## Framework

#### Ethics must begin apriori,

#### A] Empirical Uncertainty – evil demon could deceive us and inability to know others experience make empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics. Outweighs since it would be escapable since people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### [B] Constitutive Authority – The meta-ethic is bindingness. Practical reason is the only unescapable authority because to ask why I should be a reasoner concedes it’s authority since you’re actively reasoning.

#### [C] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory.

#### That justifies universality – a] a priori principles like reason apply to everyone since they are independent of human experience and b] any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. Prefer:

#### [1] Performativity—freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify the neg arguments/standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### [2] Consequences Fail: [A] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence. [B] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events. [C] Aggregation Fails --- suffering is not additive can’t compare between one migraine and 10 head aches [D] Yes act/omission distinction – there are infinite events occurring over which you have no control, so you can never be moral

#### [3] Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. Any standard is an interpretation of the word ought. Thus, framework is a topicality debate about terms in the resolution. Prefer,

#### Resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since only analytical arguments are required. Key to fairness so all people can engage

#### Resolvability: Clarity of weighing under interpretation of Kantianism: perfect duties above imperfect duties. Duties in right. Explicit categories that supersede other categories. All other FWs are consequentialist that use unquantifiable prob, mag, or prob x mag. Resolvability is an independent voter since otherwise the judge can’t make a decision.

#### [B] Only universalizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

### Plan

#### Plan text: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines during pandemics.

#### Enforcement through limited IP waivers solve – patent term extensions are normal means and solves innovation and scale-up.

Young and Potts-Szeliga 21 [Roberta; Counsel in Seyfarth’s Litigation department and Intellectual Property and Patent Litigation practice groups in Los Angeles; Jamaica Potts-Szeliga; Partner in Seyfarth’s Litigation department and Intellectual Property and Patent Litigation practice groups in Washington, DC. She also provides advice on FDA regulatory issues and is part of the firm’s Health Care, Life Sciences, and Pharmaceuticals team; “A Third Option: Limited IP Waiver Could Solve Our Pandemic Vaccine Problems,” IP Watch Dog; 7/21/21; <https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/07/21/third-option-limited-ip-waiver-solve-pandemic-vaccine-problems/id=135732/>] Justin

Limited Waiver Approach

This article suggests a third option, between voluntary vaccine donation and the full IP waiver proposal, that may offer a way forward. The third proposed solution is incentivized limited IP waivers that could encourage (or require) private companies to engage in licensing agreements with nations to share some, but not all, of the knowledge and designs covering the COVID-19 vaccines to the developing world. The limited IP waivers could cover the minimum necessary portions of the technology to produce basic COVID-19 vaccines. The waivers could be limited in time to the duration of the pandemic, or another term agreed to by the WTO. The term could also be defined as ending when widespread vaccination and immunity goals are achieved. The incentive for pharmaceutical companies to support such limited IP waivers could be provided in the form of patent term extensions for the technology covered by the limited IP waivers.

Extensions of patent term are already known and widely used. In the U.S., patent term adjustments are automatically added on to the patent lifespan to account for any delays by the USPTO in the patent prosecution process. In some cases, these mechanisms may extend the patent term for years. Patent term extensions also are available for regulatory delays (35 U.S.C. § 156). In particular, patents covering, inter alia, drug products approved by the United States Food & Drug Administration may be eligible for up to five years of additional patent term to give back time required to complete the regulatory review process. Both patent term adjustments and patent term extensions arise from activities beyond the control of the pharmaceutical companies. A pandemic patent term extension fashioned after such known extensions could be made used to compensate for the current pressing global health needs.

This third proposal may be achievable at the WTO. Hurdles remain and it could be months or years before the WTO reaches an agreement on any waiver of IP protections, and years before countries build factories, gather materials, and gain the expertise to produce the vaccines. A steep hurdle is that mRNA is a new technology, with no machines or experts for hire. Nonetheless, the third solution offers hope to find a middle ground that may begin to be implemented before the end of the current pandemic and be in place for the future.

The patent term extension could be provided for countries with patent offices and could be adapted based on laws and conditions in each country. Pandemic-related patent term extensions could be given for a period of time that the compulsory license is in force. With current pandemic projections of six months to two years for sufficient distribution, providing a patent term extension is reasonable and in line with the time period of many patent term extensions. Given that most pharmaceutical patents are prosecuted in multiple countries, this provides an incentive to participate in a limited waiver program.

Let’s Not Repeat Past Mistakes

It’s been a century since the last pandemic devastated the globe and the only certainty is that this will not be the last pandemic. Solutions created today lay a foundation for mitigation of the next pandemic. It’s been said that those who refuse to learn from history are doomed to repeat it, a thought too painful to contemplate with a pandemic. The industrial nations of the world have technology that others are literally dying to obtain—a high price to pay. Incentivized limited IP waivers may offer a compromise to bridge the gap between maintaining IP rights (and thus relying on charity alone) and arbitrary compulsory licensing that could deter the technological investment to create life-saving solutions in the future.

### Offense

#### 3] Property rights minimize the opportunity of innovation which limits individual freedom through creating monopolies. They also limit the use of tangible objects such as medicines for good purposes.

Cernea and Uszkai 12 Cernea, Mihail-Valentin, and Radu Uszkai. *The Clash between Global Justice and Pharmaceutical Patents: A Critical Analysis*. 2012, the-clash-between-global-justice-and-drug-patents-a-critical-analysis.pdf. SJEP

To make this point clearer, we regard property as an ethical institution which emerged in the context of reiterated conflict between agents for tangible goods. A useful analogy would be, for example, the particular way in which David Hume discusses the emergence of justice in the context of scarcity in which agents pursue their own interests4 . As a result, the purpose of property rights would be that of avoiding or minimizing the possibility of conflict and that of increasing the costs of free-riding or trespassing. Let’s take the following example which will illustrate better our point. Assume that X is a philosophy student and has a copy of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Y is a college of him but he does not have the book. They both have to write an essay on Kant’s categorical imperative. Because Y does not have the book, let’s assume that he decides, whether by the use of coercion or fraud to take his book. As a result, the theft leaves X without his property because tangible goods are rivalrous in consumption. Both student can’t, at the same time but in a different place read about Kant’s categorical imperative from the same copy. Now a different example: suppose X invents a new way of harvesting corn and Y harvests his corn accordingly. This situation is quite different in comparison to the case we presented earlier, because Y does not leaves X without either his new harvesting mechanisms which he created but neither without the idea behind the mechanism. It would be hard to say that Y stole something from X because the consumption of intangible goods such as ideas does not have the same rivalrous property as a copy of a book written by Kant. Actually, the existence of the patent system fosters the scarcity of ideas. In this context patents represent unjustified state-granted monopolies. Moreover, intellectual property rights have another profound immoral consequence: it limits the use of tangible objects which we acquired fully in line with market rules.

#### [2] IPP is inconsistent with free market principles

**Kinsella 11** (Stephan Kinsella, 5-25-2011, accessed on 8-23-2021, Foundation for Economic Education, "How Intellectual Property Hampers the Free Market | N. Stephan Kinsella", <https://fee.org/articles/how-intellectual-property-hampers-the-free-market/>) BHHS AK

But are they? There are good reasons to think that IP is not actually property—that it is actually antithetical to a private-property, free-market order. By intellectual property, I mean primarily patent and copyright. It’s important to understand the origins of these concepts. As law professor Eric E. Johnson notes, “The monopolies now understood as copyrights and patents were originally created by royal decree, bestowed as a form of favoritism and control. As the power of the monarchy dwindled, these chartered monopolies were reformed, and essentially by default, they wound up in the hands of authors and inventors.” Patents were exclusive monopolies to sell various goods and services for a limited time. The word patent, historian Patricia Seed explains, comes from the Latin patente, signifying open letters. Patents were “open letters” granted by the monarch authorizing someone to do something—to be, say, the only person to sell a certain good in a certain area, to homestead land in the New World on behalf of the crown, and so on. It’s interesting that many defenders of IP—such as patent lawyers and even some libertarians—get indignant if you call patents or copyright a monopoly. “It’s not a monopoly; it’s a property right,” they say. “If it’s a monopoly then your use of your car is a monopoly.” But patents are State grants of monopoly privilege. One of the first patent statutes was England’s Statute of Monopolies of 1624, a good example of truth in labeling. Granting patents was a way for the State to raise money without having to impose a tax. Dispensing them also helped secure the loyalty of favorites. The patentee in return received protection from competition. This was great for the State and the patentee but not for competition or the consumer. In today’s system we’ve democratized and institutionalized intellectual property. Now anyone can apply. You don’t have to go to the king or be his buddy. You can just go to the patent office. But the same thing happens. Some companies apply for patents just to keep the wolves at bay. After all, if you don’t have patents someone might sue you or reinvent and patent the same ideas you are using. If you have a patent arsenal, others are afraid to sue you. So companies spend millions of dollars to obtain patents for defensive purposes. Large companies rattle their sabers or sue each other, then make a deal, say, to cross-license their patents to each other. That’s fine for them because they have protection from each other’s competition. But what does it do to smaller companies? They don’t have big patent arsenals or a credible countersuit threat. So patents amount to a barrier to entry, the modern version of mercantilist protectionism. What about copyright? The roots literally lie in censorship. It was easy for State and church to control thought by controlling the scribes, but then the printing press came along, and the authorities worried that they couldn’t control official thought as easily. So Queen Mary created the Stationer’s Company in 1557, with the exclusive franchise over book publishing, to control the press and what information the people could access. When the charter of the Stationer’s Company expired, the publishers lobbied for an extension, but in the Statute of Anne (1710) Parliament gave copyright to authors instead. Authors liked this because it freed their works from State control. Nowadays they use copyright much as the State originally did: to censor and ban books. (More below.) IP, American Style The American system of IP began with the U.S. Constitution. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 authorizes (but doesn’t require) Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Despite modern IP proponents’ claims to the contrary, the American founders did not view intellectual property as a natural right but only as a policy tool to encourage innovation. Yet they were nervous about monopoly privilege, which is why patents and copyrights were authorized only for a limited time. Even John Locke, whose thought influenced the Founding Fathers, did not view copyright and patent as natural rights. Nor did he maintain that property homesteading applied to ideas. It applied only to scarce physical resources. Granted, some state constitutions had little versions of copyright before the American Constitution. (See Tom W. Bell, Intellectual Privilege: Copyright, Common Law, and the Common Good, part 1, chapter 3, section B.1.) On occasion, the language of natural rights was used to defend it, but this was just cover for the monopolies they granted to special interests. Natural rights do not expire after 15 years. Natural rights are not extended to Americans only. Natural rights wouldn’t exclude many types of innovation and intellectual creativity and cover only a few arbitrary types. And what is the result of this system? In the case of patents we have a modern statute administered by a huge federal bureaucracy that grants monopolies on the production and trade of various things, which means holders may ask the federal courts to order the use of force to stop competitors. But the competitors have not done anything that justifies force. They merely have used information to guide their actions with respect to their own property. Is that compatible with private property and the free market?

#### That affirms: Free market economies are the only ones that allow people to be free to pursue their own interests.

**Richman 12** [Sheldon Richman, 8-5-2012, "The Free Market Doesn't Need Government Regulation," Reason, <https://reason.com/2012/08/05/the-free-market-doesnt-need-government-r/>] // SJ AME

What regulates the conduct of these people? Market forces. (I keep specifying "in a freed market" because in a state-regulated economy, competitive market forces are diminished or suppressed.) Economically speaking, people cannot do whatever they want—and get away with it—in a freed market because other people are free to counteract them and it's in their interest to do so. That's part of what we mean by market forces. Just because the government doesn't stop a seller from charging $100 for an apple doesn't mean he or she can get that amount. Market forces regulate the seller as strictly as any bureaucrat could—even more so, because a bureaucrat can be bribed. Whom would you have to bribe to win an exemption from the law of supply and demand? (Well, you might bribe enough legislators to obtain protection from competition, but that would constitute an abrogation of the market.) It is no matter of indifference whether state operatives or market forces do the regulating. Bureaucrats, who necessarily have limited knowledge and perverse incentives, regulate by threat of physical force. In contrast, market forces operate peacefully through millions of cooperating participants, each with intimate knowledge of her own personal circumstances and looking out for her own well-being. Bureaucratic regulation is likely to be irrelevant or (more likely) inimical to what people in the market care about. Not so regulation by market forces.

#### ] The categorical imperative rejects the idea of intellectual property as it suppresses freedom by preventing others from innovating and suppressing speech in the name of a copyright.

Pievatolo 10 Pievatolo, Maria. “Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?” *Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual Property?*, 7 Feb. 2010, bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html. SJEP

In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to take for granted that the objects of real rights are only corporeal entities or res corporales: «Sache ist ein Ding, was keiner Zurechnung fähig ist. Ein jedes Object der freien Willkür, welches selbst der Freiheit ermangelt, heiß daher Sache (res corporalis)». [32](http://bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html#ftn.id2478823) Theoretically, however, such a negative definition could have been appropriate to incorporeal things as well. According to Kant, the rightful possession of a thing should be distinguished from its sensible possession. Something external would be rightfully mine «only if I may assume that i could be wronged by another's use of a thing even though I am not in possession of it» (AA.06 [245:13-16](http://virt052.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/Kant/aa06/245.html)). The rightful possession is an intelligible, not sensible, relation. I can claim that my bicycle is mine only if I am entitled to require that nobody takes it even when I leave it alone in the backyard. Kant's theory of property is very different from Fichte's principle of property as explained in his 1793 essay, according to which we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of which by another is physically impossible. For this reason, according to Fichte, the originality of the exposition entitles an author to claim a rightful property on his work. Is it really so obvious that originality implies property? Property is a comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time over the use of material objects. It is so comfortable just because it is physically possible to appropriate things; we do not need to invoke property when something cannot be separated from someone. I say both that my fingerprints or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two "mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the latter is the "mine" of property. The former can be used to identify someone, and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively to someone; the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external thing, if we consider it from a physical point of view. It is possible to lie on a historical circumstance, by plagiarizing a text, i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not wrote it. However, properly speaking, no one can "steal" the historical connection between "my" writing style and me: the convention of property is useless, in this case. Besides, if Fichte's principle were the only justification of property right, it would undermine the very concept of it: as it is physically possible to "attribute" my bicycle to another, when I leave it alone in the backyard, everyone would be entitled to take it for himself. As Kant would have said, a legal property right cannot be founded on sensible situations, but only on intelligible relations. Although he defines things as res corporales, Kant determines the rightful possession of a thing as a possession without detentio, by ignoring all its sensible facets. Such a possession - a possession of a thing without holding it - is exerted on an object that is "merely distinct from me", regardless of its position in space and time. Space and time, indeed, are sensible determinations and should be left out of consideration. According to the postulate of practical reason with regard to rights, property is justified by a permissive law of reason: [33](http://bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html#ftn.id2533469) if a rightful possession were not possible, every object would be a res nullius and nobody would be entitled to use it. Kant implicitly denies that a res nullius can be used by everyone at the same time. His tacit assumption suggests that the objects of property, besides being distinct from the subjects, are excludable and rivalrous as well, just like the res corporales. Kant asserts that something external is mine if I would be wronged by being disturbed in my use of it even though I am not in possession of it (AA.6, [249:5-7](http://virt052.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/Kant/aa06/249.html)). If property is a merely intelligible relation with an object that is simply distinct from the subject, we have no reason to deny that such an object might be immaterial as well, just like the objects of intellectual property. Why, then, does Kant refrain from using the very concept of it? According to him, a speech is an action of a person: it belongs to the realm of personal rights. A person who is speaking to the people is engaging a relationship with them; if someone else engages such a relationship in his name, he needs his authorization. The reprinter, as it were, does not play with property: he is only an agent without authority. Speeches, by Kant, cannot be separated from persons: he has seen the unholy promised land of intellectual property without entering it. According to Kant, before the acquired rights, everyone has a moral capacity for putting others under obligation that he calls innate right or internal meum vel tuum (AA.06, [237:24-25](http://virt052.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/Kant/aa06/237.html)). The innate right is only one: freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice, insofar it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law. Freedom belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity: in other words, it has to be assumed before every civil constitution, because it is the very possibility condition of law. Freedom implies innate equality, «that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being his own master (sui iuris), as well as being a human being beyond reproach (iusti) since before he performs any act affecting rights he has done no wrong to anyone, and finally his being authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it - such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them.» (AA.06, [237-238](http://virt052.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/Kant/aa06/237.html)) [34](http://bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html#ftn.id2533617) In spite of his intellectual theory of property, [35](http://bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html#ftn.id2533628) Kant does not enter in the realm of intellectual property for a strong systematic reason. Liberty of speech is an important part of the innate right of freedom. It cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom itself. If the ius reale were applied to speeches, a basic element of freedom would be reduced to an alienable thing, making it easy to mix copyright protection and censorship. [36](http://bfp.sp.unipi.it/chiara/lm/kantpisa1.html#ftn.id2533656) Property rights are based on the assumption that its objects are excludable and rivalrous and need to be appropriated by someone to be used. We cannot, however, deal with speeches as they were excludable and rivalrous things that need to be appropriated to be of some use, because excluding people from speeches would be like excluding them from freedom. Therefore, Kant binds speeches to the persons and their actions, and limits the scope of copyright to publishing, or, better, to the publishing of the age of print: the Nachdruck is unjust only when someone reproduces a text without the author's permission and distributes its copies to the public. If someone copies a book for his personal use, or lets others do it, or translates and elaborates a text, there is no copyright violation, just because it is not involved any intrinsic property right, but only the exercise of the innate right of freedom. The boundary of Kant's copyright is the public use of reason, as a key element of a basic right that should be recognized to everyone. Kant does not stick to the Roman Law tradition because of conservatism, but because of Enlightenment.

### Underview

#### [1] Fairness is a voter: A] Debate’s a competitive game and requires objective evaluation. B] Fairness best coheres a winner since if one debater had ten minutes to speak and the other had three there would be incongruence that alters ability to judge the better debater C] Determines engagement in substance so it outweighs.

**[2] Aff gets 1AR theory and RVIs – otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this – meta theory also precedes the evaluation of initial theory shells because it determines whether or not I could engage in theory in the first place. no 2NR paradigm issues, responses to ac args, theory, or RVIs because a) It becomes impossible to check NC abuse if you can dump on reasons the shell doesn't matter in the 2n.**

#### [3] Presumption and Permissibility affirm: a] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me. b] If anything is permissible, then so is the aff since there is nothing prohibiting us.

### Underview 2

### 1AC – Adv – Vaccine Diplomacy

#### American vaccine diplomacy is failing in Latin America – that allows for Chinese influence. Only the plan can return the world back to a US led order.

Carman and Carl 6/15 [Ezequiel and Joseph; Argentine lawyer and global health and trade policy consultant. Previously, he served as a legal advisor to the Ministry of Justice of Buenos Aires, an assistant professor of international public law at the Universidad Católica Argentina, and a research assistant at the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law; Graduate of Liberty University, where he studied international relations and strategic international studies. He has worked for the U.S. Department of State and the Heritage Foundation; “A U.S. vaccine diplomacy strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean,” Global Americans; 6/15/21; <https://theglobalamericans.org/2021/06/a-u-s-vaccine-diplomacy-strategy-for-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/>] Justin

Once again, history seems to be repeating itself. The United States, along with the world’s other rich and mostly Western countries, continue to be accused of hoarding medical supplies, having purchased one billion surplus vaccine doses (more than is required to vaccinate their citizens). In their absence, China—and, to a lesser extent, Russia—have rushed to take advantage of the vaccine gap in the Global South, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. A lack of leadership from Washington in sharing vaccines and their intellectual property (IP) earlier in the pandemic has allowed its geopolitical competitors to take advantage of Latin America’s desperate need to acquire scarce vaccines. Although the region represents only eight percent of the global population, it has experienced nearly one-third of all COVID-19 deaths. Historical precedent demonstrates this is not the first time that Washington’s international moral standing has been damaged during a global health crisis, due to the lack of political will to share lifesaving drugs and other vital resources. However, this time around, unlike in such past episodes, there will be concrete geopolitical consequences to Washington’s inaction. In recent years, the U.S. has lost significant political and economic influence among its southern neighbors; without swift remedial action, its geopolitical rivals may cement such losses through their campaigns of vaccine diplomacy. To rebuild its influence in the region, Washington will need to muster the political will to increase Latin America and the Caribbean’s access to vaccines and develop a sound strategy for its own vaccine diplomacy. Already, some countries in the region have been sufficiently strong-armed by other global powers, the implications of which could be damaging for U.S. interests. As the world transitions into the next stage of the pandemic, those nations that continue to be most ravaged by COVID-19 will likely continue to remember which countries provided them with aid and succor in their time of need. History repeats itself In 1981, the first cases of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) were reported; the following decade was defined by a devastating global AIDS epidemic (which would eventually be recognized as a pandemic). Analogous to how Latin America and the Caribbean have borne disproportionately the burden of COVID-19, Africa was hit hardest by the AIDS epidemic. Many parallels can be drawn between the international handlings of both the COVID-19 and AIDS pandemics. By the late 1980s, once antiretroviral therapies (ARV) were approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), AIDS deaths in the U.S. began to decline immediately. Nevertheless, high levels of AIDS-related deaths in Africa continued for another decade. Africa’s enduring fight against AIDS was largely due to the cost of ARVs, which, at the time, were priced at USD $10,000 per person annually—completely out of reach for most developing countries. Pharmaceutical companies argued that the drug’s high selling price was necessary to procure a return on its investment in the research and development (R&D) of the ARV, and that pricing the drugs at a marginal cost would maximize consumer surplus while also halting future development in the industry. When pricing a drug, a pharmaceutical company needs to factor-in several costs: 1) the cost of R&D for drugs that never enter the market; 2) clinical trials necessary to comply with regulatory requirements; 3) and the marketing cost of promoting the new drug. While the original price of the patented ARV was USD $10,000 per patient per year, the price of the generic version, manufactured by the Indian pharmaceutical company Cipla, was only USD $1.00 per day. During the AIDS pandemic, since many developing countries were members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), they were forbidden from importing generic pharmaceutical products because in order to maintain compliance with regulations imposed by the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement. Western pharmaceutical companies—the owners of the IP rights for the medications—blocked access to generic ARV drugs out of fear that the importation of these generic alternatives would ultimately threaten their net profitization. Despite the protests of the pharmaceutical industry, India and South Africa continued to compete with and defy the U.S. and the WTO (a body in which powerful industrialized economies—those of the U.S., Europe, and Japan—wield disproportionate influence). Drug companies eventually sued to keep lifesaving therapies out of the hands of dying AIDS-sufferers in Africa, a state of affairs that engendered a forceful reaction from international activists. After years of political pressure, Washington was forced to yield, eventually pushing for the relaxation of stringent IP protections for ARVs, making generic versions of the drugs more accessible and affordable. Despite its eventual concession, the perception that the U.S. had fought bitterly to prioritize pharmaceutical company profits over human lives in the Global South only helped bolster negative narratives surrounding the Western superpower. However, unlike the unipolarity that characterized the 1990s and early 2000s, the U.S. is no longer the only global superpower, and the humanitarian decisions it makes now—during a new global health crisis—have the potential to be hugely consequential for the country’s influence and image. Similar to its trajectory at the height of the AIDS crisis, Washington only recently voiced its desire to back the WTO patent waiver proposal, having come under tremendous international pressure. Granted, the U.S. backed a patent waiver for COVID-19 vaccines much faster than it did for ARVs in the 1980s. However, having been presented with a rare opportunity to make amends for past moral missteps—by eliminating vaccine IP protections to ensure that affordable, generic versions of COVID-19 vaccines could be manufactured en masse around the world—the U.S. once again hesitated, limiting opportunities for developing nations to recover from the pandemic and again amplifying criticisms of the United States. Backed by over 100 developing countries, India and South Africa are once again leading the current fight to eliminate IP protections. India and South Africa filed a waiver with the WTO requesting a temporary suspension of patent obligations under TRIPS (Sections 1, 4, 5, and 7 of Part II) so that developing countries can access vaccines in a timely manner. The intent of this effort is to boost domestic manufacturing capacity by facilitating the widespread production of generic versions of COVID-19 vaccines, evening the odds with respect to global vaccine procurement and accessibility. The waiver would also allow developing countries to procure vaccines more expeditiously, either by producing them themselves or by streamlining the cumbersome institutional and legal requirements of importing pharmaceutical products from other countries that possess the necessary manufacturing capacity. After months of pushback from activists and political leaders, the U.S. finally expressed its support for patent waivers, with several key Western powers (notably France and the European Union (EU)) following suit. However, Germany—a major political player in the patent waiver debate due to its powerful pharmaceutical sector—continues to oppose the move. Other European countries remain similarly split on the patent waiver proposal, reflecting the fact that any patent waiver proposal will still requires extensive negotiation (in order for it to be accepted, there must be unanimous consent among WTO members). Political leaders and activists continue to call on the West to support the waiving of IP protections, noting that current projections anticipate that wealthy countries will be able to immunize their entire populations by the end of 2021, while developing countries will only see the same results in the next three to four years. Unlike the AIDS pandemic, COVID-19 has generated not only massive medical concerns, but also a global economic crisis: vaccination campaigns in richer countries have already allowed them to begin to rebuild their economies, while mass unemployment and lockdowns continue to strangle the economies of many developing nations. Increasing the supply and accessibility of vaccines in the developing world will undoubtedly facilitate a faster, and more equal, economic recovery. Continuing to allow the virus to spread unencumbered throughout the Global South, however, will only increase the likelihood of further viral mutations, possibly jeopardizing the efficacy of existing vaccines and further perpetuating already grave economic and medical concerns. Washington’s initial unwillingness to cross the pharmaceutical industry has undeniably damaged the moral standing of the United States. Moreover, this decision also created a humanitarian void eagerly filled by Beijing and Moscow, as they actively seek to position themselves as the benefactors of the most COVID-19-stricken region of the world: Latin America and the Caribbean. To date, Russian and Chinese vaccine diplomacy have already led to economic, diplomatic, and political losses being felt by Washington; this trend, if allowed to continue, will only further limit U.S. regional influence with its neighbors to the south. A lack of strategy and political will In the absence of an effective vaccine diplomacy strategy from Washington, and with the perpetuation of its current nationalistic vaccine policy, some of the pharmaceutical companies that the U.S. so readily protects have pushed countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean into the waiting arms of Beijing and Moscow. While some Latin American countries have received a few vaccines from Western companies, most nations in the region continue to struggle to obtain doses. Pfizer, a U.S. pharmaceutical company, was accused of bullying Latin American countries during vaccine procurement negotiations, using its own leverage to attempt to force desperate nations to offer sovereign assets—such as their embassies—as collateral. Pfizer’s efforts resulted in a lost deal with Argentina, which has continued to grow increasingly closer to China. While the U.S. possesses a surplus of COVID-19 vaccines, it has failed to develop an effective, far-reaching donation strategy. Only recently did the Biden administration announce its plans to ship 80 million vaccines—a small portion of its surplus supply—abroad. Of the initial 25 million doses destined to be distributed internationally, 19 million will be donated to the largely mismanaged UN-backed COVAX program, with only six million of these COVAX doses designated for Latin America and the Caribbean. In comparison, China alone has donated or sold over 165 million vaccines to Latin America, with countries like Chile and Uruguay having vaccinated 80 and 63 percent of their populations, respectively, with Chinese vaccines. The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden previously donated a total of 4.2 million AstraZeneca vaccines to Canada and Mexico, the first vaccines that the U.S. had sent abroad. Still, this relatively modest donation was preceded by repeated calls from prominent Latin American leaders for President Biden to donate vaccines to U.S. allies in Latin America. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) was notably rebuffed in his request for shipments of U.S. vaccines, being told by the Biden administration that it was prioritizing the vaccination of the American public (despite the fact that Washington had already bought enough vaccines to inoculate the entire U.S. population several times over). Colombia President Iván Duque of Colombia, a country that is a key regional ally, has also called for the Biden administration to aid countries in the Western Hemisphere that are struggling to procure vaccines. By contrast, some Latin American officials have described easier negotiations, cheaper prices, and overall better terms in their successful agreements with Russia and China. Last year, for example, Beijing offered a USD $1 billion loan to Latin American nations to help finance their purchasing of Chinese-made vaccines—an offer that was well-received by recipient countries. Due to a lack of vaccine support and assurance from Washington, countries are growing closer to Beijing and Moscow, succumbing to rival geopolitical powers that do not align with the diplomatic and economic interests of the United States. Brazil remains one of the countries hardest hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite President Jair Bolsanaro’s anti-science tendencies and hawkish stance towards Beijing, however, his government has still proven susceptible to the influence of China. Earlier this year, a New York Times report brought attention to the Bolsonaro government’s arrangement to allow Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, to participate in upcoming biddings for contracts to construct Brazil’s 5G network. (Under the Trump Administration, Brazil had been one of the 50 countries to agree to the Clean Network Initiative—an agreement that committed signatories to forbidding Huawei from being involved in their 5G networks, due to national security concerns.) The announcement came after Brazil’s telecommunications minister, Fábio Faria, traveled to Beijing to meet with Huawei executives. Recounting his trip, Faria was quoted as saying that he had taken “advantage of the trip to ask for vaccines.” This development aligns with recent warnings from the U.S. Southern Command Chief Admiral Craig Faller, who claimed, during a U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, that China was using its vaccine leverage to push for Huawei’s integration into Latin America’s 5G networks. In the absence of Washington, several countries have increased their engagement with China and Russia (or have at least been pressured to). Paraguay and Guyana, for instance, have been pushed by China to switch their official diplomatic recognition from Taiwan (Republic of China, or ROC) to China (People’s Republic of China, or PRC) and to increase bilateral trade relations. Colombia, historically one of Washington’s closest allies in Latin America, uncharacteristically applauded Beijing’s efforts to promote human rights at the United Nations Human Rights Council, only one week after it received half a million doses of a Chinese-made vaccine. In Mexico, Beijing and Moscow also scored points; after securing a second shipment of Chinese vaccines, Mexico announced it would expand its “strategic partnership” with China. With respect to Russia, when (AMLO) tested positive for COVID-19 in January, he received a call from Russian President Vladimir Putin, wishing his Mexican counterpart a quick recovery. Shortly thereafter, AMLO announced that Mexico would receive a shipment of 24 million Russian vaccines and that he had invited Putin to visit Mexico, which would mark the Russian leader’s first visit to the country in nearly a decade. These developments are especially relevant when considering the fact that, before President Biden announced the sharing of the U.S. supply of AstraZeneca vaccines with Mexico, he had initially rejected AMLO’s call for assistance. In Bolivia, Putin has curried favor with President Luis Arce. President Arce’s political leanings are reminiscent of those of his predecessor, Evo Morales, who had an especially close relationship with Moscow; it would be reasonable to expect, therefore, that Arce may be similarly keen to deepen Moscow’s relationship with La Paz. After donating a large supply of vaccines to Bolivia, Putin sought out Arce to discuss the possible revival of several key Russian projects in the country: among them, the reactivation of a suspended nuclear power plant project, Russian development of Bolivia’s natural gas reserves, and investments in the country’s extensive lithium deposits (lithium being a mineral key to the global transition to clean energy, as it is a vital component in the production of high capacity batteries in both civilian and military hardware). In 2019, Russian businesses were beaten by other firms in the rush to invest in Bolivia’s nascent lithium industry; however, Arce has recently announced plans for new lithium projects that have received interest from both Russian and American companies. Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, Russia has continued to sign vaccine deals in an effort to increase its influence. Russia’s vaccine diplomacy has primarily been a soft power push, unlike China’s more brazen “wolf warrior” diplomacy. Nevertheless, it represents a re-establishment of a foothold in the region that Russia (and its predecessor, the USSR) has not boasted since the Cold War. While some countries, like Mexico and Bolivia, appear genuinely interested in deepening their ties with U.S. geopolitical rivals, it is widely recognized that most other nations of Latin America and the Caribbean are being squeezed politically by vaccines. If Latin America is not offered a practical alternative, it will likely continue to conduct business with Moscow and Beijing, thus incurring more debts of gratitude to global powerhouses eager to expand their economic and political influence through vaccine diplomacy. A forward-thinking strategy To this point, the U.S. has been significantly outpaced by China and Russia when it comes to building and strengthening relations with its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors. The dynamic surrounding COVID-19 vaccine distribution is evocative of another era of recent history when the U.S. abandoned the suffering of the developing world for the sake of profit-maximizing pharmaceutical companies. With Latin America and the Caribbean being the region hardest hit in the world by the COVID-19 pandemic—much as Africa was at the height of the AIDS pandemic—the U.S. is only undermining its moral standing and regional influence by failing to more readily extend a helping hand. As the war against COVID-19 reaches a détente in the U.S., the Biden administration should make this issue a top priority. First, the U.S. needs to aggressively push its Western partners to back the IP patent waiver at the WTO in order to push forward a patent proposal that will help increase vaccine production capacity worldwide. Doing so will demonstrate to the world that Washington has the political will to defy the wishes of the powerful pharmaceutical industry and and re-establish its leadership role among the Western powers. Second, in order to counter its geopolitical rivals and restore its moral standing, the Biden administration will need to be more “present” in regional vaccine distribution, demonstrated through a vigorous campaign of public diplomacy. Unlike their American counterparts, Chinese and Russian diplomatic officials are always present whenever a new shipment of their vaccines enter a given country. These arrivals have frequently been met with fanfare and attention from the Latin American press—coverage that, in turn, helps to shape public opinion regarding Sino-Russian influence and elevate the political stature of the two revisionist powers among the Latin American electorate. Adopting this strategy would help convey the message that vaccines are coming from the American people, rather than from faceless multinational corporations, and help rebuild moral standing for the U.S. among Latin American and Caribbean citizenries. Public-private partnerships with these companies would allow the U.S. to obtain more accountability with respect to international vaccine distribution; previous agreements have proven successful in achieving similar public perceptions of transparency and accountability.

#### Latin America is still skeptical of Chinese aid but lack of US presence means it’s the only choice – recent influence means it’s try or die to capitalize on this weakness.

Raimundo 9/3 [Joshua; 9/3/21; Graduate of the World Journalism Institute; “*China peddles influence with vaccines*,” World Tour, <https://wng.org/roundups/china-peddles-influence-with-vaccines-1630687161>] Justin

This past winter, as COVID-19 vaccines first became widely available, the Dominican Republic agreed to receive 768,000 doses of the Sinovac shot developed in China. The same week, Dominican President Luis Abinader lifted the nation’s longstanding ban on Huawei, a Chinese 5G telecommunications company. The decision disappointed many Dominicans who are suspicious of the Beijing-backed company. Many nations have banned or sanctioned Huawei, which they suspect uses its technology to spy on foreign customers. Sinovac now accounts for 7.9 million of the 9.2 million administered doses in the Dominican Republic, or 86 percent of the tiny island nation’s vaccines. Brazilian telecom regulator Anatel similarly reversed course on Huawei policy in February, lifting a ban three weeks after agreeing to receive 20 million Sinovac doses. The Chinese jab comprises about 80 percent of Brazil’s administered shots. While developing the Sinovac and Sinopharm shots in 2020, Beijing offered a $1 billion loan to Latin American nations to buy its vaccines. For some countries such as Honduras, a billion dollars is larger than the entire government budget. Many nations found the offer irresistible even though Chinese vaccines were more expensive and less effective than American ones and came with diplomatic strings attached. Early this spring, the Paraguayan government said Chinese institutions told them to cut ties with Taiwan as a condition for buying Beijing’s vaccines. Paraguay condemned the action and accused Chinese institutions of using the crisis to “satisfy petty, sectorial, interests” by manipulating smaller governments into doing what is economically and politically advantageous for China. Honduras has a long history of diplomacy with Taiwan, but President Juan Hernandez in May acknowledged he was considering opening a foreign trade office in China for the first time. The move would strain his country’s relations with Taiwan, but it would open the door for Honduras to buy Chinese vaccines. He said his impoverished country was struggling to get vaccines and would do whatever was necessary for the sake of the people. China has a track record of doing favors for Latin American countries to influence their foreign policy. Taiwanese diplomats claim that in 2018, Beijing offered the Dominican government $3.1 billion to cut ties with Taiwan. Jesús Ogando, a delegate in the Dominican Congress, confirmed China offered the Dominican Republic some kind of deal in 2018. “There has been since that occasion a better relationship between the Dominican government and the Chinese government, and a distancing from Taiwan,” he told me. China’s peddling of influence along with COVID-19 vaccines means people in Latin American countries might have missed out on more effective prevention. The World Health Organization has published various studies revealing **Sinovac’s comparative ineffectiveness** at stopping symptomatic infections after two doses. Phase III trials in Indonesia found Sinovac was 84 percent effective against symptomatic infection. Similar studies registered an effectiveness of 67 percent in Chile and 50.4 percent in Brazil. In comparison, the U.S.-made Pfizer and Moderna vaccines were about 95 percent effective against symptomatic coronavirus infections before the appearance of the delta variant. Since delta appeared, studies show varying effectiveness among the United States’ Pfizer and Moderna shots, which use mRNA technology, and vaccines made from inactive viruses such as Sinopharm, Sinovac, and Johnson & Johnson. A recent Mayo Clinic study, which is still awaiting review, suggested the effectiveness of vaccines by Moderna and Pfizer decreased to as low as 76 percent and 42 percent, respectively, among patients in Minnesota last month. Studies in Brazil and Bahrain found Sinopharm and Sinovac less protective against the delta variant than other vaccines. A study conducted in China by Chinese scientists during a delta outbreak found the two Chinese-made shots were 77 percent effective at preventing the coronavirus and 100 percent effective at preventing severe illness and death. “The truth is that everybody here wanted to get either Pfizer or Moderna vaccines,” said Pastor Alex Figueroa of Gracia Soberana Baptist Church in Santiago, Chile. “People got vaccinated with what was available, which was Sinovac.” Officials in Uruguay say Sinovac is helping stop COVID-19 there. While they concluded Sinovac was only 61 percent effective at preventing coronavirus cases, they found the Chinese vaccine helped reduce death and ICU admissions by 95 percent and 92 percent, respectively. Since early June, case and death rates in Uruguay have steadily declined.

#### Chinese influence ends the liberal order.

Cossu 7/16 [Elena; Early-stage researcher for the MSCA Innovative Training Network FATIGUE, PhD candidate in economics at Corvinus University of Budapest and recently finished her year as a visiting researcher at University College London and at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Elena comes from a place culturally in between Germany and Italy. She has also had experience working in Greece, France, Latin America, Thailand, and Hungary. Elena is passionate about political and economic inequalities between states, and about understanding what prevents the political and economic convergence of different peripheries of the world; “In Latin America, Chinese vaccine diplomacy is directly challenging US’s declining authority,” Scroll.in; 7/16/21; <https://scroll.in/article/1000114/in-latin-america-chinese-vaccine-diplomacy-is-directly-challenging-uss-declining-authority>] Justin

It is impossible to enter a room these days without talking about Covid-19 vaccines. If, however, you happened to be talking to Latin Americans, you would notice an unusual pattern: considerable gratitude towards China for its vaccine rollout.

It is gratitude, moreover, that is very hard to find in Europe or the United States. The reason is simple: the number of vaccines provided by China to countries in need is truly impressive.

During a global vaccine shortage, China has been able to provide 252 million doses to the world. This includes the majority of total doses made available to Latin American countries.

Six national or regional entities can produce and distribute a consistent number of vaccines: Europe, the United States, China, South Korea and India. China has distributed the highest number, and almost half (42%) of these have gone outside its own country.

As of May, no other country can match this figure. Most countries are focused primarily on achieving their own herd immunity first.

Even more striking is the fact that the United States is exporting a mere 1% of its vaccines, almost solely to Canada and Mexico. In May, the US pledged to increase its exported doses by 100 million by the end of the year. Yet even if it had achieved this goal, it would not be even half of the Chinese figure. Chinese vaccine diplomacy in Latin America is challenging US authority in the region, at a time when US influence is in visible decline.

Declining ‘Washington Consensus’

The rationale behind American policy towards Latin America has long been that unstable neighbours (especially Communist ones) destabilise the region. In extreme cases, this has resulted in US involvement in various regime changes in Latin America. But the more frequently used mechanism of influence, especially since the end of the Cold War, has been economic diplomacy.

The main tool for this has been the infamous Washington Consensus. The logic of this was very simple: a state-led economic model is a bad thing. An “economist approved” liberal model should therefore solve all Latin America’s problems. It did not work out like that.

Despite good intentions, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank programmes did not alleviate Latin America’s problems. On the contrary, the Washington Consensus is often cited as having fuelled a resurgence of populism in Latin America. It is also held responsible for the succession of left-wing governments in the 1990s known as the Pink Tide.

Five of the nations subject to the Washington Consensus (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela) even displayed authoritarian tendencies. In the mid-2010s the region experienced a so-called Blue Tide: the rise of liberal governments to counterbalance the previous left-wing ones. This phenomenon was also considered a long-term consequence of the chronic failure of US economic diplomacy on the continent.

Today, Latin America still struggles with political instability and high levels of inequality. The United States’ top-down approach has failed. What is more, cooperation has dramatically declined because of the Trump administration’s approach and the US’s own internal problems.

Rising Chinese power

In this context, China has seen the Covid crisis as an opportunity to reinforce its ambitions as a rising power trying to exert more influence in the international order.

A scheduled $8 trillion for project infrastructure in sixty-eight countries through the New Silk Road programme vividly captures its approach. Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia already have partnership projects with China and Mexico is considering joining one.

The US and Chinese tools for economic diplomacy are very similar in practice, yet fundamentally different in philosophy.

The US strategy is based on individualism: We as a nation will be the most economically successful by working hard to realise our individuality... We will export the idea that this is the best possible system through soft power and economic cooperation.

In contrast, Chinese economic diplomacy is an extension of a collective dream where individuals work hard to realise the success of the collectivity: everybody in their community and the world.

In the context of Latin America, this competition between two philosophical approaches is especially risky for the United States. Too many factors favour the Chinese way of thinking: the inward-looking diplomatic approach of the United States during the Trump administration; the perennial flirtation of some Latin American countries with various forms of socialism; and the failure of the US’s own economic and other (capitalist) strategies there.

Old international order

In this power vacuum, the rise of China during a crisis situation might push the world toward a new international bipolar order. Latin America’s enthusiasm for Chinese vaccines might constitute the first grouping of countries genuinely lost to US influence.

Latin America is not just showing an interest in vaccine rollout. It is also showing how the old dichotomy of capitalism versus socialism is becoming increasingly redundant in some parts of the world.

Analogous to the fading of the US-Russia dichotomy, rising Chinese influence in Latin America shows countries becoming more open-minded towards different economic and social narratives. They are less concerned with “good” and “bad” and more concerned with the concrete opportunities different choices offer.

#### Collapse of the liberal order causes extinction.

Yulis 17 [Max; Major in PoliSci, Penn Political Review; “In Defense of Liberal Internationalism,” Penn Political Review; 4/8/17; <http://pennpoliticalreview.org/2017/04/in-defense-of-liberal-internationalism/>] // Re-Cut Justin

Over the past decade, international headlines have been bombarded with stories about the unraveling of the post-Cold War world order, the creation of revolutionary smart devices and military technologies, the rise of militant jihadist organizations, and nuclear proliferation. Indeed, times are paradoxically promising and alarming. In relation to treating the world’s ills, fortunately, there is a capable hegemon– one that has the ability to revive the world order and traditionally hallmarked human rights, peace, and democracy. The United States, with all of its shortcomings, had crafted an international agenda that significantly impacted the post-WWII landscape. Countries invested their ambitions into security communities, international institutions, and international law in an effort to mitigate the chances of a nuclear catastrophe or another World War. The horrors and atrocities of the two Great Wars had traumatized the global community, which spurred calls for peace and the creation of a universalist agenda. Today, the world’s fickle and declining hegemon still has the ability, but not the will, to uphold the world order that it had so carefully and eagerly helped construct. Now, the stakes are too high, and there must be a mighty and willing global leader to lead the effort of diffusing democratic ideals and reinforcing stability through both military and diplomatic means. To do this, the United States must abandon its insurgent wave of isolationism and protectionism, and come to grips with the newly transnational nature of problems ranging from climate change to international terrorism.

First, the increase in intra-state conflict should warrant concern as many countries, namely in Africa and the Middle East, are seeing the total collapse of civil society and government. These power vacuums are being filled with increasingly ideological and dangerous tribal and non-state actors, such as Boko Haram, ISIS, and Al-Shabaab. Other bloody civil wars in Rwanda, Sudan, and the Congo have contributed to the deaths of millions in the past two decades. As the West has seen, however, military intervention has not been all that successful in building and empowering democratic institutions in the Far East. A civil crusade, along with the strengthening of international institutions, may in fact be the answer to undoing tribal, religious, and sectarian divisions, thereby mitigating the prospects of civil conflict. During the Wilsonian era, missionaries did their part to internationalize the concept of higher education, which has contributed to the growth of universities in formerly underdeveloped countries such as China and South Korea.[1] In addition, the teachings of missionaries emphasized the universality of humanity and the oneness of man, which was antithetical to the justifications for imperialism and the rampant sectarianism that plagued much of the Middle East and Africa.[2] Seeing that an increase in the magnitude of human casualty is becoming more of a reality due to advancements in military technology and the increasing outbreaks of civil war, international cooperation and the diffusion of norms that highlight the importance of stable governance, democracy, and human rights is the only recourse to address the rise in sectarian divides and civil conflicts. So long as the trend of the West’s desire to look inward continues, it is likely that nation states mired in conflict will devolve into ethnic or tribal enclaves bent on relying on war to maintain their legitimacy and power. Aside from growing sectarianism and the increasing prevalence of failed states, an even more daunting threat come from weapons that transcend the costs of conventional warfare.

The problem of nuclear proliferation has been around for decades, and on the eve of President Trump’s inauguration, it appeared that Obama’s lofty goal of advocating for nonproliferation would no longer be a priority of American foreign policy.[3] In addition, now that the American president is threatening to undo much of the United States’ extensive network of alliances, formerly non-nuclear states may be forced to rearm themselves. Disarmament is central to liberal internationalism, as was apparent by the Washington Naval Treaty advocated by Wilson, and by the modern CTBT treaty. The reverse is, however, being seen in the modern era, with cries coming from Japan and South Korea to remobilize and begin their own nuclear weapon programs.[4] A world with more nuclear actors is a formula for chaos, especially if nuclear weapons become mass-produced. Non-state actors will increasingly eye these nuclear sites as was the case near a Belgian nuclear power plant just over a year ago.[5] If any government commits a serious misstep, access to nuclear weapons on the behalf of terrorist and insurgent groups will become a reality, especially if a civil war occurs. States with nuclear weapons require domestic stability and strong security, which is why states such as Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan could be in serious trouble in the event of a domestic uprising or military coup. The disarmament of all states is essential for human survival, and if it is not achieved, then a world full of nuclear weapons and an international system guided by realpolitik could give rise to nuclear warfare. In today’s world, nuclear weapons leave all states virtually defenseless. But, for nuclear deproliferation to become a cornerstone of the global agenda, a pacifying and democratic power must rise to the limelight to advocate the virtues of peace, stability, and human rights.

#### Yes transition wars---both sides miscalculate.

Min-hyung Kim 20. Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea. “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future” Emerald Insight. 02-04-2019. <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/html> // Re-Cut Justin

Underlying these arguments for an inevitable war between the two superpowers is PTT. PTT originally formulated by Organski (1958) posits that **war is likely** when the power of the dominant state in the international system (i.e. hegemon) is **declining** and that a dissatisfied rising challenger **substantially reduces the power gap between the hegemon and itself**. Unlike balance of power theory, PTT argues that the war is most likely when there is near power parity between a dominant state and a rising and dissatisfied challenger (Organski and Kugler, 1980, pp. 19-20)[5]. A rising power here is generally dissatisfied with the existing international order and **initiates war against a declining hegemon in order to impose orders that are more favorable to itself** (Organski 1958, pp. 364-367). Layne (2018, p. 110) put these power transition dynamics quite succinctly as follows: “Over time, however, the relative power of states changes, and eventually the international order no longer reflects the actual distribution of power between or among the leading Great Powers. When that happens, the legitimacy of the prevailing order is called into question, and it will be challenged by the rising power(s).” And when the balance of power between a dominant state and a rising challenger changes sufficiently, a new order replaces an old one typically **by a hegemonic war** (2018, p. 104). Paying close attention to the **growing Sino–US competition** over hegemony in the twenty-first century, therefore, Shirk (2007, p. 4), China specialist, argues that “History teaches us that rising powers are likely to provoke war.” On the other hand, scholars like Gilpin (1981) contend that the power transition war between great powers is likely to occur when a hegemonic state whose power is declining due to imperial overstretch[6] views “**preventive war as the most attractive means of eliminating the threat** posed by challengers” (Ned Lebow and Valentino, 2009, p. 391), although they do acknowledge that there might be some “ways to prolong the period of its power preponderance vis-à-vis the rising challenger, so that the rapidly rising power will not dare to challenge the hegemonic leadership” (Kim and Gates, 2015, p. 221). In this case, the initiator of war is a declining hegemon, rather than a rising challenger. The declining hegemon who fears a rising challenger’s overtaking its power in the near future **sees war as a better option** than other options of maintaining its hegemony such as reducing its commitments abroad and appeasing a rising challenger.

### 1AC – Adv – Pandemics

#### Only the plan can solve covid access – inequalities heighten the risk of mutations and uneven development – neg objections miss the boat.

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According to Duke Global Health Innovation Center, which monitors COVID-19 vaccine purchases, rich nations representing just 14 per cent of the world population have bought up to 53 per cent of the most promising vaccines so far. As of 4 July 2021, the high-income countries (HICs) purchased more than half (6.16 billion) vaccine doses sold globally. At the same time, the low-income countries (LICs) received only 0.3 per cent of the vaccines produced. The low and middle-income countries (LMICs), which account for 81 per cent of the global adult population, purchased 33 per cent, and COVAX (COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access) has received 13 per cent.10 Many HICs bought enough doses to vaccinate their populations several times over. For instance, Canada procured 10.45 doses per person, while the UK, EU and the US procured 8.18, 6.89, and 4.60 doses per inhabitant, respectively.11

Consequently, there is a significant disparity between HICs and LICs in vaccine administration as well. As of 8 July 2021, 3.32 billion vaccine doses had been administered globally.12 Nonetheless, only one per cent of people in LICs have been given at least one dose. While in HICs almost one in four people have received the vaccine, in LICs, it is one in more than 500. The World Health Organization (WHO) notes that about 90 per cent of African countries will miss the September target to vaccinate at least 10 per cent of their populations as a third wave looms on the continent.13 South Africa, the most affected African country, for instance, has vaccinated less than two per cent of its population of about 59 million. This is in contrast with the US where almost 47.5 per cent of the population of more than 330 million has been fully vaccinated. In Sub-Saharan Africa, vaccine rollout remains the slowest in the world. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), at current rates, by the end of 2021, a massive global inequity will continue to exist, with Africa still experiencing meagre vaccination rates while other parts of the world move much closer to complete vaccination.14

This vaccine inequity is not only morally indefensible but also clinically counter-productive. If this situation prevails, LICs could be waiting until 2025 for vaccinating half of their people. Allowing most of the world’s population to go unvaccinated will also spawn new virus mutations, more contagious viruses leading to a steep rise in COVID-19 cases. Such a scenario could cause twice as many deaths as against distributing them globally, on a priority basis. Preventing this humanitarian catastrophe requires removing all barriers to the production and distribution of vaccines. TRIPS is one such barrier that prevents vaccine production in LMICs and hence its equitable distribution.

TRIPS: Barrier to Equitable Health Care Access

The opponents of the waiver proposal argue that IPR are not a significant barrier to equitable access to health care, and existing TRIPS flexibilities are sufficient to address the COVID-19 pandemic. However, history suggests the contrary. For instance, when South Africa passed the Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1997 to address the HIV/AIDS public health crisis, nearly 40 of world’s largest and influential pharma companies took the South African government to court over the violation of TRIPS. The Act, which invoked the compulsory licensing provision, allowed South Africa to produce affordable generic drugs.15 The Big Pharma also lobbied developed countries, particularly the US, to put bilateral trade sanctions against South Africa.16

Similarly, when Indian company Cipla decided to provide generic antiretrovirals (ARVs) to the African market at a lower cost, Big Pharma retaliated through patent litigations in Indian and international trade courts and branded Indian drug companies as thieves.17 Another instance was when Swiss company Roche initiated patent infringement proceedings against Cipla’s decision to launch a generic version of cancer drug, “erlotinib”. Though the Delhi High Court initially dismissed Roche's appeal by citing “public interest” and “affordability of medicines,” the continued to pressure the generic pharma companies over IPR. 18 Likewise, Pfizer’s aggressive patenting strategy prevented South Korea in developing pneumonia vaccines for children.19

A recent document by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), or Doctors Without Borders, highlights various instances of how IP hinders manufacturing and supply of diagnostics, medical equipment, treatments and vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, during the peak of the COVID-19 first wave in Europe, Roche rejected a request from the Netherlands to release the recipe of key chemical reagents needed to increase the production of diagnostic kits. Another example was patent holders threatening producers of 3D printing ventilators with patent infringement lawsuits in Italy.20 The MSF also found that patents pose a severe threat to access to affordable versions of newer vaccines.21

The opponents of the TRIPS waiver also argue that IP is the incentive for innovation and if it is undermined, future innovation will suffer. However, most of the COVID-19 medical innovations, particularly vaccines, are developed with public financing assistance. Governments spent billions of dollars for COVID-19 vaccine research. Notably, out of $6.1 billion in investment tracked up to July 2021, 98.12 per cent was public funding.22 The US and Germany are the largest investors in vaccine R&D with $2.2 billion and $1.5 billion funding.

Private companies received 94.6 per cent of this funding; Moderna received the highest $956.3 million and Janssen $910.6 million. Moreover, governments also invested $50.9 billion for advance purchase agreements (APAs) as an incentive for vaccine development. A recent IMF working paper also notes that public research institutions were a key driver of the COVID-19 R&D effort—accounting for 70 per cent of all COVID-19 clinical trials globally.23 The argument is that vaccines are developed with the support of substantial public financing, hence there is a public right to the scientific achievements. Moreover, private companies reaped billions in profits from COVID-19 vaccines.

One could argue that since the US, Germany and other HICs are spending money, their citizens are entitled to get vaccines first, hence vaccine nationalism is morally defensible. Nonetheless, it is not the case. The TRIPS Agreement includes several provisions which mandates promotion of technology transfer from developed countries to LDCs. For instance, Article 7 states that "the protection and enforcement of IP rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technical knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."24 Similarly, Article 66.2 also mandates the developed countries to transfer technologies to LDCs to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base. The LMICs opened their markets and amended domestic patent laws favouring developing countries’ products against this promise of technology transfer.

Another argument against the proposed TRIPS waiver is that a waiver would not increase the manufacturing of COVID-19 vaccines. Indeed, one of the significant factors contributing to vaccine inequity is the lack of manufacturing capacity in the global south. Further, a TRIPS waiver will not automatically translate into improved manufacturing capacity. However, a waiver would be the first but essential step to increase manufacturing capacity worldwide. For instance, to export COVID-19 vaccine-related products, countries need to ensure that there are no IP restrictions at both ends – exporting and importing. The market for vaccine materials includes consumables, single-use reactors bags, filters, culture media, and vaccine ingredients. Export blockages on raw materials, equipment and finished products harm the overall output of the vaccine supply chain. If there is no TRIPS restriction, more governments and companies will invest in repurposing their facilities.

Similarly, the arguments such as that no other manufacturers can carry out the complex manufacturing process of COVID-19 vaccines and generic manufacturing as that would jeopardise quality, have also been proven wrong in the past. For instance, in the early 1990s, when Indian company Shantha Biotechnics approached a Western firm for a technology transfer of Hepatitis B vaccine, the firm responded that “India cannot afford such high technology vaccines… And even if you can afford to buy the technology, your scientists cannot understand recombinant technology in the least.”25 Later, Shantha Biotechnics developed its own vaccine at $1 per dose, and the UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund) mass inoculation programme uses this vaccine against Hepatitis B. In 2009, Shantha sold over 120 million doses of vaccines globally.

India also produces high-quality generic drugs for HIV/AIDS and cancer treatment and markets them across the globe. Now, a couple of Indian companies are in the last stage of producing mRNA (Messenger RNA) vaccines.26 Similarly, Bangladesh and Indonesia claimed that they could manufacture millions of COVID-19 vaccine doses a year if pharmaceutical companies share the know-how.27 Recently, Vietnam also said that the country could satisfy COVID-19 vaccine production requirements once it obtains vaccine patents.28 Countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, Cuba, Brazil, Argentina and South Korea have the capacity to produce high-quality vaccines but lack technologies and know-how. However, Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa and Tunisia have limited manufacturing capacities, which could also produce COVID-19 vaccines after repurposing.

Moreover, COVID-19 vaccine IPR runs across the entire value chain – vaccine development, production, use, etc. A mere patent waiver may not be enough to address the issues related to its production and distribution. What is more important here is to share the technical know-how and information such as trade secrets. Therefore, the existing TRIPS flexibilities, such as compulsory and voluntary licensing, are insufficient to address this crisis. Further, compulsory licensing and the domestic legal procedures it requires is cumbersome and not expedient in a public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic.

India’s Role in Ensuring Vaccine Equity India's response to COVID-19 at the global level was primarily two-fold. First, its proactive engagements in the regional and international platforms. Second, its policies and programmes to provide therapeutics and vaccines to the world. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, India has been advocating international cooperation and policy coordination in fighting it. For instance, in April 2020, India co-sponsored a UN resolution that called for fair and equitable access to essential medical supplies and future vaccines to COVID-19. Later, in October 2020, India also put pressure on developed countries with a joint WTO proposal for TRIPS waiver. India’s Vaccine Maitri initiative also aims vaccine equity. As of 29 May 2021, India has supplied 663.698 lakh doses of COVID-19 vaccines to 95 countries. It includes 107.15 lakh doses as a gift to more than 45 countries, 357.92 lakh doses by commercial sales, and 198.628 lakh doses to the COVAX facility.29 The COVAX initiative aims to ensure rapid and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines for all countries, regardless of their income level. India has decided to supply 10 million doses of the vaccine to Africa and one million to the UN health workers under the COVAX facility. India has also removed the IPR of Covaxin that would help platforms like C-TAP once WHO and developed countries’ regulatory bodies approve the vaccine. If agreed, the waiver would benefit India in many ways. First, more vaccines will help the country to control the pandemic and its recurring waves. Second, it will be a boost to India's pharma industry, particularly the generic medicine industry. According to the Biotechnology Innovation Organization, 834 unique active compounds are involved in the current R&D of COVID-19 therapeutics, vaccines, and diagnostics. It means that thousands of new patents are awaited, and that will hinder India's ability to produce COVID-19 related medical products. Only through a waiver, this challenge can be addressed. Similarly, scientists note that mRNA is the future of vaccine technology. However, manufacturing mRNA vaccines involves complex processes and procedures. Only a very few Indian manufacturers have access to this technology; however, that too is limited. Once Indian companies have access to mRNA technology, it will help country’s generic medicine industry and boost India’s economy. Therefore, even if the WTO agrees on a waiver for a period shorter than proposed, India should accept it. In addition, mRNA vaccines can be produced in lesser time compared to the traditional vaccines. While traditional vaccines’ production takes four to five months, mRNA needs only six to eight weeks. Access to this technology will be vital for India in expediting the fight against COVID-19 and future pandemics. Finally, a waiver may strengthen India's diplomatic soft power. At present, what hinders India's Vaccine Maitri initiative is the scarcity of vaccines at home. On the other hand, China is increasing its standing in Africa, South America and the Pacific through vaccine diplomacy. The WHO approval of the Chinese vaccines and lack of access to vaccines by most developing countries, opens up huge space for China to do its vaccine diplomacy. Here, India should convince its Quad partners, particularly Australia and Japan, who oppose the waiver that vaccine production in developing countries through TRIPS waiver will enable the grouping to deliver its pledged billion doses of COVID-19 vaccine in the Indo-Pacific region. In short, the proposed waiver, if agreed, will help India in addressing the public health crisis by producing more vaccines and distributing them at home; economically, by boosting its generic pharmaceutical industry, and diplomatically, providing vaccines to the developing and least-developed countries. Therefore, India should use all available means and methods, from trade-offs to pressurising, to make the waiver happen.

#### Yes scale-up for covid.

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Currently many idle suppliers can’t begin vaccine production until they upgrade and repurpose existing manufacturing capacity for new technology. Opponents often argue that this step is the true barrier to rapid scale-up. One high-profile detractor, BIO President and CEO Michelle McMurry-Heath, argues that “handing [needy countries] the blueprint to construct a kitchen that — in optimal conditions — can take a year to build will not help us stop the emergence of dangerous new Covid variants.”

This argument ignores two core truths: In many cases, manufacturing capacity needs only repurposing which can take mere months. And Covid-19, at the current global response and vaccination rates, will be a threat for years.

Both truths suggest that we pass the blueprint and build the kitchen.

Facilitating structures to transfer technology and capacity are already in place. The WHO launched the mRNA technology transfer hub model last month to provide manufacturers in low- and middle-income countries with the financial, training, and logistical support needed to scale up vaccine manufacturing capacity. Scores of manufacturers in these countries have already expressed interest. This initiative, however, requires recipient manufacturers to acquire the IP necessary for mRNA technologies— which is currently missing.

#### Independently strategic patenting harms innovation incentives during pandemics – encourages reproduction of generics and decrease breakthroughs.

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As the COVID-19 pandemic is sweeping through the world, thousands of people urgently need access to affordable medicines. Based on past experience of treatments for other life-threatening diseases, there is a fear that access to any vaccines and treatment that may be developed in the future will be affected by patents, leading to unaffordably high prices. However, the problem of high drug prices is not new. It had been inflating healthcare budgets and posing a serious risk to the affordability and accessibility of medicines for society well before the pandemic.Footnote3 This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that, despite the alleged surge in investments into pharmaceutical R&D, current statistics indicate that the number of new breakthrough medicines is decreasing.Footnote4 On the other hand, the number of drugs that contain modifications of existing medicines is growing, demonstrating that pharmaceutical companies have been increasingly focusing their research on incremental drug development, rather than on breakthrough innovation.Footnote5 Various reasons for high drug prices and the growing focus on incremental innovation are put forward by pharmaceutical companies, including the complexity of drug discovery and development, as well as the expensive and lengthy regulatory procedures involved.Footnote6 While these reasons play an important role in this regard, some practices by pharmaceutical companies substantially contribute to this problem.Footnote7 In particular, pharmaceutical companies have been increasingly engaging in strategic patenting to delay or even block generic competition.Footnote8 These practices attracted the attention of the European Commission, which discussed them more than a decade ago in its 2009 Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report.Footnote9 The Commission identified a series of patent strategies which it described as aiming “to extend the breadth and duration of [originators’] patent protection”Footnote10 and “to delay or block the market entry of generic medicine”.Footnote11 Such findings have fuelled debates as to whether these strategies may be deemed unlawful and violate EU competition rules, while also being justifiable business practices under patent law. Until today, no agreement has been reached either on the legality of these practices, or on an efficient legal tool to assess them. As a result, despite there being solid evidence that such strategies may block generic competition, allowing originators to maintain artificially high drug prices and preventing patients from accessing cheaper generics, they remain outside the ambit of the Commission’s activities. Instead, the Commission has been focusing on more straightforward patent-related practices, such as reverse payment agreements. This article argues that strategic patenting by pharmaceutical companies requires a long-overdue intervention by competition authorities. It aims to attract their attention to the harmful effects of strategic patenting. Specifically, it will contest the argument traditionally put forward by originator pharmaceutical companies that the intervention of competition law into patenting practices will reduce their incentives to innovate. The paper will argue to the contrary that, along with a more immediate negative effect in the form of high drug prices that is widely explored in the literature,Footnote12 strategic patenting also affects dynamic competition by stifling innovation. Importantly, it will be explained that the assessment of the effect of this practice should focus not only on innovation by originators, but should also take a wider market perspective by assessing its effect on follow-on innovation by generic companies. The latter argument is often overlooked. The paper will outline the current approach to strategic patenting that considers this practice lawful, and will provide arguments for the intervention of competition law. This, in turn, will open the possibility for competition authorities to investigate this practice in order to prevent its harmful effect on innovation and consumer welfare. Moreover, while patent law may provide certain mechanisms to deal with strategic patenting, such as raising the bar for patentability of pharmaceutical follow-on inventions,Footnote13 these tools may not be effective in all cases. Therefore, as will be explained further, competition law may be a more suitable tool to address the negative effects of strategic patenting.Footnote14 The article will be organised as follows. It will first discuss the complex structure of the pharmaceutical industry, focusing on its key players for the purpose of this article: originators and generic companies. It will further explore patenting practices employed by pharmaceutical companies and will define the notion of strategic patenting. The article will then argue that the latter strategy is against the rationale of patent and competition laws, as it stifles competition by impairing incentives to innovate of both originators and generic companies. Finally, it will discuss the current approach to strategic patenting that considers this practice lawful, and will argue that it should be subject to scrutiny under the rules of competition law, to address its negative effects. Pharmaceutical Innovation and Generic Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry The pharmaceutical industry is unique in its complexity. It is characterised by heavy state regulation and, sometimes, by the competing interests of the pharmaceutical business and society. It also involves multiple actors, including originators,Footnote15 marketing authorisation bodies, generic companies,Footnote16 doctors, pharmacies and patients. Each of them plays their part in the lengthy and complicated process of transforming a chemical compound into an effective and affordable medicine, which is then prescribed, dispensed and consumed. In these complex relationships, the two key players have crucial roles. On the one hand, originators play an important role in developing new and improved medicines for the benefit of society. On the other hand, generic companies benefit society by supplying cheaper equivalents of the originators’ medicines, which leads to the reduction of drug prices and facilitates access to affordable medicines. When the interests of these two players are kept in balance, benefits are maximised for society, which receives innovative and improved medicines, as well as timely access to generic drugs. However, if the balance swings towards one of the players, then society loses out, as there will be insufficient access to either innovative or affordable medicines. Therefore, both pharmaceutical innovation and generic competition must be duly incentivised and protected. Moreover, these two elements of the pharmaceutical industry are constantly interacting and have a profound impact on each other. In particular, pharmaceutical innovation is the backbone of the pharmaceutical industry, in which originators play an important role. The process of drug development is long and complicated, requires significant investments, and bears considerable commercial risks.Footnote17 It is also highly regulated, including, among other things, the requirement for originators to obtain a special authorisation from a designated state authority to market a drug. Such marketing authorisations are granted to the originators only if they can prove that the drug is safe and effective, which typically requires lengthy and expensive clinical trials.Footnote18 In order to protect these significant efforts and investments, pharmaceutical companies rely heavily on the exclusivity granted by intellectual property rights, and in particular, patents.Footnote19 Patents provide a 20-year monopoly right, during which a pharmaceutical company enjoys market exclusivity and can charge a monopoly price for its products. Originators argue that strong patent protection is essential in order to recoup investments, as well as to incentivise them to engage in further innovation.Footnote20 Once such patent protection expires, however, other companies may develop generics of a branded drug, and start competing with the originator for the market. This is called generic competition. Generic drugs are bioequivalent versions of a branded drug that has lost its patent protection.Footnote21 It is estimated that the generic entry typically leads to, on average, an 80 per cent market share loss and a 20–30 per cent reduction of a drug price, with further price decreases with each additional generic entrant, leading, in some instances, to a fall in price of up to 90 per cent.Footnote22 A representative example of the effect of generic competition on the originators’ drug prices is the significant decrease in price and dramatic loss of profits by Eli Lilly. The expiration of a patent protecting its blockbusterFootnote23 antidepressant Prozac in 2001 resulted in a loss of almost 70 per cent of its market and $2.4 billion in annual U.S. sales.Footnote24 This effect of generic competition is beneficial for society, as it reduces the financial pressure on healthcare budgets and increases the accessibility of drugs. Patenting Practices by Pharmaceutical Companies As was mentioned above, generic competition is prevented during the life of a patent protecting an active compound of a drug (a so-called “basic” or “primary” patent).Footnote25 Such a basic patent covers an active ingredient itself and, therefore, provides the strongest protection for the product. Therefore, generic competition normally starts only after the basic patent expires, or if a generic company succeeds in invalidating it. While in the past pharmaceutical companies mainly protected their products with a single patent covering an active compound,Footnote26 they now increasingly seek additional patent protection on various aspects of a drugFootnote27 in order to protect their market position.Footnote28 Such additional patents are often called secondary patents.Footnote29 A pharmaceutical company may want to obtain secondary patents, which protect such aspects of a drug as, for example, its process of manufacture, formulation and/or specific form, etc. Therefore, even after the basic patent protecting an active compound expires, a drug may still be protected by other secondary patents. This may result in the extension of the scope and length of the protection of a product, especially if secondary patents have a later expiration date than a basic patent.Footnote30 This, in particular, may occur if, for example, the process of producing an active compound disclosed in the basic patent is sufficient only for reproducing this compound in a laboratory, but it is unsuitable for producing it on a large commercial scale.Footnote31 If the originator was able to secure a secondary patent that protects such a large scale manufacturing process, it would prevent generics from using this process for producing their generic versions of a drug; otherwise they would risk infringing this secondary patent.Footnote32 However, a unique feature of pharmaceuticals is that an active ingredient can be manufactured using different methods and processes, can exist in different forms or can be used in different formulations. Therefore, when a basic patent on an active ingredient expires, other companies can develop alternative methods of production, forms or formulations of this active compound and start competing with the originator company.Footnote33 While such patenting strategies by originators are lawful in principle, some of them may be problematic. In particular, in anticipation of the loss of patent protection, originators may engage in strategic patenting which artificially prevents generic competition and results in an extension of their market monopoly.Footnote34 Defining Strategic Patenting In its Sector Inquiry Report, the European Commission explained that the drug development process consists of three main stages: (i) the R&D stage, which ends with the launch of a drug on the market; (ii) the period between the launch and the patent expiry; and (iii) the period after the patent expiration, when generics can enter the market.Footnote35 During the second stage, i.e. after the launch of a drug, originators seek to maximise their income from the product in order to recoup their R&D investments and earn profits before the commencement of generic competition.Footnote36 It is also during this stage that pharmaceutical companies seek to prolong their market exclusivity. In recent years, pharmaceutical companies have been increasingly relying on the strategic use of the patent system to combat the pressure of generic competition. Such practices are often called “life cycle management” by originators and proponents of the practice. For example, as Burdon and Sloper explained, “[a] key element of any life cycle management strategy … is to extend patent protection beyond the basic patent term for as long as possible, by filing secondary patents which are effective to keep generics off the market”.Footnote37 However, critics have characterised the practice as “evergreening”,Footnote38 as it essentially evergreens the patent protection and the exclusivity of a product.Footnote39 For instance, Bansal et al. explain that evergreening “refers to different ways wherein patent owners take undue advantage of the law and associated regulatory processes to extend their IP monopoly, particularly over highly lucrative ‘blockbuster’ drugs, by filing disguised/artful patents on an already patent-protected invention shortly before expiry of the ‘parent’ patent”.Footnote40 During its investigation into the pharmaceutical industry, the European Commission found that the number of patents granted and pending applications significantly increases with the value of a drug, i.e. “blockbuster medicines can even be protected by up to nearly 100 INNFootnote41-specific EPO patented bundles and applications …, which in one particular case led to 1,300 patents and applications across all the EU Member States”.Footnote42 The Commission also found that the ratio of primary to secondary patents is 1:7, where the latter “mostly concern formulations, processes and non-formulation products…, such as salts, polymorphic forms, particles, solvates and hydrates”.Footnote43 As a result, the Commission concluded that the practice of “maximising patent coverage in such a way is the creation of a web of patents”, which affects the generics’ ability to “develop a generic version of the medicine in form of a salt, crystalline or amorphous form”, because it “would inevitably infringe a patent (for example, a patent for the relevant salt, crystalline or amorphous form of the medicine)”.Footnote44 Each of such patents would typically have a later expiration date, which effectively extends a period of market exclusivity beyond the expiration of a basic patent.Footnote45 In addition, most of these patents that protect such follow-on modifications are so-called “sleeping” patents, i.e. patents which a company has no intention of commercialising.Footnote46 Moreover, such modifications may provide little or no therapeutic benefits to the patient compared to the original drug.Footnote47 Nevertheless, such patents allow originators to secure the most efficient, broadest and longest possible protection for their successful products.Footnote48 The denser the web of secondary patents, the more difficult it is for generics to develop their generic equivalents, even if they know that only a few patents of a large portfolio would, in fact, be valid and infringed by their products.Footnote49 Despite such knowledge, it is impossible to be certain before introducing a generic whether this will be the case and, thus, whether the generic company will be subject to injunctions preventing the sale of their generic products.Footnote50 Such practice, therefore, provides an appreciable competitive advantage for originators by creating a significant legal and commercial uncertainty for generics in relation to the possibility of their market entry.Footnote51 This paper argues that such a strategic use of the patent system by pharmaceutical companies is against the shared goal of patent and competition laws of facilitating innovation for the benefit of society. As will be explained further, in addition to a more immediate negative effect in the form of high drug prices, strategic patenting may also impair innovation by reducing originators’ incentives to innovate, and affecting generics’ ability to develop alternative generic products. Strategic patenting, therefore, may enable originators to avoid competitive pressures by preventing generic competition without a need to engage in genuine innovation. Strategic Patenting Contradicts the Rationale of the Patent System and Competition Law In the competitive markets, the success of a company is based on its business performance.Footnote52 In order to compete on performance by “offering better quality and a wider choice of new and improved goods and services”Footnote53 firms must innovate. Realising the importance of protecting innovation, which is considered to be the main driver of economic growth,Footnote54 states have put in place various mechanisms to ensure a suitable environment for its advancement. These include granting the property rights to the results of innovation in the form of patents, as well as implementing competition law rules to stimulate dynamic competition.Footnote55 Specifically, one of the main justifications for the patent system is the encouragement of innovationFootnote56 that serves as an engine for economic growth and development.Footnote57 The patent system pursues this aim by offering the patent owners a period of exclusive rights as a reward for their innovative efforts and an incentive to engage in further innovation.Footnote58 Therefore, intellectual property rules, and patents in particular, are seen as an essential element of undistorted competition on the internal market.Footnote59 These exclusive rights are considered to be a necessary incentive to invest in R&D and innovation, particularly in such sectors as pharmaceuticals, where the R&D costs are high, but the costs of copying the R&D results are marginal.Footnote60 At the same time, the “innovation theory”, embodied in the EU competition law rules and policy, is designed to stimulate innovation by fostering competition on the markets.Footnote61 The competition law rules keep markets innovative by maintaining effective competition through preventing the foreclosure of markets and maintaining access to them.Footnote62 The rationale is that firms react to pressures of competition by continuously seeking to innovate.Footnote63 Therefore, patent and competition laws complement each other, as on the one hand, existing competition creates pressures on firms, forcing them to innovate, the so-called “stick”, while on the other hand, patent law provides a “carrot” in the form of the exclusive right, thus inducing innovators to innovate.Footnote64 These two bodies of laws are seen as “complementary efforts to promote an efficient marketplace and long-run, dynamic competition through innovation”.Footnote65 As the European Commission noted “both intellectual property rights and competition are necessary to promote innovation and ensure a competitive exploitation thereof”.Footnote66 These two bodies of laws, therefore, have the same fundamental goal of enhancing innovation for the benefit of consumer welfare. Importantly, patent and competition laws are designed to stimulate not only innovation of “pioneer” innovators, but they are also aimed at facilitating follow-on innovation.Footnote67 Patent law contains provisions that require inventors to disclose information about their inventions, as well as providing exceptions such as experimental use and compulsory licensing, which allow third parties to access the inventions still under patent protection.Footnote68 Therefore, along with pioneer innovators, the rationale of incentives to innovate in patent law also applies to follow-on innovators, balancing the interests of these two types of inventors.Footnote69 Similarly, competition law aims at stimulating all types of innovation, including follow-on innovation. On the other hand, EU competition law proscribes practices that reduce incentives to innovate both for “pioneer” and follow-on innovators. This is enshrined in Art. 102(b) TFEU, which prohibits abuses that consist of, inter alia, limiting technological development. For example, in AstraZeneca the General Court considered that the company’s practice of misusing the patent system had the potential of reducing its incentives to innovate and was anticompetitive.Footnote70 In MagillFootnote71 and Microsoft,Footnote72 the courts found that the IP rights owners abused their dominant positions by blocking innovation of their potential competitors. More recently, several decisions by the European Commission also emphasised the importance of protecting innovation. In January 2018, the Commission fined QualcommFootnote73 €997 million for abusing its market dominance in LTEFootnote74 baseband chipsets.Footnote75 The Commission considered that the exclusivity payments that Qualcomm paid to Apple denied rivals the possibility to compete on the merits, and deprived European consumers of genuine choice and innovation.Footnote76 Furthermore, in July 2018, the Commission found in Google Android that Google abused its dominant position, and fined the company €4.34 billion for anticompetitive restrictions it had imposed on mobile device manufacturers and network operators to strengthen its dominant position in general internet search.Footnote77 The Commission considered that Google’s restrictive practices denied other companies the chance to compete on the merits and innovate.Footnote78 Finally, in 2017 the Commission issued its decision, in which it took the view that Amazon abused its dominant positions on the markets for the retail distribution of e-books by inserting the so-called “parity clauses” in the agreements with its e-book suppliers.Footnote79 It concluded that these clauses had the potential of reducing the incentives to innovate both by e-book suppliers and retailers.Footnote80 These decisions demonstrate that the European Commission recognises the fundamental importance of protecting innovation. They confirm that strategies that are capable of stifling innovation and reducing the incentives to innovate may constitute an abuse of dominance under Art. 102 TFEU. It is argued in this article that, along with the practices condemned by the Commission in the decisions discussed above, strategic patenting can also harm innovation by impairing incentives to innovate of both originators and generic companies, and therefore should raise competition law concerns. Strategic Patenting Impairs Originators’ Incentives to Innovate While originator companies typically argue that the competition law intervention into their patenting practices will reduce their incentives to innovate,Footnote81 this article asserts that strategic patenting itself reduces originators’ incentives. Thus, in a properly functioning system, when a patent protecting a product is close to expiration the originator would be encouraged to innovate further in order to introduce a new product on the market and maintain its competitive position. However, by engaging in strategic patenting, the originator’s incentive to innovate diminishes as it enjoys its monopoly position by merely procuring numerous secondary patents that shield its current product from generic competition. Therefore, when companies engage in such strategic patenting, they are merely protecting themselves from the competitive pressures that competition law aims to establish. Maintaining that this practice is lawful, originators argue that strong patent protection is essential for recouping their investments, as well as for incentivising them to engage in further innovation.Footnote82 Such a position may find some support in the arguments put forward by Joseph Schumpeter and his followers, who claimed that since monopoly increases the reward of the innovator, monopolists are more prone to innovation.Footnote83 However, as Lowe noted:Footnote84 the empirical evidence of the past few decades has worked against Schumpeter and in favor of Kenneth Arrow, who contends that in favoring monopolies Schumpeter underestimated the incentives for innovation that competition can offer. Monopolists tend to want to keep their monopolies by resorting to any measures that can keep new entrants out. Firms under competitive pressure from actual or potential competition, on the other hand, are less complacent and know that inventing a new product is their best strategy for maintaining and increasing their market share. In the same vein, the Commission emphasises the importance of competition for the incentives to innovate, stating that: “[r]ivalry between undertakings is an essential driver of economic efficiency, including dynamic efficiencies in the form of innovation. In its absence the dominant undertaking will lack adequate incentives to continue to create and pass on efficiency gains.”Footnote85 Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry confirms that strategic patenting reduces incentives to engage in genuine and meritorious innovation. In many cases, strategically accumulated secondary patents are of marginal quality and are typically the result of routine research activities.Footnote86 For example, in Perindopril the European Commission revealed that most of the secondary patents, procured as part of the originator company’s anti-generic strategy, were seen by the company as “blocking” or “paper”, some of which it considered involved “zero inventive step”Footnote87 and a purely editorial task.Footnote88 Moreover, these follow-on pharmaceutical inventions are specifically timed around the expiration of the basic patent and can be developed on demand.Footnote89 In AstraZeneca the Commission noted that the company designed to “[f]ile a patent-cloud of mixtures, uses, formulations, new indications, and chemistry” in relation to its blockbuster product omeprazole to slow down generic entry at a specifically defined time, close to the expiration of the basic patent.Footnote90 The main aim of these patents is to increase uncertainty for generic companies as to the possibility of their market entry.Footnote91 Therefore, while many of these secondary patents may be trivial and potentially invalid, the originator pursues them to protect its current successful product from generic competition.Footnote92 Even if a company continues to engage in innovation in parallel to pursuing strategic patenting, it still protects itself from the pressures of competition, which would have forced the company to innovate faster and would thus provide consumers with better products and/or access to cheaper generic versions earlier. As Ullrich argues:Footnote93 A slowdown in the transition of the new medicines from the protected status of a proprietary medicine to the status of generic products manufactured and distributed in open competition does not simply mean a loss of static efficiency, namely a loss of consumer well-being due to a slowdown in the reduction of process. Rather, such a slowdown also involves the risk of a loss of dynamic efficiency in that it extends the duration of a monopoly rent situation, thus reducing the pressure to innovate more quickly. Following the rationale of the General Court’s statement in AstraZeneca, the practice of the originator that extends its market monopoly by relying on the patent system “potentially reduces the incentive to engage in innovation, since it enables the company in a dominant position to maintain its exclusivity beyond the period envisaged by the legislator”.Footnote94 Such practices, according to the Court, act “contrary to the public interest”.Footnote95 Therefore, the practice of strategic patenting that protects originators’ monopolies from competitive pressures and significantly reduces their incentives to engage in genuine innovation is contrary to the rationale of the patent system, has a significant negative effect on competition and should raise competition law concerns. Strategic Patenting Impairs Follow-on Innovation of Generic Companies Strategic patenting also has a chilling effect on follow-on innovation by generic competitors in the form of developing alternative versions of an off-patent compound. As was discussed earlier, the expiry of a basic patent that protects an active compound facilitates generic competition. This is because even if the product is still protected by process, specific form or formulation patents, generic companies may develop alternative ways of producing or formulating the product and start competing with the originator. In the absence of strategically accumulated patents by the originator, generic companies are typically open to innovating to launch alternative generic products as soon as the basic patent expires. However, by pursuing strategic patenting, originators may discourage generics from engaging in follow-on innovation because of the uncertainty about the patent protection and a fear of infringing on one of the numerous patents.Footnote96 In its Sector Inquiry Report, the Commission cited the following quote from one of the originators: The entire point of the patenting strategy adopted by many originators is to remove legal certainty. The strategy is to file as many patents as possible on all areas of the drug and create a “minefield” for the generics to navigate. All generics know that very few patents in that larger group will be valid and infringed by the product they propose to make, but it is impossible to be certain prior to launch that your product will not infringe and you will not be the subject of an interim injunction.Footnote97 Therefore, as a result of creating an impenetrable ring of patent protection by the originator,Footnote98 generic competitors may be prevented from developing alternative generic versions of an off-patent compound. One of the examples revealed by the Commission during its Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry was the filing by an originator company of “more than 30 patent families translating into several hundreds of patents in the Member States in relation to one product”, many of which were filed after the introduction of the product.Footnote99 This affected the intentions of several generic companies that planned to develop and bring their generic versions of the original product to the market.Footnote100 As a result, in addition to the already high barriers to entry into the pharmaceutical market due to patents that protect an existing product and the need to obtain a marketing authorisation, strategic patenting raises these entry barriers further, making it very difficult for generic companies to overcome them. This strategy, therefore, “may without further enforcement action by originator companies, … delay generic entry until the patent situation is clearer or even discourage more risk-sensitive generic companies from entering altogether”.Footnote101 Consequently, the fact that actual or potential competitors of originators would not be able to develop alternative generic products means that no one could enter the market and challenge originators’ monopoly positions. This results in a weakening of competition in the relevant market and a strengthening of the originator’s already dominant position. As Maggiolino put it, “patent accumulation … may work as a pre-emptive entry-deterrence strategy to protect monopoly power and … lower consumer welfare by allowing dominant firms to keep on charging over-competitive prices”.Footnote102 Therefore, when an array of accumulated secondary patents “blocks monopolists’ rivals from producing follow-on innovations, this strategy prevents the whole society from enjoying … these further innovations”.Footnote103 While practices that facilitate innovation are encouraged by competition law, practices that are aimed at blocking follow-on innovation by competitors should raise competition law concerns.

#### Corona escalates security threats that cause extinction – cooperation thesis is wrong.

Recna 21 [Research Center for Nuclear Weapon Abolition; Nagasaki, Japan; “Pandemic Futures and Nuclear Weapon Risks: The Nagasaki 75th Anniversary pandemic-nuclear nexus scenarios final report,” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament; 5/28/21; <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2021.1890867>] Justin

The Challenge: Multiple Existential Threats

The relationship between pandemics and war is as long as human history. Past pandemics have set the scene for wars by weakening societies, undermining resilience, and exacerbating civil and inter-state conflict. Other disease outbreaks have erupted during wars, in part due to the appalling public health and battlefield conditions resulting from war, in turn sowing the seeds for new conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, pandemics have spread with unprecedented speed due to increased mobility created by globalization, especially between urbanized areas. Although there are positive signs that scientific advances and rapid innovation can help us manage pandemics, it is likely that deadly infectious viruses will be a challenge for years to come.

The COVID-19 is the most demonic pandemic threat in modern history. It has erupted at a juncture of other existential global threats, most importantly, accelerating climate change and resurgent nuclear threat-making. The most important issue, therefore, is how the coronavirus (and future pandemics) will increase or decrease the risks associated with these twin threats, climate change effects, and the next use of nuclear weapons in war.5

Today, the nine nuclear weapons arsenals not only can annihilate hundreds of cities, but also cause nuclear winter and mass starvation of a billion or more people, if not the entire human species. Concurrently, climate change is enveloping the planet with more frequent and intense storms, accelerating sea level rise, and advancing rapid ecological change, expressed in unprecedented forest fires across the world. Already stretched to a breaking point in many countries, the current pandemic may overcome resilience to the point of near or actual collapse of social, economic, and political order.

In this extraordinary moment, it is timely to reflect on the existence and possible uses of weapons of mass destruction under pandemic conditions – most importantly, nuclear weapons, but also chemical and biological weapons. Moments of extreme crisis and vulnerability can prompt aggressive and counterintuitive actions that in turn may destabilize already precariously balanced threat systems, underpinned by conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the threat of weaponized chemical and biological technologies. Consequently, the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially nuclear weapons, increases at such times, possibly sharply.

The COVID-19 pandemic is clearly driving massive, rapid, and unpredictable changes that will redefine every aspect of the human condition, including WMD – just as the world wars of the first half of the 20th century led to a revolution in international affairs and entirely new ways of organizing societies, economies, and international relations, in part based on nuclear weapons and their threatened use. In a world reshaped by pandemics, nuclear weapons – as well as correlated non-nuclear WMD, nuclear alliances, “deterrence” doctrines, operational and declaratory policies, nuclear extended deterrence, organizational practices, and the **existential risks** posed by retaining these capabilities – are all up for redefinition.

A pandemic has potential to destabilize a nuclear-prone conflict by incapacitating the supreme nuclear commander or commanders who have to issue nuclear strike orders, creating uncertainty as to who is in charge, how to handle nuclear mistakes (such as errors, accidents, technological failures, and entanglement with conventional operations gone awry), and opening a brief opportunity for a first strike at a time when the COVID-infected state may not be able to retaliate efficiently – or at all – due to leadership confusion. In some nuclear-laden conflicts, a state might use a pandemic as a cover for political or military provocations in the belief that the adversary is distracted and partly disabled by the pandemic, increasing the risk of war in a nuclear-prone conflict. At the same time, a pandemic may lead nuclear armed states to increase the isolation and sanctions against a nuclear adversary, making it even harder to stop the spread of the disease, in turn creating a pandemic reservoir and transmission risk back to the nuclear armed state or its allies.

In principle, the common threat of the pandemic might induce nuclear-armed states to reduce the tension in a nuclear-prone conflict and thereby the risk of nuclear war. It may cause nuclear adversaries or their umbrella states to seek to resolve conflicts in a cooperative and collaborative manner by creating habits of communication, engagement, and mutual learning that come into play in the nuclear-military sphere. For example, militaries may cooperate to control pandemic transmission, including by working together against criminal-terrorist non-state actors that are trafficking people or by joining forces to ensure that a new pathogen is not developed as a bioweapon.

To date, however, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the isolation of some nuclear-armed states and provided a textbook case of the failure of states to cooperate to overcome the pandemic. Borders have slammed shut, trade shut down, and budgets blown out, creating enormous pressure to focus on immediate domestic priorities. Foreign policies have become markedly more nationalistic. Dependence on nuclear weapons may increase as states seek to buttress a global re-spatialization6 of all dimensions of human interaction at all levels to manage pandemics. The effect of nuclear threats on leaders may make it less likely – or even impossible – to achieve the kind of concert at a global level needed to respond to and administer an effective vaccine, making it harder and even impossible to revert to pre-pandemic international relations. The result is that some states may proliferate their own nuclear weapons, further reinforcing the spiral of conflicts contained by nuclear threat, with cascading effects on the risk of nuclear war.