellated' as black subject by the use of racist language, while the boy reproduces himself as white. **They both have little choice but to be produced by discourse. But what does 'produced' mean?** Surely not that there was no Frantz Fanon prior to this boy's interjection. It means, for these theorists**, that the interjection makes phenotype matter, that without language there would not be any difference. Language (or culture at large) is a screen which mediates between consciousness and the obscure matter of the body. Whenever language (the language of science, for example) claims to grasp materiality 'itself', it in fact hits against the wall of its own mediations. In this mediation model of language, materiality is forever unknown and there is no intermingling possible between the two realms.** In Bodies That Matter, Butler writes: "The body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or signified as prior. This signification produces as an effect of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless and simultaneously claims to discover as that which precedes its own action" (1993, page 30). Butler's well-known argument is that there is no anatomy or phenotype unless invoked by signification, by discourses of gender and race. It is beyond dispute that no body is untouched by signification. The question is, rather, how signification comes to have any effect at all, if not through the materiality of signs, bodies, and spaces. The statement "Tiens, un negre" requires a larynx, the proximity of a Negro, a comprehen-sion of French, and being within earshot to hear it. For sure, Butler repeatedly states that there is a 'materiality' to signs, but she refuses to extend this statement to bodies or things. The physical body of skin, blood, and bones remains other, a 'constitutive outside' that is expelled by discourse ("signified as prior"), but has no rhythms and volume of its own. Thus, a Butlerian critique can rightly question the 'naturalness' of a bedrock of phenotype posited by, and justifying, racial discourse (Butler, 1997). But such critique halts abruptly at the deep gorge between racist discourse (which it attacks) and phenotypical matter (about which it will not say anything). Is not pheno-type itself shaped by cultural practice? Does phenotype ever resist its 'performance'? By not allowing anything from across the gorge to enter her critique, Butler ultimately remains complicit with what she attacks: the metaphysical positing of an inert exter-iority to language. Can it not be possible to think and write about physical bodies without positing them as primary, pure, fixed, bounded, and self-transparent? Bodies need to be appreciated as productive in their own right, just like words or money or architecture. Fanon's phenotype is not at all 'performed' or 'constituted' by the boy's exclamation. Phenotype is constituted instead by genetic endowments, envi-ronmental conditions, exercise, hormones, diet, disease, ageing, etc. What language does to phenotype—phenotype itself—is charge it, circumscribe what it is capable of doing in particular spaces. There was certainly real phenotypical difference before the exclamation, but it had no effect on the situation (yet). The exclamation brings out a latency, a latency Fanon knew was there, but had perhaps forgotten, looking absent-mindedly for a seat. After the exclamation, Fanon's options are limited. Now, his phenotype demands active management. Now, his phenotype is alive, chaining him to the histories and geographies of race and colonialism. "I am overdetermined from without. I am the slave not of the 'idea' that others have of me but of my own appearance" (Fanon, [1952] 1986, page 116). There is no mediation, only a pair of eyes, an exclamation, and a little index finger connecting to a body with darker skin, in a train of paler bodies. There are the memories of explora-tion and slavery, carried around by bodies which were brought up with them and subsequently charge situations like this. There is moreover the wry smile, panic, bitter-ness, shame, and disgust. Finally, there are seats, compartments, tickets windows the winter

#### The macropolitical striation produced by the faciality machine is the root cause of the rejection of deviance which results in formation of oppression and infinite striation on the subject.

**Saldanha 2** (Saldanha, Arun. Arun Saldanha Department of Geography, University of Minnesota, Reontologising Race: the Machinic Geography of Phenotype. Vol. 24, Society and Space, 2006. P. 18-20) SJ//DA

There is an explicit or implicit notion of space imbricated in any ontology. Thus, Doreen Massey has consistently attacked the static, nonrelational conception of space of the modern masculine tradition (Massey, 2005). But neither is the spatiality Massey defends one of pure flux, in which there are no 'points' (compare Doel. 1998). What is needed is a concept of space in which fixity can emerge from flux under certain conditions. This is different from saying that there is perpetual vacillation at infinite speed between two poles, fixity and flow, like in some postmodern dialectic or like Derridean undecidability, even if the poles are effects of the vacillation. Real process is not vacillary; it is irreversible and messy. To evoke the continuous but constrained dynamism of space, I want to propose the figure of viscosity Neither perfectly fluid nor solid, the viscous invokes surface tension and resistance to perturbation and mixing. **Viscosity means that the physical characteristics of a substance explain its unique movements.** There are local and temporary thickenings of interacting bodies, which then collectively become sticky, capable of capturing more bodies like them: an emergent slime mold. Under certain circumstances, the collectivity dissolves, the con-stituent bodies flowing freely again. **The world is an immense mass of viscosities, becoming thicker here, and thinner there.** In Genesis, Michel Serres tries to understand emergence, how unity can emerge from the background noise of multiplicity. At one point he writes of the "chain of contingency": "No, the contingent chain does not break, its links slide over one another, as though viscous. They touch because they are adjacent, they touch like sailors' hitches or the loops of 'nowt-way cloverleaves are stacked upon one another. It is not a linkage, but a local pull, by way of little frictions. **The local pull induces global movement very seldom, although it can happen. This is not a solid chain, it is sintely a liquid movement, a viscosity, a propagation that wagers its age in each locality"** ([1982] 1995, page 71, his italics***). Race must similarly be conceived as a chain of contingency, in which the connections between its constituent components are not given, but are made viscous through local attractio*ns*. Whiteness, for example. is about the sticky connections between property, privilege, and a paler skin. There is no essence of whiteness, but there is a relative fixity that inheres in all the 'local pulls' of its* many *elements in* flux**. Emergence and viscosity are complementary concepts, the first pertaining to the genesis of distinctions, the second to the modality of that genesis. Race's spatiality is emphatically not about discrete separations between 'races. Nobody 'has' a race, but bodies are racialised. Gilroy asks: "if 'race' is a useful way of classifying people, then how many 'races' are there?" (2000, page 37). This question betrays a logic of solids and grids. The concept of race is not for taxonomic ordering, but for studying the movements between human bodies, things, and their changing environment. The concept of race is like the concept of subculture, or disease—nobody wants to know how many subcultures or diseases there are, but how they come to be. What are the constituent components of race? Potentially everything, but certainly strands of DNA, phenotypical variation, discursive practices (law, media, science). arte-facts such as clothes and food, and the distribution of wealth. How these are connected is entirely immanent to the way certain humans behave in certain circumstances. Sarah Whatmore (2002) might call race intrinsically more-than-human, irreducible to either biology or culture. **Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus can be understood as a conceptualisation of irreducible and immanent heterogeneities like race (though they do not explicitly confirm that race is such a heterogeneity). They call these heterogeneities machinic assemblages.** **"Taking the feudal assemblage as an example, we would have to consider the inter-minglings of bodies defining feudalism: the body of the earth and the social body; the body of the overlord, the vassal, the serf; the body of the knight and the horse and their new relation to the stirrup; the weapons and tools assuring a symbiosis of bodies—a whole machinic assemblage. We would also have to consider statements, expressions, the juridical regime of heraldry, all of the incorporeal transformations, in particular, oaths and their variables (the oath of obedience. but also the oath of love, etc.): the collective assemblage of enunciation. On the other axis, we would have to consider the feudal territorialities and reterritorializations, and at the same time the line of deterritorialization that carries away both the knight and his mount, statements and acts**. We would have to consider how all this combines in the Crusades" (Deleuze and Guattari. [1980] 1987. page 89). A machinic geography of bodies asks what immanent connections they forge with things and places, how they work, travel, fight, write, love—how these bodies become viscous, slow down, get into certain habits, into certain collectivities, like city, social stratum, or racial formation. **Machinism is wary of mediation: it prefers connections and viscosities. Machinism asks how incredibly diverse processes (such as agriculture and sexuality, religion and property law) interlock, like cogs and wheels instead of signifiers and signified** But machinism is not physicalism. It understands entities not as perfectly knowable cause-effect sequences, but as bundles of virtual capacities. Approaching phenotype machinically means being prepared for the unpreparable: **phenotype connects in infinite ways. Living, social machines are not machines in the narrow sense, because they lack a preconceived 'function' and are constantly evolving. A quick return to Fanon to elucidate the machinic assemblage of race**. Another well-known quote: `The native town is a hungry town, starved of bread, of meat, of shoes, of coal, of light. The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town wallowing in the mire. It is a town of niggers and dirty arabs. The look that the native turns on the settler's town is a look of lust, a look of envy; it expresses his dreams of possession—all manner of possession: to sit at the settler's table, to sleep in the settler's bed, with his wife if possible. The colonized man is an envious man. And this the settler knows very well; when their glances meet he ascertains bitterly, always on the defensive 'They want to take our place'. It is true, for there is no native who does not dream at least once a day of setting himself up in the settler's Numerous authors have theorised about the intersection of possession, sexuality, urbanism and race (for example Low. 1996). The machinic geography of phenotype, however, takes issue with the Hegelian self/other scheme that supports much of this work, and studies instead how certain bodies stick to certain spaces, how they are chained by hunger, cold, darkness, mud, poverty, crime, glances full of envy and anxiety. The segregation between colonists and colonised is the apparently binary result of many nitty-gritty material processes which, when analysed, render it a lot less binary. This also means race is devious in inventing new ways of chaining bodies. Race is creative, constantly morphing, now disguised as sexual desire, now as la mission civilatrice, all the while weaving new elements in its wake. **Deleuze and Guattari might say that what defines race is not rigidity or inevitability, but its "lines of flight". Race can be as stark as apartheid, but mostly it is fuzzy and operates through something else. The social sciences literature on race** (urban geography, postcolonial theory, film studies) **remains relevant from the machinic perspective. Race is shown to exist through ghettoes, travel writing, and Hollywood cinema. What this literature shows is precisely race's plastic, emergent, and more-than-human spatiality** (for example, Anderson, 1991; hooks, 1992; Jackson and Penrose, 1993; Jacobs, 1996; Robinson, 1996). Still, more geographical and anthropological work needs to be done to theorise the biocultural imbrications of race. **For example, in the introduction to the collection Race, Nature and the Politics of Difference it is argued that "both race and nature are historical artefacts: assemblages of material, discourse, and practice irreducible to a single timeless essence.** By charting the ways in which race and nature work together, and by tracing key disruptions in their busy traffic, we emphasize the cultural labors required to maintain them as they are. ... We write against racisms**—not against 'race' but against the exclusionary effects pro-duced through its invocation, deployment, and reproduction" (Moore et al, 2003, page 42). But the full implications of the term assemblage—that it includes biological and other nonhuman forces—still need to be explored. There is some work being done that quietly disrespects the disciplinary boundaries of modern epistemology.** Anthropolog-ically inclined medical research has the potential to offer a critical approach to the biocultural aspects of racial division (Wade, 2002, pages 117-122). Luca Cavalli-Sforza maps human migration using genetics and physical anthropology as well as archae-ology, linguistics, and history (Cavalli-Sforza et al, 1994). This research deserves theoretical attention, so that more rigorous studies of the discursive, technological, and economic embeddedness of phenotype can be imagined. Zack (2002) has recently argued that physical anthropology can only account for variation through heredity, not the folk (taxonomic) conception of race as such. She therefore continues to define `race' as an essentialist social construction which has no basis in the science of phenotype. What is needed, however, is to highjack the folk conception and rethink race as culturally embedded phenotype. Saying that race has no basis in biology is different from saying that phenotype plays some role in racial differentiation. Pheno-type is a crucial element in the assemblage called race, and, because phenotype is already nondiscrete and shaped by culture, race cannot be an essentialist concept. Now, what does this nonessentialism mean to antiracist politics?

#### Vote neg to endorse 1000 races- a process in which the subject is unrecognizable from the faciality machine

**Saldanha 3** (Saldanha, Arun. Arun Saldanha Department of Geography, University of Minnesota, Reontologising Race: the Machinic Geography of Phenotype. Vol. 24, Society and Space, 2006. P. 20-23) SJ//DA

**Every time phenotype makes another machinic connection, there is a stutter. Every time bodies are further entrenched in segregation, however brutal, there needs to be an affective investment of some sort.** This is the ruptural moment in which to intervene. **Race should not be eliminated, but proliferated. its many energies directed at multiplying racial differences so as to render them joyfully cacophonic.** Many in American critical race theory also argue against a utopian transcendence of race, taking from W E Du Bois and pragmatism a reflexive, sometimes strategically nationalist attitude towards racial embodiment (compare Outlaw. 1996: Shuford. 2001: Winant. 2004). What is needed is an affirmation of race's creativity and virtuality: what race can he. Race need not be about order and oppression. it can be wild, far-from-equilibrium, liberatory. It is not that everyone becomes completely Brownian (or brown!), com-pletely similar, or completely unique. It is just that white supremacism becomes strenuous as many populations start harbouring a similar economic, technological, cultural productivity as whites do now linking all sorts of bodies with all sorts of wealth and all sorts of ways of life. That is**. race exists in its true mode when it is no longer stifled by racism. "The race-tribe exists only at the level of an oppressed race, and in the name of the oppression it suffers; there is no race but inferior. minoritarian; there is no domi-nant race: a race is defined not by its purity but rather by the impurity conferred upon it by a system of domination**. Bastard and mixed-blood are the true names of race- (Deleuze and Guattari. [1980] 1987. page 379). In "A thousand tiny sexes". Grosz (1994b) **follows a well-known passage of Deleuze and Guattari to argue for non-Hegelian. indeed protohuman feminism that utilises lines of flight of the gender assemblage to combat heterosexist patriarchy. "If we consider the great binary aggregates, such as the sexes or classes, it is evident that they also cross over into molecular assemblages of a different nature, and that there is a double reciprocal dependency between them.** For the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular combinations bringing into play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man, but the relation of each to the animal, the plant. etc.: a thousand tiny sexes" (Deleuze and Guattari. [1980] 1987. page 213). Similarly. **the molecularisation of race would consist in its breaking up into a thousand tiny races. It is from here that cosmopolitanism should start: the pleasure. curiosity, and concern in encountering a multiplicity of corporeal fragments outside of common-sense taxonomies. "We walk the streets among hundreds of people whose patterns of lips, breasts, and genital organs we divine: they seem to us equivalent and interchangeable. Then something snares our attention: a dimple speckled with freckles on the cheek of a woman; a steel choker around the throat of a man in a business suit: a gold ring in the punctured nipple on the hard chest of a deliveryman: a big raw fist in the delicate hand of a schoolgirl: a live python coiled about the neck of a lean, lanky adolescent with coal-black skin. Signs of clandestine disorder in the uniformed and coded crowds" (Lingis. /000 page 142) - Machinism against racism builds upon a gradual. fragmented, and shifting sense of corporeal difference, that of course extends far further than the street. Responsibility, activism, and antiracist policy will follow only from feeling and understanding the geographical differentials that exist between many different kinds of bodies:** between a Jew and a black soldier, between a woman in the Sahel and a woman in Wall Street, between a Peruvian peasant and a Chinese journalist. A machinic politics of race takes into account the real barriers to mobility and imagination that exist in different places; cosmopolitanism has to be invented, not imposed. It may seem that machinism is as utopian and open ended as Gilroy's transcendent antiracism. It is not, because it is empirical, immanent, and pragmatic. The machinic geography of phenotype shows that racism differs from place to place. and cannot be overcome in any simple way. It shows that white supremacy can subside only by changing the rules of education, or the financial sector, or the arms trade, or the pharmaceutical industry, or whatever. For machinic politics, the cultural studies pre-occupations with apology, recognition, politically correct language and reconsiliation. or else cultural hybridity, pastiche, and ambivalence, threaten to stand in the way of really doing something about the global structures of racism**. A thousand tiny races can be made only if it is acknowledged that racism is a material, inclusive series of events, a viscous geography which cannot be 'signified away. Miscegenation, openness to strangers, exoticism in art, and experimentations with whiteness can certainly help. But ultimately cosmpolitanism without critique and intervention remains complacent with its own comfortably mobile position**. In a word, ethics encompasses politics, and politics starts with convincing people of race's materiality. Close With racism enduring every well-meant attack (it's arbitrary! it's arbitrary!). it seems crucial for the humanities and social sciences to start engaging with the reality of phenotype—**phenotype itself. unmediated. in all of its connective glory. Following recent turns towards embodiment and materiality. the mediation model as endorsed by Butler and many in race and ethnic studies becomes inadequate to understand processes of racialisation. Race is not only a problem of how people think about skin colour. We need to know what race really is. that is. what it can be. Deontologising race, as Gilroy wishes to do. even if possible. seems a bad option if all the ontological questions are left to reductionist sociobiologists and far-right politicians to answe**r. As Haraway's writings attest. social scientists and cultural theorists cannot let multina-tionals and the sensationalist science press 'do' all the biology. There is simply too much at stake to continue brushing aside the biological as 'discursive practice. Haraway's project. like Latour's. nonetheless remains too epistemological (science studies). With the profusion of popular science books and television programmes on 'human nature, and this in conjunction with growing xenophobia, the public sphere is craving for critical social science interventions addressing these issues. not as mate-rial-semiotic constructions, but as debatable empirical, political and philosophical findings. Race is completely contingent, but not arbitrary: in hindsight. its differentiations and inequalities can be explained (Winant. 2004). A process such as race clearly cannot be studied with classical notions of identity, causality, cogito, representation, and reducibility. As a configuration made viscous by a whole host of processes. race requires genetics and ethnography and economics and literary theory to be understood. And a critical dialogue between the humanities and the physical sciences will he greatly facilitated by the nonmodern ontology of complexity theory. I discussed several entry points into such a pluralist ontological understanding of race. One is the phenomenology of race, provided it keeps the focus on embodied, social interaction, in which an ethics of responsibility follows from sensing the inten-sities between oneself and others, however distant. Another is the political appraisal of difference in corporeal feminism. Anthropology is a third entry point. at least if eased from the epistemological and imperialist straightjackets of modernity. Biology, as inaugurated by Darwin. is a contextual and nuanced way of understanding the intrinsic vitality of matter. **Deleuze's metaphysics of difference and repetition. finally. gives philosophical valence to the scientific project of understanding the emergence of race and the political project of striving for the freedom of more bodies. Race shows the openness of the body, the way organisms connect to their environ-ment and establish uneven relationships amongst each other. The creativity of nature is sensed, understood, and harnessed to crumble the systemic violence currently keeping bodies in place. Hoping for, striving for a thousand tiny races is not annihilating nature from culture, but on the contrary, immersing oneself in nature's lines of flight. This politics is also not mystical or anarchistic, it is pragmatic and includes state policy as well as what Deleuze and Guattari call micropolitics. It is first of all empirical: understand what race is, know its potentialities, try to sense them hiding around you. find out what is keeping them from becoming actual**.

### 3

#### The starting point of morality is practical reason. 3 warrants:

#### Ethics must begin a priori:

#### [1] Uncertainty – our experiences are inaccessible to others which allows people to say they don’t experience the same, however a priori principles are universally applied to all agents.

#### [2] Bindingness – I can keep asking “why should I follow this” which results in skep since obligations are predicated on ignorantly accepting rules. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason which concedes its authority and equally proves agency as constitutive

#### That means we must universally will maxims— any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### And, reason must be universal – [A] a reason for one agent is a reason for another agent. I can’t say 2+2=4 is true for me but not for you – that’s incoherent.

#### any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends.

#### Thus, counter-methodology: Vote negative to engage in a liberation strategy of universal reason. This entails a starting point where we abstract from individual perspectives to understand the universal, and use this starting point to apply it to empirical institutions and agents.

#### Prefer:Performativity: freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments through talking freely. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, denying self-ownership in the round automatically implies the truth of the aff framework.

#### Negate:

#### [1] Independently, Kant is incompatible with a your method – it requires unconditional respect for humanity as an end in itself.

Korsgaard 83 bracketed for gendered language (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR)

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, [they] he or she supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness. Kant considers what this might be: it cannot be an object of inclination, for those have only a conditional worth, "for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity" or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action." By this I understand him to mean that we must regard ourselves as capable of conferring value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize them. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### [2] Only univeralizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

#### [3] Independently not defending the topic is non-universalizable b/c if nobody defended the topic than a topic wouldn’t have even been created in the first place which is a contradiction in conception.

### Case

#### Consequences Fail: a] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict. b] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. c] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify because we commit the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1] Systems- the 1AC says institutions create social realities that replicate violence but in-round discourse does nothing to alter conditions. All you do is encourage teams to write better framework blocks.

#### 2] Spillover- they are missing an internal link as to why they need the ballot or why the reading of the aff forwards change. Empirically denied – judges vote on [x] all the time and nothing happens.

#### [1] the world is getting better for folks with disabilities, the ADA and other innovations prove that institutional progress is possible, additionally link turns the K since it proves futurism is good

Lee Lawrence, Christian Science Monitor, “Possibility unbound: 25 years of progress for those with disability,” ’14, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2014/1116/Possibility-unbound-25-years-of-progress-for-those-with-disability

There is no question that, to many with impairments, **the modern world can still prove a daunting and sometimes downright inhospitable place**. **But** nearly **25 years after** President George H.W. Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act (**ADA**), **an increasing number in the United States are living** more empowered, less restricted lives.The telecommunications infrastructure and all those man-made **spaces** collectively referred to as “the built environment” – which includes cities, architecture, transportation, even parks – “**are dramatically more accessible** **today than they were in 1990** when they passed the ADA,” says Andrew Imparato, executive director of the Association of University Centers on Disabilities and former president of the American Association of People with Disabilities. **Services**, too, have **expanded**, **from transit systems** offering riders with disabilities free familiarization and safety programs to **specialized guides** at museums **to** a growing number of designers developing **clothing** with a variety of specific needs in mind. **The ADA** – “our crowning achievement,” as Mr. Imparato calls it – **set the country on a** new course. Those who have come of age since 1990 have “grown up in more integrated settings and generally have higher expectations for what is possible for people with disabilities to achieve in work and in life than did the generations that came before them,” Imparato says. **Advances in technology have triggered a** sea change. **Mainstream innovations** such as Siri double as assistive technologies, while robotics, bionics, and 3-D printers have **revolutionized** the **design and manufacture of prostheses**. And mobile phones and tablets have opened an entirely new field: apps. An ever-growing list of applications ranges from **hearing aids** to **maps** for people with low vision to communications methods for children with autism. Looking forward, **experts point to another major factor in advancing quality of life**: **the bubble of aging baby boomers**. Among people under 65, an estimated 8.5 to 14 percent have a disability. **In the over-65** **population, some estimates are** as high as **50 percent.** Just as baby boomers have set trends in everything from spending habits to dating and child rearing, **boomers with disabilities** **are** **not going to scurry off to the margins of society**. **They’re going to** demand **services and products.** Many believe this will benefit society at large. At the Indiana Institute on Disability and Community, Phil Stafford talks about progress “on the cultural front .... I think that those without disabilities have a kind of a taken-for-granted perspective on the world that we are shocked out of when we understand what daily barriers people might encounter.” This might be an announcement some can’t hear, a website others can’t access, or doorknobs yet others can’t grasp. The light goes on, Mr. Stafford says, when people see “someone use their elbow to open a door that has a lever handle. People might say ‘I never thought of that.’ It’s not great world-shaking change, but it’s those minor encounters that **make us aware.”**

#### [2] No root cause claims.

Bone 17 (Kirstin Marie Bone, Department of English, University of Alabama. “Trapped behind the glass: crip theory and disability identity”. Disability and Society, April 21, 2017. <http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/09687599.2017.1313722?needAccess=true>)

The purpose of critical theory has long been the focus of debate within the academy. Are we, as theorists, obligated to strive for political and social change, or are we merely resolved to engage in the work of critical thinking? This question becomes particularly contested in the realm of minority theory, because the groups we study are those whose histories are awash in a cycle of oppression and marginalization. Within disability studies, an examination of dominate modes of thought produces an answer: as theorists, we should strive to improve the living conditions of the community we examine. One mode of discourse in particular that has positioned itself as seeking this political and social impact is ~~crip~~ [disability] theory. Based in the rhetoric of queer theory, ‘crip’ seeks to challenge constructions of able-bodiedness and be politically generative through the fracturing of key systems of oppression. Whether or not it actually accomplishes these goals is debatable, particularly because its founding principles allow anyone to colonize the disabled identity as their own. In order to understand the nuances of crip theory and the ways in which this framework fractures the disabled community, I will examine this theory through three different lenses. The first lens is to understand the word ‘crip/crippled’ and its relationship with other historical terms for disability. This framework will demonstrate how ~~crip~~ [disability] theory continues oppressive cycles instead of fulfilling politically generative and empowering goals. Next, I examine crip theory through its relationships with other branches of theory. By placing crip theory within this context, I identify the ways ~~crip~~ [disability] and other dominant branches of thought both succeed and fail in advancing the lives of disabled people. Finally, I conduct a rigorous examination of crip theory as defined by the dominant theorists who subscribe to its ideology. Through this tri-fold reading, I conclude that crip theory’s transformative agenda has not been realized. Instead, ~~crip~~ [disability] theory continues a cycle of silencing and marginalization that widens the divide between disability studies and the lived experiences of the disabled rather than bridging those critical gaps in meaningful ways.

#### [3] Psychoanalysis is infinitely regressive, not falsifiable, and too abstract

Gordon 1 – Paul Gordon, accomplished psychotherapist, “Psychoanalysis and Racism: The Politics of Defeat,” RACE & CLASS v. 42 n. 4, 2001, pp. 17-34.

But in the thirty years since Kovel wrote, that attempt to relate mind and society has been fractured by the advent of postmodernism, with its subsumption of the material/historical, of notions of cause and effect, to what is transitory, contingent, free-¯oating, evanescent. Psychoanalysis, by stepping into the vacuum left by the abandonment of all metanarrative, has tended to put mind over society. This is particularly noticeable in the work of the Centre for New Ethnicities Research at the University of East London, which purports to straddle the worlds of the academy and action by developing projects for the local community and within education generally.28 But**,** in marrying psychoanalysis and postmodernism, on the basis of claiming to be both scholarly and action oriented, it degrades scholarship and undermines action, and ends in discourse **analysis a language** in which metaphor passes for reality**.** Cohen's work unavoidably raises the question of the status of psycho- analysis as a social or political theory, as distinct from a clinical one. Can psychoanalysis, in other words, apply to the social world of groups, institutions, nations, states and cultures in the way that it does, or at least may do, to individuals? Certainly there is now a considerable body of literature and a plethora of academic courses, and so on, claim- ing that psychoanalysis is a social theory. And, of course, in popular discourse, it is now a commonplace to hear of nations and societies spoken of in personalised ways. Thus `truth commissions' and the like, which have become so common in the past decade in countries which have undergone turbulent change, are seen as forms of national therapy or catharsis, even if this is far from being their purpose. Nevertheless, the question remains: does it make sense, as Michael Ignatieff puts it, to speak of nations having psyches the way that individuals do? `Can a nation's past make people ill as we know repressed memories sometimes make individuals ill? . . . Can we speak of nations ``working through'' a civil war or an atrocity as we speak of individuals working through a traumatic memory or event?' 47 The problem withthe application ofpsychoanalysis to social institutionsis thatthere can be no testing of the claims made. If someone says, for instance, that nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, how can this be proved? Thepioneers of psychoanalysis, from Freud onwards, allderivedtheirideas in the context oftheirwork with individual patients and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient**.** Outside of the consulting room, there can be no **such** verification process, and the further one moves from the individual **patient,** the less purchase psychoanalyticideas canhave**.** Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking. Butif everything is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true. An example of Cohen's method is to be found in his 1993 working paper, `Home rules', subtitled `Some re¯ections on racism and nation- alism in everyday life'. Here Cohen talks about taking a `particular line of thought for a walk'. While there is nothing wrong with taking a line of thought for a walk, such an exercise is not necessarily the same as thinking. One of the problems with Cohen's approach is that a kind of free association, mixed with deconstruction, leads not to analysis, not even to psychoanalysis, but to . . . well, just more free association, an endless, indeed one might say pointless, play on words. This approach may well throw up some interesting associations along the way, connections one had never thought of but it is not to be confused with political analysis. In `Home rules', anything and everything to do with `home' can and does ®nd a place here and, as I indicated above, even the popular ®lm Home Alone is pressed into service as a story about `racial' invasion.

#### [4] Neuroscience proves neural malleability

Masland 20[Richard Masland- Contributing columnist “The Brain Reshapes Our Malleable Senses to Fit the World” <https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-brain-reshapes-our-malleable-senses-to-fit-the-world-20200324/#:~:text=Yet%20with%20modern%20methodologies%2C%20neuroscientists,brain%20neurons%20do%20physically%20change.&text=Studies%20of%20this%20phenomenon%20are,plasticity%20of%20the%20developing%20brain>. March 24th 2020] VHS AI

Yet with modern methodologies, neuroscientists have conclusively proved that the circuits of the brain neurons do physically change. Our senses are malleable because the sensory centers of the brain rewire themselves to strike a useful balance between the capacities of the available neural resources and the demands put on them by incoming sensory impressions. Studies of this phenomenon are revealing that some sensory areas have innate tendencies toward certain functions, but they show just as powerfully the plasticity of the developing brain

#### **[5] meaningful relationships can occur between able and disabled people so instances of disgust and pity are not all that encompass relations towards disability**