### Case

#### Simulated imperialism is a paramount dynamic of the contemporary – it marks the mutual articulations of empire and hyperreality that build signifying distance into imperial formations and their racialized operations – the Disney Empire exists as the apex of this project. Disneyland brings simulated imperialism into sharper relief through three interlocking movements – the signification of imperial processes generated by simulacra; the amplification of colonizing projects through simulation; and the interpellation of hybrid subjects between (im)mobility and (in)animation. Like the Small World Ride, the 1AC provides a multicultural tours of a metaphorical global village in which the government to space by tacking on a rainbow flag – where queer bodies can fly to space to create world peace, yet this simulated world is completely and totally idealized through an absolute annihilation of the other in favor of a white, English-speaking, and culturally American utopia. It thus spatializes the forceful presence of empire within its all-embracing discursive formula.

Hom, ’13 (HOM, STEPHANIE MALIA. “Simulated Imperialism.” Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, vol. 25, no. 1, 2013, pp. 25–44. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23612199. Accessed 29 July 2021, GS)

\*OCR so potential spelling errors

At Disneyland, imperial formations inhabit the inter-stices of the hyperreal, pivoting along simulated vectors of the physical and the psychic, interior and exterior, miniature and gigantic, copy and original. Simply put. this is a locus where the (post)colonial and the hyperreal converge. It is also where we can attend to the ways that protracted imperial processes interact with the precessions of simulacra that shape contemporary image society. It is here that a nexus of imperial formations is manifest that simultaneously generates, delimits and denaturalizes the impulse of our present historical moment: simulated imperialism. This essay looks to Disneyland to bring the operations of simulated imperialism into sharper relief. It takes as its primary example the spatial practices of the It's a Small World ride. As one of the oldest attractions at the theme park. it offers a multicultural tour of a metaphorical global village where animatronic children, stylized in cultural stereotypes, sing and dance in the name of world peace ( r o .1). This boat ride through an elaborate stage set is a simulacrum within the archetypal simulacrum that is Disneyland. Yet this miniature world is also one of deceptive heterogeneity. In fact, the ride's spatial practices reveal an idealized world to be one erased of racial, cultural and linguistic difference in favor of a white. English-speaking, and culturally American utopia. Thus, the ride materializes the forceful presence of empire within its all-embracing discursive formation. What follows is a close reading of the It's a Small World ride that theorizes the three interlocking operations of simulated imperialism: the signification of imperial processes generated by simulacra; the amplification of colonizing projects through simulation; and the interpellation of hybrid subjects articulated between (i)mobility and (in)animation. It shows the imperial and the hyperreal to be mutually constitutive in the contemporary. Such a theorization reveals the positioning of empire within the domains of unending semiotic breakdown and the globalized mobility systems that order the excessive. networked, high-carbon societies of the early twenty-first century. The built environment is an especially privileged site for this type of analysis because it gives fixed physical form to shilling Imperial formations — as many architectural stud-ies of colonial empires have shown! Here, I use the term 'colonial (and its variants) to describe an attitude that desires the forced settling of physical and psychic territories, among them the nineteenth-century European scramble for Africa and strategies of internal colonization. And I take 'empire land its variants) to mean that curious sway of imperiurn and emporium that binds the neobberal present to these variegated colonial pasts.' Empire is thus always-already multivalent. It operates. unevenly and contentiously. across different tempo. talkies and geographies. macro. and micro-scales, and point. cal and economic spheres to establish and reinforce differential sovereignties that continue to subjugate the less powerful. This essay calls attention to the particular constellation of empire and simulation that builds signifying distance into imperial formations, but that is no less potent in its discriminatory effects than more physical processes. The Disney empire is one of its most pernicious forms. To situate empire within simulation also opens a way to think about imperial formations — and empire — from the destabilized margins of signification. From these limits. we an stake out new theoretical ground that weakens the hold of empire. In other words. understanding the processes of simulated imperialism can renew radical possibilities for subversion and resistance in the spaces between the imperial and the hyperreal It can create space for a world. small or otherwise. based on truly horizontal forms of belonging and harmonic difference. SIMULATED IMPERIALISM: SOME THEORETICAL NOTES Simulated imperialism signifies imperial processes generated by simulacra. This is best expressed in the built environment. where second-other fictive worlds such as colonial exhibitions and themed casino-hotels short-circuit the reality of a place and duplicate it through signs. Since these simulations arise out of different historical circumstances. the textures of their Imperial formations vary accordingly. For instance. distinct gradations of sovereignty and scales of differentiation have been at stake, say, at the Rue du alit at the 1889 Exposi. don Universelle in Paris and at the faux Roman Colosseum at Caesars Palace in Las Vegas today. The former shaped by nineteenth century discourses of empire, participated in the colonial orderfing) of Egypt. while the latter engages the authentic fakery of Las Vegas's postmodern monumental oxen? Yet both simulacra are dislocations at which imperial formations surface. And both mark a 'broader set of practices structured in dominance: insofar as the visitors to each experience imperial affinities. becoming metaphorical Onen• ta lists and Roman centurions. respective:y.' Simulated imperialism amplifies colonizing prefects through simulation. It thus brings the colonial past into the hyperreal present, suffusing the aforementioned practices of dominance with nostalgia for colonial space-time. The colonial. then. is always-already the consequence of shifting imperial formations. What is more. simulated imperialism evokes colonial pasts that have always been rooted in fantasy. It produces mirages. hallucinations. specters that do not cone. spend to historical realities. It is simulation at its best. For example. the Bab Al Shams desert resort in south-western Dubai evokes a colonial past that never existed. A self-styled Arabian oasis, it masquerades as a pseudo. Ottoman caravanserai where visitors can indulge their every Orientalist Impulse. from gazing upon belly dancers to siding camels. If one so chooses. one can even go 'behind the veil' by dressing up in a burqa. Thus, it offers a tableau vivant of revivified Oriental stereotypes. a collision of colonial fantasy and hyperreality where visitors may enjoy the pleasures that once belonged to European colonizers. Disavowal, too, structures this amplification. insofar as Bab Al Shams itself be-comes the site of ideological illusion wherein visitors. know. ins full well that the resort was built on the backs of modern. day slave laborers and continues to be run by indentured ser-vants shackled to the yoke of the neoliberal economy, behave as if they did not know. In such ways simulated imperialism reproduces what Homi Bhalsha identified as the fetishistic logic of European colonial discourse itself." Simulated imperialism interpellatts hybrid subjects Waal-toted between Om/mobility and (in/animation. This hybrichty is different from. but adiacent to. the hybrid forms scrutinized in postcolonial scholarship: it is hybridity conditioned by globalized mobility systems. in what John tirry has called the 'new mobilities paradigm.'" Whereas the limits of hybridity genes aced ambivalence and anxiety within colonial systems of order, simulated imperialism — operating in the interstices between the postcolonial and the hyperreal — interpellates subjects who exist between the mobile and the immobile, and more acute-ly. between the animate and the inanimate. This mobilized hybridity trades in the melancholic metaphysics of imperialist nostalgia; it is to mourn for what has been destroyed. fantasizing about an idealized former colonial life. and attempting to reconcile that loss through the petrifying fictions of 'tradition.'" In other words. imperialist nostalgia perpetuates the immobility to which the colonized are always condemned." Simulated imperialism. on the other hand. performs a dialectical trick that seems to celebrate the resurrection of life. In a redemptive move against this fixity and disappearance. it reanimates the colonial subject ... but only partially." The complete return of such subtexts is always kept in check.

#### The impact is space forever being left to the colonial imagination of NewSpacers under the guise of governance – like dual-use satellites, the affirmative only confirms the will to know which turns the aff

Genovese, T. R. (2017). [The new right stuff: Social imaginaries of outer space and the capitalist accumulation of the cosmos (Doctoral dissertation, Northern Arizona University) Accessed 10/3/2021] CSUF JmB

The discussion of human futures is a difficult topic with which to engage. Within the Western conception of linear time, the future is temporally forward and veiled within statically three-dimensional existence. Therefore, in this chapter, I will turn to some postmodern theorists and philosophers in order to engage with how to situate the role of science fiction, science, and NewSpace within human futures in outer space. This section is also a dreamscape of ideas that may not be fully fleshed out, but are here to generate discussion, hence the heavy reliance on phenomenology. The ideas of hyperreality were first generated by Jean Baudrillard ([1981] 1994) who defined the concept as “the generation by models of a real without origin or reality” (1). Hyperreality is a simulation; an intense blending of “reality” and representation so that there is no longer any clear line wherein one ends and the other begins—and in fact, if one accepts the theory of hyperreality, there is no reality anymore, only simulations of reality, which are unmeasurable because reality and hyperreality are indistinguishable—there’s nothing to measure against the two since reality no longer exists as a separate entity (Baudrillard [1981] 1994). Umberto Eco (1986) expands on Baudrillard’s ideas to suggest that hyperreality is created through a desire for a certain “reality,” and in order to realize that desire, one must fabricate a reality that can be consumed as real. Like Baudrillard before him, Eco (1986) uses Disneyland as an example of hyperreality that manufactures desires that can only be realized within the hyperreality it has created, leading one to wish for the hyperreal rather than nature/the “real.” Eco (1986) illustrates this by saying In this sense, Disneyland not only produces illusion, but—in confessing it— stimulates the desire for it: A real crocodile can be found in the zoo, and as a rule it is dozing or hiding, but Disneyland tells us that faked nature corresponds much more to our daydream demands. When, in the space of twenty-four hours, you go (as I did deliberately) from the fake . . . wild river of Adventureland to a trip on the Mississippi, where the captain of the paddle-wheel steamer says it is possible to see alligators on the banks of the river, and then you don’t see any, you risk feeling homesick for Disneyland, where the wild animals don’t have to be coaxed. Disneyland tells us that technology can give us more reality than nature can. (44) Baudrillard ([1981] 1994) further discusses what happens when science emerges out of science fiction and what happens when the difference between the two is indistinguishable—in other words, the real recedes and all that is left are simulations of the hyperreal and “science fiction in this sense is no longer anywhere, and it is everywhere” (126). In this age of accelerated technoscientific development—as I have argued in previous chapters—science and science fiction are melded into a Baudrillardian simulation where artificial intelligence, autonomous rocket boosters that land on autonomous drone ships, and a constant human presence in outer space is the sedimentation of hyperreality where, as Milburn (2003) has said, “the model becomes indistinguishable from the real, supplants the real, precedes the real, and finally is taken as more real than the real” (267). When the hyperreal meets the hyperobject of the cosmos, a term coined by Timothy Morton (2013) to describe a thing that is “massively distributed in time and space relative to humans” (1), interesting (and confusing) discussions can arise. For the purpose of this thesis, I would like to argue that the nebulous entity of NewSpace— which is multifaceted in that it is philosophical, ideological, and physical in itself—has emerged as a simulacrum from the hyperreality of contemporary space developments. Baudrillard ([1981] 1994) describes a simulacrum as not exactly a copy or imitation of the real, but a thing that becomes a truth in itself—as it has emerged from hyperreality, which is its own truth. I believe Gilles Deleuze (1990) defined simulacra (plural of simulacrum) best when he said: “The copy is an image endowed with resemblance, the simulacrum is an image without resemblance” (257). The overarching colonial romanticism—of a rustic pioneer traveling to a distant land—that is utilized so often by NewSpace plays into similar romanticisms employed by NASA, but instead of the objectives remaining the same, the NewSpace agenda is only concerned with profits. This is why I argue that NewSpace is acting as Saturn devouring his son, simultaneously destroying and emerging as a simulacrum from the 32 hyperreality of cosmic imaginaries. In essence, NewSpace is a copy without an original —feeding off of imaginaries that are simulations and creations of their own devising. The public, in turn, is buying into this vision as if it is the only reality possible. To utilize Eco’s (1986) example above, NewSpace is Adventureland in Disneyland and NASA and other governmental agencies of “OldSpace” are the paddle-boat on the Mississippi. No one wants to wait ten years for a scientific mission when Elon Musk can bring them to Mars in half that time. However, this is not a defense of the “real.” I am a proponent of “utopic thinking,” which in itself is hinged on a dislocation from reality in order to imagine a better world. The tyranny of the so-called real—a term that is often defined by governments and corporations in order to sustain the status-quo (Collins 2008)—is precisely how NewSpace is able to invade the imaginaries of the future so easily. If one is able to dismiss a social justice minded futurologist or science fiction writer with a “Get real!” or “That could never work in reality” then it shuts down entire social theories that resist the established ideology. David Harvey (2000) discusses this in relation to alternatives to capitalism, which fits quite well when discussing the resistance to NewSpace: If the mess seems impossible to change then it is simply because there is indeed “no alternative.” It is the supreme rationality of the market versus the silly irrationality of anything else. And all those institutions that might have helped define some alternatives have other been suppressed or—with some notable exceptions, such as the church—brow-beaten into submission. (154) In the “rationality of the market” all that remains are “degenerate utopias” (Collins 2008; Marin 1993), places like the previously mentioned Disneyland, which presents itself as a utopic place, but is actually shrouding the commercial “reality”—“the Main Street façades are presented to us as toy houses and invite us to enter them, but their interior is always a disguised supermarket, where you buy obsessively, believing that you are still playing” (Eco 1986, 43). According to Eco (1986), Disneyland’s hyperreality begins when one submits to the complete “fakeness” of the simulation in order to bask in the desirous visions of the utopia that it presents. Thus it becomes completely real. I saw this attempt at creating a hyperreality at Spaceport America, with the science fiction inspired door frames and the tour guides dressed in flight suits. Elon Musk presents it to us when he utilizes a four-stage image of Mars, starting with the red planet and ending with a terraformed, Eden-like utopia of oceans and clouds and green forests; a new Earth that beckons to colonizers with new possibilities and untapped markets. This photo is a Debordian “spectacle” that establishes and mediates a social relationship with the public through images (Debord 1994). Photos like the one above are preambles to the spectacle of 1,000 ships departing to Mars every 26 months. Even if that does not become a reality, Musk and other NewSpacers have already begun to creep into the social imaginary of space and supplant their own ideologies as truth into the cosmic hyperreality, which may relate to why my survey results contained foundationally contradictory answers. These photos are part of a larger trend within the space science hyperreality. Messeri (2016) ethnographically uncovers how Martian mapmakers are creating incredibly detailed maps that are created without direct reference to the landscape, since we have never set foot there. Therefore, “the primary goal of today’s [Martian] maps is . . . to establish Mars as inviting to human explorers,” much like the images of a terraformed Mars advertised by SpaceX (Messeri 2016, 74). Like the Jorge Luis Borges short story Del rigor en la ciencia, the map precedes the territory, and the obsession of creating a perfect map makes that map the new reality (as a simulation), while the empire it’s supposed to represent—or in this case, the planet Mars—crumbles away, ceding to the hyperreality of its representation. NASA—in its neoliberal present—is enveloped within this hyperreality as well, perhaps as it recognizes the simulation that NewSpace exists within, and how powerful it can be in the sphere of public relations. However, their production of nostalgia inducing travel posters for places humans have never been are coded to invite—and exclude—certain types of futures (Messeri 2016). Namely, these futures are white, colonial, and evoke vintage 1950s–1960s travel advertisements, a period of U.S. history ripe with inequality and oppression. The political cannot be divorced from aesthetic, no matter how much opponents may try to argue against this point; I’m sorry but Foucault 33 was right. And these theoretical frameworks are the reason why I have argued for social science to take science fiction seriously, especially science fiction that does not espouse the tropes of Spencerian social theory. Science fiction writers who identify as people of color, Indigenous, women, and LGBTQI+—with enough critical mass—can create a simulation and hyperreality with their own work that forces change at the root. The power of words, of worldmaking, of placemaking that is so inherent in science fiction writing are the catalysts for social change, especially in Earth-bound space science. Furthermore, social scientists should not only embrace the political world that science fiction inhabits, but we should be working together as a collective to actively disseminate the social science that good science fiction writers are already conducting. CHAPTER 11: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? This chapter title should really be the title of the entire thesis since it is the question that I have been muttering since the beginning of this research project—except that the title has already been skillfully used by the likes of Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Leo Tolstoy, and Vladimir Lenin. I do not think that my name has quite the prestige to fit in with the company of those gentlemen. So instead, I have decided to make it the name of my final chapter in which I try to discuss how we move forward from the rather bleak present I have divulged in these pages; but I will also throw in some radical tangents in order to keep with the titular theme. As I have argued extensively in this thesis, American imaginaries of the future are dominated by right-libertarianism. NewSpace venture capitalists like Elon Musk and Peter Thiel have latched on to futurist thinking and have the power and capital to begin enacting some of their visions. This is no surprise; engagements with the future emerged as a distinct field of social inquiry during the Cold War when neoliberal capitalism was battling state Communism for supremacy—and the political context has changed very little (Tolon 2012). However, NewSpacers depend on a climate of stress and conflict in order to justify their drastic socio-political-economic actions. For example, Peter Thiel—founder of PayPal, Facebook board member, and heavy investor in SpaceX—has said: “Because there are no truly free places left in our world, I suspect that the mode for escape must involve some sort of new and hitherto untried process that leads us to some undiscovered country; and for this reason I have focused my efforts on new technologies that may create a new space for freedom” (Gittlitz 2016, para. 8). To Thiel, and many of his right-libertarian venture capitalist revolutionary vanguard, these places are threefold: artificial island micro-nations, the Internet and cyber-communities, and outer space (Gittlitz 2016). Thiel has invested in all three of these areas and was recently placed on Trump’s transition team. Soon after Thiel’s appointment, Trump decided to divert NASA funds from climate change studies to deep space exploration. This has a lot to do with the fostering of another American frontier. As of the time of my writing this thesis, Trump has announced plans to build a wall along the United States / Mexico border. These Earthly enclosures are direct manifestations of the cosmic enclosures championed by NewSpace—and often these two proclamations are advocated by the same people in the same positions of power. Is the cosmic frontier doomed to represent the same tragedies and oppression as our Earth frontiers? Not necessarily. And here, I will begin to take a long needed—albeit brief—shift toward optimism. Today, our borderlands are places of violence, where states exert their influence in order to destroy or capitulate the Other—either figuratively or literally. However, this was not always the case. As Durrenberger (2016) has said: [In the past] the borderlands were less foreboding, places the regularizing reach of states had bypassed because they were not worth the effort. To them went those castoffs the states threw off in their great drives to define and unify: prophets, anthropologists, missionaries, and more recently revolutionaries and terrorists. Many who have lived in those areas return with stories of human potential, encouraged by what they have seen of the power of our species’ humanity. (para. 5–6) Could outer space provide a space to unleash the human potential for compassion? With the absolute vastness of the cosmos, it seems impossible—past a certain technoscientific level that I believe we are rapidly approaching—for dominant power systems like states or corporations to garner control over such enormous distances. A certain degree of anarchy—if not full fledged social anarchism or anarchistcommunism—seems to be, in my mind, an inevitability. As I have argued in previous publications, direct democracy within communities outside of the Earth’s influence seems to be the most equitable and efficient way to socially organize in a hostile environment (Genovese 2016d). Haqq-Misra (2015) proposes “liberated settlements” on Mars that reject Earthly authority and operate within their own self-determination. Philosophers, social scientists, and science fiction writers all seem to be contributing socio-political theory to this new “Space Age of Enlightenment.” With the continued generation of liberatory work, we may have a chance at chipping away at NewSpace’s hegemonic lineage of the frontier that I introduced in Chapter 6 and establish a lineage of liberation instead. In fact, I do not think that we have a choice any longer. As of this writing, as I sit behind the abrasive glow of my computer screen at 11:49pm on February 1, 2017, the United States and the world seem to be at a dangerous tipping point. The fascist creep has turned into a fascist sprint, and those that wish to claim neutrality or inaction are implicitly siding with the dominant powers that wish for nothing less than the destruction of the environment for capital gains, a stripping of what little civil protections are left, a mass defunding of all educational systems, a homogenizing of this country utilizing Nazi-era racial order schemes, a villainization of anyone who is not a right, white, Christian man, continued colonial expansion into sovereign Indigenous land while repeatedly breaking treaties, rampant hetero-patriarchy, and the list continues ad nauseam. It is our duty as anthropologists, as social scientists, as science fiction writers, as space enthusiasts, as educators, as human beings to make sure that while we are on Earth, we will fight for the weak, the marginalized, and the disenfranchised by any means necessary and with respect, ears open to the requests of those people who have suffered for years under the boots of oppression, and for whom we may have very little frame of reference in regard to their suffering under structural violence. And as we begin to journey and live away from the only place we have ever called home, we must leave into the cosmos for the right reasons—not for capital, for power, or for narcissistic perceptions of glory, but in the spirit of equity, mutual aid, love, diversity, as well as playful curiosity, and we must do it with soul, with heart, and with joy.

#### "If the matrix were to make a movie about the matrix, The Matrix is surely the movie it would make"—we think this is true of the 1ac's relationship to debate. The move towards authentic radical theory within the cemetery walls of the Western university merely engenders a semiotic fantasy of radicalism paving over very real conditions of violent colonialism, pain, and death in order to make this space possible. We will be very clear here: debate cannot create jouissance or catharsis which means they don’t get their role of the ballot

Anarchist News 10. “The University, Social Death, and the Inside Joke,” <http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620>

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other. Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50] In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice: "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]

#### The “other” and radical alterity has been obliterated in favor of mere difference. Their alternative is nothing more than the communities interpassive obsession within debate’s new resistant “thing” which assures it’s inter-absorption into a closed informational schema which we call “integral reality”

Pawlett 14. William Pawlett, senior lecturer in media, communications, and cultural studies at the University of Wolverhampton, UK, “Society At War With Itself,” International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, Volume 11, Number 2 (May, 2014)

It all depends on the ground we choose to fight on … most often … we choose to fight on ground where we are beaten before we begin (Baudrillard 2001: 119). This paper examines Baudrillard’s assertion, made in later works includingImpossible Exchange (2001), The Intelligence of Evil (2005) and Pyres of Autumn(2006), that individuals, society and indeed the global system, are internally and irreconcilably divided, that modernity is ‘at odds with itself’ (Baudrillard 2006: 1). In his view dissent, rejection and insurrection emerge from within, not from external challenges such as alternative ideologies or competing worldviews, but from within bodies, within borders, inside programmes. For Baudrillard much of the violence, hatred and discomfort visible around the globe can be understood as a latent but fundamental ‘silent insurrection’ against the global integrating system and its many pressures, demands and humiliations (2001: 106). This is anendogenic or intra-genic rejection, it emanates from within the system, from within individuals, even from within language, electronic systems and bodily cells, erupting as abreaction, metastasis and sudden reversal.[2](http://www2.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol-11_2/v11-2-pawlett.html#ft-endnote2) For Baudrillard then, despite the many simulations of external threat and enmity – radical Islam currently being the best example – the most dangerous threat lies within: ‘society faces a far harder test than any external threA2: that of its own absence, its loss of reality’ (2006: 1). The global order, conventionally labelled “capitalist”, is neutralising its values and structures, its ideologies disappear, its principles are sacrificed. Even the sense of “reality” produced by the abstract sign and by simulation models begin to disappear (2005: 67-73; 2009: 10-15). The goal is ‘integral reality’, a limitless operational project geared towards the total transcription of the world into virtuality: ‘everything is realised and technically materialised without reference to any principle or final purpose’ (2005: 18). Yet there is an internal war or “backlash” taking place between integralist violence which seeks ultimate control by eliminating all otherness, and duality. Duality, for Baudrillard, is “indestructible” and is manifest as the inevitable or destined re-emergence of otherness: of death, Evil, ambivalence, the ghosts of symbolic exchange, the accursed share within the system. The integrating system then suffers a ‘dissent working away at it from inside. It is the global violence immanent in the world-system itself which, from within, sets the purest form of symbolic challenge against it’ (2005: 22). This is a war or conflict that does not end, the outcome of which cannot be predicted or programmed. It is a war that is quite different from the disappearance of war into simulated non-events, such as occurred with the Gulf wars (Baudrillard 1995). Indeed, Baudrillard suggests, the deterrence of world wars, and of nuclear wars, does not result in peace, but in a viral proliferation of conflicts, a fractalisation of war and conflict into everyday, local, and ubiquitous terror (1993b: 27). This paper will examine Baudrillard’s position on internal rejection through two closely related themes: complicity and duality. Complicity, and the closely related term collusion, are themselves dual in Baudrillard’s sense. That is, complicity or collusion express an internal division or ‘duality’ which is not a simple opposition of terms. As is so often the case, Baudrillard’s position builds on his much earlier studies: Requiem For the Media (orig. 1972, in Baudrillard 1981: 164-184) had already argued that the dominance of the abstract sign and of simulation models meant that any critique of the system made through the channels of semiotic abstraction were automatically re-absorbed into the system. Any meaningful challenge must invent its own, alternative medium – such as the silk-screen printings, hand-painted notices and graffiti of May 1968 – or it will lapse into an ineffectual complicity with the system it seeks to challenge (Baudrillard 1981: 176). In his later work, Baudrillard’s emphasis on duality and complicity is extended much further, taking on global, anthropological and even cosmological dimensions, and increasingly complicity and collusion are seen as dual, as encompassing both acceptance and a subtle defiance. This paper examines the dual nature of complicity and collusion. It considers the influence of La Boetie’s notorious Essay on Voluntary Servitude on Baudrillard, seeking to draw out what is distinctive in Baudrillard’s position. The second section turns to the notion of duality, examining Good and Evil and Baudrillard’s assertion that attempts to eliminate duality merely revive or re-active it. Complicity implies a complexity of relations, and, specifically, the condition of being an accomplice to those in power. To be an accomplice is to assist in the committing of a crime. If the crime is murder, the term accomplice implies one who plans, reflects, calculates – but does not strike the lethal blow. The crime which is of particular interest to Baudrillard is, of course, the perfect crime: the elimination of otherness, of ambivalence, of duality, even of “reality” and of the abstract representational sign which enables a sense of “reality” (Baudrillard 1996). The global, integral, carnivalising and cannibalising system, which might loosely still be called capitalist, is at war against radical otherness or duality; yet, for Baudrillard, as duality lies at its heart, locked within its foundations, it is indestructible and emerges through attempts to eliminate it. If the system has been largely successful at eliminating external threats, it finds itself in an even worse situation: it is at war with itself. II. Complicity Complicity is a particularly slippery term. In the 1980s Baudrillard’s thought, mistakenly assumed to be “Postmodernist”, was argued to be complicit with capitalism, largely because it questioned the ability of dominant strands of Marxism and feminism to significantly challenge the capitalist system (Callinicos 1989; Norris 1992). At the same time, Baudrillard was alleging that the work of supposedly radical theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari (1984 orig. 1972) and Lyotard (1993 orig. 1974) was, with their emphasis on desire as productive and liberatory force, complicit with the mechanisms of advanced consumer capitalism (Baudrillard 1987: 17-20). So which branch of contemporary theory is most complicit with capitalism? Liberals, humanists and environmentalists who see their clothes stolen by mainstream politicians? Marxists and Communists who by refusing to update their thinking provide a slow moving target for right-wing snipers? Post- Modernists and Post-Structuralists who attack Enlightenment thought but refuse to speak of the human subject and so have “thrown the baby out with the bath water”? Network and complexity theory which flattens all phenomena and experience to a position on a grid, producing a very complex simplification? The list could go on but it is a question that cannot be answered because all critical theories are complicit with the system they critique. They fight on a terrain already demarcated by their opponents, a terrain on which they are beaten before they begin, one where the most compelling argument can always be dismissed as doom-mongering or irresponsible intellectualism. This includes Baudrillard’s own critical thinking, as he readily acknowledges (Baudrillard 2009a: 39). Further, and even more damaging to the project of critique, in a hegemonic or integral order the system solicits critique and it criticises itself, so displacing and making redundant the laborious attempts at academic critique. The latter continue, even proliferate, but with decreasing impact. So, what does Baudrillard mean by complicity with the global order? Baudrillard’s concern is primarily with complicity at the level of the form of the (capitalist) system, not at the level of belief, consent or allegiance to particular contents of capitalist life (consumer products, plurality of ‘lifestyles’, a degree of ‘tolerance’ etc.). Complicity is often seen, by critics of capitalism, as acceptance of consumerism and its myriad choices and lifestyles, but this is a reductive level of analysis from Baudrillard’s perspective. By complicity or collusion Baudrillard means, on the one hand, the very widespread willingness to surrender or give up beliefs, passions and “symbolic defences” (2010: 24), and on the other – as the dual form – an equally widespread ability to find a space of defiance through the play of complicity, collusion, hyperconformity and indifference (1983: 41-8). That is, while many of us (in the relatively affluent West) share in the profanating, denigrating and “carnivalising” of all values, embracing indifference, shrugging “whatever”, we do so with very little commitment to the system, rejoicing inwardly when it suffers reversals: we operate in a dual mode. While such attitudes of indifference may seem to accept that there is no meaningful alternative to capitalism: an attitude that has been called ‘capitalist nihilism’ (Davis in Milbank and Zizek, 2009) and ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher 2008), Baudrillard’s notions of “integral reality”, duality and complicity may have significant advantages over those approaches. Unlike thinkers who remain anchored to critical thinking defined by determinate negation, Baudrillard’s approach emphasises ambivalence, reversal and both personal and collective modes of rejection more subtle than those envisioned by the increasingly exhausted mechanisms of critique. The critique of consumer capitalism – the consumption of junk food, junk entertainment and junk information – is now integral to the system; the critique of finance capitalism – banker’s bonuses, corporate tax avoidance – is integral to the system, yet it fails to bring about meaningful or determinate social transformation. Indeed, such critiques may do no more than provide the system with a fleeting sense of “reality” – real issues, real problems to deal with – around which the system can reproduce its simulacra, perhaps to reassure us that “something is being done”, “measures are being put into place” etc. “Reality” cannot be dialectically negated by critical concepts when both ‘reality’ and the critical concept disappear together, their fates clearly tied to each other (Baudrillard 2009b: 10-12). There is a sense then in which the production of critique is in complicity with the system, the unravel-able proliferation and excess of critical accounts of the system has the effect of protecting the system. Complicity consists in a sharing of the denigration of all values, all institutions, all ideas, all beliefs: so long as we believe in nothing – at least not passionately – then the system has us, at least superficially. For example, in recent decades we have seen the denigration of religious faiths – or their reduction to ‘cultural identity’ and ‘world heritage’ objects; the denigration of public services and welfare provision accompanied by their marketisation; the denigration of the poor, the young, immigrants and the unemployed. Yet this is not only the denigration of the powerless or disenfranchised, there is also the widespread denigration of those seen as powerful: politicians, corporations, celebrities. For Baudrillard, it is quite inadequate to focus only on the power of global neo-liberal policies such as marketisation in these processes of denigration. This is where Baudrillard’s position departs decisively from anti-globalists and from neo-Communists such as Negri, Zizek, and Badiou. Global power has deliberately sacrificed its values and ideologies, it presents no position, it takes no stand, it undermines even the illusion that “free markets” function and has made “capital” virtual; become orbital it is removed from a terrestrial, geo-political or subjective space. These are protective measures enabling power to become (almost) hegemonic (Baudrillard 2009a: 33-56; 2010: 35-40). Baudrillard often emphasises the fragility and the vulnerability to reversal of the “powerful” and the distinction between powerful and powerless is radically questioned in his work. So what is this global power? Where is it? The answer, of course, is that it is everywhere and it is in everyone. We have not liberated ourselves from slavery, but, Baudrillard contends, internalised the masters: ‘[e]verthing changes with the emancipation of the slave and the internalisation of the master by the emancipated slave’ (2009a: 33). We tyrannise ourselves, for example by demanding that we maximise our opportunities, fulfill our potential. This is a deeper level of slavery – and complicity – than any previous historical system could inflict (Baudrillard 1975; 2009a: 33). Yet duality always re-emerges, Baudrillard insists: indifference is dual, complicity is dual. Carnivalisation and cannibalisation are themselves dual: the global system absorbs all otherness in a ‘forced conversion to modernity’ (2010: 5), reproducing otherness within the carnival of marketable “difference”, yet cannibalisation emerges as a reversion and derailing of this process. The world adopts Western models: economic, cultural, religious – or it appears to. Hidden within this complicity with the West, there is, Baudrillard suggests, a deeper sense of derision and rejection. The allegiance to Western models is superficial; it is a form of mimicry or hyperconformity that involves a ritual-like exorcism of the hegemonic system. Further, such mimicry reveals the superficiality of Western cultural and economic models: this is not only a superficial acceptance, but an acceptance of superficiality. Western values are already parodic, and, in being accepted, they are subject to further parody as they circulate around the globe (2010: 4-11). The West has deregulated and devalued itself and demands that the rest of the world follows: "It is everything by which a human being retains some value in his own eyes that we (the West) are deliberately sacrificing … [o]ur truth is always to be sought in unveiling, de-sublimation, reductive analysis …[n]othing is true if it is not desacralised, objectivised, shorn of its aura, dragged on to the stage" (Baudrillard 2010: 23). Western desacrilisation amounts to a powerful challenge to the rest of the world, a potlatch: desacralise in return or perish! But who has the power? Who is the victor? There isn’t one, according to Baudrillard. Of the global order, Baudrillard writes: ‘We are its hostages – victims and accomplices at one and the same time – immersed in the same global monopoly of the networks. A monopoly which, moreover – and this is the supreme ruse of hegemony – no one holds any longer’ (2010: 40). There is no Master, no sovereign because all the structures and dictates of power have been internalised, this is the complicity we all share with global order, yet it is a dual complicity: an over-eager acceptance goes hand-in-hand with a deep and growing rejection. Baudrillard’s discussions of power, servitude and complicity make frequent reference to Estienne La Boetie’s essay on voluntary servitude, completed around 1554. The fundamental political question for La Boetie is: ‘how can it happen that a vast number of individuals, of towns, cities and nations can allow one man to tyrannise them, a man who has no power except the power they themselves give him, who could do them no harm were they not willing to suffer harm’ (La Boetie 1988: 38). It seems people do not want to be free, do not want to wield power or determine their own fates: ‘it is the people who enslave themselves’ (La Boetie 1988: 41). People in general are the accomplices of the powerful and the tyrannical, some profit directly through wealth, property, favour – ‘the little tyrants beneath the principal one’ (1988: 64), but many do not, why do they not rebel? Baudrillard takes up La Boetie’s emphasis on servitude being enforced and maintained from within, rather than from without. Yet, there are also major divergences. La Boetie deplores the “common people” for accepting the narcotising pleasures of drinking, gambling and sexual promiscuity, while Baudrillard rejects such elitism and celebrates the masses abilities to strategically defy those who would manipulate them through perverse but lethally effective practices such as silence, radical indifference, hyperconformity – dual modes of complicity and rejection (Baudrillard 1983: 1-61). Though La Boetie’s essay prefigures the development of the concept of hegemony, he never doubts that voluntary servitude is unnatural, a product of malign custom that is in contradiction with the true nature of human beings which is to enjoy a God-given freedom. Baudrillard, by contrast, examines voluntary servitude as a strategy of the refusal of power, a refusal of the snares of self and identity, as strategy of freedom from the tyranny of the will and the fiction of self-determination (Baudrillard 2001: 51-7). For Baudrillard the “declination” or refusal of will disarms those who seek to exert power through influencing or guiding peoples’ choices and feelings towards particular ends. It also allows for a symbolic space, a space of vital distance or removal, a space in which to act, or even act-out (of) a character (Baudrillard 2001: 72-3). This is a space where radical otherness may be encountered, a sense of shared destiny which is a manifestation of the dual form at the level of individual existence (Baudrillard 2001: 79). It could certainly be argued that modern subjects are confronted by a far more subtle and pervasive system of control than were the subjects discussed in La Boetie’s analysis. In theorising the nature of modern controls Baudrillard develops suggestive themes from La Boetie’s work. Speaking of slavery in the Assyrian empire, where, apparently, kings would not appear in public, La Boetie argues, ‘the fact that they did not know who their master was, and hardly knew whether they had one at all, made them all the more willing to be slaves’ (1988: 60). Whatever its historical provenance, this strategy of power is, it seems, generalised in modernity; particularly after the shift away from Fordist mass production it has become increasingly hard to detect who the masters actually are. While workers are persecuted by middle managers, supervisors, team leaders, project co-ordinators who are the masters of this universe? Who are the true beneficiaries? Rather than trying to identify a global neo-liberal elite, as do many proponents of anti-capitalist theory, Baudrillard suggests that the situation we confront is so grave because “we” (those in the West in relatively privileged positions) have usurped the position of masters; we have become the slave masters of ourselves, tyrannising every detail of our own lives: trying to work harder, trying for promotion or simply trying to avoid redundancy. We are all the accomplices of a trans-capitalist, trans-economic exploitation. We are all tyrants: a billion tiny tyrants servicing a system of elimination. But this is not to say that Baudrillard ignores power differentials altogether: ‘it is, indeed, those who submit themselves most mercilessly to their own decisions who fill the greater part of the authoritarian ranks, alleging sacrifice on their parts to impose even greater sacrifices on others’ (2001: 60-1). We all impose such violence on ourselves and on others as part of our daily routines, hence Baudrillard’s injunction to refuse power: ‘Power itself must be abolished – and not solely because of a refusal to be dominated, which is at the heart of all traditional struggles – but also, just as violently, in the refusal to dominate’ (2009a: 47). Yet, even on the theme of systemic violence and elimination, Baudrillard differs sharply from neo-communist theory, while retaining a position of defiance. Systemic eliminationism should not be conceived in individual or subjective terms, despite good points made in recent studies of work and education under neo-liberalism, such as Cederström and Fleming’s Dead Man Working (2012). At a formal level, neo-liberal eliminationism does not merely eliminate jobs and also lives (for example in the recent textile factory fires in Bangladesh), it eliminates meaning, symbolic space and thought. And it eliminates not by termination but by “ex-termination”. That is, by transcribing the world into integral reality, the system produces a single, meaning-depleted, virtual space which encourages participation, engagement and campaigning, on condition that these are produced as part and parcel of an integrated void where “[t]he real no longer has any force as sign, and signs no longer have any force of meaning” (Baudrillard 2001: 4). Most of the developed world has been conferred the right to blog and to tweet as they please and they are indebted to the system in a way which far exceeds the paying of a small tribute or rent to Microsoft or Apple (Zizek 2010: 233). The symbolic debt imposed by the modern world and its technologies is of a metaphysical or cosmological order. Through it we take leave of this world Baudrillard suggests, we become extra-terrestrials. We will recognise no Other, no singularity, no debt to anyone because we attempt to cancel everything out in an integral, technological system that has no outsides because it was, in a sense, created from the outside.

#### Capitalism is collapsing now – outweighs and turns all their impacts

George Monbiot 19 4-1-2019 Dare to declare capitalism dead – before it takes us all down with it [https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/25/capitalism-economic-system-survival-earth Accessed 4-21-2022](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/25/capitalism-economic-system-survival-earth%20Accessed%204-21-2022)] CSUF JmB

For most of my adult life I’ve railed against “corporate capitalism”, “consumer capitalism” and “crony capitalism”. It took me a long time to see that the problem is not the adjective but the noun. While some people have rejected capitalism gladly and swiftly, I’ve done so slowly and reluctantly. Part of the reason was that I could see no clear alternative: unlike some anti-capitalists, I have never been an enthusiast for state communism. I was also inhibited by its religious status. To say “capitalism is failing” in the 21st century is like saying “God is dead” in the 19th: it is secular blasphemy. It requires a degree of self-confidence I did not possess. But as I’ve grown older, I’ve come to recognise two things. First, that it is the system, rather than any variant of the system, that drives us inexorably towards disaster. Second, that you do not have to produce a definitive alternative to say that capitalism is failing. The statement stands in its own right. But it also demands another, and different, effort to develop a new system. Capitalism’s failures arise from two of its defining elements. The first is perpetual growth. Economic growth is the aggregate effect of the quest to accumulate capital and extract profit. Capitalism collapses without growth, yet perpetual growth on a finite planet leads inexorably to environmental calamity. Those who defend capitalism argue that, as consumption switches from goods to services, economic growth can be decoupled from the use of material resources. Last week a paper in the journal New Political Economy, by Jason Hickel and Giorgos Kallis, examined this premise. They found that while some relative decoupling took place in the 20th century (material resource consumption grew, but not as quickly as economic growth), in the 21st century there has been a recoupling: rising resource consumption has so far matched or exceeded the rate of economic growth. The absolute decoupling needed to avert environmental catastrophe (a reduction in material resource use) has never been achieved, and appears impossible while economic growth continues. Green growth is an illusion. A system based on perpetual growth cannot function without peripheries and externalities. There must always be an extraction zone – from which materials are taken without full payment – and a disposal zone, where costs are dumped in the form of waste and pollution. As the scale of economic activity increases until capitalism affects everything, from the atmosphere to the deep ocean floor, the entire planet becomes a sacrifice zone: we all inhabit the periphery of the profit-making machine. This drives us towards cataclysm on such a scale that most people have no means of imagining it. The threatened collapse of our life-support systems is bigger by far than war, famine, pestilence or economic crisis, though it is likely to incorporate all four. Societies can recover from these apocalyptic events, but not from the loss of soil, an abundant biosphere and a habitable climate. The second defining element is the bizarre assumption that a person is entitled to as great a share of the world’s natural wealth as their money can buy. This seizure of common goods causes three further dislocations. First, the scramble for exclusive control of non-reproducible assets, which implies either violence or legislative truncations of other people’s rights. Second, the immiseration of other people by an economy based on looting across both space and time. Third, the translation of economic power into political power, as control over essential resources leads to control over the social relations that surround them. In the New York Times on Sunday, the Nobel economist Joseph Stiglitz sought to distinguish between good capitalism, which he called “wealth creation”, and bad capitalism, which he called “wealth grabbing” (extracting rent). I understand his distinction. But from the environmental point of view, wealth creation is wealth grabbing. Economic growth, intrinsically linked to the increasing use of material resources, means seizing natural wealth from both living systems and future generations. To point to such problems is to invite a barrage of accusations, many of which are based on this premise: capitalism has rescued hundreds of millions of people from poverty – now you want to impoverish them again. It is true that capitalism, and the economic growth it drives, has radically improved the prosperity of vast numbers of people, while simultaneously destroying the prosperity of many others: those whose land, labour and resources were seized to fuel growth elsewhere. Much of the wealth of the rich nations was – and is – built on slavery and colonial expropriation. Like coal, capitalism has brought many benefits. But, like coal, it now causes more harm than good. Just as we have found means of generating useful energy that are better and less damaging than coal, so we need to find means of generating human wellbeing that are better and less damaging than capitalism. There is no going back: the alternative to capitalism is neither feudalism nor state communism. Soviet communism had more in common with capitalism than the advocates of either system would care to admit. Both systems are (or were) obsessed with generating economic growth. Both are willing to inflict astonishing levels of harm in pursuit of this and other ends. Both promised a future in which we would need to work for only a few hours a week, but instead demand endless, brutal labour. Both are dehumanising. Both are absolutist, insisting that theirs and theirs alone is the one true God. So what does a better system look like? I don’t have a complete answer, and I don’t believe any one person does. But I think I see a rough framework emerging. Part of it is provided by the ecological civilisation proposed by Jeremy Lent, one of the greatest thinkers of our age. Other elements come from Kate Raworth’s doughnut economics and the environmental thinking of Naomi Klein, Amitav Ghosh, Angaangaq Angakkorsuaq, Raj Patel and Bill McKibben. Part of the answer lies in the notion of “private sufficiency, public luxury”. Another part arises from the creation of a new conception of justice based on this simple principle: every generation, everywhere, shall have an equal right to the enjoyment of natural wealth. I believe our task is to identify the best proposals from many different thinkers and shape them into a coherent alternative. Because no economic system is only an economic system but intrudes into every aspect of our lives, we need many minds from various disciplines – economic, environmental, political, cultural, social and logistical – working collaboratively to create a better way of organising ourselves that meets our needs without destroying our home. Our choice comes down to this. Do we stop life to allow capitalism to continue, or stop capitalism to allow life to continue?

#### Performance is not a mode of resistance – it gives too much power to the audience because the performer is structurally blocked from controlling the (re)presentation of their representations. Appealing to the ballot is a way of turning over one’s identity to the same reproductive economy that underwrites liberalism

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**Performance’s only life is in the present**. **Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own ontology**. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivityproposed here, becomes itself through disappearance. **The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to** thelaws of **the reproductive economy** **are enormous**. **For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions** **valued**. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressedby the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occursover a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, butthis repetition itself marks it as “different.” **The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present.** The other arts, especially painting and photography, are drawnincreasingly toward performance. The French-born artist Sophie Calle,for example, has photographed the galleries of the Isabella StewartGardner Museum in Boston. Several valuable paintings were stolen fromthe museum in 1990. Calle interviewed various visitors and membersof the muse um staff, asking them to describe the stolen paintings. She then transcribed these texts and placed them next to the photographs of the galleries. Her work suggests that the descriptions and memories of the paintings constitute their continuing “presence,” despite the absence of the paintings themselves. **Calle gestures toward a notion of the interactive exchange between** the **art** object **and the viewer**. **While such exchanges are** often recorded as **the stated goals** of museums and galleries, **the institutional effect** of the gallery often **seems to put the masterpiece under house arrest**, **controlling all conflicting and unprofessional commentary about it**. The speech act of memory and description (Austin’s constative utterance) becomes a performative expression when Calle places these commentaries within the 147 representation of the museum. The descriptions fill in, and thus supplement (add to, defer, and displace) the stolen paintings. The factthat these descriptions vary considerably—even at times wildly—onlylends credence to the fact that the interaction between the art objectand the spectator is, essentially, performative—and therefore resistantto the claims of validity and accuracy endemic to the discourse of reproduction. While the art historian of painting must ask if thereproduction is accurate and clear, Calle asks where seeing and memoryforget the object itself and enter the subject’s own set of personalmeanings and associations. Further her work suggests that the forgetting(or stealing) of the object is a fundamental energy of its descriptiverecovering. The description itself does not reproduce the object, it ratherhelps us to restage and restate the effort to remember what is lost. Thedescriptions remind us how loss acquires meaning and generatesrecovery—not only of and for the object, but for the one who remembers.The disappearance of the object is fundamental to performance; itrehearses and repeats the disappearance of the subject who longs alwaysto be remembered. For her contribution to the Dislocations show at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1991, Calle used the same idea but this time she asked curators, guards, and restorers to describe paintings that were on loan from the permanent collection. She also asked them to draw small pictures of their memories of the paintings. She then arranged the texts and pictures according to the exact dimensions of the circulating paintings and placed them on the wall where the actual paintings usually hang. Calle calls her piece Ghosts, and as the visitor discovers Calle’s work spread throughout the museum, it is as if Calle’s own eye is following and tracking the viewer as she makes her way through the museum.1 Moreover, Calle’s work seems to disappear because it is dispersed throughout the “permanent collection”—a collection which circulates despite its “permanence.” Calle’s artistic contribution is a kind of self-concealment in which she offers the words of others about other works of art under her own artistic signature. By making visible her attempt to offer what she does not have, what cannot be seen, Calle subverts the goal of museum display. She exposes what the museum does not have and cannot offer and uses that absence to generate her own work. By placing memories in the place of paintings, Calle asks that the ghosts of memory be seen as equivalent to “the permanent collection” of “great works.” One senses that if she asked the same people over and over about the same paintings, each time they would describe a slightly different painting. In this sense, Calle demonstrates the performative quality of all seeing. 148 I **Performance in a strict ontological sense is nonreproductive**. It is this quality which makes performance the runt of the litter of contemporary art. **Performance clogs the smooth machinery of reproductive representation necessary to the circulation of capital**. Perhaps nowhere was the affinity between the ideology of capitalism and art made more manifest than in the debates about the funding policies for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA).2 Targeting both photography and performance art, conservative politicians sought to prevent endorsing the “real” bodies implicated and made visible by these art forms. Performance implicates the real through the presence of living bodies. In performance art spectatorship there is an element of consumption: there are no left-overs, the gazing spectator must try to take everything in. Without a copy, live performance plunges into visibility—in a maniacally charged present—and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and control. Performance resists the balanced circulations of finance. It saves nothing; it only spends. While photography is vulnerable to charges of counterfeiting and copying, performance art is vulnerable to charges of valuelessness and emptiness. Performance indicates the possibility of revaluing that emptiness; this potential revaluation gives performance art its distinctive oppositional edge.3 To attempt to write about the undocumentable event of performance is to invoke the rules of the written document and thereby alter the event itself. Just as quantum physics discovered that macro-instruments cannot measure microscopic particles without transforming those particles, so too must performance critics realize that the labor to write about performance (and thus to “preserve” it) is also a labor that fundamentally alters the event. It does no good, however, to simply refuse to write about performance because of this inescapable transformation. The challenge raised by the ontological claims of performance for writing is to re-mark again the performative possibilities of writing itself. The act of writing toward disappearance, rather than the act of writing toward preservation, must remember that the after-effect of disappearance is the experience of subjectivity itself. This is the project of Roland Barthes in both Camera Lucida and Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes. It is also his project in Empire of Signs, but in this book he takes the memory of a city in which he no longer is, a city from which he disappears, as the motivation for the search for a disappearing performative writing. The trace left by that script is the meeting-point of a mutual disappearance; shared subjectivity is possible for Barthes because two people can recognize the same Impossible. To live for a love whose goal is to share the Impossible is both a humbling project and an exceedingly ambitious one, for it seeks to find connection only in that which is no longer there. Memory. Sight. Love. It must involve a full seeing of the Other’s absence (the ambitious part), a seeing which also entails the acknowledgment of the Other’s presence (the humbling part). For to acknowledge the Other’s (always partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own (always partial) absence. In the field of linguistics, the performative speech act shares with the ontology of performance the inability to be reproduced or repeated. “Being an individual and historical act, a performative utterance cannot be repeated. Each reproduction is a new act performed by someone who is qualified. Otherwise, the reproduction of the performative utterance by someone else necessarily transforms it into a constative utterance.”4 149 Writing, an activity which relies on the reproduction of the Same(the three letters cat will repeatedly signify the four-legged furry animalwith whiskers) for the production of meaning, can broach the frame of performance but cannot mimic an art that is nonreproductive. Themimicry of speech and writing, **the strange process by which we put words in each other’s mouths and others’ words in our own, relies on a substitutional economy in which equivalencies are assumed and re-established**. **Performance refuses this system of exchange and resists the circulatory economy fundamental to it**. **Performance honors the idea that a limited number of people in a specific time/space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no visible trace afterward**. **Writing about it** necessarily **cancels the “tracelessness**” **inaugurated within this performative promise. Performance’s independence from mass reproduction**, technologically, economically, and **linguistically**, **is its greatest strength.** But buffeted by the encroaching ideologies of capitaland reproduction, it frequently devalues this strength. Writing aboutperformance often, unwittingly, encourages this weakness and falls inbehind the drive of the document/ary. **Performance’s challenge** to writing**is to discover a way for repeated words to become performative utterances, rather than,** as Benveniste warned, **constative utterances**.

#### When confronted with the ethical injunction of the aff, respond with “I would prefer not to”—vote neg on presumption

Baudrillard 98 (Jean Baudrillard, “Present Considerations: The Uncertainty of All Value Systems” xx-xx-1998, GS)

It’s also the parody of political emancipation. Is capitalism for you the cold monster Simone Weil referred to when speaking of the State? Baudrillard: It’s a monster which is standing social liberation on its head. It’s capital now that’s emancipating itself from the workers! It’s parents who are liberating them­selves from their children! End of the Oedipus complex, end of the class struggle, in whose shade everything worked so well. All the flows are being reversed. The talk was all of freedom, of emancipation, of transforming as much fatality as possi­ble into liberty. Today, it’s evident that the great wave of liberation is simply the best way of giving the slaves back a bogus power arid freedom. Forced interaction: the masses now intervene directly in the event through the ratings and all the other immediate feedback devices: they’ve become interactive! And in opinion polls we’re all involved statistically: forced complicity. In any case, we’ve been interactive for a long time, like it or not, through all the automatic response systems we’re enslaved to. And the interactivity we’re being offered will never – by a long chalk – be the equal of the interactivity we already suffer: the col­lective interpassivity which the other form merely prolongs with information and communications technologies. This is why it’s impossible, in the interactive sphere, to raise the problem of free­dom and responsibility. People are almost amazed that they have children (are children ever amazed that they have parents?). They’re amazed at being responsible for them, as at many other things. They’re amazed at having to take charge of their own lives. They haven’t the heart for it any more; they’ve no convictions. In pre­sent conditions, they’re even amazed at having a body. There’s no longer any real basis for all that. It no longer imposes itself on the imagination or on consciousness as a value, nor even on the unconscious, as a fantasy. In this context, any responsi­bility or appeal to responsibility is surrealistic. They might just as well be amazed at having to seek work – as they might at being relay stations for lots of meaningless networks, the involuntary actors in a general interactive comedy – the targets for demands and questions for which they are merely the automatic answering machines. Petit: Are they amazed, at least, that they live in silent collusion with the powers that be? Baudrillard: Not even that, since they’re in collusion with a power which, strictly speak­ing, no longer even exists, which is even worse. Which is simultaneously invested and disinvested by everyone, like a revolving stage or a zero-sum variable geom­etry. Everyone plays along in the comedy of power (as in many others besides: the comedy of the social or of culture). But I retain the hope that there’s a double game going on here, both individual and collective. One ought to be able to pre­vent this situation from perpetuating itself, to disconnect it, break down the consensual sequence. But one can hardly have any illusions, either about the awareness generated or about revolt following. In a history in progress, you cre­ate an event if you anticipate, if you create more rapid conditions of development, and hence an explosive differential. In an involutive curve like ours, by attempting to speed up or correct the system you contribute to the involution. We’re trapped. We’re part of the automatic writing of the system. But there are uncon­scious forms of social upheaval and creeping revolt against this forced participation we’ve been speaking of. For example, there has gradually emerged recently into popular consciousness (unconsciousness) the (old, ’68) idea that consumption is a con. Petit: The consumer has supplanted the citizen, then. Hence, as you noted in your book of 1970,[2](https://baudrillardstudies.ubishops.ca/present-considerations-the-uncertainty-of-all-value-systems/#2) the intense guilt which attaches to this new style of hedonis­tic behaviour. Baudrillard: Even in the reptilian brain of the grass-roots consumer, it’s become clear, when faced with power’s economic ultimatum – consume, consume, or the machine will grind to a halt – that consumers have become hostages, guinea pigs. After the general mobilization of the worker, then the soldier, then the citizen in universal suffrage (vote any Way you like, but vote!), we now have the mobilization of the consumer. And, with it, new latent forms of resistance when those from whom one wishes to extort need, expenditure as a social obligation – having extorted speech, votes, sex and happiness from them – realize what, “embolic” power they have in relation to the system: quite simply to consume less – not out of conscientious objection, or even from political resolve, but as a self-defence reflex. Here’ again, an agonizing revision of the watchwords of modernity is in prospect – the watchwords of growth and welfare. It’s a revisionism, this refusal to consume, a social treason in the eyes of the dominant free-market liberalism. A new class struggle is beginning” (if the herd doesn’t want to graze, how is one to make one’s butter?) Petit: There is perhaps a new political economy to bring about. Reversibility can also take the form of the re-founding of the economic sphere. I’m thinking of the contaminated blood affair, mad cows, asbestos… Baudrillard: Is this still political economy? I think the two terms, the economic and the political, have mingled their determinations and, so to speak, imploded into one another. We’re in the postscript of a history or a political economy in which we’re dealing with the waste products of two centuries of capital and production, includ­ing human waste. For thirty years or more we’ve been engaged in the management of waste, in a politics and an economy of dejection – which clearly involves a cer­tain abjection – in an interminable enterprise of recycling, cleansing and laundering, and this, once again, includes human material. And not only in its social dimension, but in the reprocessing of the genetic capital of the species. The whole system of modernity has embarked upon repentance and assumed a victim’s perspective, as though we were dealing with a historical catastrophe of the human race that already existed, had already occurred, and the recycling of that catastro­phe. We’re all impersonal victims of this virtual catastrophe, this backfiring of capital and history, from which we re-emerge as its symptoms and its multiple waste products. Hence the agonizing revision of modernity in which we’re engaged, excluded from ourselves by the unconditional liberation of all our desires. In this sense, we’re in a fundamentally revisionist society. The whole century is currently in mourning for, and repenting, all the libera­tions it has desired and accommodated, all the bounds it has burst – everything it was enslaved to and is now orphaned by. All the gains of modernity and liberation in recession – sex, tobacco, alcohol, speed, abortions: activities which are now clan­destine, doomed to prohibition and apartheid, refused a residence permit or cloistered in reserves. A general revisionist movement and a tide now flowing the other way – for future generations, this will all doubtless form part of what they never knew (happiness or hell!) For us, at least, those things still had the time to exist. But with the precession of the prohibition, they will disappear from circula­tion without even having appeared. Similarly, with all the ideals of modernity, the ideals of the Enlightenment, of happiness, well-being and freedom, their technical realization amounts to a violent desublimation. All that was liberated is currently being liquidated. Petit: Can’t one, then, liberate oneself from liberation? Baudrillard: The paradox of liberation is that the people liberated are never the ones you think: children, slaves, women or colonial peoples. It’s always the others liberating themselves from them, getting rid of them in the name of a principle of freedom and emancipation. Hence the dramatic concern of children to ensure that parents don’t stop being parents, or at least that they do so as late as possible. Hence the collective concern to beg the State not to stop being the State, to force it to take on its role, whereas it’s constantly trying to relinquish that role – and with good reason. The State is constantly “liberating” the citizens, urging them to look after themselves – something they generally don’t want to do at all. In this sense, we’re all potential Bartlebys: “I would prefer not to” Be free! Be responsible! Take responsibility for yourself! – “I would prefer not to”. Preferring not to, rather than willing something (Philippe Lançon, Libération). Preferring not to any more. Not to run any more, or compete, or consume, and not, at any price, to be free. This is all part of the pattern of a repentance of modernity, of a subtle indifference which senses the dangers of a responsibility and an emancipation which are too good to be true. Hence the currently triumphant sentimental, familial, political and moral revisionism, which can take on the more violent aspect of a “reac­tionary” hatred of oneself or others, the product of the disillusionment that follows liberatory violence. This opposite tide, this “regressive” resublimation, is the con­temporary form – and, so to speak, the consequence – of the repressive desublimation analysed by Marcuse. Decidedly, freedom isn’t simple, and liberation even less so.