## 1NC Round 3

### 1

#### The affirmative is invested in a will to transparency and global modus venvindi which seeks the maximization of norms and satellization of the planet through the installation of a universal security apparatus. Their cooperation over the peaceful use of space succumbs to an understanding of war as reality that expands the operational function of liquidation beyond the atmosphere. Be skeptical of their attachment to transparency, empirical reality, and necessity of security as the search for mastery normalizes an impulse to conquer alterity and produces the very conditions for its collapse.

Baudrillard 83 (Jean Baudrillard, who is he really. *Simulations* translated by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman 1983)DR 19

The "space race" played exactly the same role as the nuclear race. This is why it was so easily able to take over from it in the '60's (Kennedy Khrushchev), or to develop concurrently in a mode of "peaceful coexistence." For what is the ultimate function of the space race, of lunar conquest, of satellite launchings, if not the institution of a model of universal gravitation, of satellisation, whose perfect embryo is the lunar module: a programmed microcosm, where nothing can be left to chance? Trajectory, energy, computation, physiology, psychology, the environment - nothing can be left to contingency, this is the total universe of the norm - the Law no longer exists, it is the operational immanence of every detail which is law. A universe purged of every threat to the senses, in a state of asepsis and weightlessness - it is this very perfection which is fascinating. For the exaltation of the masses was not in response to the lunar landing or the voyage of man in space (this is rather the fulfillment of an earlier dream) - no, **we are dumbfounded by the perfection of their plannin**g and **technical manipulation**, by the immanent wonder of programmed development. Fascinated by the maximisation of norms and by the mastery of probability. Unbalanced by the model, as we are by death, but without fear or impulse. For if the law, with its aura of transgression, if order, with its aura of violence, still taps a perverse imaginary, then the norm fixes, hypnotises, dumbfounds, causing every imaginary to involve. We no longer fantasise about every minutia of a program. Its observance alone unbalances. The vertigo of a flawless world. The same model of planned infallibility, of maximal security and deterrence, now governs the spread of the social. That is the true nuclear fallout: the meticulous operation of technology serves as a model for the meticulous operation of the social. Here, too, **nothing will be left to chance**; moreover, this is the essence of socialisation, which has been going on for some centuries but which has now entered into its accelerated phase, towards a limit people imagined would be explosive (revolution), but which currently results in an inverse, irreversible, implosive process: a generalised deterrence of every chance, of every accident, of every transversality, of every finality, of every contradiction, rupture or complexity **in a sociality illuminated by the norm** and **doomed to the transparency of detail radiated by datacollecting mechanisms**. In fact, the spatial and nuclear models do not even have their own ends: **neither has lunar exploration**, nor **military and strategic superiority**. Their truth lies in their being models of simulation, **vector models of a system of planetary control** (where even the super-powers of this scenario are not free-the whole world is satellised). 8 Reject the evidence: **with satellisation**, the one who is satellised is not whom you might think. By the orbital inscription of a space object, the **planet earth becomes a satellite**, the terrestrial principle of reality becomes excentric, hyperreal and insignificant. By the orbital establishment of **a system of control like peaceful coexistence**, all terrestrial microsystems are satellised and lose their autonomy. All energy, all events are absorbed by this excentric gravitation, **everything condenses and implodes on the micro-model of control** alone **(the orbital satellite),** as conversely, in the other, biological dimension everything converges and implodes on the molecular micromodel of the genetic code. Between the two, caught between the nuclear and the genetic, in the simultaneous assumption of the two fundamental codes of deterrence, every principle of meaning is absorbed, every deployment of the real is impossible. The simultaneity of two events in July 1975 illustrates this in a striking way: **the linkup in space** of the two American and Soviet super-satellites, apotheosis of peaceful existence - and the suppression by the Chinese of character writing and conversion to the Roman alphabet. This latter signifies the "orbital" establishment of an abstract and model system of signs, into whose orbit will be reabsorbed all those once remarkable and singular forms of style and writing. The satellisation of their tongue: this is the way the Chinese enter the system of peaceful coexistence, which is inscribed in their sky at the very same time by the docking of the two satellites. The orbital flight of the Big Two, the neutralisation and homogenisation of everybody else on earth. **Yet, despite this deterrence by the orbital authority** - the nuclear code or molecular-events continue at ground level, mishaps are increasingly more numerous, despite the global process of contiguity and simultaneity of data. **But, subtly,** these events no longer make any sense; they are nothing more than a duplex effect of simulation at the summit. The best example must be the Vietnam war, since it was at the crossroads of a maximal historical or "revolutionary" stake and the installation of this deterrent authority. **What sense did that war make**, if not that its unfolding sealed the end of history in the culminating and decisive event of our age? **Why did such a difficult, long and arduous war vanish overnight as if by magic?** Why didn't the American defeat (the greatest reversal in its history) have any internal repercussions? If it had truly signified a setback in the planetary strategy of the USA, it should have necessarily disturbed the internal balance of the American political system. But no such thing happened. Hence **something else took place**. Ultimately this war was only a crucial episode in a peaceful coexistence. It marked the advent of China to peaceful coexistence. **The long sought-after securing and concretising of China's non-intervention**, China's apprenticeship in a global modus vivendi, the passing from a strategy of world revolution to one of a sharing of forces and empires, the transition from a radical alternative to political alternation in a now almost settled system (normalisation of PekingWashington relations): all this was the stake of the Vietnam war, and in that sense, the USA pulled out of Vietnam but they won the war. And the war "spontaneously" came to an end when the objective had been attained. This is why it was de-escalated, demobilised so easily. The effects of this same remolding are legible in the field. The war lasted as long as there remained unliquidated elements irreducible to a healthy politics and a discipline of power, even a communist one. When finally the war passed from the resistance to the hands of regular Northern troops, it could stop: it had attained its objective. Thus the stake was a political relay. When the Vietnamese proved they were no longer bearers of an unpredictable subversion, it could be handed over to them. That this was communist order wasn't fundamentally serious: it had proved itself, it could be trusted. They are even more effective than capitalists in liquidating "primitive" precapitalist and antiquated structures. Same scenario as in the Algerian war. The other aspect of this war and of all wars since: behind the armed violence, the murderous antagonism between adversaries - which seems a matter of life and death, and which is played as such (otherwise you could never send out people to get smashed up in this kind of trouble), behind this simulacrum of a struggle to death and of ruthless global stakes, the two adversaries are fundamentally as one against that other, unnamed, never mentioned thing, whose objective outcome in war, with equal complicity between the two adversaries, is total liquidation. It is tribal, communal, pre-capitalist structures, every form of exchange, language and symbolic organisation which must be abolished. Their murder is the object of war - and in its immense spectacular contrivance of death, war is only the medium of this process of terrorist rationalisation by the social - the murder through which sociality can be founded, **no matter what allegiance**, communist or capitalist. The total complicity or division of labour between two adversaries (who can even make huge sacrifices to reach that) for the very purpose of remolding and domesticating social relations. "The North Vietnamese were advised to countenance a scenario of the liquidation of the American presence through which, of course, honour must be preserved." The scenario: the extremely heavy bombardment of Hanoi. The intolerable nature of this bombing should not conceal the fact that it was only a simulacrum to allow the Vietnamese to seem to countenance a compromise and Nixon to make the Americans swallow the retreat of their forces. The game was already won, nothing was objectively at stake but the credibility of the final montage. **Moralists about war**, champions of war's exalted values should not be greatly upset: a war is not any the less heinous for being a mere simulacrum - the flesh suffers just the same, and the dead ex-combatants count as much there as in other wars. That objective is always amply accomplished, like that of the partitioning of territories and of disciplinary sociality. What no longer exists is the adversity of adversaries, **the reality of** antagonistic causes, the ideological seriousness of war - also the reality of defeat or victory, war being a process whose triumph lies quite beyond these appearances. In any case, the pacification (or deterrence) dominating us today is beyond war and peace, **the simultaneous equivalence of peace and war.** "War is peace," said Orwell. Here, also, the two differential poles implode into each other, or recycle one another - a simultaneity of contradictions that is both the parody and the end of all dialectic. Thus it is possible to miss the truth of a war: namely, that it was well over before reaching a conclusion, that at its very core, war was brought to an end, and that perhaps it never ever began. Many other such events (the oil crisis, etc,) never began, never existed, except that artificial mishaps - abstracts, ersatzes of troubles, catastrophes and crises intended to maintain a historical and psychological investment under hypnosis. All media and the official news service only exist to maintain the illusion of actuality - of the reality of the stakes, of the objectivity of the facts. All events are to be read in reverse, where one perceives (as with the communists "in power" in Italy, the posthumous, "nostalgic" rediscovery of gulags and Soviet dissidents like the almost contemporary rediscovery, by a moribund ethnology, of the lost "difference" of Savages) that all these things arrive too late, with an overdue history, a lagging spiral, that they have exhausted their meaning long in advance and only survive on an artificial effervescence of signs, that all these events follow on illogically from one another, with a total equanimity towards the greatest inconsistencies, with a profound indifference to their consequences (but this is because there are none any more: they burn out in their spectacular promotion) - thus the whole newsreel of "the present" gives the sinister impression of kitsch, retro and porno all at the same timedoubtless everyone knows this, and nobody really accepts it. The reality of simulation is unendurable - more cruel than Artaud's Theatre of Cruelty, which was still an attempt at a dramaturgy of life, the last flickering of an ideal of the body, blood and violence in a system already sweeping towards a reabsorption of all the stakes without a trace of blood. For us the trick has been played. All dramaturgy, and even all real writing of cruelty has disappeared. Simulation is master, and nostalgia, the phantasmal parodic rehabilitation of all lost referentials, alone remain. Everything still unfolds before us, in the cold light of deterrence (including Artaud, who is entitled like all the rest to his revival, to a second existence as the referential of cruelty).

**International cooperation over debris is an ideological smokescreen for neoconservative practices and capital fixes – debris risk is incalculable and their collision cascade arguments are a fantasy, but their modelling practice secures a social fantasy of threat that enables imperial transcendence.**

**Ormord, 12** (James, School of Applied Social Science, University of Brighton, “Beyond world risk society? A critique of Ulrich Beck’s world risk society thesis as a framework for understanding risk associated with human activity in outer space.” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2013, volume 31, pages 727 – 744)

Prior to the Iridium–Cosmos collision experts placed the odds of two objects larger than ten centimetres in diameter colliding in space at “millions, maybe even billions, to one” (Rincon, 2009). The chances of damage being sustained by operational objects as they collide with smaller objects are much higher, at 1–10%; this may be their single greatest threat (Rex, 1998; Williamson, 2006; Wright, 2009, page 6). A United Nations report in 1999 brought together a range of measurements and statistical models from different agencies in an attempt to draw up a risk assessment. These models “did not agree quantitatively because of differences in assumptions and starting conditions” (UN, 1999, page 25). But despite this, it concluded that collision risk in Low Earth Orbit (less than 2000 kilometres) was “not great”, and the collision risk in Geostationary Orbit was “correspondingly lower”. However, all were also agreed that the number of major collisions would rise exponentially if current trends continued. This is based on the understanding that because it takes a long time to disperse, debris created from one impact will go on to create more impacts in a ‘collision cascade’, referred to as the ‘Kessler Syndrome’ (Brearley, 2005; Williamson, 2006; Wright, 2009). In a 2006 report NASA referred to this situation as “supercritical” (Wright, 2009). Modelling this effect adds to the complexity of a risk assessment already understood to be limited by knowledge of current amounts of debris and of how spacecraft respond to impacts that “do not fall into categories normally known from solid-state physics” (Rex, 1998, page 100; UN, 1999). To these difficulties in modelling the physical risks to spacecraft should be added the impossibility of establishing the social and economic consequences of a collision cascade in Geostationary Orbit, which one author describes as a (limited) resource “necessary to human life” as “the space ... which allows contemporary communication practices to exist” (2) Geostationary Orbit exists at an altitude of 35 786 kilometres at which satellites appear stationary from Earth. See Collis (2009) for a useful discussion of its legal geography. (Collis, 2009, pages 55 and 49). Expert opinion has suggested a collision cascade “could take out world communications” (Ellis, 2009). Outer space was once considered inexhaustible. It is now being realised that the development of outer space has been unevenly concentrated in key regions (see MacDonald, 2007), with implications for thinking of outer space as a ‘common pool resource’. Debris might impede the use of space within a generation as the unintended consequences of human activity undermine its promise (Benko and Schrogl, 1997a). Earth’s orbit now has to be seen as a ‘fragile environment’ for human activity (Benko and Schrogl, 1997a; Williamson, 2006). A 1972 UN Convention established that the ‘launching state’ is liable for any damage caused by its activities or by nongovernmental entities operating under its jurisdiction. In terms of damage caused by debris in outer space, if fault can be established then financial reparation must be made to restore damage to people or property. There is therefore, in principle, a mechanism for establishing accountability. Lotta Viikari (2008) still holds out hope for the development of Environmental Impact Assessments and the extension of ‘polluter pays’ principles to space debris (page 20). This convention breaks down, however, in a ‘supercritical’ space environment in which it becomes increasingly difficult for a claims commission to establish cause, fault, and damages (Zhao, 2004). Due to the impossibility of establishing fault, no claims for compensation have ever been settled in regard to space debris (Kai-Uwe Schrogl, personal communication, October 2010). As international law only considers direct damage between states and their corporations, there is no incentive to protect the space environment itself (Brearley, 2005, page 26). As the shortcomings of the system of accountability have become increasingly apparent, measures to address the space debris issue have been agreed by international bodies. NASA guidelines having already been established following a commitment by President Reagan (in consultation with industry), the 1999 UN report detailed a number of possible strategies for dealing with the space debris issue. Firstly, space objects should avoid releasing debris as part of their normal operations, avoid on-orbit explosion (eg, by venting energy sources), and be disposed of at the end of their lifetimes, either by reducing their orbit so that they reenter the atmosphere more quickly or by moving them to a ‘disposal’ or ‘graveyard’ orbit further from the Earth, though neither is risk-free (Rex, 1998). Secondly, space object designers should protect them with adequate shielding and collision avoidance mechanisms. Many of these guidelines have since been reiterated in 2002 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee guidelines and were eventually accepted by the UN in 2008. The possibility but incalculability of a future collision cascade is a prime example of late-modern risk. It is particularly interesting to note that the reports were also marked by the paradox of risk modelling in a reflexive society (Beck, 2009, page 136): scientists attempted to incorporate responses to their predictions into the predictions themselves, thus reducing the predicted risk on which these responses were supposedly based. But the degree of voluntary **international cooperation** in response to the issue of space debris appears to vindicate Beck’s optimism about a cosmopolitanism ‘from above’, shared with others such as David Held [and echoed in regard to space debris by David Wright (2009, page 10)]. **There are, however, reasons to be sceptical**. In an excellent paper on sovereignty in outer space, Jill Stuart (2009) contrasts Held’s (2002) cosmopolitan sovereignty with regime theories based on the Realpolitik of state confrontation [or Everett Dolman’s (2002) ‘Astropolitik’, on which see Fraser MacDonald (2007) for a critique]. Cosmopolitan sovereignty is based on a cosmopolitan consciousness both influencing and influenced by **international cooperation** in outer space (eg, the International Space Station). Stuart argues that the declining importance of the nation-state resonates with the ‘overview effect’ of viewing a borderless Earth from space (White, 1987). Despite her optimism, Stuart is aware that there are serious issues with Held’s cosmopolitanism, especially when applied to outer space. There is good reason to believe that the **apparent** **cosmopolitanism** of human activity in outer space is an **ideological smokescreen** behind which **neoconservative policies** are being pursued (see, for example, Caldicott, 2002). In his analysis of images of Earth taken from space, Denis Cosgrove (1994) identifies both a ‘One World’ discourse that views a globally connected world as the project of a modern Christian American **imperialism**, and a ‘Whole Earth’ vitalist environmentalism that sees Earth as fragile, isolated organic unity. “Each”, however, “effectively exemplifies the Apollonian urge to re-establish a **transcendental**, univocal, and universally valid vantage point from which to sketch a totalising discourse” (page 288). Both thus erase locality. Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1996) also tears apart the ‘spaceship Earth’ ideology reflected in White’s overview effect, arguing that **the illusion of a unified Earth serves only to disguise inequalities of power**. **The lack of accountability** for space debris actually **polarises** international interest in **space debris mitigation**. States such as **the US** that rely on the ‘space operating environment’ **to exercise control over social order** (see Dickens and Ormrod, 2009), and that have an economic interest in maintaining **capital growth** in outer space, have a long-term interest in mitigating against debris [although the US withholds high-quality data because of security concerns (Rincon, 2009)]. States with only a short-term interest in space, such as Indonesia, have not been willing to mitigate space debris (Benko and Schrogl, 1997a). **Rational actor theory** has been employed to argue both that the major spacefaring nations will be willing to mitigate space debris voluntarily (Brearley, 2005) and that international agreements are necessary (Viikari, 2008). Such theory reaches its limits here as it cannot cope with the differing political and economic interests within states and their temporal nature. Even when alliances and agreements hold, it must be questioned whether the current trajectory of space debris mitigation serves the interests of a global public. As Enzensberger (1996) observes, industrial measures to protect the environment either serve to concentrate capital in the hands of larger companies as smaller companies cannot finance their own mitigation systems, or they manifest themselves as costs to the public (page 26). Viikari (2008, page 24) suggests **the former is also true of competing spacefaring states**. Viikari nonetheless advocates a system wherein ‘environmental losers’ could receive other benefits. Neil Smith (2009) anticipates the developmentof **outer space** becomingthe next stage in the extensive **expansion of capitalism**. He also makes clear, in relation to carbon trading on Earth, that a system such as Viikari proposes would neither protect the nearby space environment nor spread the benefits of space activity more equally (it merely represents ‘**the vertical integration of nature into capital’**). The costs borne by the public, meanwhile, include those associated with debris-monitoring and with state mission compliance with international guidelines. There has also been discussion of developing lasers, tethers, and slings to drag debris out of orbit (ESA, 2005), all of which introduce their own forms of risk. A contract to develop such technology would benefit one space technology company or another but the cost would be borne by the public, as recently demonstrated by NASA’s $1.9 million award to Star Technology and Research to develop the ElectroDynamic Debris Eliminator (Chang, 2012). **Commercial sector compliance** with voluntary codes of practice **is** understandably **low** as **it can be extremely costly and organisations** within the sector **cannot be held responsible** in the event of catastrophe. Nor does capital, as an abstract and fluid entity, have any interest in the long-term future of the space environment. **Satellites fix capital for a decade, but their investors have no concern for the future beyond this**. Whether or not guidelines are forced on commercial operators will depend on the relationship between states or suprastates and capital. While the costs of mitigation are seen to undermine commercial viability it is unlikely that procedures will become compulsory. This includes the possibility of a launch tax, which would fly in the face of legislative trends in US space policy. Compulsory measures are more likely, however, if major stakeholders in the space industry become the ones to profit from them. European company EADS Astrium has funded £1 million in research into the CubeSail project at the Surrey Space Centre in the UK. The CubeSail is intended to drag satellites out of orbit at the end of their lifetimes. EADS is a major state contractor as well as a commercial operator. France has recently made it law that satellites under its jurisdiction must be deorbited after twenty-five years. There are profits to be made by Astrium if other countries follow suit. The politics of space debris call into question Beck’s assertion that the old alliances between the state, capital, and science are over. In recent work, Beck (2005, page 138) makes clear that he believes **the transnational logic of capital trumps the power of states**. But this work lacks the attention to the complexity of relationships between neoliberal and neoconservative politics that characterises the work of David Harvey (2003). Harvey argues that states vacillate historically between protecting regional interests and opening borders. The creation of larger and larger alliances of states is one potential outcome of this process. It may be that international state alliances in one form or another take responsibility for space debris. But Harvey reminds us that, firstly, these ‘cosmopolitan’ agreements do not represent the public interest but exist to safeguard capital accumulation, and, secondly, that they are always prone to dissolution. **None of the parties involved support the measure most certain to improve orbital pollution, which is to stop (or limit) the launch of objects into orbit** (UN, 1999). Instead, the solutions being pursued only serve to deepen the contradiction between those who benefit from risk mitigation and those who bear the costs. As attention to the problem grows, **the perceived impending catastrophe appears to demand an immediate technological solution that actually obscures the politics at work** [see de Goede and Randalls (2009); see also Swyngedouw (2007) on catastrophism and climate change].

#### The aff’s invocation of a cosmopolitan transnational worldview derives from modern conception of the human as self-authoring, sovereign, and rational driver of human progress. Calls for cosmopolitan orientations legitimate those already in possession of global capacity to define the global order, reproducing and intensifying a bifurcated global citizenship on the lines of Man.

Jabri 11 [Vivienne Jabri is a professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College - London. “Cosmopolitan politics, security, political subjectivity.” European Journal of International Relations, Vol 18, No 4. P 625-644.]

**The cosmopolitan worldview is narrated** across regions and cultures, so that a term that has its origins in ancient Greece can be thought of **as encompassing an attitude** or a mode of being **that is receptive to difference, extending care and hospitality towards the stranger.** From Diogenes to Ibn Khaldun to Tagore, the idea of the **cosmopolitan** as a form of being that is at once of the world and of locality **is** also evocative of **an ethos of mutual recognition, interconnection and ethical commitment.** However, as noted by Sheldon Pollock et al. (2000: 577), ‘cosmopolitanism is not some known entity existing in the world, with a clear genealogy from the Stoics to Immanuel Kant, that simply awaits more detailed description at the hands of scholarship’. Nevertheless, **attempts** to somehow ground cosmopolitanism, to confer it a fixed meaning, **to transform this meaning into a political project, derives from a distinctly modern conception of ‘man’ as a self-authoring entity whose rationality is the essential driver of human progress.** If cosmopolitanism is conceived as a modern project, the challenge is then to trace the political and its modes of expression in the different forms that cosmopolitanism takes. The aporia that lies at the heart of cosmopolitanism is revealed when we consider how the concept can performatively generate two quite different, but interrelated possibilities. One possibility, as will be shown below, is that of security, and the other is that of solidarity. Both possibilities invoke the global as a terrain of action, of intervention, so that the subjectivities invoked by the concept include the one who acts, or seeks to act, upon the global as a terrain of humanity, but also with this humanity, and the one acted upon, but also with. Genealogically, as Stephen Toulmin highlights, the idea of the ‘cosmopolis’ seeks to ‘give a comprehensive account of the world, so as to bind things together in “politico-theological”, as much as in scientific or explanatory terms’ (Toulmin, 1990: 128), an account that at the dawn of modernity, in 17th-century Europe, places a premium on the certain and the rational over the uncertain and the emotional. While the genealogical backdrop to the concept is beyond the remit of this article, it is important to highlight the idea that the concept of the cosmopolitan, or the cosmopolitical, brings forth, or enables, a conception of the global as a terrain of action. But what form does such action take? And what are the conditions of possibility that confer primacy to certain forms of action over others, certain forms of subjectivity over others? For David Chandler (2009b), to invoke the ‘global’ as a terrain of politics is ‘ideological’ rather than being premised on empirical investigation of how it is that individuals and groups come to conceive of themselves as political beings beyond their locality. Only through such empirical investigation can we discern how the ‘global’ comes to constitute subjects as political beings. While I fully concur with this call, I want to take a different approach to the question of invocations of the global. I do so by thinking of such invocations in terms of the performative element of the concept of the cosmopolitan; what the concept enables. In writing critically and genealogically on the concept of ‘global civil society’, Jens Bartelson (2006: 372) argues that ‘Rather than asking what the concept of global civil society might mean and what kind of institutions and practices it might refer to, we should ask what is done by means of it — what kind of world is constituted, and what kind of beliefs, institutions and practices can be justified, through the usage of this concept?’ This is the approach I wish to take in relation to the concept of cosmopolitanism and ask what is done by means of it. Much of what is understood today as **the cosmopolitan project has its genesis in the trajectory of liberal thought, from the Enlightenment to the present** (Fine, 2003). Indeed the conceptual schema that came to define the Enlightenment provides an indication of the distinguishing political content of liberal cosmopolitanism. As argued by Koselleck (1988: 121–122), the 18th century saw the rise of the ‘concept of criticism’ and its ‘growing political importance’ as it made its target of critique not just the Church, but the absolutist state, so that the ‘yardstick’ (1988: 8) by which Enlightenment thought could be measured was its opposition to absolutist rule, an opposition that found expression in dualisms that though challenged, nevertheless inform much thinking to the present; nature versus culture, the domestic and the international, epistemology and ethics, the latter and politics. This is the context within which the cosmopolitan imagination could be given political and juridical content, one that, as in Kant for example, could see the driving imperative of security as being complicit not just in the affirmation of bounded political community, but also in the legislation of its limits.7 While Kant’s ontological and epistemological commitments reveal the trajectory of his thought in arriving at his conception of ‘cosmopolitan right’ (see Williams, 1992; cf. Bartelson, 1995), what is important to highlight in the context of this article is that, **in Kant, humanity is compelled, for purposes of reason and of nature, to ‘discover’ and ‘reinforce’ what he refers to as a ‘cosmopolitan system of general political security’** (Kant, 1970: 49). **This in turn must be related to a historical context that saw the elevation of critique as the defining feature of Enlightenment thought, and as a vehicle towards the management of uncertainty. The critique of the absolutist state makes possible, indeed legitimizes, not just the transformation of the internal, but also the external, government of the state and the limitation of its power.** **This regulative aspect of the cosmopolitan must also be understood in constitutive terms, as producing a particular kind of state or polity**, one that has a self-understanding of critical limits to rule, both internal and external. Witnessed in its contemporary articulations, we see the concept of cosmopolitanism rendered in both normative and descriptive terms. However, what is important to highlight is the question of what is done by means of the concept. Nowhere in recent discourse is the binding of the world in security terms more apparent than in the so-called ***Princeton Project of National Security***, co-authored by Ikenberry and Slaughter (2006). This project **advocates a** ‘Concert of Democracies’, a **coalition of liberal democratic states that might come to oversee global security and guarantee its protection in the face of threats from the world’s unstable, undemocratic regions. Any transformation** of these latter parts of the world, ‘bringing governments up to PAR’, as the authors put it,8 **must first and foremost see the wholesale transformation of their societies so that they come to aspire towards and realize the promise of democracy, domestically in the form of governance structures that are answerable to the rights of individuals and the welfare of societies, and internationally in the form of acceptance and recognition in conformity with the demands of a liberal global order**: ‘Liberty requires order, and order, at some level, must be able to harness force’ (Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006: 20). Distinctions are clearly drawn in these statements, so that there is a part of the world, not simply the West, but **the ‘democratic’**, that comes up to PAR, and **must be conferred the authority to act upon the** world, in word and deed, and another part, **the ‘undemocratic’, that can be reshaped through action in the name of global security.** A similar framing might be seen in the discourses of ‘risk’ and ‘liquid fear’ associated respectively with Ulrich Beck and Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman, 2006). While the ‘critical’ underpinnings of Beck and Bauman mean that their distinctions are not turned into the hierarchies apparent in Ikenberry and Slaughter, nevertheless the diagnostics reveal a similar premise that sees the ‘cosmopolitan moment’ emerging through risk and uncertainty and in the moment’s countervailing potential. Beck invokes Hannah Arendt in conceiving of this moment as a ‘new beginning’ comparable to the founding of the Athenian polis, the American founding fathers and the aftermath of the Holocaust, when he claims that the ‘Shock of danger is a call for a new beginning. Where there is a new beginning, there are new possibilities of action’ (Beck, 2009: 49). **The facticity of the cosmopolitan moment is**, in Beck, **contained in ‘world risk society’ just as its normativity is driven by the uncertainties that define risk in the contemporary late-modern era.** Framed in more sceptical tones, Bauman’s (2007) **critical sociology** of what he refers to as ‘liquid times’, **relates the desire for the containment of uncertainty with the ‘shared experience’ of ‘contemporary fears’**. While Beck and Bauman are reluctant to invoke hierarchies of agency in conceptualizing responses to this ‘shared experience’ of fear, Ikenberry and Slaughter are clear in their understanding of the location wherein global authority lies. A similar hierarchical conception of societies in terms of the capacity to govern might best be seen in the cosmopolitanism articulated in Habermas’s writings. Here we discern a picture of what can be done by means of the concept and the forms of political subjectivity that a cosmopolitanism of government generates or makes possible. **For liberal cosmopolitans like Habermas** (1997, 2001), **the actuality of a cosmopolitan global arena must be conferred positive force through law, seen as the pacifier of social relations and as guarantor of the human interest contained in a positive conception of human rights.** For Habermas (1997: 82), ‘cosmopolitan law’ must take precedence over ‘international law’ in that it alone ‘confers legal status to the individual subjects and justifies their unmediated membership in the association of free and equal world citizens’.However, **Habermas’s reference to ‘unmediated membership’ of a global citizenry belies his own reliance on the mediations of power that govern this global terrain.** **The legislative authority that reconfigures international space towards cosmopolitan law lies in the hands of agencies that are in possession of global reach**. For Habermas (1994), such l**egislative authority must have the backing of the ‘moral resources’ that derive from existing constitutional democracies, acting ‘on behalf of’ international institutions such as the UN, or directly, through security organizations such as NATO**. **The reconfiguration of the international does not, therefore, simply emerge as an inevitable consequence of transnational human interaction, but comes to acquire the force of law through situated practices and decisions made by sovereign entities in possession of the human, monetary and military resources necessary for the realization of a global liberal order.**9 There is, then, a disjuncture between the universal claims of a liberal cosmopolitan reconfiguration of the international, a reconfiguration that is authored by a particular set of states and their agents, variously the UN Security Council, NATO or ‘coalitions of the wiling’ as underwriters of Habermas’s ‘post-national constellation’ or Slaughter’s ‘Concert of Democracies’, and the claims to a ‘multi-layered citizenship’ made by those who aspire towards post-national political community.10 Where traditionally in liberal political thought, citizenship arises from a social contract authored by the citizens themselves, **in the context of cosmopolitan citizenship, it is only the few — those in possession of global capacity — who define the limits and remits of what constitutes universal space**. **This bifurcation of the world into those conferred the legislative authority to reconfigure international space and those not in possession of such authority is superimposed by another hierarchical division that sees the former as sources of security and the latter as distinct sources of threat**.11

#### When confronted with the ethical injunction of the aff, respond with “I would prefer not to”—vote neg on presumption

Baudrillard 98 (Jean, Ex-Prof of Media and Philosophy @ EGS, Paroxysm, p 60//shree)

JB: The paradox of liberation is that the people liberated are never the ones you think: children, slaves, women or colonial peoples. It’s always the others liberating themselves from them, getting rid of them in the name of a principle of freedom and emancipation. Hence the dramatic concern of children to ensure that parents don’t stop being parents, or at least that they do so as late as possible. Hence the collective concern to beg the State not to stop being the State, to force it to take on its role, whereas it’s constantly trying to relinquish that role—and with good reason. The State is constantly ‘liberating’ the citizens, urging them to look after themselves—something they generally don’t want to do at all. In this sense, we’re all potential Bartlebys: ‘I would prefer not to’. Be free! Be responsible! Take responsibility for yourself!—‘I would prefer not to’. Preferring not to, rather than willing something (Philippe Lancon, Liberation). Preferring not to any more. Not to run any more, or compete, or consume, and not, at any price, to be free. This is all part of the pattern of a repentance of modernity, of a subtle indifference which senses the dangers of a responsibility and an emancipation which are too good to be true. Hence the currently triumphant sentimental, familial, political and moral revisionism, which can take on the more violent aspect of a ‘reactionary’ hatred of oneself or others, the product of the disillusionment that follows liberatory violence. This opposite tide, this ‘regressive’ resublimation, is the contemporary form—and, so to speak, the consequence—of the repressive desublimation analysed by Marcuse. Decidedly, freedom isn’t simple, and liberation even less so.

## Case

### Mining

#### 1. Garcia just says that the US has not explicity banned asteriod mining - not that mining is increasing now in the squo - frame this contention through the lense that literally no-one is mining asteriods now which means the aff is solving a problem that doesn't exist yet.

#### 2. AND, Gent is in the context of lunar-mining - not asteroid mining which means they can't access their internal links.

#### 3. AND, Scoles isn't even about mining - it's about NASA re-directing asteriods which is something the affirmative can't solve and means if they are right about their impacts it's inevitable.

#### 4. McKnight is about collision of large objects, not mining - something the affirmative can't solve. Also we control uniqueness - no collision since card was written and Russia blowing up their satelleite didn't cause international war, which answers Johnson

#### 5. We control uniqueness on Ford too - satellites did nothing to stop COVID from spreading and there's already a global pandemic happening now which makes the impact scenarios non-unique. COVID proves that despite idiots no singular virus could knock-out the entire population of the globe.

#### 6. O'Donnel is describing what is happening in the squo - no scenarios for escalation means that you don't care about the impact, besides CFCs, HCFCs, halons, carbon tetrachloride, methyl chloroform and methyl bromide all prove the impact is inevitable

#### 7. Xu '20 is talking about states mining - not corporations - that means the impact happens post-aff and extinction is inevitable

.

**8. Time frame – Kessler effect 200 years away.**

Peter **Stubbe**, PhD in law @ Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt, **’17**, State Accountability for Space Debris: A Legal Study of Responsibility for Polluting the Space Environment and Liability for Damage Caused by Space Debris, Koninklijke Brill Publishing, ISBN 978-90-04-31407-8, p. 27-31

The prediction of possible scenarios of the future evolution of the debris p o p ulation involves many uncertainties. Long-term forecasting means the prediction of the evolution of the future debris environment in time periods of decades or even centuries. Predictions are based on models84 that work with certain assumptions, and altering these parameters significantly influences the outcomes of the predictions. Assumptions on the future space traffic and on the initial object environment are particularly critical to the results of modeling efforts.85 A well-known pattern for the evolution of the debris population is the so-called Kessler effect’, which assumes that there is a certain collision probability among space objects because many satellites operate in similar orbital regions. These collisions create fragments, and thus additional objects in the respective orbits, which in turn enhances the risk of further collisions. Consequently, the number of objects and collisions increases exponentially and eventually results in the formation of a self-sustaining debris belt around the Earth. While it has long been assumed that such a process of collisional cascading is likely to occur only in a very long-term perspective (meaning a time 1 n of several hundred years),87 a consensus has evolved in recent years that an uncontrolled growth of the debris population in certain altitudes could become reality much sooner.88 In fact, a recent cooperative study undertaken by various space agencies in the scope of i a d c shows that the current l e o debris population is unstable, even if current mitigation measures are applied. The study concludes:Even with a 90% implementation of the commonly-adopted mitigation measures [...] the l e o debris population is expected to increase by an average of **30% in the next 200 years.** The population growth is primarily driven by catastrophic collisions between 700 and 1000 km altitudes and such collisions are likely to occur every 5 to 9 years.89

#### 9. Their project of sustainability is only ever possible through homogenization as soldiers with green masks launch wars against those who don’t comply– this mythical construct frames any deviance as scum, creating a spiral of violence against that which refuses the sanitary natural order

Bauman 15. Whitney, Department of Religious Studies, Florida International University, Oxford JournalsArts & Humanities Jnl of the American Academy of Religion Volume 83, Issue 4Pp. 1005-1023. “Religion, Ecology, and the Planetary Other: Opening Spaces for Difference.” July 14, 2015

PART II: MIMESIS AND EXCEPTIONALISM: THE WORLD AS SACRIFICIAL STANDING RESERVE. Generalized imitation has the power to create worlds that are perfectly disconnected from reality: at once orderly, stable, and totally illusory. (Dupuy 2011: 209) In order to navigate the creative and destructive mechanism of mimesis, I argue that it is first necessary to distinguish between mimetic projects that attempt to create new worlds regardless of the rest of the natural world and those that are grounded in planetary systems. Obviously, the opening quote of this section suggests that mimesis in our meaning-making practices has the capacity to create orderly but illusory worlds. This, I would argue, is the mimetic function of something like the truth regime of the global mobiles outlined above. Of course, such mimetic processes—ones that ignore the evolving planetary context—ultimately create a lot of violence toward the rest of the natural world because the world becomes standing reserve, separated out from moral concern as that which is used in the project to re-create the orderly world of contemporary globalized capitalism. One can also see this type of mimesis at work in (abstract) foundations of gender and sexuality roles that are defined as “normal” (usually as heteronormative), and into which our bodies are forced. These types of mimesis force life into specific channels. To some extent, religions have played a large role in this process as well. However, religion ought not to be seen only in a negative light. Religions and philosophies also reveal the mimetic structure of our very imaginings as grounded in evolutionary mimetic structures, and part of ecological healing is the re-cognition of such groundings. Refusal of our Mimetic Entanglement How did we begin to refuse our embeddedness in larger cosmic and evolutionary mimetic structures? When did humans begin to regard humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world? This is, of course, a question that obviously cannot be answered; but some wagers can be made. Rather than lay the blame of domination on sexism, racism, anthropocentrism, or any other isms as the critical theories that I am in debt to tend to do, I would lay it on an emergent transition resulting from the space of mimetic excess. My reasons for this are that if one travels down the rabbit hole of searching for the ultimate source of the logic of domination that leads to all isms, then one has already committed him/herself to the idea that humans are (at least from that point on) really separate from the rest of the natural world. Not to mention one is already then committed to laying blame for oppressions onto a scapegoat: patriarchy, heterosexism, speciesism, or racism. In order to re-read humans as always and already a part of the natural world, I follow an idea put forth by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment (2007). Bruce Martin sums up their insight well. He writes: Human reason ‘degenerated’ as it imitated the nature it came to dominate; in so doing it created a vicious, lifeless circle of domination perpetuated by a ‘rational’ society that has come to dominate the individual as much as ‘nature’ ever did. (Martin 2011: 116) In other words, we could attribute our forward looking and deliberating brains that emerged from the rest of the evolutionary process and more specifically out of lines of hominids, to the location of our eyes in front of our skulls, our ears on the side of our heads that give us honing abilities, and our upright posture that made it easier for our ancestors to hunt. Such features orient us toward critically examining the evidence and making decisions toward and about things that are not immediately present or in the distance. These features, along with our opposable thumbs, set us up eventually in a fairly dominant position vis-à-vis other animals and species on the planet. These moments of mimetic excess or spaces of creative emergence eventually lead to hominization. As Girard notes, “We can conceive of hominization as a series of steps that allow for the domestication of progressively increasing and intense mimetic effects, separated from one another by crises that would be catastrophes but also generative in that they would trigger the founding mechanism and at each step provide for more rigorous prohibition within the group, and for a more ritual canalization toward the outside” (1987: 96).6 In other words, at each emergent level, an inside/outside is created that marks sameness off from that which is other. The patterns of sameness that led to success would be mimicked—as any useful evolutionary adaptation is—and over time the genetic lines that survived would see differences in brain structures that lead to something like critical reflection. Far from being intentional, such a “dominating” position is an emergent phenomenon from the spaces of mimetic excess when our species began taking advantage of emergent possibilities (rather than necessarily falling into the same patterns of the past). Eventually, reason becomes the key in human success and in the domination over other humans and the rest of the natural world. The repetition of such narratives of dominations has led to the “isms” of our species rather than any sort of inherent capacities or tendencies, and it is this type of narrative that has led to the refusal of our mimetic embeddedness and to the type of human exceptionalism that we are so familiar with and critical of. This desire for control makes sense in an evolutionary context in which hominids and Homo sapiens have largely been at the whim of a nature “red in tooth and claw.” At a time before modern technologies, mastery of nature would be an essential component of survival. Humans would be the victims of a nature that was uncaring and unkind. Nature then becomes the ultimate victim and scapegoat that the logic of mastery then sacrifices. As Girard notes: The accusation makes the victim responsible for the disorder and catastrophe, in other words for the crisis, that afflicts the community. … [The mistreatment of the victim] is an aggressive reaction against a victim that would not be killed if it were not held responsible for the mimetic crisis. (1987: 38) One important point that helps to argue for something like nature as victim in the ways in which I am arguing here is the writings of Francis Bacon and other authors of the early scientific method and scientific revolution. There is no clear reason as to why natural science had to understand nature as dead matter, religion as somehow subjective opinion, and science as an objective adventure. Philosophical and other literary works such as Bacon's New Atlantis had to teach people that science would replace the church, that it was okay to experiment on other animals, and that this would lead to human progress (Merchant 1980). What some have termed “literary lynchings” and “literary sacrifices” had to prepare the euro-western imagination for treating nature as if it were merely standing reserve and for creating the human logic of domination.7 Though the contemporary logic of domination has long forgotten its founding myth, the religious, philosophical, and scientific attempts to make humans exceptional all participate in this story. This recognition can help us to argue for and re-inscribe our continuity with the rest of the natural world in ways that might open our meaning-making practices up toward planetary concerns. If we understand our whole thought process as dependent upon mimetic structures and processes found in the rest of the natural world, then we can begin to see even our meaning-making practices as emerging out of and addressing these types of structures. As Girard notes, “Order in human culture certainly does arise from an extreme of disorder, for such disorder is the disappearance of any and all contested objects in the midst of conflict, and it is at such a point that acquisitive mimesis is transformed into conflictual mimesis and tends toward the unification of conflict against an adversary” (1987: 28–29). Just as order seems to emerge out of chaos in other biological systems, so too in our cultural and religious systems; and, Girard argues, these moments of mimetic frenzy require some type of scapegoat, ritual, or expulsion of adversary if order is to be restored (1987: 30). However, there is in much of Girardian thought too much fear of chaos, hybridity, and disorder. Such a fear, or at least a desire to project order onto disorder where no real order exists, is actually part of the problem of a projective form of mimesis that leads to more and more disorder (or so I am arguing). In other words, perhaps mimetic identification with the rest of the natural world could provide an alternative way in which we can appreciate our difference and recognize our continuity without the need for continuing mass ecological destruction in the name of the enforced (dis)order of human exceptionalism. From this understanding, religions and philosophies have captured within their meaning-making structures certain truths expressed in the form of human thinking that can be found in other systems of the rest of the natural world: the balance between chaos and order, the sacrifice necessary for life to continue, and the inherent impossibility of any ultimate order or peace in the worlds that we currently inhabit. As Eric Schneider, Dorion Sagan, and other scientists that discuss non-equilibrium thermodynamics argue, equilibrium—or in this case ultimate order and peace—means death (Schneider and Sagan 2006). Perhaps this last insight is the reason that humans strive for some sort of transcendent resolution: every part of our being cries out against the seeming injustice of predator–prey, creative–destructive cycles, so our reason forces us to produce some sort of order that we just have not arrived at yet, in the case of religions, or imposes a logic of order on the entire planet, in the case of sciences. In any event, this type of understanding could help us understand our current planetary crises in a way that is in continuity with the ongoing creative–destructive processes of the planet. \*\*\*\*\*\*The Earth as Sacrificial Standing Reserve: The Logic of Domination One thing I find promising about the mechanism of mimesis as Girard understands it is that it has the potential to help re-write human thinking, including religious imaginings and scientific logic and reasoning, into the rest of the evolving planetary community, even if Girard himself did not imagine such a re-writing. If our human thinking operates according to mimetic structures, then they are in continuity with other repetitive cycles and systems in the cosmos and planet—as I argued above. In particular, I think that Girard's discussion of mimetic crisis has something to offer in terms of thinking about our current, global ecological problems. Girard argues that paroxysm is the result of certain points of conflictual mimesis within communities (1987: 26). At some points in human histories, the energy of mimetic excess must be released in moments of violence or breakdown. The repetitions of roles—defined in terms of gender, sex, sexuality, race, nationality, and even humanity—are always imperfect and lead to some type of remainder that is other from the repetitive role performances. This mimetic excess must be dealt with or the loss of all order and fall into chaos is risked (Girard 1987: 7). Religions, and I would argue the logic of domination found in reductive materialism, positivism, and scientism, all have ways of dealing with mimetic excess and releasing the violence that builds up. As Girard notes, “All modern ideologies are immense machines that justify and legitimate conflicts that in our time could put an end to humanity” (1987: 31). In other words, these systems must deal with mimetic excess, but they always risk violence. This is where the concept of the scapegoat comes in: as mimetic release. If, as I have argued, one of the dominant ideologies through which humans create meaning-making practices in the contemporary process of globalization relies on the logic of domination via science and technology, then perhaps the mimetic excess, the moment of paroxysm, can be understood as climate change and all the other environmental disasters we are faced with at this planetary moment. In the case of the effects of climate change especially, the human “community thinks of itself as entirely passive vis-à-vis its own victim, whereas” the rest of the natural world “appears by contrast, to be the only active and responsible agent in the matter” (Girard 1987: 27). We have now become victims of the excess of our own desire to impose order on the world. The logic of domination that imposes human desires and values upon the rest of the natural world and sets it up as standing reserve for humans returns in the form of climate change, huge storms, cancers, droughts, heat waves, and other acts of “nature” or “God” over which we poor humans have no control. In this case, the evolutionary fear of nature, leading to the imposition of order through repetition of the place of humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world, is creating terror, disorder, and chaos that are rising to a planetary frenzy.8 This mimetic excess, this abject remainder is the space of chaos and complexity, of creativity and destruction; but this excess demands some sort of recognition at threat of even greater destruction and chaos. Current rituals of scapegoating and release of this mimetic excess, in my opinion, only lead to projections of repressed mimesis. That is, “where the self as subject is projected onto the external world. The result is often fear of the other and subsequent attempts to master or dominate it” (Martin 2011: 120). In this case, “reversal of domination requires ‘mimetic identification’—that is internalization of the external that honors the particularity or individuality of the other” (Martin 2011: 120). We need new rituals and ways of thinking that help us to leave open spaces for mimetic excess, for the abject, and for creative emergence of possibilities toward planetary alternatives. I end this article with some ideas of what that might look like. Previous Section Next Section PART III: TRANSHUMANITY AND THE PLANETARY FUTURE: MIMETIC EXCESS, ABJECTION, AND SITES OF TRANSFORMATION Only the damming of mimetic forces by means of the prohibition and the diversion of these forces in the direction of ritual are capable of spreading and perpetuating the reconciliatory effect of the surrogate victim. … The Sacred is Violence. (Girard 1987: 32) The seemingly simple insight that Girard articulates here, that the sacred is violence, is a hard pill to swallow for many contemporary minds. The idea that the ground of being, that god or ultimate reality is somehow supposed to be peace, harmony, or some type of wholeness, may be the very idea that leads to much ecological and human violence today. We seek in our repetitions of actions and roles to enforce some type of order and balance upon the world that just does not exist. This desire to enforce equilibrium on the planet is actually wreaking havoc on humans and the rest of the planetary community. What if we begin our meaning-making practices from a space that suggests we are always already mixed up in a creative–destructive process of planetary becoming and that there is no ultimate explanation, end, or goal toward which all life can be conformed. This is what I have articulated elsewhere as a viable agnostic, planetary theology (Bauman 2009, 2014). Here I articulate three components of our meaning-making practices that might help us create points of mimetic identification with the abject: human thinking as “lines of flight,” thinking toward the trans-human, and planetary ethics of the “not yet.”

### Multilateralism

#### 10. Don't let them fool you with the second-advantage - the internal link is still the same space debris which I already did all of the work to disprove above - it's inevitable, the aff can't solve it, and they don't have a coherent internal link story to explain how they get there

#### 11. Make them explain how a US satteleite getting hit by space debris makes nuclear terrorism more likely - it just makes it more possible which are two entirely distinct scenarios - one is an actualy increase in the percent chance of it happening, the other is it is easier for it to happen, which means they don't have an impact scenario

#### 12. Your ideas are terrifying and your hearts are faint, condemning the world to the simulacral existence of peace and security, your acts of piety and pity are absurd, committed as if they were irresistible. Your promises are a life spent wandering the surface of the world with minimal intensity—life spent playing penny slots and drinking bud light instead of ever risking anything or buying the good shit. Finally, you fear blood more and more. Blood and time.

Bishop ‘9 /Ryan, teaches at the National University of Singapore and has published on critical theory, military technology, avantgarde aesthetics, urbanism, architecture, literature, and international sex tourism. He edits or serves on the editorial boards of several journals “Baudrillard, Death, and Cold War Theory” in Baudrillard Now: Current Perspectives in Baudrillard Studies, polity, ed. R. Bishop pg. 60-70/

Extending a conceit borrowed from Francois de Bernard, itself a continuation of his own conceit, Baudrillard writes that the Iraq War is a film: not like a film – not a simile – but film itself (rather like the Gulf War is TV). The Iraq War has a “screenplay” which “has to be fulfilled unerringly” (Intelligence of Evil, 124). Everything from technical to financial materiel, including control of distribution (similar to Charlie Chaplin, Mary Pickford, and Douglas Fairbanks with their United Artists studio), has been mobilized for “The Iraq War: The film.” “In the end,” Baudrillard argues, “operational war becomes an enormous special effect; cinema becomes the paradigm of warfare, and we can imagine it as ‘real,’ whereas it is merely the mirror of its cinematic being” (ibid.). The audience of the Iraq War, in all of its modes of delivery and distribution, then replicate the audience of The Island. The implications of this replication at the level of the political become rather obvious, but not necessarily so at first glance. If the audience of The Island witnesses a self on screen no longer accessible to them other than on screen, then the audience of the Iraq War witnesses political action (technological, military, and economic) no longer accessible to constituents of representational government other than onscreen. As noted earlier, even those arenas usually allotted to the general populace in representational governments have been subsumed by the drive to Integral Reality as exemplified by the global demonstrations against the invasion of Iraq that did nothing to slow the attack and only filled up TV news shows with the performance of dissent. The result is, according to Baudrillard, that “we are henceforth dealing with the exercise of power in the pure state with no concern for sovereignty or representation; with the Integral Reality of negative power” (Intelligence of Evil, 120). More worrying, however, might be the relationship between the simulation of cinematic experience of the Iraq War and its relationship to the drive toward Integral Reality, as delineated in The Intelligence of Evil, but foreshadowed briefly in the Gulf War essays. The key connections here are those that link simulation (or modeling) to pre-empting any phenomena, set of values, or actions that might lead to an event, a disruption of the drive to completion of the Real: here understood as the platitudes operating under terms such as universal values, democracy, neoliberal economic markets, etc. The entire apparatus of globalization processes intends to perfect and complete the Real and the Good on its own terms and with Universal Values as its justification. The relationship between the global and the universal replicates that between technics and truth. The Gulf War essays show how the fully mediated simulacral conflict of the early 1990s fit the larger pattern of Cold War deterrence as another means of waging conflict and thus realizing as completely as possible the control of images and information (disinformation). On the geopolitical scale, then, the purpose of wars is to rein in recalcitrant regimes while sending messages to other potential foes about the technological, military, and simulational power of the US: “the large footprint” in the sand that the Pentagon invoked during the early period of the Iraq War. Sending a message, of course, has long been a strategy for exercising sovereignty. About the Gulf War, Baudrillard writes, “Our wars have less to do with the confrontation of warriors than with the domestication of the refractory forces on the planet, those uncontrollable elements as the police would say, to which belong not only Islam in its entirety but wild ethnic groups, minority languages, etc. All that is singular and irreducible must be reduced and absorbed. This is the law of democracy and the New World Order” (Gulf War, 86). This is, of course, the project of simulation, the wresting of the event in potentia from its potential and potential realization. The model and the object merge to create one whole entity, as in the third order of simulacra. Containment leads not just to control but also to osmosis, to preventive measures rendering any further or similar outbreaks possible. And all of it scripted ahead of time. The script demands that nothing deviate from the script, a screenplay writer with some real clout at last. The raw power of the integral drive is based, in Baudrillard’s argument, entirely on “the prevention and policing of events” (Intelligence of Evil, 121), to fulfill the script’s demands. This, after all, was the justification for the pre-emptive nature of the Iraq War, whose aim was nominally the prevention in advance of Saddam’s use of weapons of mass destruction. The models provided by intelligence and tele-technological surveillance indicated variance from the global order of Integral Reality and thus necessitated, in simplistic cause-effect rationalization, the preventive measure known as war – but only war that is cinema: scripted, special effects, everything all in place and safe when the lights go up. But the prevention now is universal, absolute, no longer contained to war or security. “Anything that could happen,” Baudrillard argues, “anything that might take place is regarded as terrorism. The rule, or the order, is that nothing can take place, nothing is to occur any more. So anything that can occur must be predicted in advance, exterminated in advance” (Hegarty, 2004: 147). And this is what war has become: pre-emption, carrying Cold War logic to its complete and completely (il)logical ends of absolute completion. Everything is a threat that does not emerge from the order that controls the spread of Integral Reality. Terrorism is “no longer at all religious or ideological . . . it’s all forms. So, in practice, it’s total war, maybe the fourth world war, or like Virilio said, a sort of planetary civil war, as it’s a coalition of all powers on the side of order against all those who are potential terrorists. All populations are virtually terrorist insofar as they have not been exterminated” (ibid.). Baudrillard’s analyses, rather like the Cold War doctrine that maintained an enforced state of terror called mutually assured destruction (MAD), might seem to leave us no room for maneuvering or action of any kind. Yet, Death lurks in the systems he discusses, the ones driving incessantly to completion and perfection, and Death provides us hope, though, admittedly, a slim one. The systems generate their own modes of destruction, an auto-destructivity that emerges from the very processes that wish to exclude any resistance to them. In an exceptionally prescient passage that can be linked directly to the Iraq War, Baudrillard asserts: But this Integral Reality of power is also its end. A power that is no longer based on anything other than the prevention and policing of events, which no longer has political will but the will to dispel ghosts, itself becomes ghostly and vulnerable. Its virtual power – its programming power in terms of software and the like – is total, but as a result it can no longer bring itself into play, except against itself, by all kinds of internal failures. At the height of its mastery, it can only lose face. (Intelligence of Evil, 121) The loss of face Baudrillard evokes here is not the result of hubris, per se, but rather the effect of realizing exactly what one has set out to achieve. The hermitic world of complete containment, surveillance, and control, no matter how illusory, if successful, can only ever result in yielding for itself no outside. Anything that impedes the spread of this Integral Reality is co-opted or obliterated, which is the position of “Islam” for the West. In its abstracted, political sense, “Islam,” which must be put in qualifying quotation marks, materializes that which would and does oppose Integral Reality. But this materialization will not be the force that undoes the drive to completion; rather the seeds of its own demise are sown from within. A drive for utter completion – logically and redundantly – can only end when it is complete: a kind of systematized selfdestruction through realization. The conditions that make Integral Reality possible, as well as the goals it desires, therefore render it impossible to achieve and undesirable to do so. Yet it persists, and more perniciously than ever, despite the humiliating, bloody and intractable conflict in Iraq. The salvation of theory in death, or the salvation that is death Although death is pivotal to many whose work falls within the domain of critical theory, Baudrillard’s work, perhaps more so than others’, articulates, embodies, and enacts the role of Death within theoretical writing and its relation to the political. Death, and especially the death drive in Freud according to Baudrillard, does not provide any space for the operation of dialectical co-option or reclamation. And it is this trait, Death’s absolute imperviousness to the dialectic, that makes it radical, intractable, usable (Symbolic Exchange and Death, 151). Such is the position that Baudrillard himself assumes within analyses of media, simulation, the subject, the object, politics, war, economics, culture, the event, theory itself, and thought. In relation to systems, the Death that Baudrillard wishes to address functions in a two-fold manner: it is what waits at “the term of the system” – at its end – and it is “the symbolic extermination that stalks the system itself” (Symbolic Exchange of Death, 5). Therefore Death is both internal to the system and its “operational logic” and “a radical-finality” outside it. Only Death operates both within and without the system (5). As such it carries the mark of perfection (completion of the system’s operation and project) and the defectiveness inherently lurking within it. Death is ambiguity and paradox made manifest, and is both the system’s realization and its impediment. Death resists modeling, the simulation. Its lack of predictability and the difficulty in controlling it, in fact, resides at the center of the various systems, policies, and logics that drive the Cold War. Death is the event without compare and which must be elided at all costs. Under the patriotic yet threatening rubrics of security, safety, “our way of life,” etc., the entire elaborate apparatus of the Cold War was erected and launched, while also continuing with intensified reverberations into the present – all to ward off Death on a scale hitherto the domain of Nature or the gods. Following a lead from the poet Octavio Paz and sounding like an interlocutor of Paul Virilio’s, Baudrillard discusses Death, therefore, in terms of the accident (Symbolic Exchange and Death, 160–6). For as Paz contends, modern science and technology, including medicine, have converted epidemics and natural catastrophes into explainable and controllable phenomena. The rational order can explain and contain anything that threatens it, as can Integral Reality (for which the rational order is another metonym, as is the global). As such, Death becomes an accident to be contained and controlled, explained and predicted. If Death equals an accident, and accidents threaten the rational order, Baudrillard argues, then Death-as accident also threatens political sovereignty and power, “hence the police presence at the scenes of catastrophe” (161). Death is the disruption that destabilizes all that has been ordered and made stable. At the height of the Cold War as an historical phenomenon, the major powers relied heavily on a rational order that both players acknowledged (at least between themselves) to be operational. This led to the enforced and heavily armed stalemate of MAD, and with it arrived the horrific spectacle of the nuclear accident, or the computer accident. The accidental launch of the impossible exchange of missiles would be, in rote pronouncements of certitude, “the only way” these rational and sane nations would fire nuclear weapons: hence the many examples of cultural representations of accidental nuclear war that filled popular media (invoking worlds synonymous to the one portrayed as the simulated wasteland in The Island). The import of simulation in containing Death on a global scale can be seen in the supposed rational containment of both the opposition and oneself. The simulated scenarios of both war games and accidental launches, the modeling of events, become a kind of necromantic or occult means of controlling unleashed forces and foretelling possible futures in order to prevent the accident (or the event) – to prevent Death itself. The thought processes, or mental make-up, required to plan and design large-scale modeling meant to pre-empt accidents are themselves a kind of technology of thinking, and this mental technicity comprises an important element in the construction of Integral Reality. Simulation requires faith not in its own verisimilitude but in its capacity to change events, even Death. The US embodies this kind of faith and has from the Cold War to the present, which, as such, becomes a target for many satiric novelists. One particularly influenced by Baudrillard’s ideas about simulation is Don DeLillo, whose novel White Noise reads like a primer on the French theorist’s writings. One motif in the novel is a company called SIMUVAC, which stands for “simulated evacuation.” The company stages fake evacuations for a variety of emergencies, including nuclear events, complete with a theatrical or cinematic set of special effects: uniforms, sound effects, smells, and blood (if required). The firm turns up several times in the novel but makes its first, and most satirically poignant, appearance during an actual emergency. In perfect Baudrillardian fashion, the company, which operates solely with and for simulation, uses a live emergency to practice (or simulate) its own simulated emergencies, which is the commodity it packages and sells to various government agencies. The protagonist of the novel asks a SIMUVAC employee, in the midst of the actual crisis, to evaluate their rehearsal. The SIMUVAC operative replies in darkly comedic fashion: The insertion curve isn’t as smooth as we would like. There’s a probability excess. Plus which we don’t have our victims laid out where we we’d want them if this was an actual simulation. In other words we’re forced to take our victims where we find them. We didn’t get a jump on computer traffic. Suddenly it just spilled out, three-dimensionally, all over the landscape. You have to make allowances for the fact that everything we see tonight is real. There’s a lot of polishing to do. But that’s what this exercise is all about. (DeLillo, 1985: 139) The passage contains beautiful parodic examples of the vagaries that language suffers at the hands of bureaucrats, with nonsense phrases passing as technical jargon, including “insertion curve” and “probability excess,” as well as the delightfully oxymoronic “actual simulation.” But beyond this parody, DeLillo evokes the technicity of thought deeply embedded in Cold War America, the same technicity that Baudrillard works through at multiple levels, to reveal the deep investment in the power and control afforded by simulation. The desirable element of simulation is, in fact, control, such as with body placement, which is something actual disasters arrange without care or consultation with the modelers. When the SIMUVAC employee claims that things are in need of “polishing” because “everything we see tonight is real,” we witness the retreat into the comfortable delusion afforded by simulation despite its no-nonsense claims to hard-nosed pragmatism – “that’s what this exercise is all about,” he asserts. SIMUVAC, as a company, markets readiness, the capacity to make a community alert and prepared, but can only deliver on this promise as long as everything remains contained in the model. (And if events do not remain neatly in the model, then the company can use the “accident” to better refine their simulation and techniques.) The same is true of governments, and this is the fear of the accident – and the fear the accident manifests – that Baudrillard (pace Paz) analyzes. Every sector of Integral Reality lives in fear of events because they can “spill out, three-dimensionally, all over the landscape,” no longer in control of the system. All that various institutions, systems, and technologies promise to contain refuses to be contained. Such is the revenge of the object, about which Baudrillard writes, and the intractability of that which lies outside the systems of transparency and integration. Death stalks the protective simulating enterprises from inside and out. Baudrillard as a stylist of considerable skill and a rhetorician well-steeped in the rhetorical tradition similarly mobilizes his writing itself as Death in relation to the systems operative within academic discourse. From the late 1960s on, his writings and books have deviated rather widely from the conventions of sociological or philosophical genres and academic writing by reaching into the humanistic essay tradition (long since abandoned) and combining it with the most current of pressing issues. What constitutes a standard argument within the humanities and qualitative social sciences, what passes for knowledge and knowledge formation and construction, depends heavily on the adherence of a given work to these conventions. Baudrillard’s textual Deaths provide “fatal strategies” intended to stave off the actual death of thought that can result from routinized, by-the-number, knowledge formation. The aphoristic style, borrowed most directly from Nietzsche, works in a nonlinear fashion that nonetheless makes consistent and sustained arguments across his books as well as within them. Baudrillard teases an idea, settles on a problematic, and pulls at its various permutations, checking how it might work from one context to another. As a result, his writing can be simultaneously readable and enjoyable while also being difficult and frustrating. Like his friend Virilio, he does not develop his argument in a full or linear fashion, instead allowing for fragments, tangents, and hyperbole to carry thought off course and place readers in a textual space that is comfortable (especially if they have read nineteenthcentury philosophers) and discomfiting at the same time. To this end, he resurrects outmoded philosophical discourse while at the same time adding to it a late modernist poetic sensibility. The latter quality emerges most obviously in his deployment of terms as talismans of the moment of writing as well as terrain themselves for inquiry: the strategic deployment of labels and phrases intended to make us pay attention to their elasticity and formidable ability to fascinate, illuminate, and instantiate a stability of unstable phenomena. Baudrillard is always contemporary, his thoughts being solidly grounded in the present, and his terminology is always embedded in the current moment. He relies on older essayistic forms to structure his thoughts and musings, which often appear as thoughts and musings, i.e. slightly inchoate and coming into focus through the act of writing. The processual quality of his style injects Death as that which cannot be represented adequately into the deathly regimes of academic language meted out by rote adherence to genre-driven formulae within academic discursive practices. In an important sense, Baudrillard posits that Death is the salvation of theory while also arguing for the salvation that is Death. With the nuclear sword of Damocles dangling over our heads ever since the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have slipped into a constant state of imminent global death that no longer seems like death, so swift and horrible will it be that it outstrips our imagination. “If the bomb drops,” he writes in America, “we shall neither have the time to die nor any awareness of dying” (42). Echoing the neo-Freudian psychoanalyst Ernst Becker, Baudrillard argues that Death ostensibly has been removed from our horizon in the American Era, and we, those who follow in America’s global footsteps, have moved easily and subtly into a state of daily ease and material comfort, buffeted and protected by a staggering array of tele-technologies, opto-electronics, and international ballistic missiles all meant to keep Death at bay and survival at the forefront. Lost in this heady combination of technological, intellectual, and economic materiel mounted for sheer survival, of course, is life (43). Only that which is alive can die, and our cocooned embrace of globalization, which in turn cocoons and embraces us, leaves us with an existence that recalls the prescient horror films of George Romero begun early in the Cold War: an existence like that of zombies, neither alive nor dead, but frantically and brainlessly consuming all in sight. Baudrillard rescues Death from its purgatorial condition of “the not alive” or mere survival. And in order to do so, he takes his cue from the masses who are the targets of this weaponry and way of life, the enactors of this ethos of bland avoidance and unthinking consumption. Their wholesale passivity to the apparatus of survival – from nuclear bunkers to Star Wars – emerges from a weariness of having been ceaselessly confronted with apocalyptic visions since the first nuclear explosions in New Mexico and Japan, and they “defend themselves with a lack of imagination” (America, 44). “The masses’ silent indifference to nuclear pathos (whether it comes from the nuclear powers or from antinuclear campaigners) is therefore a great sign of hope,” he asserts, “and a political fact of great import” (44). To understand Death as immanent within the system and without it, as immanent within bios and zoe and without it, is to resist the simulation of Death that hovers over our heads in the Cold War and the War on Terror. The salvation of Death, which is also the salvation of Baudrillard’s writing, thought, and analyses, provides us with the means of getting this specific brutal excess back into our collective frame of reference, not for the sake of nihilism, but to resist the nihilism built into all the projects of utter completion and realization that have rendered politics, the subject, the object, thought, and theory as simulation.

#### 13. There are multiple logical barriers that preclude any state from ever supplying terrorists with WMDs

Walt, 7/25/13

(Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, where he served as academic dean from 2002-2006, 7/25/13, “Why We Don't Need to Worry About a 'Nuclear Handoff'”, Foreign Policy, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/25/why\_we\_dont\_need\_to\_worry\_about\_a\_nuclear\_handoff, Accessed 9/3/13, NC)

After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. national security establishment started focusing on the various ways that "international terrorism" might pose a threat to U.S. interests or the United States itself. Unsurprisingly, experts began to dream up all sorts of frightening scenarios and worry about all sorts of far-fetched scenarios. I remember this period well, and I recall sitting through seminars and workshops at which lots of very smart and creative people were imagining various nasty things that groups like al Qaeda might try to do. Hijack gas trucks and blow up the Lincoln Tunnel? Take over the Mall of America and create carnage on a big shopping day? Commandeer a supertanker and smash it into the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge? Wait until summer and then set forest fires all over the American West? The list of conceivable dangers was infinitely long, but if you sat in enough of those seminars, you could easily become convinced that it was only a matter of time before somebody did something really nasty to you or your loved ones. Imagination is one thing, but disciplined risk assessment is another. It's easy to dream up bad things that could conceivably happen, but intelligent public policy should rest on a more careful and sustained appraisal of how likely those various scary things are. And that's why I suggest you read Keir Lieber and Daryl Press's recent article in the journal International Security on "Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists." The fear that nuclear-armed states would hand weapons to terrorists has been a staple of U.S. threat-mongering ever since 9/11. It was a key part of the justification for invading Iraq in 2003, and it forms part of the constant drumbeat for military action against Iran. But it never made much sense for two reasons. First, a nuclear-armed state has little incentive to give up control over weapons it has labored long and hard to acquire, for what could the state possibly gain from doing so? Second, a state giving nuclear weapons to terrorists could never be sure that those weapons would not be traced back to it and thereby invite devastating retaliation. Lieber and Press examine the historical record and show that it is almost impossible to conduct a major terrorist operation and not be blamed for it. Here's the abstract for their article: “Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran's nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely is it that the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism could remain anonymous? Data culled from a decade of terrorist incidents reveal that attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror attacks. Attribution rates are even higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally -- 97 percent for incidents in which ten or more people were killed. Moreover, tracing a terrorist group that used a nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be difficult, because few countries sponsor terror; few terror groups have multiple sponsors; and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough material to manufacture them. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both actions would invite devastating retaliation.” I might add that this is the kind of important, nonpartisan, policy-relevant work that more social scientists ought to be doing. It is also important to disseminate these findings widely, so that 1) U.S. policymakers won't keep chasing phantom dangers, 2) the leaders of nuclear-armed states understand that their arsenals are good for deterrence and not much else, and 3) said leaders also understand the need to keep whatever weapons they might have under very reliable control.

#### 14. Multilateralism can’t stop conflict

Bordachev 13 (Timofei, Doctor of Political Science, is the Director of the Center for Comprehensive International and European Studies at the Higher School of Economics, “Political Tsunami Hits Hard,” 6/30, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Political-Tsunami-Hits-Hard-16054)

The financial crisis in the United States, which in 2008 went global, and the continuing efforts by countries around the world to fight its effects have highlighted four most important tendencies in international affairs. First, pretty obvious is the conflict between the growing economic unity of the world and its worsening political fragmentation. The rise of sovereign ambitions and attempts to address all problems at the national level has come into conflict with financial and economic globalization and exacerbates crisis trends. Second, democratization in international politics and greater independence of individual states play an ever greater role. This “in-depth unfreezing” for the first time manifested itself in China’s soaring global ambitions and in the national interests and requests of other Asian countries. Turkey, a stable ally of the West in NATO and a EU aspirant waiting patiently in the antechamber, is trying on the guise of a regional power ever more often. In the meantime, the need for taking into account the ever larger range of opinions quickly erodes the international institutions that emerged in the Cold War era. This is seen not just in the sphere of security: the United Nations efficiency has largely fallen victim to the first phase of the global geopolitical catastrophe of the 1990s. Third, the growing international weight of the new countries and attempts by the old-timers, who won the Cold War, to preserve the hard-won status quo bring back the conservative interpretations of such terms as “sovereignty” and “sovereign rights.” Not only the leaders of new-comers to world politics, or the United States, traditionally concerned about its sovereignty, but quite respectable heads of European states, too, start talking about the protection of national interests. Finally, military power is ever more frequently employed by major powers as a tool to address foreign policy issues. EU countries and the United States used force and threats to use force back at the time when they were getting their hands on the assets of the former USSR. However, they were faced with a very limited set of tasks then. It never occurred to anyone in the West to say in 1999 that the purpose of NATO’s operation against Yugoslavia was to force Slobodan Milosevic to resign or, still worse, to put him to death by some untraditional way of hanging. The need for using military force with or without reason merely confirms that the international community has no other means to prevent the emergence or escalation of conflicts.

**15. Space cooperation doesn’t lead to broader relations.**

**Sterner 15** (Eric Sterner is a fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute. He held senior staff positions for the U.S. House Science and Armed Services committees and served in DoD and as NASA’s associate deputy administrator for policy and planning, “Talk and Cooperation in Space” 8/6/2015 <https://spacenews.com/op-ed-china-talk-and-cooperation-in-space/>)

How might cooperation with China benefit the United States? Some hold that cooperation in space helps promote cooperation on Earth. Writing in SpaceNews in 2013, Michael Krepon argued “The more they cooperate in space, the less likely it is that their competition on Earth will result in military confrontation. The reverse is also true.” That sentiment is widespread and flows from the nobility of exploration. **If only it were so.** Unfortunately, a country’s space behavior appears to have little affect on its terrestrial actions. Russia’s multidecadal human spaceflight partnership with the United States did not prevent it from invading and destabilizing Ukraine when it moved toward a closer relationship with the European Union, many of whose members are Russian partners in the International Space Station. Space cooperation **has not, and will not**, prevent the continued worsening of the security environment in Europe, which flows from Russian behavior on Earth, not in space. **Space cooperation with China is similarly unlikely to moderate its behavior**. Tensions in Asia derive from China’s insistence on pressing unlawful territorial claims in the Pacific, most recently by transforming disputed coral reefs into would-be military bases. Ironically, civilian space technology has proved critical in documenting these aggressive moves. To further demonstrate the civil space cooperation does not promote cooperation on Earth, we need look no further than recent history. The NASA administrator’s visit to China in the fall of 2014 nearly coincided with China’s hacking of NOAA, with whom Beijing has a “partnership” in studying climate change. Military confrontation flows from the interaction of hard power in pursuit of competing national interests. Space cooperation falls into the realm of soft power. It has value in strengthening relationships among like-minded states with similar interests. China’s aggressiveness toward its neighbors, its human rights record and its cyberattacks on the United States strongly demonstrate that it and the United States are **not of like minds**. This is not the result of insufficient space cooperation, but of divergent national interests. The United States is a status quo power; China is not.

### Solvency

#### 16. China says no they will exploit the resources – official Chinese declaration

Xinhua News 19 (Chinese government controlled media, 5-17,  Chinese deep space research leads to deeper international cooperation, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/07/c_138040362.htm>, accessed 8/13/19, jmg)

Chinese space experts have strengthened international exchanges in the latest achievements in exploring the moon, Mars, Jupiter, asteroids and the deeper cosmos. While developing the Chang'e-5 and Chang'e-6 lunar probes and China's first Mars probe, China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) is also pushing forward space programs such as the planned unmanned lunar research station, and probing asteroids, Mars, the Jovian system and the edge of the solar system, as well as interplanetary exploration, said experts from CAST. They were speaking to more than 370 experts from both at home and abroad in Beijing at a recent international symposium on lunar and deep space exploration. Deng Zongquan, an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering and a professor with the Harbin Institute of Technology, introduced many creative ideas at the symposium on designing future probes and rovers for exploring the moon and Mars. The design of the future lunar and Mars rovers could be different from the six-wheeled lunar rovers, Yutu and Yutu-2, already sent onto the moon, Deng said. Four-wheeled and eight-wheeled rovers also have advantages. For instance, the eight-wheeled rover could have a better carrying capacity and be used in building lunar scientific research station, Deng said. Chinese experts are also developing drilling technology and research on ice detection methods on the moon, he said. China recently unveiled its plan to explore an asteroid and a comet, inviting scientists around the world to participate. The mission will involve exploring a near-Earth asteroid, named 2016HO3, and a main-belt comet, named 133P, according to the China National Space Administration. Huang Jiangchuan, a researcher from CAST and chief designer of China's Chang'e-2 probe, said China's first asteroid probe is expected to be launched before 2025. He said the scientific objective of the exploration includes studying the formulation and evolution of the solar system, the role of near-Earth asteroid and main-belt comet impacts on the origin of life, and the solar system small bodies dynamics formation. The target 2016HO3 has a very close relationship with Earth and is called as a "mini moon" or a quasi satellite of the earth, said Huang. "Where is it from? What's its relationship with the earth and moon? Those are questions we want to know," he said. The second detection target of the mission, the comet 133P, probably contains water based on observation on Earth, and the exploration will help study its volatilization mechanism. "We are facing great technological challenges in exploring asteroids and comets due to the little understanding about their detailed features and high uncertainty," he added. "Compared with Japan, Europe and the United States, China is a latecomer in the exploration of asteroids and comets. We need to go faster, and we hope the mission will have multiple goals and can satisfy scientists' curiosity," said Huang. Over the past few years, CAST has been working on the mission design, and key technologies of asteroid exploration through self-funded projects, Huang said. "Due to the technology complexity, vast investment and high risks, CAST is willing to cooperate with other institutes in various ways and jointly conduct international deep space exploration for the benefit of humanity," said Huang. "There are so many small bodies like asteroids and comets in space, but only a few have been detected. The exploration could help us prevent threat from them to the earth, as well as exploit their resources," Huang said. Athena Coustenis, an astrophysicist from the Paris Observatory, said at the symposium that European scientists have a strong interest in collaborating with China on the asteroid exploration mission.

### Framing

#### 17. The role of the ballot is to determine whether the 1AC was productive in the debate space - material violence does not go away after the ballot and there's no intrinsic connection between their scholarship and a W - any defense against their method means we win.